Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Pull EFI updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main changes in this cycle were:
- Transparently fall back to other poweroff method(s) if EFI poweroff
fails (and returns)
- Use separate PE/COFF section headers for the RX and RW parts of the
ARM stub loader so that the firmware can use strict mapping
permissions
- Add support for requesting the firmware to wipe RAM at warm reboot
- Increase the size of the random seed obtained from UEFI so CRNG
fast init can complete earlier
- Update the EFI framebuffer address if it points to a BAR that gets
moved by the PCI resource allocation code
- Enable "reset attack mitigation" of TPM environments: this is
enabled if the kernel is configured with
CONFIG_RESET_ATTACK_MITIGATION=y.
- Clang related fixes
- Misc cleanups, constification, refactoring, etc"
* 'efi-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
efi/bgrt: Use efi_mem_type()
efi: Move efi_mem_type() to common code
efi/reboot: Make function pointer orig_pm_power_off static
efi/random: Increase size of firmware supplied randomness
efi/libstub: Enable reset attack mitigation
firmware/efi/esrt: Constify attribute_group structures
firmware/efi: Constify attribute_group structures
firmware/dcdbas: Constify attribute_group structures
arm/efi: Split zImage code and data into separate PE/COFF sections
arm/efi: Replace open coded constants with symbolic ones
arm/efi: Remove pointless dummy .reloc section
arm/efi: Remove forbidden values from the PE/COFF header
drivers/fbdev/efifb: Allow BAR to be moved instead of claiming it
efi/reboot: Fall back to original power-off method if EFI_RESET_SHUTDOWN returns
efi/arm/arm64: Add missing assignment of efi.config_table
efi/libstub/arm64: Set -fpie when building the EFI stub
efi/libstub/arm64: Force 'hidden' visibility for section markers
efi/libstub/arm64: Use hidden attribute for struct screen_info reference
efi/arm: Don't mark ACPI reclaim memory as MEMBLOCK_NOMAP
Pull x86 apic updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"This update provides:
- Cleanup of the IDT management including the removal of the extra
tracing IDT. A first step to cleanup the vector management code.
- The removal of the paravirt op adjust_exception_frame. This is a
XEN specific issue, but merged through this branch to avoid nasty
merge collisions
- Prevent dmesg spam about the TSC DEADLINE bug, when the CPU has
disabled the TSC DEADLINE timer in CPUID.
- Adjust a debug message in the ioapic code to print out the
information correctly"
* 'x86-apic-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (51 commits)
x86/idt: Fix the X86_TRAP_BP gate
x86/xen: Get rid of paravirt op adjust_exception_frame
x86/eisa: Add missing include
x86/idt: Remove superfluous ALIGNment
x86/apic: Silence "FW_BUG TSC_DEADLINE disabled due to Errata" on CPUs without the feature
x86/idt: Remove the tracing IDT leftovers
x86/idt: Hide set_intr_gate()
x86/idt: Simplify alloc_intr_gate()
x86/idt: Deinline setup functions
x86/idt: Remove unused functions/inlines
x86/idt: Move interrupt gate initialization to IDT code
x86/idt: Move APIC gate initialization to tables
x86/idt: Move regular trap init to tables
x86/idt: Move IST stack based traps to table init
x86/idt: Move debug stack init to table based
x86/idt: Switch early trap init to IDT tables
x86/idt: Prepare for table based init
x86/idt: Move early IDT setup out of 32-bit asm
x86/idt: Move early IDT handler setup to IDT code
x86/idt: Consolidate IDT invalidation
...
Pull x86 mm changes from Ingo Molnar:
"PCID support, 5-level paging support, Secure Memory Encryption support
The main changes in this cycle are support for three new, complex
hardware features of x86 CPUs:
- Add 5-level paging support, which is a new hardware feature on
upcoming Intel CPUs allowing up to 128 PB of virtual address space
and 4 PB of physical RAM space - a 512-fold increase over the old
limits. (Supercomputers of the future forecasting hurricanes on an
ever warming planet can certainly make good use of more RAM.)
Many of the necessary changes went upstream in previous cycles,
v4.14 is the first kernel that can enable 5-level paging.
This feature is activated via CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL=y - disabled by
default.
(By Kirill A. Shutemov)
- Add 'encrypted memory' support, which is a new hardware feature on
upcoming AMD CPUs ('Secure Memory Encryption', SME) allowing system
RAM to be encrypted and decrypted (mostly) transparently by the
CPU, with a little help from the kernel to transition to/from
encrypted RAM. Such RAM should be more secure against various
attacks like RAM access via the memory bus and should make the
radio signature of memory bus traffic harder to intercept (and
decrypt) as well.
This feature is activated via CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y - disabled
by default.
(By Tom Lendacky)
- Enable PCID optimized TLB flushing on newer Intel CPUs: PCID is a
hardware feature that attaches an address space tag to TLB entries
and thus allows to skip TLB flushing in many cases, even if we
switch mm's.
(By Andy Lutomirski)
All three of these features were in the works for a long time, and
it's coincidence of the three independent development paths that they
are all enabled in v4.14 at once"
* 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (65 commits)
x86/mm: Enable RCU based page table freeing (CONFIG_HAVE_RCU_TABLE_FREE=y)
x86/mm: Use pr_cont() in dump_pagetable()
x86/mm: Fix SME encryption stack ptr handling
kvm/x86: Avoid clearing the C-bit in rsvd_bits()
x86/CPU: Align CR3 defines
x86/mm, mm/hwpoison: Clear PRESENT bit for kernel 1:1 mappings of poison pages
acpi, x86/mm: Remove encryption mask from ACPI page protection type
x86/mm, kexec: Fix memory corruption with SME on successive kexecs
x86/mm/pkeys: Fix typo in Documentation/x86/protection-keys.txt
x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Speed up page tables dump for CONFIG_KASAN=y
x86/mm: Implement PCID based optimization: try to preserve old TLB entries using PCID
x86: Enable 5-level paging support via CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL=y
x86/mm: Allow userspace have mappings above 47-bit
x86/mm: Prepare to expose larger address space to userspace
x86/mpx: Do not allow MPX if we have mappings above 47-bit
x86/mm: Rename tasksize_32bit/64bit to task_size_32bit/64bit()
x86/xen: Redefine XEN_ELFNOTE_INIT_P2M using PUD_SIZE * PTRS_PER_PUD
x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Fix printout of p4d level
x86/mm/dump_pagetables: Generalize address normalization
x86/boot: Fix memremap() related build failure
...
Pull x86 boot updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main changes are KASL related fixes and cleanups: in particular we
now exclude certain physical memory ranges as KASLR randomization
targets that have proven to be unreliable (early-)RAM on some firmware
versions"
* 'x86-boot-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/boot/KASLR: Work around firmware bugs by excluding EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_* and EFI_LOADER_* from KASLR's choice
x86/boot/KASLR: Prefer mirrored memory regions for the kernel physical address
efi: Introduce efi_early_memdesc_ptr to get pointer to memmap descriptor
x86/boot/KASLR: Rename process_e820_entry() into process_mem_region()
x86/boot/KASLR: Switch to pass struct mem_vector to process_e820_entry()
x86/boot/KASLR: Wrap e820 entries walking code into new function process_e820_entries()
Pull x86 asm updates from Ingo Molnar:
- Introduce the ORC unwinder, which can be enabled via
CONFIG_ORC_UNWINDER=y.
The ORC unwinder is a lightweight, Linux kernel specific debuginfo
implementation, which aims to be DWARF done right for unwinding.
Objtool is used to generate the ORC unwinder tables during build, so
the data format is flexible and kernel internal: there's no
dependency on debuginfo created by an external toolchain.
The ORC unwinder is almost two orders of magnitude faster than the
(out of tree) DWARF unwinder - which is important for perf call graph
profiling. It is also significantly simpler and is coded defensively:
there has not been a single ORC related kernel crash so far, even
with early versions. (knock on wood!)
But the main advantage is that enabling the ORC unwinder allows
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTERS to be turned off - which speeds up the kernel
measurably:
With frame pointers disabled, GCC does not have to add frame pointer
instrumentation code to every function in the kernel. The kernel's
.text size decreases by about 3.2%, resulting in better cache
utilization and fewer instructions executed, resulting in a broad
kernel-wide speedup. Average speedup of system calls should be
roughly in the 1-3% range - measurements by Mel Gorman [1] have shown
a speedup of 5-10% for some function execution intense workloads.
The main cost of the unwinder is that the unwinder data has to be
stored in RAM: the memory cost is 2-4MB of RAM, depending on kernel
config - which is a modest cost on modern x86 systems.
Given how young the ORC unwinder code is it's not enabled by default
- but given the performance advantages the plan is to eventually make
it the default unwinder on x86.
See Documentation/x86/orc-unwinder.txt for more details.
- Remove lguest support: its intended role was that of a temporary
proof of concept for virtualization, plus its removal will enable the
reduction (removal) of the paravirt API as well, so Rusty agreed to
its removal. (Juergen Gross)
- Clean up and fix FSGS related functionality (Andy Lutomirski)
- Clean up IO access APIs (Andy Shevchenko)
- Enhance the symbol namespace (Jiri Slaby)
* 'x86-asm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (47 commits)
objtool: Handle GCC stack pointer adjustment bug
x86/entry/64: Use ENTRY() instead of ALIGN+GLOBAL for stub32_clone()
x86/fpu/math-emu: Add ENDPROC to functions
x86/boot/64: Extract efi_pe_entry() from startup_64()
x86/boot/32: Extract efi_pe_entry() from startup_32()
x86/lguest: Remove lguest support
x86/paravirt/xen: Remove xen_patch()
objtool: Fix objtool fallthrough detection with function padding
x86/xen/64: Fix the reported SS and CS in SYSCALL
objtool: Track DRAP separately from callee-saved registers
objtool: Fix validate_branch() return codes
x86: Clarify/fix no-op barriers for text_poke_bp()
x86/switch_to/64: Rewrite FS/GS switching yet again to fix AMD CPUs
selftests/x86/fsgsbase: Test selectors 1, 2, and 3
x86/fsgsbase/64: Report FSBASE and GSBASE correctly in core dumps
x86/fsgsbase/64: Fully initialize FS and GS state in start_thread_common
x86/asm: Fix UNWIND_HINT_REGS macro for older binutils
x86/asm/32: Fix regs_get_register() on segment registers
x86/xen/64: Rearrange the SYSCALL entries
x86/asm/32: Remove a bunch of '& 0xffff' from pt_regs segment reads
...
There's a potential bug in how we select the KASLR kernel address n
the early boot code.
The KASLR boot code currently chooses the kernel image's physical memory
location from E820_TYPE_RAM regions by walking over all e820 entries.
E820_TYPE_RAM includes EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE and EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA
as well, so those regions can end up hosting the kernel image. According to
the UEFI spec, all memory regions marked as EfiBootServicesCode and
EfiBootServicesData are available as free memory after the first call
to ExitBootServices(). I.e. so such regions should be usable for the
kernel, per spec.
In real life however, we have workarounds for broken x86 firmware,
where we keep such regions reserved until SetVirtualAddressMap() is done.
See the following code in should_map_region():
static bool should_map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md)
{
...
/*
* Map boot services regions as a workaround for buggy
* firmware that accesses them even when they shouldn't.
*
* See efi_{reserve,free}_boot_services().
*/
if (md->type =3D=3D EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE ||
md->type =3D=3D EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA)
return false;
This workaround suppressed a boot crash, but potential issues still
remain because no one prevents the regions from overlapping with kernel
image by KASLR.
So let's make sure that EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_{CODE|DATA} regions are never
chosen as kernel memory for the workaround to work fine.
Furthermore, EFI_LOADER_{CODE|DATA} regions are also excluded because
they can be used after ExitBootServices() as defined in EFI spec.
As a result, we choose kernel address only from EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY
which is the only memory type we know to be safely free.
Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Junichi Nomura <j-nomura@ce.jp.nec.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com
Cc: izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170828074444.GC23181@hori1.linux.bs1.fc.nec.co.jp
[ Rewrote/fixed/clarified the changelog and the in code comments. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
If a zero for the number of lines manages to slip through, scroll()
may underflow some offset calculations, causing accesses outside the
video memory.
Make the check in __putstr() more pessimistic to prevent that.
Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1503858223-14983-1-git-send-email-jschoenh@amazon.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The current slack space is not enough for LZ4, which has a worst case
overhead of 0.4% for data that cannot be further compressed. With
an LZ4 compressed kernel with an embedded initrd, the output is likely
to overwrite the input.
Increase the slack space to avoid that.
Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1503842124-29718-1-git-send-email-jschoenh@amazon.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Similarly to the 32-bit code, efi_pe_entry body() is somehow squashed into
startup_64().
In the old days, we forced startup_64() to start at offset 0x200 and efi_pe_entry()
to start at 0x210. But this requirement was removed long time ago, in:
99f857db88 ("x86, build: Dynamically find entry points in compressed startup code")
The way it is now makes the code less readable and illogical. Given
we can now safely extract the inlined efi_pe_entry() body from
startup_64() into a separate function, we do so.
We also annotate the function appropriatelly by ENTRY+ENDPROC.
ABI offsets are preserved:
0000000000000000 T startup_32
0000000000000200 T startup_64
0000000000000390 T efi64_stub_entry
On the top-level, it looked like:
.org 0x200
ENTRY(startup_64)
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB ; start of inlined
jmp preferred_addr
GLOBAL(efi_pe_entry)
... ; a lot of assembly (efi_pe_entry)
leaq preferred_addr(%rax), %rax
jmp *%rax
preferred_addr:
#endif ; end of inlined
... ; a lot of assembly (startup_64)
ENDPROC(startup_64)
And it is now converted into:
.org 0x200
ENTRY(startup_64)
... ; a lot of assembly (startup_64)
ENDPROC(startup_64)
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB
ENTRY(efi_pe_entry)
... ; a lot of assembly (efi_pe_entry)
leaq startup_64(%rax), %rax
jmp *%rax
ENDPROC(efi_pe_entry)
#endif
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170824073327.4129-2-jslaby@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The efi_pe_entry() body is somehow squashed into startup_32(). In the old days,
we forced startup_32() to start at offset 0x00 and efi_pe_entry() to start
at 0x10.
But this requirement was removed long time ago, in:
99f857db88 ("x86, build: Dynamically find entry points in compressed startup code")
The way it is now makes the code less readable and illogical. Given
we can now safely extract the inlined efi_pe_entry() body from
startup_32() into a separate function, we do so and we separate it to two
functions as they are marked already: efi_pe_entry() + efi32_stub_entry().
We also annotate the functions appropriatelly by ENTRY+ENDPROC.
ABI offset is preserved:
0000 128 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 6 startup_32
0080 60 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 6 efi_pe_entry
00bc 68 FUNC GLOBAL DEFAULT 6 efi32_stub_entry
On the top-level, it looked like this:
ENTRY(startup_32)
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB ; start of inlined
jmp preferred_addr
ENTRY(efi_pe_entry)
... ; a lot of assembly (efi_pe_entry)
ENTRY(efi32_stub_entry)
... ; a lot of assembly (efi32_stub_entry)
leal preferred_addr(%eax), %eax
jmp *%eax
preferred_addr:
#endif ; end of inlined
... ; a lot of assembly (startup_32)
ENDPROC(startup_32)
And it is now converted into:
ENTRY(startup_32)
... ; a lot of assembly (startup_32)
ENDPROC(startup_32)
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB
ENTRY(efi_pe_entry)
... ; a lot of assembly (efi_pe_entry)
ENDPROC(efi_pe_entry)
ENTRY(efi32_stub_entry)
... ; a lot of assembly (efi32_stub_entry)
leal startup_32(%eax), %eax
jmp *%eax
ENDPROC(efi32_stub_entry)
#endif
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170824073327.4129-1-jslaby@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The first 32 bits of gate struct are the same for 32 and 64 bit kernels.
The 32-bit version uses desc_struct and no designated data structure,
so we need different accessors for 32 and 64 bit kernels.
Aside of that the macros which are necessary to build the 32-bit
gate descriptor are horrible to read.
Unify the gate structs and switch all code fiddling with it over.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170828064957.861974317@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
If a machine is reset while secrets are present in RAM, it may be
possible for code executed after the reboot to extract those secrets
from untouched memory. The Trusted Computing Group specified a mechanism
for requesting that the firmware clear all RAM on reset before booting
another OS. This is done by setting the MemoryOverwriteRequestControl
variable at startup. If userspace can ensure that all secrets are
removed as part of a controlled shutdown, it can reset this variable to
0 before triggering a hardware reboot.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170825155019.6740-2-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Currently KASLR will parse all e820 entries of RAM type and add all
candidate positions into the slots array. After that we choose one slot
randomly as the new position which the kernel will be decompressed into
and run at.
On systems with EFI enabled, e820 memory regions are coming from EFI
memory regions by combining adjacent regions.
These EFI memory regions have various attributes, and the "mirrored"
attribute is one of them. The physical memory region whose descriptors
in EFI memory map has EFI_MEMORY_MORE_RELIABLE attribute (bit: 16) are
mirrored. The address range mirroring feature of the kernel arranges such
mirrored regions into normal zones and other regions into movable zones.
With the mirroring feature enabled, the code and data of the kernel can only
be located in the more reliable mirrored regions. However, the current KASLR
code doesn't check EFI memory entries, and could choose a new kernel position
in non-mirrored regions. This will break the intended functionality of the
address range mirroring feature.
To fix this, if EFI is detected, iterate EFI memory map and pick the mirrored
region to process for adding candidate of randomization slot. If EFI is disabled
or no mirrored region found, still process the e820 memory map.
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com
Cc: izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com
Cc: keescook@chromium.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk
Cc: n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com
Cc: thgarnie@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1502722464-20614-3-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.com
[ Rewrote most of the text. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The existing map iteration helper for_each_efi_memory_desc_in_map can
only be used after the kernel initializes the EFI subsystem to set up
struct efi_memory_map.
Before that we also need iterate map descriptors which are stored in several
intermediate structures, like struct efi_boot_memmap for arch independent
usage and struct efi_info for x86 arch only.
Introduce efi_early_memdesc_ptr() to get pointer to a map descriptor, and
replace several places where that primitive is open coded.
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
[ Various improvements to the text. ]
Acked-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com
Cc: izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com
Cc: keescook@chromium.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com
Cc: thgarnie@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170816134651.GF21273@x1
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The clang warning 'address-of-packed-member' is disabled for the general
kernel code, also disable it for the x86 boot code.
This suppresses a bunch of warnings like this when building with clang:
./arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h:535:30: warning: taking address of
packed member 'sp0' of class or structure 'x86_hw_tss' may result in an
unaligned pointer value [-Waddress-of-packed-member]
return this_cpu_read_stable(cpu_tss.x86_tss.sp0);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
./arch/x86/include/asm/percpu.h:391:59: note: expanded from macro
'this_cpu_read_stable'
#define this_cpu_read_stable(var) percpu_stable_op("mov", var)
^~~
./arch/x86/include/asm/percpu.h:228:16: note: expanded from macro
'percpu_stable_op'
: "p" (&(var)));
^~~
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Cc: Doug Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170725215053.135586-1-mka@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
undef memcpy() and friends in boot/string.c so that the functions
defined here will have the correct names, otherwise we end up
up trying to redefine __builtin_memcpy() etc.
Surprisingly, GCC allows this (and, helpfully, discards the
__builtin_ prefix from the function name when compiling it),
but clang does not.
Adding these #undef's appears to preserve what I assume was
the original intent of the code.
Signed-off-by: Michael Davidson <md@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Bernhard.Rosenkranzer@linaro.org
Cc: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170724235155.79255-1-mka@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Every kernel build on x86 will result in some output:
Setup is 13084 bytes (padded to 13312 bytes).
System is 4833 kB
CRC 6d35fa35
Kernel: arch/x86/boot/bzImage is ready (#2)
This shuts it up, so that 'make -s' is truely silent as long as
everything works. Building without '-s' should produce unchanged
output.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170719125310.2487451-6-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Changes to the existing page table macros will allow the SME support to
be enabled in a simple fashion with minimal changes to files that use these
macros. Since the memory encryption mask will now be part of the regular
pagetable macros, we introduce two new macros (_PAGE_TABLE_NOENC and
_KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC) to allow for early pagetable creation/initialization
without the encryption mask before SME becomes active. Two new pgprot()
macros are defined to allow setting or clearing the page encryption mask.
The FIXMAP_PAGE_NOCACHE define is introduced for use with MMIO. SME does
not support encryption for MMIO areas so this define removes the encryption
mask from the page attribute.
Two new macros are introduced (__sme_pa() / __sme_pa_nodebug()) to allow
creating a physical address with the encryption mask. These are used when
working with the cr3 register so that the PGD can be encrypted. The current
__va() macro is updated so that the virtual address is generated based off
of the physical address without the encryption mask thus allowing the same
virtual address to be generated regardless of whether encryption is enabled
for that physical location or not.
Also, an early initialization function is added for SME. If SME is active,
this function:
- Updates the early_pmd_flags so that early page faults create mappings
with the encryption mask.
- Updates the __supported_pte_mask to include the encryption mask.
- Updates the protection_map entries to include the encryption mask so
that user-space allocations will automatically have the encryption mask
applied.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com>
Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b36e952c4c39767ae7f0a41cf5345adf27438480.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The original function process_e820_entry() only takes care of each
e820 entry passed.
And move the E820_TYPE_RAM checking logic into process_e820_entries().
And remove the redundent local variable 'addr' definition in
find_random_phys_addr().
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com
Cc: izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com
Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk
Cc: thgarnie@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1499603862-11516-2-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This adds support for compiling with a rough equivalent to the glibc
_FORTIFY_SOURCE=1 feature, providing compile-time and runtime buffer
overflow checks for string.h functions when the compiler determines the
size of the source or destination buffer at compile-time. Unlike glibc,
it covers buffer reads in addition to writes.
GNU C __builtin_*_chk intrinsics are avoided because they would force a
much more complex implementation. They aren't designed to detect read
overflows and offer no real benefit when using an implementation based
on inline checks. Inline checks don't add up to much code size and
allow full use of the regular string intrinsics while avoiding the need
for a bunch of _chk functions and per-arch assembly to avoid wrapper
overhead.
This detects various overflows at compile-time in various drivers and
some non-x86 core kernel code. There will likely be issues caught in
regular use at runtime too.
Future improvements left out of initial implementation for simplicity,
as it's all quite optional and can be done incrementally:
* Some of the fortified string functions (strncpy, strcat), don't yet
place a limit on reads from the source based on __builtin_object_size of
the source buffer.
* Extending coverage to more string functions like strlcat.
* It should be possible to optionally use __builtin_object_size(x, 1) for
some functions (C strings) to detect intra-object overflows (like
glibc's _FORTIFY_SOURCE=2), but for now this takes the conservative
approach to avoid likely compatibility issues.
* The compile-time checks should be made available via a separate config
option which can be enabled by default (or always enabled) once enough
time has passed to get the issues it catches fixed.
Kees said:
"This is great to have. While it was out-of-tree code, it would have
blocked at least CVE-2016-3858 from being exploitable (improper size
argument to strlcpy()). I've sent a number of fixes for
out-of-bounds-reads that this detected upstream already"
[arnd@arndb.de: x86: fix fortified memcpy]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170627150047.660360-1-arnd@arndb.de
[keescook@chromium.org: avoid panic() in favor of BUG()]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170626235122.GA25261@beast
[keescook@chromium.org: move from -mm, add ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE, tweak Kconfig help]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170526095404.20439-1-danielmicay@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-8-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull x86 mm updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main changes in this cycle were:
- Continued work to add support for 5-level paging provided by future
Intel CPUs. In particular we switch the x86 GUP code to the generic
implementation. (Kirill A. Shutemov)
- Continued work to add PCID CPU support to native kernels as well.
In this round most of the focus is on reworking/refreshing the TLB
flush infrastructure for the upcoming PCID changes. (Andy
Lutomirski)"
* 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (34 commits)
x86/mm: Delete a big outdated comment about TLB flushing
x86/mm: Don't reenter flush_tlb_func_common()
x86/KASLR: Fix detection 32/64 bit bootloaders for 5-level paging
x86/ftrace: Exclude functions in head64.c from function-tracing
x86/mmap, ASLR: Do not treat unlimited-stack tasks as legacy mmap
x86/mm: Remove reset_lazy_tlbstate()
x86/ldt: Simplify the LDT switching logic
x86/boot/64: Put __startup_64() into .head.text
x86/mm: Add support for 5-level paging for KASLR
x86/mm: Make kernel_physical_mapping_init() support 5-level paging
x86/mm: Add sync_global_pgds() for configuration with 5-level paging
x86/boot/64: Add support of additional page table level during early boot
x86/boot/64: Rename init_level4_pgt and early_level4_pgt
x86/boot/64: Rewrite startup_64() in C
x86/boot/compressed: Enable 5-level paging during decompression stage
x86/boot/efi: Define __KERNEL32_CS GDT on 64-bit configurations
x86/boot/efi: Fix __KERNEL_CS definition of GDT entry on 64-bit configurations
x86/boot/efi: Cleanup initialization of GDT entries
x86/asm: Fix comment in return_from_SYSCALL_64()
x86/mm/gup: Switch GUP to the generic get_user_page_fast() implementation
...
Pull x86 cleanups from Ingo Molnar:
"Two small cleanups"
* 'x86-cleanups-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/paravirt: Remove unnecessary return from void function
x86/boot: Add missing strchr() declaration
Pull x86 boot updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main changes in this cycle were KASLR improvements for rare
environments with special boot options, by Baoquan He. Also misc
smaller changes/cleanups"
* 'x86-boot-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/debug: Extend the lower bound of crash kernel low reservations
x86/boot: Remove unused copy_*_gs() functions
x86/KASLR: Use the right memcpy() implementation
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt: Update 'memmap=' boot option description
x86/KASLR: Handle the memory limit specified by the 'memmap=' and 'mem=' boot options
x86/KASLR: Parse all 'memmap=' boot option entries
KASLR uses hack to detect whether we booted via startup_32() or
startup_64(): it checks what is loaded into cr3 and compares it to
_pgtables. _pgtables is the array of page tables where early code
allocates page table from.
KASLR expects cr3 to point to _pgtables if we booted via startup_32(), but
that's not true if we booted with 5-level paging enabled. In this case top
level page table is allocated separately and only the first p4d page table
is allocated from the array.
Let's modify the check to cover both 4- and 5-level paging cases.
The patch also renames 'level4p' to 'top_level_pgt' as it now can hold
page table for 4th or 5th level, depending on configuration.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170628121730.43079-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Kernel text KASLR is separated into physical address and virtual
address randomization. And for virtual address randomization, we
only randomiza to get an offset between 16M and KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE.
So the initial value of 'virt_addr' should be LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR,
but not the original kernel loading address 'output'.
The bug will cause kernel boot failure if kernel is loaded at a different
position than the address, 16M, which is decided at compiled time.
Kexec/kdump is such practical case.
To fix it, just assign LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR to virt_addr as initial
value.
Tested-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: 8391c73 ("x86/KASLR: Randomize virtual address separately")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1498567146-11990-3-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
For kernel text KASLR, the virtual address is confined to area of 1G,
[0xffffffff80000000, 0xffffffffc0000000). For the implemenataion of
virtual address randomization, we only randomize to get an offset
between 16M and 1G, then add this offset to the starting address,
0xffffffff80000000. Here 16M is the offset which is decided at linking
stage. So the amount of the local variable 'virt_addr' which respresents
the offset plus the kernel output size can not exceed KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE.
Add a debug check for the offset. If out of bounds, print error
message and hang there.
Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1498567146-11990-2-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The Sparse static analyzer emits this warning:
symbol 'strchr' was not declared. Should it be static?
This patch adds the appropriate extern declaration to string.h
to fix the warning.
Signed-off-by: Tommy Nguyen <remyabel@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170623143601.GA20743@NoChina
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
We need to cover two basic cases: when bootloader left us in 32-bit mode
and when bootloader enabled long mode.
The patch implements unified codepath to enabled 5-level paging for both
cases. It means case when we start in 32-bit mode, we first enable long
mode with 4-level and then switch over to 5-level paging.
Switching from 4-level to 5-level paging is not trivial. We cannot do it
directly. Setting LA57 in long mode would trigger #GP. So we need to
switch off long mode first and the then re-enable with 5-level paging.
NOTE: The need of switching off long mode means we are in trouble if
bootloader put us above 4G boundary. If bootloader wants to boot 5-level
paging kernel, it has to put kernel below 4G or enable 5-level paging on
it's own, so we could avoid the step.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170606113133.22974-7-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
We would need to switch temporarily to compatibility mode during booting
with 5-level paging enabled. It would require 32-bit code segment
descriptor.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170606113133.22974-6-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This is preparation for following patches without changing semantics of the
code.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170606113133.22974-4-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The kernel has several code paths that read CR3. Most of them assume that
CR3 contains the PGD's physical address, whereas some of them awkwardly
use PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK to mask off low bits.
Add explicit mask macros for CR3 and convert all of the CR3 readers.
This will keep them from breaking when PCID is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/883f8fb121f4616c1c1427ad87350bb2f5ffeca1.1497288170.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
copy_from_gs() and copy_to_gs() are unused in the boot code. They have
actually never been used -- they were always commented out since their
addition in 2007:
5be8656615 ("String-handling functions for the new x86 setup code.")
So remove them -- they can be restored from history if needed.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170531081243.5709-1-jslaby@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The decompressor has its own implementation of the string functions,
but has to include the right header to get those, while implicitly
including linux/string.h may result in a link error:
arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.o: In function `choose_random_location':
kaslr.c:(.text+0xf51): undefined reference to `_mmx_memcpy'
This has appeared now as KASLR started using memcpy(), via:
d52e7d5a95 ("x86/KASLR: Parse all 'memmap=' boot option entries")
Other files in the decompressor already do the same thing.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170530091446.1000183-1-arnd@arndb.de
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The 'mem=' boot option limits the max address a system can use - any memory
region above the limit will be removed.
Furthermore, the 'memmap=nn[KMG]' variant (with no offset specified) has the same
behaviour as 'mem='.
KASLR needs to consider this when choosing the random position for
decompressing the kernel. Do it.
Tested-by: Masayoshi Mizuma <m.mizuma@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com
Cc: douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com
Cc: dyoung@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1494654390-23861-3-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
In commit:
f28442497b ("x86/boot: Fix KASLR and memmap= collision")
... the memmap= option is parsed so that KASLR can avoid those reserved
regions. It uses cmdline_find_option() to get the value if memmap=
is specified, however the problem is that cmdline_find_option() can only
find the last entry if multiple memmap entries are provided. This
is not correct.
Address this by checking each command line token for a "memmap=" match
and parse each instance instead of using cmdline_find_option().
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: dan.j.williams@intel.com
Cc: douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com
Cc: dyoung@redhat.com
Cc: m.mizuma@jp.fujitsu.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1494654390-23861-2-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The boot code Makefile contains a straight 'readelf' invocation. This
causes build warnings in cross compile environments, when there is no
unprefixed readelf accessible via $PATH.
Add the missing $(CROSS_COMPILE) prefix.
[ tglx: Rewrote changelog ]
Fixes: 98f7852537 ("x86/boot: Refuse to build with data relocations")
Signed-off-by: Rob Landley <rob@landley.net>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl>
Cc: "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/ced18878-693a-9576-a024-113ef39a22c0@landley.net
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Kernel identity mappings on x86-64 kernels are created in two
ways: by the early x86 boot code, or by kernel_ident_mapping_init().
Native kernels (which is the dominant usecase) use the former,
but the kexec and the hibernation code uses kernel_ident_mapping_init().
There's a subtle difference between these two ways of how identity
mappings are created, the current kernel_ident_mapping_init() code
creates identity mappings always using 2MB page(PMD level) - while
the native kernel boot path also utilizes gbpages where available.
This difference is suboptimal both for performance and for memory
usage: kernel_ident_mapping_init() needs to allocate pages for the
page tables when creating the new identity mappings.
This patch adds 1GB page(PUD level) support to kernel_ident_mapping_init()
to address these concerns.
The primary advantage would be better TLB coverage/performance,
because we'd utilize 1GB TLBs instead of 2MB ones.
It is also useful for machines with large number of memory to
save paging structure allocations(around 4MB/TB using 2MB page)
when setting identity mappings for all the memory, after using
1GB page it will consume only 8KB/TB.
( Note that this change alone does not activate gbpages in kexec,
we are doing that in a separate patch. )
Signed-off-by: Xunlei Pang <xlpang@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1493862171-8799-1-git-send-email-xlpang@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The compressed boot function error() is used to halt execution, but it
wasn't marked with "noreturn". This fixes that in preparation for
supporting kernel FORTIFY_SOURCE, which uses the noreturn annotation
on panic, and calls error(). GCC would warn about a noreturn function
calling a non-noreturn function:
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c: In function ‘fortify_panic’:
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c:416:1: warning: ‘noreturn’ function does return
}
^
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170506045116.GA2879@beast
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull x86 mm updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main x86 MM changes in this cycle were:
- continued native kernel PCID support preparation patches to the TLB
flushing code (Andy Lutomirski)
- various fixes related to 32-bit compat syscall returning address
over 4Gb in applications, launched from 64-bit binaries - motivated
by C/R frameworks such as Virtuozzo. (Dmitry Safonov)
- continued Intel 5-level paging enablement: in particular the
conversion of x86 GUP to the generic GUP code. (Kirill A. Shutemov)
- x86/mpx ABI corner case fixes/enhancements (Joerg Roedel)
- ... plus misc updates, fixes and cleanups"
* 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (62 commits)
mm, zone_device: Replace {get, put}_zone_device_page() with a single reference to fix pmem crash
x86/mm: Fix flush_tlb_page() on Xen
x86/mm: Make flush_tlb_mm_range() more predictable
x86/mm: Remove flush_tlb() and flush_tlb_current_task()
x86/vm86/32: Switch to flush_tlb_mm_range() in mark_screen_rdonly()
x86/mm/64: Fix crash in remove_pagetable()
Revert "x86/mm/gup: Switch GUP to the generic get_user_page_fast() implementation"
x86/boot/e820: Remove a redundant self assignment
x86/mm: Fix dump pagetables for 4 levels of page tables
x86/mpx, selftests: Only check bounds-vs-shadow when we keep shadow
x86/mpx: Correctly report do_mpx_bt_fault() failures to user-space
Revert "x86/mm/numa: Remove numa_nodemask_from_meminfo()"
x86/espfix: Add support for 5-level paging
x86/kasan: Extend KASAN to support 5-level paging
x86/mm: Add basic defines/helpers for CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL=y
x86/paravirt: Add 5-level support to the paravirt code
x86/mm: Define virtual memory map for 5-level paging
x86/asm: Remove __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT==47 assert
x86/boot: Detect 5-level paging support
x86/mm/numa: Remove numa_nodemask_from_meminfo()
...
Dave found that a kdump kernel with KASLR enabled will reset to the BIOS
immediately if physical randomization failed to find a new position for
the kernel. A kernel with the 'nokaslr' option works in this case.
The reason is that KASLR will install a new page table for the identity
mapping, while it missed building it for the original kernel location
if KASLR physical randomization fails.
This only happens in the kexec/kdump kernel, because the identity mapping
has been built for kexec/kdump in the 1st kernel for the whole memory by
calling init_pgtable(). Here if physical randomizaiton fails, it won't build
the identity mapping for the original area of the kernel but change to a
new page table '_pgtable'. Then the kernel will triple fault immediately
caused by no identity mappings.
The normal kernel won't see this bug, because it comes here via startup_32()
and CR3 will be set to _pgtable already. In startup_32() the identity
mapping is built for the 0~4G area. In KASLR we just append to the existing
area instead of entirely overwriting it for on-demand identity mapping
building. So the identity mapping for the original area of kernel is still
there.
To fix it we just switch to the new identity mapping page table when physical
KASLR succeeds. Otherwise we keep the old page table unchanged just like
"nokaslr" does.
Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1493278940-5885-1-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The minimum size for a new stack (512 bytes) setup for arch/x86/boot components
when the bootloader does not setup/provide a stack for the early boot components
is not "enough".
The setup code executing as part of early kernel startup code, uses the stack
beyond 512 bytes and accidentally overwrites and corrupts part of the BSS
section. This is exposed mostly in the early video setup code, where
it was corrupting BSS variables like force_x, force_y, which in-turn affected
kernel parameters such as screen_info (screen_info.orig_video_cols) and
later caused an exception/panic in console_init().
Most recent boot loaders setup the stack for early boot components, so this
stack overwriting into BSS section issue has not been exposed.
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish@bluestacks.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170419152015.10011-1-ashishkalra@Ashishs-MacBook-Pro.local
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
There's a conflict between ongoing level-5 paging support and
the E820 rewrite. Since the E820 rewrite is essentially ready,
merge it into x86/mm to reduce tree conflicts.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The E820 rework in WIP.x86/boot has gone through a couple of weeks
of exposure in -tip, merge it in a wider fashion.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
