Commit Graph

11 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
David Howells
d7d775b1ff rxrpc: Ask the security class how much space to allow in a packet
Ask the security class how much header and trailer space to allow for when
allocating a packet, given how much data is remaining.

This will allow the rxgk security class to stick both a trailer in as well
as a header as appropriate in the future.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2020-11-23 19:53:11 +00:00
David Howells
f4bdf3d683 rxrpc: Don't reserve security header in Tx DATA skbuff
Insert the security header into the skbuff representing a DATA packet to be
transmitted rather than using skb_reserve() when the packet is allocated.
This makes it easier to apply crypto that spans the security header and the
data, particularly in the upcoming RxGK class where we have a common
encrypt-and-checksum function that is used in a number of circumstances.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2020-11-23 18:09:30 +00:00
David Howells
8d47a43c48 rxrpc: Merge prime_packet_security into init_connection_security
Merge the ->prime_packet_security() into the ->init_connection_security()
hook as they're always called together.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2020-11-23 18:09:30 +00:00
David Howells
41057ebde0 rxrpc: Support keys with multiple authentication tokens
rxrpc-type keys can have multiple tokens attached for different security
classes.  Currently, rxrpc always picks the first one, whether or not the
security class it indicates is supported.

Add preliminary support for choosing which security class will be used
(this will need to be directed from a higher layer) and go through the
tokens to find one that's supported.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2020-11-23 18:09:29 +00:00
David Howells
1db88c5343 rxrpc: Fix -Wframe-larger-than= warnings from on-stack crypto
rxkad sometimes triggers a warning about oversized stack frames when
building with clang for a 32-bit architecture:

net/rxrpc/rxkad.c:243:12: error: stack frame size of 1088 bytes in function 'rxkad_secure_packet' [-Werror,-Wframe-larger-than=]
net/rxrpc/rxkad.c:501:12: error: stack frame size of 1088 bytes in function 'rxkad_verify_packet' [-Werror,-Wframe-larger-than=]

The problem is the combination of SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK() in
rxkad_verify_packet()/rxkad_secure_packet() with the relatively large
scatterlist in rxkad_verify_packet_1()/rxkad_secure_packet_encrypt().

The warning does not show up when using gcc, which does not inline the
functions as aggressively, but the problem is still the same.

Allocate the cipher buffers from the slab instead, caching the allocated
packet crypto request memory used for DATA packet crypto in the rxrpc_call
struct.

Fixes: 17926a7932 ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-07-30 10:32:35 -07:00
Thomas Gleixner
b4d0d230cc treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 36
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public licence as published by
  the free software foundation either version 2 of the licence or at
  your option any later version

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-or-later

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 114 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190520170857.552531963@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-05-24 17:27:11 +02:00
David Howells
fb46f6ee10 rxrpc: Trace protocol errors in received packets
Add a tracepoint (rxrpc_rx_proto) to record protocol errors in received
packets.  The following changes are made:

 (1) Add a function, __rxrpc_abort_eproto(), to note a protocol error on a
     call and mark the call aborted.  This is wrapped by
     rxrpc_abort_eproto() that makes the why string usable in trace.

 (2) Add trace_rxrpc_rx_proto() or rxrpc_abort_eproto() to protocol error
     generation points, replacing rxrpc_abort_call() with the latter.

 (3) Only send an abort packet in rxkad_verify_packet*() if we actually
     managed to abort the call.

Note that a trace event is also emitted if a kernel user (e.g. afs) tries
to send data through a call when it's not in the transmission phase, though
it's not technically a receive event.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2017-04-06 11:09:39 +01:00
David Howells
248f219cb8 rxrpc: Rewrite the data and ack handling code
Rewrite the data and ack handling code such that:

 (1) Parsing of received ACK and ABORT packets and the distribution and the
     filing of DATA packets happens entirely within the data_ready context
     called from the UDP socket.  This allows us to process and discard ACK
     and ABORT packets much more quickly (they're no longer stashed on a
     queue for a background thread to process).

 (2) We avoid calling skb_clone(), pskb_pull() and pskb_trim().  We instead
     keep track of the offset and length of the content of each packet in
     the sk_buff metadata.  This means we don't do any allocation in the
     receive path.

 (3) Jumbo DATA packet parsing is now done in data_ready context.  Rather
     than cloning the packet once for each subpacket and pulling/trimming
     it, we file the packet multiple times with an annotation for each
     indicating which subpacket is there.  From that we can directly
     calculate the offset and length.

 (4) A call's receive queue can be accessed without taking locks (memory
     barriers do have to be used, though).

 (5) Incoming calls are set up from preallocated resources and immediately
     made live.  They can than have packets queued upon them and ACKs
     generated.  If insufficient resources exist, DATA packet #1 is given a
     BUSY reply and other DATA packets are discarded).

 (6) sk_buffs no longer take a ref on their parent call.

To make this work, the following changes are made:

 (1) Each call's receive buffer is now a circular buffer of sk_buff
     pointers (rxtx_buffer) rather than a number of sk_buff_heads spread
     between the call and the socket.  This permits each sk_buff to be in
     the buffer multiple times.  The receive buffer is reused for the
     transmit buffer.

 (2) A circular buffer of annotations (rxtx_annotations) is kept parallel
     to the data buffer.  Transmission phase annotations indicate whether a
     buffered packet has been ACK'd or not and whether it needs
     retransmission.

     Receive phase annotations indicate whether a slot holds a whole packet
     or a jumbo subpacket and, if the latter, which subpacket.  They also
     note whether the packet has been decrypted in place.

 (3) DATA packet window tracking is much simplified.  Each phase has just
     two numbers representing the window (rx_hard_ack/rx_top and
     tx_hard_ack/tx_top).

     The hard_ack number is the sequence number before base of the window,
     representing the last packet the other side says it has consumed.
     hard_ack starts from 0 and the first packet is sequence number 1.

     The top number is the sequence number of the highest-numbered packet
     residing in the buffer.  Packets between hard_ack+1 and top are
     soft-ACK'd to indicate they've been received, but not yet consumed.

     Four macros, before(), before_eq(), after() and after_eq() are added
     to compare sequence numbers within the window.  This allows for the
     top of the window to wrap when the hard-ack sequence number gets close
     to the limit.

     Two flags, RXRPC_CALL_RX_LAST and RXRPC_CALL_TX_LAST, are added also
     to indicate when rx_top and tx_top point at the packets with the
     LAST_PACKET bit set, indicating the end of the phase.

 (4) Calls are queued on the socket 'receive queue' rather than packets.
     This means that we don't need have to invent dummy packets to queue to
     indicate abnormal/terminal states and we don't have to keep metadata
     packets (such as ABORTs) around

 (5) The offset and length of a (sub)packet's content are now passed to
     the verify_packet security op.  This is currently expected to decrypt
     the packet in place and validate it.

     However, there's now nowhere to store the revised offset and length of
     the actual data within the decrypted blob (there may be a header and
     padding to skip) because an sk_buff may represent multiple packets, so
     a locate_data security op is added to retrieve these details from the
     sk_buff content when needed.

 (6) recvmsg() now has to handle jumbo subpackets, where each subpacket is
     individually secured and needs to be individually decrypted.  The code
     to do this is broken out into rxrpc_recvmsg_data() and shared with the
     kernel API.  It now iterates over the call's receive buffer rather
     than walking the socket receive queue.

Additional changes:

 (1) The timers are condensed to a single timer that is set for the soonest
     of three timeouts (delayed ACK generation, DATA retransmission and
     call lifespan).

 (2) Transmission of ACK and ABORT packets is effected immediately from
     process-context socket ops/kernel API calls that cause them instead of
     them being punted off to a background work item.  The data_ready
     handler still has to defer to the background, though.

 (3) A shutdown op is added to the AF_RXRPC socket so that the AFS
     filesystem can shut down the socket and flush its own work items
     before closing the socket to deal with any in-progress service calls.

Future additional changes that will need to be considered:

 (1) Make sure that a call doesn't hog the front of the queue by receiving
     data from the network as fast as userspace is consuming it to the
     exclusion of other calls.

 (2) Transmit delayed ACKs from within recvmsg() when we've consumed
     sufficiently more packets to avoid the background work item needing to
     run.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-09-08 11:10:12 +01:00
David Howells
5a42976d4f rxrpc: Add tracepoint for working out where aborts happen
Add a tracepoint for working out where local aborts happen.  Each
tracepoint call is labelled with a 3-letter code so that they can be
distinguished - and the DATA sequence number is added too where available.

rxrpc_kernel_abort_call() also takes a 3-letter code so that AFS can
indicate the circumstances when it aborts a call.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-09-07 16:34:40 +01:00
Herbert Xu
a263629da5 rxrpc: Avoid using stack memory in SG lists in rxkad
rxkad uses stack memory in SG lists which would not work if stacks were
allocated from vmalloc memory.  In fact, in most cases this isn't even
necessary as the stack memory ends up getting copied over to kmalloc
memory.

This patch eliminates all the unnecessary stack memory uses by supplying
the final destination directly to the crypto API.  In two instances where a
temporary buffer is actually needed we also switch use a scratch area in
the rxrpc_call struct (only one DATA packet will be being secured or
verified at a time).

Finally there is no need to split a split-page buffer into two SG entries
so code dealing with that has been removed.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2016-07-06 10:43:05 +01:00
David Howells
e0e4d82f3b rxrpc: Create a null security type and get rid of conditional calls
Create a null security type for security index 0 and get rid of all
conditional calls to the security operations.  We expect normally to be
using security, so this should be of little negative impact.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-11 15:34:41 -04:00