Clearing the cpu in prev's mm_cpumask early will avoid the flush tlb
IPI's while the cr3 is still pointing to the prev mm. And this window
can lead to the possibility of bogus TLB fills resulting in strange
failures. One such problematic scenario is mentioned below.
T1. CPU-1 is context switching from mm1 to mm2 context and got a NMI
etc between the point of clearing the cpu from the mm_cpumask(mm1)
and before reloading the cr3 with the new mm2.
T2. CPU-2 is tearing down a specific vma for mm1 and will proceed with
flushing the TLB for mm1. It doesn't send the flush TLB to CPU-1
as it doesn't see that cpu listed in the mm_cpumask(mm1).
T3. After the TLB flush is complete, CPU-2 goes ahead and frees the
page-table pages associated with the removed vma mapping.
T4. CPU-2 now allocates those freed page-table pages for something
else.
T5. As the CR3 and TLB caches for mm1 is still active on CPU-1, CPU-1
can potentially speculate and walk through the page-table caches
and can insert new TLB entries. As the page-table pages are
already freed and being used on CPU-2, this page walk can
potentially insert a bogus global TLB entry depending on the
(random) contents of the page that is being used on CPU-2.
T6. This bogus TLB entry being global will be active across future CR3
changes and can result in weird memory corruption etc.
To avoid this issue, for the prev mm that is handing over the cpu to
another mm, clear the cpu from the mm_cpumask(prev) after the cr3 is
changed.
Marking it for -stable, though we haven't seen any reported failure that
can be attributed to this.
Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org [v2.6.32+]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Makes code futureproof against the impending change to mm->cpu_vm_mask (to be a pointer).
It's also a chance to use the new cpumask_ ops which take a pointer
(the older ones are deprecated, but there's no hurry for arch code).
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Impact: pt_regs changed, lazy gs handling made optional, add slight
overhead to SAVE_ALL, simplifies error_code path a bit
On x86_32, %gs hasn't been used by kernel and handled lazily. pt_regs
doesn't have place for it and gs is saved/loaded only when necessary.
In preparation for stack protector support, this patch makes lazy %gs
handling optional by doing the followings.
* Add CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS and place for gs in pt_regs.
* Save and restore %gs along with other registers in entry_32.S unless
LAZY_GS. Note that this unfortunately adds "pushl $0" on SAVE_ALL
even when LAZY_GS. However, it adds no overhead to common exit path
and simplifies entry path with error code.
* Define different user_gs accessors depending on LAZY_GS and add
lazy_save_gs() and lazy_load_gs() which are noop if !LAZY_GS. The
lazy_*_gs() ops are used to save, load and clear %gs lazily.
* Define ELF_CORE_COPY_KERNEL_REGS() which always read %gs directly.
xen and lguest changes need to be verified.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Impact: cleanup
On x86_32, %gs is handled lazily. It's not saved and restored on
kernel entry/exit but only when necessary which usually is during task
switch but there are few other places. Currently, it's done by
calling savesegment() and loadsegment() explicitly. Define
get_user_gs(), set_user_gs() and task_user_gs() and use them instead.
While at it, clean up register access macros in signal.c.
This cleans up code a bit and will help future changes.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Impact: cleanup
tj: * changed cpu to unsigned as was done on mmu_context_64.h as cpu
id is officially unsigned int
* added missing ';' to 32bit version of deactivate_mm()
Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Change header guards named "ASM_X86__*" to "_ASM_X86_*" since:
a. the double underscore is ugly and pointless.
b. no leading underscore violates namespace constraints.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
