Add safe methods for reading and writing Rust values to and from
userspace pointers.
The C methods for copying to/from userspace use a function called
`check_object_size` to verify that the kernel pointer is not dangling.
However, this check is skipped when the length is a compile-time
constant, with the assumption that such cases trivially have a correct
kernel pointer.
In this patch, we apply the same optimization to the typed accessors.
For both methods, the size of the operation is known at compile time to
be size_of of the type being read or written. Since the C side doesn't
provide a variant that skips only this check, we create custom helpers
for this purpose.
The majority of reads and writes to userspace pointers in the Rust
Binder driver uses these accessor methods. Benchmarking has found that
skipping the `check_object_size` check makes a big difference for the
cases being skipped here. (And that the check doesn't make a difference
for the cases that use the raw read/write methods.)
This code is based on something that was originally written by Wedson on
the old rust branch. It was modified by Alice to skip the
`check_object_size` check, and to update various comments, including the
notes about kernel pointers in `WritableToBytes`.
Co-developed-by: Wedson Almeida Filho <wedsonaf@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Wedson Almeida Filho <wedsonaf@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Benno Lossin <benno.lossin@proton.me>
Reviewed-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Trevor Gross <tmgross@umich.edu>
Reviewed-by: Gary Guo <gary@garyguo.net>
Signed-off-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240528-alice-mm-v7-3-78222c31b8f4@google.com
[ Wrapped docs to 100 and added a few intra-doc links. - Miguel ]
Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
A pointer to an area in userspace memory, which can be either read-only
or read-write.
All methods on this struct are safe: attempting to read or write on bad
addresses (either out of the bound of the slice or unmapped addresses)
will return `EFAULT`. Concurrent access, *including data races to/from
userspace memory*, is permitted, because fundamentally another userspace
thread/process could always be modifying memory at the same time (in the
same way that userspace Rust's `std::io` permits data races with the
contents of files on disk). In the presence of a race, the exact byte
values read/written are unspecified but the operation is well-defined.
Kernelspace code should validate its copy of data after completing a
read, and not expect that multiple reads of the same address will return
the same value.
These APIs are designed to make it difficult to accidentally write
TOCTOU bugs. Every time you read from a memory location, the pointer is
advanced by the length so that you cannot use that reader to read the
same memory location twice. Preventing double-fetches avoids TOCTOU
bugs. This is accomplished by taking `self` by value to prevent
obtaining multiple readers on a given `UserSlice`, and the readers only
permitting forward reads. If double-fetching a memory location is
necessary for some reason, then that is done by creating multiple
readers to the same memory location.
Constructing a `UserSlice` performs no checks on the provided address
and length, it can safely be constructed inside a kernel thread with no
current userspace process. Reads and writes wrap the kernel APIs
`copy_from_user` and `copy_to_user`, which check the memory map of the
current process and enforce that the address range is within the user
range (no additional calls to `access_ok` are needed).
This code is based on something that was originally written by Wedson on
the old rust branch. It was modified by Alice by removing the
`IoBufferReader` and `IoBufferWriter` traits, and various other changes.
Signed-off-by: Wedson Almeida Filho <wedsonaf@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Benno Lossin <benno.lossin@proton.me>
Reviewed-by: Trevor Gross <tmgross@umich.edu>
Reviewed-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240528-alice-mm-v7-1-78222c31b8f4@google.com
[ Wrapped docs to 100 and added a few intra-doc links. - Miguel ]
Signed-off-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
