btf_resolve_helper_id() caching logic is a bit racy, since under root the
verifier can verify several programs in parallel. Fix it with READ/WRITE_ONCE.
Fix the type as well, since error is also recorded.
Fixes: a7658e1a41 ("bpf: Check types of arguments passed into helpers")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191114185720.1641606-15-ast@kernel.org
Introduce BPF trampoline concept to allow kernel code to call into BPF programs
with practically zero overhead. The trampoline generation logic is
architecture dependent. It's converting native calling convention into BPF
calling convention. BPF ISA is 64-bit (even on 32-bit architectures). The
registers R1 to R5 are used to pass arguments into BPF functions. The main BPF
program accepts only single argument "ctx" in R1. Whereas CPU native calling
convention is different. x86-64 is passing first 6 arguments in registers
and the rest on the stack. x86-32 is passing first 3 arguments in registers.
sparc64 is passing first 6 in registers. And so on.
The trampolines between BPF and kernel already exist. BPF_CALL_x macros in
include/linux/filter.h statically compile trampolines from BPF into kernel
helpers. They convert up to five u64 arguments into kernel C pointers and
integers. On 64-bit architectures this BPF_to_kernel trampolines are nops. On
32-bit architecture they're meaningful.
The opposite job kernel_to_BPF trampolines is done by CAST_TO_U64 macros and
__bpf_trace_##call() shim functions in include/trace/bpf_probe.h. They convert
kernel function arguments into array of u64s that BPF program consumes via
R1=ctx pointer.
This patch set is doing the same job as __bpf_trace_##call() static
trampolines, but dynamically for any kernel function. There are ~22k global
kernel functions that are attachable via nop at function entry. The function
arguments and types are described in BTF. The job of btf_distill_func_proto()
function is to extract useful information from BTF into "function model" that
architecture dependent trampoline generators will use to generate assembly code
to cast kernel function arguments into array of u64s. For example the kernel
function eth_type_trans has two pointers. They will be casted to u64 and stored
into stack of generated trampoline. The pointer to that stack space will be
passed into BPF program in R1. On x86-64 such generated trampoline will consume
16 bytes of stack and two stores of %rdi and %rsi into stack. The verifier will
make sure that only two u64 are accessed read-only by BPF program. The verifier
will also recognize the precise type of the pointers being accessed and will
not allow typecasting of the pointer to a different type within BPF program.
The tracing use case in the datacenter demonstrated that certain key kernel
functions have (like tcp_retransmit_skb) have 2 or more kprobes that are always
active. Other functions have both kprobe and kretprobe. So it is essential to
keep both kernel code and BPF programs executing at maximum speed. Hence
generated BPF trampoline is re-generated every time new program is attached or
detached to maintain maximum performance.
To avoid the high cost of retpoline the attached BPF programs are called
directly. __bpf_prog_enter/exit() are used to support per-program execution
stats. In the future this logic will be optimized further by adding support
for bpf_stats_enabled_key inside generated assembly code. Introduction of
preemptible and sleepable BPF programs will completely remove the need to call
to __bpf_prog_enter/exit().
Detach of a BPF program from the trampoline should not fail. To avoid memory
allocation in detach path the half of the page is used as a reserve and flipped
after each attach/detach. 2k bytes is enough to call 40+ BPF programs directly
which is enough for BPF tracing use cases. This limit can be increased in the
future.
BPF_TRACE_FENTRY programs have access to raw kernel function arguments while
BPF_TRACE_FEXIT programs have access to kernel return value as well. Often
kprobe BPF program remembers function arguments in a map while kretprobe
fetches arguments from a map and analyzes them together with return value.
BPF_TRACE_FEXIT accelerates this typical use case.
Recursion prevention for kprobe BPF programs is done via per-cpu
bpf_prog_active counter. In practice that turned out to be a mistake. It
caused programs to randomly skip execution. The tracing tools missed results
they were looking for. Hence BPF trampoline doesn't provide builtin recursion
prevention. It's a job of BPF program itself and will be addressed in the
follow up patches.
BPF trampoline is intended to be used beyond tracing and fentry/fexit use cases
in the future. For example to remove retpoline cost from XDP programs.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191114185720.1641606-5-ast@kernel.org
The bpf program type raw_tp together with 'expected_attach_type'
was the most appropriate api to indicate BTF-enabled raw_tp programs.
But during development it became apparent that 'expected_attach_type'
cannot be used and new 'attach_btf_id' field had to be introduced.
Which means that the information is duplicated in two fields where
one of them is ignored.
Clean it up by introducing new program type where both
'expected_attach_type' and 'attach_btf_id' fields have
specific meaning.
In the future 'expected_attach_type' will be extended
with other attach points that have similar semantics to raw_tp.
This patch is replacing BTF-enabled BPF_PROG_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT with
prog_type = BPF_RPOG_TYPE_TRACING
expected_attach_type = BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP
attach_btf_id = btf_id of raw tracepoint inside the kernel
Future patches will add
expected_attach_type = BPF_TRACE_FENTRY or BPF_TRACE_FEXIT
where programs have the same input context and the same helpers,
but different attach points.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191030223212.953010-2-ast@kernel.org
The return value of raw_tp programs is ignored by __bpf_trace_run()
that calls them. The verifier also allows any value to be returned.
For BTF-enabled raw_tp lets enforce 'return 0', so that return value
can be used for something in the future.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191029032426.1206762-1-ast@kernel.org
This patch makes a few changes to btf_ctx_access() to prepare
it for non raw_tp use case where the attach_btf_id is not
necessary a BTF_KIND_TYPEDEF.
It moves the "btf_trace_" prefix check and typedef-follow logic to a new
function "check_attach_btf_id()" which is called only once during
bpf_check(). btf_ctx_access() only operates on a BTF_KIND_FUNC_PROTO
type now. That should also be more efficient since it is done only
one instead of every-time check_ctx_access() is called.
"check_attach_btf_id()" needs to find the func_proto type from
the attach_btf_id. It needs to store the result into the
newly added prog->aux->attach_func_proto. func_proto
btf type has no name, so a proper name should be stored into
"attach_func_name" also.
v2:
- Move the "btf_trace_" check to an earlier verifier phase (Alexei)
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191025001811.1718491-1-kafai@fb.com
Introduce new helper that reuses existing skb perf_event output
implementation, but can be called from raw_tracepoint programs
that receive 'struct sk_buff *' as tracepoint argument or
can walk other kernel data structures to skb pointer.
In order to do that teach verifier to resolve true C types
of bpf helpers into in-kernel BTF ids.
The type of kernel pointer passed by raw tracepoint into bpf
program will be tracked by the verifier all the way until
it's passed into helper function.
For example:
kfree_skb() kernel function calls trace_kfree_skb(skb, loc);
bpf programs receives that skb pointer and may eventually
pass it into bpf_skb_output() bpf helper which in-kernel is
implemented via bpf_skb_event_output() kernel function.
Its first argument in the kernel is 'struct sk_buff *'.
The verifier makes sure that types match all the way.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191016032505.2089704-11-ast@kernel.org
Pointer to BTF object is a pointer to kernel object or NULL.
Such pointers can only be used by BPF_LDX instructions.
The verifier changed their opcode from LDX|MEM|size
to LDX|PROBE_MEM|size to make JITing easier.
The number of entries in extable is the number of BPF_LDX insns
that access kernel memory via "pointer to BTF type".
Only these load instructions can fault.
Since x86 extable is relative it has to be allocated in the same
memory region as JITed code.
Allocate it prior to last pass of JITing and let the last pass populate it.
Pointer to extable in bpf_prog_aux is necessary to make page fault
handling fast.
Page fault handling is done in two steps:
1. bpf_prog_kallsyms_find() finds BPF program that page faulted.
It's done by walking rb tree.
2. then extable for given bpf program is binary searched.
This process is similar to how page faulting is done for kernel modules.
The exception handler skips over faulting x86 instruction and
initializes destination register with zero. This mimics exact
behavior of bpf_probe_read (when probe_kernel_read faults dest is zeroed).
JITs for other architectures can add support in similar way.
Until then they will reject unknown opcode and fallback to interpreter.
Since extable should be aligned and placed near JITed code
make bpf_jit_binary_alloc() return 4 byte aligned image offset,
so that extable aligning formula in bpf_int_jit_compile() doesn't need
to rely on internal implementation of bpf_jit_binary_alloc().
On x86 gcc defaults to 16-byte alignment for regular kernel functions
due to better performance. JITed code may be aligned to 16 in the future,
but it will use 4 in the meantime.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191016032505.2089704-10-ast@kernel.org
Pointer to BTF object is a pointer to kernel object or NULL.
The memory access in the interpreter has to be done via probe_kernel_read
to avoid page faults.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191016032505.2089704-9-ast@kernel.org
libbpf analyzes bpf C program, searches in-kernel BTF for given type name
and stores it into expected_attach_type.
The kernel verifier expects this btf_id to point to something like:
typedef void (*btf_trace_kfree_skb)(void *, struct sk_buff *skb, void *loc);
which represents signature of raw_tracepoint "kfree_skb".
Then btf_ctx_access() matches ctx+0 access in bpf program with 'skb'
and 'ctx+8' access with 'loc' arguments of "kfree_skb" tracepoint.
In first case it passes btf_id of 'struct sk_buff *' back to the verifier core
and 'void *' in second case.
Then the verifier tracks PTR_TO_BTF_ID as any other pointer type.
Like PTR_TO_SOCKET points to 'struct bpf_sock',
PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK points to 'struct bpf_tcp_sock', and so on.
PTR_TO_BTF_ID points to in-kernel structs.
If 1234 is btf_id of 'struct sk_buff' in vmlinux's BTF
then PTR_TO_BTF_ID#1234 points to one of in kernel skbs.
When PTR_TO_BTF_ID#1234 is dereferenced (like r2 = *(u64 *)r1 + 32)
the btf_struct_access() checks which field of 'struct sk_buff' is
at offset 32. Checks that size of access matches type definition
of the field and continues to track the dereferenced type.
If that field was a pointer to 'struct net_device' the r2's type
will be PTR_TO_BTF_ID#456. Where 456 is btf_id of 'struct net_device'
in vmlinux's BTF.
Such verifier analysis prevents "cheating" in BPF C program.
The program cannot cast arbitrary pointer to 'struct sk_buff *'
and access it. C compiler would allow type cast, of course,
but the verifier will notice type mismatch based on BPF assembly
and in-kernel BTF.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191016032505.2089704-7-ast@kernel.org
If in-kernel BTF exists parse it and prepare 'struct btf *btf_vmlinux'
for further use by the verifier.
In-kernel BTF is trusted just like kallsyms and other build artifacts
embedded into vmlinux.
Yet run this BTF image through BTF verifier to make sure
that it is valid and it wasn't mangled during the build.
If in-kernel BTF is incorrect it means either gcc or pahole or kernel
are buggy. In such case disallow loading BPF programs.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191016032505.2089704-4-ast@kernel.org
Fix "warning: cast to pointer from integer of different size" when
casting u64 addr to void *.
Fixes: a23740ec43 ("bpf: Track contents of read-only maps as scalars")
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191011172053.2980619-1-andriin@fb.com
Maps that are read-only both from BPF program side and user space side
have their contents constant, so verifier can track referenced values
precisely and use that knowledge for dead code elimination, branch
pruning, etc. This patch teaches BPF verifier how to do this.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20191009201458.2679171-2-andriin@fb.com
Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2019-09-16
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree.
The main changes are:
1) Now that initial BPF backend for gcc has been merged upstream, enable
BPF kselftest suite for bpf-gcc. Also fix a BE issue with access to
bpf_sysctl.file_pos, from Ilya.
2) Follow-up fix for link-vmlinux.sh to remove bash-specific extensions
related to recent work on exposing BTF info through sysfs, from Andrii.
3) AF_XDP zero copy fixes for i40e and ixgbe driver which caused umem
headroom to be added twice, from Ciara.
4) Refactoring work to convert sock opt tests into test_progs framework
in BPF kselftests, from Stanislav.
5) Fix a general protection fault in dev_map_hash_update_elem(), from Toke.
6) Cleanup to use BPF_PROG_RUN() macro in KCM, from Sami.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
"ctx:file_pos sysctl:read write ok" fails on s390 with "Read value !=
nux". This is because verifier rewrites a complete 32-bit
bpf_sysctl.file_pos update to a partial update of the first 32 bits of
64-bit *bpf_sysctl_kern.ppos, which is not correct on big-endian
systems.
Fix by using an offset on big-endian systems.
Ditto for bpf_sysctl.file_pos reads. Currently the test does not detect
a problem there, since it expects to see 0, which it gets with high
probability in error cases, so change it to seek to offset 3 and expect
3 in bpf_sysctl.file_pos.
Fixes: e1550bfe0d ("bpf: Add file_pos field to bpf_sysctl ctx")
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20190816105300.49035-1-iii@linux.ibm.com/
Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree.
The main changes are:
1) Add the ability to use unaligned chunks in the AF_XDP umem. By
relaxing where the chunks can be placed, it allows to use an
arbitrary buffer size and place whenever there is a free
address in the umem. Helps more seamless DPDK AF_XDP driver
integration. Support for i40e, ixgbe and mlx5e, from Kevin and
Maxim.
2) Addition of a wakeup flag for AF_XDP tx and fill rings so the
application can wake up the kernel for rx/tx processing which
avoids busy-spinning of the latter, useful when app and driver
is located on the same core. Support for i40e, ixgbe and mlx5e,
from Magnus and Maxim.
3) bpftool fixes for printf()-like functions so compiler can actually
enforce checks, bpftool build system improvements for custom output
directories, and addition of 'bpftool map freeze' command, from Quentin.
4) Support attaching/detaching XDP programs from 'bpftool net' command,
from Daniel.
5) Automatic xskmap cleanup when AF_XDP socket is released, and several
barrier/{read,write}_once fixes in AF_XDP code, from Björn.
6) Relicense of bpf_helpers.h/bpf_endian.h for future libbpf
inclusion as well as libbpf versioning improvements, from Andrii.
7) Several new BPF kselftests for verifier precision tracking, from Alexei.
8) Several BPF kselftest fixes wrt endianess to run on s390x, from Ilya.
9) And more BPF kselftest improvements all over the place, from Stanislav.
10) Add simple BPF map op cache for nfp driver to batch dumps, from Jakub.
11) AF_XDP socket umem mapping improvements for 32bit archs, from Ivan.
12) Add BPF-to-BPF call and BTF line info support for s390x JIT, from Yauheni.
13) Small optimization in arm64 JIT to spare 1 insns for BPF_MOD, from Jerin.
14) Fix an error check in bpf_tcp_gen_syncookie() helper, from Petar.
15) Various minor fixes and cleanups, from Nathan, Masahiro, Masanari,
Peter, Wei, Yue.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The problem can be seen in the following two tests:
0: (bf) r3 = r10
1: (55) if r3 != 0x7b goto pc+0
2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r3 -8) = 0
3: (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8)
..
0: (85) call bpf_get_prandom_u32#7
1: (bf) r3 = r10
2: (55) if r3 != 0x7b goto pc+0
3: (7b) *(u64 *)(r3 -8) = r0
4: (79) r4 = *(u64 *)(r10 -8)
When backtracking need to mark R4 it will mark slot fp-8.
But ST or STX into fp-8 could belong to the same block of instructions.
When backtracing is done the parent state may have fp-8 slot
as "unallocated stack". Which will cause verifier to warn
and incorrectly reject such programs.
Writes into stack via non-R10 register are rare. llvm always
generates canonical stack spill/fill.
For such pathological case fall back to conservative precision
tracking instead of rejecting.
Reported-by: syzbot+c8d66267fd2b5955287e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: b5dc0163d8 ("bpf: precise scalar_value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Introduce BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ flag to stress test parentage chain
and state pruning.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
While adding extra tests for precision tracking and extra infra
to adjust verifier heuristics the existing test
"calls: cross frame pruning - liveness propagation" started to fail.
The root cause is the same as described in verifer.c comment:
* Also if parent's curframe > frame where backtracking started,
* the verifier need to mark registers in both frames, otherwise callees
* may incorrectly prune callers. This is similar to
* commit 7640ead939 ("bpf: verifier: make sure callees don't prune with caller differences")
* For now backtracking falls back into conservative marking.
Turned out though that returning -ENOTSUPP from backtrack_insn() and
doing mark_all_scalars_precise() in the current parentage chain is not enough.
Depending on how is_state_visited() heuristic is creating parentage chain
it's possible that callee will incorrectly prune caller.
Fix the issue by setting precise=true earlier and more aggressively.
Before this fix the precision tracking _within_ functions that don't do
bpf2bpf calls would still work. Whereas now precision tracking is completely
disabled when bpf2bpf calls are present anywhere in the program.
No difference in cilium tests (they don't have bpf2bpf calls).
No difference in test_progs though some of them have bpf2bpf calls,
but precision tracking wasn't effective there.
Fixes: b5dc0163d8 ("bpf: precise scalar_value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree.
There is a small merge conflict in libbpf (Cc Andrii so he's in the loop
as well):
for (i = 1; i <= btf__get_nr_types(btf); i++) {
t = (struct btf_type *)btf__type_by_id(btf, i);
if (!has_datasec && btf_is_var(t)) {
/* replace VAR with INT */
t->info = BTF_INFO_ENC(BTF_KIND_INT, 0, 0);
<<<<<<< HEAD
/*
* using size = 1 is the safest choice, 4 will be too
* big and cause kernel BTF validation failure if
* original variable took less than 4 bytes
*/
t->size = 1;
*(int *)(t+1) = BTF_INT_ENC(0, 0, 8);
} else if (!has_datasec && kind == BTF_KIND_DATASEC) {
=======
t->size = sizeof(int);
*(int *)(t + 1) = BTF_INT_ENC(0, 0, 32);
} else if (!has_datasec && btf_is_datasec(t)) {
>>>>>>> 72ef80b5ee
/* replace DATASEC with STRUCT */
Conflict is between the two commits 1d4126c4e1 ("libbpf: sanitize VAR to
conservative 1-byte INT") and b03bc6853c ("libbpf: convert libbpf code to
use new btf helpers"), so we need to pick the sanitation fixup as well as
use the new btf_is_datasec() helper and the whitespace cleanup. Looks like
the following:
[...]
if (!has_datasec && btf_is_var(t)) {
/* replace VAR with INT */
t->info = BTF_INFO_ENC(BTF_KIND_INT, 0, 0);
/*
* using size = 1 is the safest choice, 4 will be too
* big and cause kernel BTF validation failure if
* original variable took less than 4 bytes
*/
t->size = 1;
*(int *)(t + 1) = BTF_INT_ENC(0, 0, 8);
} else if (!has_datasec && btf_is_datasec(t)) {
/* replace DATASEC with STRUCT */
[...]
The main changes are:
1) Addition of core parts of compile once - run everywhere (co-re) effort,
that is, relocation of fields offsets in libbpf as well as exposure of
kernel's own BTF via sysfs and loading through libbpf, from Andrii.
More info on co-re: http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf2019.html#session-2
and http://vger.kernel.org/lpc-bpf2018.html#session-2
2) Enable passing input flags to the BPF flow dissector to customize parsing
and allowing it to stop early similar to the C based one, from Stanislav.
3) Add a BPF helper function that allows generating SYN cookies from XDP and
tc BPF, from Petar.
4) Add devmap hash-based map type for more flexibility in device lookup for
redirects, from Toke.
5) Improvements to XDP forwarding sample code now utilizing recently enabled
devmap lookups, from Jesper.
6) Add support for reporting the effective cgroup progs in bpftool, from Jakub
and Takshak.
7) Fix reading kernel config from bpftool via /proc/config.gz, from Peter.
8) Fix AF_XDP umem pages mapping for 32 bit architectures, from Ivan.
9) Follow-up to add two more BPF loop tests for the selftest suite, from Alexei.
10) Add perf event output helper also for other skb-based program types, from Allan.
11) Fix a co-re related compilation error in selftests, from Yonghong.
====================
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
A common pattern when using xdp_redirect_map() is to create a device map
where the lookup key is simply ifindex. Because device maps are arrays,
this leaves holes in the map, and the map has to be sized to fit the
largest ifindex, regardless of how many devices actually are actually
needed in the map.
This patch adds a second type of device map where the key is looked up
using a hashmap, instead of being used as an array index. This allows maps
to be densely packed, so they can be smaller.
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Acked-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
The very first check in test_pkt_md_access is failing on s390, which
happens because loading a part of a struct __sk_buff field produces
an incorrect result.
The preprocessed code of the check is:
{
__u8 tmp = *((volatile __u8 *)&skb->len +
((sizeof(skb->len) - sizeof(__u8)) / sizeof(__u8)));
if (tmp != ((*(volatile __u32 *)&skb->len) & 0xFF)) return 2;
};
clang generates the following code for it:
0: 71 21 00 03 00 00 00 00 r2 = *(u8 *)(r1 + 3)
1: 61 31 00 00 00 00 00 00 r3 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 0)
2: 57 30 00 00 00 00 00 ff r3 &= 255
3: 5d 23 00 1d 00 00 00 00 if r2 != r3 goto +29 <LBB0_10>
Finally, verifier transforms it to:
0: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 +104)
1: (bc) w2 = w2
2: (74) w2 >>= 24
3: (bc) w2 = w2
4: (54) w2 &= 255
5: (bc) w2 = w2
The problem is that when verifier emits the code to replace a partial
load of a struct __sk_buff field (*(u8 *)(r1 + 3)) with a full load of
struct sk_buff field (*(u32 *)(r1 + 104)), an optional shift and a
bitwise AND, it assumes that the machine is little endian and
incorrectly decides to use a shift.
Adjust shift count calculation to account for endianness.
Fixes: 31fd85816d ("bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields")
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, this patch silences
the following warning:
kernel/bpf/verifier.c: In function ‘check_return_code’:
kernel/bpf/verifier.c:6106:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP4_RECVMSG ||
^
kernel/bpf/verifier.c:6109:2: note: here
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB:
^~~~
Warning level 3 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=3
Notice that is much clearer to explicitly add breaks in each case
statement (that actually contains some code), rather than letting
the code to fall through.
This patch is part of the ongoing efforts to enable
-Wimplicit-fallthrough.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
When backtracking instructions to propagate precision bit for registers
and stack slots, one class of instructions (BPF_ST) weren't handled
causing extra stack slots to be propagated into parent state. Parent
state might not have that much stack allocated, though, which causes
warning on invalid stack slot usage.
This patch adds handling of BPF_ST instructions:
BPF_MEM | <size> | BPF_ST: *(size *) (dst_reg + off) = imm32
Reported-by: syzbot+4da3ff23081bafe74fc2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: b5dc0163d8 ("bpf: precise scalar_value tracking")
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
When equivalent state is found the current state needs to propagate precision marks.
Otherwise the verifier will prune the search incorrectly.
There is a price for correctness:
before before broken fixed
cnst spill precise precise
bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 1923 8128 1863 1898
bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 3077 6707 2468 2666
bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1062 1062 544 544
bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 166729 380712 22629 36823
bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 174607 440652 28805 45325
bpf_netdev.o 8407 31904 6801 7002
bpf_overlay.o 5420 23569 4754 4858
bpf_lxc_jit.o 39389 359445 50925 69631
Overall precision tracking is still very effective.
Fixes: b5dc0163d8 ("bpf: precise scalar_value tracking")
Reported-by: Lawrence Brakmo <brakmo@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Tested-by: Lawrence Brakmo <brakmo@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
We don't currently allow lookups into a devmap from eBPF, because the map
lookup returns a pointer directly to the dev->ifindex, which shouldn't be
modifiable from eBPF.
However, being able to do lookups in devmaps is useful to know (e.g.)
whether forwarding to a specific interface is enabled. Currently, programs
work around this by keeping a shadow map of another type which indicates
whether a map index is valid.
Since we now have a flag to make maps read-only from the eBPF side, we can
simply lift the lookup restriction if we make sure this flag is always set.
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Implement new BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCKOPT program type and
BPF_CGROUP_{G,S}ETSOCKOPT cgroup hooks.
BPF_CGROUP_SETSOCKOPT can modify user setsockopt arguments before
passing them down to the kernel or bypass kernel completely.
BPF_CGROUP_GETSOCKOPT can can inspect/modify getsockopt arguments that
kernel returns.
Both hooks reuse existing PTR_TO_PACKET{,_END} infrastructure.
The buffer memory is pre-allocated (because I don't think there is
a precedent for working with __user memory from bpf). This might be
slow to do for each {s,g}etsockopt call, that's why I've added
__cgroup_bpf_prog_array_is_empty that exits early if there is nothing
attached to a cgroup. Note, however, that there is a race between
__cgroup_bpf_prog_array_is_empty and BPF_PROG_RUN_ARRAY where cgroup
program layout might have changed; this should not be a problem
because in general there is a race between multiple calls to
{s,g}etsocktop and user adding/removing bpf progs from a cgroup.
The return code of the BPF program is handled as follows:
* 0: EPERM
* 1: success, continue with next BPF program in the cgroup chain
v9:
* allow overwriting setsockopt arguments (Alexei Starovoitov):
* use set_fs (same as kernel_setsockopt)
* buffer is always kzalloc'd (no small on-stack buffer)
v8:
* use s32 for optlen (Andrii Nakryiko)
v7:
* return only 0 or 1 (Alexei Starovoitov)
* always run all progs (Alexei Starovoitov)
* use optval=0 as kernel bypass in setsockopt (Alexei Starovoitov)
(decided to use optval=-1 instead, optval=0 might be a valid input)
* call getsockopt hook after kernel handlers (Alexei Starovoitov)
v6:
* rework cgroup chaining; stop as soon as bpf program returns
0 or 2; see patch with the documentation for the details
* drop Andrii's and Martin's Acked-by (not sure they are comfortable
with the new state of things)
v5:
* skip copy_to_user() and put_user() when ret == 0 (Martin Lau)
v4:
* don't export bpf_sk_fullsock helper (Martin Lau)
* size != sizeof(__u64) for uapi pointers (Martin Lau)
* offsetof instead of bpf_ctx_range when checking ctx access (Martin Lau)
v3:
* typos in BPF_PROG_CGROUP_SOCKOPT_RUN_ARRAY comments (Andrii Nakryiko)
* reverse christmas tree in BPF_PROG_CGROUP_SOCKOPT_RUN_ARRAY (Andrii
Nakryiko)
* use __bpf_md_ptr instead of __u32 for optval{,_end} (Martin Lau)
* use BPF_FIELD_SIZEOF() for consistency (Martin Lau)
* new CG_SOCKOPT_ACCESS macro to wrap repeated parts
v2:
* moved bpf_sockopt_kern fields around to remove a hole (Martin Lau)
* aligned bpf_sockopt_kern->buf to 8 bytes (Martin Lau)
* bpf_prog_array_is_empty instead of bpf_prog_array_length (Martin Lau)
* added [0,2] return code check to verifier (Martin Lau)
* dropped unused buf[64] from the stack (Martin Lau)
* use PTR_TO_SOCKET for bpf_sockopt->sk (Martin Lau)
* dropped bpf_target_off from ctx rewrites (Martin Lau)
* use return code for kernel bypass (Martin Lau & Andrii Nakryiko)
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Cc: Martin Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Alexei Starovoitov says:
====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2019-06-19
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net-next* tree.
The main changes are:
1) new SO_REUSEPORT_DETACH_BPF setsocktopt, from Martin.
2) BTF based map definition, from Andrii.
3) support bpf_map_lookup_elem for xskmap, from Jonathan.
4) bounded loops and scalar precision logic in the verifier, from Alexei.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Introduce precision tracking logic that
helps cilium programs the most:
old clang old clang new clang new clang
with all patches with all patches
bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 1838 2283 1923 1863
bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 3218 2657 3077 2468
bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1064 545 1062 544
bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 26935 23045 166729 22629
bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 34439 35240 174607 28805
bpf_netdev.o 9721 8753 8407 6801
bpf_overlay.o 6184 7901 5420 4754
bpf_lxc_jit.o 39389 50925 39389 50925
Consider code:
654: (85) call bpf_get_hash_recalc#34
655: (bf) r7 = r0
656: (15) if r8 == 0x0 goto pc+29
657: (bf) r2 = r10
658: (07) r2 += -48
659: (18) r1 = 0xffff8881e41e1b00
661: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1
662: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+23
663: (69) r1 = *(u16 *)(r0 +0)
664: (15) if r1 == 0x0 goto pc+21
665: (bf) r8 = r7
666: (57) r8 &= 65535
667: (bf) r2 = r8
668: (3f) r2 /= r1
669: (2f) r2 *= r1
670: (bf) r1 = r8
671: (1f) r1 -= r2
672: (57) r1 &= 255
673: (25) if r1 > 0x1e goto pc+12
R0=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=20,vs=64,imm=0) R1_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=30,var_off=(0x0; 0x1f))
674: (67) r1 <<= 1
675: (0f) r0 += r1
At this point the verifier will notice that scalar R1 is used in map pointer adjustment.
R1 has to be precise for later operations on R0 to be validated properly.
The verifier will backtrack the above code in the following way:
last_idx 675 first_idx 664
regs=2 stack=0 before 675: (0f) r0 += r1 // started backtracking R1 regs=2 is a bitmask
regs=2 stack=0 before 674: (67) r1 <<= 1
regs=2 stack=0 before 673: (25) if r1 > 0x1e goto pc+12
regs=2 stack=0 before 672: (57) r1 &= 255
regs=2 stack=0 before 671: (1f) r1 -= r2 // now both R1 and R2 has to be precise -> regs=6 mask
regs=6 stack=0 before 670: (bf) r1 = r8 // after this insn R8 and R2 has to be precise
regs=104 stack=0 before 669: (2f) r2 *= r1 // after this one R8, R2, and R1
regs=106 stack=0 before 668: (3f) r2 /= r1
regs=106 stack=0 before 667: (bf) r2 = r8
regs=102 stack=0 before 666: (57) r8 &= 65535
regs=102 stack=0 before 665: (bf) r8 = r7
regs=82 stack=0 before 664: (15) if r1 == 0x0 goto pc+21
// this is the end of verifier state. The following regs will be marked precised:
R1_rw=invP(id=0,umax_value=65535,var_off=(0x0; 0xffff)) R7_rw=invP(id=0)
parent didn't have regs=82 stack=0 marks // so backtracking continues into parent state
last_idx 663 first_idx 655
regs=82 stack=0 before 663: (69) r1 = *(u16 *)(r0 +0) // R1 was assigned no need to track it further
regs=80 stack=0 before 662: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+23 // keep tracking R7
regs=80 stack=0 before 661: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1 // keep tracking R7
regs=80 stack=0 before 659: (18) r1 = 0xffff8881e41e1b00
regs=80 stack=0 before 658: (07) r2 += -48
regs=80 stack=0 before 657: (bf) r2 = r10
regs=80 stack=0 before 656: (15) if r8 == 0x0 goto pc+29
regs=80 stack=0 before 655: (bf) r7 = r0 // here the assignment into R7
// mark R0 to be precise:
R0_rw=invP(id=0)
parent didn't have regs=1 stack=0 marks // regs=1 -> tracking R0
last_idx 654 first_idx 644
regs=1 stack=0 before 654: (85) call bpf_get_hash_recalc#34 // and in the parent frame it was a return value
// nothing further to backtrack
Two scalar registers not marked precise are equivalent from state pruning point of view.
More details in the patch comments.
It doesn't support bpf2bpf calls yet and enabled for root only.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
The commit 7640ead939 partially resolved the issue of callees
incorrectly pruning the callers.
With introduction of bounded loops and jmps_processed heuristic
single verifier state may contain multiple branches and calls.
It's possible that new verifier state (for future pruning) will be
allocated inside callee. Then callee will exit (still within the same
verifier state). It will go back to the caller and there R6-R9 registers
will be read and will trigger mark_reg_read. But the reg->live for all frames
but the top frame is not set to LIVE_NONE. Hence mark_reg_read will fail
to propagate liveness into parent and future walking will incorrectly
conclude that the states are equivalent because LIVE_READ is not set.
In other words the rule for parent/live should be:
whenever register parentage chain is set the reg->live should be set to LIVE_NONE.
is_state_visited logic already follows this rule for spilled registers.
Fixes: 7640ead939 ("bpf: verifier: make sure callees don't prune with caller differences")
Fixes: f4d7e40a5b ("bpf: introduce function calls (verification)")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Allow the verifier to validate the loops by simulating their execution.
Exisiting programs have used '#pragma unroll' to unroll the loops
by the compiler. Instead let the verifier simulate all iterations
of the loop.
In order to do that introduce parentage chain of bpf_verifier_state and
'branches' counter for the number of branches left to explore.
See more detailed algorithm description in bpf_verifier.h
This algorithm borrows the key idea from Edward Cree approach:
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/877222/
Additional state pruning heuristics make such brute force loop walk
practical even for large loops.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
This patch extends is_branch_taken() logic from JMP+K instructions
to JMP+X instructions.
Conditional branches are often done when src and dst registers
contain known scalars. In such case the verifier can follow
the branch that is going to be taken when program executes.
That speeds up the verification and is essential feature to support
bounded loops.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Compilers often spill induction variables into the stack,
hence it is necessary for the verifier to track scalar values
of the registers through stack slots.
Also few bpf programs were incorrectly rejected in the past,
since the verifier was not able to track such constants while
they were used to compute offsets into packet headers.
Tracking constants through the stack significantly decreases
the chances of state pruning, since two different constants
are considered to be different by state equivalency.
End result that cilium tests suffer serious degradation in the number
of states processed and corresponding verification time increase.
before after
bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 1838 6441
bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 3218 5908
bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1064 1064
bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 26935 93790
bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 34439 123886
bpf_netdev.o 9721 31413
bpf_overlay.o 6184 18561
bpf_lxc_jit.o 39389 359445
After further debugging turned out that cillium progs are
getting hurt by clang due to the same constant tracking issue.
Newer clang generates better code by spilling less to the stack.
Instead it keeps more constants in the registers which
hurts state pruning since the verifier already tracks constants
in the registers:
old clang new clang
(no spill/fill tracking introduced by this patch)
bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 1838 1923
bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 3218 3077
bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1064 1062
bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 26935 166729
bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 34439 174607
bpf_netdev.o 9721 8407
bpf_overlay.o 6184 5420
bpf_lcx_jit.o 39389 39389
The final table is depressing:
old clang old clang new clang new clang
const spill/fill const spill/fill
bpf_lb-DLB_L3.o 1838 6441 1923 8128
bpf_lb-DLB_L4.o 3218 5908 3077 6707
bpf_lb-DUNKNOWN.o 1064 1064 1062 1062
bpf_lxc-DDROP_ALL.o 26935 93790 166729 380712
bpf_lxc-DUNKNOWN.o 34439 123886 174607 440652
bpf_netdev.o 9721 31413 8407 31904
bpf_overlay.o 6184 18561 5420 23569
bpf_lxc_jit.o 39389 359445 39389 359445
Tracking constants in the registers hurts state pruning already.
Adding tracking of constants through stack hurts pruning even more.
The later patch address this general constant tracking issue
with coarse/precise logic.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
"Lots of bug fixes here:
1) Out of bounds access in __bpf_skc_lookup, from Lorenz Bauer.
2) Fix rate reporting in cfg80211_calculate_bitrate_he(), from John
Crispin.
3) Use after free in psock backlog workqueue, from John Fastabend.
4) Fix source port matching in fdb peer flow rule of mlx5, from Raed
Salem.
5) Use atomic_inc_not_zero() in fl6_sock_lookup(), from Eric Dumazet.
6) Network header needs to be set for packet redirect in nfp, from
John Hurley.
7) Fix udp zerocopy refcnt, from Willem de Bruijn.
8) Don't assume linear buffers in vxlan and geneve error handlers,
from Stefano Brivio.
9) Fix TOS matching in mlxsw, from Jiri Pirko.
10) More SCTP cookie memory leak fixes, from Neil Horman.
11) Fix VLAN filtering in rtl8366, from Linus Walluij.
12) Various TCP SACK payload size and fragmentation memory limit fixes
from Eric Dumazet.
13) Use after free in pneigh_get_next(), also from Eric Dumazet.
14) LAPB control block leak fix from Jeremy Sowden"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (145 commits)
lapb: fixed leak of control-blocks.
tipc: purge deferredq list for each grp member in tipc_group_delete
ax25: fix inconsistent lock state in ax25_destroy_timer
neigh: fix use-after-free read in pneigh_get_next
tcp: fix compile error if !CONFIG_SYSCTL
hv_sock: Suppress bogus "may be used uninitialized" warnings
be2net: Fix number of Rx queues used for flow hashing
net: handle 802.1P vlan 0 packets properly
tcp: enforce tcp_min_snd_mss in tcp_mtu_probing()
tcp: add tcp_min_snd_mss sysctl
tcp: tcp_fragment() should apply sane memory limits
tcp: limit payload size of sacked skbs
Revert "net: phylink: set the autoneg state in phylink_phy_change"
bpf: fix nested bpf tracepoints with per-cpu data
bpf: Fix out of bounds memory access in bpf_sk_storage
vsock/virtio: set SOCK_DONE on peer shutdown
net: dsa: rtl8366: Fix up VLAN filtering
net: phylink: set the autoneg state in phylink_phy_change
net: add high_order_alloc_disable sysctl/static key
tcp: add tcp_tx_skb_cache sysctl
...
Currently, the AF_XDP code uses a separate map in order to
determine if an xsk is bound to a queue. Instead of doing this,
have bpf_map_lookup_elem() return a xdp_sock.
Rearrange some xdp_sock members to eliminate structure holes.
Remove selftest - will be added back in later patch.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Intention of cgroup bind/connect/sendmsg BPF hooks is to act transparently
to applications as also stated in original motivation in 7828f20e37 ("Merge
branch 'bpf-cgroup-bind-connect'"). When recently integrating the latter
two hooks into Cilium to enable host based load-balancing with Kubernetes,
I ran into the issue that pods couldn't start up as DNS got broken. Kubernetes
typically sets up DNS as a service and is thus subject to load-balancing.
Upon further debugging, it turns out that the cgroupv2 sendmsg BPF hooks API
is currently insufficient and thus not usable as-is for standard applications
shipped with most distros. To break down the issue we ran into with a simple
example:
# cat /etc/resolv.conf
nameserver 147.75.207.207
nameserver 147.75.207.208
For the purpose of a simple test, we set up above IPs as service IPs and
transparently redirect traffic to a different DNS backend server for that
node:
# cilium service list
ID Frontend Backend
1 147.75.207.207:53 1 => 8.8.8.8:53
2 147.75.207.208:53 1 => 8.8.8.8:53
The attached BPF program is basically selecting one of the backends if the
service IP/port matches on the cgroup hook. DNS breaks here, because the
hooks are not transparent enough to applications which have built-in msg_name
address checks:
# nslookup 1.1.1.1
;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.207#53
;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.208#53
;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.207#53
[...]
;; connection timed out; no servers could be reached
# dig 1.1.1.1
;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.207#53
;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.208#53
;; reply from unexpected source: 8.8.8.8#53, expected 147.75.207.207#53
[...]
; <<>> DiG 9.11.3-1ubuntu1.7-Ubuntu <<>> 1.1.1.1
;; global options: +cmd
;; connection timed out; no servers could be reached
For comparison, if none of the service IPs is used, and we tell nslookup
to use 8.8.8.8 directly it works just fine, of course:
# nslookup 1.1.1.1 8.8.8.8
1.1.1.1.in-addr.arpa name = one.one.one.one.
In order to fix this and thus act more transparent to the application,
this needs reverse translation on recvmsg() side. A minimal fix for this
API is to add similar recvmsg() hooks behind the BPF cgroups static key
such that the program can track state and replace the current sockaddr_in{,6}
with the original service IP. From BPF side, this basically tracks the
service tuple plus socket cookie in an LRU map where the reverse NAT can
then be retrieved via map value as one example. Side-note: the BPF cgroups
static key should be converted to a per-hook static key in future.
Same example after this fix:
# cilium service list
ID Frontend Backend
1 147.75.207.207:53 1 => 8.8.8.8:53
2 147.75.207.208:53 1 => 8.8.8.8:53
Lookups work fine now:
# nslookup 1.1.1.1
1.1.1.1.in-addr.arpa name = one.one.one.one.
Authoritative answers can be found from:
# dig 1.1.1.1
; <<>> DiG 9.11.3-1ubuntu1.7-Ubuntu <<>> 1.1.1.1
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NXDOMAIN, id: 51550
;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 512
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;1.1.1.1. IN A
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
. 23426 IN SOA a.root-servers.net. nstld.verisign-grs.com. 2019052001 1800 900 604800 86400
;; Query time: 17 msec
;; SERVER: 147.75.207.207#53(147.75.207.207)
;; WHEN: Tue May 21 12:59:38 UTC 2019
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 111
And from an actual packet level it shows that we're using the back end
server when talking via 147.75.207.20{7,8} front end:
# tcpdump -i any udp
[...]
12:59:52.698732 IP foo.42011 > google-public-dns-a.google.com.domain: 18803+ PTR? 1.1.1.1.in-addr.arpa. (38)
12:59:52.698735 IP foo.42011 > google-public-dns-a.google.com.domain: 18803+ PTR? 1.1.1.1.in-addr.arpa. (38)
12:59:52.701208 IP google-public-dns-a.google.com.domain > foo.42011: 18803 1/0/0 PTR one.one.one.one. (67)
12:59:52.701208 IP google-public-dns-a.google.com.domain > foo.42011: 18803 1/0/0 PTR one.one.one.one. (67)
[...]
In order to be flexible and to have same semantics as in sendmsg BPF
programs, we only allow return codes in [1,1] range. In the sendmsg case
the program is called if msg->msg_name is present which can be the case
in both, connected and unconnected UDP.
The former only relies on the sockaddr_in{,6} passed via connect(2) if
passed msg->msg_name was NULL. Therefore, on recvmsg side, we act in similar
way to call into the BPF program whenever a non-NULL msg->msg_name was
passed independent of sk->sk_state being TCP_ESTABLISHED or not. Note
that for TCP case, the msg->msg_name is ignored in the regular recvmsg
path and therefore not relevant.
For the case of ip{,v6}_recv_error() paths, picked up via MSG_ERRQUEUE,
the hook is not called. This is intentional as it aligns with the same
semantics as in case of TCP cgroup BPF hooks right now. This might be
better addressed in future through a different bpf_attach_type such
that this case can be distinguished from the regular recvmsg paths,
for example.
Fixes: 1cedee13d2 ("bpf: Hooks for sys_sendmsg")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: Martynas Pumputis <m@lambda.lt>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of version 2 of the gnu general public license as
published by the free software foundation this program is
distributed in the hope that it will be useful but without any
warranty without even the implied warranty of merchantability or
fitness for a particular purpose see the gnu general public license
for more details
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-only
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 64 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexios Zavras <alexios.zavras@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190529141901.894819585@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Allows cgroup inet skb programs to return values in the range [0, 3].
The second bit is used to deterine if congestion occurred and higher
level protocol should decrease rate. E.g. TCP would call tcp_enter_cwr()
The bpf_prog must set expected_attach_type to BPF_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS
at load time if it uses the new return values (i.e. 2 or 3).
The expected_attach_type is currently not enforced for
BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB. e.g Meaning the current bpf_prog with
expected_attach_type setting to BPF_CGROUP_INET_EGRESS can attach to
BPF_CGROUP_INET_INGRESS. Blindly enforcing expected_attach_type will
break backward compatibility.
This patch adds a enforce_expected_attach_type bit to only
enforce the expected_attach_type when it uses the new
return value.
Signed-off-by: Lawrence Brakmo <brakmo@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
This patch randomizes high 32-bit of a definition when BPF_F_TEST_RND_HI32
is set.
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
After previous patches, verifier will mark a insn if it really needs zero
extension on dst_reg.
It is then for back-ends to decide how to use such information to eliminate
unnecessary zero extension code-gen during JIT compilation.
One approach is verifier insert explicit zero extension for those insns
that need zero extension in a generic way, JIT back-ends then do not
generate zero extension for sub-register write at default.
However, only those back-ends which do not have hardware zero extension
want this optimization. Back-ends like x86_64 and AArch64 have hardware
zero extension support that the insertion should be disabled.
This patch introduces new target hook "bpf_jit_needs_zext" which returns
false at default, meaning verifier zero extension insertion is disabled at
default. A back-end could override this hook to return true if it doesn't
have hardware support and want verifier insert zero extension explicitly.
Offload targets do not use this native target hook, instead, they could
get the optimization results using bpf_prog_offload_ops.finalize.
NOTE: arches could have diversified features, it is possible for one arch
to have hardware zero extension support for some sub-register write insns
but not for all. For example, PowerPC, SPARC have zero extended loads, but
not for alu32. So when verifier zero extension insertion enabled, these JIT
back-ends need to peephole insns to remove those zero extension inserted
for insn that actually has hardware zero extension support. The peephole
could be as simple as looking the next insn, if it is a special zero
extension insn then it is safe to eliminate it if the current insn has
hardware zero extension support.
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Patched insns do not go through generic verification, therefore doesn't has
zero extension information collected during insn walking.
We don't bother analyze them at the moment, for any sub-register def comes
from them, just conservatively mark it as needing zero extension.
Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
eBPF ISA specification requires high 32-bit cleared when low 32-bit
sub-register is written. This applies to destination register of ALU32 etc.
JIT back-ends must guarantee this semantic when doing code-gen. x86_64 and
AArch64 ISA has the same semantics, so the corresponding JIT back-end
doesn't need to do extra work.
However, 32-bit arches (arm, x86, nfp etc.) and some other 64-bit arches
(PowerPC, SPARC etc) need to do explicit zero extension to meet this
requirement, otherwise code like the following will fail.
u64_value = (u64) u32_value
... other uses of u64_value
This is because compiler could exploit the semantic described above and
save those zero extensions for extending u32_value to u64_value, these JIT
back-ends are expected to guarantee this through inserting extra zero
extensions which however could be a significant increase on the code size.
Some benchmarks show there could be ~40% sub-register writes out of total
insns, meaning at least ~40% extra code-gen.
One observation is these extra zero extensions are not always necessary.
Take above code snippet for example, it is possible u32_value will never be
casted into a u64, the value of high 32-bit of u32_value then could be
ignored and extra zero extension could be eliminated.
This patch implements this idea, insns defining sub-registers will be
marked when the high 32-bit of the defined sub-register matters. For
those unmarked insns, it is safe to eliminate high 32-bit clearnace for
them.
Algo:
- Split read flags into READ32 and READ64.
- Record index of insn that does sub-register write. Keep the index inside
reg state and update it during verifier insn walking.
- A full register read on a sub-register marks its definition insn as
needing zero extension on dst register.
A new sub-register write overrides the old one.
- When propagating read64 during path pruning, also mark any insn defining
a sub-register that is read in the pruned path as full-register.
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@netronome.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
All prune points inside a callee bpf function most likely will have
different callsites. For example, if function foo() is called from
two callsites the half of explored states in all prune points in foo()
will be useless for subsequent walking of one of those callsites.
Fortunately explored_states pruning heuristics keeps the number of states
per prune point small, but walking these states is still a waste of cpu
time when the callsite of the current state is different from the callsite
of the explored state.
To improve pruning logic convert explored_states into hash table and
use simple insn_idx ^ callsite hash to select hash bucket.
This optimization has no effect on programs without bpf2bpf calls
and drastically improves programs with calls.
In the later case it reduces total memory consumption in 1M scale tests
by almost 3 times (peak_states drops from 5752 to 2016).
Care should be taken when comparing the states for equivalency.
Since the same hash bucket can now contain states with different indices
the insn_idx has to be part of verifier_state and compared.
Different hash table sizes and different hash functions were explored,
but the results were not significantly better vs this patch.
They can be improved in the future.
Hit/miss heuristic is not counting index miscompare as a miss.
Otherwise verifier stats become unstable when experimenting
with different hash functions.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
split explored_states into prune_point boolean mark
and link list of explored states.
This removes STATE_LIST_MARK hack and allows marks to be separate from states.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
clean up explored_states to prep for introduction of hashtable
No functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
The limit of 1024 subsequent jumps was causing otherwise valid
programs to be rejected. Bump it to 8192 and make the error more verbose.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Commit 31fd85816d ("bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program
context fields") made the verifier add AND instructions to clear the
unwanted bits with a mask when doing a narrow load. The mask is
computed with
(1 << size * 8) - 1
where "size" is the size of the narrow load. When doing a 4 byte load
of a an 8 byte field the verifier shifts the literal 1 by 32 places to
the left. This results in an overflow of a signed integer, which is an
undefined behavior. Typically, the computed mask was zero, so the
result of the narrow load ended up being zero too.
Cast the literal to long long to avoid overflows. Note that narrow
load of the 4 byte fields does not have the undefined behavior,
because the load size can only be either 1 or 2 bytes, so shifting 1
by 8 or 16 places will not overflow it. And reading 4 bytes would not
be a narrow load of a 4 bytes field.
Fixes: 31fd85816d ("bpf: permits narrower load from bpf program context fields")
Reviewed-by: Alban Crequy <alban@kinvolk.io>
Reviewed-by: Iago López Galeiras <iago@kinvolk.io>
Signed-off-by: Krzesimir Nowak <krzesimir@kinvolk.io>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
