enough in order for the LBR MSR access to not #GP
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Merge tag 'perf_urgent_for_v5.19_rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull perf fix from Borislav Petkov:
- Reorganize the perf LBR init code so that a TSX quirk is applied
early enough in order for the LBR MSR access to not #GP
* tag 'perf_urgent_for_v5.19_rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
perf/x86/intel/lbr: Fix unchecked MSR access error on HSW
work if even needed, at all).
- Prevent return thunks patching of the LKDTM modules as it is not needed there
- Avoid writing the SPEC_CTRL MSR on every kernel entry on eIBRS parts
- Enhance error output of apply_returns() when it fails to patch a return thunk
- A sparse fix to the sev-guest module
- Protect EFI fw calls by issuing an IBPB on AMD
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Merge tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.19_rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov:
"A couple more retbleed fallout fixes.
It looks like their urgency is decreasing so it seems like we've
managed to catch whatever snafus the limited -rc testing has exposed.
Maybe we're getting ready... :)
- Make retbleed mitigations 64-bit only (32-bit will need a bit more
work if even needed, at all).
- Prevent return thunks patching of the LKDTM modules as it is not
needed there
- Avoid writing the SPEC_CTRL MSR on every kernel entry on eIBRS
parts
- Enhance error output of apply_returns() when it fails to patch a
return thunk
- A sparse fix to the sev-guest module
- Protect EFI fw calls by issuing an IBPB on AMD"
* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.19_rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/speculation: Make all RETbleed mitigations 64-bit only
lkdtm: Disable return thunks in rodata.c
x86/bugs: Warn when "ibrs" mitigation is selected on Enhanced IBRS parts
x86/alternative: Report missing return thunk details
virt: sev-guest: Pass the appropriate argument type to iounmap()
x86/amd: Use IBPB for firmware calls
* Fix use of sched_setaffinity in selftests
* Sync kernel headers to tools
* Fix KVM_STATS_UNIT_MAX
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Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
- Check for invalid flags to KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR
- Fix use of sched_setaffinity in selftests
- Sync kernel headers to tools
- Fix KVM_STATS_UNIT_MAX
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
KVM: x86: Protect the unused bits in MSR exiting flags
tools headers UAPI: Sync linux/kvm.h with the kernel sources
KVM: selftests: Fix target thread to be migrated in rseq_test
KVM: stats: Fix value for KVM_STATS_UNIT_MAX for boolean stats
The mitigations for RETBleed are currently ineffective on x86_32 since
entry_32.S does not use the required macros. However, for an x86_32
target, the kconfig symbols for them are still enabled by default and
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/retbleed will wrongly report
that mitigations are in place.
Make all of these symbols depend on X86_64, and only enable RETHUNK by
default on X86_64.
Fixes: f43b9876e8 ("x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YtwSR3NNsWp1ohfV@decadent.org.uk
Scattered across the archs are 3 basic forms of tlb_{start,end}_vma().
Provide two new MMU_GATHER_knobs to enumerate them and remove the per
arch tlb_{start,end}_vma() implementations.
- MMU_GATHER_NO_FLUSH_CACHE indicates the arch has flush_cache_range()
but does *NOT* want to call it for each VMA.
- MMU_GATHER_MERGE_VMAS indicates the arch wants to merge the
invalidate across multiple VMAs if possible.
With these it is possible to capture the three forms:
1) empty stubs;
select MMU_GATHER_NO_FLUSH_CACHE and MMU_GATHER_MERGE_VMAS
2) start: flush_cache_range(), end: empty;
select MMU_GATHER_MERGE_VMAS
3) start: flush_cache_range(), end: flush_tlb_range();
default
Obviously, if the architecture does not have flush_cache_range() then
it also doesn't need to select MMU_GATHER_NO_FLUSH_CACHE.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The fuzzer triggers the below trace.
[ 7763.384369] unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x689
(tried to write 0x1fffffff8101349e) at rIP: 0xffffffff810704a4
(native_write_msr+0x4/0x20)
[ 7763.397420] Call Trace:
[ 7763.399881] <TASK>
[ 7763.401994] intel_pmu_lbr_restore+0x9a/0x1f0
[ 7763.406363] intel_pmu_lbr_sched_task+0x91/0x1c0
[ 7763.410992] __perf_event_task_sched_in+0x1cd/0x240
On a machine with the LBR format LBR_FORMAT_EIP_FLAGS2, when the TSX is
disabled, a TSX quirk is required to access LBR from registers.
The lbr_from_signext_quirk_needed() is introduced to determine whether
the TSX quirk should be applied. However, the
lbr_from_signext_quirk_needed() is invoked before the
intel_pmu_lbr_init(), which parses the LBR format information. Without
the correct LBR format information, the TSX quirk never be applied.
Move the lbr_from_signext_quirk_needed() into the intel_pmu_lbr_init().
Checking x86_pmu.lbr_has_tsx in the lbr_from_signext_quirk_needed() is
not required anymore.
Both LBR_FORMAT_EIP_FLAGS2 and LBR_FORMAT_INFO have LBR_TSX flag, but
only the LBR_FORMAT_EIP_FLAGS2 requirs the quirk. Update the comments
accordingly.
Fixes: 1ac7fd8159 ("perf/x86/intel/lbr: Support LBR format V7")
Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220714182630.342107-1-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
The following warning was seen:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:557 apply_returns (arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:557 (discriminator 1))
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc4-00008-gee88d363d156 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-debian-1.16.0-4 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:apply_returns (arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:557 (discriminator 1))
Code: ff ff 74 cb 48 83 c5 04 49 39 ee 0f 87 81 fe ff ff e9 22 ff ff ff 0f 0b 48 83 c5 04 49 39 ee 0f 87 6d fe ff ff e9 0e ff ff ff <0f> 0b 48 83 c5 04 49 39 ee 0f 87 59 fe ff ff e9 fa fe ff ff 48 89
The warning happened when apply_returns() failed to convert "JMP
__x86_return_thunk" to RET. It was instead a JMP to nowhere, due to the
thunk relocation not getting resolved.
That rodata.o code is objcopy'd to .rodata, and later memcpy'd, so
relocations don't work (and are apparently silently ignored).
LKDTM is only used for testing, so the naked RET should be fine. So
just disable return thunks for that file.
While at it, disable objtool and KCSAN for the file.
Fixes: 0b53c374b9 ("x86/retpoline: Use -mfunction-return")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Debugged-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Ys58BxHxoDZ7rfpr@xsang-OptiPlex-9020/
IBRS mitigation for spectre_v2 forces write to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL at
every kernel entry/exit. On Enhanced IBRS parts setting
MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL[IBRS] only once at boot is sufficient. MSR writes at
every kernel entry/exit incur unnecessary performance loss.
When Enhanced IBRS feature is present, print a warning about this
unnecessary performance loss.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2a5eaf54583c2bfe0edc4fea64006656256cca17.1657814857.git.pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com
Debugging missing return thunks is easier if we can see where they're
happening.
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Ys66hwtFcGbYmoiZ@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net/
The flags for KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR and KVM_X86_SET_MSR_FILTER
have no protection for their unused bits. Without protection, future
development for these features will be difficult. Add the protection
needed to make it possible to extend these features in the future.
Signed-off-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220714161314.1715227-1-aaronlewis@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
On AMD IBRS does not prevent Retbleed; as such use IBPB before a
firmware call to flush the branch history state.
And because in order to do an EFI call, the kernel maps a whole lot of
the kernel page table into the EFI page table, do an IBPB just in case
in order to prevent the scenario of poisoning the BTB and causing an EFI
call using the unprotected RET there.
[ bp: Massage. ]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220715194550.793957-1-cascardo@canonical.com
can accomodate a XenPV guest due to how the latter is setting up the PAT
machinery
Now that the retbleed nightmare is public, here's the first round of
fallout fixes:
- Fix a build failure on 32-bit due to missing include
- Remove an untraining point in espfix64 return path
- other small cleanups
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Merge tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.19_rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Improve the check whether the kernel supports WP mappings so that it
can accomodate a XenPV guest due to how the latter is setting up the
PAT machinery
- Now that the retbleed nightmare is public, here's the first round of
fallout fixes:
* Fix a build failure on 32-bit due to missing include
* Remove an untraining point in espfix64 return path
* other small cleanups
* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.19_rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/bugs: Remove apostrophe typo
um: Add missing apply_returns()
x86/entry: Remove UNTRAIN_RET from native_irq_return_ldt
x86/bugs: Mark retbleed_strings static
x86/pat: Fix x86_has_pat_wp()
x86/asm/32: Fix ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE use on 32-bit
Fix more fallout from recent changes of the ACPI CPPC handling on AMD
platforms (Mario Limonciello).
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Merge tag 'acpi-5.19-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm
Pull ACPI fix from Rafael Wysocki:
"Fix more fallout from recent changes of the ACPI CPPC handling on AMD
platforms (Mario Limonciello)"
* tag 'acpi-5.19-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm:
ACPI: CPPC: Fix enabling CPPC on AMD systems with shared memory
Remove a superfluous ' in the mitigation string.
Fixes: e8ec1b6e08 ("x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for JMP2RET")
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
* Fix missing PAGE_PFN_MASK
* Fix SRCU deadlock caused by kvm_riscv_check_vcpu_requests()
x86:
* Fix for nested virtualization when TSC scaling is active
* Estimate the size of fastcc subroutines conservatively, avoiding disastrous
underestimation when return thunks are enabled
* Avoid possible use of uninitialized fields of 'struct kvm_lapic_irq'
Generic:
* Mark as such the boolean values available from the statistics file descriptors
* Clarify statistics documentation
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Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull KVM fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
"RISC-V:
- Fix missing PAGE_PFN_MASK
- Fix SRCU deadlock caused by kvm_riscv_check_vcpu_requests()
x86:
- Fix for nested virtualization when TSC scaling is active
- Estimate the size of fastcc subroutines conservatively, avoiding
disastrous underestimation when return thunks are enabled
- Avoid possible use of uninitialized fields of 'struct
kvm_lapic_irq'
Generic:
- Mark as such the boolean values available from the statistics file
descriptors
- Clarify statistics documentation"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm:
KVM: emulate: do not adjust size of fastop and setcc subroutines
KVM: x86: Fully initialize 'struct kvm_lapic_irq' in kvm_pv_kick_cpu_op()
Documentation: kvm: clarify histogram units
kvm: stats: tell userspace which values are boolean
x86/kvm: fix FASTOP_SIZE when return thunks are enabled
KVM: nVMX: Always enable TSC scaling for L2 when it was enabled for L1
RISC-V: KVM: Fix SRCU deadlock caused by kvm_riscv_check_vcpu_requests()
riscv: Fix missing PAGE_PFN_MASK
Instead of doing complicated calculations to find the size of the subroutines
(which are even more complicated because they need to be stringified into
an asm statement), just hardcode to 16.
It is less dense for a few combinations of IBT/SLS/retbleed, but it has
the advantage of being really simple.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.15.x: 84e7051c0b: x86/kvm: fix FASTOP_SIZE when return thunks are enabled
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
'vector' and 'trig_mode' fields of 'struct kvm_lapic_irq' are left
uninitialized in kvm_pv_kick_cpu_op(). While these fields are normally
not needed for APIC_DM_REMRD, they're still referenced by
__apic_accept_irq() for trace_kvm_apic_accept_irq(). Fully initialize
the structure to avoid consuming random stack memory.
Fixes: a183b638b6 ("KVM: x86: make apic_accept_irq tracepoint more generic")
Reported-by: syzbot+d6caa905917d353f0d07@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20220708125147.593975-1-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Some of the statistics values exported by KVM are always only 0 or 1.
It can be useful to export this fact to userspace so that it can track
them specially (for example by polling the value every now and then to
compute a % of time spent in a specific state).
Therefore, add "boolean value" as a new "unit". While it is not exactly
a unit, it walks and quacks like one. In particular, using the type
would be wrong because boolean values could be instantaneous or peak
values (e.g. "is the rmap allocated?") or even two-bucket histograms
(e.g. "number of posted vs. non-posted interrupt injections").
Suggested-by: Amneesh Singh <natto@weirdnatto.in>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Windows 10/11 guests with Hyper-V role (WSL2) enabled are observed to
hang upon boot or shortly after when a non-default TSC frequency was
set for L1. The issue is observed on a host where TSC scaling is
supported. The problem appears to be that Windows doesn't use TSC
frequency for its guests even when the feature is advertised and KVM
filters SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING out when creating L2 controls from
L1's. This leads to L2 running with the default frequency (matching
host's) while L1 is running with an altered one.
Keep SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING in secondary exec controls for L2 when
it was set for L1. TSC_MULTIPLIER is already correctly computed and
written by prepare_vmcs02().
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220712135009.952805-1-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
UNTRAIN_RET is not needed in native_irq_return_ldt because RET
untraining has already been done at this point.
In addition, when the RETBleed mitigation is IBPB, UNTRAIN_RET clobbers
several registers (AX, CX, DX) so here it trashes user values which are
in these registers.
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/35b0d50f-12d1-10c3-f5e8-d6c140486d4a@oracle.com
When commit 72f2ecb7ec ("ACPI: bus: Set CPPC _OSC bits for all
and when CPPC_LIB is supported") was introduced, we found collateral
damage that a number of AMD systems that supported CPPC but
didn't advertise support in _OSC stopped having a functional
amd-pstate driver. The _OSC was only enforced on Intel systems at that
time.
This was fixed for the MSR based designs by commit 8b356e536e
("ACPI: CPPC: Don't require _OSC if X86_FEATURE_CPPC is supported")
but some shared memory based designs also support CPPC but haven't
advertised support in the _OSC. Add support for those designs as well by
hardcoding the list of systems.
Fixes: 72f2ecb7ec ("ACPI: bus: Set CPPC _OSC bits for all and when CPPC_LIB is supported")
Fixes: 8b356e536e ("ACPI: CPPC: Don't require _OSC if X86_FEATURE_CPPC is supported")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/3559249.JlDtxWtqDm@natalenko.name/
Cc: 5.18+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.18+
Reported-and-tested-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name>
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
x86_has_pat_wp() is using a wrong test, as it relies on the normal
PAT configuration used by the kernel. In case the PAT MSR has been
setup by another entity (e.g. Xen hypervisor) it might return false
even if the PAT configuration is allowing WP mappings. This due to the
fact that when running as Xen PV guest the PAT MSR is setup by the
hypervisor and cannot be changed by the guest. This results in the WP
related entry to be at a different position when running as Xen PV
guest compared to the bare metal or fully virtualized case.
The correct way to test for WP support is:
1. Get the PTE protection bits needed to select WP mode by reading
__cachemode2pte_tbl[_PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP] (depending on the PAT MSR
setting this might return protection bits for a stronger mode, e.g.
UC-)
2. Translate those bits back into the real cache mode selected by those
PTE bits by reading __pte2cachemode_tbl[__pte2cm_idx(prot)]
3. Test for the cache mode to be _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP
Fixes: f88a68facd ("x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503132207.17234-1-jgross@suse.com
The build on x86_32 currently fails after commit
9bb2ec608a (objtool: Update Retpoline validation)
with:
arch/x86/kernel/../../x86/xen/xen-head.S:35: Error: no such instruction: `annotate_unret_safe'
ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE is defined in nospec-branch.h. And head_32.S is
missing this include. Fix this.
Fixes: 9bb2ec608a ("objtool: Update Retpoline validation")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/63e23f80-033f-f64e-7522-2816debbc367@kernel.org
solved and the nightmare is complete, here's the next one: speculating
after RET instructions and leaking privileged information using the now
pretty much classical covert channels.
It is called RETBleed and the mitigation effort and controlling
functionality has been modelled similar to what already existing
mitigations provide.
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Merge tag 'x86_bugs_retbleed' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull lockdep fix for x86 retbleed from Borislav Petkov:
- Fix lockdep complaint for __static_call_fixup()
* tag 'x86_bugs_retbleed' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/static_call: Serialize __static_call_fixup() properly
__static_call_fixup() invokes __static_call_transform() without holding
text_mutex, which causes lockdep to complain in text_poke_bp().
Adding the proper locking cures that, but as this is either used during
early boot or during module finalizing, it's not required to use
text_poke_bp(). Add an argument to __static_call_transform() which tells
it to use text_poke_early() for it.
Fixes: ee88d363d1 ("x86,static_call: Use alternative RET encoding")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
solved and the nightmare is complete, here's the next one: speculating
after RET instructions and leaking privileged information using the now
pretty much classical covert channels.
It is called RETBleed and the mitigation effort and controlling
functionality has been modelled similar to what already existing
mitigations provide.
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Merge tag 'x86_bugs_retbleed' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 retbleed fixes from Borislav Petkov:
"Just when you thought that all the speculation bugs were addressed and
solved and the nightmare is complete, here's the next one: speculating
after RET instructions and leaking privileged information using the
now pretty much classical covert channels.
It is called RETBleed and the mitigation effort and controlling
functionality has been modelled similar to what already existing
mitigations provide"
* tag 'x86_bugs_retbleed' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (54 commits)
x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior
x86/kexec: Disable RET on kexec
x86/bugs: Do not enable IBPB-on-entry when IBPB is not supported
x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS() back into error_entry
x86/bugs: Add Cannon lake to RETBleed affected CPU list
x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs
x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO
x86/common: Stamp out the stepping madness
KVM: VMX: Prevent RSB underflow before vmenter
x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS
KVM: VMX: Fix IBRS handling after vmexit
KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS
KVM: VMX: Convert launched argument to flags
KVM: VMX: Flatten __vmx_vcpu_run()
objtool: Re-add UNWIND_HINT_{SAVE_RESTORE}
x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask
x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exit
x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state change
x86/speculation: Fix firmware entry SPEC_CTRL handling
x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n
...
failures where the hypervisor verifies page tables and uninitialized
data in that range leads to bogus failures in those checks
- Add any potential setup_data entries supplied at boot to the identity
pagetable mappings to prevent kexec kernel boot failures. Usually, this
is not a problem for the normal kernel as those mappings are part of
the initially mapped 2M pages but if kexec gets to allocate the second
kernel somewhere else, those setup_data entries need to be mapped there
too.
- Fix objtool not to discard text references from the __tracepoints
section so that ENDBR validation still works
- Correct the setup_data types limit as it is user-visible, before 5.19
releases
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Merge tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.19_rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- Prepare for and clear .brk early in order to address XenPV guests
failures where the hypervisor verifies page tables and uninitialized
data in that range leads to bogus failures in those checks
- Add any potential setup_data entries supplied at boot to the identity
pagetable mappings to prevent kexec kernel boot failures. Usually,
this is not a problem for the normal kernel as those mappings are
part of the initially mapped 2M pages but if kexec gets to allocate
the second kernel somewhere else, those setup_data entries need to be
mapped there too.
- Fix objtool not to discard text references from the __tracepoints
section so that ENDBR validation still works
- Correct the setup_data types limit as it is user-visible, before 5.19
releases
* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.19_rc6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/boot: Fix the setup data types max limit
x86/ibt, objtool: Don't discard text references from tracepoint section
x86/compressed/64: Add identity mappings for setup_data entries
x86: Fix .brk attribute in linker script
x86: Clear .brk area at early boot
x86/xen: Use clear_bss() for Xen PV guests
Some Intel processors may use alternate predictors for RETs on
RSB-underflow. This condition may be vulnerable to Branch History
Injection (BHI) and intramode-BTI.
Kernel earlier added spectre_v2 mitigation modes (eIBRS+Retpolines,
eIBRS+LFENCE, Retpolines) which protect indirect CALLs and JMPs against
such attacks. However, on RSB-underflow, RET target prediction may
fallback to alternate predictors. As a result, RET's predicted target
may get influenced by branch history.
A new MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL bit (RRSBA_DIS_S) controls this fallback
behavior when in kernel mode. When set, RETs will not take predictions
from alternate predictors, hence mitigating RETs as well. Support for
this is enumerated by CPUID.7.2.EDX[RRSBA_CTRL] (bit2).
For spectre v2 mitigation, when a user selects a mitigation that
protects indirect CALLs and JMPs against BHI and intramode-BTI, set
RRSBA_DIS_S also to protect RETs for RSB-underflow case.
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
All the invocations unroll to __x86_return_thunk and this file
must be PIC independent.
This fixes kexec on 64-bit AMD boxes.
[ bp: Fix 32-bit build. ]
Reported-by: Edward Tran <edward.tran@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Awais Tanveer <awais.tanveer@oracle.com>
Suggested-by: Ankur Arora <ankur.a.arora@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
There are some VM configurations which have Skylake model but do not
support IBPB. In those cases, when using retbleed=ibpb, userspace is going
to be killed and kernel is going to panic.
If the CPU does not support IBPB, warn and proceed with the auto option. Also,
do not fallback to IBPB on AMD/Hygon systems if it is not supported.
Fixes: 3ebc170068 ("x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb")
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Commit
ee774dac0d ("x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry()")
moved PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry, into its own function, in
part to avoid calling error_entry() for XenPV.
However, commit
7c81c0c921 ("x86/entry: Avoid very early RET")
had to change that because the 'ret' was too early and moved it into
idtentry, bloating the text size, since idtentry is expanded for every
exception vector.
However, with the advent of xen_error_entry() in commit
d147553b64 ("x86/xen: Add UNTRAIN_RET")
it became possible to remove PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS from idtentry, back
into *error_entry().
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cannon lake is also affected by RETBleed, add it to the list.
Fixes: 6ad0ad2bf8 ("x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability")
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
The decompressed kernel initially relies on the identity map set up by
the boot/compressed kernel for accessing things like boot_params. With
the recent introduction of SEV-SNP support, the decompressed kernel
also needs to access the setup_data entries pointed to by
boot_params->hdr.setup_data.
This can lead to a crash in the kexec kernel during early boot due to
these entries not currently being included in the initial identity map,
see thread at Link below.
Include mappings for the setup_data entries in the initial identity map.
[ bp: Massage commit message and use a helper var for better readability. ]
Fixes: b190a043c4 ("x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup")
Reported-by: Jun'ichi Nomura <junichi.nomura@nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/TYCPR01MB694815CD815E98945F63C99183B49@TYCPR01MB6948.jpnprd01.prod.outlook.com
commit 72f2ecb7ec ("ACPI: bus: Set CPPC _OSC bits for all and
when CPPC_LIB is supported") added support for claiming to
support CPPC in _OSC on non-Intel platforms.
This unfortunately caused a regression on a vartiety of AMD
platforms in the field because a number of AMD platforms don't set
the `_OSC` bit 5 or 6 to indicate CPPC or CPPC v2 support.
As these AMD platforms already claim CPPC support via a dedicated
MSR from `X86_FEATURE_CPPC`, use this enable this feature rather
than requiring the `_OSC` on platforms with a dedicated MSR.
If there is additional breakage on the shared memory designs also
missing this _OSC, additional follow up changes may be needed.
Fixes: 72f2ecb7ec ("Set CPPC _OSC bits for all and when CPPC_LIB is supported")
Reported-by: Perry Yuan <perry.yuan@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Commit in Fixes added the "NOLOAD" attribute to the .brk section as a
"failsafe" measure.
Unfortunately, this leads to the linker no longer covering the .brk
section in a program header, resulting in the kernel loader not knowing
that the memory for the .brk section must be reserved.
This has led to crashes when loading the kernel as PV dom0 under Xen,
but other scenarios could be hit by the same problem (e.g. in case an
uncompressed kernel is used and the initrd is placed directly behind
it).
So drop the "NOLOAD" attribute. This has been verified to correctly
cover the .brk section by a program header of the resulting ELF file.
Fixes: e32683c6f7 ("x86/mm: Fix RESERVE_BRK() for older binutils")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220630071441.28576-4-jgross@suse.com
The .brk section has the same properties as .bss: it is an alloc-only
section and should be cleared before being used.
Not doing so is especially a problem for Xen PV guests, as the
hypervisor will validate page tables (check for writable page tables
and hypervisor private bits) before accepting them to be used.
Make sure .brk is initially zero by letting clear_bss() clear the brk
area, too.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220630071441.28576-3-jgross@suse.com
Instead of clearing the bss area in assembly code, use the clear_bss()
function.
This requires to pass the start_info address as parameter to
xen_start_kernel() in order to avoid the xen_start_info being zeroed
again.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220630071441.28576-2-jgross@suse.com
Do fine-grained Kconfig for all the various retbleed parts.
NOTE: if your compiler doesn't support return thunks this will
silently 'upgrade' your mitigation to IBPB, you might not like this.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
BTC_NO indicates that hardware is not susceptible to Branch Type Confusion.
Zen3 CPUs don't suffer BTC.
Hypervisors are expected to synthesise BTC_NO when it is appropriate
given the migration pool, to prevent kernels using heuristics.
[ bp: Massage. ]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
The whole MMIO/RETBLEED enumeration went overboard on steppings. Get
rid of all that and simply use ANY.
If a future stepping of these models would not be affected, it had
better set the relevant ARCH_CAP_$FOO_NO bit in
IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
On VMX, there are some balanced returns between the time the guest's
SPEC_CTRL value is written, and the vmenter.
Balanced returns (matched by a preceding call) are usually ok, but it's
at least theoretically possible an NMI with a deep call stack could
empty the RSB before one of the returns.
For maximum paranoia, don't allow *any* returns (balanced or otherwise)
between the SPEC_CTRL write and the vmenter.
[ bp: Fix 32-bit build. ]
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Prevent RSB underflow/poisoning attacks with RSB. While at it, add a
bunch of comments to attempt to document the current state of tribal
knowledge about RSB attacks and what exactly is being mitigated.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
For legacy IBRS to work, the IBRS bit needs to be always re-written
after vmexit, even if it's already on.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
On eIBRS systems, the returns in the vmexit return path from
__vmx_vcpu_run() to vmx_vcpu_run() are exposed to RSB poisoning attacks.
Fix that by moving the post-vmexit spec_ctrl handling to immediately
after the vmexit.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
