The attached patch adds support to generate audit messages on two cases.
The first one is a case when a multi-thread process tries to switch its
performing security context using setcon(3), but new security context is
not bounded by the old one.
type=SELINUX_ERR msg=audit(1245311998.599:17): \
op=security_bounded_transition result=denied \
oldcontext=system_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0 \
newcontext=system_u:system_r:guest_webapp_t:s0
The other one is a case when security_compute_av() masked any permissions
due to the type boundary violation.
type=SELINUX_ERR msg=audit(1245312836.035:32): \
op=security_compute_av reason=bounds \
scontext=system_u:object_r:user_webapp_t:s0 \
tcontext=system_u:object_r:shadow_t:s0:c0 \
tclass=file perms=getattr,open
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
It is a cleanup patch to cut down a line within 80 columns.
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
--
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 6 +++---
1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch enables applications to handle permissive domain correctly.
Since the v2.6.26 kernel, SELinux has supported an idea of permissive
domain which allows certain processes to work as if permissive mode,
even if the global setting is enforcing mode.
However, we don't have an application program interface to inform
what domains are permissive one, and what domains are not.
It means applications focuses on SELinux (XACE/SELinux, SE-PostgreSQL
and so on) cannot handle permissive domain correctly.
This patch add the sixth field (flags) on the reply of the /selinux/access
interface which is used to make an access control decision from userspace.
If the first bit of the flags field is positive, it means the required
access control decision is on permissive domain, so application should
allow any required actions, as the kernel doing.
This patch also has a side benefit. The av_decision.flags is set at
context_struct_compute_av(). It enables to check required permissions
without read_lock(&policy_rwlock).
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
--
security/selinux/avc.c | 2 +-
security/selinux/include/security.h | 4 +++-
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 4 ++--
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 30 +++++-------------------------
4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
It appears there was an intention to have the security server only decide
certain permissions and leave other for later as some sort of a portential
performance win. We are currently always deciding all 32 bits of
permissions and this is a useless couple of branches and wasted space.
This patch completely drops the av.decided concept.
This in a 17% reduction in the time spent in avc_has_perm_noaudit
based on oprofile sampling of a tbench benchmark.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
I started playing with pahole today and decided to put it against the
selinux structures. Found we could save a little bit of space on x86_64
(and no harm on i686) just reorganizing some structs.
Object size changes:
av_inherit: 24 -> 16
selinux_class_perm: 48 -> 40
context: 80 -> 72
Admittedly there aren't many of av_inherit or selinux_class_perm's in
the kernel (33 and 1 respectively) But the change to the size of struct
context reverberate out a bit. I can get some hard number if they are
needed, but I don't see why they would be. We do change which cacheline
context->len and context->str would be on, but I don't see that as a
problem since we are clearly going to have to load both if the context
is to be of any value. I've run with the patch and don't seem to be
having any problems.
An example of what's going on using struct av_inherit would be:
form: to:
struct av_inherit { struct av_inherit {
u16 tclass; const char **common_pts;
const char **common_pts; u32 common_base;
u32 common_base; u16 tclass;
};
(notice all I did was move u16 tclass to the end of the struct instead
of the beginning)
Memory layout before the change:
struct av_inherit {
u16 tclass; /* 2 */
/* 6 bytes hole */
const char** common_pts; /* 8 */
u32 common_base; /* 4 */
/* 4 byes padding */
/* size: 24, cachelines: 1 */
/* sum members: 14, holes: 1, sum holes: 6 */
/* padding: 4 */
};
Memory layout after the change:
struct av_inherit {
const char ** common_pts; /* 8 */
u32 common_base; /* 4 */
u16 tclass; /* 2 */
/* 2 bytes padding */
/* size: 16, cachelines: 1 */
/* sum members: 14, holes: 0, sum holes: 0 */
/* padding: 2 */
};
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Don't store the field->op in the messy (and very inconvenient for e.g.
audit_comparator()) form; translate to dense set of values and do full
validation of userland-submitted value while we are at it.
->audit_init_rule() and ->audit_match_rule() get new values now; in-tree
instances updated.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This patch provides support for including the LSM's secid in addition to
the LSM's MLS information in the NetLabel security attributes structure.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Currently when SELinux fails to allocate memory in
security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr() the NetLabel LSM domain field is set to
NULL which triggers the default NetLabel LSM domain mapping which may not
always be the desired mapping. This patch fixes this by returning an error
when the kernel is unable to allocate memory. This could result in more
failures on a system with heavy memory pressure but it is the "correct"
thing to do.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
At some point during the 2.6.27 development cycle two new fields were added
to the SELinux context structure, a string pointer and a length field. The
code in selinux_secattr_to_sid() was not modified and as a result these two
fields were left uninitialized which could result in erratic behavior,
including kernel panics, when NetLabel is used. This patch fixes the
problem by fully initializing the context in selinux_secattr_to_sid() before
use and reducing the level of direct context manipulation done to help
prevent future problems.
Please apply this to the 2.6.27-rcX release stream.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
At some point during the 2.6.27 development cycle two new fields were added
to the SELinux context structure, a string pointer and a length field. The
code in selinux_secattr_to_sid() was not modified and as a result these two
fields were left uninitialized which could result in erratic behavior,
including kernel panics, when NetLabel is used. This patch fixes the
problem by fully initializing the context in selinux_secattr_to_sid() before
use and reducing the level of direct context manipulation done to help
prevent future problems.
Please apply this to the 2.6.27-rcX release stream.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix a bug and a philosophical decision about who handles errors.
security_context_to_sid_core() was leaking a context in the common case.
This was causing problems on fedora systems which recently have started
making extensive use of this function.
In discussion it was decided that if string_to_context_struct() had an
error it was its own responsibility to clean up any mess it created
along the way.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context
under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application
to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and
helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request.
When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider
permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process
shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context
also means another thread can easily refer violated information.
The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain
has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign
a per-thread security context.
Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can
never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two
explicit or implicit ways.
The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define
a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of
existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated
name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t".
This feature requires a new policy version.
The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into
kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it.
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Replace "thing != NULL" comparisons with just "thing" to make
the code look more uniform (mixed styles were used even in the
same source file).
Signed-off-by: Vesa-Matti Kari <vmkari@cc.helsinki.fi>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
expr_isvalid() in conditional.c was off-by-one and allowed
invalid expression type COND_LAST. However, it is this header file
that needs to be fixed. That way the if-statement's disjunction's
second component reads more naturally, "if expr type is greater than
the last allowed value" ( rather than using ">=" in conditional.c):
if (expr->expr_type <= 0 || expr->expr_type > COND_LAST)
Signed-off-by: Vesa-Matti Kari <vmkari@cc.helsinki.fi>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Trivial minor fixes that change C null character style.
Signed-off-by: Vesa-Matti Kari <vmkari@cc.helsinki.fi>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This reverts commit 811f379927.
From Eric Paris:
"Please drop this patch for now. It deadlocks on ntfs-3g. I need to
rework it to handle fuse filesystems better. (casey was right)"
Currently if a FS is mounted for which SELinux policy does not define an
fs_use_* that FS will either be genfs labeled or not labeled at all.
This decision is based on the existence of a genfscon rule in policy and
is irrespective of the capabilities of the filesystem itself. This
patch allows the kernel to check if the filesystem supports security
xattrs and if so will use those if there is no fs_use_* rule in policy.
An fstype with a no fs_use_* rule but with a genfs rule will use xattrs
if available and will follow the genfs rule.
This can be particularly interesting for things like ecryptfs which
actually overlays a real underlying FS. If we define excryptfs in
policy to use xattrs we will likely get this wrong at times, so with
this path we just don't need to define it!
Overlay ecryptfs on top of NFS with no xattr support:
SELinux: initialized (dev ecryptfs, type ecryptfs), uses genfs_contexts
Overlay ecryptfs on top of ext4 with xattr support:
SELinux: initialized (dev ecryptfs, type ecryptfs), uses xattr
It is also useful as the kernel adds new FS we don't need to add them in
policy if they support xattrs and that is how we want to handle them.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
I've gotten complaints and reports about people not understanding the
meaning of the current unknown class/perm handling the kernel emits on
every policy load. Hopefully this will make make it clear to everyone
the meaning of the message and won't waste a printk the user won't care
about anyway on systems where the kernel and the policy agree on
everything.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
On Mon, 2008-06-09 at 01:24 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> Getting a few of these with FC5:
>
> SELinux: context_struct_compute_av: unrecognized class 69
> SELinux: context_struct_compute_av: unrecognized class 69
>
> one came out when I logged in.
>
> No other symptoms, yet.
Change handling of invalid classes by SELinux, reporting class values
unknown to the kernel as errors (w/ ratelimit applied) and handling
class values unknown to policy as normal denials.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
We used to protect against races of policy load in security_load_policy
by using the load_mutex. Since then we have added a new mutex,
sel_mutex, in sel_write_load() which is always held across all calls to
security_load_policy we are covered and can safely just drop this one.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The class_to_string array is referenced by tclass. My code mistakenly
was using tclass - 1. If the proceeding class is a userspace class
rather than kernel class this may cause a denial/EINVAL even if unknown
handling is set to allow. The bug shouldn't be allowing excess
privileges since those are given based on the contents of another array
which should be correctly referenced.
At this point in time its pretty unlikely this is going to cause
problems. The most recently added kernel classes which could be
affected are association, dccp_socket, and peer. Its pretty unlikely
any policy with handle_unknown=allow doesn't have association and
dccp_socket undefined (they've been around longer than unknown handling)
and peer is conditionalized on a policy cap which should only be defined
if that class exists in policy.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix an endianness bug in the handling of network node addresses by
SELinux. This yields no change on little endian hardware but fixes
the incorrect handling on big endian hardware. The network node
addresses are stored in network order in memory by checkpolicy, not in
cpu/host order, and thus should not have cpu_to_le32/le32_to_cpu
conversions applied upon policy write/read unlike other data in the
policy.
Bug reported by John Weeks of Sun, who noticed that binary policy
files built from the same policy source on x86 and sparc differed and
tracked it down to the ipv4 address handling in checkpolicy.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Formatting and syntax changes
whitespace, tabs to spaces, trailing space
put open { on same line as struct def
remove unneeded {} after if statements
change printk("Lu") to printk("llu")
convert asm/uaccess.h to linux/uaacess.h includes
remove unnecessary asm/bug.h includes
convert all users of simple_strtol to strict_strtol
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix a sleeping function called from invalid context bug by moving allocation
to the callers prior to taking the policy rdlock.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Introduce SELinux support for deferred mapping of security contexts in
the SID table upon policy reload, and use this support for inode
security contexts when the context is not yet valid under the current
policy. Only processes with CAP_MAC_ADMIN + mac_admin permission in
policy can set undefined security contexts on inodes. Inodes with
such undefined contexts are treated as having the unlabeled context
until the context becomes valid upon a policy reload that defines the
context. Context invalidation upon policy reload also uses this
support to save the context information in the SID table and later
recover it upon a subsequent policy reload that defines the context
again.
This support is to enable package managers and similar programs to set
down file contexts unknown to the system policy at the time the file
is created in order to better support placing loadable policy modules
in packages and to support build systems that need to create images of
different distro releases with different policies w/o requiring all of
the contexts to be defined or legal in the build host policy.
With this patch applied, the following sequence is possible, although
in practice it is recommended that this permission only be allowed to
specific program domains such as the package manager.
# rmdir baz
# rm bar
# touch bar
# chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # foo_exec_t is not yet defined
chcon: failed to change context of `bar' to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument
# mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz
mkdir: failed to set default file creation context to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument
# cat setundefined.te
policy_module(setundefined, 1.0)
require {
type unconfined_t;
type unlabeled_t;
}
files_type(unlabeled_t)
allow unconfined_t self:capability2 mac_admin;
# make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile setundefined.pp
# semodule -i setundefined.pp
# chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # foo_exec_t is not yet defined
# mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz
# ls -Zd bar baz
-rw-r--r-- root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t bar
drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t baz
# cat foo.te
policy_module(foo, 1.0)
type foo_exec_t;
files_type(foo_exec_t)
# make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile foo.pp
# semodule -i foo.pp # defines foo_exec_t
# ls -Zd bar baz
-rw-r--r-- root root user_u:object_r:foo_exec_t bar
drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz
# semodule -r foo
# ls -Zd bar baz
-rw-r--r-- root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t bar
drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t baz
# semodule -i foo.pp
# ls -Zd bar baz
-rw-r--r-- root root user_u:object_r:foo_exec_t bar
drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz
# semodule -r setundefined foo
# chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # no longer defined and not allowed
chcon: failed to change context of `bar' to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument
# rmdir baz
# mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz
mkdir: failed to set default file creation context to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Make secctx_to_secid() take constant secdata.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add missing consts to xattr function arguments.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch changes policydb.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
location of * in pointer declarations
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes mls_types.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
spaces used instead of tabs
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes mls.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
spaces used instead of tabs
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes hashtab.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
spaces used instead of tabs
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes context.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
include spaces around , in function calls
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes ss/conditional.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
location of * in pointer declarations
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
More formatting changes. Aside from the 80 character line limit even
the checkpatch scripts like this file now. Too bad I don't get paid by
the lines of code I change.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Make sure all printk start with KERN_*
Make sure all printk end with \n
Make sure all printk have the word 'selinux' in them
Change "function name" to "%s", __func__ (found 2 wrong)
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes sidtab.c to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
whitespace at end of lines
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
spacing around parenthesis
locateion of { around struct and else clauses
location of * in pointer declarations
removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section
useless {} in if statemetns
useless checking for NULL before kfree
fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements
and any number of other things I forgot to mention
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes services.c to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
whitespace at end of lines
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
spacing around parenthesis
locateion of { around struct and else clauses
location of * in pointer declarations
removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section
useless {} in if statemetns
useless checking for NULL before kfree
fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements
and any number of other things I forgot to mention
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes mls.c to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
whitespace at end of lines
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
spacing around parenthesis
locateion of { around struct and else clauses
location of * in pointer declarations
removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section
useless {} in if statemetns
useless checking for NULL before kfree
fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements
and any number of other things I forgot to mention
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes hashtab.c to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
whitespace at end of lines
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
spacing around parenthesis
locateion of { around struct and else clauses
location of * in pointer declarations
removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section
useless {} in if statemetns
useless checking for NULL before kfree
fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements
and any number of other things I forgot to mention
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes ebitmap.c to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
whitespace at end of lines
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
spacing around parenthesis
locateion of { around struct and else clauses
location of * in pointer declarations
removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section
useless {} in if statemetns
useless checking for NULL before kfree
fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements
and any number of other things I forgot to mention
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes conditional.c to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
whitespace at end of lines
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
spacing around parenthesis
locateion of { around struct and else clauses
location of * in pointer declarations
removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section
useless {} in if statemetns
useless checking for NULL before kfree
fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements
and any number of other things I forgot to mention
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
