As for IMA, move hardcoded EVM function calls from various places in the
kernel to the LSM infrastructure, by introducing a new LSM named 'evm'
(last and always enabled like 'ima'). The order in the Makefile ensures
that 'evm' hooks are executed after 'ima' ones.
Make EVM functions as static (except for evm_inode_init_security(), which
is exported), and register them as hook implementations in init_evm_lsm().
Also move the inline functions evm_inode_remove_acl(),
evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_set_acl() from the public
evm.h header to evm_main.c.
Unlike before (see commit to move IMA to the LSM infrastructure),
evm_inode_post_setattr(), evm_inode_post_set_acl(),
evm_inode_post_remove_acl(), and evm_inode_post_removexattr() are not
executed for private inodes.
Finally, add the LSM_ID_EVM case in lsm_list_modules_test.c
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In preparation for moving IMA and EVM to the LSM infrastructure, introduce
the inode_post_removexattr hook.
At inode_removexattr hook, EVM verifies the file's existing HMAC value. At
inode_post_removexattr, EVM re-calculates the file's HMAC with the passed
xattr removed and other file metadata.
Other LSMs could similarly take some action after successful xattr removal.
The new hook cannot return an error and cannot cause the operation to be
reverted.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
As it is currently declared, the xattr_handler structs are const but the
array containing their pointers is not. This patch makes it so that fs
modules can place them in .rodata, which makes it harder for
accidental/malicious modifications at runtime.
Signed-off-by: Wedson Almeida Filho <walmeida@microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230930050033.41174-2-wedsonaf@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
It is particularly important for the userns mount case (when a sensible
nr_inodes maximum may not be enforced) that tmpfs user xattrs be subject
to memory cgroup limiting. Leave temporary buffer allocations as is,
but change the persistent simple xattr allocations from GFP_KERNEL to
GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT. This limits kernfs's cgroupfs too, but that's good.
(I had intended to send this change earlier, but had been confused by
shmem_alloc_inode() using GFP_KERNEL, and thought a discussion would be
needed to change that too: no, I was forgetting the SLAB_ACCOUNT on that
kmem_cache, which implicitly adds __GFP_ACCOUNT to all its allocations.)
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Message-Id: <f6953e5a-4183-8314-38f2-40be60998615@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Enable "user." extended attributes on tmpfs, limiting them by tracking
the space they occupy, and deducting that space from the limited ispace
(unless tmpfs mounted with nr_inodes=0 to leave that ispace unlimited).
tmpfs inodes and simple xattrs are both unswappable, and have to be in
lowmem on a 32-bit highmem kernel: so the ispace limit is appropriate
for xattrs, without any need for a further mount option.
Add simple_xattr_space() to give approximate but deterministic estimate
of the space taken up by each xattr: with simple_xattrs_free() outputting
the space freed if required (but kernfs and even some tmpfs usages do not
require that, so don't waste time on strlen'ing if not needed).
Security and trusted xattrs were already supported: for consistency and
simplicity, account them from the same pool; though there's a small risk
that a tmpfs with enough space before would now be considered too small.
When extended attributes are used, "df -i" does show more IUsed and less
IFree than can be explained by the inodes: document that (manpage later).
xfstests tests/generic which were not run on tmpfs before but now pass:
020 037 062 070 077 097 103 117 337 377 454 486 523 533 611 618 728
with no new failures.
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <2e63b26e-df46-5baa-c7d6-f9a8dd3282c5@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
tmpfs wants to support limited user extended attributes, but kernfs
(or cgroupfs, the only kernfs with KERNFS_ROOT_SUPPORT_USER_XATTR)
already supports user extended attributes through simple xattrs: but
limited by a policy (128KiB per inode) too liberal to be used on tmpfs.
To allow a different limiting policy for tmpfs, without affecting the
policy for kernfs, change simple_xattr_set() to return the replaced or
removed xattr (if any), leaving the caller to update their accounting
then free the xattr (by simple_xattr_free(), renamed from the static
free_simple_xattr()).
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <158c6585-2aa7-d4aa-90ff-f7c3f8fe407c@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Commit f2620f166e caused the kernel to start emitting POSIX ACL xattrs
for NFSv4 inodes, which it doesn't support. The only other user of
generic_listxattr is HFS (classic) and it doesn't support POSIX ACLs
either.
Fixes: f2620f166e xattr: simplify listxattr helpers
Reported-by: Ondrej Valousek <ondrej.valousek.xm@renesas.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Message-Id: <20230516124655.82283-1-jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
All codepaths that don't want to implement POSIX ACLs should simply not
implement the associated inode operations instead of relying on
IOP_XATTR. That's the case for all filesystems today.
For vfs_listxattr() all filesystems that explicitly turn of xattrs for a
given inode all set inode->i_op to a dedicated set of inode operations
that doesn't implement ->listxattr(). We can remove the dependency of
vfs_listxattr() on IOP_XATTR.
Removing this dependency will allow us to decouple POSIX ACLs from
IOP_XATTR and they can still be listed even if no other xattr handlers
are implemented. Otherwise we would have to implement elaborate schemes
to raise IOP_XATTR even if sb->s_xattr is set to NULL.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
his helpers is really just used to check for user.* xattr support so
don't make it pointlessly generic.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
The generic_listxattr() and simple_xattr_list() helpers list xattrs and
contain duplicated code. Add two helpers that both generic_listxattr()
and simple_xattr_list() can use.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iHUEABYKAB0WIQRAhzRXHqcMeLMyaSiRxhvAZXjcogUCY+5NlQAKCRCRxhvAZXjc
orOaAP9i2h3OJy95nO2Fpde0Bt2UT+oulKCCcGlvXJ8/+TQpyQD/ZQq47gFQ0EAz
Br5NxeyGeecAb0lHpFz+CpLGsxMrMwQ=
=+BG5
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'fs.idmapped.v6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping
Pull vfs idmapping updates from Christian Brauner:
- Last cycle we introduced the dedicated struct mnt_idmap type for
mount idmapping and the required infrastucture in 256c8aed2b ("fs:
introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts"). As promised in last
cycle's pull request message this converts everything to rely on
struct mnt_idmap.
Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached
to a mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy
to conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with
namespaces that are relevant on the mount level. Especially for
non-vfs developers without detailed knowledge in this area this was a
potential source for bugs.
This finishes the conversion. Instead of passing the plain namespace
around this updates all places that currently take a pointer to a
mnt_userns with a pointer to struct mnt_idmap.
Now that the conversion is done all helpers down to the really
low-level helpers only accept a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of
two namespace arguments.
Conflating mount and other idmappings will now cause the compiler to
complain loudly thus eliminating the possibility of any bugs. This
makes it impossible for filesystem developers to mix up mount and
filesystem idmappings as they are two distinct types and require
distinct helpers that cannot be used interchangeably.
Everything associated with struct mnt_idmap is moved into a single
separate file. With that change no code can poke around in struct
mnt_idmap. It can only be interacted with through dedicated helpers.
That means all filesystems are and all of the vfs is completely
oblivious to the actual implementation of idmappings.
We are now also able to extend struct mnt_idmap as we see fit. For
example, we can decouple it completely from namespaces for users that
don't require or don't want to use them at all. We can also extend
the concept of idmappings so we can cover filesystem specific
requirements.
In combination with the vfs{g,u}id_t work we finished in v6.2 this
makes this feature substantially more robust and thus difficult to
implement wrong by a given filesystem and also protects the vfs.
- Enable idmapped mounts for tmpfs and fulfill a longstanding request.
A long-standing request from users had been to make it possible to
create idmapped mounts for tmpfs. For example, to share the host's
tmpfs mount between multiple sandboxes. This is a prerequisite for
some advanced Kubernetes cases. Systemd also has a range of use-cases
to increase service isolation. And there are more users of this.
However, with all of the other work going on this was way down on the
priority list but luckily someone other than ourselves picked this
up.
As usual the patch is tiny as all the infrastructure work had been
done multiple kernel releases ago. In addition to all the tests that
we already have I requested that Rodrigo add a dedicated tmpfs
testsuite for idmapped mounts to xfstests. It is to be included into
xfstests during the v6.3 development cycle. This should add a slew of
additional tests.
* tag 'fs.idmapped.v6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping: (26 commits)
shmem: support idmapped mounts for tmpfs
fs: move mnt_idmap
fs: port vfs{g,u}id helpers to mnt_idmap
fs: port fs{g,u}id helpers to mnt_idmap
fs: port i_{g,u}id_into_vfs{g,u}id() to mnt_idmap
fs: port i_{g,u}id_{needs_}update() to mnt_idmap
quota: port to mnt_idmap
fs: port privilege checking helpers to mnt_idmap
fs: port inode_owner_or_capable() to mnt_idmap
fs: port inode_init_owner() to mnt_idmap
fs: port acl to mnt_idmap
fs: port xattr to mnt_idmap
fs: port ->permission() to pass mnt_idmap
fs: port ->fileattr_set() to pass mnt_idmap
fs: port ->set_acl() to pass mnt_idmap
fs: port ->get_acl() to pass mnt_idmap
fs: port ->tmpfile() to pass mnt_idmap
fs: port ->rename() to pass mnt_idmap
fs: port ->mknod() to pass mnt_idmap
fs: port ->mkdir() to pass mnt_idmap
...
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
256c8aed2b ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts").
This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap.
Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a
mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to
conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces
that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers
without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for
bugs.
Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the
really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of
two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two
eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems
only operate on struct mnt_idmap.
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
256c8aed2b ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts").
This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap.
Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a
mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to
conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces
that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers
without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for
bugs.
Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the
really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of
two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two
eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems
only operate on struct mnt_idmap.
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
256c8aed2b ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts").
This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap.
Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a
mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to
conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces
that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers
without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for
bugs.
Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the
really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of
two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two
eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems
only operate on struct mnt_idmap.
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
256c8aed2b ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts").
This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap.
Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a
mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to
conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces
that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers
without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for
bugs.
Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the
really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of
two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two
eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems
only operate on struct mnt_idmap.
Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
The file locking definitions have lived in fs.h since the dawn of time,
but they are only used by a small subset of the source files that
include it.
Move the file locking definitions to a new header file, and add the
appropriate #include directives to the source files that need them. By
doing this we trim down fs.h a bit and limit the amount of rebuilding
that has to be done when we make changes to the file locking APIs.
Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iHUEABYKAB0WIQRAhzRXHqcMeLMyaSiRxhvAZXjcogUCY5bw/wAKCRCRxhvAZXjc
ol79AQCsHS9s78dLUvdasfQ1023dyF9zaQ8XGkDO6tRssJzGAAD7B8odxDsfQgjQ
Qzzn9YPZVUgHjd4xBg21UVPmRP5snwQ=
=wYgr
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'fs.xattr.simple.rework.rbtree.rwlock.v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping
Pull simple-xattr updates from Christian Brauner:
"This ports the simple xattr infrastucture to rely on a simple rbtree
protected by a read-write lock instead of a linked list protected by a
spinlock.
A while ago we received reports about scaling issues for filesystems
using the simple xattr infrastructure that also support setting a
larger number of xattrs. Specifically, cgroups and tmpfs.
Both cgroupfs and tmpfs can be mounted by unprivileged users in
unprivileged containers and root in an unprivileged container can set
an unrestricted number of security.* xattrs and privileged users can
also set unlimited trusted.* xattrs. A few more words on further that
below. Other xattrs such as user.* are restricted for kernfs-based
instances to a fairly limited number.
As there are apparently users that have a fairly large number of
xattrs we should scale a bit better. Using a simple linked list
protected by a spinlock used for set, get, and list operations doesn't
scale well if users use a lot of xattrs even if it's not a crazy
number.
Let's switch to a simple rbtree protected by a rwlock. It scales way
better and gets rid of the perf issues some people reported. We
originally had fancier solutions even using an rcu+seqlock protected
rbtree but we had concerns about being to clever and also that
deletion from an rbtree with rcu+seqlock isn't entirely safe.
The rbtree plus rwlock is perfectly fine. By far the most common
operation is getting an xattr. While setting an xattr is not and
should be comparatively rare. And listxattr() often only happens when
copying xattrs between files or together with the contents to a new
file.
Holding a lock across listxattr() is unproblematic because it doesn't
list the values of xattrs. It can only be used to list the names of
all xattrs set on a file. And the number of xattr names that can be
listed with listxattr() is limited to XATTR_LIST_MAX aka 65536 bytes.
If a larger buffer is passed then vfs_listxattr() caps it to
XATTR_LIST_MAX and if more xattr names are found it will return
-E2BIG. In short, the maximum amount of memory that can be retrieved
via listxattr() is limited and thus listxattr() bounded.
Of course, the API is broken as documented on xattr(7) already. While
I have no idea how the xattr api ended up in this state we should
probably try to come up with something here at some point. An iterator
pattern similar to readdir() as an alternative to listxattr() or
something else.
Right now it is extremly strange that users can set millions of xattrs
but then can't use listxattr() to know which xattrs are actually set.
And it's really trivial to do:
for i in {1..1000000}; do setfattr -n security.$i -v $i ./file1; done
And around 5000 xattrs it's impossible to use listxattr() to figure
out which xattrs are actually set. So I have suggested that we try to
limit the number of xattrs for simple xattrs at least. But that's a
future patch and I don't consider it very urgent.
A bonus of this port to rbtree+rwlock is that we shrink the memory
consumption for users of the simple xattr infrastructure.
This also adds kernel documentation to all the functions"
* tag 'fs.xattr.simple.rework.rbtree.rwlock.v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping:
xattr: use rbtree for simple_xattrs
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=klFk
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20221212' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:
- Improve the error handling in the device cgroup such that memory
allocation failures when updating the access policy do not
potentially alter the policy.
- Some minor fixes to reiserfs to ensure that it properly releases
LSM-related xattr values.
- Update the security_socket_getpeersec_stream() LSM hook to take
sockptr_t values.
Previously the net/BPF folks updated the getsockopt code in the
network stack to leverage the sockptr_t type to make it easier to
pass both kernel and __user pointers, but unfortunately when they did
so they didn't convert the LSM hook.
While there was/is no immediate risk by not converting the LSM hook,
it seems like this is a mistake waiting to happen so this patch
proactively does the LSM hook conversion.
- Convert vfs_getxattr_alloc() to return an int instead of a ssize_t
and cleanup the callers. Internally the function was never going to
return anything larger than an int and the callers were doing some
very odd things casting the return value; this patch fixes all that
and helps bring a bit of sanity to vfs_getxattr_alloc() and its
callers.
- More verbose, and helpful, LSM debug output when the system is booted
with "lsm.debug" on the command line. There are examples in the
commit description, but the quick summary is that this patch provides
better information about which LSMs are enabled and the ordering in
which they are processed.
- General comment and kernel-doc fixes and cleanups.
* tag 'lsm-pr-20221212' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
lsm: Fix description of fs_context_parse_param
lsm: Add/fix return values in lsm_hooks.h and fix formatting
lsm: Clarify documentation of vm_enough_memory hook
reiserfs: Add missing calls to reiserfs_security_free()
lsm,fs: fix vfs_getxattr_alloc() return type and caller error paths
device_cgroup: Roll back to original exceptions after copy failure
LSM: Better reporting of actual LSMs at boot
lsm: make security_socket_getpeersec_stream() sockptr_t safe
audit: Fix some kernel-doc warnings
lsm: remove obsoleted comments for security hooks
fs: edit a comment made in bad taste
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQEzBAABCgAdFiEEkJ7fqygL5xE8uB3PUwOZruX0MckFAmOTX7AACgkQUwOZruX0
MclZNgf/XAoQbNRkB0H8oi3CS7RWl0iBlmPLKtNo39NuNgW6RCDY4F9rYt6F+dfq
P4EuYayZwYw9g/JotEVXtg6Sp7FINKHkMMvlvwa+VsN1fPVM1AbD4mos5imDsj0f
tkDVNXHsEOIc2tq0Ov9KUARCN59WpjV5dS0YQmCEsABIJQ1yu9FbCfm6WX3tH4Wd
l+z6SSU38ZjQw4fSsc4rEqxf3imynCz9fVJYdfUKsg5WH7TswBQbYEAExMPhd6df
qioM1t9u/nBFhOjw1VVgElx7PUijANczyiatU00jNRbMjCLlZcs5yjvv5XTgfRIe
u2UJZJB0+6eTqAjA8neC4Z6eKnezwQ==
=Cizh
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'fs.xattr.simple.noaudit.v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping
Pull xattr audit fix from Seth Forshee:
"This is a single patch to remove auditing of the capability check in
simple_xattr_list().
This check is done to check whether trusted xattrs should be included
by listxattr(2). SELinux will normally log a denial when capable() is
called and the task's SELinux context doesn't have the corresponding
capability permission allowed, which can end up spamming the log.
Since a failed check here cannot be used to infer malicious intent,
auditing is of no real value, and it makes sense to stop auditing the
capability check"
* tag 'fs.xattr.simple.noaudit.v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping:
fs: don't audit the capability check in simple_xattr_list()
The vfs_getxattr_alloc() function currently returns a ssize_t value
despite the fact that it only uses int values internally for return
values. Fix this by converting vfs_getxattr_alloc() to return an
int type and adjust the callers as necessary. As part of these
caller modifications, some of the callers are fixed to properly free
the xattr value buffer on both success and failure to ensure that
memory is not leaked in the failure case.
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
A while ago Vasily reported that it is possible to set a large number of
xattrs on inodes of filesystems that make use of the simple xattr
infrastructure. This includes all kernfs-based filesystems that support
xattrs (e.g., cgroupfs and tmpfs). Both cgroupfs and tmpfs can be
mounted by unprivileged users in unprivileged containers and root in an
unprivileged container can set an unrestricted number of security.*
xattrs and privileged users can also set unlimited trusted.* xattrs. As
there are apparently users that have a fairly large number of xattrs we
should scale a bit better. Other xattrs such as user.* are restricted
for kernfs-based instances to a fairly limited number.
Using a simple linked list protected by a spinlock used for set, get,
and list operations doesn't scale well if users use a lot of xattrs even
if it's not a crazy number. There's no need to bring in the big guns
like rhashtables or rw semaphores for this. An rbtree with a rwlock, or
limited rcu semanics and seqlock is enough.
It scales within the constraints we are working in. By far the most
common operation is getting an xattr. Setting xattrs should be a
moderately rare operation. And listxattr() often only happens when
copying xattrs between files or together with the contents to a new
file. Holding a lock across listxattr() is unproblematic because it
doesn't list the values of xattrs. It can only be used to list the names
of all xattrs set on a file. And the number of xattr names that can be
listed with listxattr() is limited to XATTR_LIST_MAX aka 65536 bytes. If
a larger buffer is passed then vfs_listxattr() caps it to XATTR_LIST_MAX
and if more xattr names are found it will return -E2BIG. In short, the
maximum amount of memory that can be retrieved via listxattr() is
limited.
Of course, the API is broken as documented on xattr(7) already. In the
future we might want to address this but for now this is the world we
live in and have lived for a long time. But it does indeed mean that
once an application goes over XATTR_LIST_MAX limit of xattrs set on an
inode it isn't possible to copy the file and include its xattrs in the
copy unless the caller knows all xattrs or limits the copy of the xattrs
to important ones it knows by name (At least for tmpfs, and kernfs-based
filesystems. Other filesystems might provide ways of achieving this.).
Bonus of this port to rbtree+rwlock is that we shrink the memory
consumption for users of the simple xattr infrastructure.
Also add proper kernel documentation to all the functions.
A big thanks to Paul for his comments.
Cc: Vasily Averin <vvs@openvz.org>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
The check being unconditional may lead to unwanted denials reported by
LSMs when a process has the capability granted by DAC, but denied by an
LSM. In the case of SELinux such denials are a problem, since they can't
be effectively filtered out via the policy and when not silenced, they
produce noise that may hide a true problem or an attack.
Checking for the capability only if any trusted xattr is actually
present wouldn't really address the issue, since calling listxattr(2) on
such node on its own doesn't indicate an explicit attempt to see the
trusted xattrs. Additionally, it could potentially leak the presence of
trusted xattrs to an unprivileged user if they can check for the denials
(e.g. through dmesg).
Therefore, it's best (and simplest) to keep the check unconditional and
instead use ns_capable_noaudit() that will silence any associated LSM
denials.
Fixes: 38f3865744 ("xattr: extract simple_xattr code from tmpfs")
Reported-by: Martin Pitt <mpitt@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Convert an initial portion to rely on struct mnt_idmap by converting the
high level xattr helpers.
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Now that the posix acl api is active we can remove all the hacky helpers
we had to keep around for all these years and also remove the set and
get posix acl xattr handler methods as they aren't needed anymore.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
In previous patches we built a new posix api solely around get and set
inode operations. Now that we have all the pieces in place we can switch
the system calls and the vfs over to only rely on this api when
interacting with posix acls. This finally removes all type unsafety and
type conversion issues explained in detail in [1] that we aim to get rid
of.
With the new posix acl api we immediately translate into an appropriate
kernel internal struct posix_acl format both when getting and setting
posix acls. This is a stark contrast to before were we hacked unsafe raw
values into the uapi struct that was stored in a void pointer relying
and having filesystems and security modules hack around in the uapi
struct as well.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1]
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Now that posix acls have a proper api us it to copy them.
All filesystems that can serve as lower or upper layers for overlayfs
have gained support for the new posix acl api in previous patches.
So switch all internal overlayfs codepaths for copying posix acls to the
new posix acl api.
Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Split out the generic checks whether an inode allows writing xattrs. Since
security.* and system.* xattrs don't have any restrictions and we're going
to split out posix acls into a dedicated api we will use this helper to
check whether we can write posix acls.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
The is_posix_acl_xattr() helper was added in 0c5fd887d2 ("acl: move
idmapped mount fixup into vfs_{g,s}etxattr()") to remove the open-coded
checks for POSIX ACLs. We missed to update two locations. Switch them to
use the helper.
Cc: Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) <sforshee@kernel.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) <sforshee@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Now that we don't perform translations directly in vfs_setxattr()
anymore we can constify the @value argument in vfs_setxattr(). This also
allows us to remove the hack to cast from a const in ovl_do_setxattr().
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) <sforshee@kernel.org>
The uapi POSIX ACL struct passed through the value argument during
setxattr() contains {g,u}id values encoded via ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries
that should actually be stored in the form of k{g,u}id_t (See [1] for a
long explanation of the issue.).
In 0c5fd887d2 ("acl: move idmapped mount fixup into vfs_{g,s}etxattr()")
we took the mount's idmapping into account in order to let overlayfs
handle POSIX ACLs on idmapped layers correctly. The fixup is currently
performed directly in vfs_setxattr() which piles on top of the earlier
hackiness by handling the mount's idmapping and stuff the vfs{g,u}id_t
values into the uapi struct as well. While that is all correct and works
fine it's just ugly.
Now that we have introduced vfs_make_posix_acl() earlier move handling
idmapped mounts out of vfs_setxattr() and into the POSIX ACL handler
where it belongs.
Note that we also need to call vfs_make_posix_acl() for EVM which
interpretes POSIX ACLs during security_inode_setxattr(). Leave them a
longer comment for future reference.
All filesystems that support idmapped mounts via FS_ALLOW_IDMAP use the
standard POSIX ACL xattr handlers and are covered by this change. This
includes overlayfs which simply calls vfs_{g,s}etxattr().
The following filesystems use custom POSIX ACL xattr handlers: 9p, cifs,
ecryptfs, and ntfs3 (and overlayfs but we've covered that in the paragraph
above) and none of them support idmapped mounts yet.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org/ [1]
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) <sforshee@kernel.org>
This cycle we added support for mounting overlayfs on top of idmapped mounts.
Recently I've started looking into potential corner cases when trying to add
additional tests and I noticed that reporting for POSIX ACLs is currently wrong
when using idmapped layers with overlayfs mounted on top of it.
I'm going to give a rather detailed explanation to both the origin of the
problem and the solution.
Let's assume the user creates the following directory layout and they have a
rootfs /var/lib/lxc/c1/rootfs. The files in this rootfs are owned as you would
expect files on your host system to be owned. For example, ~/.bashrc for your
regular user would be owned by 1000:1000 and /root/.bashrc would be owned by
0:0. IOW, this is just regular boring filesystem tree on an ext4 or xfs
filesystem.
The user chooses to set POSIX ACLs using the setfacl binary granting the user
with uid 4 read, write, and execute permissions for their .bashrc file:
setfacl -m u:4:rwx /var/lib/lxc/c2/rootfs/home/ubuntu/.bashrc
Now they to expose the whole rootfs to a container using an idmapped mount. So
they first create:
mkdir -pv /vol/contpool/{ctrover,merge,lowermap,overmap}
mkdir -pv /vol/contpool/ctrover/{over,work}
chown 10000000:10000000 /vol/contpool/ctrover/{over,work}
The user now creates an idmapped mount for the rootfs:
mount-idmapped/mount-idmapped --map-mount=b:0:10000000:65536 \
/var/lib/lxc/c2/rootfs \
/vol/contpool/lowermap
This for example makes it so that /var/lib/lxc/c2/rootfs/home/ubuntu/.bashrc
which is owned by uid and gid 1000 as being owned by uid and gid 10001000 at
/vol/contpool/lowermap/home/ubuntu/.bashrc.
Assume the user wants to expose these idmapped mounts through an overlayfs
mount to a container.
mount -t overlay overlay \
-o lowerdir=/vol/contpool/lowermap, \
upperdir=/vol/contpool/overmap/over, \
workdir=/vol/contpool/overmap/work \
/vol/contpool/merge
The user can do this in two ways:
(1) Mount overlayfs in the initial user namespace and expose it to the
container.
(2) Mount overlayfs on top of the idmapped mounts inside of the container's
user namespace.
Let's assume the user chooses the (1) option and mounts overlayfs on the host
and then changes into a container which uses the idmapping 0:10000000:65536
which is the same used for the two idmapped mounts.
Now the user tries to retrieve the POSIX ACLs using the getfacl command
getfacl -n /vol/contpool/lowermap/home/ubuntu/.bashrc
and to their surprise they see:
# file: vol/contpool/merge/home/ubuntu/.bashrc
# owner: 1000
# group: 1000
user::rw-
user:4294967295:rwx
group::r--
mask::rwx
other::r--
indicating the the uid wasn't correctly translated according to the idmapped
mount. The problem is how we currently translate POSIX ACLs. Let's inspect the
callchain in this example:
idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536
caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536
overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:0:4k /* initial idmapping */
sys_getxattr()
-> path_getxattr()
-> getxattr()
-> do_getxattr()
|> vfs_getxattr()
| -> __vfs_getxattr()
| -> handler->get == ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get()
| -> ovl_xattr_get()
| -> vfs_getxattr()
| -> __vfs_getxattr()
| -> handler->get() /* lower filesystem callback */
|> posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user()
{
4 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 4);
4 = mapped_kuid_fs(&init_user_ns /* no idmapped mount */, 4);
/* FAILURE */
-1 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 4);
}
If the user chooses to use option (2) and mounts overlayfs on top of idmapped
mounts inside the container things don't look that much better:
idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536
caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536
overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:10000000:65536
sys_getxattr()
-> path_getxattr()
-> getxattr()
-> do_getxattr()
|> vfs_getxattr()
| -> __vfs_getxattr()
| -> handler->get == ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get()
| -> ovl_xattr_get()
| -> vfs_getxattr()
| -> __vfs_getxattr()
| -> handler->get() /* lower filesystem callback */
|> posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user()
{
4 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 4);
4 = mapped_kuid_fs(&init_user_ns, 4);
/* FAILURE */
-1 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 4);
}
As is easily seen the problem arises because the idmapping of the lower mount
isn't taken into account as all of this happens in do_gexattr(). But
do_getxattr() is always called on an overlayfs mount and inode and thus cannot
possible take the idmapping of the lower layers into account.
This problem is similar for fscaps but there the translation happens as part of
vfs_getxattr() already. Let's walk through an fscaps overlayfs callchain:
setcap 'cap_net_raw+ep' /var/lib/lxc/c2/rootfs/home/ubuntu/.bashrc
The expected outcome here is that we'll receive the cap_net_raw capability as
we are able to map the uid associated with the fscap to 0 within our container.
IOW, we want to see 0 as the result of the idmapping translations.
If the user chooses option (1) we get the following callchain for fscaps:
idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536
caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536
overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:0:4k /* initial idmapping */
sys_getxattr()
-> path_getxattr()
-> getxattr()
-> do_getxattr()
-> vfs_getxattr()
-> xattr_getsecurity()
-> security_inode_getsecurity() ________________________________
-> cap_inode_getsecurity() | |
{ V |
10000000 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* overlayfs idmapping */, 10000000); |
10000000 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:0:4k /* no idmapped mount */, 10000000); |
/* Expected result is 0 and thus that we own the fscap. */ |
0 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 10000000); |
} |
-> vfs_getxattr_alloc() |
-> handler->get == ovl_other_xattr_get() |
-> vfs_getxattr() |
-> xattr_getsecurity() |
-> security_inode_getsecurity() |
-> cap_inode_getsecurity() |
{ |
0 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* lower s_user_ns */, 0); |
10000000 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:10000000:65536 /* idmapped mount */, 0); |
10000000 = from_kuid(0:0:4k /* overlayfs idmapping */, 10000000); |
|____________________________________________________________________|
}
-> vfs_getxattr_alloc()
-> handler->get == /* lower filesystem callback */
And if the user chooses option (2) we get:
idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536
caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536
overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:10000000:65536
sys_getxattr()
-> path_getxattr()
-> getxattr()
-> do_getxattr()
-> vfs_getxattr()
-> xattr_getsecurity()
-> security_inode_getsecurity() _______________________________
-> cap_inode_getsecurity() | |
{ V |
10000000 = make_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* overlayfs idmapping */, 0); |
10000000 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:0:4k /* no idmapped mount */, 10000000); |
/* Expected result is 0 and thus that we own the fscap. */ |
0 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 10000000); |
} |
-> vfs_getxattr_alloc() |
-> handler->get == ovl_other_xattr_get() |
|-> vfs_getxattr() |
-> xattr_getsecurity() |
-> security_inode_getsecurity() |
-> cap_inode_getsecurity() |
{ |
0 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* lower s_user_ns */, 0); |
10000000 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:10000000:65536 /* idmapped mount */, 0); |
0 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* overlayfs idmapping */, 10000000); |
|____________________________________________________________________|
}
-> vfs_getxattr_alloc()
-> handler->get == /* lower filesystem callback */
We can see how the translation happens correctly in those cases as the
conversion happens within the vfs_getxattr() helper.
For POSIX ACLs we need to do something similar. However, in contrast to fscaps
we cannot apply the fix directly to the kernel internal posix acl data
structure as this would alter the cached values and would also require a rework
of how we currently deal with POSIX ACLs in general which almost never take the
filesystem idmapping into account (the noteable exception being FUSE but even
there the implementation is special) and instead retrieve the raw values based
on the initial idmapping.
The correct values are then generated right before returning to userspace. The
fix for this is to move taking the mount's idmapping into account directly in
vfs_getxattr() instead of having it be part of posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user().
To this end we split out two small and unexported helpers
posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() and posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt(). The
former to be called in vfs_getxattr() and the latter to be called in
vfs_setxattr().
Let's go back to the original example. Assume the user chose option (1) and
mounted overlayfs on top of idmapped mounts on the host:
idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536
caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536
overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:0:4k /* initial idmapping */
sys_getxattr()
-> path_getxattr()
-> getxattr()
-> do_getxattr()
|> vfs_getxattr()
| |> __vfs_getxattr()
| | -> handler->get == ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get()
| | -> ovl_xattr_get()
| | -> vfs_getxattr()
| | |> __vfs_getxattr()
| | | -> handler->get() /* lower filesystem callback */
| | |> posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt()
| | {
| | 4 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 4);
| | 10000004 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:10000000:65536 /* lower idmapped mount */, 4);
| | 10000004 = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004);
| | |_______________________
| | } |
| | |
| |> posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() |
| { |
| V
| 10000004 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004);
| 10000004 = mapped_kuid_fs(&init_user_ns /* no idmapped mount */, 10000004);
| 10000004 = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004);
| } |_________________________________________________
| |
| |
|> posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() |
{ V
10000004 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* init_user_ns */, 10000004);
/* SUCCESS */
4 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmapping */, 10000004);
}
And similarly if the user chooses option (1) and mounted overayfs on top of
idmapped mounts inside the container:
idmapped mount /vol/contpool/merge: 0:10000000:65536
caller's idmapping: 0:10000000:65536
overlayfs idmapping (ofs->creator_cred): 0:10000000:65536
sys_getxattr()
-> path_getxattr()
-> getxattr()
-> do_getxattr()
|> vfs_getxattr()
| |> __vfs_getxattr()
| | -> handler->get == ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get()
| | -> ovl_xattr_get()
| | -> vfs_getxattr()
| | |> __vfs_getxattr()
| | | -> handler->get() /* lower filesystem callback */
| | |> posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt()
| | {
| | 4 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 4);
| | 10000004 = mapped_kuid_fs(0:10000000:65536 /* lower idmapped mount */, 4);
| | 10000004 = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004);
| | |_______________________
| | } |
| | |
| |> posix_acl_getxattr_idmapped_mnt() |
| { V
| 10000004 = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, 10000004);
| 10000004 = mapped_kuid_fs(&init_user_ns /* no idmapped mount */, 10000004);
| 10000004 = from_kuid(0(&init_user_ns, 10000004);
| |_________________________________________________
| } |
| |
|> posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() |
{ V
10000004 = make_kuid(0:0:4k /* init_user_ns */, 10000004);
/* SUCCESS */
4 = from_kuid(0:10000000:65536 /* caller's idmappings */, 10000004);
}
The last remaining problem we need to fix here is ovl_get_acl(). During
ovl_permission() overlayfs will call:
ovl_permission()
-> generic_permission()
-> acl_permission_check()
-> check_acl()
-> get_acl()
-> inode->i_op->get_acl() == ovl_get_acl()
> get_acl() /* on the underlying filesystem)
->inode->i_op->get_acl() == /*lower filesystem callback */
-> posix_acl_permission()
passing through the get_acl request to the underlying filesystem. This will
retrieve the acls stored in the lower filesystem without taking the idmapping
of the underlying mount into account as this would mean altering the cached
values for the lower filesystem. So we block using ACLs for now until we
decided on a nice way to fix this. Note this limitation both in the
documentation and in the code.
The most straightforward solution would be to have ovl_get_acl() simply
duplicate the ACLs, update the values according to the idmapped mount and
return it to acl_permission_check() so it can be used in posix_acl_permission()
forgetting them afterwards. This is a bit heavy handed but fairly
straightforward otherwise.
Link: https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped/issues/9
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220708090134.385160-2-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
This splits off do_getxattr function from the getxattr function. This will
allow io_uring to call it from its io worker.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Roesch <shr@fb.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220323154420.3301504-3-shr@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
This splits of the setup part of the function setxattr in its own
dedicated function called setxattr_copy. In addition it also exposes a new
function called do_setxattr for making the setxattr call.
This makes it possible to call these two functions from io_uring in the
processing of an xattr request.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Roesch <shr@fb.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220323154420.3301504-2-shr@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Last cycle we extended the idmapped mounts infrastructure to support
idmapped mounts of idmapped filesystems (No such filesystem yet exist.).
Since then, the meaning of an idmapped mount is a mount whose idmapping
is different from the filesystems idmapping.
While doing that work we missed to adapt the acl translation helpers.
They still assume that checking for the identity mapping is enough. But
they need to use the no_idmapping() helper instead.
Note, POSIX ACLs are always translated right at the userspace-kernel
boundary using the caller's current idmapping and the initial idmapping.
The order depends on whether we're coming from or going to userspace.
The filesystem's idmapping doesn't matter at the border.
Consequently, if a non-idmapped mount is passed we need to make sure to
always pass the initial idmapping as the mount's idmapping and not the
filesystem idmapping. Since it's irrelevant here it would yield invalid
ids and prevent setting acls for filesystems that are mountable in a
userns and support posix acls (tmpfs and fuse).
I verified the regression reported in [1] and verified that this patch
fixes it. A regression test will be added to xfstests in parallel.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215849 [1]
Fixes: bd303368b7 ("fs: support mapped mounts of mapped filesystems")
Cc: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.17
Cc: <regressions@lists.linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Fix kernel-doc warnings in xattr.c:
../fs/xattr.c:257: warning: Function parameter or member 'mnt_userns' not described in '__vfs_setxattr_locked'
../fs/xattr.c:485: warning: Function parameter or member 'mnt_userns' not described in '__vfs_removexattr_locked'
and fix one function whose kernel-doc was not in the correct format.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210216042929.8931-4-rdunlap@infradead.org
Fixes: 71bc356f93 ("commoncap: handle idmapped mounts")
Fixes: b1ab7e4b2a ("VFS: Factor out part of vfs_setxattr so it can be called from the SELinux hook for inode_setsecctx.")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
The may_follow_link(), may_linkat(), may_lookup(), may_open(),
may_o_create(), may_create_in_sticky(), may_delete(), and may_create()
helpers determine whether the caller is privileged enough to perform the
associated operations. Let them handle idmapped mounts by mapping the
inode or fsids according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the
checks are identical to non-idmapped inodes. The patch takes care to
retrieve the mount's user namespace right before performing permission
checks and passing it down into the fileystem so the user namespace
can't change in between by someone idmapping a mount that is currently
not idmapped. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so
non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-13-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
When interacting with user namespace and non-user namespace aware
filesystem capabilities the vfs will perform various security checks to
determine whether or not the filesystem capabilities can be used by the
caller, whether they need to be removed and so on. The main
infrastructure for this resides in the capability codepaths but they are
called through the LSM security infrastructure even though they are not
technically an LSM or optional. This extends the existing security hooks
security_inode_removexattr(), security_inode_killpriv(),
security_inode_getsecurity() to pass down the mount's user namespace and
makes them aware of idmapped mounts.
In order to actually get filesystem capabilities from disk the
capability infrastructure exposes the get_vfs_caps_from_disk() helper.
For user namespace aware filesystem capabilities a root uid is stored
alongside the capabilities.
In order to determine whether the caller can make use of the filesystem
capability or whether it needs to be ignored it is translated according
to the superblock's user namespace. If it can be translated to uid 0
according to that id mapping the caller can use the filesystem
capabilities stored on disk. If we are accessing the inode that holds
the filesystem capabilities through an idmapped mount we map the root
uid according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are
identical to non-idmapped mounts: reading filesystem caps from disk
enforces that the root uid associated with the filesystem capability
must have a mapping in the superblock's user namespace and that the
caller is either in the same user namespace or is a descendant of the
superblock's user namespace. For filesystems that are mountable inside
user namespace the caller can just mount the filesystem and won't
usually need to idmap it. If they do want to idmap it they can create an
idmapped mount and mark it with a user namespace they created and which
is thus a descendant of s_user_ns. For filesystems that are not
mountable inside user namespaces the descendant rule is trivially true
because the s_user_ns will be the initial user namespace.
If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped
mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-11-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
When interacting with extended attributes the vfs verifies that the
caller is privileged over the inode with which the extended attribute is
associated. For posix access and posix default extended attributes a uid
or gid can be stored on-disk. Let the functions handle posix extended
attributes on idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an
idmapped mount we need to map it according to the mount's user
namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts.
This has no effect for e.g. security xattrs since they don't store uids
or gids and don't perform permission checks on them like posix acls do.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-10-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
The posix acl permission checking helpers determine whether a caller is
privileged over an inode according to the acls associated with the
inode. Add helpers that make it possible to handle acls on idmapped
mounts.
The vfs and the filesystems targeted by this first iteration make use of
posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user() and posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() to
translate basic posix access and default permissions such as the
ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP type according to the initial user namespace (or
the superblock's user namespace) to and from the caller's current user
namespace. Adapt these two helpers to handle idmapped mounts whereby we
either map from or into the mount's user namespace depending on in which
direction we're translating.
Similarly, cap_convert_nscap() is used by the vfs to translate user
namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities from the
superblock's user namespace to the caller's user namespace. Enable it to
handle idmapped mounts by accounting for the mount's user namespace.
In addition the fileystems targeted in the first iteration of this patch
series make use of the posix_acl_chmod() and, posix_acl_update_mode()
helpers. Both helpers perform permission checks on the target inode. Let
them handle idmapped mounts. These two helpers are called when posix
acls are set by the respective filesystems to handle this case we extend
the ->set() method to take an additional user namespace argument to pass
the mount's user namespace down.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-9-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
The inode_owner_or_capable() helper determines whether the caller is the
owner of the inode or is capable with respect to that inode. Allow it to
handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped
mount it according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks
are identical to non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is
passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical
behavior as before.
Similarly, allow the inode_init_owner() helper to handle idmapped
mounts. It initializes a new inode on idmapped mounts by mapping the
fsuid and fsgid of the caller from the mount's user namespace. If the
initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts
will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-7-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
The two helpers inode_permission() and generic_permission() are used by
the vfs to perform basic permission checking by verifying that the
caller is privileged over an inode. In order to handle idmapped mounts
we extend the two helpers with an additional user namespace argument.
On idmapped mounts the two helpers will make sure to map the inode
according to the mount's user namespace and then peform identical
permission checks to inode_permission() and generic_permission(). If the
initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts
will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-6-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
cap_convert_nscap() does permission checking as well as conversion of the
xattr value conditionally based on fs's user-ns.
This is needed by overlayfs and probably other layered fs (ecryptfs) and is
what vfs_foo() is supposed to do anyway.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Fix kernel-doc warnings in fs/xattr.c:
../fs/xattr.c:251: warning: Function parameter or member 'dentry' not described in '__vfs_setxattr_locked'
../fs/xattr.c:251: warning: Function parameter or member 'name' not described in '__vfs_setxattr_locked'
../fs/xattr.c:251: warning: Function parameter or member 'value' not described in '__vfs_setxattr_locked'
../fs/xattr.c:251: warning: Function parameter or member 'size' not described in '__vfs_setxattr_locked'
../fs/xattr.c:251: warning: Function parameter or member 'flags' not described in '__vfs_setxattr_locked'
../fs/xattr.c:251: warning: Function parameter or member 'delegated_inode' not described in '__vfs_setxattr_locked'
../fs/xattr.c:458: warning: Function parameter or member 'dentry' not described in '__vfs_removexattr_locked'
../fs/xattr.c:458: warning: Function parameter or member 'name' not described in '__vfs_removexattr_locked'
../fs/xattr.c:458: warning: Function parameter or member 'delegated_inode' not described in '__vfs_removexattr_locked'
Fixes: 08b5d5014a ("xattr: break delegations in {set,remove}xattr")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/7a3dd5a2-5787-adf3-d525-c203f9910ec4@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add a function that checks is an extended attribute namespace is
supported for an inode, meaning that a handler must be present
for either the whole namespace, or at least one synthetic
xattr in the namespace.
To be used by the nfs server code when being queried for extended
attributes support.
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
set/removexattr on an exported filesystem should break NFS delegations.
This is true in general, but also for the upcoming support for
RFC 8726 (NFSv4 extended attribute support). Make sure that they do.
Additionally, they need to grow a _locked variant, since callers might
call this with i_rwsem held (like the NFS server code).
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.9+
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden <fllinden@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
`removed_sized` isn't correctly initialized (as the doc comment
suggests) on memory allocation failures. Fix by moving initialization up
a bit.
Fixes: 0c47383ba3 ("kernfs: Add option to enable user xattrs")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Xu <dxu@dxuuu.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
This helps set up size accounting in the next commit. Without this out
param, it's difficult to find out the removed xattr size without taking
a lock for longer and walking the xattr linked list twice.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Xu <dxu@dxuuu.xyz>
Acked-by: Chris Down <chris@chrisdown.name>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
xattr values have a 64k maximum size. This can result in an order 4
kmalloc request which can be difficult to fulfill. Since xattrs do not
need physically contiguous memory, we can switch to kvmalloc and not
have to worry about higher order allocations failing.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Xu <dxu@dxuuu.xyz>
Acked-by: Chris Down <chris@chrisdown.name>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Add SPDX license identifiers to all files which:
- Have no license information of any form
- Have EXPORT_.*_SYMBOL_GPL inside which was used in the
initial scan/conversion to ignore the file
These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX
license identifier is:
GPL-2.0-only
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Commit 786534b92f introduced a regression that caused listxattr to
return the POSIX ACL attribute names even though sysfs doesn't support
POSIX ACLs. This happens because simple_xattr_list checks for NULL
i_acl / i_default_acl, but inode_init_always initializes those fields
to ACL_NOT_CACHED ((void *)-1). For example:
$ getfattr -m- -d /sys
/sys: system.posix_acl_access: Operation not supported
/sys: system.posix_acl_default: Operation not supported
Fix this in simple_xattr_list by checking if the filesystem supports POSIX ACLs.
Fixes: 786534b92f ("tmpfs: listxattr should include POSIX ACL xattrs")
Reported-by: Marc Aurèle La France <tsi@tuyoix.net>
Tested-by: Marc Aurèle La France <tsi@tuyoix.net>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.5+
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
