The arg5 of KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY should have a __user pointer tag on
it as it is a user pointer. This clears the following sparse warning
for this:
security/keys/keyctl.c:1755:43: warning: incorrect type in argument 3 (different address spaces)
security/keys/keyctl.c:1755:43: expected struct keyctl_pkey_query [noderef] <asn:1>*<noident>
security/keys/keyctl.c:1755:43: got struct keyctl_pkey_query *<noident>
Signed-off-by: Ben Dooks <ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Every in-kernel use of this function defined it to KERNEL_DS (either as
an actual define, or as an inline function). It's an entirely
historical artifact, and long long long ago used to actually read the
segment selector valueof '%ds' on x86.
Which in the kernel is always KERNEL_DS.
Inspired by a patch from Jann Horn that just did this for a very small
subset of users (the ones in fs/), along with Al who suggested a script.
I then just took it to the logical extreme and removed all the remaining
gunk.
Roughly scripted with
git grep -l '(get_ds())' -- :^tools/ | xargs sed -i 's/(get_ds())/(KERNEL_DS)/'
git grep -lw 'get_ds' -- :^tools/ | xargs sed -i '/^#define get_ds()/d'
plus manual fixups to remove a few unusual usage patterns, the couple of
inline function cases and to fix up a comment that had become stale.
The 'get_ds()' function remains in an x86 kvm selftest, since in user
space it actually does something relevant.
Inspired-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Inspired-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Remove modules not using it (SELinux and SMACK aren't
the only ones not using it).
Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
new primitive: vfs_dup_fs_context(). Comes with fs_context
method (->dup()) for copying the filesystem-specific parts
of fs_context, along with LSM one (->fs_context_dup()) for
doing the same to LSM parts.
[needs better commit message, and change of Author:, anyway]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Implement the new mount API LSM hooks for SELinux. At some point the old
hooks will need to be removed.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
cc: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Add LSM hooks for use by the new mount API and filesystem context code.
This includes:
(1) Hooks to handle allocation, duplication and freeing of the security
record attached to a filesystem context.
(2) A hook to snoop source specifications. There may be multiple of these
if the filesystem supports it. They will to be local files/devices if
fs_context::source_is_dev is true and will be something else, possibly
remote server specifications, if false.
(3) A hook to snoop superblock configuration options in key[=val] form.
If the LSM decides it wants to handle it, it can suppress the option
being passed to the filesystem. Note that 'val' may include commas
and binary data with the fsopen patch.
(4) A hook to perform validation and allocation after the configuration
has been done but before the superblock is allocated and set up.
(5) A hook to transfer the security from the context to a newly created
superblock.
(6) A hook to rule on whether a path point can be used as a mountpoint.
These are intended to replace:
security_sb_copy_data
security_sb_kern_mount
security_sb_mount
security_sb_set_mnt_opts
security_sb_clone_mnt_opts
security_sb_parse_opts_str
[AV -- some of the methods being replaced are already gone, some of the
methods are not added for the lack of need]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
To avoid potential confusion, explicitly ignore "security=" when "lsm=" is
used on the command line, and report that it is happening.
Suggested-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
This should have gone in with commit
c1a85a00ea.
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
"Hopefully the last pull request for this release. Fingers crossed:
1) Only refcount ESP stats on full sockets, from Martin Willi.
2) Missing barriers in AF_UNIX, from Al Viro.
3) RCU protection fixes in ipv6 route code, from Paolo Abeni.
4) Avoid false positives in untrusted GSO validation, from Willem de
Bruijn.
5) Forwarded mesh packets in mac80211 need more tailroom allocated,
from Felix Fietkau.
6) Use operstate consistently for linkup in team driver, from George
Wilkie.
7) ThunderX bug fixes from Vadim Lomovtsev. Mostly races between VF
and PF code paths.
8) Purge ipv6 exceptions during netdevice removal, from Paolo Abeni.
9) nfp eBPF code gen fixes from Jiong Wang.
10) bnxt_en firmware timeout fix from Michael Chan.
11) Use after free in udp/udpv6 error handlers, from Paolo Abeni.
12) Fix a race in x25_bind triggerable by syzbot, from Eric Dumazet"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (65 commits)
net: phy: realtek: Dummy IRQ calls for RTL8366RB
tcp: repaired skbs must init their tso_segs
net/x25: fix a race in x25_bind()
net: dsa: Remove documentation for port_fdb_prepare
Revert "bridge: do not add port to router list when receives query with source 0.0.0.0"
selftests: fib_tests: sleep after changing carrier. again.
net: set static variable an initial value in atl2_probe()
net: phy: marvell10g: Fix Multi-G advertisement to only advertise 10G
bpf, doc: add bpf list as secondary entry to maintainers file
udp: fix possible user after free in error handler
udpv6: fix possible user after free in error handler
fou6: fix proto error handler argument type
udpv6: add the required annotation to mib type
mdio_bus: Fix use-after-free on device_register fails
net: Set rtm_table to RT_TABLE_COMPAT for ipv6 for tables > 255
bnxt_en: Wait longer for the firmware message response to complete.
bnxt_en: Fix typo in firmware message timeout logic.
nfp: bpf: fix ALU32 high bits clearance bug
nfp: bpf: fix code-gen bug on BPF_ALU | BPF_XOR | BPF_K
Documentation: networking: switchdev: Update port parent ID section
...
syzbot hit the 'BUG_ON(index_key->desc_len == 0);' in __key_link_begin()
called from construct_alloc_key() during sys_request_key(), because the
length of the key description was never calculated.
The problem is that we rely on ->desc_len being initialized by
search_process_keyrings(), specifically by search_nested_keyrings().
But, if the process isn't subscribed to any keyrings that never happens.
Fix it by always initializing keyring_index_key::desc_len as soon as the
description is set, like we already do in some places.
The following program reproduces the BUG_ON() when it's run as root and
no session keyring has been installed. If it doesn't work, try removing
pam_keyinit.so from /etc/pam.d/login and rebooting.
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
int main(void)
{
int id = add_key("keyring", "syz", NULL, 0, KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING);
keyctl_setperm(id, KEY_OTH_WRITE);
setreuid(5000, 5000);
request_key("user", "desc", "", id);
}
Reported-by: syzbot+ec24e95ea483de0a24da@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: b2a4df200d ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch
cases where we are expecting to fall through.
This patch fixes the following warnings:
security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c:85:10: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:940:18: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:943:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:972:21: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:974:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/smack/smack_lsm.c:3391:9: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/apparmor/domain.c:569:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
Warning level 3 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=3
Also, add a missing break statement to fix the following warning:
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c:116:26: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
The SCTP sections were ending up at the top-level table of contents
under the security section when they should have be sections with the
SCTP chapters. In addition to correcting the section and subsection
headings, this merges the SCTP documents into a single file to organize
the chapters more clearly, internally linkifies them, and adds the
missing SPDX header.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Several u->addr and u->path users are not holding any locks in
common with unix_bind(). unix_state_lock() is useless for those
purposes.
u->addr is assign-once and *(u->addr) is fully set up by the time
we set u->addr (all under unix_table_lock). u->path is also
set in the same critical area, also before setting u->addr, and
any unix_sock with ->path filled will have non-NULL ->addr.
So setting ->addr with smp_store_release() is all we need for those
"lockless" users - just have them fetch ->addr with smp_load_acquire()
and don't even bother looking at ->path if they see NULL ->addr.
Users of ->addr and ->path fall into several classes now:
1) ones that do smp_load_acquire(u->addr) and access *(u->addr)
and u->path only if smp_load_acquire() has returned non-NULL.
2) places holding unix_table_lock. These are guaranteed that
*(u->addr) is seen fully initialized. If unix_sock is in one of the
"bound" chains, so's ->path.
3) unix_sock_destructor() using ->addr is safe. All places
that set u->addr are guaranteed to have seen all stores *(u->addr)
while holding a reference to u and unix_sock_destructor() is called
when (atomic) refcount hits zero.
4) unix_release_sock() using ->path is safe. unix_bind()
is serialized wrt unix_release() (normally - by struct file
refcount), and for the instances that had ->path set by unix_bind()
unix_release_sock() comes from unix_release(), so they are fine.
Instances that had it set in unix_stream_connect() either end up
attached to a socket (in unix_accept()), in which case the call
chain to unix_release_sock() and serialization are the same as in
the previous case, or they never get accept'ed and unix_release_sock()
is called when the listener is shut down and its queue gets purged.
In that case the listener's queue lock provides the barriers needed -
unix_stream_connect() shoves our unix_sock into listener's queue
under that lock right after having set ->path and eventual
unix_release_sock() caller picks them from that queue under the
same lock right before calling unix_release_sock().
5) unix_find_other() use of ->path is pointless, but safe -
it happens with successful lookup by (abstract) name, so ->path.dentry
is guaranteed to be NULL there.
earlier-variant-reviewed-by: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Set the timestamp on new keys rather than leaving it unset.
Fixes: 31d5a79d7f ("KEYS: Do LRU discard in full keyrings")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
In the request_key() upcall mechanism there's a dependency loop by which if
a key type driver overrides the ->request_key hook and the userspace side
manages to lose the authorisation key, the auth key and the internal
construction record (struct key_construction) can keep each other pinned.
Fix this by the following changes:
(1) Killing off the construction record and using the auth key instead.
(2) Including the operation name in the auth key payload and making the
payload available outside of security/keys/.
(3) The ->request_key hook is given the authkey instead of the cons
record and operation name.
Changes (2) and (3) allow the auth key to naturally be cleaned up if the
keyring it is in is destroyed or cleared or the auth key is unlinked.
Fixes: 7ee02a316600 ("keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth key")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
If the sysctl 'kernel.keys.maxkeys' is set to some number n, then
actually users can only add up to 'n - 1' keys. Likewise for
'kernel.keys.maxbytes' and the root_* versions of these sysctls. But
these sysctls are apparently supposed to be *maximums*, as per their
names and all documentation I could find -- the keyrings(7) man page,
Documentation/security/keys/core.rst, and all the mentions of EDQUOT
meaning that the key quota was *exceeded* (as opposed to reached).
Thus, fix the code to allow reaching the quotas exactly.
Fixes: 0b77f5bfb4 ("keys: make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Linux 5.0 introduced the platform keyring to allow verifying the IMA
kexec kernel image signature using the pre-boot keys. This pull
request similarly makes keys on the platform keyring accessible for
verifying the PE kernel image signature.*
Also included in this pull request is a new IMA hook that tags tmp
files, in policy, indicating the file hash needs to be calculated.
The remaining patches are cleanup.
*Upstream commit "993a110319a4 (x86/kexec: Fix a kexec_file_load()
failure)" is required for testing.
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Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-20190213' of git://git.infradead.org/users/jjs/linux-tpmdd into next-tpm
tpmdd updates for Linux v5.1
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Clean up the transmission flow
==============================
Cleaned up the whole transmission flow. Locking of the chip is now done in
the level of tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops() instead taking the chip
lock inside tpm_transmit(). The nested calls inside tpm_transmit(), used
with the resource manager, have been refactored out.
Should make easier to perform more complex transactions with the TPM
without making the subsystem a bigger mess (e.g. encrypted channel patches
by James Bottomley).
PPI 1.3 support
===============
TPM PPI 1.3 introduces an additional optional command parameter that may be
needed for some commands. Display the parameter if the command requires
such a parameter. Only command 23 (SetPCRBanks) needs one.
The PPI request file will show output like this then:
# echo "23 16" > request
# cat request
23 16
# echo "5" > request
# cat request
5
Extend all PCR banks in IMA
===========================
Instead of static PCR banks array, the array of available PCR banks is now
allocated dynamically. The digests sizes are determined dynamically using a
probe PCR read without relying crypto's static list of hash algorithms.
This should finally make sealing of measurements in IMA safe and secure.
TPM 2.0 selftests
=================
Added a test suite to tools/testing/selftests/tpm2 previously outside of
the kernel tree: https://github.com/jsakkine-intel/tpm2-scripts.
Currently, tpm_pcr_extend() accepts as an input only a SHA1 digest.
This patch replaces the hash parameter of tpm_pcr_extend() with an array of
tpm_digest structures, so that the caller can provide a digest for each PCR
bank currently allocated in the TPM.
tpm_pcr_extend() will not extend banks for which no digest was provided,
as it happened before this patch, but instead it requires that callers
provide the full set of digests. Since the number of digests will always be
chip->nr_allocated_banks, the count parameter has been removed.
Due to the API change, ima_pcr_extend() and pcrlock() have been modified.
Since the number of allocated banks is not known in advance, the memory for
the digests must be dynamically allocated. To avoid performance degradation
and to avoid that a PCR extend is not done due to lack of memory, the array
of tpm_digest structures is allocated by the users of the TPM driver at
initialization time.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (on x86 for TPM 1.2 & PTT TPM 2.0)
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
When crypto agility support will be added to the TPM driver, users of the
driver have to retrieve the allocated banks from chip->allocated_banks and
use this information to prepare the array of tpm_digest structures to be
passed to tpm_pcr_extend().
This patch retrieves a tpm_chip pointer from tpm_default_chip() so that the
pointer can be used to prepare the array of tpm_digest structures.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Currently, the TPM driver retrieves the digest size from a table mapping
TPM algorithms identifiers to identifiers defined by the crypto subsystem.
If the algorithm is not defined by the latter, the digest size can be
retrieved from the output of the PCR read command.
The patch modifies the definition of tpm_pcr_read() and tpm2_pcr_read() to
pass the desired hash algorithm and obtain the digest size at TPM startup.
Algorithms and corresponding digest sizes are stored in the new structure
tpm_bank_info, member of tpm_chip, so that the information can be used by
other kernel subsystems.
tpm_bank_info contains: the TPM algorithm identifier, necessary to generate
the event log as defined by Trusted Computing Group (TCG); the digest size,
to pad/truncate a digest calculated with a different algorithm; the crypto
subsystem identifier, to calculate the digest of event data.
This patch also protects against data corruption that could happen in the
bus, by checking that the digest size returned by the TPM during a PCR read
matches the size of the algorithm passed to tpm2_pcr_read().
For the initial PCR read, when digest sizes are not yet available, this
patch ensures that the amount of data copied from the output returned by
the TPM does not exceed the size of the array data are copied to.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
In case of error, the function securityfs_create_dir() returns ERR_PTR()
and never returns NULL. The NULL test in the return value check should
be replaced with IS_ERR().
Fixes: aeca4e2ca6 ("LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
commit a2c513835b ("selinux: inline some AVC functions used only once")
introduced usage of audit_log_string() in place of audit_log_format()
for fixed strings. However, audit_log_string() quotes the string.
This breaks the avc audit message format and userspace audit parsers.
Switch back to using audit_log_format().
Fixes: a2c513835b ("selinux: inline some AVC functions used only once")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Instead of sizeof use pre-defined constant for UUID representation.
While here, drop the implementation details of uuid_t type.
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
If tmpfiles can be made persistent, then newly created tmpfiles need to
be treated like any other new files in policy.
This patch indicates which newly created tmpfiles are in policy, causing
the file hash to be calculated on __fput().
Reported-by: Ignaz Forster <ignaz.forster@gmx.de>
[rgoldwyn@suse.com: Call ima_post_create_tmpfile() in vfs_tmpfile() as
opposed to do_tmpfile(). This will help the case for overlayfs where
copy_up is denied while overwriting a file.]
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning:
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c: In function 'init_evm':
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c:566:21: warning:
variable 'xattr' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
Commit 21af766314 ("EVM: turn evm_config_xattrnames into a list")
defined and set "xattr", but never used it.
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: tweaked the patch description explanation]
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Properly start the enumeration associated with match_table_t at zero,
making Opt_err/Opt_error the last enumeration value.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
commit 9dc92c4517 ("integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring")
introduced a .platform keyring for storing preboot keys, used for
verifying kernel image signatures. Currently only IMA-appraisal is able
to use the keyring to verify kernel images that have their signature
stored in xattr.
This patch exposes the .platform keyring, making it accessible for
verifying PE signed kernel images as well.
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: fixed checkpatch errors, squashed with patch fix]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
aa_label_merge() can return NULL for memory allocations failures
make sure to handle and set the correct error in this case.
Reported-by: Peng Hao <peng.hao2@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
when compiled without CONFIG_IPV6:
security/apparmor/lsm.c:1601:21: warning: ‘apparmor_ipv6_postroute’ defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
static unsigned int apparmor_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Reported-by: Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>
Tested-by: Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>
Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The audit_rule_match() struct audit_context *actx parameter is not used
by any in-tree consumers (selinux, apparmour, integrity, smack).
The audit context is an internal audit structure that should only be
accessed by audit accessor functions.
It was part of commit 03d37d25e0 ("LSM/Audit: Introduce generic
Audit LSM hooks") but appears to have never been used.
Remove it.
Please see the github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/107
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
[PM: fixed the referenced commit title]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The include for asm/syscall.h was needed in a prior version of lsm.c
that checked return values of syscall_get_nr, but since we did away with
that part of the code this include is no longer necessary. Take out this
include since it breaks builds for certain architectures. We no longer
have any arch-specific code in SafeSetID.
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
This patch changes the Kconfig file for the SafeSetID LSM to depend on
CONFIG_SECURITY as well as select CONFIG_SECURITYFS, since the policies
for the LSM are configured through writing to securityfs.
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
These checks are only guarding against programming errors that could
silently grant too many permissions. These cases are better handled with
WARN_ON(), since it doesn't really help much to crash the machine in
this case.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In case a file has an invalid context set, in an AVC record generated
upon access to such file, the target context is always reported as
unlabeled. This patch adds new optional fields to the AVC record
(srawcon and trawcon) that report the actual context string if it
differs from the one reported in scontext/tcontext. This is useful for
diagnosing SELinux denials involving invalid contexts.
To trigger an AVC that illustrates this situation:
# setenforce 0
# touch /tmp/testfile
# setfattr -n security.selinux -v system_u:object_r:banana_t:s0 /tmp/testfile
# runcon system_u:system_r:sshd_t:s0 cat /tmp/testfile
AVC before:
type=AVC msg=audit(1547801083.248:11): avc: denied { open } for pid=1149 comm="cat" path="/tmp/testfile" dev="tmpfs" ino=6608 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s15:c0.c1023 tclass=file permissive=1
AVC after:
type=AVC msg=audit(1547801083.248:11): avc: denied { open } for pid=1149 comm="cat" path="/tmp/testfile" dev="tmpfs" ino=6608 scontext=system_u:system_r:sshd_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s15:c0.c1023 tclass=file permissive=1 trawcon=system_u:object_r:banana_t:s0
Note that it is also possible to encounter this situation with the
'scontext' field - e.g. when a new policy is loaded while a process is
running, whose context is not valid in the new policy.
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1135683
Cc: Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
We don't need to crash the machine in these cases. Let's just detect the
buggy state early and error out with a warning.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
avc_dump_av() and avc_dump_query() are each used only in one place. Get
rid of them and open code their contents in the call sites.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
SafeSetID gates the setid family of syscalls to restrict UID/GID
transitions from a given UID/GID to only those approved by a
system-wide whitelist. These restrictions also prohibit the given
UIDs/GIDs from obtaining auxiliary privileges associated with
CAP_SET{U/G}ID, such as allowing a user to set up user namespace UID
mappings. For now, only gating the set*uid family of syscalls is
supported, with support for set*gid coming in a future patch set.
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
V3 namespaced file capabilities were introduced in
commit 8db6c34f1d ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities")
Add support for these by adding the "frootid" field to the existing
fcaps fields in the NAME and BPRM_FCAPS records.
Please see github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/103
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
[PM: comment tweak to fit an 80 char line width]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Being able to specify multiple "use_group" lines makes it
easier to write whitelisted policies.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Follow many of recommendations by scripts/checkpatch.pl, and follow
"lift switch variables out of switches" by Kees Cook.
This patch makes no functional change.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
TOMOYO security module is designed to use "struct task_struct"->security
in order to allow per "struct task_struct" tracking without being disturbed
by unable to update "struct cred"->security due to override mechanism.
Now that infrastructure-managed security blob is ready, this patch updates
TOMOYO to use "struct task_struct"->security.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
There is a plan to build the kernel with -Wimplicit-fallthrough and
these places in the code produced warnings (W=1). Fix them up.
This commit remove the following warnings:
security/keys/request_key.c:293:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/keys/request_key.c:298:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/keys/request_key.c:307:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
There is a plan to build the kernel with -Wimplicit-fallthrough and
these places in the code produced warnings (W=1). Fix them up.
This commit remove the following warning:
security/keys/process_keys.c:380:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/keys/process_keys.c:404:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
security/keys/process_keys.c:424:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
There is a plan to build the kernel with -Wimplicit-fallthrough and
this place in the code produced a warning (W=1).
This commit remove the following warning:
security/keys/keyring.c:248:10: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=]
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
AppArmor will no longer be the only user of task blob
after TOMOYO started using task blob.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Fixes: f4ad8f2c40 ("LSM: Infrastructure management of the task security")
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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Merge tag 'v5.0-rc3' into next-general
Sync to Linux 5.0-rc3 to pull in the VFS changes which impacted a lot
of the LSM code.
Fixes the following sparse warnings:
security/security.c:533:5: warning:
symbol 'lsm_task_alloc' was not declared. Should it be static?
security/security.c:554:5: warning:
symbol 'lsm_ipc_alloc' was not declared. Should it be static?
security/security.c:575:5: warning:
symbol 'lsm_msg_msg_alloc' was not declared. Should it be static?
Fixes: f4ad8f2c40 ("LSM: Infrastructure management of the task security")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Since current->cred == current->real_cred when ordered_lsm_init()
is called, and lsm_early_cred()/lsm_early_task() need to be called
between the amount of required bytes is determined and module specific
initialization function is called, we can move these calls from
individual modules to ordered_lsm_init().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Pull security subsystem fixes from James Morris:
"Fixes for the security subsystem.
The first (by Casey actually - it's misattributed) fixes a regression
introduced with the LSM stacking changes"
* 'fixes-v5.0-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
LSM: Check for NULL cred-security on free
Yama: Check for pid death before checking ancestry
seccomp: fix UAF in user-trap code
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Check that the cred security blob has been set before trying
to clean it up. There is a case during credential initialization
that could result in this.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+69ca07954461f189e808@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
It's possible that a pid has died before we take the rcu lock, in which
case we can't walk the ancestry list as it may be detached. Instead, check
for death first before doing the walk.
Reported-by: syzbot+a9ac39bf55329e206219@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 2d514487fa ("security: Yama LSM")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20190115' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux fix from Paul Moore:
"One small patch to fix a potential NULL dereference on a failed
SELinux policy load"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20190115' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix GPF on invalid policy
Ignore all selinux_inode_notifysecctx() calls on mounts with SBLABEL_MNT
flag unset. This is achived by returning -EOPNOTSUPP for this case in
selinux_inode_setsecurtity() (because that function should not be called
in such case anyway) and translating this error to 0 in
selinux_inode_notifysecctx().
This fixes behavior of kernfs-based filesystems when mounted with the
'context=' option. Before this patch, if a node's context had been
explicitly set to a non-default value and later the filesystem has been
remounted with the 'context=' option, then this node would show up as
having the manually-set context and not the mount-specified one.
Steps to reproduce:
# mount -t cgroup2 cgroup2 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
# chcon unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/cgroup.stat
# ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
total 0
-r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs
-r--r--r--. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads
# umount /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
# mount -o context=system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 -t cgroup2 cgroup2 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
Result before:
# ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
total 0
-r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs
-r--r--r--. 1 root root unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads
Result after:
# ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
total 0
-r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.controllers
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.depth
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.max.descendants
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.procs
-r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.stat
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.subtree_control
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t:s0 0 Dec 13 10:41 cgroup.threads
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In the SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT case we never want to allow relabeling
files/directories, so we should never set the SBLABEL_MNT flag. The
'special handling' in selinux_is_sblabel_mnt() is only intended for when
the behavior is set to SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS.
While there, make the logic in selinux_is_sblabel_mnt() more explicit
and add a BUILD_BUG_ON() to make sure that introducing a new
SECURITY_FS_USE_* forces a review of the logic.
Fixes: d5f3a5f6e7 ("selinux: add security in-core xattr support for pstore and debugfs")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
commit bda0be7ad9 ("security: make inode_follow_link RCU-walk aware")
switched selinux_inode_follow_link() to use avc_has_perm_flags() and
pass down the MAY_NOT_BLOCK flag if called during RCU walk. However,
the only test of MAY_NOT_BLOCK occurs during slow_avc_audit()
and only if passing an inode as audit data (LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE). Since
selinux_inode_follow_link() passes a dentry directly, passing MAY_NOT_BLOCK
here serves no purpose. Switch selinux_inode_follow_link() to use
avc_has_perm() and drop avc_has_perm_flags() since there are no other
users.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
commit 0dc1ba24f7 ("SELINUX: Make selinux cache VFS RCU walks safe")
results in no audit messages at all if in permissive mode because the
cache is updated during the rcu walk and thus no denial occurs on
the subsequent ref walk. Fix this by not updating the cache when
performing a non-blocking permission check. This only affects search
and symlink read checks during rcu walk.
Fixes: 0dc1ba24f7 ("SELINUX: Make selinux cache VFS RCU walks safe")
Reported-by: BMK <bmktuwien@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
levdatum->level can be NULL if we encounter an error while loading
the policy during sens_read prior to initializing it. Make sure
sens_destroy handles that case correctly.
Reported-by: syzbot+6664500f0f18f07a5c0e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch provides a general mechanism for passing flags to the
security_capable LSM hook. It replaces the specific 'audit' flag that is
used to tell security_capable whether it should log an audit message for
the given capability check. The reason for generalizing this flag
passing is so we can add an additional flag that signifies whether
security_capable is being called by a setid syscall (which is needed by
the proposed SafeSetID LSM).
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
With blob sharing in place, TOMOYO is no longer an exclusive LSM, so it
can operate separately now. Mark it as such.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Move management of the kern_ipc_perm->security and
msg_msg->security blobs out of the individual security
modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead
of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules
tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and
the space is allocated there.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Don't use the ipc->security pointer directly.
Don't use the msg_msg->security pointer directly.
Provide helper functions that provides the security blob pointers.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Don't use the ipc->security pointer directly.
Don't use the msg_msg->security pointer directly.
Provide helper functions that provides the security blob pointers.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Move management of the task_struct->security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
The only user of this blob is AppArmor. The AppArmor use
is abstracted to avoid future conflict.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Move management of the inode->i_security blob out
of the individual security modules and into the security
infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within
the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much
space is required, and the space is allocated there.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Don't use the inode->i_security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Don't use the inode->i_security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Move management of the file->f_security blob out of the
individual security modules and into the infrastructure.
The modules no longer allocate or free the data, instead
they tell the infrastructure how much space they require.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Don't use the file->f_security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Don't use the file->f_security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Move management of the cred security blob out of the
security modules and into the security infrastructre.
Instead of allocating and freeing space the security
modules tell the infrastructure how much space they
require.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Don't use the cred->security pointer directly.
Provide helper functions that provide the security blob pointer.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Don't use the cred->security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
There are no longer users of selinux_is_enabled().
Remove it. As selinux_is_enabled() is the only reason
for include/linux/selinux.h remove that as well.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
The SELinux specific credential poisioning only makes sense
if SELinux is managing the credentials. As the intent of this
patch set is to move the blob management out of the modules
and into the infrastructure, the SELinux specific code has
to go. The poisioning could be introduced into the infrastructure
at some later date.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Don't use the cred->security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Don't use the cred->security pointer directly.
Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[kees: adjusted for ordered init series]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Back in 2007 I made what turned out to be a rather serious
mistake in the implementation of the Smack security module.
The SELinux module used an interface in /proc to manipulate
the security context on processes. Rather than use a similar
interface, I used the same interface. The AppArmor team did
likewise. Now /proc/.../attr/current will tell you the
security "context" of the process, but it will be different
depending on the security module you're using.
This patch provides a subdirectory in /proc/.../attr for
Smack. Smack user space can use the "current" file in
this subdirectory and never have to worry about getting
SELinux attributes by mistake. Programs that use the
old interface will continue to work (or fail, as the case
may be) as before.
The proposed S.A.R.A security module is dependent on
the mechanism to create its own attr subdirectory.
The original implementation is by Kees Cook.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
This converts capabilities to use the new LSM_ORDER_FIRST position.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
In preparation for distinguishing the "capability" LSM from other LSMs, it
must be ordered first. This introduces LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE for the general
LSMs and LSM_ORDER_FIRST for capability. In the future LSM_ORDER_LAST
for could be added for anything that must run last (e.g. Landlock may
use this).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
This converts Yama from being a direct "minor" LSM into an ordered LSM.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This converts LoadPin from being a direct "minor" LSM into an ordered LSM.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Since we already have to do a pass through the LSMs to figure out if
exclusive LSMs should be disabled after the first one is seen as enabled,
this splits the logic up a bit more cleanly. Now we do a full "prepare"
pass through the LSMs (which also allows for later use by the blob-sharing
code), before starting the LSM initialization pass.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
This removes CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY in favor of the explicit ordering
offered by CONFIG_LSM and adds all the exclusive LSMs to the ordered
LSM initialization. The old meaning of CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY is now
captured by which exclusive LSM is listed first in the LSM order. All
LSMs not added to the ordered list are explicitly disabled.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
In preparation for removing CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY, this removes the
soon-to-be redundant SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE. Since explicit
ordering via CONFIG_LSM or "lsm=" will define whether an LSM is enabled or
not, this CONFIG will become effectively ignored, so remove it. However,
in order to stay backward-compatible with "security=selinux", the enable
variable defaults to true.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
In preparation for removing CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY, this removes the
soon-to-be redundant SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE. Since explicit
ordering via CONFIG_LSM or "lsm=" will define whether an LSM is enabled or
not, this CONFIG will become effectively ignored, so remove it. However,
in order to stay backward-compatible with "security=apparmor", the enable
variable defaults to true.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
In order to both support old "security=" Legacy Major LSM selection, and
handling real exclusivity, this creates LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE and updates
the selection logic to handle them.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
For what are marked as the Legacy Major LSMs, make them effectively
exclusive when selected on the "security=" boot parameter, to handle
the future case of when a previously major LSMs become non-exclusive
(e.g. when TOMOYO starts blob-sharing).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This moves the string handling for "security=" boot parameter into
a stored pointer instead of a string duplicate. This will allow
easier handling of the string when switching logic to use the coming
enable/disable infrastructure.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Until now, any LSM without an enable storage variable was considered
enabled. This inverts the logic and sets defaults to true only if the
LSM gets added to the ordered initialization list. (And an exception
continues for the major LSMs until they are integrated into the ordered
initialization in a later patch.)
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Provide a way to explicitly choose LSM initialization order via the new
"lsm=" comma-separated list of LSMs.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
This provides a way to declare LSM initialization order via the new
CONFIG_LSM. Currently only non-major LSMs are recognized. This will
be expanded in future patches.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
This constructs an ordered list of LSMs to initialize, using a hard-coded
list of only "integrity": minor LSMs continue to have direct hook calls,
and major LSMs continue to initialize separately.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
As a prerequisite to adjusting LSM selection logic in the future, this
moves the selection logic up out of the individual major LSMs, making
their init functions only run when actually enabled. This considers all
LSMs enabled by default unless they specified an external "enable"
variable.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
In preparation for lifting the "is this LSM enabled?" logic out of the
individual LSMs, pass in any special enabled state tracking (as needed
for SELinux, AppArmor, and LoadPin). This should be an "int" to include
handling any future cases where "enabled" is exposed via sysctl which
has no "bool" type.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
This provides a place for ordered LSMs to be initialized, separate from
the "major" LSMs. This is mainly a copy/paste from major_lsm_init() to
ordered_lsm_init(), but it will change drastically in later patches.
What is not obvious in the patch is that this change moves the integrity
LSM from major_lsm_init() into ordered_lsm_init(), since it is not marked
with the LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR. As it is the only LSM in the "ordered"
list, there is no reordering yet created.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
This adds a flag for the current "major" LSMs to distinguish them when
we have a universal method for ordering all LSMs. It's called "legacy"
since the distinction of "major" will go away in the blob-sharing world.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Pull vfs mount API prep from Al Viro:
"Mount API prereqs.
Mostly that's LSM mount options cleanups. There are several minor
fixes in there, but nothing earth-shattering (leaks on failure exits,
mostly)"
* 'mount.part1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (27 commits)
mount_fs: suppress MAC on MS_SUBMOUNT as well as MS_KERNMOUNT
smack: rewrite smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
smack: get rid of match_token()
smack: take the guts of smack_parse_opts_str() into a new helper
LSM: new method: ->sb_add_mnt_opt()
selinux: rewrite selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
selinux: regularize Opt_... names a bit
selinux: switch away from match_token()
selinux: new helper - selinux_add_opt()
LSM: bury struct security_mnt_opts
smack: switch to private smack_mnt_opts
selinux: switch to private struct selinux_mnt_opts
LSM: hide struct security_mnt_opts from any generic code
selinux: kill selinux_sb_get_mnt_opts()
LSM: turn sb_eat_lsm_opts() into a method
nfs_remount(): don't leak, don't ignore LSM options quietly
btrfs: sanitize security_mnt_opts use
selinux; don't open-code a loop in sb_finish_set_opts()
LSM: split ->sb_set_mnt_opts() out of ->sb_kern_mount()
new helper: security_sb_eat_lsm_opts()
...
Nobody has actually used the type (VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE) argument
of the user address range verification function since we got rid of the
old racy i386-only code to walk page tables by hand.
It existed because the original 80386 would not honor the write protect
bit when in kernel mode, so you had to do COW by hand before doing any
user access. But we haven't supported that in a long time, and these
days the 'type' argument is a purely historical artifact.
A discussion about extending 'user_access_begin()' to do the range
checking resulted this patch, because there is no way we're going to
move the old VERIFY_xyz interface to that model. And it's best done at
the end of the merge window when I've done most of my merges, so let's
just get this done once and for all.
This patch was mostly done with a sed-script, with manual fix-ups for
the cases that weren't of the trivial 'access_ok(VERIFY_xyz' form.
There were a couple of notable cases:
- csky still had the old "verify_area()" name as an alias.
- the iter_iov code had magical hardcoded knowledge of the actual
values of VERIFY_{READ,WRITE} (not that they mattered, since nothing
really used it)
- microblaze used the type argument for a debug printout
but other than those oddities this should be a total no-op patch.
I tried to fix up all architectures, did fairly extensive grepping for
access_ok() uses, and the changes are trivial, but I may have missed
something. Any missed conversion should be trivially fixable, though.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull TPM updates from James Morris:
- Support for partial reads of /dev/tpm0.
- Clean up for TPM 1.x code: move the commands to tpm1-cmd.c and make
everything to use the same data structure for building TPM commands
i.e. struct tpm_buf.
* 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (25 commits)
tpm: add support for partial reads
tpm: tpm_ibmvtpm: fix kdoc warnings
tpm: fix kdoc for tpm2_flush_context_cmd()
tpm: tpm_try_transmit() refactor error flow.
tpm: use u32 instead of int for PCR index
tpm1: reimplement tpm1_continue_selftest() using tpm_buf
tpm1: reimplement SAVESTATE using tpm_buf
tpm1: rename tpm1_pcr_read_dev to tpm1_pcr_read()
tpm1: implement tpm1_pcr_read_dev() using tpm_buf structure
tpm: tpm1: rewrite tpm1_get_random() using tpm_buf structure
tpm: tpm-space.c remove unneeded semicolon
tpm: tpm-interface.c drop unused macros
tpm: add tpm_auto_startup() into tpm-interface.c
tpm: factor out tpm_startup function
tpm: factor out tpm 1.x pm suspend flow into tpm1-cmd.c
tpm: move tpm 1.x selftest code from tpm-interface.c tpm1-cmd.c
tpm: factor out tpm1_get_random into tpm1-cmd.c
tpm: move tpm_getcap to tpm1-cmd.c
tpm: move tpm1_pcr_extend to tpm1-cmd.c
tpm: factor out tpm_get_timeouts()
...
Pull smack updates from James Morris:
"Two Smack patches for 4.21.
Jose's patch adds missing documentation and Zoran's fleshes out the
access checks on keyrings"
* 'next-smack' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
Smack: Improve Documentation
smack: fix access permissions for keyring
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
"In Linux 4.19, a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data was
upstreamed, allowing LSMs and IMA to prevent the kexec_load syscall.
Different signature verification methods exist for verifying the
kexec'ed kernel image. This adds additional support in IMA to prevent
loading unsigned kernel images via the kexec_load syscall,
independently of the IMA policy rules, based on the runtime "secure
boot" flag. An initial IMA kselftest is included.
In addition, this pull request defines a new, separate keyring named
".platform" for storing the preboot/firmware keys needed for verifying
the kexec'ed kernel image's signature and includes the associated IMA
kexec usage of the ".platform" keyring.
(David Howell's and Josh Boyer's patches for reading the
preboot/firmware keys, which were previously posted for a different
use case scenario, are included here)"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
integrity: Remove references to module keyring
ima: Use inode_is_open_for_write
ima: Support platform keyring for kernel appraisal
efi: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed
efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser
efi: Add EFI signature data types
integrity: Load certs to the platform keyring
integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring
selftests/ima: kexec_load syscall test
ima: don't measure/appraise files on efivarfs
x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode
docs: Extend trusted keys documentation for TPM 2.0
x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86
ima: add support for arch specific policies
ima: refactor ima_init_policy()
ima: prevent kexec_load syscall based on runtime secureboot flag
x86/ima: define arch_ima_get_secureboot
integrity: support new struct public_key_signature encoding field
We need to check the return value of match_token() for Opt_err before
doing anything with it.
[ Not only did the old "-1" value for Opt_err cause problems for the
__test_and_set_bit(), as fixed in commit 94c13f66e1 ("security:
don't use a negative Opt_err token index"), but accessing
"args[0].from" is invalid for the Opt_err case, as pointed out by Eric
later. - Linus ]
Reported-by: syzbot+a22e0dc07567662c50bc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 00d60fd3b9 ("KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org # 4.20
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
- support -y option for merge_config.sh to avoid downgrading =y to =m
- remove S_OTHER symbol type, and touch include/config/*.h files correctly
- fix file name and line number in lexer warnings
- fix memory leak when EOF is encountered in quotation
- resolve all shift/reduce conflicts of the parser
- warn no new line at end of file
- make 'source' statement more strict to take only string literal
- rewrite the lexer and remove the keyword lookup table
- convert to SPDX License Identifier
- compile C files independently instead of including them from zconf.y
- fix various warnings of gconfig
- misc cleanups
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Merge tag 'kconfig-v4.21' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild
Pull Kconfig updates from Masahiro Yamada:
- support -y option for merge_config.sh to avoid downgrading =y to =m
- remove S_OTHER symbol type, and touch include/config/*.h files correctly
- fix file name and line number in lexer warnings
- fix memory leak when EOF is encountered in quotation
- resolve all shift/reduce conflicts of the parser
- warn no new line at end of file
- make 'source' statement more strict to take only string literal
- rewrite the lexer and remove the keyword lookup table
- convert to SPDX License Identifier
- compile C files independently instead of including them from zconf.y
- fix various warnings of gconfig
- misc cleanups
* tag 'kconfig-v4.21' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild: (39 commits)
kconfig: surround dbg_sym_flags with #ifdef DEBUG to fix gconf warning
kconfig: split images.c out of qconf.cc/gconf.c to fix gconf warnings
kconfig: add static qualifiers to fix gconf warnings
kconfig: split the lexer out of zconf.y
kconfig: split some C files out of zconf.y
kconfig: convert to SPDX License Identifier
kconfig: remove keyword lookup table entirely
kconfig: update current_pos in the second lexer
kconfig: switch to ASSIGN_VAL state in the second lexer
kconfig: stop associating kconf_id with yylval
kconfig: refactor end token rules
kconfig: stop supporting '.' and '/' in unquoted words
treewide: surround Kconfig file paths with double quotes
microblaze: surround string default in Kconfig with double quotes
kconfig: use T_WORD instead of T_VARIABLE for variables
kconfig: use specific tokens instead of T_ASSIGN for assignments
kconfig: refactor scanning and parsing "option" properties
kconfig: use distinct tokens for type and default properties
kconfig: remove redundant token defines
kconfig: rename depends_list to comment_option_list
...
Merge misc updates from Andrew Morton:
- large KASAN update to use arm's "software tag-based mode"
- a few misc things
- sh updates
- ocfs2 updates
- just about all of MM
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (167 commits)
kernel/fork.c: mark 'stack_vm_area' with __maybe_unused
memcg, oom: notify on oom killer invocation from the charge path
mm, swap: fix swapoff with KSM pages
include/linux/gfp.h: fix typo
mm/hmm: fix memremap.h, move dev_page_fault_t callback to hmm
hugetlbfs: Use i_mmap_rwsem to fix page fault/truncate race
hugetlbfs: use i_mmap_rwsem for more pmd sharing synchronization
memory_hotplug: add missing newlines to debugging output
mm: remove __hugepage_set_anon_rmap()
include/linux/vmstat.h: remove unused page state adjustment macro
mm/page_alloc.c: allow error injection
mm: migrate: drop unused argument of migrate_page_move_mapping()
blkdev: avoid migration stalls for blkdev pages
mm: migrate: provide buffer_migrate_page_norefs()
mm: migrate: move migrate_page_lock_buffers()
mm: migrate: lock buffers before migrate_page_move_mapping()
mm: migration: factor out code to compute expected number of page references
mm, page_alloc: enable pcpu_drain with zone capability
kmemleak: add config to select auto scan
mm/page_alloc.c: don't call kasan_free_pages() at deferred mem init
...
* Add support for the security features of nvdimm devices that
implement a security model similar to ATA hard drive security. The
security model supports locking access to the media at
device-power-loss, to be unlocked with a passphrase, and secure-erase
(crypto-scramble).
Unlike the ATA security case where the kernel expects device
security to be managed in a pre-OS environment, the libnvdimm security
implementation allows key provisioning and key-operations at OS
runtime. Keys are managed with the kernel's encrypted-keys facility to
provide data-at-rest security for the libnvdimm key material. The
usage model mirrors fscrypt key management, but is driven via
libnvdimm sysfs.
* Miscellaneous updates for api usage and comment fixes.
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Merge tag 'libnvdimm-for-4.21' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm
Pull libnvdimm updates from Dan Williams:
"The vast bulk of this update is the new support for the security
capabilities of some nvdimms.
The userspace tooling for this capability is still a work in progress,
but the changes survive the existing libnvdimm unit tests. The changes
also pass manual checkout on hardware and the new nfit_test emulation
of the security capability.
The touches of the security/keys/ files have received the necessary
acks from Mimi and David. Those changes were necessary to allow for a
new generic encrypted-key type, and allow the nvdimm sub-system to
lookup key material referenced by the libnvdimm-sysfs interface.
Summary:
- Add support for the security features of nvdimm devices that
implement a security model similar to ATA hard drive security. The
security model supports locking access to the media at
device-power-loss, to be unlocked with a passphrase, and
secure-erase (crypto-scramble).
Unlike the ATA security case where the kernel expects device
security to be managed in a pre-OS environment, the libnvdimm
security implementation allows key provisioning and key-operations
at OS runtime. Keys are managed with the kernel's encrypted-keys
facility to provide data-at-rest security for the libnvdimm key
material. The usage model mirrors fscrypt key management, but is
driven via libnvdimm sysfs.
- Miscellaneous updates for api usage and comment fixes"
* tag 'libnvdimm-for-4.21' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/nvdimm/nvdimm: (21 commits)
libnvdimm/security: Quiet security operations
libnvdimm/security: Add documentation for nvdimm security support
tools/testing/nvdimm: add Intel DSM 1.8 support for nfit_test
tools/testing/nvdimm: Add overwrite support for nfit_test
tools/testing/nvdimm: Add test support for Intel nvdimm security DSMs
acpi/nfit, libnvdimm/security: add Intel DSM 1.8 master passphrase support
acpi/nfit, libnvdimm/security: Add security DSM overwrite support
acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Add support for issue secure erase DSM to Intel nvdimm
acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Add enable/update passphrase support for Intel nvdimms
acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Add disable passphrase support to Intel nvdimm.
acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Add unlock of nvdimm support for Intel DIMMs
acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Add freeze security support to Intel nvdimm
acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Introduce nvdimm_security_ops
keys-encrypted: add nvdimm key format type to encrypted keys
keys: Export lookup_user_key to external users
acpi/nfit, libnvdimm: Store dimm id as a member to struct nvdimm
libnvdimm, namespace: Replace kmemdup() with kstrndup()
libnvdimm, label: Switch to bitmap_zalloc()
ACPI/nfit: Adjust annotation for why return 0 if fail to find NFIT at start
libnvdimm, bus: Check id immediately following ida_simple_get
...
totalram_pages and totalhigh_pages are made static inline function.
Main motivation was that managed_page_count_lock handling was complicating
things. It was discussed in length here,
https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/995739/#1181785 So it seemes
better to remove the lock and convert variables to atomic, with preventing
poteintial store-to-read tearing as a bonus.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding style fixes]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1542090790-21750-4-git-send-email-arunks@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Arun KS <arunks@codeaurora.org>
Suggested-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Add 1472-byte test to tcrypt for IPsec
- Reintroduced crypto stats interface with numerous changes
- Support incremental algorithm dumps
Algorithms:
- Add xchacha12/20
- Add nhpoly1305
- Add adiantum
- Add streebog hash
- Mark cts(cbc(aes)) as FIPS allowed
Drivers:
- Improve performance of arm64/chacha20
- Improve performance of x86/chacha20
- Add NEON-accelerated nhpoly1305
- Add SSE2 accelerated nhpoly1305
- Add AVX2 accelerated nhpoly1305
- Add support for 192/256-bit keys in gcmaes AVX
- Add SG support in gcmaes AVX
- ESN for inline IPsec tx in chcr
- Add support for CryptoCell 703 in ccree
- Add support for CryptoCell 713 in ccree
- Add SM4 support in ccree
- Add SM3 support in ccree
- Add support for chacha20 in caam/qi2
- Add support for chacha20 + poly1305 in caam/jr
- Add support for chacha20 + poly1305 in caam/qi2
- Add AEAD cipher support in cavium/nitrox"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (130 commits)
crypto: skcipher - remove remnants of internal IV generators
crypto: cavium/nitrox - Fix build with !CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
crypto: salsa20-generic - don't unnecessarily use atomic walk
crypto: skcipher - add might_sleep() to skcipher_walk_virt()
crypto: x86/chacha - avoid sleeping under kernel_fpu_begin()
crypto: cavium/nitrox - Added AEAD cipher support
crypto: mxc-scc - fix build warnings on ARM64
crypto: api - document missing stats member
crypto: user - remove unused dump functions
crypto: chelsio - Fix wrong error counter increments
crypto: chelsio - Reset counters on cxgb4 Detach
crypto: chelsio - Handle PCI shutdown event
crypto: chelsio - cleanup:send addr as value in function argument
crypto: chelsio - Use same value for both channel in single WR
crypto: chelsio - Swap location of AAD and IV sent in WR
crypto: chelsio - remove set but not used variable 'kctx_len'
crypto: ux500 - Use proper enum in hash_set_dma_transfer
crypto: ux500 - Use proper enum in cryp_set_dma_transfer
crypto: aesni - Add scatter/gather avx stubs, and use them in C
crypto: aesni - Introduce partial block macro
..
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) New ipset extensions for matching on destination MAC addresses, from
Stefano Brivio.
2) Add ipv4 ttl and tos, plus ipv6 flow label and hop limit offloads to
nfp driver. From Stefano Brivio.
3) Implement GRO for plain UDP sockets, from Paolo Abeni.
4) Lots of work from Michał Mirosław to eliminate the VLAN_TAG_PRESENT
bit so that we could support the entire vlan_tci value.
5) Rework the IPSEC policy lookups to better optimize more usecases,
from Florian Westphal.
6) Infrastructure changes eliminating direct manipulation of SKB lists
wherever possible, and to always use the appropriate SKB list
helpers. This work is still ongoing...
7) Lots of PHY driver and state machine improvements and
simplifications, from Heiner Kallweit.
8) Various TSO deferral refinements, from Eric Dumazet.
9) Add ntuple filter support to aquantia driver, from Dmitry Bogdanov.
10) Batch dropping of XDP packets in tuntap, from Jason Wang.
11) Lots of cleanups and improvements to the r8169 driver from Heiner
Kallweit, including support for ->xmit_more. This driver has been
getting some much needed love since he started working on it.
12) Lots of new forwarding selftests from Petr Machata.
13) Enable VXLAN learning in mlxsw driver, from Ido Schimmel.
14) Packed ring support for virtio, from Tiwei Bie.
15) Add new Aquantia AQtion USB driver, from Dmitry Bezrukov.
16) Add XDP support to dpaa2-eth driver, from Ioana Ciocoi Radulescu.
17) Implement coalescing on TCP backlog queue, from Eric Dumazet.
18) Implement carrier change in tun driver, from Nicolas Dichtel.
19) Support msg_zerocopy in UDP, from Willem de Bruijn.
20) Significantly improve garbage collection of neighbor objects when
the table has many PERMANENT entries, from David Ahern.
21) Remove egdev usage from nfp and mlx5, and remove the facility
completely from the tree as it no longer has any users. From Oz
Shlomo and others.
22) Add a NETDEV_PRE_CHANGEADDR so that drivers can veto the change and
therefore abort the operation before the commit phase (which is the
NETDEV_CHANGEADDR event). From Petr Machata.
23) Add indirect call wrappers to avoid retpoline overhead, and use them
in the GRO code paths. From Paolo Abeni.
24) Add support for netlink FDB get operations, from Roopa Prabhu.
25) Support bloom filter in mlxsw driver, from Nir Dotan.
26) Add SKB extension infrastructure. This consolidates the handling of
the auxiliary SKB data used by IPSEC and bridge netfilter, and is
designed to support the needs to MPTCP which could be integrated in
the future.
27) Lots of XDP TX optimizations in mlx5 from Tariq Toukan.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1845 commits)
net: dccp: fix kernel crash on module load
drivers/net: appletalk/cops: remove redundant if statement and mask
bnx2x: Fix NULL pointer dereference in bnx2x_del_all_vlans() on some hw
net/net_namespace: Check the return value of register_pernet_subsys()
net/netlink_compat: Fix a missing check of nla_parse_nested
ieee802154: lowpan_header_create check must check daddr
net/mlx4_core: drop useless LIST_HEAD
mlxsw: spectrum: drop useless LIST_HEAD
net/mlx5e: drop useless LIST_HEAD
iptunnel: Set tun_flags in the iptunnel_metadata_reply from src
net/mlx5e: fix semicolon.cocci warnings
staging: octeon: fix build failure with XFRM enabled
net: Revert recent Spectre-v1 patches.
can: af_can: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
packet: validate address length if non-zero
nfc: af_nfc: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
phonet: af_phonet: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
net: core: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
net: minor cleanup in skb_ext_add()
net: drop the unused helper skb_ext_get()
...
Pull general security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"The main changes here are Paul Gortmaker's removal of unneccesary
module.h infrastructure"
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
security: integrity: partial revert of make ima_main explicitly non-modular
security: fs: make inode explicitly non-modular
security: audit and remove any unnecessary uses of module.h
security: integrity: make evm_main explicitly non-modular
keys: remove needless modular infrastructure from ecryptfs_format
security: integrity: make ima_main explicitly non-modular
tomoyo: fix small typo
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20181224' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux patches from Paul Moore:
"I already used my best holiday pull request lines in the audit pull
request, so this one is going to be a bit more boring, sorry about
that. To make up for this, we do have a birthday of sorts to
celebrate: SELinux turns 18 years old this December. Perhaps not the
most exciting thing in the world for most people, but I think it's
safe to say that anyone reading this email doesn't exactly fall into
the "most people" category.
Back to business and the pull request itself:
Ondrej has five patches in this pull request and I lump them into
three categories: one patch to always allow submounts (using similar
logic to elsewhere in the kernel), one to fix some issues with the
SELinux policydb, and the others to cleanup and improve the SELinux
sidtab.
The other patches from Alexey and Petr and trivial fixes that are
adequately described in their respective subject lines.
With this last pull request of the year, I want to thank everyone who
has contributed patches, testing, and reviews to the SELinux project
this year, and the past 18 years. Like any good open source effort,
SELinux is only as good as the community which supports it, and I'm
very happy that we have the community we do - thank you all!"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20181224' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve performance
selinux: use separate table for initial SID lookup
selinux: make "selinux_policycap_names[]" const char *
selinux: always allow mounting submounts
selinux: refactor sidtab conversion
Documentation: Update SELinux reference policy URL
selinux: policydb - fix byte order and alignment issues
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Merge tag 'audit-pr-20181224' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"In the finest of holiday of traditions, I have a number of gifts to
share today. While most of them are re-gifts from others, unlike the
typical re-gift, these are things you will want in and around your
tree; I promise.
This pull request is perhaps a bit larger than our typical PR, but
most of it comes from Jan's rework of audit's fanotify code; a very
welcome improvement. We ran this through our normal regression tests,
as well as some newly created stress tests and everything looks good.
Richard added a few patches, mostly cleaning up a few things and and
shortening some of the audit records that we send to userspace; a
change the userspace folks are quite happy about.
Finally YueHaibing and I kick in a few patches to simplify things a
bit and make the code less prone to errors.
Lastly, I want to say thanks one more time to everyone who has
contributed patches, testing, and code reviews for the audit subsystem
over the past year. The project is what it is due to your help and
contributions - thank you"
* tag 'audit-pr-20181224' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit: (22 commits)
audit: remove duplicated include from audit.c
audit: shorten PATH cap values when zero
audit: use current whenever possible
audit: minimize our use of audit_log_format()
audit: remove WATCH and TREE config options
audit: use session_info helper
audit: localize audit_log_session_info prototype
audit: Use 'mark' name for fsnotify_mark variables
audit: Replace chunk attached to mark instead of replacing mark
audit: Simplify locking around untag_chunk()
audit: Drop all unused chunk nodes during deletion
audit: Guarantee forward progress of chunk untagging
audit: Allocate fsnotify mark independently of chunk
audit: Provide helper for dropping mark's chunk reference
audit: Remove pointless check in insert_hash()
audit: Factor out chunk replacement code
audit: Make hash table insertion safe against concurrent lookups
audit: Embed key into chunk
audit: Fix possible tagging failures
audit: Fix possible spurious -ENOSPC error
...
make it use smack_add_opt() and avoid separate copies - gather
non-LSM options by memmove() in place
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
same issue as with selinux...
[fix by Andrei Vagin folded in]
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
smack_add_opt() adds an already matched option to growing smack_mnt_options
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Adding options to growing mnt_opts. NFS kludge with passing
context= down into non-text-options mount switched to it, and
with that the last use of ->sb_parse_opts_str() is gone.
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
make it use selinux_add_opt() and avoid separate copies - gather
non-LSM options by memmove() in place
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
It's not a good fit, unfortunately, and the next step will make it
even less so. Open-code what we need here.
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
the guts of the loop in selinux_parse_opts_str() - takes one
(already recognized) option and adds it to growing selinux_mnt_opts.
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
none of the convolutions needed, just 4 strings, TYVM...
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Keep void * instead, allocate on demand (in parse_str_opts, at the
moment). Eventually both selinux and smack will be better off
with private structures with several strings in those, rather than
this "counter and two pointers to dynamically allocated arrays"
ugliness. This commit allows to do that at leisure, without
disrupting anything outside of given module.
Changes:
* instead of struct security_mnt_opt use an opaque pointer
initialized to NULL.
* security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(), security_sb_parse_opts_str() and
security_free_mnt_opts() take it as var argument (i.e. as void **);
call sites are unchanged.
* security_sb_set_mnt_opts() and security_sb_remount() take
it by value (i.e. as void *).
* new method: ->sb_free_mnt_opts(). Takes void *, does
whatever freeing that needs to be done.
* ->sb_set_mnt_opts() and ->sb_remount() might get NULL as
mnt_opts argument, meaning "empty".
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
it's much easier to just do the right thing in ->sb_show_options(),
without bothering with allocating and populating arrays, etc.
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Kill ->sb_copy_data() - it's used only in combination with immediately
following ->sb_parse_opts_str(). Turn that combination into a new
method.
This is just a mechanical move - cleanups will be the next step.
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
1) keeping a copy in btrfs_fs_info is completely pointless - we never
use it for anything. Getting rid of that allows for simpler calling
conventions for setup_security_options() (caller is responsible for
freeing mnt_opts in all cases).
2) on remount we want to use ->sb_remount(), not ->sb_set_mnt_opts(),
same as we would if not for FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA. Behaviours *are*
close (in fact, selinux sb_set_mnt_opts() ought to punt to
sb_remount() in "already initialized" case), but let's handle
that uniformly. And the only reason why the original btrfs changes
didn't go for security_sb_remount() in btrfs_remount() case is that
it hadn't been exported. Let's export it for a while - it'll be
going away soon anyway.
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
... leaving the "is it kernel-internal" logics in the caller.
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
combination of alloc_secdata(), security_sb_copy_data(),
security_sb_parse_opt_str() and free_secdata().
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This paves the way for retaining the LSM options from a common filesystem
mount context during a mount parameter parsing phase to be instituted prior
to actual mount/reconfiguration actions.
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This paves the way for retaining the LSM options from a common filesystem
mount context during a mount parameter parsing phase to be instituted prior
to actual mount/reconfiguration actions.
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The Kconfig lexer supports special characters such as '.' and '/' in
the parameter context. In my understanding, the reason is just to
support bare file paths in the source statement.
I do not see a good reason to complicate Kconfig for the room of
ambiguity.
The majority of code already surrounds file paths with double quotes,
and it makes sense since file paths are constant string literals.
Make it treewide consistent now.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Acked-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa@the-dreams.de>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Lots of conflicts, by happily all cases of overlapping
changes, parallel adds, things of that nature.
Thanks to Stephen Rothwell, Saeed Mahameed, and others
for their guidance in these resolutions.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
In commit 4f83d5ea64 ("security: integrity: make ima_main explicitly
non-modular") I'd removed <linux/module.h> after assuming that the
function is_module_sig_enforced() was an LSM function and not a core
kernel module function.
Unfortunately the typical .config selections used in build testing
provide an implicit <linux/module.h> presence, and so normal/typical
build testing did not immediately reveal my incorrect assumption.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Only the mount namespace code that implements mount(2) should be using the
MS_* flags. Suppress them inside the kernel unless uapi/linux/mount.h is
included.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
skb_sec_path gains 'const' qualifier to avoid
xt_policy.c: 'skb_sec_path' discards 'const' qualifier from pointer target type
same reasoning as previous conversions: Won't need to touch these
spots anymore when skb->sp is removed.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Start the policy_tokens and the associated enumeration from zero,
simplifying the pt macro.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The code uses a bitmap to check for duplicate tokens during parsing, and
that doesn't work at all for the negative Opt_err token case.
There is absolutely no reason to make Opt_err be negative, and in fact
it only confuses things, since some of the affected functions actually
return a positive Opt_xyz enum _or_ a regular negative error code (eg
-EINVAL), and using -1 for Opt_err makes no sense.
There are similar problems in ima_policy.c and key encryption, but they
don't have the immediate bug wrt bitmap handing, and ima_policy.c in
particular needs a different patch to make the enum values match the
token array index. Mimi is sending that separately.
Reported-by: syzbot+a22e0dc07567662c50bc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Fixes: 5208cc8342 ("keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options")
Fixes: 00d60fd3b9 ("KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]")
Cc: James Morris James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
From what I can tell, it has never been used.
Mimi: This was introduced prior to Rusty's decision to use appended
signatures for kernel modules.
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
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Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-20181217' of git://git.infradead.org/users/jjs/linux-tpmdd into next-tpm
tpmdd updates for Linux v4.21
From Jarkko:
v4.21 updates:
* Support for partial reads of /dev/tpm0.
* Clean up for TPM 1.x code: move the commands to tpm1-cmd.c and make
everything to use the same data structure for building TPM commands
i.e. struct tpm_buf.
From Mimi:
In Linux 4.19, a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data was
upstreamed, allowing LSMs and IMA to prevent the kexec_load
syscall. Different signature verification methods exist for verifying
the kexec'ed kernel image. This pull request adds additional support
in IMA to prevent loading unsigned kernel images via the kexec_load
syscall, independently of the IMA policy rules, based on the runtime
"secure boot" flag. An initial IMA kselftest is included.
In addition, this pull request defines a new, separate keyring named
".platform" for storing the preboot/firmware keys needed for verifying
the kexec'ed kernel image's signature and includes the associated IMA
kexec usage of the ".platform" keyring.
(David Howell's and Josh Boyer's patches for reading the
preboot/firmware keys, which were previously posted for a different
use case scenario, are included here.)
Adding nvdimm key format type to encrypted keys in order to limit the size
of the key to 32bytes.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Export lookup_user_key() symbol in order to allow nvdimm passphrase
update to retrieve user injected keys.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Use the aptly named function rather than open coding the check. No
functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
On secure boot enabled systems, the bootloader verifies the kernel
image and possibly the initramfs signatures based on a set of keys. A
soft reboot(kexec) of the system, with the same kernel image and
initramfs, requires access to the original keys to verify the
signatures.
This patch allows IMA-appraisal access to those original keys, now
loaded on the platform keyring, needed for verifying the kernel image
and initramfs signatures.
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: only use platform keyring if it's enabled (Thiago)]
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
If a user tells shim to not use the certs/hashes in the UEFI db variable
for verification purposes, shim will set a UEFI variable called
MokIgnoreDB. Have the uefi import code look for this and ignore the db
variable if it is found.
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: removed reference to "secondary" keyring comment]
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Secure Boot stores a list of allowed certificates in the 'db' variable.
This patch imports those certificates into the platform keyring. The shim
UEFI bootloader has a similar certificate list stored in the 'MokListRT'
variable. We import those as well.
Secure Boot also maintains a list of disallowed certificates in the 'dbx'
variable. We load those certificates into the system blacklist keyring
and forbid any kernel signed with those from loading.
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: dropped Josh's original patch description]
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Add a function to parse an EFI signature blob looking for elements of
interest. A list is made up of a series of sublists, where all the
elements in a sublist are of the same type, but sublists can be of
different types.
For each sublist encountered, the function pointed to by the
get_handler_for_guid argument is called with the type specifier GUID and
returns either a pointer to a function to handle elements of that type or
NULL if the type is not of interest.
If the sublist is of interest, each element is passed to the handler
function in turn.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The patch refactors integrity_load_x509(), making it a wrapper for a new
function named integrity_add_key(). This patch also defines a new
function named integrity_load_cert() for loading the platform keys.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
On secure boot enabled systems, a verified kernel may need to kexec
additional kernels. For example, it may be used as a bootloader needing
to kexec a target kernel or it may need to kexec a crashdump kernel. In
such cases, it may want to verify the signature of the next kernel
image.
It is further possible that the kernel image is signed with third party
keys which are stored as platform or firmware keys in the 'db' variable.
The kernel, however, can not directly verify these platform keys, and an
administrator may therefore not want to trust them for arbitrary usage.
In order to differentiate platform keys from other keys and provide the
necessary separation of trust, the kernel needs an additional keyring to
store platform keys.
This patch creates the new keyring called ".platform" to isolate keys
provided by platform from keys by kernel. These keys are used to
facilitate signature verification during kexec. Since the scope of this
keyring is only the platform/firmware keys, it cannot be updated from
userspace.
This keyring can be enabled by setting CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The Makefile/Kconfig entry controlling compilation of this code is:
security/Makefile:obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS) += inode.o
security/Kconfig:config SECURITYFS
security/Kconfig: bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
...meaning that it currently is not being built as a module by anyone.
Lets remove the couple traces of modular infrastructure use, so that
when reading the driver there is no doubt it is builtin-only.
We also delete the MODULE_LICENSE tag etc. since all that information
is already contained at the top of the file in the comments.
The removal of module.h uncovered a couple previously hidden implicit
header requirements which are now included explicitly.
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Historically a lot of these existed because we did not have
a distinction between what was modular code and what was providing
support to modules via EXPORT_SYMBOL and friends. That changed
when we forked out support for the latter into the export.h file.
This means we should be able to reduce the usage of module.h
in code that is obj-y Makefile or bool Kconfig.
The advantage in removing such instances is that module.h itself
sources about 15 other headers; adding significantly to what we feed
cpp, and it can obscure what headers we are effectively using.
Since module.h might have been the implicit source for init.h
(for __init) and for export.h (for EXPORT_SYMBOL) we consider each
instance for the presence of either and replace as needed.
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
The Makefile/Kconfig entry controlling compilation of this code is:
obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm.o
evm-y := evm_main.o evm_crypto.o evm_secfs.o
security/integrity/evm/Kconfig:config EVM
security/integrity/evm/Kconfig: bool "EVM support"
...meaning that it currently is not being built as a module by anyone.
Lets remove the couple traces of modular infrastructure use, so that
when reading the driver there is no doubt it is builtin-only.
We also delete the MODULE_LICENSE tag etc. since all that information
is already contained at the top of the file in the comments.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Even though the support can be modular, only one file needs to use
all the macros like MODULE_AUTHOR, MODULE_LICENSE etc. Only the one
responsible for registering/removal with module_init/module_exit
needs to declare these. In this case, that file is "encrypted.c"
and it already has the MODULE_LICENSE that we are removing here.
Since the file does EXPORT_SYMBOL, we add export.h - and build tests
show that module.h (which includes everything) was hiding an implicit
use of string.h - so that is added as well.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
The Makefile/Kconfig entry controlling compilation of this code is:
obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig:config IMA
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig- bool "Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA)"
...meaning that it currently is not being built as a module by anyone.
Lets remove the couple traces of modular infrastructure use, so that
when reading the driver there is no doubt it is builtin-only.
We also delete the MODULE_LICENSE tag etc. since all that information
is already contained at the top of the file in the comments.
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Update the builtin IMA policies specified on the boot command line
(eg. ima_policy="tcb|appraise_tcb") to permit accessing efivar files.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
On x86, there are two methods of verifying a kexec'ed kernel image
signature being loaded via the kexec_file_load syscall - an architecture
specific implementaton or a IMA KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraisal rule. Neither
of these methods verify the kexec'ed kernel image signature being loaded
via the kexec_load syscall.
Secure boot enabled systems require kexec images to be signed. Therefore,
this patch loads an IMA KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK policy rule on secure boot
enabled systems not configured with CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG enabled.
When IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM is configured, different IMA appraise modes
(eg. fix, log) can be specified on the boot command line, allowing unsigned
or invalidly signed kernel images to be kexec'ed. This patch permits
enabling IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM or IMA_ARCH_POLICY, but not both.
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Builtin IMA policies can be enabled on the boot command line, and replaced
with a custom policy, normally during early boot in the initramfs. Build
time IMA policy rules were recently added. These rules are automatically
enabled on boot and persist after loading a custom policy.
There is a need for yet another type of policy, an architecture specific
policy, which is derived at runtime during kernel boot, based on the
runtime secure boot flags. Like the build time policy rules, these rules
persist after loading a custom policy.
This patch adds support for loading an architecture specific IMA policy.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Co-Developed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This patch removes the code duplication in ima_init_policy() by defining
a new function named add_rules(). The new function adds the rules to the
initial IMA policy, the custom policy or both based on the policy mask
(IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY, IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY).
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
When CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG is enabled, the kexec_file_load syscall
requires the kexec'd kernel image to be signed. Distros are concerned
about totally disabling the kexec_load syscall. As a compromise, the
kexec_load syscall will only be disabled when CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG
is configured and the system is booted with secureboot enabled.
This patch disables the kexec_load syscall only for systems booted with
secureboot enabled.
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: add missing mesage on kexec_load failure]
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Before this patch, during a policy reload the sidtab would become frozen
and trying to map a new context to SID would be unable to add a new
entry to sidtab and fail with -ENOMEM.
Such failures are usually propagated into userspace, which has no way of
distignuishing them from actual allocation failures and thus doesn't
handle them gracefully. Such situation can be triggered e.g. by the
following reproducer:
while true; do load_policy; echo -n .; sleep 0.1; done &
for (( i = 0; i < 1024; i++ )); do
runcon -l s0:c$i echo -n x || break
# or:
# chcon -l s0:c$i <some_file> || break
done
This patch overhauls the sidtab so it doesn't need to be frozen during
policy reload, thus solving the above problem.
The new SID table leverages the fact that SIDs are allocated
sequentially and are never invalidated and stores them in linear buckets
indexed by a tree structure. This brings several advantages:
1. Fast SID -> context lookup - this lookup can now be done in
logarithmic time complexity (usually in less than 4 array lookups)
and can still be done safely without locking.
2. No need to re-search the whole table on reverse lookup miss - after
acquiring the spinlock only the newly added entries need to be
searched, which means that reverse lookups that end up inserting a
new entry are now about twice as fast.
3. No need to freeze sidtab during policy reload - it is now possible
to handle insertion of new entries even during sidtab conversion.
The tree structure of the new sidtab is able to grow automatically to up
to about 2^31 entries (at which point it should not have more than about
4 tree levels). The old sidtab had a theoretical capacity of almost 2^32
entries, but half of that is still more than enough since by that point
the reverse table lookups would become unusably slow anyway...
The number of entries per tree node is selected automatically so that
each node fits into a single page, which should be the easiest size for
kmalloc() to handle.
Note that the cache for reverse lookup is preserved with equivalent
logic. The only difference is that instead of storing pointers to the
hash table nodes it stores just the indices of the cached entries.
The new cache ensures that the indices are loaded/stored atomically, but
it still has the drawback that concurrent cache updates may mess up the
contents of the cache. Such situation however only reduces its
effectivity, not the correctness of lookups.
Tested by selinux-testsuite and thoroughly tortured by this simple
stress test:
```
function rand_cat() {
echo $(( $RANDOM % 1024 ))
}
function do_work() {
while true; do
echo -n "system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0:c$(rand_cat),c$(rand_cat)" \
>/sys/fs/selinux/context 2>/dev/null || true
done
}
do_work >/dev/null &
do_work >/dev/null &
do_work >/dev/null &
while load_policy; do echo -n .; sleep 0.1; done
kill %1
kill %2
kill %3
```
Link: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/38
Reported-by: Orion Poplawski <orion@nwra.com>
Reported-by: Li Kun <hw.likun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: most of sidtab.c merged by hand due to conflicts]
[PM: checkpatch fixes in mls.c, services.c, sidtab.c]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This moves handling of initial SIDs into a separate table. Note that the
SIDs stored in the main table are now shifted by SECINITSID_NUM and
converted to/from the actual SIDs transparently by helper functions.
This change doesn't make much sense on its own, but it simplifies
further sidtab overhaul in a succeeding patch.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: fixed some checkpatch warnings on line length, whitespace]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Function smack_key_permission() only issues smack requests for the
following operations:
- KEY_NEED_READ (issues MAY_READ)
- KEY_NEED_WRITE (issues MAY_WRITE)
- KEY_NEED_LINK (issues MAY_WRITE)
- KEY_NEED_SETATTR (issues MAY_WRITE)
A blank smack request is issued in all other cases, resulting in
smack access being granted if there is any rule defined between
subject and object, or denied with -EACCES otherwise.
Request MAY_READ access for KEY_NEED_SEARCH and KEY_NEED_VIEW.
Fix the logic in the unlikely case when both MAY_READ and
MAY_WRITE are needed. Validate access permission field for valid
contents.
Signed-off-by: Zoran Markovic <zmarkovic@sierrawireless.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20181129' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux fix from Paul Moore:
"One more SELinux fix for v4.20: add some missing netlink message to
SELinux permission mappings. The netlink messages were added in v4.19,
but unfortunately we didn't catch it then because the mechanism to
catch these things was bypassed.
In addition to adding the mappings, we're adding some comments to the
code to hopefully prevent bypasses in the future"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20181129' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: add support for RTM_NEWCHAIN, RTM_DELCHAIN, and RTM_GETCHAIN
Commit 32a4f5ecd7 ("net: sched: introduce chain object to uapi")
added new RTM_* definitions without properly updating SELinux, this
patch adds the necessary SELinux support.
While there was a BUILD_BUG_ON() in the SELinux code to protect from
exactly this case, it was bypassed in the broken commit. In order to
hopefully prevent this from happening in the future, add additional
comments which provide some instructions on how to resolve the
BUILD_BUG_ON() failures.
Fixes: 32a4f5ecd7 ("net: sched: introduce chain object to uapi")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.19
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
There are many places, notably audit_log_task_info() and
audit_log_exit(), that take task_struct pointers but in reality they
are always working on the current task. This patch eliminates the
task_struct arguments and uses current directly which allows a number
of cleanups as well.
Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
If a superblock has the MS_SUBMOUNT flag set, we should always allow
mounting it. These mounts are done automatically by the kernel either as
part of mounting some parent mount (e.g. debugfs always mounts tracefs
under "tracing" for compatibility) or they are mounted automatically as
needed on subdirectory accesses (e.g. NFS crossmnt mounts). Since such
automounts are either an implicit consequence of the parent mount (which
is already checked) or they can happen during regular accesses (where it
doesn't make sense to check against the current task's context), the
mount permission check should be skipped for them.
Without this patch, attempts to access contents of an automounted
directory can cause unexpected SELinux denials.
In the current kernel tree, the MS_SUBMOUNT flag is set only via
vfs_submount(), which is called only from the following places:
- AFS, when automounting special "symlinks" referencing other cells
- CIFS, when automounting "referrals"
- NFS, when automounting subtrees
- debugfs, when automounting tracefs
In all cases the submounts are meant to be transparent to the user and
it makes sense that if mounting the master is allowed, then so should be
the automounts. Note that CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability checking is already
skipped for (SB_KERNMOUNT|SB_SUBMOUNT) in:
- sget_userns() in fs/super.c:
if (!(flags & (SB_KERNMOUNT|SB_SUBMOUNT)) &&
!(type->fs_flags & FS_USERNS_MOUNT) &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
- sget() in fs/super.c:
/* Ensure the requestor has permissions over the target filesystem */
if (!(flags & (SB_KERNMOUNT|SB_SUBMOUNT)) && !ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
Verified internally on patched RHEL 7.6 with a reproducer using
NFS+httpd and selinux-tesuite.
Fixes: 93faccbbfa ("fs: Better permission checking for submounts")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This is a purely cosmetic change that encapsulates the three-step sidtab
conversion logic (shutdown -> clone -> map) into a single function
defined in sidtab.c (as opposed to services.c).
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
[PM: whitespaces fixes to make checkpatch happy]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
'shash' algorithms are always synchronous, so passing CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC
in the mask to crypto_alloc_shash() has no effect. Many users therefore
already don't pass it, but some still do. This inconsistency can cause
confusion, especially since the way the 'mask' argument works is
somewhat counterintuitive.
Thus, just remove the unneeded CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC flags.
This patch shouldn't change any actual behavior.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20181115' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"Two small SELinux fixes for v4.20.
Ondrej's patch adds a check on user input, and my patch ensures we
don't look past the end of a buffer.
Both patches are quite small and pass the selinux-testsuite"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20181115' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix non-MLS handling in mls_context_to_sid()
selinux: check length properly in SCTP bind hook
when compiled without CONFIG_IPV6:
security/apparmor/lsm.c:1601:21: warning: ‘apparmor_ipv6_postroute’ defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
static unsigned int apparmor_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Reported-by: Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>
Tested-by: Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>
Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Commit 95ffe19420 ("selinux: refactor mls_context_to_sid() and make
it stricter") inadvertently changed how we handle labels that did not
contain MLS information. This patch restores the proper behavior in
mls_context_to_sid() and adds a comment explaining the proper
behavior to help ensure this doesn't happen again.
Fixes: 95ffe19420 ("selinux: refactor mls_context_to_sid() and make it stricter")
Reported-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
On systems with IMA-appraisal enabled with a policy requiring file
signatures, the "good" signature values are stored on the filesystem as
extended attributes (security.ima). Signature verification failure
would normally be limited to just a particular file (eg. executable),
but during boot signature verification failure could result in a system
hang.
Defining and requiring a new public_key_signature field requires all
callers of asymmetric signature verification to be updated to reflect
the change. This patch updates the integrity asymmetric_verify()
caller.
Fixes: 82f94f2447 ("KEYS: Provide software public key query function [ver #2]")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
selinux_sctp_bind_connect() must verify if the address buffer has
sufficient length before accessing the 'sa_family' field. See
__sctp_connect() for a similar check.
The length of the whole address ('len') is already checked in the
callees.
Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@gmx.us>
Fixes: d452930fd3 ("selinux: Add SCTP support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.17+
Cc: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Qian Cai <cai@gmx.us>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
On systems with IMA-appraisal enabled with a policy requiring file
signatures, the "good" signature values are stored on the filesystem as
extended attributes (security.ima). Signature verification failure
would normally be limited to just a particular file (eg. executable),
but during boot signature verification failure could result in a system
hang.
Defining and requiring a new public_key_signature field requires all
callers of asymmetric signature verification to be updated to reflect
the change. This patch updates the integrity asymmetric_verify()
caller.
Fixes: 82f94f2447 ("KEYS: Provide software public key query function [ver #2]")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
The TPM specs defines PCR index as a positive number, and there is
no reason to use a signed number. It is also a possible security
issue as currently no functions check for a negative index,
which may become a large number when converted to u32.
Adjust the API to use u32 instead of int in all PCR related
functions.
Signed-off-by: Tomas Winkler <tomas.winkler@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Do the LE conversions before doing the Infiniband-related range checks.
The incorrect checks are otherwise causing a failure to load any policy
with an ibendportcon rule on BE systems. This can be reproduced by
running (on e.g. ppc64):
cat >my_module.cil <<EOF
(type test_ibendport_t)
(roletype object_r test_ibendport_t)
(ibendportcon mlx4_0 1 (system_u object_r test_ibendport_t ((s0) (s0))))
EOF
semodule -i my_module.cil
Also, fix loading/storing the 64-bit subnet prefix for OCON_IBPKEY to
use a correctly aligned buffer.
Finally, do not use the 'nodebuf' (u32) buffer where 'buf' (__le32)
should be used instead.
Tested internally on a ppc64 machine with a RHEL 7 kernel with this
patch applied.
Cc: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Cc: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.13+
Fixes: a806f7a161 ("selinux: Create policydb version for Infiniband support")
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
- replace spin_is_locked() with lockdep
- add base support for secmark labeling and matching
+ Cleanups
- clean an indentation issue, remove extraneous space
- remove no-op permission check in policy_unpack
- fix checkpatch missing spaces error in Parse secmark policy
- fix network performance issue in aa_label_sk_perm
+ Bug fixes
- add #ifdef checks for secmark filtering
- fix an error code in __aa_create_ns()
- don't try to replace stale label in ptrace checks
- fix failure to audit context info in build_change_hat
- check buffer bounds when mapping permissions mask
- fully initialize aa_perms struct when answering userspace query
- fix uninitialized value in aa_split_fqname
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Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-11-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen:
"Features/Improvements:
- replace spin_is_locked() with lockdep
- add base support for secmark labeling and matching
Cleanups:
- clean an indentation issue, remove extraneous space
- remove no-op permission check in policy_unpack
- fix checkpatch missing spaces error in Parse secmark policy
- fix network performance issue in aa_label_sk_perm
Bug fixes:
- add #ifdef checks for secmark filtering
- fix an error code in __aa_create_ns()
- don't try to replace stale label in ptrace checks
- fix failure to audit context info in build_change_hat
- check buffer bounds when mapping permissions mask
- fully initialize aa_perms struct when answering userspace query
- fix uninitialized value in aa_split_fqname"
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-11-01' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor:
apparmor: clean an indentation issue, remove extraneous space
apparmor: fix checkpatch error in Parse secmark policy
apparmor: add #ifdef checks for secmark filtering
apparmor: Fix uninitialized value in aa_split_fqname
apparmor: don't try to replace stale label in ptraceme check
apparmor: Replace spin_is_locked() with lockdep
apparmor: Allow filtering based on secmark policy
apparmor: Parse secmark policy
apparmor: Add a wildcard secid
apparmor: don't try to replace stale label in ptrace access check
apparmor: Fix network performance issue in aa_label_sk_perm
Trivial fix to clean up an indentation issue, remove space
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
This patch exposes some common functionality needed to send TPM commands.
Several functions from keys/trusted.c are exposed for use by the new tpm
key subtype and a module dependency is introduced.
In the future, common functionality between the trusted key type and the
asym_tpm subtype should be factored out into a common utility library.
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Provide five keyctl functions that permit userspace to make use of the new
key type ops for accessing and driving asymmetric keys.
(*) Query an asymmetric key.
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY,
key_serial_t key, unsigned long reserved,
struct keyctl_pkey_query *info);
Get information about an asymmetric key. The information is returned
in the keyctl_pkey_query struct:
__u32 supported_ops;
A bit mask of flags indicating which ops are supported. This is
constructed from a bitwise-OR of:
KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_{ENCRYPT,DECRYPT,SIGN,VERIFY}
__u32 key_size;
The size in bits of the key.
__u16 max_data_size;
__u16 max_sig_size;
__u16 max_enc_size;
__u16 max_dec_size;
The maximum sizes in bytes of a blob of data to be signed, a signature
blob, a blob to be encrypted and a blob to be decrypted.
reserved must be set to 0. This is intended for future use to hand
over one or more passphrases needed unlock a key.
If successful, 0 is returned. If the key is not an asymmetric key,
EOPNOTSUPP is returned.
(*) Encrypt, decrypt, sign or verify a blob using an asymmetric key.
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT,
const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
const char *info,
const void *in,
void *out);
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT,
const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
const char *info,
const void *in,
void *out);
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN,
const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
const char *info,
const void *in,
void *out);
long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY,
const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
const char *info,
const void *in,
const void *in2);
Use an asymmetric key to perform a public-key cryptographic operation
a blob of data.
The parameter block pointed to by params contains a number of integer
values:
__s32 key_id;
__u32 in_len;
__u32 out_len;
__u32 in2_len;
For a given operation, the in and out buffers are used as follows:
Operation ID in,in_len out,out_len in2,in2_len
======================= =============== =============== ===========
KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT Raw data Encrypted data -
KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT Encrypted data Raw data -
KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN Raw data Signature -
KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY Raw data - Signature
info is a string of key=value pairs that supply supplementary
information.
The __spare space in the parameter block must be set to 0. This is
intended, amongst other things, to allow the passing of passphrases
required to unlock a key.
If successful, encrypt, decrypt and sign all return the amount of data
written into the output buffer. Verification returns 0 on success.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Pull LoadPin updates from James Morris:
"From Kees: This is a small reporting improvement and the param change
needed for the ordering series (but since the loadpin change is
desired and separable, I'm putting it here)"
* 'next-loadpin' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
LoadPin: Rename boot param "enabled" to "enforce"
LoadPin: Report friendly block device name
Pull smack updates from James Morris:
"From Casey: three patches for Smack for 4.20. Two clean up warnings
and one is a rarely encountered ptrace capability check"
* 'next-smack' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
Smack: Mark expected switch fall-through
Smack: ptrace capability use fixes
Smack: remove set but not used variable 'root_inode'
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
"From Mimi: This contains a couple of bug fixes, including one for a
recent problem with calculating file hashes on overlayfs, and some
code cleanup"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
MAINTAINERS: add Jarkko as maintainer for trusted keys
ima: open a new file instance if no read permissions
ima: fix showing large 'violations' or 'runtime_measurements_count'
security/integrity: remove unnecessary 'init_keyring' variable
security/integrity: constify some read-only data
vfs: require i_size <= SIZE_MAX in kernel_read_file()
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"In this patchset, there are a couple of minor updates, as well as some
reworking of the LSM initialization code from Kees Cook (these prepare
the way for ordered stackable LSMs, but are a valuable cleanup on
their own)"
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures
LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure
LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info
LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM()
vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA
LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info
LSM: Remove initcall tracing
LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info
vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section
LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization
security: fix LSM description location
keys: Fix the use of the C++ keyword "private" in uapi/linux/keyctl.h
seccomp: remove unnecessary unlikely()
security: tomoyo: Fix obsolete function
security/capabilities: remove check for -EINVAL
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20181022' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
"Three SELinux patches for v4.20, all fall under the bug-fix or
behave-better category, which is good. All three have pretty good
descriptions too, which is even better"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20181022' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: Add __GFP_NOWARN to allocation at str_read()
selinux: refactor mls_context_to_sid() and make it stricter
selinux: fix mounting of cgroup2 under older policies
Pull siginfo updates from Eric Biederman:
"I have been slowly sorting out siginfo and this is the culmination of
that work.
The primary result is in several ways the signal infrastructure has
been made less error prone. The code has been updated so that manually
specifying SEND_SIG_FORCED is never necessary. The conversion to the
new siginfo sending functions is now complete, which makes it
difficult to send a signal without filling in the proper siginfo
fields.
At the tail end of the patchset comes the optimization of decreasing
the size of struct siginfo in the kernel from 128 bytes to about 48
bytes on 64bit. The fundamental observation that enables this is by
definition none of the known ways to use struct siginfo uses the extra
bytes.
This comes at the cost of a small user space observable difference.
For the rare case of siginfo being injected into the kernel only what
can be copied into kernel_siginfo is delivered to the destination, the
rest of the bytes are set to 0. For cases where the signal and the
si_code are known this is safe, because we know those bytes are not
used. For cases where the signal and si_code combination is unknown
the bits that won't fit into struct kernel_siginfo are tested to
verify they are zero, and the send fails if they are not.
I made an extensive search through userspace code and I could not find
anything that would break because of the above change. If it turns out
I did break something it will take just the revert of a single change
to restore kernel_siginfo to the same size as userspace siginfo.
Testing did reveal dependencies on preferring the signo passed to
sigqueueinfo over si->signo, so bit the bullet and added the
complexity necessary to handle that case.
Testing also revealed bad things can happen if a negative signal
number is passed into the system calls. Something no sane application
will do but something a malicious program or a fuzzer might do. So I
have fixed the code that performs the bounds checks to ensure negative
signal numbers are handled"
* 'siginfo-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (80 commits)
signal: Guard against negative signal numbers in copy_siginfo_from_user32
signal: Guard against negative signal numbers in copy_siginfo_from_user
signal: In sigqueueinfo prefer sig not si_signo
signal: Use a smaller struct siginfo in the kernel
signal: Distinguish between kernel_siginfo and siginfo
signal: Introduce copy_siginfo_from_user and use it's return value
signal: Remove the need for __ARCH_SI_PREABLE_SIZE and SI_PAD_SIZE
signal: Fail sigqueueinfo if si_signo != sig
signal/sparc: Move EMT_TAGOVF into the generic siginfo.h
signal/unicore32: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate
signal/unicore32: Generate siginfo in ucs32_notify_die
signal/unicore32: Use send_sig_fault where appropriate
signal/arc: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate
signal/arc: Push siginfo generation into unhandled_exception
signal/ia64: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate
signal/ia64: Use the force_sig(SIGSEGV,...) in ia64_rt_sigreturn
signal/ia64: Use the generic force_sigsegv in setup_frame
signal/arm/kvm: Use send_sig_mceerr
signal/arm: Use send_sig_fault where appropriate
signal/arm: Use force_sig_fault where appropriate
...
LoadPin's "enabled" setting is really about enforcement, not whether
or not the LSM is using LSM hooks. Instead, split this out so that LSM
enabling can be logically distinct from whether enforcement is happening
(for example, the pinning happens when the LSM is enabled, but the pin
is only checked when "enforce" is set). This allows LoadPin to continue
to operate sanely in test environments once LSM enable/disable is
centrally handled (i.e. we want LoadPin to be enabled separately from
its enforcement).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Instead of only reporting major/minor, include the actual block device
name, at least as seen by the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
The newly added code fails to build when either SECMARK or
NETFILTER are disabled:
security/apparmor/lsm.c: In function 'apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb':
security/apparmor/lsm.c:1138:12: error: 'struct sk_buff' has no member named 'secmark'; did you mean 'mark'?
security/apparmor/lsm.c:1671:21: error: 'struct nf_hook_state' declared inside parameter list will not be visible outside of this definition or declaration [-Werror]
Add a set of #ifdef checks around it to only enable the code that
we can compile and that makes sense in that configuration.
Fixes: ab9f211508 ("apparmor: Allow filtering based on secmark policy")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
LSM initialization failures have traditionally been ignored. We should
at least WARN when something goes wrong.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Booting with "lsm.debug" will report future details on how LSM ordering
decisions are being made.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
In preparation for making LSM selections outside of the LSMs, include
the name of LSMs in struct lsm_info.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Instead of using argument-based initializers, switch to defining the
contents of struct lsm_info on a per-LSM basis. This also drops
the final use of the now inaccurate "initcall" naming.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
In preparation for doing more interesting LSM init probing, this converts
the existing initcall system into an explicit call into a function pointer
from a section-collected struct lsm_info array.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
This partially reverts commit 58eacfffc4 ("init, tracing: instrument
security and console initcall trace events") since security init calls
are about to no longer resemble regular init calls.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
In preparation for switching from initcall to just a regular set of
pointers in a section, rename the internal section name.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
For a while now, the LSM core has said it was "initializED", rather than
"initializING". This adjust the report to be more accurate (i.e. before
this was reported before any LSMs had been initialized.)
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Open a new file instance as opposed to changing file->f_mode when
the file is not readable. This is done to accomodate overlayfs
stacked file operations change. The real struct file is hidden
behind the overlays struct file. So, any file->f_mode manipulations are
not reflected on the real struct file. Open the file again in read mode
if original file cannot be read, read and calculate the hash.
Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <rgoldwyn@suse.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org (linux-4.19)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The 12 character temporary buffer is not necessarily long enough to hold
a 'long' value. Increase it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The 'init_keyring' variable actually just gave the value of
CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING. We should check the config option
directly instead. No change in behavior; this just simplifies the code.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Constify some static data that is never modified,
so that it is placed in .rodata.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Linus recently observed that if we did not worry about the padding
member in struct siginfo it is only about 48 bytes, and 48 bytes is
much nicer than 128 bytes for allocating on the stack and copying
around in the kernel.
The obvious thing of only adding the padding when userspace is
including siginfo.h won't work as there are sigframe definitions in
the kernel that embed struct siginfo.
So split siginfo in two; kernel_siginfo and siginfo. Keeping the
traditional name for the userspace definition. While the version that
is used internally to the kernel and ultimately will not be padded to
128 bytes is called kernel_siginfo.
The definition of struct kernel_siginfo I have put in include/signal_types.h
A set of buildtime checks has been added to verify the two structures have
the same field offsets.
To make it easy to verify the change kernel_siginfo retains the same
size as siginfo. The reduction in size comes in a following change.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
begin_current_label_crit_section() must run in sleepable context because
when label_is_stale() is true, aa_replace_current_label() runs, which uses
prepare_creds(), which can sleep.
Until now, the ptraceme access check (which runs with tasklist_lock held)
violated this rule.
Fixes: b2d09ae449 ("apparmor: move ptrace checks to using labels")
Reported-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
lockdep_assert_held() is better suited to checking locking requirements,
since it won't get confused when someone else holds the lock. This is
also a step towards possibly removing spin_is_locked().
Signed-off-by: Lance Roy <ldr709@gmail.com>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Add support for dropping or accepting packets based on their secmark
tags.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Add support for parsing secmark policy provided by userspace, and
store that in the overall policy.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Reserve a secid value that we can use as a wildcard, allowing us to
define policy that's expected to match against all secids.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
This changes UAPI, breaking iwd and libell:
ell/key.c: In function 'kernel_dh_compute':
ell/key.c:205:38: error: 'struct keyctl_dh_params' has no member named 'private'; did you mean 'dh_private'?
struct keyctl_dh_params params = { .private = private,
^~~~~~~
dh_private
This reverts commit 8a2336e549.
Fixes: 8a2336e549 ("uapi/linux/keyctl.h: don't use C++ reserved keyword as a struct member name")
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch cases
where we are expecting to fall through.
Notice that in this particular case, I replaced "No break" with a
proper "Fall through" annotation, which is what GCC is expecting
to find.
Warning level 2 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=2
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 115051 ("Missing break in switch")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This fixes a pair of problems in the Smack ptrace checks
related to checking capabilities. In both cases, as reported
by Lukasz Pawelczyk, the raw capability calls are used rather
than the Smack wrapper that check addition restrictions.
In one case, as reported by Jann Horn, the wrong task is being
checked for capabilities.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Fixes gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning:
security/smack/smackfs.c: In function 'smk_fill_super':
security/smack/smackfs.c:2856:16: warning:
variable 'root_inode' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This reverts commit 1f40a46cf4.
It turned out that this patch is not sufficient to enable PTI on 32 bit
systems with legacy 2-level page-tables. In this paging mode the huge-page
PTEs are in the top-level page-table directory, where also the mirroring to
the user-space page-table happens. So every huge PTE exits twice, in the
kernel and in the user page-table.
That means that accessed/dirty bits need to be fetched from two PTEs in
this mode to be safe, but this is not trivial to implement because it needs
changes to generic code just for the sake of enabling PTI with 32-bit
legacy paging. As all systems that need PTI should support PAE anyway,
remove support for PTI when 32-bit legacy paging is used.
Fixes: 7757d607c6 ('x86/pti: Allow CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION for x86_32')
Reported-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536922754-31379-1-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
syzbot is hitting warning at str_read() [1] because len parameter can
become larger than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. We don't need to emit warning for
this case.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=7f2f5aad79ea8663c296a2eedb81978401a908f0
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+ac488b9811036cea7ea0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
As a comment above begin_current_label_crit_section() explains,
begin_current_label_crit_section() must run in sleepable context because
when label_is_stale() is true, aa_replace_current_label() runs, which uses
prepare_creds(), which can sleep.
Until now, the ptrace access check (which runs with a task lock held)
violated this rule.
Also add a might_sleep() assertion to begin_current_label_crit_section(),
because asserts are less likely to be ignored than comments.
Fixes: b2d09ae449 ("apparmor: move ptrace checks to using labels")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-09-06' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor fix from John Johansen:
"A fix for an issue syzbot discovered last week:
- Fix for bad debug check when converting secids to secctx"
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-09-06' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor:
apparmor: fix bad debug check in apparmor_secid_to_secctx()
The intended behavior change for this patch is to reject any MLS strings
that contain (trailing) garbage if p->mls_enabled is true.
As suggested by Paul Moore, change mls_context_to_sid() so that the two
parts of the range are extracted before the rest of the parsing. Because
now we don't have to scan for two different separators simultaneously
everywhere, we can actually switch to strchr() everywhere instead of the
open-coded loops that scan for two separators at once.
mls_context_to_sid() used to signal how much of the input string was parsed
by updating `*scontext`. However, there is actually no case in which
mls_context_to_sid() only parses a subset of the input and still returns
a success (other than the buggy case with a second '-' in which it
incorrectly claims to have consumed the entire string). Turn `scontext`
into a simple pointer argument and stop redundantly checking whether the
entire input was consumed in string_to_context_struct(). This also lets us
remove the `scontext_len` argument from `string_to_context_struct()`.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
[PM: minor merge fuzz in convert_context()]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Since this header is in "include/uapi/linux/", apparently people want to
use it in userspace programs -- even in C++ ones. However, the header
uses a C++ reserved keyword ("private"), so change that to "dh_private"
instead to allow the header file to be used in C++ userspace.
Fixes https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=191051
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0db6c314-1ef4-9bfa-1baa-7214dd2ee061@infradead.org
Fixes: ddbb411487 ("KEYS: Add KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE command")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
commit 901ef845fa ("selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs")
broke mounting of cgroup2 under older SELinux policies which lacked
a genfscon rule for cgroup2. This prevents mounting of cgroup2 even
when SELinux is permissive.
Change the handling when there is no genfscon rule in policy to
just mark the inode unlabeled and not return an error to the caller.
This permits mounting and access if allowed by policy, e.g. to
unconfined domains.
I also considered changing the behavior of security_genfs_sid() to
never return -ENOENT, but the current behavior is relied upon by
other callers to perform caller-specific handling.
Fixes: 901ef845fa ("selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs")
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reported-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Tested-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
simple_strtoul is obsolete, and use kstrtouint instead
Signed-off-by: Ding Xiang <dingxiang@cmss.chinamobile.com>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps() never returned -EINVAL so remove the
rc == -EINVAL check.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
- apparmor: remove no-op permission check in policy_unpack
+ Bug fixes
- apparmor: fix an error code in __aa_create_ns()
- apparmor: Fix failure to audit context info in build_change_hat
- apparmor: Check buffer bounds when mapping permissions mask
- apparmor: Fully initialize aa_perms struct when answering userspace query
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Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-08-23' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen:
"There is nothing major this time just four bug fixes and a patch to
remove some dead code:
Cleanups:
- remove no-op permission check in policy_unpack
Bug fixes:
- fix an error code in __aa_create_ns()
- fix failure to audit context info in build_change_hat
- check buffer bounds when mapping permissions mask
- fully initialize aa_perms struct when answering userspace query"
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2018-08-23' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor:
apparmor: remove no-op permission check in policy_unpack
apparmor: fix an error code in __aa_create_ns()
apparmor: Fix failure to audit context info in build_change_hat
apparmor: Fully initialize aa_perms struct when answering userspace query
apparmor: Check buffer bounds when mapping permissions mask
Pull namespace fixes from Eric Biederman:
"This is a set of four fairly obvious bug fixes:
- a switch from d_find_alias to d_find_any_alias because the xattr
code perversely takes a dentry
- two mutex vs copy_to_user fixes from Jann Horn
- a fix to use a sanitized size not the size userspace passed in from
Christian Brauner"
* 'userns-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
getxattr: use correct xattr length
sys: don't hold uts_sem while accessing userspace memory
userns: move user access out of the mutex
cap_inode_getsecurity: use d_find_any_alias() instead of d_find_alias()
Allow the initcall tables to be emitted using relative references that
are only half the size on 64-bit architectures and don't require fixups
at runtime on relocatable kernels.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180704083651.24360-5-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Acked-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We should return error pointers in this function. Returning NULL
results in a NULL dereference in the caller.
Fixes: 73688d1ed0 ("apparmor: refactor prepare_ns() and make usable from different views")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
"This adds support for EVM signatures based on larger digests, contains
a new audit record AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE to differentiate the
IMA policy rules from the IMA-audit messages, addresses two deadlocks
due to either loading or searching for crypto algorithms, and cleans
up the audit messages"
* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
EVM: fix return value check in evm_write_xattrs()
integrity: prevent deadlock during digsig verification.
evm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signatures
evm: Don't deadlock if a crypto algorithm is unavailable
integrity: silence warning when CONFIG_SECURITYFS is not enabled
ima: Differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions
ima: Do not audit if CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT is not set
ima: Use audit_log_format() rather than audit_log_string()
ima: Call audit_log_string() rather than logging it untrusted
Pull TPM updates from James Morris:
- Migrate away from PM runtime as explicit cmdReady/goIdle transactions
for every command is a spec requirement. PM runtime adds only a layer
of complexity on our case.
- tpm_tis drivers can now specify the hwrng quality.
- TPM 2.0 code uses now tpm_buf for constructing messages. Jarkko
thinks Tomas Winkler has done the same for TPM 1.2, and will start
digging those changes from the patchwork in the near future.
- Bug fixes and clean ups
* 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
ima: Get rid of ima_used_chip and use ima_tpm_chip != NULL instead
ima: Use tpm_default_chip() and call TPM functions with a tpm_chip
tpm: replace TPM_TRANSMIT_RAW with TPM_TRANSMIT_NESTED
tpm: Convert tpm_find_get_ops() to use tpm_default_chip()
tpm: Implement tpm_default_chip() to find a TPM chip
tpm: rename tpm_chip_find_get() to tpm_find_get_ops()
tpm: Allow tpm_tis drivers to set hwrng quality.
tpm: Return the actual size when receiving an unsupported command
tpm: separate cmd_ready/go_idle from runtime_pm
tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon: switch to i2c_lock_bus(..., I2C_LOCK_SEGMENT)
tpm_tis_spi: Pass the SPI IRQ down to the driver
tpm: migrate tpm2_get_random() to use struct tpm_buf
tpm: migrate tpm2_get_tpm_pt() to use struct tpm_buf
tpm: migrate tpm2_probe() to use struct tpm_buf
tpm: migrate tpm2_shutdown() to use struct tpm_buf
Pull smack updates from James Morris:
"Minor fixes from Piotr Sawicki"
* 'next-smack' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
Smack: Inform peer that IPv6 traffic has been blocked
Smack: Check UDP-Lite and DCCP protocols during IPv6 handling
Smack: Fix handling of IPv4 traffic received by PF_INET6 sockets
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
"Highlights:
- Gustavo A. R. Silva keeps working on the implicit switch fallthru
changes.
- Support 802.11ax High-Efficiency wireless in cfg80211 et al, From
Luca Coelho.
- Re-enable ASPM in r8169, from Kai-Heng Feng.
- Add virtual XFRM interfaces, which avoids all of the limitations of
existing IPSEC tunnels. From Steffen Klassert.
- Convert GRO over to use a hash table, so that when we have many
flows active we don't traverse a long list during accumluation.
- Many new self tests for routing, TC, tunnels, etc. Too many
contributors to mention them all, but I'm really happy to keep
seeing this stuff.
- Hardware timestamping support for dpaa_eth/fsl-fman from Yangbo Lu.
- Lots of cleanups and fixes in L2TP code from Guillaume Nault.
- Add IPSEC offload support to netdevsim, from Shannon Nelson.
- Add support for slotting with non-uniform distribution to netem
packet scheduler, from Yousuk Seung.
- Add UDP GSO support to mlx5e, from Boris Pismenny.
- Support offloading of Team LAG in NFP, from John Hurley.
- Allow to configure TX queue selection based upon RX queue, from
Amritha Nambiar.
- Support ethtool ring size configuration in aquantia, from Anton
Mikaev.
- Support DSCP and flowlabel per-transport in SCTP, from Xin Long.
- Support list based batching and stack traversal of SKBs, this is
very exciting work. From Edward Cree.
- Busyloop optimizations in vhost_net, from Toshiaki Makita.
- Introduce the ETF qdisc, which allows time based transmissions. IGB
can offload this in hardware. From Vinicius Costa Gomes.
- Add parameter support to devlink, from Moshe Shemesh.
- Several multiplication and division optimizations for BPF JIT in
nfp driver, from Jiong Wang.
- Lots of prepatory work to make more of the packet scheduler layer
lockless, when possible, from Vlad Buslov.
- Add ACK filter and NAT awareness to sch_cake packet scheduler, from
Toke Høiland-Jørgensen.
- Support regions and region snapshots in devlink, from Alex Vesker.
- Allow to attach XDP programs to both HW and SW at the same time on
a given device, with initial support in nfp. From Jakub Kicinski.
- Add TLS RX offload and support in mlx5, from Ilya Lesokhin.
- Use PHYLIB in r8169 driver, from Heiner Kallweit.
- All sorts of changes to support Spectrum 2 in mlxsw driver, from
Ido Schimmel.
- PTP support in mv88e6xxx DSA driver, from Andrew Lunn.
- Make TCP_USER_TIMEOUT socket option more accurate, from Jon
Maxwell.
- Support for templates in packet scheduler classifier, from Jiri
Pirko.
- IPV6 support in RDS, from Ka-Cheong Poon.
- Native tproxy support in nf_tables, from Máté Eckl.
- Maintain IP fragment queue in an rbtree, but optimize properly for
in-order frags. From Peter Oskolkov.
- Improvde handling of ACKs on hole repairs, from Yuchung Cheng"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1996 commits)
bpf: test: fix spelling mistake "REUSEEPORT" -> "REUSEPORT"
hv/netvsc: Fix NULL dereference at single queue mode fallback
net: filter: mark expected switch fall-through
xen-netfront: fix warn message as irq device name has '/'
cxgb4: Add new T5 PCI device ids 0x50af and 0x50b0
net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: missing unlock on error path
rds: fix building with IPV6=m
inet/connection_sock: prefer _THIS_IP_ to current_text_addr
net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: bitwise vs logical bug
net: sock_diag: Fix spectre v1 gadget in __sock_diag_cmd()
ieee802154: hwsim: using right kind of iteration
net: hns3: Add vlan filter setting by ethtool command -K
net: hns3: Set tx ring' tc info when netdev is up
net: hns3: Remove tx ring BD len register in hns3_enet
net: hns3: Fix desc num set to default when setting channel
net: hns3: Fix for phy link issue when using marvell phy driver
net: hns3: Fix for information of phydev lost problem when down/up
net: hns3: Fix for command format parsing error in hclge_is_all_function_id_zero
net: hns3: Add support for serdes loopback selftest
bnxt_en: take coredump_record structure off stack
...
- verify depmod is installed before modules_install
- support build salt in case build ids must be unique between builds
- allow users to specify additional host compiler flags via HOST*FLAGS,
and rename internal variables to KBUILD_HOST*FLAGS
- update buildtar script to drop vax support, add arm64 support
- update builddeb script for better debarch support
- document the pit-fall of if_changed usage
- fix parallel build of UML with O= option
- make 'samples' target depend on headers_install to fix build errors
- remove deprecated host-progs variable
- add a new coccinelle script for refcount_t vs atomic_t check
- improve double-test coccinelle script
- misc cleanups and fixes
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Merge tag 'kbuild-v4.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild
Pull Kbuild updates from Masahiro Yamada:
- verify depmod is installed before modules_install
- support build salt in case build ids must be unique between builds
- allow users to specify additional host compiler flags via HOST*FLAGS,
and rename internal variables to KBUILD_HOST*FLAGS
- update buildtar script to drop vax support, add arm64 support
- update builddeb script for better debarch support
- document the pit-fall of if_changed usage
- fix parallel build of UML with O= option
- make 'samples' target depend on headers_install to fix build errors
- remove deprecated host-progs variable
- add a new coccinelle script for refcount_t vs atomic_t check
- improve double-test coccinelle script
- misc cleanups and fixes
* tag 'kbuild-v4.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/masahiroy/linux-kbuild: (41 commits)
coccicheck: return proper error code on fail
Coccinelle: doubletest: reduce side effect false positives
kbuild: remove deprecated host-progs variable
kbuild: make samples really depend on headers_install
um: clean up archheaders recipe
kbuild: add %asm-generic to no-dot-config-targets
um: fix parallel building with O= option
scripts: Add Python 3 support to tracing/draw_functrace.py
builddeb: Add automatic support for sh{3,4}{,eb} architectures
builddeb: Add automatic support for riscv* architectures
builddeb: Add automatic support for m68k architecture
builddeb: Add automatic support for or1k architecture
builddeb: Add automatic support for sparc64 architecture
builddeb: Add automatic support for mips{,64}r6{,el} architectures
builddeb: Add automatic support for mips64el architecture
builddeb: Add automatic support for ppc64 and powerpcspe architectures
builddeb: Introduce functions to simplify kconfig tests in set_debarch
builddeb: Drop check for 32-bit s390
builddeb: Change architecture detection fallback to use dpkg-architecture
builddeb: Skip architecture detection when KBUILD_DEBARCH is set
...
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20180814' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
"There are 16 patches in here but really only one that is of any
significance. That one patch is by nixiaoming and fixes a few places
where we were not properly cleaning up dentry and inode objects in the
selinuxfs error handling code. The rest are either printk->pr_*
conversions, constification tweaks, and a minor tweak to MAINTAINERS.
Everything passes the selinux-testsuite and looks to merge cleanly
against your master branch"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20180814' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: cleanup dentry and inodes on error in selinuxfs
selinux: constify write_op[]
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in netnode
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in avc
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in netif
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in netport
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in sidtab
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in netlink
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in selinuxfs
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in services
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in avtab
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in hooks
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in policydb
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in ebitmap
selinux: Cleanup printk logging in conditional
MAINTAINERS: update the LSM and SELinux subsystems
