There was a race window that the pathname which is subjected to "file execute"
permission check when retrying via supervisor's decision because the pathname
was recalculated upon retry. Though, there is an inevitable race window even
without supervisor, for we have to calculate the symbolic link's pathname from
"struct linux_binprm"->filename rather than from "struct linux_binprm"->file
because we cannot back calculate the symbolic link's pathname from the
dereferenced pathname.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To be able to split permissions for Apache's CGI programs which are executed
without execve(), add special domain transition which is performed by writing
a TOMOYO's domainname to /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain interface.
This is an API for TOMOYO-aware userland applications. However, since I expect
TOMOYO and other LSM modules to run in parallel, this patch does not use
/proc/self/attr/ interface in order to avoid conflicts with other LSM modules
when it became possible to run multiple LSM modules in parallel.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add per-entry flag which controls generation of grant logs because Xen and KVM
issues ioctl requests so frequently. For example,
file ioctl /dev/null 0x5401 grant_log=no
will suppress /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/audit even if preference says
grant_log=yes .
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch adds support for permission checks for PF_INET/PF_INET6/PF_UNIX
socket's bind()/listen()/connect()/send() operations.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch adds support for checking environment variable's names.
Although TOMOYO already provides ability to check argv[]/envp[] passed to
execve() requests,
file execute /bin/sh exec.envp["LD_LIBRARY_PATH"]="bar"
will reject execution of /bin/sh if environment variable LD_LIBRARY_PATH is not
defined. To grant execution of /bin/sh if LD_LIBRARY_PATH is not defined,
administrators have to specify like
file execute /bin/sh exec.envp["LD_LIBRARY_PATH"]="/system/lib"
file execute /bin/sh exec.envp["LD_LIBRARY_PATH"]=NULL
. Since there are many environment variables whereas conditional checks are
applied as "&&", it is difficult to cover all combinations. Therefore, this
patch supports conditional checks that are applied as "||", by specifying like
file execute /bin/sh
misc env LD_LIBRARY_PATH exec.envp["LD_LIBRARY_PATH"]="/system/lib"
which means "grant execution of /bin/sh if environment variable is not defined
or is defined and its value is /system/lib".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix warning:
security/selinux/exports.c:18:6: warning: symbol 'selinux_is_enabled' was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fixes sparse warnings:
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:105:6: warning: symbol 'ima_file_free' was not declared. Should it be static?
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:167:5: warning: symbol 'ima_file_mmap' was not declared. Should it be static?
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:192:5: warning: symbol 'ima_bprm_check' was not declared. Should it be static?
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c:211:5: warning: symbol 'ima_file_check' was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fixes sparse warning:
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c:290:5: warning: symbol 'ima_open_policy' was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix sparse warnings:
security/apparmor/procattr.c:35:5: warning: symbol 'aa_getprocattr' was not declared. Should it be static?
security/apparmor/procattr.c:113:5: warning: symbol 'aa_setprocattr_changehat' was not declared. Should it be static?
security/apparmor/procattr.c:158:5: warning: symbol 'aa_setprocattr_changeprofile' was not declared. Should it be static?
security/apparmor/procattr.c:166:5: warning: symbol 'aa_setprocattr_permipc' was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Fix the following warnings:
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:384:35: warning: symbol 'size' shadows an earlier one
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:370:24: originally declared here
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:443:29: warning: symbol 'tmp' shadows an earlier one
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:434:21: originally declared here
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Fix the following sparse warnings:
security/apparmor/lib.c:37:6: warning: symbol 'aa_split_fqname' was not declared. Should it be static?
security/apparmor/lib.c:63:6: warning: symbol 'aa_info_message' was not declared. Should it be static?
security/apparmor/lib.c:83:6: warning: symbol 'kvmalloc' was not declared. Should it be static?
security/apparmor/lib.c:123:6: warning: symbol 'kvfree' was not declared. Should it be static?
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Include ipc.h to eliminate sparse warnings.
security/apparmor/ipc.c:61:5: warning: symbol 'aa_may_ptrace' was not declared. Should it be static?
security/apparmor/ipc.c:83:5: warning: symbol 'aa_ptrace' was not declared. Should it be static
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
In tomoyo_get_mode() since 2.6.36, CONFIG::file::execute was by error used in
place of CONFIG::file if CONFIG::file::execute was set to other than default.
As a result, enforcing mode was not applied in a way documentation says.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
unregister_key_type() has code to mark a key as dead and make it unavailable in
one loop and then destroy all those unavailable key payloads in the next loop.
However, the loop to mark keys dead renders the key undetectable to the second
loop by changing the key type pointer also.
Fix this by the following means:
(1) The key code has two garbage collectors: one deletes unreferenced keys and
the other alters keyrings to delete links to old dead, revoked and expired
keys. They can end up holding each other up as both want to scan the key
serial tree under spinlock. Combine these into a single routine.
(2) Move the dead key marking, dead link removal and dead key removal into the
garbage collector as a three phase process running over the three cycles
of the normal garbage collection procedure. This is tracked by the
KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_1, _2 and _3 state flags.
unregister_key_type() then just unlinks the key type from the list, wakes
up the garbage collector and waits for the third phase to complete.
(3) Downgrade the key types sem in unregister_key_type() once it has deleted
the key type from the list so that it doesn't block the keyctl() syscall.
(4) Dead keys that cannot be simply removed in the third phase have their
payloads destroyed with the key's semaphore write-locked to prevent
interference by the keyctl() syscall. There should be no in-kernel users
of dead keys of that type by the point of unregistration, though keyctl()
may be holding a reference.
(5) Only perform timer recalculation in the GC if the timer actually expired.
If it didn't, we'll get another cycle when it goes off - and if the key
that actually triggered it has been removed, it's not a problem.
(6) Only garbage collect link if the timer expired or if we're doing dead key
clean up phase 2.
(7) As only key_garbage_collector() is permitted to use rb_erase() on the key
serial tree, it doesn't need to revalidate its cursor after dropping the
spinlock as the node the cursor points to must still exist in the tree.
(8) Drop the spinlock in the GC if there is contention on it or if we need to
reschedule. After dealing with that, get the spinlock again and resume
scanning.
This has been tested in the following ways:
(1) Run the keyutils testsuite against it.
(2) Using the AF_RXRPC and RxKAD modules to test keytype removal:
Load the rxrpc_s key type:
# insmod /tmp/af-rxrpc.ko
# insmod /tmp/rxkad.ko
Create a key (http://people.redhat.com/~dhowells/rxrpc/listen.c):
# /tmp/listen &
[1] 8173
Find the key:
# grep rxrpc_s /proc/keys
091086e1 I--Q-- 1 perm 39390000 0 0 rxrpc_s 52:2
Link it to a session keyring, preferably one with a higher serial number:
# keyctl link 0x20e36251 @s
Kill the process (the key should remain as it's linked to another place):
# fg
/tmp/listen
^C
Remove the key type:
rmmod rxkad
rmmod af-rxrpc
This can be made a more effective test by altering the following part of
the patch:
if (unlikely(gc_state & KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_2)) {
/* Make sure everyone revalidates their keys if we marked a
* bunch as being dead and make sure all keyring ex-payloads
* are destroyed.
*/
kdebug("dead sync");
synchronize_rcu();
To call synchronize_rcu() in GC phase 1 instead. That causes that the
keyring's old payload content to hang around longer until it's RCU
destroyed - which usually happens after GC phase 3 is complete. This
allows the destroy_dead_key branch to be tested.
Reported-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The dead key link reaper should be non-reentrant as it relies on global state
to keep track of where it's got to when it returns to the work queue manager to
give it some air.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Make the key reaper non-reentrant by sticking it on the appropriate system work
queue when we queue it. This will allow it to have global state and drop
locks. It should probably be non-reentrant already as it may spend a long time
holding the key serial spinlock, and so multiple entrants can spend long
periods of time just sitting there spinning, waiting to get the lock.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Move the unreferenced key reaper function to the keys garbage collector file
as that's a more appropriate place with the dead key link reaper.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
__key_link() should use the RCU deref wrapper rcu_dereference_locked_keyring()
for accessing keyring payloads rather than calling rcu_dereference_protected()
directly.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The keyctl call:
keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 1)
should create a session keyring if the process doesn't have one of its own
because the create flag argument is set - rather than subscribing to and
returning the user-session keyring as:
keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0)
will do.
This can be tested by commenting out pam_keyinit in the /etc/pam.d files and
running the following program a couple of times in a row:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
key_serial_t uk, usk, sk, nsk;
uk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING, 0);
usk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING, 0);
sk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0);
nsk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 1);
printf("keys: %08x %08x %08x %08x\n", uk, usk, sk, nsk);
return 0;
}
Without this patch, I see:
keys: 3975ddc7 119c0c66 119c0c66 119c0c66
keys: 3975ddc7 119c0c66 119c0c66 119c0c66
With this patch, I see:
keys: 2cb4997b 34112878 34112878 17db2ce3
keys: 2cb4997b 34112878 34112878 39f3c73e
As can be seen, the session keyring starts off the same as the user-session
keyring each time, but with the patch a new session keyring is created when
the create flag is set.
Reported-by: Greg Wettstein <greg@enjellic.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Greg Wettstein <greg@enjellic.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
If install_session_keyring() is given a keyring, it should install it rather
than just creating a new one anyway. This was accidentally broken in:
commit d84f4f992c
Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Fri Nov 14 10:39:23 2008 +1100
Subject: CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials
The impact of that commit is that pam_keyinit no longer works correctly if
'force' isn't specified against a login process. This is because:
keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0)
now always creates a new session keyring and thus the check whether the session
keyring and the user-session keyring are the same is always false. This leads
pam_keyinit to conclude that a session keyring is installed and it shouldn't be
revoked by pam_keyinit here if 'revoke' is specified.
Any system that specifies 'force' against pam_keyinit in the PAM configuration
files for login methods (login, ssh, su -l, kdm, etc.) is not affected since
that bypasses the broken check and forces the creation of a new session keyring
anyway (for which the revoke flag is not cleared) - and any subsequent call to
pam_keyinit really does have a session keyring already installed, and so the
check works correctly there.
Reverting to the previous behaviour will cause the kernel to subscribe the
process to the user-session keyring as its session keyring if it doesn't have a
session keyring of its own. pam_keyinit will detect this and install a new
session keyring anyway (and won't clear the revert flag).
This can be tested by commenting out pam_keyinit in the /etc/pam.d files and
running the following program a couple of times in a row:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
key_serial_t uk, usk, sk;
uk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING, 0);
usk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING, 0);
sk = keyctl_get_keyring_ID(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0);
printf("keys: %08x %08x %08x\n", uk, usk, sk);
return 0;
}
Without the patch, I see:
keys: 3884e281 24c4dfcf 22825f8e
keys: 3884e281 24c4dfcf 068772be
With the patch, I see:
keys: 26be9c83 0e755ce0 0e755ce0
keys: 26be9c83 0e755ce0 0e755ce0
As can be seen, with the patch, the session keyring is the same as the
user-session keyring each time; without the patch a new session keyring is
generated each time.
Reported-by: Greg Wettstein <greg@enjellic.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Greg Wettstein <greg@enjellic.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Although the EVM encrypted-key should be encrypted/decrypted using a
trusted-key, a user-defined key could be used instead. When using a user-
defined key, a TCG_TPM dependency should not be required. Unfortunately,
the encrypted-key code needs to be refactored a bit in order to remove
this dependency.
This patch adds the TCG_TPM dependency.
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotimenet>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
daemonize() is only needed when a user-space task does kernel_thread().
tomoyo_gc_thread() is kthread_create()'ed and thus it doesn't need
the soon-to-be-deprecated daemonize().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Initialize has_cap in cap_bprm_set_creds()
Reported-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
A task (when !SECURE_NOROOT) which executes a setuid-root binary will
obtain root privileges while executing that binary. If the binary also
has effective capabilities set, then only those capabilities will be
granted. The rationale is that the same binary can carry both setuid-root
and the minimal file capability set, so that on a filesystem not
supporting file caps the binary can still be executed with privilege,
while on a filesystem supporting file caps it will run with minimal
privilege.
This special case currently does NOT happen if there are file capabilities
but no effective capabilities. Since capability-aware programs can very
well start with empty pE but populated pP and move those caps to pE when
needed. In other words, if the file has file capabilities but NOT
effective capabilities, then we should do the same thing as if there
were file capabilities, and not grant full root privileges.
This patchset does that.
(Changelog by Serge Hallyn).
Signed-off-by: Zhi Li <lizhi1215@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
evm_inode_init_security() should return 0, when EVM is not enabled.
(Returning an error is a remnant of evm_inode_post_init_security.)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Select trusted and encrypted keys if EVM is selected, to ensure
the requisite symbols are available. Otherwise, these can be
selected as modules while EVM is static, leading to a kernel
build failure.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Commit bd03a3e4 "TOMOYO: Add policy namespace support." forgot to set EOF flag
and forgot to print namespace at PREFERENCE line.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
My @hp.com will no longer be valid starting August 5, 2011 so an update is
necessary. My new email address is employer independent so we don't have
to worry about doing this again any time soon.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (54 commits)
tpm_nsc: Fix bug when loading multiple TPM drivers
tpm: Move tpm_tis_reenable_interrupts out of CONFIG_PNP block
tpm: Fix compilation warning when CONFIG_PNP is not defined
TOMOYO: Update kernel-doc.
tpm: Fix a typo
tpm_tis: Probing function for Intel iTPM bug
tpm_tis: Fix the probing for interrupts
tpm_tis: Delay ACPI S3 suspend while the TPM is busy
tpm_tis: Re-enable interrupts upon (S3) resume
tpm: Fix display of data in pubek sysfs entry
tpm_tis: Add timeouts sysfs entry
tpm: Adjust interface timeouts if they are too small
tpm: Use interface timeouts returned from the TPM
tpm_tis: Introduce durations sysfs entry
tpm: Adjust the durations if they are too small
tpm: Use durations returned from TPM
TOMOYO: Enable conditional ACL.
TOMOYO: Allow using argv[]/envp[] of execve() as conditions.
TOMOYO: Allow using executable's realpath and symlink's target as conditions.
TOMOYO: Allow using owner/group etc. of file objects as conditions.
...
Fix up trivial conflict in security/tomoyo/realpath.c
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6:
merge fchmod() and fchmodat() guts, kill ancient broken kludge
xfs: fix misspelled S_IS...()
xfs: get rid of open-coded S_ISREG(), etc.
vfs: document locking requirements for d_move, __d_move and d_materialise_unique
omfs: fix (mode & S_IFDIR) abuse
btrfs: S_ISREG(mode) is not mode & S_IFREG...
ima: fmode_t misspelled as mode_t...
pci-label.c: size_t misspelled as mode_t
jffs2: S_ISLNK(mode & S_IFMT) is pointless
snd_msnd ->mode is fmode_t, not mode_t
v9fs_iop_get_acl: get rid of unused variable
vfs: dont chain pipe/anon/socket on superblock s_inodes list
Documentation: Exporting: update description of d_splice_alias
fs: add missing unlock in default_llseek()
This allows us to move duplicated code in <asm/atomic.h>
(atomic_inc_not_zero() for now) to <linux/atomic.h>
Signed-off-by: Arun Sharma <asharma@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jikos/trivial: (43 commits)
fs: Merge split strings
treewide: fix potentially dangerous trailing ';' in #defined values/expressions
uwb: Fix misspelling of neighbourhood in comment
net, netfilter: Remove redundant goto in ebt_ulog_packet
trivial: don't touch files that are removed in the staging tree
lib/vsprintf: replace link to Draft by final RFC number
doc: Kconfig: `to be' -> `be'
doc: Kconfig: Typo: square -> squared
doc: Konfig: Documentation/power/{pm => apm-acpi}.txt
drivers/net: static should be at beginning of declaration
drivers/media: static should be at beginning of declaration
drivers/i2c: static should be at beginning of declaration
XTENSA: static should be at beginning of declaration
SH: static should be at beginning of declaration
MIPS: static should be at beginning of declaration
ARM: static should be at beginning of declaration
rcu: treewide: Do not use rcu_read_lock_held when calling rcu_dereference_check
Update my e-mail address
PCIe ASPM: forcedly -> forcibly
gma500: push through device driver tree
...
Fix up trivial conflicts:
- arch/arm/mach-ep93xx/dma-m2p.c (deleted)
- drivers/gpio/gpio-ep93xx.c (renamed and context nearby)
- drivers/net/r8169.c (just context changes)
For a number of file systems that don't have a mount point (e.g. sockfs
and pipefs), they are not marked as long term. Therefore in
mntput_no_expire, all locks in vfs_mount lock are taken instead of just
local cpu's lock to aggregate reference counts when we release
reference to file objects. In fact, only local lock need to have been
taken to update ref counts as these file systems are in no danger of
going away until we are ready to unregister them.
The attached patch marks file systems using kern_mount without
mount point as long term. The contentions of vfs_mount lock
is now eliminated. Before un-registering such file system,
kern_unmount should be called to remove the long term flag and
make the mount point ready to be freed.
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: (107 commits)
vfs: use ERR_CAST for err-ptr tossing in lookup_instantiate_filp
isofs: Remove global fs lock
jffs2: fix IN_DELETE_SELF on overwriting rename() killing a directory
fix IN_DELETE_SELF on overwriting rename() on ramfs et.al.
mm/truncate.c: fix build for CONFIG_BLOCK not enabled
fs:update the NOTE of the file_operations structure
Remove dead code in dget_parent()
AFS: Fix silly characters in a comment
switch d_add_ci() to d_splice_alias() in "found negative" case as well
simplify gfs2_lookup()
jfs_lookup(): don't bother with . or ..
get rid of useless dget_parent() in btrfs rename() and link()
get rid of useless dget_parent() in fs/btrfs/ioctl.c
fs: push i_mutex and filemap_write_and_wait down into ->fsync() handlers
drivers: fix up various ->llseek() implementations
fs: handle SEEK_HOLE/SEEK_DATA properly in all fs's that define their own llseek
Ext4: handle SEEK_HOLE/SEEK_DATA generically
Btrfs: implement our own ->llseek
fs: add SEEK_HOLE and SEEK_DATA flags
reiserfs: make reiserfs default to barrier=flush
...
Fix up trivial conflicts in fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_super.c due to the new
shrinker callout for the inode cache, that clashed with the xfs code to
start the periodic workers later.
* 'core-rcu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip:
rcu: Fix wrong check in list_splice_init_rcu()
net,rcu: Convert call_rcu(xt_rateest_free_rcu) to kfree_rcu()
sysctl,rcu: Convert call_rcu(free_head) to kfree
vmalloc,rcu: Convert call_rcu(rcu_free_vb) to kfree_rcu()
vmalloc,rcu: Convert call_rcu(rcu_free_va) to kfree_rcu()
ipc,rcu: Convert call_rcu(ipc_immediate_free) to kfree_rcu()
ipc,rcu: Convert call_rcu(free_un) to kfree_rcu()
security,rcu: Convert call_rcu(sel_netport_free) to kfree_rcu()
security,rcu: Convert call_rcu(sel_netnode_free) to kfree_rcu()
ia64,rcu: Convert call_rcu(sn_irq_info_free) to kfree_rcu()
block,rcu: Convert call_rcu(disk_free_ptbl_rcu_cb) to kfree_rcu()
scsi,rcu: Convert call_rcu(fc_rport_free_rcu) to kfree_rcu()
audit_tree,rcu: Convert call_rcu(__put_tree) to kfree_rcu()
security,rcu: Convert call_rcu(whitelist_item_free) to kfree_rcu()
md,rcu: Convert call_rcu(free_conf) to kfree_rcu()
* 'ptrace' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/oleg/misc: (39 commits)
ptrace: do_wait(traced_leader_killed_by_mt_exec) can block forever
ptrace: fix ptrace_signal() && STOP_DEQUEUED interaction
connector: add an event for monitoring process tracers
ptrace: dont send SIGSTOP on auto-attach if PT_SEIZED
ptrace: mv send-SIGSTOP from do_fork() to ptrace_init_task()
ptrace_init_task: initialize child->jobctl explicitly
has_stopped_jobs: s/task_is_stopped/SIGNAL_STOP_STOPPED/
ptrace: make former thread ID available via PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG after PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC stop
ptrace: wait_consider_task: s/same_thread_group/ptrace_reparented/
ptrace: kill real_parent_is_ptracer() in in favor of ptrace_reparented()
ptrace: ptrace_reparented() should check same_thread_group()
redefine thread_group_leader() as exit_signal >= 0
do not change dead_task->exit_signal
kill task_detached()
reparent_leader: check EXIT_DEAD instead of task_detached()
make do_notify_parent() __must_check, update the callers
__ptrace_detach: avoid task_detached(), check do_notify_parent()
kill tracehook_notify_death()
make do_notify_parent() return bool
ptrace: s/tracehook_tracer_task()/ptrace_parent()/
...
The rcu callback sel_netport_free() just calls a kfree(),
so we use kfree_rcu() instead of the call_rcu(sel_netport_free).
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
The rcu callback sel_netnode_free() just calls a kfree(),
so we use kfree_rcu() instead of the call_rcu(sel_netnode_free).
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
The rcu callback whitelist_item_free() just calls a kfree(),
so we use kfree_rcu() instead of the call_rcu(whitelist_item_free).
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
pass mask instead; kill security_inode_exec_permission() since we can use
security_inode_permission() instead.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Permit changing of security.evm only when valid, unless in fixmode.
Reported-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
We will use digital signatures in addtion to hmac.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
If EVM is not supported or enabled, evm_verify_hmac() returns
INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN, which ima_appraise_measurement() ignores and sets
the appraisal status based solely on the security.ima verification.
evm_verify_hmac() also returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN for other failures, such
as temporary failures like -ENOMEM, resulting in possible attack vectors.
This patch changes the default return code for temporary/unexpected
failures, like -ENOMEM, from INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN to INTEGRITY_FAIL, making
evm_verify_hmac() fail safe.
As a result, failures need to be re-evaluated in order to catch both
temporary errors, such as the -ENOMEM, as well as errors that have been
resolved in fix mode.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Using shash is more efficient, because the algorithm is allocated only
once. Only the descriptor to store the hash state needs to be allocated
for every operation.
Changelog v6:
- check for crypto_shash_setkey failure
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Changelog v7:
- moved the initialization call to security_inode_init_security,
renaming evm_inode_post_init_security to evm_inode_init_security
- increase size of xattr array for EVM xattr
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Initialize 'security.evm' for new files.
Changelog v7:
- renamed evm_inode_post_init_security to evm_inode_init_security
- moved struct xattr definition to earlier patch
- allocate xattr name
Changelog v6:
- Use 'struct evm_ima_xattr_data'
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Imbed the evm calls evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(),
evm_inode_removexattr() in the security hooks. evm_inode_setxattr()
protects security.evm xattr. evm_inode_post_setxattr() and
evm_inode_removexattr() updates the hmac associated with an inode.
(Assumes an LSM module protects the setting/removing of xattr.)
Changelog:
- Don't define evm_verifyxattr(), unless CONFIG_INTEGRITY is enabled.
- xattr_name is a 'const', value is 'void *'
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs) against integrity
attacks. The current patchset maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the security
xattrs, storing the value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'. We
anticipate other methods for protecting the security extended attributes.
This patch reserves the first byte of 'security.evm' as a place holder for
the type of method.
Changelog v6:
- move evm_ima_xattr_type definition to security/integrity/integrity.h
- defined a structure for the EVM xattr called evm_ima_xattr_data
(based on Serge Hallyn's suggestion)
- removed unnecessary memset
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs) against integrity
attacks. This patchset provides the framework and an initial method. The
initial method maintains an HMAC-sha1 value across the security extended
attributes, storing the HMAC value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'.
Other methods of validating the integrity of a file's metadata will be posted
separately (eg. EVM-digital-signatures).
While this patchset does authenticate the security xattrs, and
cryptographically binds them to the inode, coming extensions will bind other
directory and inode metadata for more complete protection. To help simplify
the review and upstreaming process, each extension will be posted separately
(eg. IMA-appraisal, IMA-appraisal-directory). For a general overview of the
proposed Linux integrity subsystem, refer to Dave Safford's whitepaper:
http://downloads.sf.net/project/linux-ima/linux-ima/Integrity_overview.pdf.
EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it with a
trusted/encrypted key for the HMAC-sha1 operation. The key is loaded onto the
root's keyring using keyctl. Until EVM receives notification that the key has
been successfully loaded onto the keyring (echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm), EVM can
not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN.
Loading the key and signaling EVM should be done as early as possible. Normally
this is done in the initramfs, which has already been measured as part of the
trusted boot. For more information on creating and loading existing
trusted/encrypted keys, refer to Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt. A
sample dracut patch, which loads the trusted/encrypted key and enables EVM, is
available from http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM.
Based on the LSMs enabled, the set of EVM protected security xattrs is defined
at compile. EVM adds the following three calls to the existing security hooks:
evm_inode_setxattr(), evm_inode_post_setxattr(), and evm_inode_removexattr. To
initialize and update the 'security.evm' extended attribute, EVM defines three
calls: evm_inode_post_init(), evm_inode_post_setattr() and
evm_inode_post_removexattr() hooks. To verify the integrity of a security
xattr, EVM exports evm_verifyxattr().
Changelog v7:
- Fixed URL in EVM ABI documentation
Changelog v6: (based on Serge Hallyn's review)
- fix URL in patch description
- remove evm_hmac_size definition
- use SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE (removed both MAX_DIGEST_SIZE and evm_hmac_size)
- moved linux include before other includes
- test for crypto_hash_setkey failure
- fail earlier for invalid key
- clear entire encrypted key, even on failure
- check xattr name length before comparing xattr names
Changelog:
- locking based on i_mutex, remove evm_mutex
- using trusted/encrypted keys for storing the EVM key used in the HMAC-sha1
operation.
- replaced crypto hash with shash (Dmitry Kasatkin)
- support for additional methods of verifying the security xattrs
(Dmitry Kasatkin)
- iint not allocated for all regular files, but only for those appraised
- Use cap_sys_admin in lieu of cap_mac_admin
- Use __vfs_setxattr_noperm(), without permission checks, from EVM
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Move the inode integrity data(iint) management up to the integrity directory
in order to share the iint among the different integrity models.
Changelog:
- don't define MAX_DIGEST_SIZE
- rename several globally visible 'ima_' prefixed functions, structs,
locks, etc to 'integrity_'
- replace '20' with SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE
- reflect location change in appropriate Kconfig and Makefiles
- remove unnecessary initialization of iint_initialized to 0
- rebased on current ima_iint.c
- define integrity_iint_store/lock as static
There should be no other functional changes.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
This patch changes the security_inode_init_security API by adding a
filesystem specific callback to write security extended attributes.
This change is in preparation for supporting the initialization of
multiple LSM xattrs and the EVM xattr. Initially the callback function
walks an array of xattrs, writing each xattr separately, but could be
optimized to write multiple xattrs at once.
For existing security_inode_init_security() calls, which have not yet
been converted to use the new callback function, such as those in
reiserfs and ocfs2, this patch defines security_old_inode_init_security().
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Update comments for scripts/kernel-doc and fix some of errors reported by
scripts/checkpatch.pl .
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch adds support for permission checks using argv[]/envp[] of execve()
request. Hooks are in the last patch of this pathset.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch adds support for permission checks using executable file's realpath
upon execve() and symlink's target upon symlink(). Hooks are in the last patch
of this pathset.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch adds support for permission checks using file object's DAC
attributes (e.g. owner/group) when checking file's pathnames. Hooks for passing
file object's pointers are in the last patch of this pathset.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch adds support for permission checks using current thread's UID/GID
etc. in addition to pathnames.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Since ca5ecddf (rcu: define __rcu address space modifier for sparse)
rcu_dereference_check use rcu_read_lock_held as a part of condition
automatically so callers do not have to do that as well.
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
/sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/.domain_status can be easily emulated using
/sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy . We can remove this interface by
updating /usr/sbin/tomoyo-setprofile utility.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
I forgot to add #ifndef in commit 0e4ae0e0 "TOMOYO: Make several options
configurable.", resulting
security/built-in.o: In function `tomoyo_bprm_set_creds':
tomoyo.c:(.text+0x4698e): undefined reference to `tomoyo_load_policy'
error.
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
AppArmor is masking the capabilities returned by capget against the
capabilities mask in the profile. This is wrong, in complain mode the
profile has effectively all capabilities, as the profile restrictions are
not being enforced, merely tested against to determine if an access is
known by the profile.
This can result in the wrong behavior of security conscience applications
like sshd which examine their capability set, and change their behavior
accordingly. In this case because of the masked capability set being
returned sshd fails due to DAC checks, even when the profile is in complain
mode.
Kernels affected: 2.6.36 - 3.0.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
The pointer returned from tracehook_tracer_task() is only valid inside
the rcu_read_lock. However the tracer pointer obtained is being passed
to aa_may_ptrace outside of the rcu_read_lock critical section.
Mover the aa_may_ptrace test into the rcu_read_lock critical section, to
fix this.
Kernels affected: 2.6.36 - 3.0
Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
To be able to start using enforcing mode from the early stage of boot sequence,
this patch adds support for activating access control without calling external
policy loader program. This will be useful for systems where operations which
can lead to the hijacking of the boot sequence are needed before loading the
policy. For example, you can activate immediately after loading the fixed part
of policy which will allow only operations needed for mounting a partition
which contains the variant part of policy and verifying (e.g. running GPG
check) and loading the variant part of policy. Since you can start using
enforcing mode from the beginning, you can reduce the possibility of hijacking
the boot sequence.
This patch makes several variables configurable on build time. This patch also
adds TOMOYO_loader= and TOMOYO_trigger= kernel command line option to boot the
same kernel in two different init systems (BSD-style init and systemd).
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To be able to start using enforcing mode from the early stage of boot sequence,
this patch adds support for built-in policy configuration (and next patch adds
support for activating access control without calling external policy loader
program).
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Show statistics such as last policy update time and last policy violation time
in addition to memory usage.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Gather string constants to one file in order to make the object size smaller.
Use unsigned type where appropriate.
read()/write() returns ssize_t.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Currently TOMOYO holds SRCU lock upon open() and releases it upon close()
because list elements stored in the "struct tomoyo_io_buffer" instances are
accessed until close() is called. However, such SRCU usage causes lockdep to
complain about leaving the kernel with SRCU lock held.
This patch solves the warning by holding/releasing SRCU upon each
read()/write(). This patch is doing something similar to calling kfree()
without calling synchronize_srcu(), by selectively deferring kfree() by keeping
track of the "struct tomoyo_io_buffer" instances.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
TOMOYO wants to use /proc/self/ rather than /proc/$PID/ if $PID matches current
thread's process ID in order to prevent current thread from accessing other
process's information unless needed.
But since procfs can be mounted on various locations (e.g. /proc/ /proc2/ /p/
/tmp/foo/100/p/ ), TOMOYO cannot tell that whether the numeric part in the
string returned by __d_path() represents process ID or not.
Therefore, to be able to convert from $PID to self no matter where procfs is
mounted, this patch changes pathname representations for filesystems which do
not support rename() operation (e.g. proc, sysfs, securityfs).
Examples:
/proc/self/mounts => proc:/self/mounts
/sys/kernel/security/ => sys:/kernel/security/
/dev/pts/0 => devpts:/0
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Mauras Olivier reported that it is difficult to use TOMOYO in LXC environments,
for TOMOYO cannot distinguish between environments outside the container and
environments inside the container since LXC environments are created using
pivot_root(). To address this problem, this patch introduces policy namespace.
Each policy namespace has its own set of domain policy, exception policy and
profiles, which are all independent of other namespaces. This independency
allows users to develop policy without worrying interference among namespaces.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
ACL group allows administrator to globally grant not only "file read"
permission but also other permissions.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/audit interface. This interface generates audit
logs in the form of domain policy so that /usr/sbin/tomoyo-auditd can reuse
audit logs for appending to /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy
interface.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Remove global preference from profile structure in order to make code simpler.
Due to this structure change, printk() warnings upon policy violation are
temporarily disabled. They will be replaced by
/sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/audit by next patch.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Convert "allow_..." style directives to "file ..." style directives.
By converting to the latter style, we can pack policy like
"file read/write/execute /path/to/file".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use structure for passing ACL line, in preparation for supporting policy
namespace and conditional parameters.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use common structure for ACL with "struct list_head" + "atomic_t".
Use array/struct where possible.
Remove is_group from "struct tomoyo_name_union"/"struct tomoyo_number_union".
Pass "struct file"->private_data rather than "struct file".
Update some of comments.
Bring tomoyo_same_acl_head() from common.h to domain.c .
Bring tomoyo_invalid()/tomoyo_valid() from common.h to util.c .
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Update (or temporarily remove) comments.
Remove or replace some of #define lines.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
In order to synchronize with TOMOYO 1.8's syntax,
(1) Remove special handling for allow_read/write permission.
(2) Replace deny_rewrite/allow_rewrite permission with allow_append permission.
(3) Remove file_pattern keyword.
(4) Remove allow_read permission from exception policy.
(5) Allow creating domains in enforcing mode without calling supervisor.
(6) Add permission check for opening directory for reading.
(7) Add permission check for stat() operation.
(8) Make "cat < /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain" behave as if
"cat /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain".
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The 'encrypted' key type defines its own payload format which contains a
symmetric key randomly generated that cannot be used directly to mount
an eCryptfs filesystem, because it expects an authentication token
structure.
This patch introduces the new format 'ecryptfs' that allows to store an
authentication token structure inside the encrypted key payload containing
a randomly generated symmetric key, as the same for the format 'default'.
More details about the usage of encrypted keys with the eCryptfs
filesystem can be found in the file 'Documentation/keys-ecryptfs.txt'.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Acked-by: Gianluca Ramunno <ramunno@polito.it>
Acked-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
