We should drop the ->s_umount mutex if an error occurs after the
sget()/grab_super() call. This was introduced when adding support
for multiple instances of devpts and noticed during a code review/reorg.
Signed-off-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The last user of do_pipe is in arch/alpha/, after replacing it with
do_pipe_flags, the do_pipe can be totally dropped.
Signed-off-by: Cheng Renquan <crquan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Copy symlink data into the union member it is accessed through. Although
this shouldn't make a difference to behaviour it makes the code easier
to follow and grep through. It may also prevent problems if the
struct/union definitions change in the future.
Signed-off-by: Duane Griffin <duaneg@dghda.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Ensure fast symlink targets are NUL-terminated, even if corrupted
on-disk.
Signed-off-by: Duane Griffin <duaneg@dghda.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
ufs2 fast symlinks can be twice as long as ufs ones, however the code
was using the ufs size in various places. Fix that so ufs2 symlinks over
60 characters aren't truncated.
Note that we copy the entire area instead of using the maxsymlinklen field
from the superblock. This way we will be more robust against corruption (of
the superblock).
While we are at it, use memcpy instead of open-coding it with for loops.
Signed-off-by: Duane Griffin <duaneg@dghda.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The maximum fast symlink size is set in the superblock of certain types
of UFS filesystem. Before using it we need to check that it isn't longer
than the available space we have in the inode.
Signed-off-by: Duane Griffin <duaneg@dghda.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Add a switch for the various i_mode fmt cases, and remove the comment
about writeability of devices nodes - that part is handled in
inode_permission and comment on (briefly) there.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Make sure that comments describe what's going on and not how, and always
use __d_instantiate instead of two separate branches, one with
d_instantiate and one with __d_instantiate.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Due to a different size of ino_t ustat needs a compat handler, but
currently only x86 and mips provide one. Add a generic compat_sys_ustat
and switch all architectures over to it. Instead of doing various
user copy hacks compat_sys_ustat just reimplements sys_ustat as
it's trivial. This was suggested by Arnd Bergmann.
Found by Eric Sandeen when running xfstests/017 on ppc64, which causes
stack smashing warnings on RHEL/Fedora due to the too large amount of
data writen by the syscall.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
In two error cases affs_remove_link doesn't call affs_unlock_dir to
release the i_hash_lock semaphore.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Update all previous incarnations of my email address to the correct one.
Signed-off-by: Gertjan van Wingerde <gwingerde@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If ecryptfs_encrypted_view or ecryptfs_xattr_metadata were being
specified as mount options, a NULL pointer dereference of crypt_stat
was possible during lookup.
This patch moves the crypt_stat assignment into
ecryptfs_lookup_and_interpose_lower(), ensuring that crypt_stat
will not be NULL before we attempt to dereference it.
Thanks to Dan Carpenter and his static analysis tool, smatch, for
finding this bug.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When allocating the memory used to store the eCryptfs header contents, a
single, zeroed page was being allocated with get_zeroed_page().
However, the size of an eCryptfs header is either PAGE_CACHE_SIZE or
ECRYPTFS_MINIMUM_HEADER_EXTENT_SIZE (8192), whichever is larger, and is
stored in the file's private_data->crypt_stat->num_header_bytes_at_front
field.
ecryptfs_write_metadata_to_contents() was using
num_header_bytes_at_front to decide how many bytes should be written to
the lower filesystem for the file header. Unfortunately, at least 8K
was being written from the page, despite the chance of the single,
zeroed page being smaller than 8K. This resulted in random areas of
kernel memory being written between the 0x1000 and 0x1FFF bytes offsets
in the eCryptfs file headers if PAGE_SIZE was 4K.
This patch allocates a variable number of pages, calculated with
num_header_bytes_at_front, and passes the number of allocated pages
along to ecryptfs_write_metadata_to_contents().
Thanks to Florian Streibelt for reporting the data leak and working with
me to find the problem. 2.6.28 is the only kernel release with this
vulnerability. Corresponds to CVE-2009-0787
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.sg>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: dann frazier <dannf@dannf.org>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Florian Streibelt <florian@f-streibelt.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The libaio test harness turned up a problem whereby lookup_ioctx on a
bogus io context was returning the 1 valid io context from the list
(harness/cases/3.p).
Because of that, an extra put_iocontext was done, and when the process
exited, it hit a BUG_ON in the put_iocontext macro called from exit_aio
(since we expect a users count of 1 and instead get 0).
The problem was introduced by "aio: make the lookup_ioctx() lockless"
(commit abf137dd77).
Thanks to Zach for pointing out that hlist_for_each_entry_rcu will not
return with a NULL tpos at the end of the loop, even if the entry was
not found.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Zach Brown <zach.brown@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
Cc: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Remove a source of fput() call from inside IRQ context. Myself, like Eric,
wasn't able to reproduce an fput() call from IRQ context, but Jeff said he was
able to, with the attached test program. Independently from this, the bug is
conceptually there, so we might be better off fixing it. This patch adds an
optimization similar to the one we already do on ->ki_filp, on ->ki_eventfd.
Playing with ->f_count directly is not pretty in general, but the alternative
here would be to add a brand new delayed fput() infrastructure, that I'm not
sure is worth it.
Signed-off-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com>
Cc: Zach Brown <zach.brown@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mason/btrfs-unstable:
Btrfs: Clear space_info full when adding new devices
Btrfs: Fix locking around adding new space_info
Nick Piggin noticed this (very unlikely) race between setting a page
dirty and creating the buffers for it - we need to hold the mapping
private_lock until we've set the page dirty bit in order to make sure
that create_empty_buffers() might not build up a set of buffers without
the dirty bits set when the page is dirty.
I doubt anybody has ever hit this race (and it didn't solve the issue
Nick was looking at), but as Nick says: "Still, it does appear to solve
a real race, which we should close."
Acked-by: Nick Piggin <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/ext4:
ext4: fix bb_prealloc_list corruption due to wrong group locking
ext4: fix bogus BUG_ONs in in mballoc code
ext4: Print the find_group_flex() warning only once
ext4: fix header check in ext4_ext_search_right() for deep extent trees.
Although this operation is unsupported by our implementation
we still need to provide an encode routine for it to
merely encode its (error) status back in the compound reply.
Thanks for Bill Baker at sun.com for testing with the Sun
OpenSolaris' client, finding, and reporting this bug at
Connectathon 2009.
This bug was introduced in 2.6.27
Signed-off-by: Benny Halevy <bhalevy@panasas.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Commit ee6f779b9e ("filp->f_pos not
correctly updated in proc_task_readdir") changed the proc code to use
filp->f_pos directly, rather than through a temporary variable. In the
process, that caused the operations to be done on the full 64 bits, even
though the offset is never that big.
That's all fine and dandy per se, but for some unfathomable reason gcc
generates absolutely horrid code when using 64-bit values in switch()
statements. To the point of actually calling out to gcc helper
functions like __cmpdi2 rather than just doing the trivial comparisons
directly the way gcc does for normal compares. At which point we get
link failures, because we really don't want to support that kind of
crazy code.
Fix this by just casting the f_pos value to "unsigned long", which
is plenty big enough for /proc, and avoids the gcc code generation issue.
Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Zhang Le <r0bertz@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This is for Red Hat bug 490026: EXT4 panic, list corruption in
ext4_mb_new_inode_pa
ext4_lock_group(sb, group) is supposed to protect this list for
each group, and a common code flow to remove an album is like
this:
ext4_get_group_no_and_offset(sb, pa->pa_pstart, &grp, NULL);
ext4_lock_group(sb, grp);
list_del(&pa->pa_group_list);
ext4_unlock_group(sb, grp);
so it's critical that we get the right group number back for
this prealloc context, to lock the right group (the one
associated with this pa) and prevent concurrent list manipulation.
however, ext4_mb_put_pa() passes in (pa->pa_pstart - 1) with a
comment, "-1 is to protect from crossing allocation group".
This makes sense for the group_pa, where pa_pstart is advanced
by the length which has been used (in ext4_mb_release_context()),
and when the entire length has been used, pa_pstart has been
advanced to the first block of the next group.
However, for inode_pa, pa_pstart is never advanced; it's just
set once to the first block in the group and not moved after
that. So in this case, if we subtract one in ext4_mb_put_pa(),
we are actually locking the *previous* group, and opening the
race with the other threads which do not subtract off the extra
block.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
filp->f_pos only get updated at the end of the function. Thus d_off of those
dirents who are in the middle will be 0, and this will cause a problem in
glibc's readdir implementation, specifically endless loop. Because when overflow
occurs, f_pos will be set to next dirent to read, however it will be 0, unless
the next one is the last one. So it will start over again and again.
There is a sample program in man 2 gendents. This is the output of the program
running on a multithread program's task dir before this patch is applied:
$ ./a.out /proc/3807/task
--------------- nread=128 ---------------
i-node# file type d_reclen d_off d_name
506442 directory 16 1 .
506441 directory 16 0 ..
506443 directory 16 0 3807
506444 directory 16 0 3809
506445 directory 16 0 3812
506446 directory 16 0 3861
506447 directory 16 0 3862
506448 directory 16 8 3863
This is the output after this patch is applied
$ ./a.out /proc/3807/task
--------------- nread=128 ---------------
i-node# file type d_reclen d_off d_name
506442 directory 16 1 .
506441 directory 16 2 ..
506443 directory 16 3 3807
506444 directory 16 4 3809
506445 directory 16 5 3812
506446 directory 16 6 3861
506447 directory 16 7 3862
506448 directory 16 8 3863
Signed-off-by: Zhang Le <r0bertz@gentoo.org>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If bio_integrity_clone() fails, bio_clone() returns NULL without freeing
the newly allocated bio.
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
Stricter gfp_mask might be required for clone allocation.
For example, request-based dm may clone bio in interrupt context
so it has to use GFP_ATOMIC.
Signed-off-by: Kiyoshi Ueda <k-ueda@ct.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun'ichi Nomura <j-nomura@ce.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
* 'bugfixes' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/nfs-2.6:
NFS: Fix the fix to Bugzilla #11061, when IPv6 isn't defined...
SUNRPC: xprt_connect() don't abort the task if the transport isn't bound
SUNRPC: Fix an Oops due to socket not set up yet...
Bug 11061, NFS mounts dropped
NFS: Handle -ESTALE error in access()
NLM: Fix GRANT callback address comparison when IPv6 is enabled
NLM: Shrink the IPv4-only version of nlm_cmp_addr()
NFSv3: Fix posix ACL code
NFS: Fix misparsing of nfsv4 fs_locations attribute (take 2)
SUNRPC: Tighten up the task locking rules in __rpc_execute()
* 'upstream-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mfasheh/ocfs2:
ocfs2: Use xs->bucket to set xattr value outside
ocfs2: Fix a bug found by sparse check.
ocfs2: tweak to get the maximum inline data size with xattr
ocfs2: reserve xattr block for new directory with inline data
eCryptfs has file encryption keys (FEK), file encryption key encryption
keys (FEKEK), and filename encryption keys (FNEK). The per-file FEK is
encrypted with one or more FEKEKs and stored in the header of the
encrypted file. I noticed that the FEK is also being encrypted by the
FNEK. This is a problem if a user wants to use a different FNEK than
their FEKEK, as their file contents will still be accessible with the
FNEK.
This is a minimalistic patch which prevents the FNEKs signatures from
being copied to the inode signatures list. Ultimately, it keeps the FEK
from being encrypted with a FNEK.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dustin Kirkland <kirkland@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When a ramfs nommu mapping is expanded, contiguous pages are allocated
and added to the pagecache. The caller's reference is then passed on
by moving whole pagevecs to the file lru list.
If the page cache adding fails, make sure that the error path also
moves the pagevec contents which might still contain up to PAGEVEC_SIZE
successfully added pages, of which we would leak references otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Enrik Berkhan <Enrik.Berkhan@ge.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The pages attached to a ramfs inode's pagecache by truncation from nothing
- as done by SYSV SHM for example - may get discarded under memory
pressure.
The problem is that the pages are not marked dirty. Anything that creates
data in an MMU-based ramfs will cause the pages holding that data will
cause the set_page_dirty() aop to be called.
For the NOMMU-based mmap, set_page_dirty() may be called by write(), but
it won't be called by page-writing faults on writable mmaps, and it isn't
called by ramfs_nommu_expand_for_mapping() when a file is being truncated
from nothing to allocate a contiguous run.
The solution is to mark the pages dirty at the point of allocation by the
truncation code.
Signed-off-by: Enrik Berkhan <Enrik.Berkhan@ge.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Nick Piggin <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Thiemo Nagel reported that:
# dd if=/dev/zero of=image.ext4 bs=1M count=2
# mkfs.ext4 -v -F -b 1024 -m 0 -g 512 -G 4 -I 128 -N 1 \
-O large_file,dir_index,flex_bg,extent,sparse_super image.ext4
# mount -o loop image.ext4 mnt/
# dd if=/dev/zero of=mnt/file
oopsed, with a BUG_ON in ext4_mb_normalize_request because
size == EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP
It appears to me (esp. after talking to Andreas) that the BUG_ON
is bogus; a request of exactly EXT4_BLOCKS_PER_GROUP should
be allowed, though larger sizes do indicate a problem.
Fix that an another (apparently rare) codepath with a similar check.
Reported-by: Thiemo Nagel <thiemo.nagel@ph.tum.de>
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
A long time ago, xs->base is allocated a 4K size and all the contents
in the bucket are copied to the it. Now we use ocfs2_xattr_bucket to
abstract xattr bucket and xs->base is initialized to the start of the
bu_bhs[0]. So xs->base + offset will overflow when the value root is
stored outside the first block.
Then why we can survive the xattr test by now? It is because we always
read the bucket contiguously now and kernel mm allocate continguous
memory for us. We are lucky, but we should fix it. So just get the
right value root as other callers do.
Signed-off-by: Tao Ma <tao.ma@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
We need to use le32_to_cpu to test rec->e_cpos in
ocfs2_dinode_insert_check.
Signed-off-by: Tao Ma <tao.ma@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
Replace max_inline_data with max_inline_data_with_xattr
to ensure it correct when xattr inlined.
Signed-off-by: Tiger Yang <tiger.yang@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
If this is a new directory with inline data, we choose to
reserve the entire inline area for directory contents and
force an external xattr block.
Signed-off-by: Tiger Yang <tiger.yang@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>
There was a report of a data corruption
http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/11/14/121. There is a script included to
reproduce the problem.
During testing, I encountered a number of strange things with ext3, so I
tried ext2 to attempt to reduce complexity of the problem. I found that
fsstress would quickly hang in wait_on_inode, waiting for I_LOCK to be
cleared, even though instrumentation showed that unlock_new_inode had
already been called for that inode. This points to memory scribble, or
synchronisation problme.
i_state of I_NEW inodes is not protected by inode_lock because other
processes are not supposed to touch them until I_LOCK (and I_NEW) is
cleared. Adding WARN_ON(inode->i_state & I_NEW) to sites where we modify
i_state revealed that generic_sync_sb_inodes is picking up new inodes from
the inode lists and passing them to __writeback_single_inode without
waiting for I_NEW. Subsequently modifying i_state causes corruption. In
my case it would look like this:
CPU0 CPU1
unlock_new_inode() __sync_single_inode()
reg <- inode->i_state
reg -> reg & ~(I_LOCK|I_NEW) reg <- inode->i_state
reg -> inode->i_state reg -> reg | I_SYNC
reg -> inode->i_state
Non-atomic RMW on CPU1 overwrites CPU0 store and sets I_LOCK|I_NEW again.
Fix for this is rather than wait for I_NEW inodes, just skip over them:
inodes concurrently being created are not subject to data integrity
operations, and should not significantly contribute to dirty memory
either.
After this change, I'm unable to reproduce any of the added warnings or
hangs after ~1hour of running. Previously, the new warnings would start
immediately and hang would happen in under 5 minutes.
I'm also testing on ext3 now, and so far no problems there either. I
don't know whether this fixes the problem reported above, but it fixes a
real problem for me.
Cc: "Jorge Boncompte [DTI2]" <jorge@dti2.net>
Reported-by: Adrian Hunter <ext-adrian.hunter@nokia.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In sget(), destroy_super(s) is called with s->s_umount held, which makes
lockdep unhappy.
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If the second fasync_helper() fails, pipe_rdwr_fasync() returns the error
but leaves the file on ->fasync_readers.
This was always wrong, but since 233e70f422
"saner FASYNC handling on file close" we have the new problem. Because in
this case setfl() doesn't set FASYNC bit, __fput() will not do
->fasync(0), and we leak fasync_struct with ->fa_file pointing to the
freed file.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Stephen Rothwell reports:
Today's linux-next build (powerpc ppc64_defconfig) failed like this:
fs/built-in.o: In function `.nfs_get_client':
client.c:(.text+0x115010): undefined reference to `.__ipv6_addr_type'
Fix by moving the IPV6 specific parts of commit
d7371c41b0 ("Bug 11061, NFS mounts dropped")
into the '#ifdef IPV6..." section.
Also fix up a couple of formatting issues.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
This is a short-term warning, and even printk_ratelimit() can result
in too much noise in system logs. So only print it once as a warning.
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
The corrupted filesystem patch added a check against zlib trying to
output too much data in the presence of data corruption. This check
triggered if zlib_inflate asked to be called again (Z_OK) with
avail_out == 0 and no more output buffers available. This check proves
to be rather dumb, as it incorrectly catches the case where zlib has
generated all the output, but there are still input bytes to be processed.
This patch does a number of things. It removes the original check and
replaces it with code to not move to the next output buffer if there
are no more output buffers available, relying on zlib to error if it
wants an extra output buffer in the case of data corruption. It
also replaces the Z_NO_FLUSH flag with the more correct Z_SYNC_FLUSH
flag, and makes the error messages more understandable to
non-technical users.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@lougher.demon.co.uk>
Reported-by: Stefan Lippers-Hollmann <s.L-H@gmx.de>
* 'for-linus' of git://oss.sgi.com/xfs/xfs:
xfs: only issues a cache flush on unmount if barriers are enabled
xfs: prevent lockdep false positive in xfs_iget_cache_miss
xfs: prevent kernel crash due to corrupted inode log format
