Commit Graph

171 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
NeilBrown
5169b844b7 mm: submit multipage reads for SWP_FS_OPS swap-space
swap_readpage() is given one page at a time, but may be called repeatedly
in succession.

For block-device swap-space, the blk_plug functionality allows the
multiple pages to be combined together at lower layers.  That cannot be
used for SWP_FS_OPS as blk_plug may not exist - it is only active when
CONFIG_BLOCK=y.  Consequently all swap reads over NFS are single page
reads.

With this patch we pass in a pointer-to-pointer when swap_readpage can
store state between calls - much like the effect of blk_plug.  After
calling swap_readpage() some number of times, the state will be passed to
swap_read_unplug() which can submit the combined request.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/164859778127.29473.14059420492644907783.stgit@noble.brown
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Tested-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-05-09 18:20:49 -07:00
NeilBrown
014bb1de4f mm: create new mm/swap.h header file
Patch series "MM changes to improve swap-over-NFS support".

Assorted improvements for swap-via-filesystem.

This is a resend of these patches, rebased on current HEAD.  The only
substantial changes is that swap_dirty_folio has replaced
swap_set_page_dirty.

Currently swap-via-fs (SWP_FS_OPS) doesn't work for any filesystem.  It
has previously worked for NFS but that broke a few releases back.  This
series changes to use a new ->swap_rw rather than ->readpage and
->direct_IO.  It also makes other improvements.

There is a companion series already in linux-next which fixes various
issues with NFS.  Once both series land, a final patch is needed which
changes NFS over to use ->swap_rw.


This patch (of 10):

Many functions declared in include/linux/swap.h are only used within mm/

Create a new "mm/swap.h" and move some of these declarations there.
Remove the redundant 'extern' from the function declarations.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: mm/memory-failure.c needs mm/swap.h]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/164859751830.29473.5309689752169286816.stgit@noble.brown
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/164859778120.29473.11725907882296224053.stgit@noble.brown
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Tested-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-05-09 18:20:47 -07:00
Miaohe Lin
f3b9e8cc8b mm/madvise: fix potential pte_unmap_unlock pte error
We can't assume pte_offset_map_lock will return same orig_pte value. So
it's necessary to reacquire the orig_pte or pte_unmap_unlock will unmap
the stale pte.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220416081416.23304-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com
Fixes: 9c276cc65a ("mm: introduce MADV_COLD")
Fixes: 854e9ed09d ("mm: support madvise(MADV_FREE)")
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-28 23:16:09 -07:00
Charan Teja Kalla
e6b0a7b357 Revert "mm: madvise: skip unmapped vma holes passed to process_madvise"
This reverts commit 08095d6310 ("mm: madvise: skip unmapped vma holes
passed to process_madvise") as process_madvise() fails to return the
exact processed bytes in other cases too.

As an example: if process_madvise() hits mlocked pages after processing
some initial bytes passed in [start, end), it just returns EINVAL
although some bytes are processed.  Thus making an exception only for
ENOMEM is partially fixing the problem of returning the proper advised
bytes.

Thus revert this patch and return proper bytes advised.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e73da1304a88b6a8a11907045117cccf4c2b8374.1648046642.git.quic_charante@quicinc.com
Fixes: 08095d6310 ("mm: madvise: skip unmapped vma holes passed to process_madvise")
Signed-off-by: Charan Teja Kalla <quic_charante@quicinc.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-04-01 11:46:09 -07:00
Johannes Weiner
9457056ac4 mm: madvise: MADV_DONTNEED_LOCKED
MADV_DONTNEED historically rejects mlocked ranges, but with MLOCK_ONFAULT
and MCL_ONFAULT allowing to mlock without populating, there are valid use
cases for depopulating locked ranges as well.

Users mlock memory to protect secrets.  There are allocators for secure
buffers that want in-use memory generally mlocked, but cleared and
invalidated memory to give up the physical pages.  This could be done with
explicit munlock -> mlock calls on free -> alloc of course, but that adds
two unnecessary syscalls, heavy mmap_sem write locks, vma splits and
re-merges - only to get rid of the backing pages.

Users also mlockall(MCL_ONFAULT) to suppress sustained paging, but are
okay with on-demand initial population.  It seems valid to selectively
free some memory during the lifetime of such a process, without having to
mess with its overall policy.

Why add a separate flag? Isn't this a pretty niche usecase?

- MADV_DONTNEED has been bailing on locked vmas forever. It's at least
  conceivable that someone, somewhere is relying on mlock to protect
  data from perhaps broader invalidation calls. Changing this behavior
  now could lead to quiet data corruption.

- It also clarifies expectations around MADV_FREE and maybe
  MADV_REMOVE. It avoids the situation where one quietly behaves
  different than the others. MADV_FREE_LOCKED can be added later.

- The combination of mlock() and madvise() in the first place is
  probably niche. But where it happens, I'd say that dropping pages
  from a locked region once they don't contain secrets or won't page
  anymore is much saner than relying on mlock to protect memory from
  speculative or errant invalidation calls. It's just that we can't
  change the default behavior because of the two previous points.

Given that, an explicit new flag seems to make the most sense.

[hannes@cmpxchg.org: fix mips build]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220304171912.305060-1-hannes@cmpxchg.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-03-24 19:06:51 -07:00
Mike Kravetz
90e7e7f5ef mm: enable MADV_DONTNEED for hugetlb mappings
Patch series "Add hugetlb MADV_DONTNEED support", v3.

Userfaultfd selftests for hugetlb does not perform UFFD_EVENT_REMAP
testing.  However, mremap support was recently added in commit
550a7d60bd ("mm, hugepages: add mremap() support for hugepage backed
vma").  While attempting to enable mremap support in the test, it was
discovered that the mremap test indirectly depends on MADV_DONTNEED.

madvise does not allow MADV_DONTNEED for hugetlb mappings.  However, that
is primarily due to the check in can_madv_lru_vma().  By simply removing
the check and adding huge page alignment, MADV_DONTNEED can be made to
work for hugetlb mappings.

Do note that there is no compelling use case for adding this support.
This was discussed in the RFC [1].  However, adding support makes sense as
it is fairly trivial and brings hugetlb functionality more in line with
'normal' memory.

After enabling support, add selftest for MADV_DONTNEED as well as
MADV_REMOVE.  Then update userfaultfd selftest.

If new functionality is accepted, then madvise man page will be updated to
indicate hugetlb is supported.  It will also be updated to clarify what
happens to the passed length argument.

This patch (of 3):

MADV_DONTNEED is currently disabled for hugetlb mappings.  This certainly
makes sense in shared file mappings as the pagecache maintains a reference
to the page and it will never be freed.  However, it could be useful to
unmap and free pages in private mappings.  In addition, userfaultfd minor
fault users may be able to simplify code by using MADV_DONTNEED.

The primary thing preventing MADV_DONTNEED from working on hugetlb
mappings is a check in can_madv_lru_vma().  To allow support for hugetlb
mappings create and use a new routine madvise_dontneed_free_valid_vma()
that allows hugetlb mappings in this specific case.

For normal mappings, madvise requires the start address be PAGE aligned
and rounds up length to the next multiple of PAGE_SIZE.  Do similarly for
hugetlb mappings: require start address be huge page size aligned and
round up length to the next multiple of huge page size.  Use the new
madvise_dontneed_free_valid_vma routine to check alignment and round up
length/end.  zap_page_range requires this alignment for hugetlb vmas
otherwise we will hit BUGs.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220215002348.128823-1-mike.kravetz@oracle.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220215002348.128823-2-mike.kravetz@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@linux.dev>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Axel Rasmussen <axelrasmussen@google.com>
Cc: Mina Almasry <almasrymina@google.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-03-24 19:06:50 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
9030fb0bb9 Folio changes for 5.18
- Rewrite how munlock works to massively reduce the contention
    on i_mmap_rwsem (Hugh Dickins):
    https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/8e4356d-9622-a7f0-b2c-f116b5f2efea@google.com/
  - Sort out the page refcount mess for ZONE_DEVICE pages (Christoph Hellwig):
    https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20220210072828.2930359-1-hch@lst.de/
  - Convert GUP to use folios and make pincount available for order-1
    pages. (Matthew Wilcox)
  - Convert a few more truncation functions to use folios (Matthew Wilcox)
  - Convert page_vma_mapped_walk to use PFNs instead of pages (Matthew Wilcox)
  - Convert rmap_walk to use folios (Matthew Wilcox)
  - Convert most of shrink_page_list() to use a folio (Matthew Wilcox)
  - Add support for creating large folios in readahead (Matthew Wilcox)
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Merge tag 'folio-5.18c' of git://git.infradead.org/users/willy/pagecache

Pull folio updates from Matthew Wilcox:

 - Rewrite how munlock works to massively reduce the contention on
   i_mmap_rwsem (Hugh Dickins):

     https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/8e4356d-9622-a7f0-b2c-f116b5f2efea@google.com/

 - Sort out the page refcount mess for ZONE_DEVICE pages (Christoph
   Hellwig):

     https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20220210072828.2930359-1-hch@lst.de/

 - Convert GUP to use folios and make pincount available for order-1
   pages. (Matthew Wilcox)

 - Convert a few more truncation functions to use folios (Matthew
   Wilcox)

 - Convert page_vma_mapped_walk to use PFNs instead of pages (Matthew
   Wilcox)

 - Convert rmap_walk to use folios (Matthew Wilcox)

 - Convert most of shrink_page_list() to use a folio (Matthew Wilcox)

 - Add support for creating large folios in readahead (Matthew Wilcox)

* tag 'folio-5.18c' of git://git.infradead.org/users/willy/pagecache: (114 commits)
  mm/damon: minor cleanup for damon_pa_young
  selftests/vm/transhuge-stress: Support file-backed PMD folios
  mm/filemap: Support VM_HUGEPAGE for file mappings
  mm/readahead: Switch to page_cache_ra_order
  mm/readahead: Align file mappings for non-DAX
  mm/readahead: Add large folio readahead
  mm: Support arbitrary THP sizes
  mm: Make large folios depend on THP
  mm: Fix READ_ONLY_THP warning
  mm/filemap: Allow large folios to be added to the page cache
  mm: Turn can_split_huge_page() into can_split_folio()
  mm/vmscan: Convert pageout() to take a folio
  mm/vmscan: Turn page_check_references() into folio_check_references()
  mm/vmscan: Account large folios correctly
  mm/vmscan: Optimise shrink_page_list for non-PMD-sized folios
  mm/vmscan: Free non-shmem folios without splitting them
  mm/rmap: Constify the rmap_walk_control argument
  mm/rmap: Convert rmap_walk() to take a folio
  mm: Turn page_anon_vma() into folio_anon_vma()
  mm/rmap: Turn page_lock_anon_vma_read() into folio_lock_anon_vma_read()
  ...
2022-03-22 17:03:12 -07:00
Charan Teja Kalla
08095d6310 mm: madvise: skip unmapped vma holes passed to process_madvise
The process_madvise() system call is expected to skip holes in vma passed
through 'struct iovec' vector list.  But do_madvise, which
process_madvise() calls for each vma, returns ENOMEM in case of unmapped
holes, despite the VMA is processed.

Thus process_madvise() should treat ENOMEM as expected and consider the
VMA passed to as processed and continue processing other vma's in the
vector list.  Returning -ENOMEM to user, despite the VMA is processed,
will be unable to figure out where to start the next madvise.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4f091776142f2ebf7b94018146de72318474e686.1647008754.git.quic_charante@quicinc.com
Fixes: ecb8ac8b1f14("mm/madvise: introduce process_madvise() syscall: an external memory hinting API")
Signed-off-by: Charan Teja Kalla <quic_charante@quicinc.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-03-22 15:57:10 -07:00
Charan Teja Kalla
5bd009c7c9 mm: madvise: return correct bytes advised with process_madvise
Patch series "mm: madvise: return correct bytes processed with
process_madvise", v2.  With the process_madvise(), always choose to return
non zero processed bytes over an error.  This can help the user to know on
which VMA, passed in the 'struct iovec' vector list, is failed to advise
thus can take the decission of retrying/skipping on that VMA.

This patch (of 2):

The process_madvise() system call returns error even after processing some
VMA's passed in the 'struct iovec' vector list which leaves the user
confused to know where to restart the advise next.  It is also against
this syscall man page[1] documentation where it mentions that "return
value may be less than the total number of requested bytes, if an error
occurred after some iovec elements were already processed.".

Consider a user passed 10 VMA's in the 'struct iovec' vector list of which
9 are processed but one.  Then it just returns the error caused on that
failed VMA despite the first 9 VMA's processed, leaving the user confused
about on which VMA it is failed.  Returning the number of bytes processed
here can help the user to know which VMA it is failed on and thus can
retry/skip the advise on that VMA.

[1]https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/process_madvise.2.html.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1647008754.git.quic_charante@quicinc.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/125b61a0edcee5c2db8658aed9d06a43a19ccafc.1647008754.git.quic_charante@quicinc.com
Fixes: ecb8ac8b1f14("mm/madvise: introduce process_madvise() syscall: an external memory hinting API")
Signed-off-by: Charan Teja Kalla <quic_charante@quicinc.com>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-03-22 15:57:10 -07:00
Miaohe Lin
531037a065 mm/madvise: use vma_lookup() instead of find_vma()
Using vma_lookup() verifies the start address is contained in the found
vma.  This results in easier to read the code.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220311082731.63513-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-03-22 15:57:09 -07:00
luofei
d1fe111fb6 mm/hwpoison: avoid the impact of hwpoison_filter() return value on mce handler
When the hwpoison page meets the filter conditions, it should not be
regarded as successful memory_failure() processing for mce handler, but
should return a distinct value, otherwise mce handler regards the error
page has been identified and isolated, which may lead to calling
set_mce_nospec() to change page attribute, etc.

Here memory_failure() return -EOPNOTSUPP to indicate that the error
event is filtered, mce handler should not take any action for this
situation and hwpoison injector should treat as correct.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220223082135.2769649-1-luofei@unicloud.com
Signed-off-by: luofei <luofei@unicloud.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-03-22 15:57:07 -07:00
Suren Baghdasaryan
942341dcc5 mm: fix use-after-free when anon vma name is used after vma is freed
When adjacent vmas are being merged it can result in the vma that was
originally passed to madvise_update_vma being destroyed.  In the current
implementation, the name parameter passed to madvise_update_vma points
directly to vma->anon_name and it is used after the call to vma_merge.
In the cases when vma_merge merges the original vma and destroys it,
this might result in UAF.  For that the original vma would have to hold
the anon_vma_name with the last reference.  The following vma would need
to contain a different anon_vma_name object with the same string.  Such
scenario is shown below:

madvise_vma_behavior(vma)
  madvise_update_vma(vma, ..., anon_name == vma->anon_name)
    vma_merge(vma)
      __vma_adjust(vma) <-- merges vma with adjacent one
        vm_area_free(vma) <-- frees the original vma
    replace_vma_anon_name(anon_name) <-- UAF of vma->anon_name

Fix this by raising the name refcount and stabilizing it.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220224231834.1481408-3-surenb@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220223153613.835563-3-surenb@google.com
Fixes: 9a10064f56 ("mm: add a field to store names for private anonymous memory")
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+aa7b3d4b35f9dc46a366@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Cc: Chris Hyser <chris.hyser@oracle.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@google.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Xiaofeng Cao <caoxiaofeng@yulong.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-03-05 11:08:32 -08:00
Suren Baghdasaryan
96403e1128 mm: prevent vm_area_struct::anon_name refcount saturation
A deep process chain with many vmas could grow really high.  With
default sysctl_max_map_count (64k) and default pid_max (32k) the max
number of vmas in the system is 2147450880 and the refcounter has
headroom of 1073774592 before it reaches REFCOUNT_SATURATED
(3221225472).

Therefore it's unlikely that an anonymous name refcounter will overflow
with these defaults.  Currently the max for pid_max is PID_MAX_LIMIT
(4194304) and for sysctl_max_map_count it's INT_MAX (2147483647).  In
this configuration anon_vma_name refcount overflow becomes theoretically
possible (that still require heavy sharing of that anon_vma_name between
processes).

kref refcounting interface used in anon_vma_name structure will detect a
counter overflow when it reaches REFCOUNT_SATURATED value but will only
generate a warning and freeze the ref counter.  This would lead to the
refcounted object never being freed.  A determined attacker could leak
memory like that but it would be rather expensive and inefficient way to
do so.

To ensure anon_vma_name refcount does not overflow, stop anon_vma_name
sharing when the refcount reaches REFCOUNT_MAX (2147483647), which still
leaves INT_MAX/2 (1073741823) values before the counter reaches
REFCOUNT_SATURATED.  This should provide enough headroom for raising the
refcounts temporarily.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220223153613.835563-2-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Suggested-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Cc: Chris Hyser <chris.hyser@oracle.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@google.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Xiaofeng Cao <caoxiaofeng@yulong.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-03-05 11:08:32 -08:00
Suren Baghdasaryan
5c26f6ac94 mm: refactor vm_area_struct::anon_vma_name usage code
Avoid mixing strings and their anon_vma_name referenced pointers by
using struct anon_vma_name whenever possible.  This simplifies the code
and allows easier sharing of anon_vma_name structures when they
represent the same name.

[surenb@google.com: fix comment]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220223153613.835563-1-surenb@google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220224231834.1481408-1-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Suggested-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Suggested-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@google.com>
Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Cc: Chris Hyser <chris.hyser@oracle.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Xiaofeng Cao <caoxiaofeng@yulong.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-03-05 11:08:32 -08:00
Hugh Dickins
a213e5cf71 mm/munlock: delete munlock_vma_pages_all(), allow oomreap
munlock_vma_pages_range() will still be required, when munlocking but
not munmapping a set of pages; but when unmapping a pte, the mlock count
will be maintained in much the same way as it will be maintained when
mapping in the pte.  Which removes the need for munlock_vma_pages_all()
on mlocked vmas when munmapping or exiting: eliminating the catastrophic
contention on i_mmap_rwsem, and the need for page lock on the pages.

There is still a need to update locked_vm accounting according to the
munmapped vmas when munmapping: do that in detach_vmas_to_be_unmapped().
exit_mmap() does not need locked_vm updates, so delete unlock_range().

And wasn't I the one who forbade the OOM reaper to attack mlocked vmas,
because of the uncertainty in blocking on all those page locks?
No fear of that now, so permit the OOM reaper on mlocked vmas.

Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
2022-02-17 11:56:44 -05:00
Arnd Bergmann
17fca131ce mm: move anon_vma declarations to linux/mm_inline.h
The patch to add anonymous vma names causes a build failure in some
configurations:

  include/linux/mm_types.h: In function 'is_same_vma_anon_name':
  include/linux/mm_types.h:924:37: error: implicit declaration of function 'strcmp' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
    924 |         return name && vma_name && !strcmp(name, vma_name);
        |                                     ^~~~~~
  include/linux/mm_types.h:22:1: note: 'strcmp' is defined in header '<string.h>'; did you forget to '#include <string.h>'?

This should not really be part of linux/mm_types.h in the first place,
as that header is meant to only contain structure defintions and need a
minimum set of indirect includes itself.

While the header clearly includes more than it should at this point,
let's not make it worse by including string.h as well, which would pull
in the expensive (compile-speed wise) fortify-string logic.

Move the new functions into a separate header that only needs to be
included in a couple of locations.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211207125710.2503446-1-arnd@kernel.org
Fixes: "mm: add a field to store names for private anonymous memory"
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@google.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-15 16:30:27 +02:00
Suren Baghdasaryan
78db341283 mm: add anonymous vma name refcounting
While forking a process with high number (64K) of named anonymous vmas
the overhead caused by strdup() is noticeable.  Experiments with ARM64
Android device show up to 40% performance regression when forking a
process with 64k unpopulated anonymous vmas using the max name lengths
vs the same process with the same number of anonymous vmas having no
name.

Introduce anon_vma_name refcounted structure to avoid the overhead of
copying vma names during fork() and when splitting named anonymous vmas.

When a vma is duplicated, instead of copying the name we increment the
refcount of this structure.  Multiple vmas can point to the same
anon_vma_name as long as they increment the refcount.  The name member
of anon_vma_name structure is assigned at structure allocation time and
is never changed.  If vma name changes then the refcount of the original
structure is dropped, a new anon_vma_name structure is allocated to hold
the new name and the vma pointer is updated to point to the new
structure.

With this approach the fork() performance regressions is reduced 3-4x
times and with usecases using more reasonable number of VMAs (a few
thousand) the regressions is not measurable.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211019215511.3771969-3-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Colin Cross <ccross@google.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@gmail.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rob Landley <rob@landley.net>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@fusionio.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-15 16:30:27 +02:00
Colin Cross
9a10064f56 mm: add a field to store names for private anonymous memory
In many userspace applications, and especially in VM based applications
like Android uses heavily, there are multiple different allocators in
use.  At a minimum there is libc malloc and the stack, and in many cases
there are libc malloc, the stack, direct syscalls to mmap anonymous
memory, and multiple VM heaps (one for small objects, one for big
objects, etc.).  Each of these layers usually has its own tools to
inspect its usage; malloc by compiling a debug version, the VM through
heap inspection tools, and for direct syscalls there is usually no way
to track them.

On Android we heavily use a set of tools that use an extended version of
the logic covered in Documentation/vm/pagemap.txt to walk all pages
mapped in userspace and slice their usage by process, shared (COW) vs.
unique mappings, backing, etc.  This can account for real physical
memory usage even in cases like fork without exec (which Android uses
heavily to share as many private COW pages as possible between
processes), Kernel SamePage Merging, and clean zero pages.  It produces
a measurement of the pages that only exist in that process (USS, for
unique), and a measurement of the physical memory usage of that process
with the cost of shared pages being evenly split between processes that
share them (PSS).

If all anonymous memory is indistinguishable then figuring out the real
physical memory usage (PSS) of each heap requires either a pagemap
walking tool that can understand the heap debugging of every layer, or
for every layer's heap debugging tools to implement the pagemap walking
logic, in which case it is hard to get a consistent view of memory
across the whole system.

Tracking the information in userspace leads to all sorts of problems.
It either needs to be stored inside the process, which means every
process has to have an API to export its current heap information upon
request, or it has to be stored externally in a filesystem that somebody
needs to clean up on crashes.  It needs to be readable while the process
is still running, so it has to have some sort of synchronization with
every layer of userspace.  Efficiently tracking the ranges requires
reimplementing something like the kernel vma trees, and linking to it
from every layer of userspace.  It requires more memory, more syscalls,
more runtime cost, and more complexity to separately track regions that
the kernel is already tracking.

This patch adds a field to /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/smaps to show a
userspace-provided name for anonymous vmas.  The names of named
anonymous vmas are shown in /proc/pid/maps and /proc/pid/smaps as
[anon:<name>].

Userspace can set the name for a region of memory by calling

   prctl(PR_SET_VMA, PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME, start, len, (unsigned long)name)

Setting the name to NULL clears it.  The name length limit is 80 bytes
including NUL-terminator and is checked to contain only printable ascii
characters (including space), except '[',']','\','$' and '`'.

Ascii strings are being used to have a descriptive identifiers for vmas,
which can be understood by the users reading /proc/pid/maps or
/proc/pid/smaps.  Names can be standardized for a given system and they
can include some variable parts such as the name of the allocator or a
library, tid of the thread using it, etc.

The name is stored in a pointer in the shared union in vm_area_struct
that points to a null terminated string.  Anonymous vmas with the same
name (equivalent strings) and are otherwise mergeable will be merged.
The name pointers are not shared between vmas even if they contain the
same name.  The name pointer is stored in a union with fields that are
only used on file-backed mappings, so it does not increase memory usage.

CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME kernel configuration is introduced to enable this
feature.  It keeps the feature disabled by default to prevent any
additional memory overhead and to avoid confusing procfs parsers on
systems which are not ready to support named anonymous vmas.

The patch is based on the original patch developed by Colin Cross, more
specifically on its latest version [1] posted upstream by Sumit Semwal.
It used a userspace pointer to store vma names.  In that design, name
pointers could be shared between vmas.  However during the last
upstreaming attempt, Kees Cook raised concerns [2] about this approach
and suggested to copy the name into kernel memory space, perform
validity checks [3] and store as a string referenced from
vm_area_struct.

One big concern is about fork() performance which would need to strdup
anonymous vma names.  Dave Hansen suggested experimenting with
worst-case scenario of forking a process with 64k vmas having longest
possible names [4].  I ran this experiment on an ARM64 Android device
and recorded a worst-case regression of almost 40% when forking such a
process.

This regression is addressed in the followup patch which replaces the
pointer to a name with a refcounted structure that allows sharing the
name pointer between vmas of the same name.  Instead of duplicating the
string during fork() or when splitting a vma it increments the refcount.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20200901161459.11772-4-sumit.semwal@linaro.org/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/202009031031.D32EF57ED@keescook/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/202009031022.3834F692@keescook/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/5d0358ab-8c47-2f5f-8e43-23b89d6a8e95@intel.com/

Changes for prctl(2) manual page (in the options section):

PR_SET_VMA
	Sets an attribute specified in arg2 for virtual memory areas
	starting from the address specified in arg3 and spanning the
	size specified	in arg4. arg5 specifies the value of the attribute
	to be set. Note that assigning an attribute to a virtual memory
	area might prevent it from being merged with adjacent virtual
	memory areas due to the difference in that attribute's value.

	Currently, arg2 must be one of:

	PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME
		Set a name for anonymous virtual memory areas. arg5 should
		be a pointer to a null-terminated string containing the
		name. The name length including null byte cannot exceed
		80 bytes. If arg5 is NULL, the name of the appropriate
		anonymous virtual memory areas will be reset. The name
		can contain only printable ascii characters (including
                space), except '[',']','\','$' and '`'.

                This feature is available only if the kernel is built with
                the CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME option enabled.

[surenb@google.com: docs: proc.rst: /proc/PID/maps: fix malformed table]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211123185928.2513763-1-surenb@google.com
[surenb: rebased over v5.15-rc6, replaced userpointer with a kernel copy,
 added input sanitization and CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME config. The bulk of the
 work here was done by Colin Cross, therefore, with his permission, keeping
 him as the author]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211019215511.3771969-2-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@gmail.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rob Landley <rob@landley.net>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@fusionio.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-15 16:30:27 +02:00
Colin Cross
ac1e9acc5a mm: rearrange madvise code to allow for reuse
Patch series "mm: rearrange madvise code to allow for reuse", v11.

Avoid performance regression of the new anon vma name field refcounting it.

I checked the image sizes with allnoconfig builds:

  unpatched Linus' ToT
     text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
  1324759      32   73928 1398719 1557bf vmlinux

  After the first patch is applied (madvise refactoring)
     text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
  1322346      32   73928 1396306 154e52 vmlinux
  >>> 2413 bytes decrease vs ToT <<<

  After all patches applied with CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME=n
     text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
  1322337      32   73928 1396297 154e49 vmlinux
  >>> 2422 bytes decrease vs ToT <<<

  After all patches applied with CONFIG_ANON_VMA_NAME=y
     text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
  1325228      32   73928 1399188 155994 vmlinux
  >>> 469 bytes increase vs ToT <<<

This patch (of 3):

Refactor the madvise syscall to allow for parts of it to be reused by a
prctl syscall that affects vmas.

Move the code that walks vmas in a virtual address range into a function
that takes a function pointer as a parameter.  The only caller for now
is sys_madvise, which uses it to call madvise_vma_behavior on each vma,
but the next patch will add an additional caller.

Move handling all vma behaviors inside madvise_behavior, and rename it
to madvise_vma_behavior.

Move the code that updates the flags on a vma, including splitting or
merging the vma as necessary, into a new function called
madvise_update_vma.  The next patch will add support for updating a new
anon_name field as well.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211019215511.3771969-1-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Jan Glauber <jan.glauber@gmail.com>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Rob Landley <rob@landley.net>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@fusionio.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2022-01-15 16:30:27 +02:00
Christian Brauner
ee9955d61a
mm: use pidfd_get_task()
Instead of duplicating the same code in two places use the newly added
pidfd_get_task() helper. This fixes an (unimportant for now) bug where
PIDTYPE_PID is used whereas PIDTYPE_TGID should have been used.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211004125050.1153693-3-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211011133245.1703103-3-brauner@kernel.org
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: Matthew Bobrowski <repnop@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Bobrowski <repnop@google.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-10-14 13:29:22 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
14726903c8 Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)
Merge misc updates from Andrew Morton:
 "173 patches.

  Subsystems affected by this series: ia64, ocfs2, block, and mm (debug,
  pagecache, gup, swap, shmem, memcg, selftests, pagemap, mremap,
  bootmem, sparsemem, vmalloc, kasan, pagealloc, memory-failure,
  hugetlb, userfaultfd, vmscan, compaction, mempolicy, memblock,
  oom-kill, migration, ksm, percpu, vmstat, and madvise)"

* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (173 commits)
  mm/madvise: add MADV_WILLNEED to process_madvise()
  mm/vmstat: remove unneeded return value
  mm/vmstat: simplify the array size calculation
  mm/vmstat: correct some wrong comments
  mm/percpu,c: remove obsolete comments of pcpu_chunk_populated()
  selftests: vm: add COW time test for KSM pages
  selftests: vm: add KSM merging time test
  mm: KSM: fix data type
  selftests: vm: add KSM merging across nodes test
  selftests: vm: add KSM zero page merging test
  selftests: vm: add KSM unmerge test
  selftests: vm: add KSM merge test
  mm/migrate: correct kernel-doc notation
  mm: wire up syscall process_mrelease
  mm: introduce process_mrelease system call
  memblock: make memblock_find_in_range method private
  mm/mempolicy.c: use in_task() in mempolicy_slab_node()
  mm/mempolicy: unify the create() func for bind/interleave/prefer-many policies
  mm/mempolicy: advertise new MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY
  mm/hugetlb: add support for mempolicy MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY
  ...
2021-09-03 10:08:28 -07:00
zhangkui
d5fffc5aff mm/madvise: add MADV_WILLNEED to process_madvise()
There is a usecase in Android that an app process's memory is swapped out
by process_madvise() with MADV_PAGEOUT, such as the memory is swapped to
zram or a backing device.  When the process is scheduled to running, like
switch to foreground, multiple page faults may cause the app dropped
frames.

To reduce the problem, System Management Software can read-ahead memory
of the process immediately when the app switches to forground.  Calling
process_madvise() with MADV_WILLNEED can meet this need.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210804082010.12482-1-zhangkui@oppo.com
Signed-off-by: zhangkui <zhangkui@oppo.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-09-03 09:58:18 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
aa99f3c2b9 \n
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Merge tag 'hole_punch_for_v5.15-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs

Pull fs hole punching vs cache filling race fixes from Jan Kara:
 "Fix races leading to possible data corruption or stale data exposure
  in multiple filesystems when hole punching races with operations such
  as readahead.

  This is the series I was sending for the last merge window but with
  your objection fixed - now filemap_fault() has been modified to take
  invalidate_lock only when we need to create new page in the page cache
  and / or bring it uptodate"

* tag 'hole_punch_for_v5.15-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs:
  filesystems/locking: fix Malformed table warning
  cifs: Fix race between hole punch and page fault
  ceph: Fix race between hole punch and page fault
  fuse: Convert to using invalidate_lock
  f2fs: Convert to using invalidate_lock
  zonefs: Convert to using invalidate_lock
  xfs: Convert double locking of MMAPLOCK to use VFS helpers
  xfs: Convert to use invalidate_lock
  xfs: Refactor xfs_isilocked()
  ext2: Convert to using invalidate_lock
  ext4: Convert to use mapping->invalidate_lock
  mm: Add functions to lock invalidate_lock for two mappings
  mm: Protect operations adding pages to page cache with invalidate_lock
  documentation: Sync file_operations members with reality
  mm: Fix comments mentioning i_mutex
2021-08-30 10:24:50 -07:00
David Hildenbrand
eb2faa513c mm/madvise: report SIGBUS as -EFAULT for MADV_POPULATE_(READ|WRITE)
Doing some extended tests and polishing the man page update for
MADV_POPULATE_(READ|WRITE), I realized that we end up converting also
SIGBUS (via -EFAULT) to -EINVAL, making it look like yet another
madvise() user error.

We want to report only problematic mappings and permission problems that
the user could have know as -EINVAL.

Let's not convert -EFAULT arising due to SIGBUS (or SIGSEGV) to -EINVAL,
but instead indicate -EFAULT to user space.  While we could also convert
it to -ENOMEM, using -EFAULT looks more helpful when user space might
want to troubleshoot what's going wrong: MADV_POPULATE_(READ|WRITE) is
not part of an final Linux release and we can still adjust the behavior.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210726154932.102880-1-david@redhat.com
Fixes: 4ca9b3859d ("mm/madvise: introduce MADV_POPULATE_(READ|WRITE) to prefault page tables")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Rolf Eike Beer <eike-kernel@sf-tec.de>
Cc: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-08-13 14:09:31 -10:00
Jan Kara
9608703e48 mm: Fix comments mentioning i_mutex
inode->i_mutex has been replaced with inode->i_rwsem long ago. Fix
comments still mentioning i_mutex.

Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
2021-07-12 18:31:16 +02:00
David Hildenbrand
4ca9b3859d mm/madvise: introduce MADV_POPULATE_(READ|WRITE) to prefault page tables
I. Background: Sparse Memory Mappings

When we manage sparse memory mappings dynamically in user space - also
sometimes involving MAP_NORESERVE - we want to dynamically populate/
discard memory inside such a sparse memory region.  Example users are
hypervisors (especially implementing memory ballooning or similar
technologies like virtio-mem) and memory allocators.  In addition, we want
to fail in a nice way (instead of generating SIGBUS) if populating does
not succeed because we are out of backend memory (which can happen easily
with file-based mappings, especially tmpfs and hugetlbfs).

While MADV_DONTNEED, MADV_REMOVE and FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE allow for
reliably discarding memory for most mapping types, there is no generic
approach to populate page tables and preallocate memory.

Although mmap() supports MAP_POPULATE, it is not applicable to the concept
of sparse memory mappings, where we want to populate/discard dynamically
and avoid expensive/problematic remappings.  In addition, we never
actually report errors during the final populate phase - it is best-effort
only.

fallocate() can be used to preallocate file-based memory and fail in a
safe way.  However, it cannot really be used for any private mappings on
anonymous files via memfd due to COW semantics.  In addition, fallocate()
does not actually populate page tables, so we still always get pagefaults
on first access - which is sometimes undesired (i.e., real-time workloads)
and requires real prefaulting of page tables, not just a preallocation of
backend storage.  There might be interesting use cases for sparse memory
regions along with mlockall(MCL_ONFAULT) which fallocate() cannot satisfy
as it does not prefault page tables.

II. On preallcoation/prefaulting from user space

Because we don't have a proper interface, what applications (like QEMU and
databases) end up doing is touching (i.e., reading+writing one byte to not
overwrite existing data) all individual pages.

However, that approach
1) Can result in wear on storage backing, because we end up reading/writing
   each page; this is especially a problem for dax/pmem.
2) Can result in mmap_sem contention when prefaulting via multiple
   threads.
3) Requires expensive signal handling, especially to catch SIGBUS in case
   of hugetlbfs/shmem/file-backed memory. For example, this is
   problematic in hypervisors like QEMU where SIGBUS handlers might already
   be used by other subsystems concurrently to e.g, handle hardware errors.
   "Simply" doing preallocation concurrently from other thread is not that
   easy.

III. On MADV_WILLNEED

Extending MADV_WILLNEED is not an option because
1. It would change the semantics: "Expect access in the near future." and
   "might be a good idea to read some pages" vs. "Definitely populate/
   preallocate all memory and definitely fail on errors.".
2. Existing users (like virtio-balloon in QEMU when deflating the balloon)
   don't want populate/prealloc semantics. They treat this rather as a hint
   to give a little performance boost without too much overhead - and don't
   expect that a lot of memory might get consumed or a lot of time
   might be spent.

IV. MADV_POPULATE_READ and MADV_POPULATE_WRITE

Let's introduce MADV_POPULATE_READ and MADV_POPULATE_WRITE, inspired by
MAP_POPULATE, with the following semantics:
1. MADV_POPULATE_READ can be used to prefault page tables just like
   manually reading each individual page. This will not break any COW
   mappings. The shared zero page might get mapped and no backend storage
   might get preallocated -- allocation might be deferred to
   write-fault time. Especially shared file mappings require an explicit
   fallocate() upfront to actually preallocate backend memory (blocks in
   the file system) in case the file might have holes.
2. If MADV_POPULATE_READ succeeds, all page tables have been populated
   (prefaulted) readable once.
3. MADV_POPULATE_WRITE can be used to preallocate backend memory and
   prefault page tables just like manually writing (or
   reading+writing) each individual page. This will break any COW
   mappings -- e.g., the shared zeropage is never populated.
4. If MADV_POPULATE_WRITE succeeds, all page tables have been populated
   (prefaulted) writable once.
5. MADV_POPULATE_READ and MADV_POPULATE_WRITE cannot be applied to special
   mappings marked with VM_PFNMAP and VM_IO. Also, proper access
   permissions (e.g., PROT_READ, PROT_WRITE) are required. If any such
   mapping is encountered, madvise() fails with -EINVAL.
6. If MADV_POPULATE_READ or MADV_POPULATE_WRITE fails, some page tables
   might have been populated.
7. MADV_POPULATE_READ and MADV_POPULATE_WRITE will return -EHWPOISON
   when encountering a HW poisoned page in the range.
8. Similar to MAP_POPULATE, MADV_POPULATE_READ and MADV_POPULATE_WRITE
   cannot protect from the OOM (Out Of Memory) handler killing the
   process.

While the use case for MADV_POPULATE_WRITE is fairly obvious (i.e.,
preallocate memory and prefault page tables for VMs), one issue is that
whenever we prefault pages writable, the pages have to be marked dirty,
because the CPU could dirty them any time.  while not a real problem for
hugetlbfs or dax/pmem, it can be a problem for shared file mappings: each
page will be marked dirty and has to be written back later when evicting.

MADV_POPULATE_READ allows for optimizing this scenario: Pre-read a whole
mapping from backend storage without marking it dirty, such that eviction
won't have to write it back.  As discussed above, shared file mappings
might require an explciit fallocate() upfront to achieve
preallcoation+prepopulation.

Although sparse memory mappings are the primary use case, this will also
be useful for other preallocate/prefault use cases where MAP_POPULATE is
not desired or the semantics of MAP_POPULATE are not sufficient: as one
example, QEMU users can trigger preallocation/prefaulting of guest RAM
after the mapping was created -- and don't want errors to be silently
suppressed.

Looking at the history, MADV_POPULATE was already proposed in 2013 [1],
however, the main motivation back than was performance improvements --
which should also still be the case.

V. Single-threaded performance comparison

I did a short experiment, prefaulting page tables on completely *empty
mappings/files* and repeated the experiment 10 times.  The results
correspond to the shortest execution time.  In general, the performance
benefit for huge pages is negligible with small mappings.

V.1: Private mappings

POPULATE_READ and POPULATE_WRITE is fastest.  Note that
Reading/POPULATE_READ will populate the shared zeropage where applicable
-- which result in short population times.

The fastest way to allocate backend storage (here: swap or huge pages) and
prefault page tables is POPULATE_WRITE.

V.2: Shared mappings

fallocate() is fastest, however, doesn't prefault page tables.
POPULATE_WRITE is faster than simple writes and read/writes.
POPULATE_READ is faster than simple reads.

Without a fd, the fastest way to allocate backend storage and prefault
page tables is POPULATE_WRITE.  With an fd, the fastest way is usually
FALLOCATE+POPULATE_READ or FALLOCATE+POPULATE_WRITE respectively; one
exception are actual files: FALLOCATE+Read is slightly faster than
FALLOCATE+POPULATE_READ.

The fastest way to allocate backend storage prefault page tables is
FALLOCATE+POPULATE_WRITE -- except when dealing with actual files; then,
FALLOCATE+POPULATE_READ is fastest and won't directly mark all pages as
dirty.

v.3: Detailed results

==================================================
2 MiB MAP_PRIVATE:
**************************************************
Anon 4 KiB     : Read                     :     0.119 ms
Anon 4 KiB     : Write                    :     0.222 ms
Anon 4 KiB     : Read/Write               :     0.380 ms
Anon 4 KiB     : POPULATE_READ            :     0.060 ms
Anon 4 KiB     : POPULATE_WRITE           :     0.158 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : Read                     :     0.034 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : Write                    :     0.310 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : Read/Write               :     0.362 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : POPULATE_READ            :     0.039 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : POPULATE_WRITE           :     0.229 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : Read                     :     0.030 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : Write                    :     0.030 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : Read/Write               :     0.030 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : POPULATE_READ            :     0.030 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : POPULATE_WRITE           :     0.030 ms
tmpfs          : Read                     :     0.033 ms
tmpfs          : Write                    :     0.313 ms
tmpfs          : Read/Write               :     0.406 ms
tmpfs          : POPULATE_READ            :     0.039 ms
tmpfs          : POPULATE_WRITE           :     0.285 ms
file           : Read                     :     0.033 ms
file           : Write                    :     0.351 ms
file           : Read/Write               :     0.408 ms
file           : POPULATE_READ            :     0.039 ms
file           : POPULATE_WRITE           :     0.290 ms
hugetlbfs      : Read                     :     0.030 ms
hugetlbfs      : Write                    :     0.030 ms
hugetlbfs      : Read/Write               :     0.030 ms
hugetlbfs      : POPULATE_READ            :     0.030 ms
hugetlbfs      : POPULATE_WRITE           :     0.030 ms
**************************************************
4096 MiB MAP_PRIVATE:
**************************************************
Anon 4 KiB     : Read                     :   237.940 ms
Anon 4 KiB     : Write                    :   708.409 ms
Anon 4 KiB     : Read/Write               :  1054.041 ms
Anon 4 KiB     : POPULATE_READ            :   124.310 ms
Anon 4 KiB     : POPULATE_WRITE           :   572.582 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : Read                     :   136.928 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : Write                    :   963.898 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : Read/Write               :  1106.561 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : POPULATE_READ            :    78.450 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : POPULATE_WRITE           :   805.881 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : Read                     :   357.116 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : Write                    :   357.210 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : Read/Write               :   357.606 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : POPULATE_READ            :   356.094 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : POPULATE_WRITE           :   356.937 ms
tmpfs          : Read                     :   137.536 ms
tmpfs          : Write                    :   954.362 ms
tmpfs          : Read/Write               :  1105.954 ms
tmpfs          : POPULATE_READ            :    80.289 ms
tmpfs          : POPULATE_WRITE           :   822.826 ms
file           : Read                     :   137.874 ms
file           : Write                    :   987.025 ms
file           : Read/Write               :  1107.439 ms
file           : POPULATE_READ            :    80.413 ms
file           : POPULATE_WRITE           :   857.622 ms
hugetlbfs      : Read                     :   355.607 ms
hugetlbfs      : Write                    :   355.729 ms
hugetlbfs      : Read/Write               :   356.127 ms
hugetlbfs      : POPULATE_READ            :   354.585 ms
hugetlbfs      : POPULATE_WRITE           :   355.138 ms
**************************************************
2 MiB MAP_SHARED:
**************************************************
Anon 4 KiB     : Read                     :     0.394 ms
Anon 4 KiB     : Write                    :     0.348 ms
Anon 4 KiB     : Read/Write               :     0.400 ms
Anon 4 KiB     : POPULATE_READ            :     0.326 ms
Anon 4 KiB     : POPULATE_WRITE           :     0.273 ms
Anon 2 MiB     : Read                     :     0.030 ms
Anon 2 MiB     : Write                    :     0.030 ms
Anon 2 MiB     : Read/Write               :     0.030 ms
Anon 2 MiB     : POPULATE_READ            :     0.030 ms
Anon 2 MiB     : POPULATE_WRITE           :     0.030 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : Read                     :     0.412 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : Write                    :     0.372 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : Read/Write               :     0.419 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : POPULATE_READ            :     0.343 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : POPULATE_WRITE           :     0.288 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : FALLOCATE                :     0.137 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : FALLOCATE+Read           :     0.446 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : FALLOCATE+Write          :     0.330 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : FALLOCATE+Read/Write     :     0.454 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : FALLOCATE+POPULATE_READ  :     0.379 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : FALLOCATE+POPULATE_WRITE :     0.268 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : Read                     :     0.030 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : Write                    :     0.030 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : Read/Write               :     0.030 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : POPULATE_READ            :     0.030 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : POPULATE_WRITE           :     0.030 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : FALLOCATE                :     0.030 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : FALLOCATE+Read           :     0.031 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : FALLOCATE+Write          :     0.031 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : FALLOCATE+Read/Write     :     0.031 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : FALLOCATE+POPULATE_READ  :     0.030 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : FALLOCATE+POPULATE_WRITE :     0.030 ms
tmpfs          : Read                     :     0.416 ms
tmpfs          : Write                    :     0.369 ms
tmpfs          : Read/Write               :     0.425 ms
tmpfs          : POPULATE_READ            :     0.346 ms
tmpfs          : POPULATE_WRITE           :     0.295 ms
tmpfs          : FALLOCATE                :     0.139 ms
tmpfs          : FALLOCATE+Read           :     0.447 ms
tmpfs          : FALLOCATE+Write          :     0.333 ms
tmpfs          : FALLOCATE+Read/Write     :     0.454 ms
tmpfs          : FALLOCATE+POPULATE_READ  :     0.380 ms
tmpfs          : FALLOCATE+POPULATE_WRITE :     0.272 ms
file           : Read                     :     0.191 ms
file           : Write                    :     0.511 ms
file           : Read/Write               :     0.524 ms
file           : POPULATE_READ            :     0.196 ms
file           : POPULATE_WRITE           :     0.434 ms
file           : FALLOCATE                :     0.004 ms
file           : FALLOCATE+Read           :     0.197 ms
file           : FALLOCATE+Write          :     0.554 ms
file           : FALLOCATE+Read/Write     :     0.480 ms
file           : FALLOCATE+POPULATE_READ  :     0.201 ms
file           : FALLOCATE+POPULATE_WRITE :     0.381 ms
hugetlbfs      : Read                     :     0.030 ms
hugetlbfs      : Write                    :     0.030 ms
hugetlbfs      : Read/Write               :     0.030 ms
hugetlbfs      : POPULATE_READ            :     0.030 ms
hugetlbfs      : POPULATE_WRITE           :     0.030 ms
hugetlbfs      : FALLOCATE                :     0.030 ms
hugetlbfs      : FALLOCATE+Read           :     0.031 ms
hugetlbfs      : FALLOCATE+Write          :     0.031 ms
hugetlbfs      : FALLOCATE+Read/Write     :     0.030 ms
hugetlbfs      : FALLOCATE+POPULATE_READ  :     0.030 ms
hugetlbfs      : FALLOCATE+POPULATE_WRITE :     0.030 ms
**************************************************
4096 MiB MAP_SHARED:
**************************************************
Anon 4 KiB     : Read                     :  1053.090 ms
Anon 4 KiB     : Write                    :   913.642 ms
Anon 4 KiB     : Read/Write               :  1060.350 ms
Anon 4 KiB     : POPULATE_READ            :   893.691 ms
Anon 4 KiB     : POPULATE_WRITE           :   782.885 ms
Anon 2 MiB     : Read                     :   358.553 ms
Anon 2 MiB     : Write                    :   358.419 ms
Anon 2 MiB     : Read/Write               :   357.992 ms
Anon 2 MiB     : POPULATE_READ            :   357.533 ms
Anon 2 MiB     : POPULATE_WRITE           :   357.808 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : Read                     :  1078.144 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : Write                    :   942.036 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : Read/Write               :  1100.391 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : POPULATE_READ            :   925.829 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : POPULATE_WRITE           :   804.394 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : FALLOCATE                :   304.632 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : FALLOCATE+Read           :  1163.359 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : FALLOCATE+Write          :   933.186 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : FALLOCATE+Read/Write     :  1187.304 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : FALLOCATE+POPULATE_READ  :  1013.660 ms
Memfd 4 KiB    : FALLOCATE+POPULATE_WRITE :   794.560 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : Read                     :   358.131 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : Write                    :   358.099 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : Read/Write               :   358.250 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : POPULATE_READ            :   357.563 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : POPULATE_WRITE           :   357.334 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : FALLOCATE                :   356.735 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : FALLOCATE+Read           :   358.152 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : FALLOCATE+Write          :   358.331 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : FALLOCATE+Read/Write     :   358.018 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : FALLOCATE+POPULATE_READ  :   357.286 ms
Memfd 2 MiB    : FALLOCATE+POPULATE_WRITE :   357.523 ms
tmpfs          : Read                     :  1087.265 ms
tmpfs          : Write                    :   950.840 ms
tmpfs          : Read/Write               :  1107.567 ms
tmpfs          : POPULATE_READ            :   922.605 ms
tmpfs          : POPULATE_WRITE           :   810.094 ms
tmpfs          : FALLOCATE                :   306.320 ms
tmpfs          : FALLOCATE+Read           :  1169.796 ms
tmpfs          : FALLOCATE+Write          :   933.730 ms
tmpfs          : FALLOCATE+Read/Write     :  1191.610 ms
tmpfs          : FALLOCATE+POPULATE_READ  :  1020.474 ms
tmpfs          : FALLOCATE+POPULATE_WRITE :   798.945 ms
file           : Read                     :   654.101 ms
file           : Write                    :  1259.142 ms
file           : Read/Write               :  1289.509 ms
file           : POPULATE_READ            :   661.642 ms
file           : POPULATE_WRITE           :  1106.816 ms
file           : FALLOCATE                :     1.864 ms
file           : FALLOCATE+Read           :   656.328 ms
file           : FALLOCATE+Write          :  1153.300 ms
file           : FALLOCATE+Read/Write     :  1180.613 ms
file           : FALLOCATE+POPULATE_READ  :   668.347 ms
file           : FALLOCATE+POPULATE_WRITE :   996.143 ms
hugetlbfs      : Read                     :   357.245 ms
hugetlbfs      : Write                    :   357.413 ms
hugetlbfs      : Read/Write               :   357.120 ms
hugetlbfs      : POPULATE_READ            :   356.321 ms
hugetlbfs      : POPULATE_WRITE           :   356.693 ms
hugetlbfs      : FALLOCATE                :   355.927 ms
hugetlbfs      : FALLOCATE+Read           :   357.074 ms
hugetlbfs      : FALLOCATE+Write          :   357.120 ms
hugetlbfs      : FALLOCATE+Read/Write     :   356.983 ms
hugetlbfs      : FALLOCATE+POPULATE_READ  :   356.413 ms
hugetlbfs      : FALLOCATE+POPULATE_WRITE :   356.266 ms
**************************************************

[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/6/27/698

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding style fixes]

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210419135443.12822-3-david@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Rolf Eike Beer <eike-kernel@sf-tec.de>
Cc: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-06-30 20:47:30 -07:00
Ingo Molnar
f0953a1bba mm: fix typos in comments
Fix ~94 single-word typos in locking code comments, plus a few
very obvious grammar mistakes.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210322212624.GA1963421@gmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210322205203.GB1959563@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Bhaskar Chowdhury <unixbhaskar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-05-07 00:26:35 -07:00
Suren Baghdasaryan
96cfe2c0fd mm/madvise: replace ptrace attach requirement for process_madvise
process_madvise currently requires ptrace attach capability.
PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH gives one process complete control over another
process.  It effectively removes the security boundary between the two
processes (in one direction).  Granting ptrace attach capability even to a
system process is considered dangerous since it creates an attack surface.
This severely limits the usage of this API.

The operations process_madvise can perform do not affect the correctness
of the operation of the target process; they only affect where the data is
physically located (and therefore, how fast it can be accessed).  What we
want is the ability for one process to influence another process in order
to optimize performance across the entire system while leaving the
security boundary intact.

Replace PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH with a combination of PTRACE_MODE_READ and
CAP_SYS_NICE.  PTRACE_MODE_READ to prevent leaking ASLR metadata and
CAP_SYS_NICE for influencing process performance.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210303185807.2160264-1-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[5.10+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-03-13 11:27:30 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
7d6beb71da idmapped-mounts-v5.12
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Merge tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux

Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
 "This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
  time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
  directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
  with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
  filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
  maintainers.

  Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
  are just a few:

   - Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
     multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
     scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
     implementation of portable home directories in
     systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
     directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
     computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
     effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
     login time.

   - It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
     containers without having to change ownership permanently through
     chown(2).

   - It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
     mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
     user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
     Linux subsystem.

   - It is possible to share files between containers with
     non-overlapping idmappings.

   - Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
     use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
     permission checking.

   - They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
     basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
     contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
     instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
     ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
     container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
     mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
     all files.

   - Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
     idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
     to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
     take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
     simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
     especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
     files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
     directory and container and vm scenario.

   - Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
     to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
     apply as long as the mount exists.

  Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
  pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
  this:

   - systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
     in their implementation of portable home directories.

         https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/

   - container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
     host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
     containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
     containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
     a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734

   - The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
     in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
     ported.

   - ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.

  I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
  here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
  mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
  talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:

      https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf
      https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/

  This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
  xfs:

      https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts

  It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
  execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
  non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
  setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
  be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
  merge this.

  In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
  user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
  map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
  By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
  The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
  idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
  testsuite.

  Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
  and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
  the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
  introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
  the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
  to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
  whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
  currently marked with.

  The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
  passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
  argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
  MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
  of extensibility.

  The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
  mount:

   - The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
     user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.

   - The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.

   - The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
     idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.

   - The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
     been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
     and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.

  The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
  kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.

  By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
  behavioral or performance changes are observed.

  The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:

      1d7b902e28

  In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed
  and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The
  patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or
  complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and
  xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and
  will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify
  that port has been done correctly.

  The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped
  mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most
  valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform
  mounts based on file descriptors only.

  Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2()
  RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time
  we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and
  path resolution.

  While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount
  proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not
  possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in
  the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing.

  With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last
  restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api,
  covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the
  crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount
  tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This
  syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and
  projects.

  There is a simple tool available at

      https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped

  that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this
  patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you
  decide to pull this in the following weeks:

  Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home
  directory:

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/
	total 28
	drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
	drwxr-xr-x 4 root   root   4096 Oct 28 04:00 ..
	-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu  220 Feb 25  2020 .bash_logout
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25  2020 .bashrc
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu  807 Feb 25  2020 .profile
	-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu    0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
	-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/
	total 28
	drwxr-xr-x  2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
	drwxr-xr-x 29 root  root  4096 Oct 28 22:01 ..
	-rw-------  1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001  220 Feb 25  2020 .bash_logout
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25  2020 .bashrc
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001  807 Feb 25  2020 .profile
	-rw-r--r--  1 u1001 u1001    0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
	-rw-------  1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file
	-rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file
	-rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file
	getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
	# file: mnt/my-file
	# owner: u1001
	# group: u1001
	user::rw-
	user:u1001:rwx
	group::rw-
	mask::rwx
	other::r--

	u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file
	getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
	# file: home/ubuntu/my-file
	# owner: ubuntu
	# group: ubuntu
	user::rw-
	user:ubuntu:rwx
	group::rw-
	mask::rwx
	other::r--"

* tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits)
  xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl
  xfs: support idmapped mounts
  ext4: support idmapped mounts
  fat: handle idmapped mounts
  tests: add mount_setattr() selftests
  fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
  fs: add mount_setattr()
  fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper
  fs: split out functions to hold writers
  namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt()
  mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static
  namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags
  nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
  overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
  ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
  ima: handle idmapped mounts
  apparmor: handle idmapped mounts
  fs: make helpers idmap mount aware
  exec: handle idmapped mounts
  would_dump: handle idmapped mounts
  ...
2021-02-23 13:39:45 -08:00
Will Deacon
a72afd8730 tlb: mmu_gather: Remove start/end arguments from tlb_gather_mmu()
The 'start' and 'end' arguments to tlb_gather_mmu() are no longer
needed now that there is a separate function for 'fullmm' flushing.

Remove the unused arguments and update all callers.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wjQWa14_4UpfDf=fiineNP+RH74kZeDMo_f1D35xNzq9w@mail.gmail.com
2021-01-29 20:02:29 +01:00
Will Deacon
ae8eba8b5d tlb: mmu_gather: Remove unused start/end arguments from tlb_finish_mmu()
Since commit 7a30df49f6 ("mm: mmu_gather: remove __tlb_reset_range()
for force flush"), the 'start' and 'end' arguments to tlb_finish_mmu()
are no longer used, since we flush the whole mm in case of a nested
invalidation.

Remove the unused arguments and update all callers.

Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210127235347.1402-3-will@kernel.org
2021-01-29 20:02:28 +01:00
Christian Brauner
21cb47be6f
inode: make init and permission helpers idmapped mount aware
The inode_owner_or_capable() helper determines whether the caller is the
owner of the inode or is capable with respect to that inode. Allow it to
handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped
mount it according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks
are identical to non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is
passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical
behavior as before.

Similarly, allow the inode_init_owner() helper to handle idmapped
mounts. It initializes a new inode on idmapped mounts by mapping the
fsuid and fsgid of the caller from the mount's user namespace. If the
initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts
will see identical behavior as before.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-7-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-24 14:27:16 +01:00
Christian Brauner
02f92b3868
fs: add file and path permissions helpers
Add two simple helpers to check permissions on a file and path
respectively and convert over some callers. It simplifies quite a few
codepaths and also reduces the churn in later patches quite a bit.
Christoph also correctly points out that this makes codepaths (e.g.
ioctls) way easier to follow that would otherwise have to do more
complex argument passing than necessary.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-4-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2021-01-24 14:27:16 +01:00
Oscar Salvador
1e8aaedb18 mm,memory_failure: always pin the page in madvise_inject_error
madvise_inject_error() uses get_user_pages_fast to translate the address
we specified to a page.  After [1], we drop the extra reference count for
memory_failure() path.  That commit says that memory_failure wanted to
keep the pin in order to take the page out of circulation.

The truth is that we need to keep the page pinned, otherwise the page
might be re-used after the put_page() and we can end up messing with
someone else's memory.

E.g:

CPU0
process X					CPU1
 madvise_inject_error
  get_user_pages
   put_page
					page gets reclaimed
					process Y allocates the page
  memory_failure
   // We mess with process Y memory

madvise() is meant to operate on a self address space, so messing with
pages that do not belong to us seems the wrong thing to do.
To avoid that, let us keep the page pinned for memory_failure as well.

Pages for DAX mappings will release this extra refcount in
memory_failure_dev_pagemap.

[1] ("23e7b5c2e271: mm, madvise_inject_error:
      Let memory_failure() optionally take a page reference")

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201207094818.8518-1-osalvador@suse.de
Fixes: 23e7b5c2e2 ("mm, madvise_inject_error: Let memory_failure() optionally take a page reference")
Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Suggested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 12:13:44 -08:00
Oscar Salvador
32409cba3f mm,hwpoison: drop unneeded pcplist draining
memory_failure and soft_offline_path paths now drain pcplists by calling
get_hwpoison_page.

memory_failure flags the page as HWPoison before, so that page cannot
longer go into a pcplist, and soft_offline_page only flags a page as
HWPoison if 1) we took the page off a buddy freelist 2) the page was
in-use and we migrated it 3) was a clean pagecache.

Because of that, a page cannot longer be poisoned and be in a pcplist.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201013144447.6706-5-osalvador@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-15 12:13:44 -08:00
Minchan Kim
a68a0262ab mm/madvise: remove racy mm ownership check
Jann spotted the security hole due to race of mm ownership check.

If the task is sharing the mm_struct but goes through execve() before
mm_access(), it could skip process_madvise_behavior_valid check.  That
makes *any advice hint* to reach into the remote process.

This patch removes the mm ownership check.  With it, it will lose the
ability that local process could give *any* advice hint with vector
interface for some reason (e.g., performance).  Since there is no
concrete example in upstream yet, it would be better to remove the
abiliity at this moment and need to review when such new advice comes
up.

Fixes: ecb8ac8b1f ("mm/madvise: introduce process_madvise() syscall: an external memory hinting API")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-08 20:57:18 -08:00
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)
66383800df mm: fix madvise WILLNEED performance problem
The calculation of the end page index was incorrect, leading to a
regression of 70% when running stress-ng.

With this fix, we instead see a performance improvement of 3%.

Fixes: e6e88712e4 ("mm: optimise madvise WILLNEED")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Tested-by: Xing Zhengjun <zhengjun.xing@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com>
Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Cc: "Chen, Rong A" <rong.a.chen@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201109134851.29692-1-willy@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-11-22 10:48:22 -08:00
Eric Dumazet
450677dcb0 mm/madvise: fix memory leak from process_madvise
The early return in process_madvise() will produce a memory leak.

Fix it.

Fixes: ecb8ac8b1f ("mm/madvise: introduce process_madvise() syscall: an external memory hinting API")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201116155132.GA3805951@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-11-22 10:48:22 -08:00
Minchan Kim
ecb8ac8b1f mm/madvise: introduce process_madvise() syscall: an external memory hinting API
There is usecase that System Management Software(SMS) want to give a
memory hint like MADV_[COLD|PAGEEOUT] to other processes and in the
case of Android, it is the ActivityManagerService.

The information required to make the reclaim decision is not known to the
app.  Instead, it is known to the centralized userspace
daemon(ActivityManagerService), and that daemon must be able to initiate
reclaim on its own without any app involvement.

To solve the issue, this patch introduces a new syscall
process_madvise(2).  It uses pidfd of an external process to give the
hint.  It also supports vector address range because Android app has
thousands of vmas due to zygote so it's totally waste of CPU and power if
we should call the syscall one by one for each vma.(With testing 2000-vma
syscall vs 1-vector syscall, it showed 15% performance improvement.  I
think it would be bigger in real practice because the testing ran very
cache friendly environment).

Another potential use case for the vector range is to amortize the cost
ofTLB shootdowns for multiple ranges when using MADV_DONTNEED; this could
benefit users like TCP receive zerocopy and malloc implementations.  In
future, we could find more usecases for other advises so let's make it
happens as API since we introduce a new syscall at this moment.  With
that, existing madvise(2) user could replace it with process_madvise(2)
with their own pid if they want to have batch address ranges support
feature.

ince it could affect other process's address range, only privileged
process(PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS) or something else(e.g., being the same
UID) gives it the right to ptrace the process could use it successfully.
The flag argument is reserved for future use if we need to extend the API.

I think supporting all hints madvise has/will supported/support to
process_madvise is rather risky.  Because we are not sure all hints make
sense from external process and implementation for the hint may rely on
the caller being in the current context so it could be error-prone.  Thus,
I just limited hints as MADV_[COLD|PAGEOUT] in this patch.

If someone want to add other hints, we could hear the usecase and review
it for each hint.  It's safer for maintenance rather than introducing a
buggy syscall but hard to fix it later.

So finally, the API is as follows,

      ssize_t process_madvise(int pidfd, const struct iovec *iovec,
                unsigned long vlen, int advice, unsigned int flags);

    DESCRIPTION
      The process_madvise() system call is used to give advice or directions
      to the kernel about the address ranges from external process as well as
      local process. It provides the advice to address ranges of process
      described by iovec and vlen. The goal of such advice is to improve
      system or application performance.

      The pidfd selects the process referred to by the PID file descriptor
      specified in pidfd. (See pidofd_open(2) for further information)

      The pointer iovec points to an array of iovec structures, defined in
      <sys/uio.h> as:

        struct iovec {
            void *iov_base;         /* starting address */
            size_t iov_len;         /* number of bytes to be advised */
        };

      The iovec describes address ranges beginning at address(iov_base)
      and with size length of bytes(iov_len).

      The vlen represents the number of elements in iovec.

      The advice is indicated in the advice argument, which is one of the
      following at this moment if the target process specified by pidfd is
      external.

        MADV_COLD
        MADV_PAGEOUT

      Permission to provide a hint to external process is governed by a
      ptrace access mode PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS check; see ptrace(2).

      The process_madvise supports every advice madvise(2) has if target
      process is in same thread group with calling process so user could
      use process_madvise(2) to extend existing madvise(2) to support
      vector address ranges.

    RETURN VALUE
      On success, process_madvise() returns the number of bytes advised.
      This return value may be less than the total number of requested
      bytes, if an error occurred. The caller should check return value
      to determine whether a partial advice occurred.

FAQ:

Q.1 - Why does any external entity have better knowledge?

Quote from Sandeep

"For Android, every application (including the special SystemServer)
are forked from Zygote.  The reason of course is to share as many
libraries and classes between the two as possible to benefit from the
preloading during boot.

After applications start, (almost) all of the APIs end up calling into
this SystemServer process over IPC (binder) and back to the
application.

In a fully running system, the SystemServer monitors every single
process periodically to calculate their PSS / RSS and also decides
which process is "important" to the user for interactivity.

So, because of how these processes start _and_ the fact that the
SystemServer is looping to monitor each process, it does tend to *know*
which address range of the application is not used / useful.

Besides, we can never rely on applications to clean things up
themselves.  We've had the "hey app1, the system is low on memory,
please trim your memory usage down" notifications for a long time[1].
They rely on applications honoring the broadcasts and very few do.

So, if we want to avoid the inevitable killing of the application and
restarting it, some way to be able to tell the OS about unimportant
memory in these applications will be useful.

- ssp

Q.2 - How to guarantee the race(i.e., object validation) between when
giving a hint from an external process and get the hint from the target
process?

process_madvise operates on the target process's address space as it
exists at the instant that process_madvise is called.  If the space
target process can run between the time the process_madvise process
inspects the target process address space and the time that
process_madvise is actually called, process_madvise may operate on
memory regions that the calling process does not expect.  It's the
responsibility of the process calling process_madvise to close this
race condition.  For example, the calling process can suspend the
target process with ptrace, SIGSTOP, or the freezer cgroup so that it
doesn't have an opportunity to change its own address space before
process_madvise is called.  Another option is to operate on memory
regions that the caller knows a priori will be unchanged in the target
process.  Yet another option is to accept the race for certain
process_madvise calls after reasoning that mistargeting will do no
harm.  The suggested API itself does not provide synchronization.  It
also apply other APIs like move_pages, process_vm_write.

The race isn't really a problem though.  Why is it so wrong to require
that callers do their own synchronization in some manner?  Nobody
objects to write(2) merely because it's possible for two processes to
open the same file and clobber each other's writes --- instead, we tell
people to use flock or something.  Think about mmap.  It never
guarantees newly allocated address space is still valid when the user
tries to access it because other threads could unmap the memory right
before.  That's where we need synchronization by using other API or
design from userside.  It shouldn't be part of API itself.  If someone
needs more fine-grained synchronization rather than process level,
there were two ideas suggested - cookie[2] and anon-fd[3].  Both are
applicable via using last reserved argument of the API but I don't
think it's necessary right now since we have already ways to prevent
the race so don't want to add additional complexity with more
fine-grained optimization model.

To make the API extend, it reserved an unsigned long as last argument
so we could support it in future if someone really needs it.

Q.3 - Why doesn't ptrace work?

Injecting an madvise in the target process using ptrace would not work
for us because such injected madvise would have to be executed by the
target process, which means that process would have to be runnable and
that creates the risk of the abovementioned race and hinting a wrong
VMA.  Furthermore, we want to act the hint in caller's context, not the
callee's, because the callee is usually limited in cpuset/cgroups or
even freezed state so they can't act by themselves quick enough, which
causes more thrashing/kill.  It doesn't work if the target process are
ptraced(e.g., strace, debugger, minidump) because a process can have at
most one ptracer.

[1] https://developer.android.com/topic/performance/memory"

[2] process_getinfo for getting the cookie which is updated whenever
    vma of process address layout are changed - Daniel Colascione -
    https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190520035254.57579-1-minchan@kernel.org/T/#m7694416fd179b2066a2c62b5b139b14e3894e224

[3] anonymous fd which is used for the object(i.e., address range)
    validation - Michal Hocko -
    https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200120112722.GY18451@dhcp22.suse.cz/

[minchan@kernel.org: fix process_madvise build break for arm64]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200303145756.GA219683@google.com
[minchan@kernel.org: fix build error for mips of process_madvise]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200508052517.GA197378@google.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix patch ordering issue]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix arm64 whoops]
[minchan@kernel.org: make process_madvise() vlen arg have type size_t, per Florian]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix i386 build]
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix syscall numbering]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200905142639.49fc3f1a@canb.auug.org.au
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: madvise.c needs compat.h]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200908204547.285646b4@canb.auug.org.au
[minchan@kernel.org: fix mips build]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200909173655.GC2435453@google.com
[yuehaibing@huawei.com: remove duplicate header which is included twice]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200915121550.30584-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
[minchan@kernel.org: do not use helper functions for process_madvise]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200921175539.GB387368@google.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: pidfd_get_pid() gained an argument]
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix up for "iov_iter: transparently handle compat iovecs in import_iovec"]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200928212542.468e1fef@canb.auug.org.au

Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Cc: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@redhat.com>
Cc: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
Cc: SeongJae Park <sj38.park@gmail.com>
Cc: SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@google.com>
Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
Cc: <linux-man@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200302193630.68771-3-minchan@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200508183320.GA125527@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200622192900.22757-4-minchan@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200901000633.1920247-4-minchan@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-10-18 09:27:10 -07:00
Minchan Kim
0726b01e70 mm/madvise: pass mm to do_madvise
Patch series "introduce memory hinting API for external process", v9.

Now, we have MADV_PAGEOUT and MADV_COLD as madvise hinting API.  With
that, application could give hints to kernel what memory range are
preferred to be reclaimed.  However, in some platform(e.g., Android), the
information required to make the hinting decision is not known to the app.
Instead, it is known to a centralized userspace daemon(e.g.,
ActivityManagerService), and that daemon must be able to initiate reclaim
on its own without any app involvement.

To solve the concern, this patch introduces new syscall -
process_madvise(2).  Bascially, it's same with madvise(2) syscall but it
has some differences.

1. It needs pidfd of target process to provide the hint

2. It supports only MADV_{COLD|PAGEOUT|MERGEABLE|UNMEREABLE} at this
   moment.  Other hints in madvise will be opened when there are explicit
   requests from community to prevent unexpected bugs we couldn't support.

3. Only privileged processes can do something for other process's
   address space.

For more detail of the new API, please see "mm: introduce external memory
hinting API" description in this patchset.

This patch (of 3):

In upcoming patches, do_madvise will be called from external process
context so we shouldn't asssume "current" is always hinted process's
task_struct.

Furthermore, we must not access mm_struct via task->mm, but obtain it via
access_mm() once (in the following patch) and only use that pointer [1],
so pass it to do_madvise() as well.  Note the vma->vm_mm pointers are
safe, so we can use them further down the call stack.

And let's pass current->mm as arguments of do_madvise so it shouldn't
change existing behavior but prepare next patch to make review easy.

[vbabka@suse.cz: changelog tweak]
[minchan@kernel.org: use current->mm for io_uring]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200423145215.72666-1-minchan@kernel.org
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix it for upstream changes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: whoops]
[rdunlap@infradead.org: add missing includes]

Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>
Cc: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Cc: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
Cc: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@google.com>
Cc: Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@linux.intel.com>
Cc: SeongJae Park <sj38.park@gmail.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@redhat.com>
Cc: SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
Cc: <linux-man@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200901000633.1920247-1-minchan@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200622192900.22757-1-minchan@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200302193630.68771-2-minchan@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200622192900.22757-2-minchan@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200901000633.1920247-2-minchan@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-10-18 09:27:09 -07:00
Jann Horn
4d45e75a99 mm: remove the now-unnecessary mmget_still_valid() hack
The preceding patches have ensured that core dumping properly takes the
mmap_lock.  Thanks to that, we can now remove mmget_still_valid() and all
its users.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200827114932.3572699-8-jannh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-10-16 11:11:22 -07:00
Oscar Salvador
5a2ffca3c2 mm,hwpoison: return 0 if the page is already poisoned in soft-offline
Currently, there is an inconsistency when calling soft-offline from
different paths on a page that is already poisoned.

1) madvise:

        madvise_inject_error skips any poisoned page and continues
        the loop.
        If that was the only page to madvise, it returns 0.

2) /sys/devices/system/memory/:

        When calling soft_offline_page_store()->soft_offline_page(),
        we return -EBUSY in case the page is already poisoned.
        This is inconsistent with a) the above example and b)
        memory_failure, where we return 0 if the page was poisoned.

Fix this by dropping the PageHWPoison() check in madvise_inject_error, and
let soft_offline_page return 0 if it finds the page already poisoned.

Please, note that this represents a user-api change, since now the return
error when calling soft_offline_page_store()->soft_offline_page() will be
different.

Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@ruivo.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Yakunin <zeil@yandex-team.ru>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.com>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200922135650.1634-12-osalvador@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-10-16 11:11:16 -07:00
Oscar Salvador
dc7560b496 mm,hwpoison: refactor madvise_inject_error
Make a proper if-else condition for {hard,soft}-offline.

Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi@nec.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@ruivo.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Yakunin <zeil@yandex-team.ru>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200908075626.11976-3-osalvador@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-10-16 11:11:16 -07:00
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)
e6e88712e4 mm: optimise madvise WILLNEED
Instead of calling find_get_entry() for every page index, use an XArray
iterator to skip over NULL entries, and avoid calling get_page(),
because we only want the swap entries.

[willy@infradead.org: fix LTP soft lockups]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200914165032.GS6583@casper.infradead.org

Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com>
Cc: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com>
Cc: Qian Cai <cai@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200910183318.20139-4-willy@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-10-13 18:38:29 -07:00
Minchan Kim
ce2684254b mm: validate pmd after splitting
syzbot reported the following KASAN splat:

  general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000003: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
  KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000018-0x000000000000001f]
  CPU: 1 PID: 6826 Comm: syz-executor142 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
  RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x84/0x2ae0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4296
  Code: ff df 8a 04 30 84 c0 0f 85 e3 16 00 00 83 3d 56 58 35 08 00 0f 84 0e 17 00 00 83 3d 25 c7 f5 07 00 74 2c 4c 89 e8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 30 00 74 12 4c 89 ef e8 3e d1 5a 00 48 be 00 00 00 00 00 fc
  RSP: 0018:ffffc90004b9f850 EFLAGS: 00010006
  Call Trace:
    lock_acquire+0x140/0x6f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5006
    __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline]
    _raw_spin_lock+0x2a/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151
    spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:354 [inline]
    madvise_cold_or_pageout_pte_range+0x52f/0x25c0 mm/madvise.c:389
    walk_pmd_range mm/pagewalk.c:89 [inline]
    walk_pud_range mm/pagewalk.c:160 [inline]
    walk_p4d_range mm/pagewalk.c:193 [inline]
    walk_pgd_range mm/pagewalk.c:229 [inline]
    __walk_page_range+0xe7b/0x1da0 mm/pagewalk.c:331
    walk_page_range+0x2c3/0x5c0 mm/pagewalk.c:427
    madvise_pageout_page_range mm/madvise.c:521 [inline]
    madvise_pageout mm/madvise.c:557 [inline]
    madvise_vma mm/madvise.c:946 [inline]
    do_madvise+0x12d0/0x2090 mm/madvise.c:1145
    __do_sys_madvise mm/madvise.c:1171 [inline]
    __se_sys_madvise mm/madvise.c:1169 [inline]
    __x64_sys_madvise+0x76/0x80 mm/madvise.c:1169
    do_syscall_64+0x31/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

The backing vma was shmem.

In case of split page of file-backed THP, madvise zaps the pmd instead
of remapping of sub-pages.  So we need to check pmd validity after
split.

Reported-by: syzbot+ecf80462cb7d5d552bc7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 1a4e58cce8 ("mm: introduce MADV_PAGEOUT")
Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-09-26 10:48:08 -07:00
Yang Shi
7867fd7cc4 mm: madvise: fix vma user-after-free
The syzbot reported the below use-after-free:

  BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in madvise_willneed mm/madvise.c:293 [inline]
  BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in madvise_vma mm/madvise.c:942 [inline]
  BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in do_madvise.part.0+0x1c8b/0x1cf0 mm/madvise.c:1145
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880a6163eb0 by task syz-executor.0/9996

  CPU: 0 PID: 9996 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc1-syzkaller #0
  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
  Call Trace:
    __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
    dump_stack+0x18f/0x20d lib/dump_stack.c:118
    print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xae/0x497 mm/kasan/report.c:383
    __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:513 [inline]
    kasan_report.cold+0x1f/0x37 mm/kasan/report.c:530
    madvise_willneed mm/madvise.c:293 [inline]
    madvise_vma mm/madvise.c:942 [inline]
    do_madvise.part.0+0x1c8b/0x1cf0 mm/madvise.c:1145
    do_madvise mm/madvise.c:1169 [inline]
    __do_sys_madvise mm/madvise.c:1171 [inline]
    __se_sys_madvise mm/madvise.c:1169 [inline]
    __x64_sys_madvise+0xd9/0x110 mm/madvise.c:1169
    do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  Allocated by task 9992:
    kmem_cache_alloc+0x138/0x3a0 mm/slab.c:3482
    vm_area_alloc+0x1c/0x110 kernel/fork.c:347
    mmap_region+0x8e5/0x1780 mm/mmap.c:1743
    do_mmap+0xcf9/0x11d0 mm/mmap.c:1545
    vm_mmap_pgoff+0x195/0x200 mm/util.c:506
    ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x43a/0x560 mm/mmap.c:1596
    do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  Freed by task 9992:
    kmem_cache_free.part.0+0x67/0x1f0 mm/slab.c:3693
    remove_vma+0x132/0x170 mm/mmap.c:184
    remove_vma_list mm/mmap.c:2613 [inline]
    __do_munmap+0x743/0x1170 mm/mmap.c:2869
    do_munmap mm/mmap.c:2877 [inline]
    mmap_region+0x257/0x1780 mm/mmap.c:1716
    do_mmap+0xcf9/0x11d0 mm/mmap.c:1545
    vm_mmap_pgoff+0x195/0x200 mm/util.c:506
    ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x43a/0x560 mm/mmap.c:1596
    do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

It is because vma is accessed after releasing mmap_lock, but someone
else acquired the mmap_lock and the vma is gone.

Releasing mmap_lock after accessing vma should fix the problem.

Fixes: 692fe62433 ("mm: Handle MADV_WILLNEED through vfs_fadvise()")
Reported-by: syzbot+b90df26038d1d5d85c97@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>	[5.4+]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200816141204.162624-1-shy828301@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-09-05 12:14:29 -07:00
Michel Lespinasse
c1e8d7c6a7 mmap locking API: convert mmap_sem comments
Convert comments that reference mmap_sem to reference mmap_lock instead.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix up linux-next leftovers]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/lockaphore/lock/, per Vlastimil]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: more linux-next fixups, per Michel]

Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Liam Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ying Han <yinghan@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200520052908.204642-13-walken@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-09 09:39:14 -07:00
Michel Lespinasse
d8ed45c5dc mmap locking API: use coccinelle to convert mmap_sem rwsem call sites
This change converts the existing mmap_sem rwsem calls to use the new mmap
locking API instead.

The change is generated using coccinelle with the following rule:

// spatch --sp-file mmap_lock_api.cocci --in-place --include-headers --dir .

@@
expression mm;
@@
(
-init_rwsem
+mmap_init_lock
|
-down_write
+mmap_write_lock
|
-down_write_killable
+mmap_write_lock_killable
|
-down_write_trylock
+mmap_write_trylock
|
-up_write
+mmap_write_unlock
|
-downgrade_write
+mmap_write_downgrade
|
-down_read
+mmap_read_lock
|
-down_read_killable
+mmap_read_lock_killable
|
-down_read_trylock
+mmap_read_trylock
|
-up_read
+mmap_read_unlock
)
-(&mm->mmap_sem)
+(mm)

Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Laurent Dufour <ldufour@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: Liam Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ying Han <yinghan@google.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200520052908.204642-5-walken@google.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-06-09 09:39:14 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
bc0c4d1e17 mm: check that mm is still valid in madvise()
IORING_OP_MADVISE can end up basically doing mprotect() on the VM of
another process, which means that it can race with our crazy core dump
handling which accesses the VM state without holding the mmap_sem
(because it incorrectly thinks that it is the final user).

This is clearly a core dumping problem, but we've never fixed it the
right way, and instead have the notion of "check that the mm is still
ok" using mmget_still_valid() after getting the mmap_sem for writing in
any situation where we're not the original VM thread.

See commit 04f5866e41 ("coredump: fix race condition between
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping") for more background on
this whole mmget_still_valid() thing.  You might want to have a barf bag
handy when you do.

We're discussing just fixing this properly in the only remaining core
dumping routines.  But even if we do that, let's make do_madvise() do
the right thing, and then when we fix core dumping, we can remove all
these mmget_still_valid() checks.

Reported-and-tested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Fixes: c1ca757bd6 ("io_uring: add IORING_OP_MADVISE")
Acked-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-04-24 13:28:03 -07:00
Michal Hocko
12e967fd8e mm: do not allow MADV_PAGEOUT for CoW pages
Jann has brought up a very interesting point [1].  While shared pages
are excluded from MADV_PAGEOUT normally, CoW pages can be easily
reclaimed that way.  This can lead to all sorts of hard to debug
problems.  E.g.  performance problems outlined by Daniel [2].

There are runtime environments where there is a substantial memory
shared among security domains via CoW memory and a easy to reclaim way
of that memory, which MADV_{COLD,PAGEOUT} offers, can lead to either
performance degradation in for the parent process which might be more
privileged or even open side channel attacks.

The feasibility of the latter is not really clear to me TBH but there is
no real reason for exposure at this stage.  It seems there is no real
use case to depend on reclaiming CoW memory via madvise at this stage so
it is much easier to simply disallow it and this is what this patch
does.  Put it simply MADV_{PAGEOUT,COLD} can operate only on the
exclusively owned memory which is a straightforward semantic.

[1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAG48ez0G3JkMq61gUmyQAaCq=_TwHbi1XKzWRooxZkv08PQKuw@mail.gmail.com
[2] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAKOZueua_v8jHCpmEtTB6f3i9e2YnmX4mqdYVWhV4E=Z-n+zRQ@mail.gmail.com

Fixes: 9c276cc65a ("mm: introduce MADV_COLD")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: "Joel Fernandes (Google)" <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200312082248.GS23944@dhcp22.suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-03-21 18:56:06 -07:00