For the POSIX locks they are using the same owner, which is the
thread id. And multiple POSIX locks could be merged into single one,
so when checking whether the 'file' has locks may fail.
For a file where some openers use locking and others don't is a
really odd usage pattern though. Locks are like stoplights -- they
only work if everyone pays attention to them.
Just switch ceph_get_caps() to check whether any locks are set on
the inode. If there are POSIX/OFD/FLOCK locks on the file at the
time, we should set CHECK_FILELOCK, regardless of what fd was used
to set the lock.
Fixes: ff5d913dfc ("ceph: return -EIO if read/write against filp that lost file locks")
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
This should address sporadic "client isn't responding to mclientcaps
(revoke) ..." warnings and potential associated MDS hangs.
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Merge tag 'ceph-for-6.2-rc1' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client
Pull cph update from Ilya Dryomov:
"A fix to facilitate prompt cap releases on async creates from Xiubo.
This should address sporadic "client isn't responding to mclientcaps
(revoke) ..." warnings and potential associated MDS hangs"
* tag 'ceph-for-6.2-rc1' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client:
ceph: try to check caps immediately after async creating finishes
ceph: remove useless session parameter for check_caps()
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Merge tag 'fs.acl.rework.v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping
Pull VFS acl updates from Christian Brauner:
"This contains the work that builds a dedicated vfs posix acl api.
The origins of this work trace back to v5.19 but it took quite a while
to understand the various filesystem specific implementations in
sufficient detail and also come up with an acceptable solution.
As we discussed and seen multiple times the current state of how posix
acls are handled isn't nice and comes with a lot of problems: The
current way of handling posix acls via the generic xattr api is error
prone, hard to maintain, and type unsafe for the vfs until we call
into the filesystem's dedicated get and set inode operations.
It is already the case that posix acls are special-cased to death all
the way through the vfs. There are an uncounted number of hacks that
operate on the uapi posix acl struct instead of the dedicated vfs
struct posix_acl. And the vfs must be involved in order to interpret
and fixup posix acls before storing them to the backing store, caching
them, reporting them to userspace, or for permission checking.
Currently a range of hacks and duct tape exist to make this work. As
with most things this is really no ones fault it's just something that
happened over time. But the code is hard to understand and difficult
to maintain and one is constantly at risk of introducing bugs and
regressions when having to touch it.
Instead of continuing to hack posix acls through the xattr handlers
this series builds a dedicated posix acl api solely around the get and
set inode operations.
Going forward, the vfs_get_acl(), vfs_remove_acl(), and vfs_set_acl()
helpers must be used in order to interact with posix acls. They
operate directly on the vfs internal struct posix_acl instead of
abusing the uapi posix acl struct as we currently do. In the end this
removes all of the hackiness, makes the codepaths easier to maintain,
and gets us type safety.
This series passes the LTP and xfstests suites without any
regressions. For xfstests the following combinations were tested:
- xfs
- ext4
- btrfs
- overlayfs
- overlayfs on top of idmapped mounts
- orangefs
- (limited) cifs
There's more simplifications for posix acls that we can make in the
future if the basic api has made it.
A few implementation details:
- The series makes sure to retain exactly the same security and
integrity module permission checks. Especially for the integrity
modules this api is a win because right now they convert the uapi
posix acl struct passed to them via a void pointer into the vfs
struct posix_acl format to perform permission checking on the mode.
There's a new dedicated security hook for setting posix acls which
passes the vfs struct posix_acl not a void pointer. Basing checking
on the posix acl stored in the uapi format is really unreliable.
The vfs currently hacks around directly in the uapi struct storing
values that frankly the security and integrity modules can't
correctly interpret as evidenced by bugs we reported and fixed in
this area. It's not necessarily even their fault it's just that the
format we provide to them is sub optimal.
- Some filesystems like 9p and cifs need access to the dentry in
order to get and set posix acls which is why they either only
partially or not even at all implement get and set inode
operations. For example, cifs allows setxattr() and getxattr()
operations but doesn't allow permission checking based on posix
acls because it can't implement a get acl inode operation.
Thus, this patch series updates the set acl inode operation to take
a dentry instead of an inode argument. However, for the get acl
inode operation we can't do this as the old get acl method is
called in e.g., generic_permission() and inode_permission(). These
helpers in turn are called in various filesystem's permission inode
operation. So passing a dentry argument to the old get acl inode
operation would amount to passing a dentry to the permission inode
operation which we shouldn't and probably can't do.
So instead of extending the existing inode operation Christoph
suggested to add a new one. He also requested to ensure that the
get and set acl inode operation taking a dentry are consistently
named. So for this version the old get acl operation is renamed to
->get_inode_acl() and a new ->get_acl() inode operation taking a
dentry is added. With this we can give both 9p and cifs get and set
acl inode operations and in turn remove their complex custom posix
xattr handlers.
In the future I hope to get rid of the inode method duplication but
it isn't like we have never had this situation. Readdir is just one
example. And frankly, the overall gain in type safety and the more
pleasant api wise are simply too big of a benefit to not accept
this duplication for a while.
- We've done a full audit of every codepaths using variant of the
current generic xattr api to get and set posix acls and
surprisingly it isn't that many places. There's of course always a
chance that we might have missed some and if so I'm sure we'll find
them soon enough.
The crucial codepaths to be converted are obviously stacking
filesystems such as ecryptfs and overlayfs.
For a list of all callers currently using generic xattr api helpers
see [2] including comments whether they support posix acls or not.
- The old vfs generic posix acl infrastructure doesn't obey the
create and replace semantics promised on the setxattr(2) manpage.
This patch series doesn't address this. It really is something we
should revisit later though.
The patches are roughly organized as follows:
(1) Change existing set acl inode operation to take a dentry
argument (Intended to be a non-functional change)
(2) Rename existing get acl method (Intended to be a non-functional
change)
(3) Implement get and set acl inode operations for filesystems that
couldn't implement one before because of the missing dentry.
That's mostly 9p and cifs (Intended to be a non-functional
change)
(4) Build posix acl api, i.e., add vfs_get_acl(), vfs_remove_acl(),
and vfs_set_acl() including security and integrity hooks
(Intended to be a non-functional change)
(5) Implement get and set acl inode operations for stacking
filesystems (Intended to be a non-functional change)
(6) Switch posix acl handling in stacking filesystems to new posix
acl api now that all filesystems it can stack upon support it.
(7) Switch vfs to new posix acl api (semantical change)
(8) Remove all now unused helpers
(9) Additional regression fixes reported after we merged this into
linux-next
Thanks to Seth for a lot of good discussion around this and
encouragement and input from Christoph"
* tag 'fs.acl.rework.v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping: (36 commits)
posix_acl: Fix the type of sentinel in get_acl
orangefs: fix mode handling
ovl: call posix_acl_release() after error checking
evm: remove dead code in evm_inode_set_acl()
cifs: check whether acl is valid early
acl: make vfs_posix_acl_to_xattr() static
acl: remove a slew of now unused helpers
9p: use stub posix acl handlers
cifs: use stub posix acl handlers
ovl: use stub posix acl handlers
ecryptfs: use stub posix acl handlers
evm: remove evm_xattr_acl_change()
xattr: use posix acl api
ovl: use posix acl api
ovl: implement set acl method
ovl: implement get acl method
ecryptfs: implement set acl method
ecryptfs: implement get acl method
ksmbd: use vfs_remove_acl()
acl: add vfs_remove_acl()
...
direction misannotations and (hopefully) preventing
more of the same for the future.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Merge tag 'pull-iov_iter' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull iov_iter updates from Al Viro:
"iov_iter work; most of that is about getting rid of direction
misannotations and (hopefully) preventing more of the same for the
future"
* tag 'pull-iov_iter' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
use less confusing names for iov_iter direction initializers
iov_iter: saner checks for attempt to copy to/from iterator
[xen] fix "direction" argument of iov_iter_kvec()
[vhost] fix 'direction' argument of iov_iter_{init,bvec}()
[target] fix iov_iter_bvec() "direction" argument
[s390] memcpy_real(): WRITE is "data source", not destination...
[s390] zcore: WRITE is "data source", not destination...
[infiniband] READ is "data destination", not source...
[fsi] WRITE is "data source", not destination...
[s390] copy_oldmem_kernel() - WRITE is "data source", not destination
csum_and_copy_to_iter(): handle ITER_DISCARD
get rid of unlikely() on page_copy_sane() calls
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Merge tag 'random-6.2-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random
Pull random number generator updates from Jason Donenfeld:
- Replace prandom_u32_max() and various open-coded variants of it,
there is now a new family of functions that uses fast rejection
sampling to choose properly uniformly random numbers within an
interval:
get_random_u32_below(ceil) - [0, ceil)
get_random_u32_above(floor) - (floor, U32_MAX]
get_random_u32_inclusive(floor, ceil) - [floor, ceil]
Coccinelle was used to convert all current users of
prandom_u32_max(), as well as many open-coded patterns, resulting in
improvements throughout the tree.
I'll have a "late" 6.1-rc1 pull for you that removes the now unused
prandom_u32_max() function, just in case any other trees add a new
use case of it that needs to converted. According to linux-next,
there may be two trivial cases of prandom_u32_max() reintroductions
that are fixable with a 's/.../.../'. So I'll have for you a final
conversion patch doing that alongside the removal patch during the
second week.
This is a treewide change that touches many files throughout.
- More consistent use of get_random_canary().
- Updates to comments, documentation, tests, headers, and
simplification in configuration.
- The arch_get_random*_early() abstraction was only used by arm64 and
wasn't entirely useful, so this has been replaced by code that works
in all relevant contexts.
- The kernel will use and manage random seeds in non-volatile EFI
variables, refreshing a variable with a fresh seed when the RNG is
initialized. The RNG GUID namespace is then hidden from efivarfs to
prevent accidental leakage.
These changes are split into random.c infrastructure code used in the
EFI subsystem, in this pull request, and related support inside of
EFISTUB, in Ard's EFI tree. These are co-dependent for full
functionality, but the order of merging doesn't matter.
- Part of the infrastructure added for the EFI support is also used for
an improvement to the way vsprintf initializes its siphash key,
replacing an sleep loop wart.
- The hardware RNG framework now always calls its correct random.c
input function, add_hwgenerator_randomness(), rather than sometimes
going through helpers better suited for other cases.
- The add_latent_entropy() function has long been called from the fork
handler, but is a no-op when the latent entropy gcc plugin isn't
used, which is fine for the purposes of latent entropy.
But it was missing out on the cycle counter that was also being mixed
in beside the latent entropy variable. So now, if the latent entropy
gcc plugin isn't enabled, add_latent_entropy() will expand to a call
to add_device_randomness(NULL, 0), which adds a cycle counter,
without the absent latent entropy variable.
- The RNG is now reseeded from a delayed worker, rather than on demand
when used. Always running from a worker allows it to make use of the
CPU RNG on platforms like S390x, whose instructions are too slow to
do so from interrupts. It also has the effect of adding in new inputs
more frequently with more regularity, amounting to a long term
transcript of random values. Plus, it helps a bit with the upcoming
vDSO implementation (which isn't yet ready for 6.2).
- The jitter entropy algorithm now tries to execute on many different
CPUs, round-robining, in hopes of hitting even more memory latencies
and other unpredictable effects. It also will mix in a cycle counter
when the entropy timer fires, in addition to being mixed in from the
main loop, to account more explicitly for fluctuations in that timer
firing. And the state it touches is now kept within the same cache
line, so that it's assured that the different execution contexts will
cause latencies.
* tag 'random-6.2-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random: (23 commits)
random: include <linux/once.h> in the right header
random: align entropy_timer_state to cache line
random: mix in cycle counter when jitter timer fires
random: spread out jitter callback to different CPUs
random: remove extraneous period and add a missing one in comments
efi: random: refresh non-volatile random seed when RNG is initialized
vsprintf: initialize siphash key using notifier
random: add back async readiness notifier
random: reseed in delayed work rather than on-demand
random: always mix cycle counter in add_latent_entropy()
hw_random: use add_hwgenerator_randomness() for early entropy
random: modernize documentation comment on get_random_bytes()
random: adjust comment to account for removed function
random: remove early archrandom abstraction
random: use random.trust_{bootloader,cpu} command line option only
stackprotector: actually use get_random_canary()
stackprotector: move get_random_canary() into stackprotector.h
treewide: use get_random_u32_inclusive() when possible
treewide: use get_random_u32_{above,below}() instead of manual loop
treewide: use get_random_u32_below() instead of deprecated function
...
We should call the check_caps() again immediately after the async
creating finishes in case the MDS is waiting for caps revocation
to finish.
Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/46904
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
The session parameter makes no sense any more.
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
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Merge tag 'locks-v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jlayton/linux
Pull file locking updates from Jeff Layton:
"The main change here is to add the new locks_inode_context helper, and
convert all of the places that dereference inode->i_flctx directly to
use that instead.
There is a new helper to indicate whether any locks are held on an
inode. This is mostly for Ceph but may be usable elsewhere too.
Andi Kleen requested that we print the PID when the LOCK_MAND warning
fires, to help track down applications trying to use it.
Finally, we added some new warnings to some of the file locking
functions that fire when the ->fl_file and filp arguments differ. This
helped us find some long-standing bugs in lockd. Patches for those are
in Chuck Lever's tree and should be in his v6.2 PR. After that patch,
people using NFSv2/v3 locking may see some warnings fire until those
go in.
Happy Holidays!"
* tag 'locks-v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jlayton/linux:
Add process name and pid to locks warning
nfsd: use locks_inode_context helper
nfs: use locks_inode_context helper
lockd: use locks_inode_context helper
ksmbd: use locks_inode_context helper
cifs: use locks_inode_context helper
ceph: use locks_inode_context helper
filelock: add a new locks_inode_context accessor function
filelock: new helper: vfs_inode_has_locks
filelock: WARN_ON_ONCE when ->fl_file and filp don't match
ceph currently doesn't access i_flctx safely. This requires a
smp_load_acquire, as the pointer is set via cmpxchg (a release
operation).
Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
READ/WRITE proved to be actively confusing - the meanings are
"data destination, as used with read(2)" and "data source, as
used with write(2)", but people keep interpreting those as
"we read data from it" and "we write data to it", i.e. exactly
the wrong way.
Call them ITER_DEST and ITER_SOURCE - at least that is harder
to misinterpret...
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This is a simple mechanical transformation done by:
@@
expression E;
@@
- prandom_u32_max
+ get_random_u32_below
(E)
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> # for xfs
Reviewed-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org> # for damon
Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> # for infiniband
Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> # for arm
Acked-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> # for mmc
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
The request's r_session maybe changed when it was forwarded or
resent. Both the forwarding and resending cases the requests will
be protected by the mdsc->mutex.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2137955
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
When decoding the snaps fails it maybe leaving the 'first_realm'
and 'realm' pointing to the same snaprealm memory. And then it'll
put it twice and could cause random use-after-free, BUG_ON, etc
issues.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/57686
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
The ceph_lookup_inode() function returns error pointers. It never
returns NULL.
Fixes: aa87052dd9 ("ceph: fix incorrectly showing the .snap size for stat")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic
xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to
interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to
userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to
understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of
making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are
building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode
operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths
easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1].
The current inode operation for getting posix acls takes an inode
argument but various filesystems (e.g., 9p, cifs, overlayfs) need access
to the dentry. In contrast to the ->set_acl() inode operation we cannot
simply extend ->get_acl() to take a dentry argument. The ->get_acl()
inode operation is called from:
acl_permission_check()
-> check_acl()
-> get_acl()
which is part of generic_permission() which in turn is part of
inode_permission(). Both generic_permission() and inode_permission() are
called in the ->permission() handler of various filesystems (e.g.,
overlayfs). So simply passing a dentry argument to ->get_acl() would
amount to also having to pass a dentry argument to ->permission(). We
should avoid this unnecessary change.
So instead of extending the existing inode operation rename it from
->get_acl() to ->get_inode_acl() and add a ->get_acl() method later that
passes a dentry argument and which filesystems that need access to the
dentry can implement instead of ->get_inode_acl(). Filesystems like cifs
which allow setting and getting posix acls but not using them for
permission checking during lookup can simply not implement
->get_inode_acl().
This is intended to be a non-functional change.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1]
Suggested-by/Inspired-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic
xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to
interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to
userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to
understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of
making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are
building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode
operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths
easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1].
Since some filesystem rely on the dentry being available to them when
setting posix acls (e.g., 9p and cifs) they cannot rely on set acl inode
operation. But since ->set_acl() is required in order to use the generic
posix acl xattr handlers filesystems that do not implement this inode
operation cannot use the handler and need to implement their own
dedicated posix acl handlers.
Update the ->set_acl() inode method to take a dentry argument. This
allows all filesystems to rely on ->set_acl().
As far as I can tell all codepaths can be switched to rely on the dentry
instead of just the inode. Note that the original motivation for passing
the dentry separate from the inode instead of just the dentry in the
xattr handlers was because of security modules that call
security_d_instantiate(). This hook is called during
d_instantiate_new(), d_add(), __d_instantiate_anon(), and
d_splice_alias() to initialize the inode's security context and possibly
to set security.* xattrs. Since this only affects security.* xattrs this
is completely irrelevant for posix acls.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1]
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'random-6.1-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random
Pull more random number generator updates from Jason Donenfeld:
"This time with some large scale treewide cleanups.
The intent of this pull is to clean up the way callers fetch random
integers. The current rules for doing this right are:
- If you want a secure or an insecure random u64, use get_random_u64()
- If you want a secure or an insecure random u32, use get_random_u32()
The old function prandom_u32() has been deprecated for a while
now and is just a wrapper around get_random_u32(). Same for
get_random_int().
- If you want a secure or an insecure random u16, use get_random_u16()
- If you want a secure or an insecure random u8, use get_random_u8()
- If you want secure or insecure random bytes, use get_random_bytes().
The old function prandom_bytes() has been deprecated for a while
now and has long been a wrapper around get_random_bytes()
- If you want a non-uniform random u32, u16, or u8 bounded by a
certain open interval maximum, use prandom_u32_max()
I say "non-uniform", because it doesn't do any rejection sampling
or divisions. Hence, it stays within the prandom_*() namespace, not
the get_random_*() namespace.
I'm currently investigating a "uniform" function for 6.2. We'll see
what comes of that.
By applying these rules uniformly, we get several benefits:
- By using prandom_u32_max() with an upper-bound that the compiler
can prove at compile-time is ≤65536 or ≤256, internally
get_random_u16() or get_random_u8() is used, which wastes fewer
batched random bytes, and hence has higher throughput.
- By using prandom_u32_max() instead of %, when the upper-bound is
not a constant, division is still avoided, because
prandom_u32_max() uses a faster multiplication-based trick instead.
- By using get_random_u16() or get_random_u8() in cases where the
return value is intended to indeed be a u16 or a u8, we waste fewer
batched random bytes, and hence have higher throughput.
This series was originally done by hand while I was on an airplane
without Internet. Later, Kees and I worked on retroactively figuring
out what could be done with Coccinelle and what had to be done
manually, and then we split things up based on that.
So while this touches a lot of files, the actual amount of code that's
hand fiddled is comfortably small"
* tag 'random-6.1-rc1-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random:
prandom: remove unused functions
treewide: use get_random_bytes() when possible
treewide: use get_random_u32() when possible
treewide: use get_random_{u8,u16}() when possible, part 2
treewide: use get_random_{u8,u16}() when possible, part 1
treewide: use prandom_u32_max() when possible, part 2
treewide: use prandom_u32_max() when possible, part 1
Rather than incurring a division or requesting too many random bytes for
the given range, use the prandom_u32_max() function, which only takes
the minimum required bytes from the RNG and avoids divisions. This was
done mechanically with this coccinelle script:
@basic@
expression E;
type T;
identifier get_random_u32 =~ "get_random_int|prandom_u32|get_random_u32";
typedef u64;
@@
(
- ((T)get_random_u32() % (E))
+ prandom_u32_max(E)
|
- ((T)get_random_u32() & ((E) - 1))
+ prandom_u32_max(E * XXX_MAKE_SURE_E_IS_POW2)
|
- ((u64)(E) * get_random_u32() >> 32)
+ prandom_u32_max(E)
|
- ((T)get_random_u32() & ~PAGE_MASK)
+ prandom_u32_max(PAGE_SIZE)
)
@multi_line@
identifier get_random_u32 =~ "get_random_int|prandom_u32|get_random_u32";
identifier RAND;
expression E;
@@
- RAND = get_random_u32();
... when != RAND
- RAND %= (E);
+ RAND = prandom_u32_max(E);
// Find a potential literal
@literal_mask@
expression LITERAL;
type T;
identifier get_random_u32 =~ "get_random_int|prandom_u32|get_random_u32";
position p;
@@
((T)get_random_u32()@p & (LITERAL))
// Add one to the literal.
@script:python add_one@
literal << literal_mask.LITERAL;
RESULT;
@@
value = None
if literal.startswith('0x'):
value = int(literal, 16)
elif literal[0] in '123456789':
value = int(literal, 10)
if value is None:
print("I don't know how to handle %s" % (literal))
cocci.include_match(False)
elif value == 2**32 - 1 or value == 2**31 - 1 or value == 2**24 - 1 or value == 2**16 - 1 or value == 2**8 - 1:
print("Skipping 0x%x for cleanup elsewhere" % (value))
cocci.include_match(False)
elif value & (value + 1) != 0:
print("Skipping 0x%x because it's not a power of two minus one" % (value))
cocci.include_match(False)
elif literal.startswith('0x'):
coccinelle.RESULT = cocci.make_expr("0x%x" % (value + 1))
else:
coccinelle.RESULT = cocci.make_expr("%d" % (value + 1))
// Replace the literal mask with the calculated result.
@plus_one@
expression literal_mask.LITERAL;
position literal_mask.p;
expression add_one.RESULT;
identifier FUNC;
@@
- (FUNC()@p & (LITERAL))
+ prandom_u32_max(RESULT)
@collapse_ret@
type T;
identifier VAR;
expression E;
@@
{
- T VAR;
- VAR = (E);
- return VAR;
+ return E;
}
@drop_var@
type T;
identifier VAR;
@@
{
- T VAR;
... when != VAR
}
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> # for ext4 and sbitmap
Reviewed-by: Christoph Böhmwalder <christoph.boehmwalder@linbit.com> # for drbd
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> # for s390
Acked-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> # for mmc
Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> # for xfs
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
We should set the 'stat->size' to the real number of snapshots for
snapdirs.
Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/57342
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
When unlinking a file the kclient will send a unlink request to MDS
by holding the dentry reference, and then the MDS will return 2 replies,
which are unsafe reply and a deferred safe reply.
After the unsafe reply received the kernel will return and succeed
the unlink request to user space apps.
Only when the safe reply received the dentry's reference will be
released. Or the dentry will only be unhashed from dcache. But when
the open_by_handle_at() begins to open the unlinked files it will
succeed.
The inode->i_count couldn't be used to check whether the inode is
opened or not.
Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/56524
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Luís Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
Tested-by: Luís Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
When the client has enough caps to satisfy a setattr locally without
having to talk to the server, we currently do the setattr without
incrementing the change attribute.
Ensure that if the ctime changes locally, then the change attribute
does too.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Prefer using kcalloc(a, b) over kzalloc(a * b) as this improves
semantics since kcalloc is intended for allocating an array of memory.
Signed-off-by: Kenneth Lee <klee33@uw.edu>
Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
For write when trying to get the Fwb caps we need to keep waiting
on transition from WRBUFFER|WR -> WR to avoid a new WR sync write
from going before a prior buffered writeback happens.
While for read there is no need to wait on transition from
RDCACHE|RD -> RD, and we can just exclude the revoking caps and
force to sync read.
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Just fail the request instead sending the request out, or the peer
MDS will crash.
Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/56529
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
When new caps comes we need to wake up the waiters and also when
revoking the caps, there also could be new caps comes.
Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/54044
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Luis and others, almost exclusively in the filesystem. Several patches
touch files outside of our normal purview to set the stage for bringing
in Jeff's long awaited ceph+fscrypt series in the near future. All of
them have appropriate acks and sat in linux-next for a while.
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Merge tag 'ceph-for-5.20-rc1' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client
Pull ceph updates from Ilya Dryomov:
"We have a good pile of various fixes and cleanups from Xiubo, Jeff,
Luis and others, almost exclusively in the filesystem.
Several patches touch files outside of our normal purview to set the
stage for bringing in Jeff's long awaited ceph+fscrypt series in the
near future. All of them have appropriate acks and sat in linux-next
for a while"
* tag 'ceph-for-5.20-rc1' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client: (27 commits)
libceph: clean up ceph_osdc_start_request prototype
libceph: fix ceph_pagelist_reserve() comment typo
ceph: remove useless check for the folio
ceph: don't truncate file in atomic_open
ceph: make f_bsize always equal to f_frsize
ceph: flush the dirty caps immediatelly when quota is approaching
libceph: print fsid and epoch with osd id
libceph: check pointer before assigned to "c->rules[]"
ceph: don't get the inline data for new creating files
ceph: update the auth cap when the async create req is forwarded
ceph: make change_auth_cap_ses a global symbol
ceph: fix incorrect old_size length in ceph_mds_request_args
ceph: switch back to testing for NULL folio->private in ceph_dirty_folio
ceph: call netfs_subreq_terminated with was_async == false
ceph: convert to generic_file_llseek
ceph: fix the incorrect comment for the ceph_mds_caps struct
ceph: don't leak snap_rwsem in handle_cap_grant
ceph: prevent a client from exceeding the MDS maximum xattr size
ceph: choose auth MDS for getxattr with the Xs caps
ceph: add session already open notify support
...
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Merge tag 'fs.setgid.v6.0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull setgid updates from Christian Brauner:
"This contains the work to move setgid stripping out of individual
filesystems and into the VFS itself.
Creating files that have both the S_IXGRP and S_ISGID bit raised in
directories that themselves have the S_ISGID bit set requires
additional privileges to avoid security issues.
When a filesystem creates a new inode it needs to take care that the
caller is either in the group of the newly created inode or they have
CAP_FSETID in their current user namespace and are privileged over the
parent directory of the new inode. If any of these two conditions is
true then the S_ISGID bit can be raised for an S_IXGRP file and if not
it needs to be stripped.
However, there are several key issues with the current implementation:
- S_ISGID stripping logic is entangled with umask stripping.
For example, if the umask removes the S_IXGRP bit from the file
about to be created then the S_ISGID bit will be kept.
The inode_init_owner() helper is responsible for S_ISGID stripping
and is called before posix_acl_create(). So we can end up with two
different orderings:
1. FS without POSIX ACL support
First strip umask then strip S_ISGID in inode_init_owner().
In other words, if a filesystem doesn't support or enable POSIX
ACLs then umask stripping is done directly in the vfs before
calling into the filesystem:
2. FS with POSIX ACL support
First strip S_ISGID in inode_init_owner() then strip umask in
posix_acl_create().
In other words, if the filesystem does support POSIX ACLs then
unmask stripping may be done in the filesystem itself when
calling posix_acl_create().
Note that technically filesystems are free to impose their own
ordering between posix_acl_create() and inode_init_owner() meaning
that there's additional ordering issues that influence S_ISGID
inheritance.
(Note that the commit message of commit 1639a49ccd ("fs: move
S_ISGID stripping into the vfs_*() helpers") gets the ordering
between inode_init_owner() and posix_acl_create() the wrong way
around. I realized this too late.)
- Filesystems that don't rely on inode_init_owner() don't get S_ISGID
stripping logic.
While that may be intentional (e.g. network filesystems might just
defer setgid stripping to a server) it is often just a security
issue.
Note that mandating the use of inode_init_owner() was proposed as
an alternative solution but that wouldn't fix the ordering issues
and there are examples such as afs where the use of
inode_init_owner() isn't possible.
In any case, we should also try the cleaner and generalized
solution first before resorting to this approach.
- We still have S_ISGID inheritance bugs years after the initial
round of S_ISGID inheritance fixes:
e014f37db1 ("xfs: use setattr_copy to set vfs inode attributes")
01ea173e10 ("xfs: fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories")
fd84bfdddd ("ceph: fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories")
All of this led us to conclude that the current state is too messy.
While we won't be able to make it completely clean as
posix_acl_create() is still a filesystem specific call we can improve
the S_SIGD stripping situation quite a bit by hoisting it out of
inode_init_owner() and into the respective vfs creation operations.
The obvious advantage is that we don't need to rely on individual
filesystems getting S_ISGID stripping right and instead can
standardize the ordering between S_ISGID and umask stripping directly
in the VFS.
A few short implementation notes:
- The stripping logic needs to happen in vfs_*() helpers for the sake
of stacking filesystems such as overlayfs that rely on these
helpers taking care of S_ISGID stripping.
- Security hooks have never seen the mode as it is ultimately seen by
the filesystem because of the ordering issue we mentioned. Nothing
is changed for them. We simply continue to strip the umask before
passing the mode down to the security hooks.
- The following filesystems use inode_init_owner() and thus relied on
S_ISGID stripping: spufs, 9p, bfs, btrfs, ext2, ext4, f2fs,
hfsplus, hugetlbfs, jfs, minix, nilfs2, ntfs3, ocfs2, omfs,
overlayfs, ramfs, reiserfs, sysv, ubifs, udf, ufs, xfs, zonefs,
bpf, tmpfs.
We've audited all callchains as best as we could. More details can
be found in the commit message to 1639a49ccd ("fs: move S_ISGID
stripping into the vfs_*() helpers")"
* tag 'fs.setgid.v6.0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
ceph: rely on vfs for setgid stripping
fs: move S_ISGID stripping into the vfs_*() helpers
fs: Add missing umask strip in vfs_tmpfile
fs: add mode_strip_sgid() helper
here nothing even looks at the iov_iter after the call, so we couldn't
care less whether it advances or not.
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Most of the users immediately follow successful iov_iter_get_pages()
with advancing by the amount it had returned.
Provide inline wrappers doing that, convert trivial open-coded
uses of those.
BTW, iov_iter_get_pages() never returns more than it had been asked
to; such checks in cifs ought to be removed someday...
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Equivalent of single-segment iovec. Initialized by iov_iter_ubuf(),
checked for by iter_is_ubuf(), otherwise behaves like ITER_IOVEC
ones.
We are going to expose the things like ->write_iter() et.al. to those
in subsequent commits.
New predicate (user_backed_iter()) that is true for ITER_IOVEC and
ITER_UBUF; places like direct-IO handling should use that for
checking that pages we modify after getting them from iov_iter_get_pages()
would need to be dirtied.
DO NOT assume that replacing iter_is_iovec() with user_backed_iter()
will solve all problems - there's code that uses iter_is_iovec() to
decide how to poke around in iov_iter guts and for that the predicate
replacement obviously won't suffice.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This function always returns 0, and ignores the nofail boolean. Drop the
nofail argument, make the function void return and fix up the callers.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
The netfs_write_begin() won't set the folio if the return value
is non-zero.
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Clear O_TRUNC from the flags sent in the MDS create request.
`atomic_open' is called before permission check. We should not do any
modification to the file here. The caller will do the truncation
afterward.
Fixes: 124e68e740 ("ceph: file operations")
Signed-off-by: Hu Weiwen <sehuww@mail.scut.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
The f_frsize maybe changed in the quota size is less than the defualt
4MB.
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
When the quota is approaching we need to notify it to the MDS as
soon as possible, or the client could write to the directory more
than expected.
This will flush the dirty caps without delaying after each write,
though this couldn't prevent the real size of a directory exceed
the quota but could prevent it as soon as possible.
Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/56180
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Luís Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
If the 'i_inline_version' is 1, that means the file is just new
created and there shouldn't have any inline data in it, we should
skip retrieving the inline data from MDS.
This also could help reduce possiblity of dead lock issue introduce
by the inline data and Fcr caps.
Gradually we will remove the inline feature from kclient after ceph's
scrub too have support to unline the inline data, currently this
could help reduce the teuthology test failures.
This is possiblly could also fix a bug that for some old clients if
they couldn't explictly uninline the inline data when writing, the
inline version will keep as 1 always. We may always reading non-exist
data from inline data.
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
For async create we will always try to choose the auth MDS of frag
the dentry belonged to of the parent directory to send the request
and ususally this works fine, but if the MDS migrated the directory
to another MDS before it could be handled the request will be
forwarded. And then the auth cap will be changed.
We need to update the auth cap in this case before the request is
forwarded.
Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/55857
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Willy requested that we change this back to warning on folio->private
being non-NULl. He's trying to kill off the PG_private flag, and so we'd
like to catch where it's non-NULL.
Add a VM_WARN_ON_FOLIO (since it doesn't exist yet) and change over to
using that instead of VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO along with testing the ->private
pointer.
[ xiubli: define VM_WARN_ON_FOLIO macro in case DEBUG_VM is disabled
reported by kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> ]
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
"was_async" is a bit misleadingly named. It's supposed to indicate
whether it's safe to call blocking operations from the context you're
calling it from, but it sounds like it's asking whether this was done
via async operation. For ceph, this it's always called from kernel
thread context so it should be safe to set this to false.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
There's no reason we need to lock the inode for write in order to handle
an llseek. I suspect this should have been dropped in 2013 when we
stopped doing vmtruncate in llseek.
With that gone, ceph_llseek is functionally equivalent to
generic_file_llseek, so just call that after getting the size.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Luís Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
When handle_cap_grant is called on an IMPORT op, then the snap_rwsem is
held and the function is expected to release it before returning. It
currently fails to do that in all cases which could lead to a deadlock.
Fixes: 6f05b30ea0 ("ceph: reset i_requested_max_size if file write is not wanted")
Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/55857
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Luís Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
The MDS tries to enforce a limit on the total key/values in extended
attributes. However, this limit is enforced only if doing a synchronous
operation (MDS_OP_SETXATTR) -- if we're buffering the xattrs, the MDS
doesn't have a chance to enforce these limits.
This patch adds support for decoding the xattrs maximum size setting that is
distributed in the mdsmap. Then, when setting an xattr, the kernel client
will revert to do a synchronous operation if that maximum size is exceeded.
While there, fix a dout() that would trigger a printk warning:
[ 98.718078] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 98.719012] precision 65536 too large
[ 98.719039] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3755 at lib/vsprintf.c:2703 vsnprintf+0x5e3/0x600
...
Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/55725
Signed-off-by: Luís Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
And for the 'Xs' caps for getxattr we will also choose the auth MDS,
because the MDS side code is buggy due to setxattr won't notify the
replica MDSes when the values changed and the replica MDS will return
the old values. Though we will fix it in MDS code, but this still
makes sense for old ceph.
Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/55331
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
If the connection was accidently closed due to the socket issue or
something else the clients will try to open the opened sessions, the
MDSes will send the session open reply one more time if the clients
support the notify feature.
When the clients retry to open the sessions the s_seq will be 0 as
default, we need to update it anyway.
Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/53911
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
In async unlink case the kclient won't wait for the first reply
from MDS and just drop all the links and unhash the dentry and then
succeeds immediately.
For any new create/link/rename,etc requests followed by using the
same file names we must wait for the first reply of the inflight
unlink request, or the MDS possibly will fail these following
requests with -EEXIST if the inflight async unlink request was
delayed for some reasons.
And the worst case is that for the none async openc request it will
successfully open the file if the CDentry hasn't been unlinked yet,
but later the previous delayed async unlink request will remove the
CDenty. That means the just created file is possiblly deleted later
by accident.
We need to wait for the inflight async unlink requests to finish
when creating new files/directories by using the same file names.
Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/55332
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
This macro was added but never be used. And check the ceph code
there has another CEPHFS_FEATURES_MDS_REQUIRED but always be empty.
We should clean up all this related code, which make no sense but
introducing confusion.
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Luís Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Feature bits have to be encoded into the correct locations. This hasn't
been an issue so far because the only hole in the feature bits was in bit
10 (CEPHFS_FEATURE_RECLAIM_CLIENT), which is located in the 2nd byte. When
adding more bits that go beyond the this 2nd byte, the bug will show up.
[xiubli: remove incorrect comment for CEPHFS_FEATURES_CLIENT_SUPPORTED]
Fixes: 9ba1e22453 ("ceph: allocate the correct amount of extra bytes for the session features")
Signed-off-by: Luís Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Now that we finished moving setgid stripping for regular files in setgid
directories into the vfs, individual filesystem don't need to manually
strip the setgid bit anymore. Drop the now unneeded code from ceph.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1657779088-2242-4-git-send-email-xuyang2018.jy@fujitsu.com
Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft)<brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-and-Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yang Xu <xuyang2018.jy@fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
check_write_begin() will unlock and put the folio when return
non-zero. So we should avoid unlocking and putting it twice in
netfs layer.
Change the way ->check_write_begin() works in the following two ways:
(1) Pass it a pointer to the folio pointer, allowing it to unlock and put
the folio prior to doing the stuff it wants to do, provided it clears
the folio pointer.
(2) Change the return values such that 0 with folio pointer set means
continue, 0 with folio pointer cleared means re-get and all error
codes indicating an error (no special treatment for -EAGAIN).
[ bagasdotme: use Sphinx code text syntax for *foliop pointer ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/56423
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/cf169f43-8ee7-8697-25da-0204d1b4343e@redhat.com
Co-developed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
