Currently, the cifs I/O paths hand lists of pages from the VM interface
routines at the top all the way through the intervening layers to the
socket interface at the bottom.
This is a problem, however, for interfacing with netfslib which passes an
iterator through to the ->issue_read() method (and will pass an iterator
through to the ->issue_write() method in future). Netfslib takes over
bounce buffering for direct I/O, async I/O and encrypted content, so cifs
doesn't need to do that. Netfslib also converts IOVEC-type iterators into
BVEC-type iterators if necessary.
Further, cifs needs foliating - and folios may come in a variety of sizes,
so a page list pointing to an array of heterogeneous pages may cause
problems in places such as where crypto is done.
Change the cifs I/O paths to hand iov_iter iterators all the way through
instead.
Notes:
(1) Some old routines are #if'd out to be removed in a follow up patch so
as to avoid confusing diff, thereby making the diff output easier to
follow. I've removed functions that don't overlap with anything
added.
(2) struct smb_rqst loses rq_pages, rq_offset, rq_npages, rq_pagesz and
rq_tailsz which describe the pages forming the buffer; instead there's
an rq_iter describing the source buffer and an rq_buffer which is used
to hold the buffer for encryption.
(3) struct cifs_readdata and cifs_writedata are similarly modified to
smb_rqst. The ->read_into_pages() and ->copy_into_pages() are then
replaced with passing the iterator directly to the socket.
The iterators are stored in these structs so that they are persistent
and don't get deallocated when the function returns (unlike if they
were stack variables).
(4) Buffered writeback is overhauled, borrowing the code from the afs
filesystem to gather up contiguous runs of folios. The XARRAY-type
iterator is then used to refer directly to the pagecache and can be
passed to the socket to transmit data directly from there.
This includes:
cifs_extend_writeback()
cifs_write_back_from_locked_folio()
cifs_writepages_region()
cifs_writepages()
(5) Pages are converted to folios.
(6) Direct I/O uses netfs_extract_user_iter() to create a BVEC-type
iterator from an IOBUF/UBUF-type source iterator.
(7) smb2_get_aead_req() uses netfs_extract_iter_to_sg() to extract page
fragments from the iterator into the scatterlists that the crypto
layer prefers.
(8) smb2_init_transform_rq() attached pages to smb_rqst::rq_buffer, an
xarray, to use as a bounce buffer for encryption. An XARRAY-type
iterator can then be used to pass the bounce buffer to lower layers.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org>
cc: Shyam Prasad N <nspmangalore@gmail.com>
cc: Rohith Surabattula <rohiths.msft@gmail.com>
cc: Paulo Alcantara <pc@cjr.nz>
cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164311907995.2806745.400147335497304099.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # rfc
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/164928620163.457102.11602306234438271112.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165211420279.3154751.15923591172438186144.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165348880385.2106726.3220789453472800240.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165364827111.3334034.934805882842932881.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166126396180.708021.271013668175370826.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166697259595.61150.5982032408321852414.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # rfc
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166732031756.3186319.12528413619888902872.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # rfc
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Make sure to free cifs_ses::auth_key.response before allocating it as
we might end up leaking memory in reconnect or mounting.
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
The struct sdesc is just a wrapper around shash_desc, with exact same
memory layout. Replace the hashing TFMs with shash_desc as it's what's
passed to the crypto API anyway.
Also remove the crypto_shash pointers as they can be accessed via
shash_desc->tfm (and are actually only used in the setkey calls).
Adapt cifs_{alloc,free}_hash functions to this change.
Signed-off-by: Enzo Matsumiya <ematsumiya@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Detach the TFM name from a specific algorithm (AES-CCM) as
AES-GCM is also supported, making the name misleading.
s/ccmaesencrypt/enc/
s/ccmaesdecrypt/dec/
Signed-off-by: Enzo Matsumiya <ematsumiya@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Replace kfree with kfree_sensitive, or prepend memzero_explicit() in
other cases, when freeing sensitive material that could still be left
in memory.
Signed-off-by: Enzo Matsumiya <ematsumiya@suse.de>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202209201529.ec633796-oliver.sang@intel.com
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
SMB1 server's header_preamble_size is not 0, add use is_smb1 function
to simplify the code, no actual functional changes.
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
It's better to use HEADER_PREAMBLE_SIZE because the unfolded expression
too long. No actual functional changes, minor readability improvement.
Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
During analysis of multichannel perf, it was seen that
the global locks cifs_tcp_ses_lock and GlobalMid_Lock, which
were shared between various data structures were causing a
lot of contention points.
With this change, we're breaking down the use of these locks
by introducing new locks at more granular levels. i.e.
server->srv_lock, ses->ses_lock and tcon->tc_lock to protect
the unprotected fields of server, session and tcon structs;
and server->mid_lock to protect mid related lists and entries
at server level.
Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
The srv_mutex is used during writeback so cifs should ensure that
allocations done when that mutex is held are done with GFP_NOFS, to
avoid having direct reclaim ending up waiting for the same mutex and
causing a deadlock. This is detected by lockdep with the splat below:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.18.0 #70 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
kswapd0/49 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff8880195782e0 (&tcp_ses->srv_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: compound_send_recv
but task is already holding lock:
ffffffffa98e66c0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}:
fs_reclaim_acquire
kmem_cache_alloc_trace
__request_module
crypto_alg_mod_lookup
crypto_alloc_tfm_node
crypto_alloc_shash
cifs_alloc_hash
smb311_crypto_shash_allocate
smb311_update_preauth_hash
compound_send_recv
cifs_send_recv
SMB2_negotiate
smb2_negotiate
cifs_negotiate_protocol
cifs_get_smb_ses
cifs_mount
cifs_smb3_do_mount
smb3_get_tree
vfs_get_tree
path_mount
__x64_sys_mount
do_syscall_64
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe
-> #0 (&tcp_ses->srv_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
__lock_acquire
lock_acquire
__mutex_lock
mutex_lock_nested
compound_send_recv
cifs_send_recv
SMB2_write
smb2_sync_write
cifs_write
cifs_writepage_locked
cifs_writepage
shrink_page_list
shrink_lruvec
shrink_node
balance_pgdat
kswapd
kthread
ret_from_fork
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(fs_reclaim);
lock(&tcp_ses->srv_mutex);
lock(fs_reclaim);
lock(&tcp_ses->srv_mutex);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by kswapd0/49:
#0: ffffffffa98e66c0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat
stack backtrace:
CPU: 2 PID: 49 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 5.18.0 #70
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl
dump_stack
print_circular_bug.cold
check_noncircular
__lock_acquire
lock_acquire
__mutex_lock
mutex_lock_nested
compound_send_recv
cifs_send_recv
SMB2_write
smb2_sync_write
cifs_write
cifs_writepage_locked
cifs_writepage
shrink_page_list
shrink_lruvec
shrink_node
balance_pgdat
kswapd
kthread
ret_from_fork
</TASK>
Fix this by using the memalloc_nofs_save/restore APIs around the places
where the srv_mutex is held. Do this in a wrapper function for the
lock/unlock of the srv_mutex, and rename the srv_mutex to avoid missing
call sites in the conversion.
Note that there is another lockdep warning involving internal crypto
locks, which was masked by this problem and is visible after this fix,
see the discussion in this thread:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220523123755.GA13668@axis.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CANT5p=rqcYfYMVHirqvdnnca4Mo+JQSw5Qu12v=kPfpk5yhhmg@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Shyam Prasad N <nspmangalore@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Lars Persson <larper@axis.com>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Enzo Matsumiya <ematsumiya@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Vincent Whitchurch <vincent.whitchurch@axis.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
While checking/updating status for tcp ses, smb ses or tcon,
we take GlobalMid_Lock. This doesn't make any sense.
Replaced it with cifs_tcp_ses_lock.
Ideally, we should take a spin lock per struct.
But since tcp ses, smb ses and tcon objects won't add up to a lot,
I think there should not be too much contention.
Also, in few other places, these are checked without locking.
Added locking for these.
Signed-off-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
checkpatch complains about source files with filenames (e.g. in
these cases just below the SPDX header in comments at the top of
various files in fs/cifs). It also is helpful to change this now
so will be less confusing when the parent directory is renamed
e.g. from fs/cifs to fs/smb_client (or fs/smbfs)
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
As we move to common code between client and server, we have
been asked to make the names less confusing, and refer less
to "cifs" and more to words which include "smb" instead to
e.g. "smbfs" for the client (we already have "ksmbd" for the
kernel server, and "smbd" for the user space Samba daemon).
So to be more consistent in the naming of common code between
client and server and reduce the risk of merge conflicts as
more common code is added - rename "cifs_common" to
"smbfs_common" (in future releases we also will rename
the fs/cifs directory to fs/smbfs)
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
We can not drop ARC4 and basically destroy CIFS connectivity for
almost all CIFS users so create a new forked ARC4 module that CIFS and other
subsystems that have a hard dependency on ARC4 can use.
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
for SMB1.
This removes the dependency to DES.
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Add SPDX license identifier and replace license boilerplate.
Corrects various checkpatch errors with the older format for
noting the LGPL license.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
ses->serverName is not the server name, but the string form
of the ip address of the server. Change the name to ip_addr
to avoid confusion (and fix the array length to match
maximum length of ipv6 address).
Reviewed-by: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
See Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.rst for details on new mount API
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
As said by Linus:
A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use.
Otherwise it's actively misleading.
In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the
caller wants.
In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the
future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or
something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_.
The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information
that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory
objects.
Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently
added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit.
In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure
that it won't get optimized away by the compiler.
The renaming is done by using the command sequence:
git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\
xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/'
followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding
a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more]
Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Use pr_fmt to standardize all logging for fs/cifs.
Some logging output had no CIFS: specific prefix.
Now all output has one of three prefixes:
o CIFS:
o CIFS: VFS:
o Root-CIFS:
Miscellanea:
o Convert printks to pr_<level>
o Neaten macro definitions
o Remove embedded CIFS: prefixes from formats
o Convert "illegal" to "invalid"
o Coalesce formats
o Add missing '\n' format terminations
o Consolidate multiple cifs_dbg continuations into single calls
o More consistent use of upper case first word output logging
o Multiline statement argument alignment and wrapping
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
The CIFS code uses the sync skcipher API to invoke the ecb(arc4) skcipher,
of which only a single generic C code implementation exists. This means
that going through all the trouble of using scatterlists etc buys us
very little, and we're better off just invoking the arc4 library directly.
This also reverts commit 5f4b55699a ("CIFS: Fix BUG() in calc_seckey()"),
since it is no longer necessary to allocate sec_key on the heap.
Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
password_with_pad is a fixed size buffer of 16 bytes, it contains a
password string, to be padded with \0 if shorter than 16 bytes
but is just truncated if longer.
It is not, and we do not depend on it to be, nul terminated.
As such, do not use strncpy() to populate this buffer since
the str* prefix suggests that this is a string, which it is not,
and it also confuses coverity causing a false warning.
Detected by CoverityScan CID#113743 ("Buffer not null terminated")
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Trivial fix to clean up indentation, replace spaces with tab
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Check if every data page is signed correctly in sigining helper.
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
In cifs, the timestamps are stored in memory in the cifs_fattr structure,
which uses the deprecated 'timespec' structure. Now that the VFS code
has moved on to 'timespec64', the next step is to change over the fattr
as well.
This also makes 32-bit and 64-bit systems behave the same way, and
no longer overflow the 32-bit time_t in year 2038.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
The following check would never evaluate to true:
> if (i == 0 && iov[0].iov_len <= 4)
Because 'i' always starts at 1.
This patch fixes it and also move the header checks outside the for loop
- which makes more sense.
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <palcantara@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Move the generation of the 4 byte length field down the stack and
generate it immediately before we start writing the data to the socket.
Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
When calculating signature for the packet, it needs to read into the
correct page offset for the data.
Signed-off-by: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
It seems Ronnie's preamble removal broke signing.
the signing functions are called when:
A) we send a request (to sign it)
B) when we recv a response (to check the signature).
On code path A, the smb2 header is in iov[1] but on code path B, the
smb2 header is in iov[0] (and there's only one vector).
So we have different iov indexes for the smb2 header but the signing
function always use index 1. Fix this by checking the nb of io vectors
in the signing function as a hint.
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
It seems this is a copy-paste error and that the proper variable to use
in this particular case is _sha512_ instead of _md5_.
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1465358 ("Copy-paste error")
Fixes: 1c6614d229e7 ("CIFS: add sha512 secmech")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Reviewed-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
* prepare for SMB3.11 pre-auth integrity
* enable sha512 when SMB311 is enabled in Kconfig
* add sha512 as a soft dependency
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
shash and sdesc and always allocated and freed together.
* abstract this in new functions cifs_alloc_hash() and cifs_free_hash().
* make smb2/3 crypto allocation independent from each other.
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
also replaces memset()+kfree() by kzfree().
Signed-off-by: Aurelien Aptel <aaptel@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
CURRENT_TIME macro is not y2038 safe on 32 bit systems.
The patch replaces all the uses of CURRENT_TIME by current_time() for
filesystem times, and ktime_get_* functions for authentication
timestamps and timezone calculations.
This is also in preparation for the patch that transitions vfs
timestamps to use 64 bit time and hence make them y2038 safe.
CURRENT_TIME macro will be deleted before merging the aforementioned
change.
The inode timestamps read from the server are assumed to have correct
granularity and range.
The patch also assumes that the difference between server and client
times lie in the range INT_MIN..INT_MAX. This is valid because this is
the difference between current times between server and client, and the
largest timezone difference is in the range of one day.
All cifs timestamps currently use timespec representation internally.
Authentication and timezone timestamps can also be transitioned into
using timespec64 when all other timestamps for cifs is transitioned to
use timespec64.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1491613030-11599-4-git-send-email-deepa.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This change allows to encrypt packets if it is required by a server
for SMB sessions or tree connections.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
In order to simplify further encryption support we need to separate
RFC1001 length and SMB2 header when sending a request. Put the length
field in iov[0] and the rest of the packet into following iovs.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
With commit 2b149f119 many things have been fixed/introduced.
However, the default behaviour for RawNTLMSSP authentication
seems to be wrong in case the domain is not passed on the command line.
The main points (see below) of the patch are:
- It alignes behaviour with Windows clients
- It fixes backward compatibility
- It fixes UPN
I compared this behavour with the one from a Windows 10 command line
client. When no domains are specified on the command line, I traced
the packets and observed that the client does send an empty
domain to the server.
In the linux kernel case, the empty domain is replaced by the
primary domain communicated by the SMB server.
This means that, if the credentials are valid against the local server
but that server is part of a domain, then the kernel module will
ask to authenticate against that domain and we will get LOGON failure.
I compared the packet trace from the smbclient when no domain is passed
and, in that case, a default domain from the client smb.conf is taken.
Apparently, connection succeeds anyway, because when the domain passed
is not valid (in my case WORKGROUP), then the local one is tried and
authentication succeeds. I tried with any kind of invalid domain and
the result was always a connection.
So, trying to interpret what to do and picking a valid domain if none
is passed, seems the wrong thing to do.
To this end, a new option "domainauto" has been added in case the
user wants a mechanism for guessing.
Without this patch, backward compatibility also is broken.
With kernel 3.10, the default auth mechanism was NTLM.
One of our testing servers accepted NTLM and, because no
domains are passed, authentication was local.
Moving to RawNTLMSSP forced us to change our command line
to add a fake domain to pass to prevent this mechanism to kick in.
For the same reasons, UPN is broken because the domain is specified
in the username.
The SMB server will work out the domain from the UPN and authenticate
against the right server.
Without the patch, though, given the domain is empty, it gets replaced
with another domain that could be the wrong one for the authentication.
Signed-off-by: Germano Percossi <germano.percossi@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Andy Lutromirski's new virtually mapped kernel stack allocations moves
kernel stacks the vmalloc area. This triggers the bug
kernel BUG at ./include/linux/scatterlist.h:140!
at calc_seckey()->sg_init()
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
The secmech hmac(md5) structures are present in the TCP_Server_Info
struct and can be shared among multiple CIFS sessions. However, the
server mutex is not currently held when these structures are allocated
and used, which can lead to a kernel crashes, as in the scenario below:
mount.cifs(8) #1 mount.cifs(8) #2
Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated?
// false
Is secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 allocated?
// false
secmech.hmacmd = crypto_alloc_shash..
secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc..
sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm = &secmec.hmacmd;
secmech.sdeschmaccmd5 = kzalloc
// sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm
// not yet assigned
crypto_shash_update()
deref NULL sdeschmaccmd5->shash.tfm
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00000030
epc : 8027ba34 crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158
ra : 8020f2e8 setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84
Call Trace:
crypto_shash_update+0x38/0x158
setup_ntlmv2_rsp+0x4bc/0xa84
build_ntlmssp_auth_blob+0xbc/0x34c
sess_auth_rawntlmssp_authenticate+0xac/0x248
CIFS_SessSetup+0xf0/0x178
cifs_setup_session+0x4c/0x84
cifs_get_smb_ses+0x2c8/0x314
cifs_mount+0x38c/0x76c
cifs_do_mount+0x98/0x440
mount_fs+0x20/0xc0
vfs_kern_mount+0x58/0x138
do_mount+0x1e8/0xccc
SyS_mount+0x88/0xd4
syscall_common+0x30/0x54
Fix this by locking the srv_mutex around the code which uses these
hmac(md5) structures. All the other secmech algos already have similar
locking.
Fixes: 95dc8dd14e ("Limit allocation of crypto mechanisms to dialect which requires")
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabinv@axis.com>
Acked-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu:
"Here is the crypto update for 4.6:
API:
- Convert remaining crypto_hash users to shash or ahash, also convert
blkcipher/ablkcipher users to skcipher.
- Remove crypto_hash interface.
- Remove crypto_pcomp interface.
- Add crypto engine for async cipher drivers.
- Add akcipher documentation.
- Add skcipher documentation.
Algorithms:
- Rename crypto/crc32 to avoid name clash with lib/crc32.
- Fix bug in keywrap where we zero the wrong pointer.
Drivers:
- Support T5/M5, T7/M7 SPARC CPUs in n2 hwrng driver.
- Add PIC32 hwrng driver.
- Support BCM6368 in bcm63xx hwrng driver.
- Pack structs for 32-bit compat users in qat.
- Use crypto engine in omap-aes.
- Add support for sama5d2x SoCs in atmel-sha.
- Make atmel-sha available again.
- Make sahara hashing available again.
- Make ccp hashing available again.
- Make sha1-mb available again.
- Add support for multiple devices in ccp.
- Improve DMA performance in caam.
- Add hashing support to rockchip"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (116 commits)
crypto: qat - remove redundant arbiter configuration
crypto: ux500 - fix checks of error code returned by devm_ioremap_resource()
crypto: atmel - fix checks of error code returned by devm_ioremap_resource()
crypto: qat - Change the definition of icp_qat_uof_regtype
hwrng: exynos - use __maybe_unused to hide pm functions
crypto: ccp - Add abstraction for device-specific calls
crypto: ccp - CCP versioning support
crypto: ccp - Support for multiple CCPs
crypto: ccp - Remove check for x86 family and model
crypto: ccp - memset request context to zero during import
lib/mpi: use "static inline" instead of "extern inline"
lib/mpi: avoid assembler warning
hwrng: bcm63xx - fix non device tree compatibility
crypto: testmgr - allow rfc3686 aes-ctr variants in fips mode.
crypto: qat - The AE id should be less than the maximal AE number
lib/mpi: Endianness fix
crypto: rockchip - add hash support for crypto engine in rk3288
crypto: xts - fix compile errors
crypto: doc - add skcipher API documentation
crypto: doc - update AEAD AD handling
...
The setup_ntlmv2_rsp() function may return positive value ENOMEM instead
of -ENOMEM in case of kmalloc failure.
Signed-off-by: Anton Protopopov <a.s.protopopov@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Linux cifs mount with ntlmssp against an Mac OS X (Yosemite
10.10.5) share fails in case the clocks differ more than +/-2h:
digest-service: digest-request: od failed with 2 proto=ntlmv2
digest-service: digest-request: kdc failed with -1561745592 proto=ntlmv2
Fix this by (re-)using the given server timestamp for the
ntlmv2 authentication (as Windows 7 does).
A related problem was also reported earlier by Namjae Jaen (see below):
Windows machine has extended security feature which refuse to allow
authentication when there is time difference between server time and
client time when ntlmv2 negotiation is used. This problem is prevalent
in embedded enviornment where system time is set to default 1970.
Modern servers send the server timestamp in the TargetInfo Av_Pair
structure in the challenge message [see MS-NLMP 2.2.2.1]
In [MS-NLMP 3.1.5.1.2] it is explicitly mentioned that the client must
use the server provided timestamp if present OR current time if it is
not
Reported-by: Namjae Jeon <namjae.jeon@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Seiderer <ps.report@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
remove impossible check
Pointed out by Coverity (CID 115422)
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@samba.org>
This allows directory listings to Mac to display filenames
correctly which have been created with illegal (to Windows)
characters in their filename. It does not allow
converting the other direction yet ie opening files with
these characters (followon patch).
There are seven reserved characters that need to be remapped when
mounting to Windows, Mac (or any server without Unix Extensions) which
are valid in POSIX but not in the other OS.
: \ < > ? * |
We used the normal UCS-2 remap range for this in order to convert this
to/from UTF8 as did Windows Services for Unix (basically add 0xF000 to
any of the 7 reserved characters), at least when the "mapchars" mount
option was specified.
Mac used a very slightly different "Services for Mac" remap range
0xF021 through 0xF027. The attached patch allows cifs.ko (the kernel
client) to read directories on macs containing files with these
characters and display their names properly. In theory this even
might be useful on mounts to Samba when the vfs_catia or new
"vfs_fruit" module is loaded.
Currently the 7 reserved characters look very strange in directory
listings from cifs.ko to Mac server. This patch allows these file
name characters to be read (requires specifying mapchars on mount).
Two additional changes are needed:
1) Make it more automatic: a way of detecting enough info so that
we know to try to always remap these characters or not. Various
have suggested that the SFM approach be made the default when
the server does not support POSIX Unix extensions (cifs mounts
to Samba for example) so need to make SFM remapping the default
unless mapchars (SFU style mapping) specified on mount or no
mapping explicitly requested or no mapping needed (cifs mounts to Samba).
2) Adding a patch to map the characters the other direction
(ie UTF-8 to UCS-2 on open). This patch does it for translating
readdir entries (ie UCS-2 to UTF-8)
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
A bit of cleanup plus some gratuitous variable renaming. I think using
structures instead of numeric offsets makes this code much more
understandable.
Also added a comment about current time range expected by
the server.
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <spargaonkar@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
For cifs_set_cifscreds() in "fs/cifs/connect.c", 'desc' buffer length
is 'CIFSCREDS_DESC_SIZE' (56 is less than 256), and 'ses->domainName'
length may be "255 + '\0'".
The related sprintf() may cause memory overflow, so need extend related
buffer enough to hold all things.
It is also necessary to be sure of 'ses->domainName' must be less than
256, and define the related macro instead of hard code number '256'.
Signed-off-by: Chen Gang <gang.chen@asianux.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Scott Lovenberg <scott.lovenberg@gmail.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Updated patch to try to prevent allocation of cifs, smb2 or smb3 crypto
secmech structures unless needed. Currently cifs allocates all crypto
mechanisms when the first session is established (4 functions and
4 contexts), rather than only allocating these when needed (smb3 needs
two, the rest of the dialects only need one).
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shirish Pargaonkar <shirishpargaonkar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
