Commit Graph

89 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Kuniyuki Iwashima
7202cb5916 af_unix: Remove U_LOCK_GC_LISTENER.
Commit 1971d13ffa ("af_unix: Suppress false-positive lockdep splat for
spin_lock() in __unix_gc().") added U_LOCK_GC_LISTENER for the old GC,
but it's no longer needed for the new GC.

Let's remove U_LOCK_GC_LISTENER and unix_state_lock_nested() as there's
no user.

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
2024-06-25 11:10:18 +02:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
c4da4661d9 af_unix: Remove U_LOCK_DIAG.
sk_diag_dump_icons() acquires embryo's lock by unix_state_lock_nested()
to fetch its peer.

The embryo's ->peer is set to NULL only when its parent listener is
close()d.  Then, unix_release_sock() is called for each embryo after
unlinking skb by skb_dequeue().

In sk_diag_dump_icons(), we hold the parent's recvq lock, so we need
not acquire unix_state_lock_nested(), and peer is always non-NULL.

Let's remove unnecessary unix_state_lock_nested() and non-NULL test
for peer.

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
2024-06-25 11:10:18 +02:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
98f706de44 af_unix: Define locking order for U_LOCK_SECOND in unix_stream_connect().
While a SOCK_(STREAM|SEQPACKET) socket connect()s to another, we hold
two locks of them by unix_state_lock() and unix_state_lock_nested() in
unix_stream_connect().

Before unix_state_lock_nested(), the following is guaranteed by checking
sk->sk_state:

  1. The first socket is TCP_LISTEN
  2. The second socket is not the first one
  3. Simultaneous connect() must fail

So, the client state can be TCP_CLOSE or TCP_LISTEN or TCP_ESTABLISHED.

Let's define the expected states as unix_state_lock_cmp_fn() instead of
using unix_state_lock_nested().

Note that 2. is detected by debug_spin_lock_before() and 3. cannot be
expressed as lock_cmp_fn.

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
2024-06-25 11:10:18 +02:00
Jakub Kicinski
2bd87951de Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR.

Conflicts:

drivers/net/ethernet/ti/icssg/icssg_prueth.c

net/mac80211/chan.c
  89884459a0 ("wifi: mac80211: fix idle calculation with multi-link")
  87f5500285 ("wifi: mac80211: simplify ieee80211_assign_link_chanctx()")
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240422105623.7b1fbda2@canb.auug.org.au/

net/unix/garbage.c
  1971d13ffa ("af_unix: Suppress false-positive lockdep splat for spin_lock() in __unix_gc().")
  4090fa373f ("af_unix: Replace garbage collection algorithm.")

drivers/net/ethernet/ti/icssg/icssg_prueth.c
drivers/net/ethernet/ti/icssg/icssg_common.c
  4dcd0e83ea ("net: ti: icssg-prueth: Fix signedness bug in prueth_init_rx_chns()")
  e2dc7bfd67 ("net: ti: icssg-prueth: Move common functions into a separate file")

No adjacent changes.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2024-04-25 12:41:37 -07:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
1971d13ffa af_unix: Suppress false-positive lockdep splat for spin_lock() in __unix_gc().
syzbot reported a lockdep splat regarding unix_gc_lock and
unix_state_lock().

One is called from recvmsg() for a connected socket, and another
is called from GC for TCP_LISTEN socket.

So, the splat is false-positive.

Let's add a dedicated lock class for the latter to suppress the splat.

Note that this change is not necessary for net-next.git as the issue
is only applied to the old GC impl.

[0]:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0 Not tainted
 -----------------------------------------------------
kworker/u8:1/11 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
ffff88807cea4e70 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302

but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> #1 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}:
       lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
       __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
       _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
       spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
       unix_notinflight+0x13d/0x390 net/unix/garbage.c:140
       unix_detach_fds net/unix/af_unix.c:1819 [inline]
       unix_destruct_scm+0x221/0x350 net/unix/af_unix.c:1876
       skb_release_head_state+0x100/0x250 net/core/skbuff.c:1188
       skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1200 [inline]
       __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1216 [inline]
       kfree_skb_reason+0x16d/0x3b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1252
       kfree_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1262 [inline]
       manage_oob net/unix/af_unix.c:2672 [inline]
       unix_stream_read_generic+0x1125/0x2700 net/unix/af_unix.c:2749
       unix_stream_splice_read+0x239/0x320 net/unix/af_unix.c:2981
       do_splice_read fs/splice.c:985 [inline]
       splice_file_to_pipe+0x299/0x500 fs/splice.c:1295
       do_splice+0xf2d/0x1880 fs/splice.c:1379
       __do_splice fs/splice.c:1436 [inline]
       __do_sys_splice fs/splice.c:1652 [inline]
       __se_sys_splice+0x331/0x4a0 fs/splice.c:1634
       do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
       do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

 -> #0 (&u->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}:
       check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
       check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
       validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
       __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
       lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
       __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
       _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
       spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
       __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302
       process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]
       process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
       worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416
       kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
       ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
       ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(unix_gc_lock);
                               lock(&u->lock);
                               lock(unix_gc_lock);
  lock(&u->lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

3 locks held by kworker/u8:1/11:
 #0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
 #0: ffff888015089148 ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x8e0/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 #1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3230 [inline]
 #1: ffffc90000107d00 (unix_gc_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x91b/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 #2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
 #2: ffffffff8f6ab638 (unix_gc_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: __unix_gc+0x117/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:261

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller-00007-g4d2008430ce8 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Workqueue: events_unbound __unix_gc
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
 check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187
 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
 check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
 validate_chain+0x18cb/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
 __lock_acquire+0x1346/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
 _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
 __unix_gc+0x40e/0xf70 net/unix/garbage.c:302
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0xa10/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416
 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
 </TASK>

Fixes: 47d8ac011f ("af_unix: Fix garbage collector racing against connect()")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+fa379358c28cc87cc307@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fa379358c28cc87cc307
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424170443.9832-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2024-04-25 08:37:02 -07:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
fd86344823 af_unix: Try not to hold unix_gc_lock during accept().
Commit dcf70df204 ("af_unix: Fix up unix_edge.successor for embryo
socket.") added spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock) in accept() path, and it
caused regression in a stress test as reported by kernel test robot.

If the embryo socket is not part of the inflight graph, we need not
hold the lock.

To decide that in O(1) time and avoid the regression in the normal
use case,

  1. add a new stat unix_sk(sk)->scm_stat.nr_unix_fds

  2. count the number of inflight AF_UNIX sockets in the receive
     queue under unix_state_lock()

  3. move unix_update_edges() call under unix_state_lock()

  4. avoid locking if nr_unix_fds is 0 in unix_update_edges()

Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202404101427.92a08551-oliver.sang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240413021928.20946-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
2024-04-16 13:50:57 +02:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
118f457da9 af_unix: Remove lock dance in unix_peek_fds().
In the previous GC implementation, the shape of the inflight socket
graph was not expected to change while GC was in progress.

MSG_PEEK was tricky because it could install inflight fd silently
and transform the graph.

Let's say we peeked a fd, which was a listening socket, and accept()ed
some embryo sockets from it.  The garbage collection algorithm would
have been confused because the set of sockets visited in scan_inflight()
would change within the same GC invocation.

That's why we placed spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock) and spin_unlock() in
unix_peek_fds() with a fat comment.

In the new GC implementation, we no longer garbage-collect the socket
if it exists in another queue, that is, if it has a bridge to another
SCC.  Also, accept() will require the lock if it has edges.

Thus, we need not do the complicated lock dance.

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240401173125.92184-3-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2024-04-03 19:27:13 -07:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
4090fa373f af_unix: Replace garbage collection algorithm.
If we find a dead SCC during iteration, we call unix_collect_skb()
to splice all skb in the SCC to the global sk_buff_head, hitlist.

After iterating all SCC, we unlock unix_gc_lock and purge the queue.

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240325202425.60930-15-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2024-03-29 08:28:42 -07:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
bfdb01283e af_unix: Assign a unique index to SCC.
The definition of the lowlink in Tarjan's algorithm is the
smallest index of a vertex that is reachable with at most one
back-edge in SCC.  This is not useful for a cross-edge.

If we start traversing from A in the following graph, the final
lowlink of D is 3.  The cross-edge here is one between D and C.

  A -> B -> D   D = (4, 3)  (index, lowlink)
  ^    |    |   C = (3, 1)
  |    V    |   B = (2, 1)
  `--- C <--'   A = (1, 1)

This is because the lowlink of D is updated with the index of C.

In the following patch, we detect a dead SCC by checking two
conditions for each vertex.

  1) vertex has no edge directed to another SCC (no bridge)
  2) vertex's out_degree is the same as the refcount of its file

If 1) is false, there is a receiver of all fds of the SCC and
its ancestor SCC.

To evaluate 1), we need to assign a unique index to each SCC and
assign it to all vertices in the SCC.

This patch changes the lowlink update logic for cross-edge so
that in the example above, the lowlink of D is updated with the
lowlink of C.

  A -> B -> D   D = (4, 1)  (index, lowlink)
  ^    |    |   C = (3, 1)
  |    V    |   B = (2, 1)
  `--- C <--'   A = (1, 1)

Then, all vertices in the same SCC have the same lowlink, and we
can quickly find the bridge connecting to different SCC if exists.

However, it is no longer called lowlink, so we rename it to
scc_index.  (It's sometimes called lowpoint.)

Also, we add a global variable to hold the last index used in DFS
so that we do not reset the initial index in each DFS.

This patch can be squashed to the SCC detection patch but is
split deliberately for anyone wondering why lowlink is not used
as used in the original Tarjan's algorithm and many reference
implementations.

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240325202425.60930-13-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2024-03-29 08:28:33 -07:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
ba31b4a4e1 af_unix: Save O(n) setup of Tarjan's algo.
Before starting Tarjan's algorithm, we need to mark all vertices
as unvisited.  We can save this O(n) setup by reserving two special
indices (0, 1) and using two variables.

The first time we link a vertex to unix_unvisited_vertices, we set
unix_vertex_unvisited_index to index.

During DFS, we can see that the index of unvisited vertices is the
same as unix_vertex_unvisited_index.

When we finalise SCC later, we set unix_vertex_grouped_index to each
vertex's index.

Then, we can know (i) that the vertex is on the stack if the index
of a visited vertex is >= 2 and (ii) that it is not on the stack and
belongs to a different SCC if the index is unix_vertex_grouped_index.

After the whole algorithm, all indices of vertices are set as
unix_vertex_grouped_index.

Next time we start DFS, we know that all unvisited vertices have
unix_vertex_grouped_index, and we can use unix_vertex_unvisited_index
as the not-on-stack marker.

To use the same variable in __unix_walk_scc(), we can swap
unix_vertex_(grouped|unvisited)_index at the end of Tarjan's
algorithm.

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240325202425.60930-10-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2024-03-29 08:28:20 -07:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
dcf70df204 af_unix: Fix up unix_edge.successor for embryo socket.
To garbage collect inflight AF_UNIX sockets, we must define the
cyclic reference appropriately.  This is a bit tricky if the loop
consists of embryo sockets.

Suppose that the fd of AF_UNIX socket A is passed to D and the fd B
to C and that C and D are embryo sockets of A and B, respectively.
It may appear that there are two separate graphs, A (-> D) and
B (-> C), but this is not correct.

     A --. .-- B
          X
     C <-' `-> D

Now, D holds A's refcount, and C has B's refcount, so unix_release()
will never be called for A and B when we close() them.  However, no
one can call close() for D and C to free skbs holding refcounts of A
and B because C/D is in A/B's receive queue, which should have been
purged by unix_release() for A and B.

So, here's another type of cyclic reference.  When a fd of an AF_UNIX
socket is passed to an embryo socket, the reference is indirectly held
by its parent listening socket.

  .-> A                            .-> B
  |   `- sk_receive_queue          |   `- sk_receive_queue
  |      `- skb                    |      `- skb
  |         `- sk == C             |         `- sk == D
  |            `- sk_receive_queue |           `- sk_receive_queue
  |               `- skb +---------'               `- skb +-.
  |                                                         |
  `---------------------------------------------------------'

Technically, the graph must be denoted as A <-> B instead of A (-> D)
and B (-> C) to find such a cyclic reference without touching each
socket's receive queue.

  .-> A --. .-- B <-.
  |        X        |  ==  A <-> B
  `-- C <-' `-> D --'

We apply this fixup during GC by fetching the real successor by
unix_edge_successor().

When we call accept(), we clear unix_sock.listener under unix_gc_lock
not to confuse GC.

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240325202425.60930-9-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2024-03-29 08:28:14 -07:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
aed6ecef55 af_unix: Save listener for embryo socket.
This is a prep patch for the following change, where we need to
fetch the listening socket from the successor embryo socket
during GC.

We add a new field to struct unix_sock to save a pointer to a
listening socket.

We set it when connect() creates a new socket, and clear it when
accept() is called.

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240325202425.60930-8-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2024-03-29 08:28:10 -07:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
3484f06317 af_unix: Detect Strongly Connected Components.
In the new GC, we use a simple graph algorithm, Tarjan's Strongly
Connected Components (SCC) algorithm, to find cyclic references.

The algorithm visits every vertex exactly once using depth-first
search (DFS).

DFS starts by pushing an input vertex to a stack and assigning it
a unique number.  Two fields, index and lowlink, are initialised
with the number, but lowlink could be updated later during DFS.

If a vertex has an edge to an unvisited inflight vertex, we visit
it and do the same processing.  So, we will have vertices in the
stack in the order they appear and number them consecutively in
the same order.

If a vertex has a back-edge to a visited vertex in the stack,
we update the predecessor's lowlink with the successor's index.

After iterating edges from the vertex, we check if its index
equals its lowlink.

If the lowlink is different from the index, it shows there was a
back-edge.  Then, we go backtracking and propagate the lowlink to
its predecessor and resume the previous edge iteration from the
next edge.

If the lowlink is the same as the index, we pop vertices before
and including the vertex from the stack.  Then, the set of vertices
is SCC, possibly forming a cycle.  At the same time, we move the
vertices to unix_visited_vertices.

When we finish the algorithm, all vertices in each SCC will be
linked via unix_vertex.scc_entry.

Let's take an example.  We have a graph including five inflight
vertices (F is not inflight):

  A -> B -> C -> D -> E (-> F)
       ^         |
       `---------'

Suppose that we start DFS from C.  We will visit C, D, and B first
and initialise their index and lowlink.  Then, the stack looks like
this:

  > B = (3, 3)  (index, lowlink)
    D = (2, 2)
    C = (1, 1)

When checking B's edge to C, we update B's lowlink with C's index
and propagate it to D.

    B = (3, 1)  (index, lowlink)
  > D = (2, 1)
    C = (1, 1)

Next, we visit E, which has no edge to an inflight vertex.

  > E = (4, 4)  (index, lowlink)
    B = (3, 1)
    D = (2, 1)
    C = (1, 1)

When we leave from E, its index and lowlink are the same, so we
pop E from the stack as single-vertex SCC.  Next, we leave from
B and D but do nothing because their lowlink are different from
their index.

    B = (3, 1)  (index, lowlink)
    D = (2, 1)
  > C = (1, 1)

Then, we leave from C, whose index and lowlink are the same, so
we pop B, D and C as SCC.

Last, we do DFS for the rest of vertices, A, which is also a
single-vertex SCC.

Finally, each unix_vertex.scc_entry is linked as follows:

  A -.  B -> C -> D  E -.
  ^  |  ^         |  ^  |
  `--'  `---------'  `--'

We use SCC later to decide whether we can garbage-collect the
sockets.

Note that we still cannot detect SCC properly if an edge points
to an embryo socket.  The following two patches will sort it out.

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240325202425.60930-7-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2024-03-29 08:28:04 -07:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
6ba76fd284 af_unix: Iterate all vertices by DFS.
The new GC will use a depth first search graph algorithm to find
cyclic references.  The algorithm visits every vertex exactly once.

Here, we implement the DFS part without recursion so that no one
can abuse it.

unix_walk_scc() marks every vertex unvisited by initialising index
as UNIX_VERTEX_INDEX_UNVISITED and iterates inflight vertices in
unix_unvisited_vertices and call __unix_walk_scc() to start DFS from
an arbitrary vertex.

__unix_walk_scc() iterates all edges starting from the vertex and
explores the neighbour vertices with DFS using edge_stack.

After visiting all neighbours, __unix_walk_scc() moves the visited
vertex to unix_visited_vertices so that unix_walk_scc() will not
restart DFS from the visited vertex.

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240325202425.60930-6-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2024-03-29 08:27:59 -07:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
42f298c06b af_unix: Link struct unix_edge when queuing skb.
Just before queuing skb with inflight fds, we call scm_stat_add(),
which is a good place to set up the preallocated struct unix_vertex
and struct unix_edge in UNIXCB(skb).fp.

Then, we call unix_add_edges() and construct the directed graph
as follows:

  1. Set the inflight socket's unix_sock to unix_edge.predecessor.
  2. Set the receiver's unix_sock to unix_edge.successor.
  3. Set the preallocated vertex to inflight socket's unix_sock.vertex.
  4. Link inflight socket's unix_vertex.entry to unix_unvisited_vertices.
  5. Link unix_edge.vertex_entry to the inflight socket's unix_vertex.edges.

Let's say we pass the fd of AF_UNIX socket A to B and the fd of B
to C.  The graph looks like this:

  +-------------------------+
  | unix_unvisited_vertices | <-------------------------.
  +-------------------------+                           |
  +                                                     |
  |     +--------------+             +--------------+   |         +--------------+
  |     |  unix_sock A | <---. .---> |  unix_sock B | <-|-. .---> |  unix_sock C |
  |     +--------------+     | |     +--------------+   | | |     +--------------+
  | .-+ |    vertex    |     | | .-+ |    vertex    |   | | |     |    vertex    |
  | |   +--------------+     | | |   +--------------+   | | |     +--------------+
  | |                        | | |                      | | |
  | |   +--------------+     | | |   +--------------+   | | |
  | '-> |  unix_vertex |     | | '-> |  unix_vertex |   | | |
  |     +--------------+     | |     +--------------+   | | |
  `---> |    entry     | +---------> |    entry     | +-' | |
        |--------------|     | |     |--------------|     | |
        |    edges     | <-. | |     |    edges     | <-. | |
        +--------------+   | | |     +--------------+   | | |
                           | | |                        | | |
    .----------------------' | | .----------------------' | |
    |                        | | |                        | |
    |   +--------------+     | | |   +--------------+     | |
    |   |   unix_edge  |     | | |   |   unix_edge  |     | |
    |   +--------------+     | | |   +--------------+     | |
    `-> | vertex_entry |     | | `-> | vertex_entry |     | |
        |--------------|     | |     |--------------|     | |
        |  predecessor | +---' |     |  predecessor | +---' |
        |--------------|       |     |--------------|       |
        |   successor  | +-----'     |   successor  | +-----'
        +--------------+             +--------------+

Henceforth, we denote such a graph as A -> B (-> C).

Now, we can express all inflight fd graphs that do not contain
embryo sockets.  We will support the particular case later.

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240325202425.60930-4-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2024-03-29 08:27:50 -07:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
29b64e3540 af_unix: Allocate struct unix_edge for each inflight AF_UNIX fd.
As with the previous patch, we preallocate to skb's scm_fp_list an
array of struct unix_edge in the number of inflight AF_UNIX fds.

There we just preallocate memory and do not use immediately because
sendmsg() could fail after this point.  The actual use will be in
the next patch.

When we queue skb with inflight edges, we will set the inflight
socket's unix_sock as unix_edge->predecessor and the receiver's
unix_sock as successor, and then we will link the edge to the
inflight socket's unix_vertex.edges.

Note that we set NULL to cloned scm_fp_list.edges in scm_fp_dup()
so that MSG_PEEK does not change the shape of the directed graph.

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240325202425.60930-3-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2024-03-29 08:27:44 -07:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
1fbfdfaa59 af_unix: Allocate struct unix_vertex for each inflight AF_UNIX fd.
We will replace the garbage collection algorithm for AF_UNIX, where
we will consider each inflight AF_UNIX socket as a vertex and its file
descriptor as an edge in a directed graph.

This patch introduces a new struct unix_vertex representing a vertex
in the graph and adds its pointer to struct unix_sock.

When we send a fd using the SCM_RIGHTS message, we allocate struct
scm_fp_list to struct scm_cookie in scm_fp_copy().  Then, we bump
each refcount of the inflight fds' struct file and save them in
scm_fp_list.fp.

After that, unix_attach_fds() inexplicably clones scm_fp_list of
scm_cookie and sets it to skb.  (We will remove this part after
replacing GC.)

Here, we add a new function call in unix_attach_fds() to preallocate
struct unix_vertex per inflight AF_UNIX fd and link each vertex to
skb's scm_fp_list.vertices.

When sendmsg() succeeds later, if the socket of the inflight fd is
still not inflight yet, we will set the preallocated vertex to struct
unix_sock.vertex and link it to a global list unix_unvisited_vertices
under spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock).

If the socket is already inflight, we free the preallocated vertex.
This is to avoid taking the lock unnecessarily when sendmsg() could
fail later.

In the following patch, we will similarly allocate another struct
per edge, which will finally be linked to the inflight socket's
unix_vertex.edges.

And then, we will count the number of edges as unix_vertex.out_degree.

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240325202425.60930-2-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2024-03-29 08:27:33 -07:00
Jakub Kicinski
cf244463a2 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net
Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR.

No conflicts or adjacent changes.

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2024-02-01 15:12:37 -08:00
Eric Dumazet
4d322dce82 af_unix: fix lockdep positive in sk_diag_dump_icons()
syzbot reported a lockdep splat [1].

Blamed commit hinted about the possible lockdep
violation, and code used unix_state_lock_nested()
in an attempt to silence lockdep.

It is not sufficient, because unix_state_lock_nested()
is already used from unix_state_double_lock().

We need to use a separate subclass.

This patch adds a distinct enumeration to make things
more explicit.

Also use swap() in unix_state_double_lock() as a clean up.

v2: add a missing inline keyword to unix_state_lock_nested()

[1]
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.8.0-rc1-syzkaller-00356-g8a696a29c690 #0 Not tainted

syz-executor.1/2542 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffff88808b5df9e8 (rlock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: skb_queue_tail+0x36/0x120 net/core/skbuff.c:3863

but task is already holding lock:
 ffff88808b5dfe70 (&u->lock/1){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: unix_dgram_sendmsg+0xfc7/0x2200 net/unix/af_unix.c:2089

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #1 (&u->lock/1){+.+.}-{2:2}:
        lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
        _raw_spin_lock_nested+0x31/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:378
        sk_diag_dump_icons net/unix/diag.c:87 [inline]
        sk_diag_fill+0x6ea/0xfe0 net/unix/diag.c:157
        sk_diag_dump net/unix/diag.c:196 [inline]
        unix_diag_dump+0x3e9/0x630 net/unix/diag.c:220
        netlink_dump+0x5c1/0xcd0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2264
        __netlink_dump_start+0x5d7/0x780 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2370
        netlink_dump_start include/linux/netlink.h:338 [inline]
        unix_diag_handler_dump+0x1c3/0x8f0 net/unix/diag.c:319
       sock_diag_rcv_msg+0xe3/0x400
        netlink_rcv_skb+0x1df/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543
        sock_diag_rcv+0x2a/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:280
        netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1341 [inline]
        netlink_unicast+0x7e6/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1367
        netlink_sendmsg+0xa37/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908
        sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
        __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
        sock_write_iter+0x39a/0x520 net/socket.c:1160
        call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2085 [inline]
        new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline]
        vfs_write+0xa74/0xca0 fs/read_write.c:590
        ksys_write+0x1a0/0x2c0 fs/read_write.c:643
        do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
        do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

-> #0 (rlock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{2:2}:
        check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
        check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
        validate_chain+0x1909/0x5ab0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
        __lock_acquire+0x1345/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
        lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
        __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xd5/0x120 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162
        skb_queue_tail+0x36/0x120 net/core/skbuff.c:3863
        unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x15d9/0x2200 net/unix/af_unix.c:2112
        sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
        __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
        ____sys_sendmsg+0x592/0x890 net/socket.c:2584
        ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline]
        __sys_sendmmsg+0x3b2/0x730 net/socket.c:2724
        __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2753 [inline]
        __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2750 [inline]
        __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xa0/0xb0 net/socket.c:2750
        do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
        do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&u->lock/1);
                               lock(rlock-AF_UNIX);
                               lock(&u->lock/1);
  lock(rlock-AF_UNIX);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

1 lock held by syz-executor.1/2542:
  #0: ffff88808b5dfe70 (&u->lock/1){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: unix_dgram_sendmsg+0xfc7/0x2200 net/unix/af_unix.c:2089

stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 2542 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc1-syzkaller-00356-g8a696a29c690 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
  dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
  check_noncircular+0x366/0x490 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187
  check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
  check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
  validate_chain+0x1909/0x5ab0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869
  __lock_acquire+0x1345/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
  lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754
  __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
  _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xd5/0x120 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162
  skb_queue_tail+0x36/0x120 net/core/skbuff.c:3863
  unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x15d9/0x2200 net/unix/af_unix.c:2112
  sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
  __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
  ____sys_sendmsg+0x592/0x890 net/socket.c:2584
  ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline]
  __sys_sendmmsg+0x3b2/0x730 net/socket.c:2724
  __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2753 [inline]
  __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2750 [inline]
  __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xa0/0xb0 net/socket.c:2750
  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b
RIP: 0033:0x7f26d887cda9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f26d95a60c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f26d89abf80 RCX: 00007f26d887cda9
RDX: 000000000000003e RSI: 00000000200bd000 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007f26d88c947a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000000008c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f26d89abf80 R15: 00007ffcfe081a68

Fixes: 2aac7a2cb0 ("unix_diag: Pending connections IDs NLA")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240130184235.1620738-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2024-01-31 17:51:55 -08:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
99a7a5b994 af_unix: Remove CONFIG_UNIX_SCM.
Originally, the code related to garbage collection was all in garbage.c.

Commit f4e65870e5 ("net: split out functions related to registering
inflight socket files") moved some functions to scm.c for io_uring and
added CONFIG_UNIX_SCM just in case AF_UNIX was built as module.

However, since commit 97154bcf4d ("af_unix: Kconfig: make CONFIG_UNIX
bool"), AF_UNIX is no longer built separately.  Also, io_uring does not
support SCM_RIGHTS now.

Let's move the functions back to garbage.c

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240129190435.57228-4-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2024-01-31 16:41:16 -08:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
11498715f2 af_unix: Remove io_uring code for GC.
Since commit 705318a99a ("io_uring/af_unix: disable sending
io_uring over sockets"), io_uring's unix socket cannot be passed
via SCM_RIGHTS, so it does not contribute to cyclic reference and
no longer be candidate for garbage collection.

Also, commit 6e5e6d2749 ("io_uring: drop any code related to
SCM_RIGHTS") cleaned up SCM_RIGHTS code in io_uring.

Let's do it in AF_UNIX as well by reverting commit 0091bfc817
("io_uring/af_unix: defer registered files gc to io_uring release")
and commit 1036908045 ("net: reclaim skb->scm_io_uring bit").

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240129190435.57228-3-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2024-01-31 16:41:16 -08:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
d9f21b3613 af_unix: Try to run GC async.
If more than 16000 inflight AF_UNIX sockets exist and the garbage
collector is not running, unix_(dgram|stream)_sendmsg() call unix_gc().
Also, they wait for unix_gc() to complete.

In unix_gc(), all inflight AF_UNIX sockets are traversed at least once,
and more if they are the GC candidate.  Thus, sendmsg() significantly
slows down with too many inflight AF_UNIX sockets.

However, if a process sends data with no AF_UNIX FD, the sendmsg() call
does not need to wait for GC.  After this change, only the process that
meets the condition below will be blocked under such a situation.

  1) cmsg contains AF_UNIX socket
  2) more than 32 AF_UNIX sent by the same user are still inflight

Note that even a sendmsg() call that does not meet the condition but has
AF_UNIX FD will be blocked later in unix_scm_to_skb() by the spinlock,
but we allow that as a bonus for sane users.

The results below are the time spent in unix_dgram_sendmsg() sending 1
byte of data with no FD 4096 times on a host where 32K inflight AF_UNIX
sockets exist.

Without series: the sane sendmsg() needs to wait gc unreasonably.

  $ sudo /usr/share/bcc/tools/funclatency -p 11165 unix_dgram_sendmsg
  Tracing 1 functions for "unix_dgram_sendmsg"... Hit Ctrl-C to end.
  ^C
       nsecs               : count     distribution
  [...]
      524288 -> 1048575    : 0        |                                        |
     1048576 -> 2097151    : 3881     |****************************************|
     2097152 -> 4194303    : 214      |**                                      |
     4194304 -> 8388607    : 1        |                                        |

  avg = 1825567 nsecs, total: 7477526027 nsecs, count: 4096

With series: the sane sendmsg() can finish much faster.

  $ sudo /usr/share/bcc/tools/funclatency -p 8702  unix_dgram_sendmsg
  Tracing 1 functions for "unix_dgram_sendmsg"... Hit Ctrl-C to end.
  ^C
       nsecs               : count     distribution
  [...]
         128 -> 255        : 0        |                                        |
         256 -> 511        : 4092     |****************************************|
         512 -> 1023       : 2        |                                        |
        1024 -> 2047       : 0        |                                        |
        2048 -> 4095       : 0        |                                        |
        4096 -> 8191       : 1        |                                        |
        8192 -> 16383      : 1        |                                        |

  avg = 410 nsecs, total: 1680510 nsecs, count: 4096

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123170856.41348-6-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2024-01-26 20:34:25 -08:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
5b17307bd0 af_unix: Return struct unix_sock from unix_get_socket().
Currently, unix_get_socket() returns struct sock, but after calling
it, we always cast it to unix_sk().

Let's return struct unix_sock from unix_get_socket().

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123170856.41348-4-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2024-01-26 20:34:25 -08:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
97af84a6bb af_unix: Do not use atomic ops for unix_sk(sk)->inflight.
When touching unix_sk(sk)->inflight, we are always under
spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock).

Let's convert unix_sk(sk)->inflight to the normal unsigned long.

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123170856.41348-3-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2024-01-26 20:34:24 -08:00
John Fastabend
8866730aed bpf, sockmap: af_unix stream sockets need to hold ref for pair sock
AF_UNIX stream sockets are a paired socket. So sending on one of the pairs
will lookup the paired socket as part of the send operation. It is possible
however to put just one of the pairs in a BPF map. This currently increments
the refcnt on the sock in the sockmap to ensure it is not free'd by the
stack before sockmap cleans up its state and stops any skbs being sent/recv'd
to that socket.

But we missed a case. If the peer socket is closed it will be free'd by the
stack. However, the paired socket can still be referenced from BPF sockmap
side because we hold a reference there. Then if we are sending traffic through
BPF sockmap to that socket it will try to dereference the free'd pair in its
send logic creating a use after free. And following splat:

   [59.900375] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sk_wake_async+0x31/0x1b0
   [59.901211] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88811acbf060 by task kworker/1:2/954
   [...]
   [59.905468] Call Trace:
   [59.905787]  <TASK>
   [59.906066]  dump_stack_lvl+0x130/0x1d0
   [59.908877]  print_report+0x16f/0x740
   [59.910629]  kasan_report+0x118/0x160
   [59.912576]  sk_wake_async+0x31/0x1b0
   [59.913554]  sock_def_readable+0x156/0x2a0
   [59.914060]  unix_stream_sendmsg+0x3f9/0x12a0
   [59.916398]  sock_sendmsg+0x20e/0x250
   [59.916854]  skb_send_sock+0x236/0xac0
   [59.920527]  sk_psock_backlog+0x287/0xaa0

To fix let BPF sockmap hold a refcnt on both the socket in the sockmap and its
paired socket. It wasn't obvious how to contain the fix to bpf_unix logic. The
primarily problem with keeping this logic in bpf_unix was: In the sock close()
we could handle the deref by having a close handler. But, when we are destroying
the psock through a map delete operation we wouldn't have gotten any signal
thorugh the proto struct other than it being replaced. If we do the deref from
the proto replace its too early because we need to deref the sk_pair after the
backlog worker has been stopped.

Given all this it seems best to just cache it at the end of the psock and eat 8B
for the af_unix and vsock users. Notice dgram sockets are OK because they handle
locking already.

Fixes: 94531cfcbe ("af_unix: Add unix_stream_proto for sockmap")
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231129012557.95371-2-john.fastabend@gmail.com
2023-11-30 00:25:16 +01:00
Eric Dumazet
b064ba9c3c af_unix: preserve const qualifier in unix_sk()
We can change unix_sk() to propagate its argument const qualifier,
thanks to container_of_const().

We need to change dump_common_audit_data() 'struct unix_sock *u'
local var to get a const attribute.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2023-03-18 12:23:33 +00:00
Eric Dumazet
1036908045 net: reclaim skb->scm_io_uring bit
Commit 0091bfc817 ("io_uring/af_unix: defer registered
files gc to io_uring release") added one bit to struct sk_buff.

This structure is critical for networking, and we try very hard
to not add bloat on it, unless absolutely required.

For instance, we can use a specific destructor as a wrapper
around unix_destruct_scm(), to identify skbs that unix_gc()
has to special case.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Cc: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2023-03-08 13:21:47 +00:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
2f7ca90a01 af_unix: Remove unix_table_locks.
unix_table_locks are to protect the global hash table, unix_socket_table.
The previous commit removed it, so let's clean up the unnecessary locks.

Here is a test result on EC2 c5.9xlarge where 10 processes run concurrently
in different netns and bind 100,000 sockets for each.

  without this series : 1m 38s
  with this series    :    11s

It is ~10x faster because the global hash table is split into 10 netns in
this case.

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-06-22 12:59:43 +01:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
cf2f225e26 af_unix: Put a socket into a per-netns hash table.
This commit replaces the global hash table with a per-netns one and removes
the global one.

We now link a socket in each netns's hash table so we can save some netns
comparisons when iterating through a hash bucket.

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-06-22 12:59:43 +01:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
f302d180c6 af_unix: Include the whole hash table size in UNIX_HASH_SIZE.
Currently, the size of AF_UNIX hash table is UNIX_HASH_SIZE * 2,
the first half for bind()ed sockets and the second half for unbound
ones.  UNIX_HASH_SIZE * 2 is used to define the table and iterate
over it.

In some places, we use ARRAY_SIZE(unix_socket_table) instead of
UNIX_HASH_SIZE * 2.  However, we cannot use it anymore because we
will allocate the hash table dynamically.  Then, we would have to
add UNIX_HASH_SIZE * 2 in many places, which would be troublesome.

This patch adapts the UNIX_HASH_SIZE definition to include bound
and unbound sockets and defines a new UNIX_HASH_MOD macro to ease
calculations.

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-06-22 12:59:43 +01:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
afd20b9290 af_unix: Replace the big lock with small locks.
The hash table of AF_UNIX sockets is protected by the single lock.  This
patch replaces it with per-hash locks.

The effect is noticeable when we handle multiple sockets simultaneously.
Here is a test result on an EC2 c5.24xlarge instance.  It shows latency
(under 10us only) in unix_insert_unbound_socket() while 64 CPUs creating
1024 sockets for each in parallel.

  Without this patch:

     nsec          : count     distribution
        0          : 179      |                                        |
        500        : 3021     |*********                               |
        1000       : 6271     |*******************                     |
        1500       : 6318     |*******************                     |
        2000       : 5828     |*****************                       |
        2500       : 5124     |***************                         |
        3000       : 4426     |*************                           |
        3500       : 3672     |***********                             |
        4000       : 3138     |*********                               |
        4500       : 2811     |********                                |
        5000       : 2384     |*******                                 |
        5500       : 2023     |******                                  |
        6000       : 1954     |*****                                   |
        6500       : 1737     |*****                                   |
        7000       : 1749     |*****                                   |
        7500       : 1520     |****                                    |
        8000       : 1469     |****                                    |
        8500       : 1394     |****                                    |
        9000       : 1232     |***                                     |
        9500       : 1138     |***                                     |
        10000      : 994      |***                                     |

  With this patch:

     nsec          : count     distribution
        0          : 1634     |****                                    |
        500        : 13170    |****************************************|
        1000       : 13156    |*************************************** |
        1500       : 9010     |***************************             |
        2000       : 6363     |*******************                     |
        2500       : 4443     |*************                           |
        3000       : 3240     |*********                               |
        3500       : 2549     |*******                                 |
        4000       : 1872     |*****                                   |
        4500       : 1504     |****                                    |
        5000       : 1247     |***                                     |
        5500       : 1035     |***                                     |
        6000       : 889      |**                                      |
        6500       : 744      |**                                      |
        7000       : 634      |*                                       |
        7500       : 498      |*                                       |
        8000       : 433      |*                                       |
        8500       : 355      |*                                       |
        9000       : 336      |*                                       |
        9500       : 284      |                                        |
        10000      : 243      |                                        |

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2021-11-26 18:01:58 -08:00
Kuniyuki Iwashima
e6b4b87389 af_unix: Save hash in sk_hash.
To replace unix_table_lock with per-hash locks in the next patch, we need
to save a hash in each socket because /proc/net/unix or BPF prog iterate
sockets while holding a hash table lock and release it later in a different
function.

Currently, we store a real/pseudo hash in struct unix_address.  However, we
do not allocate it to unbound sockets, nor should we do just for that.  For
this purpose, we can use sk_hash.  Then, we no longer use the hash field in
struct unix_address and can remove it.

Also, this patch does
  - rename unix_insert_socket() to unix_insert_unbound_socket()
  - remove the redundant list argument from __unix_insert_socket() and
     unix_insert_unbound_socket()
  - use 'unsigned int' instead of 'unsigned' in __unix_set_addr_hash()
  - remove 'inline' from unix_remove_socket() and
     unix_insert_unbound_socket().

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2021-11-26 18:01:57 -08:00
Jiang Wang
94531cfcbe af_unix: Add unix_stream_proto for sockmap
Previously, sockmap for AF_UNIX protocol only supports
dgram type. This patch add unix stream type support, which
is similar to unix_dgram_proto. To support sockmap, dgram
and stream cannot share the same unix_proto anymore, because
they have different implementations, such as unhash for stream
type (which will remove closed or disconnected sockets from the map),
so rename unix_proto to unix_dgram_proto and add a new
unix_stream_proto.

Also implement stream related sockmap functions.
And add dgram key words to those dgram specific functions.

Signed-off-by: Jiang Wang <jiang.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Acked-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210816190327.2739291-3-jiang.wang@bytedance.com
2021-08-16 18:43:39 -07:00
Rao Shoaib
314001f0bf af_unix: Add OOB support
This patch adds OOB support for AF_UNIX sockets.
The semantics is same as TCP.

The last byte of a message with the OOB flag is
treated as the OOB byte. The byte is separated into
a skb and a pointer to the skb is stored in unix_sock.
The pointer is used to enforce OOB semantics.

Signed-off-by: Rao Shoaib <rao.shoaib@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-08-04 09:55:52 +01:00
Cong Wang
9825d866ce af_unix: Implement unix_dgram_bpf_recvmsg()
We have to implement unix_dgram_bpf_recvmsg() to replace the
original ->recvmsg() to retrieve skmsg from ingress_msg.

AF_UNIX is again special here because the lack of
sk_prot->recvmsg(). I simply add a special case inside
unix_dgram_recvmsg() to call sk->sk_prot->recvmsg() directly.

Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210704190252.11866-8-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com
2021-07-15 18:17:50 -07:00
Cong Wang
c63829182c af_unix: Implement ->psock_update_sk_prot()
Now we can implement unix_bpf_update_proto() to update
sk_prot, especially prot->close().

Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210704190252.11866-7-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com
2021-07-15 18:17:50 -07:00
Paolo Abeni
7782040b95 unix: uses an atomic type for scm files accounting
So the scm_stat_{add,del} helper can be invoked with no
additional lock held.

This clean-up the code a bit and will make the next
patch easier.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-02-28 12:12:53 -08:00
Gustavo A. R. Silva
e955376277 af_unix: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array member
The current codebase makes use of the zero-length array language
extension to the C90 standard, but the preferred mechanism to declare
variable-length types such as these ones is a flexible array member[1][2],
introduced in C99:

struct foo {
        int stuff;
        struct boo array[];
};

By making use of the mechanism above, we will get a compiler warning
in case the flexible array does not occur last in the structure, which
will help us prevent some kind of undefined behavior bugs from being
inadvertently introduced[3] to the codebase from now on.

Also, notice that, dynamic memory allocations won't be affected by
this change:

"Flexible array members have incomplete type, and so the sizeof operator
may not be applied. As a quirk of the original implementation of
zero-length arrays, sizeof evaluates to zero."[1]

This issue was found with the help of Coccinelle.

[1] https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Zero-Length.html
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/21
[3] commit 7649773293 ("cxgb3/l2t: Fix undefined behaviour")

Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-02-28 12:08:37 -08:00
Kirill Tkhai
3c32da19a8 unix: Show number of pending scm files of receive queue in fdinfo
Unix sockets like a block box. You never know what is stored there:
there may be a file descriptor holding a mount or a block device,
or there may be whole universes with namespaces, sockets with receive
queues full of sockets etc.

The patch adds a little debug and accounts number of files (not recursive),
which is in receive queue of a unix socket. Sometimes this is useful
to determine, that socket should be investigated or which task should
be killed to put reference counter on a resourse.

v2: Pass correct argument to lockdep

Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-12-12 17:04:55 -08:00
Jens Axboe
f4e65870e5 net: split out functions related to registering inflight socket files
We need this functionality for the io_uring file registration, but
we cannot rely on it since CONFIG_UNIX can be modular. Move the helpers
to a separate file, that's always builtin to the kernel if CONFIG_UNIX is
m/y.

No functional changes in this patch, just moving code around.

Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
2019-02-28 08:24:23 -07:00
Bo YU
b1c234441e net: drop a space before tabs
Fix a warning from checkpatch.pl:'please no space before tabs'
in include/net/af_unix.h

Signed-off-by: Bo YU <tsu.yubo@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-10-31 12:37:12 -07:00
Bo YU
c4147beabe net: add an identifier name for 'struct sock *'
Fix a warning from checkpatch:
function definition argument 'struct sock *' should also have an
identifier name in include/net/af_unix.h.

Signed-off-by: Bo YU <tsu.yubo@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-10-31 12:37:12 -07:00
Vito Caputo
424c22fb62 af_unix.h: trivial whitespace cleanup
Replace spurious spaces with a tab and remove superfluous tab from
unix_sock struct.

Signed-off-by: Vito Caputo <vcaputo@pengaru.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-10-22 19:47:21 -07:00
Greg Kroah-Hartman
b24413180f License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.

By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.

Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier.  The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.

This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.

How this work was done:

Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
 - file had no licensing information it it.
 - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
 - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,

Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.

The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne.  Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.

The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed.  Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
 - Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
 - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
   lines of source
 - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
   lines).

All documentation files were explicitly excluded.

The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.

 - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
   considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
   COPYING file license applied.

   For non */uapi/* files that summary was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0                                              11139

   and resulted in the first patch in this series.

   If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
   Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0".  Results of that was:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|-------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        930

   and resulted in the second patch in this series.

 - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
   of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
   any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
   it (per prior point).  Results summary:

   SPDX license identifier                            # files
   ---------------------------------------------------|------
   GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note                       270
   GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      169
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause)    21
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    17
   LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                      15
   GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       14
   ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause)    5
   LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note                       4
   LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note                        3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT)              3
   ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT)             1

   and that resulted in the third patch in this series.

 - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
   the concluded license(s).

 - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
   license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
   licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.

 - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
   resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
   which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).

 - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
   confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

 - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
   the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
   in time.

In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.

Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights.  The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.

Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.

In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.

Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
 - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
   license ids and scores
 - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
   files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
 - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
   was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
   SPDX license was correct

This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction.  This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.

These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg.  Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected.  This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.)  Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.

Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-02 11:10:55 +01:00
David S. Miller
7a68ada6ec Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net 2017-07-21 03:38:43 +01:00
Linus Torvalds
e06fdaf40a Now that IPC and other changes have landed, enable manual markings for
randstruct plugin, including the task_struct.
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Merge tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.13-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

Pull structure randomization updates from Kees Cook:
 "Now that IPC and other changes have landed, enable manual markings for
  randstruct plugin, including the task_struct.

  This is the rest of what was staged in -next for the gcc-plugins, and
  comes in three patches, largest first:

   - mark "easy" structs with __randomize_layout

   - mark task_struct with an optional anonymous struct to isolate the
     __randomize_layout section

   - mark structs to opt _out_ of automated marking (which will come
     later)

  And, FWIW, this continues to pass allmodconfig (normal and patched to
  enable gcc-plugins) builds of x86_64, i386, arm64, arm, powerpc, and
  s390 for me"

* tag 'gcc-plugins-v4.13-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  randstruct: opt-out externally exposed function pointer structs
  task_struct: Allow randomized layout
  randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization
2017-07-19 08:55:18 -07:00
David Herrmann
27eac47b00 net/unix: drop obsolete fd-recursion limits
All unix sockets now account inflight FDs to the respective sender.
This was introduced in:

    commit 712f4aad40
    Author: willy tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
    Date:   Sun Jan 10 07:54:56 2016 +0100

        unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets

and further refined in:

    commit 415e3d3e90
    Author: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
    Date:   Wed Feb 3 02:11:03 2016 +0100

        unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct

Hence, regardless of the stacking depth of FDs, the total number of
inflight FDs is limited, and accounted. There is no known way for a
local user to exceed those limits or exploit the accounting.

Furthermore, the GC logic is independent of the recursion/stacking depth
as well. It solely depends on the total number of inflight FDs,
regardless of their layout.

Lastly, the current `recursion_level' suffers a TOCTOU race, since it
checks and inherits depths only at queue time. If we consider `A<-B' to
mean `queue-B-on-A', the following sequence circumvents the recursion
level easily:

    A<-B
       B<-C
          C<-D
             ...
               Y<-Z

resulting in:

    A<-B<-C<-...<-Z

With all of this in mind, lets drop the recursion limit. It has no
additional security value, anymore. On the contrary, it randomly
confuses message brokers that try to forward file-descriptors, since
any sendmsg(2) call can fail spuriously with ETOOMANYREFS if a client
maliciously modifies the FD while inflight.

Cc: Alban Crequy <alban.crequy@collabora.co.uk>
Cc: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@collabora.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Gundersen <teg@jklm.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-17 08:57:59 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
5518b69b76 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
 "Reasonably busy this cycle, but perhaps not as busy as in the 4.12
  merge window:

   1) Several optimizations for UDP processing under high load from
      Paolo Abeni.

   2) Support pacing internally in TCP when using the sch_fq packet
      scheduler for this is not practical. From Eric Dumazet.

   3) Support mutliple filter chains per qdisc, from Jiri Pirko.

   4) Move to 1ms TCP timestamp clock, from Eric Dumazet.

   5) Add batch dequeueing to vhost_net, from Jason Wang.

   6) Flesh out more completely SCTP checksum offload support, from
      Davide Caratti.

   7) More plumbing of extended netlink ACKs, from David Ahern, Pablo
      Neira Ayuso, and Matthias Schiffer.

   8) Add devlink support to nfp driver, from Simon Horman.

   9) Add RTM_F_FIB_MATCH flag to RTM_GETROUTE queries, from Roopa
      Prabhu.

  10) Add stack depth tracking to BPF verifier and use this information
      in the various eBPF JITs. From Alexei Starovoitov.

  11) Support XDP on qed device VFs, from Yuval Mintz.

  12) Introduce BPF PROG ID for better introspection of installed BPF
      programs. From Martin KaFai Lau.

  13) Add bpf_set_hash helper for TC bpf programs, from Daniel Borkmann.

  14) For loads, allow narrower accesses in bpf verifier checking, from
      Yonghong Song.

  15) Support MIPS in the BPF selftests and samples infrastructure, the
      MIPS eBPF JIT will be merged in via the MIPS GIT tree. From David
      Daney.

  16) Support kernel based TLS, from Dave Watson and others.

  17) Remove completely DST garbage collection, from Wei Wang.

  18) Allow installing TCP MD5 rules using prefixes, from Ivan
      Delalande.

  19) Add XDP support to Intel i40e driver, from Björn Töpel

  20) Add support for TC flower offload in nfp driver, from Simon
      Horman, Pieter Jansen van Vuuren, Benjamin LaHaise, Jakub
      Kicinski, and Bert van Leeuwen.

  21) IPSEC offloading support in mlx5, from Ilan Tayari.

  22) Add HW PTP support to macb driver, from Rafal Ozieblo.

  23) Networking refcount_t conversions, From Elena Reshetova.

  24) Add sock_ops support to BPF, from Lawrence Brako. This is useful
      for tuning the TCP sockopt settings of a group of applications,
      currently via CGROUPs"

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1899 commits)
  net: phy: dp83867: add workaround for incorrect RX_CTRL pin strap
  dt-bindings: phy: dp83867: provide a workaround for incorrect RX_CTRL pin strap
  cxgb4: Support for get_ts_info ethtool method
  cxgb4: Add PTP Hardware Clock (PHC) support
  cxgb4: time stamping interface for PTP
  nfp: default to chained metadata prepend format
  nfp: remove legacy MAC address lookup
  nfp: improve order of interfaces in breakout mode
  net: macb: remove extraneous return when MACB_EXT_DESC is defined
  bpf: add missing break in for the TCP_BPF_SNDCWND_CLAMP case
  bpf: fix return in load_bpf_file
  mpls: fix rtm policy in mpls_getroute
  net, ax25: convert ax25_cb.refcount from atomic_t to refcount_t
  net, ax25: convert ax25_route.refcount from atomic_t to refcount_t
  net, ax25: convert ax25_uid_assoc.refcount from atomic_t to refcount_t
  net, sctp: convert sctp_ep_common.refcnt from atomic_t to refcount_t
  net, sctp: convert sctp_transport.refcnt from atomic_t to refcount_t
  net, sctp: convert sctp_chunk.refcnt from atomic_t to refcount_t
  net, sctp: convert sctp_datamsg.refcnt from atomic_t to refcount_t
  net, sctp: convert sctp_auth_bytes.refcnt from atomic_t to refcount_t
  ...
2017-07-05 12:31:59 -07:00
Reshetova, Elena
8c9814b970 net: convert unix_address.refcnt from atomic_t to refcount_t
refcount_t type and corresponding API should be
used instead of atomic_t when the variable is used as
a reference counter. This allows to avoid accidental
refcounter overflows that might lead to use-after-free
situations.

Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-01 07:39:08 -07:00
Kees Cook
3859a271a0 randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization
This marks many critical kernel structures for randomization. These are
structures that have been targeted in the past in security exploits, or
contain functions pointers, pointers to function pointer tables, lists,
workqueues, ref-counters, credentials, permissions, or are otherwise
sensitive. This initial list was extracted from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's
code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding
of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and
don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code.

Left out of this list is task_struct, which requires special handling
and will be covered in a subsequent patch.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2017-06-30 12:00:51 -07:00