Commit Graph

7319 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Vitaly Kuznetsov
1e9dfbd748 KVM: nVMX: Use '-1' in 'hv_evmcs_vmptr' to indicate that eVMCS is not in use
Instead of checking 'vmx->nested.hv_evmcs' use '-1' in
'vmx->nested.hv_evmcs_vmptr' to indicate 'evmcs is not in use' state. This
matches how we check 'vmx->nested.current_vmptr'. Introduce EVMPTR_INVALID
and evmptr_is_valid() and use it instead of raw '-1' check as a preparation
to adding other 'special' values.

No functional change intended.

Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210526132026.270394-2-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:48 -04:00
Maxim Levitsky
158a48ecf7 KVM: x86: avoid loading PDPTRs after migration when possible
if new KVM_*_SREGS2 ioctls are used, the PDPTRs are
a part of the migration state and are correctly
restored by those ioctls.

Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210607090203.133058-9-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:48 -04:00
Maxim Levitsky
6dba940352 KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_GET_SREGS2 / KVM_SET_SREGS2
This is a new version of KVM_GET_SREGS / KVM_SET_SREGS.

It has the following changes:
   * Has flags for future extensions
   * Has vcpu's PDPTRs, allowing to save/restore them on migration.
   * Lacks obsolete interrupt bitmap (done now via KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS)

New capability, KVM_CAP_SREGS2 is added to signal
the userspace of this ioctl.

Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210607090203.133058-8-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:47 -04:00
Maxim Levitsky
329675dde9 KVM: x86: introduce kvm_register_clear_available
Small refactoring that will be used in the next patch.

Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210607090203.133058-7-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:47 -04:00
Maxim Levitsky
0f85722341 KVM: nVMX: delay loading of PDPTRs to KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES
Similar to the rest of guest page accesses after a migration,
this access should be delayed to KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES.

Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210607090203.133058-6-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:47 -04:00
Maxim Levitsky
b222b0b881 KVM: nSVM: refactor the CR3 reload on migration
Document the actual reason why we need to do it
on migration and move the call to svm_set_nested_state
to be closer to VMX code.

To avoid loading the PDPTRs from possibly not up to date memory map,
in nested_svm_load_cr3 after the move, move this code to
.get_nested_state_pages.

Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210607090203.133058-5-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:47 -04:00
Sean Christopherson
c7313155bf KVM: x86: Always load PDPTRs on CR3 load for SVM w/o NPT and a PAE guest
Kill off pdptrs_changed() and instead go through the full kvm_set_cr3()
for PAE guest, even if the new CR3 is the same as the current CR3.  For
VMX, and SVM with NPT enabled, the PDPTRs are unconditionally marked as
unavailable after VM-Exit, i.e. the optimization is dead code except for
SVM without NPT.

In the unlikely scenario that anyone cares about SVM without NPT _and_ a
PAE guest, they've got bigger problems if their guest is loading the same
CR3 so frequently that the performance of kvm_set_cr3() is notable,
especially since KVM's fast PGD switching means reloading the same CR3
does not require a full rebuild.  Given that PAE and PCID are mutually
exclusive, i.e. a sync and flush are guaranteed in any case, the actual
benefits of the pdptrs_changed() optimization are marginal at best.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210607090203.133058-4-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:46 -04:00
Sean Christopherson
a36dbec67e KVM: nSVM: Drop pointless pdptrs_changed() check on nested transition
Remove the "PDPTRs unchanged" check to skip PDPTR loading during nested
SVM transitions as it's not at all an optimization.  Reading guest memory
to get the PDPTRs isn't magically cheaper by doing it in pdptrs_changed(),
and if the PDPTRs did change, KVM will end up doing the read twice.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210607090203.133058-3-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:46 -04:00
Sean Christopherson
bcb72d0627 KVM: nVMX: Drop obsolete (and pointless) pdptrs_changed() check
Remove the pdptrs_changed() check when loading L2's CR3.  The set of
available registers is always reset when switching VMCSes (see commit
e5d03de593, "KVM: nVMX: Reset register cache (available and dirty
masks) on VMCS switch"), thus the "are PDPTRs available" check will
always fail.  And even if it didn't fail, reading guest memory to check
the PDPTRs is just as expensive as reading guest memory to load 'em.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210607090203.133058-2-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:46 -04:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
445caed021 KVM: x86: hyper-v: Honor HV_X64_EX_PROCESSOR_MASKS_RECOMMENDED bit
Hypercalls which use extended processor masks are only available when
HV_X64_EX_PROCESSOR_MASKS_RECOMMENDED privilege bit is exposed (and
'RECOMMENDED' is rather a misnomer).

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210521095204.2161214-28-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:44 -04:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
d264eb3c14 KVM: x86: hyper-v: Honor HV_X64_CLUSTER_IPI_RECOMMENDED bit
Hyper-V partition must possess 'HV_X64_CLUSTER_IPI_RECOMMENDED'
privilege ('recommended' is rather a misnomer) to issue
HVCALL_SEND_IPI hypercalls.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210521095204.2161214-27-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:44 -04:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
bb53ecb4d6 KVM: x86: hyper-v: Honor HV_X64_REMOTE_TLB_FLUSH_RECOMMENDED bit
Hyper-V partition must possess 'HV_X64_REMOTE_TLB_FLUSH_RECOMMENDED'
privilege ('recommended' is rather a misnomer) to issue
HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST/SPACE hypercalls.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210521095204.2161214-26-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:44 -04:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
a921cf83cc KVM: x86: hyper-v: Honor HV_DEBUGGING privilege bit
Hyper-V partition must possess 'HV_DEBUGGING' privilege to issue
HVCALL_POST_DEBUG_DATA/HVCALL_RETRIEVE_DEBUG_DATA/
HVCALL_RESET_DEBUG_SESSION hypercalls.

Note, when SynDBG is disabled hv_check_hypercall_access() returns
'true' (like for any other unknown hypercall) so the result will
be HV_STATUS_INVALID_HYPERCALL_CODE and not HV_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210521095204.2161214-25-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:44 -04:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
a60b3c594e KVM: x86: hyper-v: Honor HV_SIGNAL_EVENTS privilege bit
Hyper-V partition must possess 'HV_SIGNAL_EVENTS' privilege to issue
HVCALL_SIGNAL_EVENT hypercalls.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210521095204.2161214-24-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:43 -04:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
4f532b7f96 KVM: x86: hyper-v: Honor HV_POST_MESSAGES privilege bit
Hyper-V partition must possess 'HV_POST_MESSAGES' privilege to issue
HVCALL_POST_MESSAGE hypercalls.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210521095204.2161214-23-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:43 -04:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
34ef7d7b9c KVM: x86: hyper-v: Check access to HVCALL_NOTIFY_LONG_SPIN_WAIT hypercall
TLFS6.0b states that partition issuing HVCALL_NOTIFY_LONG_SPIN_WAIT must
posess 'UseHypercallForLongSpinWait' privilege but there's no
corresponding feature bit. Instead, we have "Recommended number of attempts
to retry a spinlock failure before notifying the hypervisor about the
failures. 0xFFFFFFFF indicates never notify." Use this to check access to
the hypercall. Also, check against zero as the corresponding CPUID must
be set (and '0' attempts before re-try is weird anyway).

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210521095204.2161214-22-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:43 -04:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
4ad81a9111 KVM: x86: hyper-v: Prepare to check access to Hyper-V hypercalls
Introduce hv_check_hypercallr_access() to check if the particular hypercall
should be available to guest, this will be used with
KVM_CAP_HYPERV_ENFORCE_CPUID mode.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210521095204.2161214-21-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:43 -04:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
1aa8a4184d KVM: x86: hyper-v: Honor HV_STIMER_DIRECT_MODE_AVAILABLE privilege bit
Synthetic timers can only be configured in 'direct' mode when
HV_STIMER_DIRECT_MODE_AVAILABLE bit was exposed.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210521095204.2161214-20-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:42 -04:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
d66bfa36f9 KVM: x86: hyper-v: Inverse the default in hv_check_msr_access()
Access to all MSRs is now properly checked. To avoid 'forgetting' to
properly check access to new MSRs in the future change the default
to 'false' meaning 'no access'.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210521095204.2161214-19-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:42 -04:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
17b6d51771 KVM: x86: hyper-v: Honor HV_FEATURE_DEBUG_MSRS_AVAILABLE privilege bit
Synthetic debugging MSRs (HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_CONTROL,
HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_STATUS, HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_SEND_BUFFER,
HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_RECV_BUFFER, HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_PENDING_BUFFER,
HV_X64_MSR_SYNDBG_OPTIONS) are only available to guest when
HV_FEATURE_DEBUG_MSRS_AVAILABLE bit is exposed.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210521095204.2161214-18-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:42 -04:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
0a19c8992d KVM: x86: hyper-v: Honor HV_FEATURE_GUEST_CRASH_MSR_AVAILABLE privilege bit
HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P0 ... HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_P4, HV_X64_MSR_CRASH_CTL are only
available to guest when HV_FEATURE_GUEST_CRASH_MSR_AVAILABLE bit is
exposed.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210521095204.2161214-17-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:42 -04:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
234d01baec KVM: x86: hyper-v: Honor HV_ACCESS_REENLIGHTENMENT privilege bit
HV_X64_MSR_REENLIGHTENMENT_CONTROL/HV_X64_MSR_TSC_EMULATION_CONTROL/
HV_X64_MSR_TSC_EMULATION_STATUS are only available to guest when
HV_ACCESS_REENLIGHTENMENT bit is exposed.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210521095204.2161214-16-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:41 -04:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
9442f3bd90 KVM: x86: hyper-v: Honor HV_ACCESS_FREQUENCY_MSRS privilege bit
HV_X64_MSR_TSC_FREQUENCY/HV_X64_MSR_APIC_FREQUENCY are only available to
guest when HV_ACCESS_FREQUENCY_MSRS bit is exposed.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210521095204.2161214-15-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:41 -04:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
978b57475c KVM: x86: hyper-v: Honor HV_MSR_APIC_ACCESS_AVAILABLE privilege bit
HV_X64_MSR_EOI, HV_X64_MSR_ICR, HV_X64_MSR_TPR, and
HV_X64_MSR_VP_ASSIST_PAGE  are only available to guest when
HV_MSR_APIC_ACCESS_AVAILABLE bit is exposed.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210521095204.2161214-14-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:41 -04:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
eba60ddae7 KVM: x86: hyper-v: Honor HV_MSR_SYNTIMER_AVAILABLE privilege bit
Synthetic timers MSRs (HV_X64_MSR_STIMER[0-3]_CONFIG,
HV_X64_MSR_STIMER[0-3]_COUNT) are only available to guest when
HV_MSR_SYNTIMER_AVAILABLE bit is exposed.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210521095204.2161214-13-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:41 -04:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
9e2715ca20 KVM: x86: hyper-v: Honor HV_MSR_SYNIC_AVAILABLE privilege bit
SynIC MSRs (HV_X64_MSR_SCONTROL, HV_X64_MSR_SVERSION, HV_X64_MSR_SIEFP,
HV_X64_MSR_SIMP, HV_X64_MSR_EOM, HV_X64_MSR_SINT0 ... HV_X64_MSR_SINT15)
are only available to guest when HV_MSR_SYNIC_AVAILABLE bit is exposed.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210521095204.2161214-12-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:40 -04:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
a1ec661c3f KVM: x86: hyper-v: Honor HV_MSR_REFERENCE_TSC_AVAILABLE privilege bit
HV_X64_MSR_REFERENCE_TSC is only available to guest when
HV_MSR_REFERENCE_TSC_AVAILABLE bit is exposed.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210521095204.2161214-11-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:40 -04:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
679008e4bb KVM: x86: hyper-v: Honor HV_MSR_RESET_AVAILABLE privilege bit
HV_X64_MSR_RESET is only available to guest when HV_MSR_RESET_AVAILABLE bit
is exposed.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210521095204.2161214-10-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:40 -04:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
d2ac25d419 KVM: x86: hyper-v: Honor HV_MSR_VP_INDEX_AVAILABLE privilege bit
HV_X64_MSR_VP_INDEX is only available to guest when
HV_MSR_VP_INDEX_AVAILABLE bit is exposed.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210521095204.2161214-9-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:40 -04:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
c2b32867f2 KVM: x86: hyper-v: Honor HV_MSR_TIME_REF_COUNT_AVAILABLE privilege bit
HV_X64_MSR_TIME_REF_COUNT is only available to guest when
HV_MSR_TIME_REF_COUNT_AVAILABLE bit is exposed.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210521095204.2161214-8-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:39 -04:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
b80a92ff81 KVM: x86: hyper-v: Honor HV_MSR_VP_RUNTIME_AVAILABLE privilege bit
HV_X64_MSR_VP_RUNTIME is only available to guest when
HV_MSR_VP_RUNTIME_AVAILABLE bit is exposed.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210521095204.2161214-7-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:39 -04:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
1561c2cb87 KVM: x86: hyper-v: Honor HV_MSR_HYPERCALL_AVAILABLE privilege bit
HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID/HV_X64_MSR_HYPERCALL are only available to guest
when HV_MSR_HYPERCALL_AVAILABLE bit is exposed.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210521095204.2161214-6-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:39 -04:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
b4128000e2 KVM: x86: hyper-v: Prepare to check access to Hyper-V MSRs
Introduce hv_check_msr_access() to check if the particular MSR
should be accessible by guest, this will be used with
KVM_CAP_HYPERV_ENFORCE_CPUID mode.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210521095204.2161214-5-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:39 -04:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
10d7bf1e46 KVM: x86: hyper-v: Cache guest CPUID leaves determining features availability
Limiting exposed Hyper-V features requires a fast way to check if the
particular feature is exposed in guest visible CPUIDs or not. To aboid
looping through all CPUID entries on every hypercall/MSR access cache
the required leaves on CPUID update.

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210521095204.2161214-4-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:38 -04:00
Vitaly Kuznetsov
644f706719 KVM: x86: hyper-v: Introduce KVM_CAP_HYPERV_ENFORCE_CPUID
Modeled after KVM_CAP_ENFORCE_PV_FEATURE_CPUID, the new capability allows
for limiting Hyper-V features to those exposed to the guest in Hyper-V
CPUIDs (0x40000003, 0x40000004, ...).

Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210521095204.2161214-3-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:38 -04:00
Vineeth Pillai
1183646a67 KVM: SVM: hyper-v: Direct Virtual Flush support
From Hyper-V TLFS:
 "The hypervisor exposes hypercalls (HvFlushVirtualAddressSpace,
  HvFlushVirtualAddressSpaceEx, HvFlushVirtualAddressList, and
  HvFlushVirtualAddressListEx) that allow operating systems to more
  efficiently manage the virtual TLB. The L1 hypervisor can choose to
  allow its guest to use those hypercalls and delegate the responsibility
  to handle them to the L0 hypervisor. This requires the use of a
  partition assist page."

Add the Direct Virtual Flush support for SVM.

Related VMX changes:
commit 6f6a657c99 ("KVM/Hyper-V/VMX: Add direct tlb flush support")

Signed-off-by: Vineeth Pillai <viremana@linux.microsoft.com>
Message-Id: <fc8d24d8eb7017266bb961e39a171b0caf298d7f.1622730232.git.viremana@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:38 -04:00
Vineeth Pillai
c4327f15df KVM: SVM: hyper-v: Enlightened MSR-Bitmap support
Enlightened MSR-Bitmap as per TLFS:

 "The L1 hypervisor may collaborate with the L0 hypervisor to make MSR
  accesses more efficient. It can enable enlightened MSR bitmaps by setting
  the corresponding field in the enlightened VMCS to 1. When enabled, L0
  hypervisor does not monitor the MSR bitmaps for changes. Instead, the L1
  hypervisor must invalidate the corresponding clean field after making
  changes to one of the MSR bitmaps."

Enable this for SVM.

Related VMX changes:
commit ceef7d10df ("KVM: x86: VMX: hyper-v: Enlightened MSR-Bitmap support")

Signed-off-by: Vineeth Pillai <viremana@linux.microsoft.com>
Message-Id: <87df0710f95d28b91cc4ea014fc4d71056eebbee.1622730232.git.viremana@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:37 -04:00
Vineeth Pillai
1e0c7d4075 KVM: SVM: hyper-v: Remote TLB flush for SVM
Enable remote TLB flush for SVM.

Signed-off-by: Vineeth Pillai <viremana@linux.microsoft.com>
Message-Id: <1ee364e397e142aed662d2920d198cd03772f1a5.1622730232.git.viremana@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:37 -04:00
Vineeth Pillai
59d21d67f3 KVM: SVM: Software reserved fields
SVM added support for certain reserved fields to be used by
software or hypervisor. Add the following reserved fields:
  - VMCB offset 0x3e0 - 0x3ff
  - Clean bit 31
  - SVM intercept exit code 0xf0000000

Later patches will make use of this for supporting Hyper-V
nested virtualization enhancements.

Signed-off-by: Vineeth Pillai <viremana@linux.microsoft.com>
Message-Id: <a1f17a43a8e9e751a1a9cc0281649d71bdbf721b.1622730232.git.viremana@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:37 -04:00
Vineeth Pillai
3c86c0d3db KVM: x86: hyper-v: Move the remote TLB flush logic out of vmx
Currently the remote TLB flush logic is specific to VMX.
Move it to a common place so that SVM can use it as well.

Signed-off-by: Vineeth Pillai <viremana@linux.microsoft.com>
Message-Id: <4f4e4ca19778437dae502f44363a38e99e3ef5d1.1622730232.git.viremana@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:36 -04:00
Krish Sadhukhan
d5a0483f9f KVM: nVMX: nSVM: Add a new VCPU statistic to show if VCPU is in guest mode
Add the following per-VCPU statistic to KVM debugfs to show if a given
VCPU is in guest mode:

	guest_mode

Also add this as a per-VM statistic to KVM debugfs to show the total number
of VCPUs that are in guest mode in a given VM.

Signed-off-by: Krish Sadhukhan <Krish.Sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20210609180340.104248-3-krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:36 -04:00
Krish Sadhukhan
b93af02c67 KVM: nVMX: nSVM: 'nested_run' should count guest-entry attempts that make it to guest code
Currently, the 'nested_run' statistic counts all guest-entry attempts,
including those that fail during vmentry checks on Intel and during
consistency checks on AMD. Convert this statistic to count only those
guest-entries that make it past these state checks and make it to guest
code. This will tell us the number of guest-entries that actually executed
or tried to execute guest code.

Signed-off-by: Krish Sadhukhan <Krish.Sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20210609180340.104248-2-krish.sadhukhan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:35 -04:00
Sean Christopherson
ecc513e5bb KVM: x86: Drop "pre_" from enter/leave_smm() helpers
Now that .post_leave_smm() is gone, drop "pre_" from the remaining
helpers.  The helpers aren't invoked purely before SMI/RSM processing,
e.g. both helpers are invoked after state is snapshotted (from regs or
SMRAM), and the RSM helper is invoked after some amount of register state
has been stuffed.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210609185619.992058-10-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:35 -04:00
Sean Christopherson
0128116550 KVM: x86: Drop .post_leave_smm(), i.e. the manual post-RSM MMU reset
Drop the .post_leave_smm() emulator callback, which at this point is just
a wrapper to kvm_mmu_reset_context().  The manual context reset is
unnecessary, because unlike enter_smm() which calls vendor MSR/CR helpers
directly, em_rsm() bounces through the KVM helpers, e.g. kvm_set_cr4(),
which are responsible for processing side effects.  em_rsm() is already
subtly relying on this behavior as it doesn't manually do
kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(), e.g. to recognize CR4.OSXSAVE changes.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210609185619.992058-9-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:35 -04:00
Sean Christopherson
1270e647c8 KVM: x86: Rename SMM tracepoint to make it reflect reality
Rename the SMM tracepoint, which handles both entering and exiting SMM,
from kvm_enter_smm to kvm_smm_transition.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210609185619.992058-8-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:35 -04:00
Sean Christopherson
0d7ee6f4b5 KVM: x86: Move "entering SMM" tracepoint into kvm_smm_changed()
Invoke the "entering SMM" tracepoint from kvm_smm_changed() instead of
enter_smm(), effectively moving it from before reading vCPU state to
after reading state (but still before writing it to SMRAM!).  The primary
motivation is to consolidate code, but calling the tracepoint from
kvm_smm_changed() also makes its invocation consistent with respect to
SMI and RSM, and with respect to KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS (which previously
only invoked the tracepoint when forcing the vCPU out of SMM).

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210609185619.992058-7-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:34 -04:00
Sean Christopherson
dc87275f47 KVM: x86: Move (most) SMM hflags modifications into kvm_smm_changed()
Move the core of SMM hflags modifications into kvm_smm_changed() and use
kvm_smm_changed() in enter_smm().  Clear HF_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK for
leaving SMM but do not set it for entering SMM.  If the vCPU is executing
outside of SMM, the flag should unequivocally be cleared, e.g. this
technically fixes a benign bug where the flag could be left set after
KVM_SET_VCPU_EVENTS, but the reverse is not true as NMI blocking depends
on pre-SMM state or userspace input.

Note, this adds an extra kvm_mmu_reset_context() to enter_smm().  The
extra/early reset isn't strictly necessary, and in a way can never be
necessary since the vCPU/MMU context is in a half-baked state until the
final context reset at the end of the function.  But, enter_smm() is not
a hot path, and exploding on an invalid root_hpa is probably better than
having a stale SMM flag in the MMU role; it's at least no worse.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210609185619.992058-6-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:34 -04:00
Sean Christopherson
fa75e08bbe KVM: x86: Invoke kvm_smm_changed() immediately after clearing SMM flag
Move RSM emulation's call to kvm_smm_changed() from .post_leave_smm() to
.exiting_smm(), leaving behind the MMU context reset.  The primary
motivation is to allow for future cleanup, but this also fixes a bug of
sorts by queueing KVM_REQ_EVENT even if RSM causes shutdown, e.g. to let
an INIT wake the vCPU from shutdown.  Of course, KVM doesn't properly
emulate a shutdown state, e.g. KVM doesn't block SMIs after shutdown, and
immediately exits to userspace, so the event request is a moot point in
practice.

Moving kvm_smm_changed() also moves the RSM tracepoint.  This isn't
strictly necessary, but will allow consolidating the SMI and RSM
tracepoints in a future commit (by also moving the SMI tracepoint).
Invoking the tracepoint before loading SMRAM state also means the SMBASE
that reported in the tracepoint will point that the state that will be
used for RSM, as opposed to the SMBASE _after_ RSM completes, which is
arguably a good thing if the tracepoint is being used to debug a RSM/SMM
issue.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210609185619.992058-5-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:34 -04:00
Sean Christopherson
edce46548b KVM: x86: Replace .set_hflags() with dedicated .exiting_smm() helper
Replace the .set_hflags() emulator hook with a dedicated .exiting_smm(),
moving the SMM and SMM_INSIDE_NMI flag handling out of the emulator in
the process.  This is a step towards consolidating much of the logic in
kvm_smm_changed(), including the SMM hflags updates.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210609185619.992058-4-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:34 -04:00
Sean Christopherson
25b17226cd KVM: x86: Emulate triple fault shutdown if RSM emulation fails
Use the recently introduced KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT to properly emulate
shutdown if RSM from SMM fails.

Note, entering shutdown after clearing the SMM flag and restoring NMI
blocking is architecturally correct with respect to AMD's APM, which KVM
also uses for SMRAM layout and RSM NMI blocking behavior.  The APM says:

  An RSM causes a processor shutdown if an invalid-state condition is
  found in the SMRAM state-save area. Only an external reset, external
  processor-initialization, or non-maskable external interrupt (NMI) can
  cause the processor to leave the shutdown state.

Of note is processor-initialization (INIT) as a valid shutdown wake
event, as INIT is blocked by SMM, implying that entering shutdown also
forces the CPU out of SMM.

For recent Intel CPUs, restoring NMI blocking is technically wrong, but
so is restoring NMI blocking in the first place, and Intel's RSM
"architecture" is such a mess that just about anything is allowed and can
be justified as micro-architectural behavior.

Per the SDM:

  On Pentium 4 and later processors, shutdown will inhibit INTR and A20M
  but will not change any of the other inhibits. On these processors,
  NMIs will be inhibited if no action is taken in the SMI handler to
  uninhibit them (see Section 34.8).

where Section 34.8 says:

  When the processor enters SMM while executing an NMI handler, the
  processor saves the SMRAM state save map but does not save the
  attribute to keep NMI interrupts disabled. Potentially, an NMI could be
  latched (while in SMM or upon exit) and serviced upon exit of SMM even
  though the previous NMI handler has still not completed.

I.e. RSM unconditionally unblocks NMI, but shutdown on RSM does not,
which is in direct contradiction of KVM's behavior.  But, as mentioned
above, KVM follows AMD architecture and restores NMI blocking on RSM, so
that micro-architectural detail is already lost.

And for Pentium era CPUs, SMI# can break shutdown, meaning that at least
some Intel CPUs fully leave SMM when entering shutdown:

  In the shutdown state, Intel processors stop executing instructions
  until a RESET#, INIT# or NMI# is asserted.  While Pentium family
  processors recognize the SMI# signal in shutdown state, P6 family and
  Intel486 processors do not.

In other words, the fact that Intel CPUs have implemented the two
extremes gives KVM carte blanche when it comes to honoring Intel's
architecture for handling shutdown during RSM.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210609185619.992058-3-seanjc@google.com>
[Return X86EMUL_CONTINUE after triple fault. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-06-17 13:09:33 -04:00