With the split of the security_task_getsecid() into subjective and
objective variants it's time to update Smack to ensure it is using
the correct task creds.
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
SELinux has a function, task_sid(), which returns the task's
objective credentials, but unfortunately is used in a few places
where the subjective task credentials should be used. Most notably
in the new security_task_getsecid_subj() LSM hook.
This patch fixes this and attempts to make things more obvious by
introducing a new function, task_sid_subj(), and renaming the
existing task_sid() function to task_sid_obj().
This patch also adds an interesting function in task_sid_binder().
The task_sid_binder() function has a comment which hopefully
describes it's reason for being, but it basically boils down to the
simple fact that we can't safely access another task's subjective
credentials so in the case of binder we need to stick with the
objective credentials regardless.
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Of the three LSMs that implement the security_task_getsecid() LSM
hook, all three LSMs provide the task's objective security
credentials. This turns out to be unfortunate as most of the hook's
callers seem to expect the task's subjective credentials, although
a small handful of callers do correctly expect the objective
credentials.
This patch is the first step towards fixing the problem: it splits
the existing security_task_getsecid() hook into two variants, one
for the subjective creds, one for the objective creds.
void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p,
u32 *secid);
void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p,
u32 *secid);
While this patch does fix all of the callers to use the correct
variant, in order to keep this patch focused on the callers and to
ease review, the LSMs continue to use the same implementation for
both hooks. The net effect is that this patch should not change
the behavior of the kernel in any way, it will be up to the latter
LSM specific patches in this series to change the hook
implementations and return the correct credentials.
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (IMA)
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add a new hook that takes an existing super block and a new mount
with new options and determines if new options confict with an
existing mount or not.
A filesystem can use this new hook to determine if it can share
the an existing superblock with a new superblock for the new mount.
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com>
Acked-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
[PM: tweak the subject line, fix tab/space problems]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20210322' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"Three SELinux patches:
- Fix a problem where a local variable is used outside its associated
function. Thankfully this can only be triggered by reloading the
SELinux policy, which is a restricted operation for other obvious
reasons.
- Fix some incorrect, and inconsistent, audit and printk messages
when loading the SELinux policy.
All three patches are relatively minor and have been through our
testing with no failures"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20210322' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinuxfs: unify policy load error reporting
selinux: fix variable scope issue in live sidtab conversion
selinux: don't log MAC_POLICY_LOAD record on failed policy load
Let's drop the pr_err()s from sel_make_policy_nodes() and just add one
pr_warn_ratelimited() call to the sel_make_policy_nodes() error path in
sel_write_load().
Changing from error to warning makes sense, since after 02a52c5c8c
("selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs"), this error
path no longer leads to a broken selinuxfs tree (it's just kept in the
original state and policy load is aborted).
I also added _ratelimited to be consistent with the other prtin in the
same function (it's probably not necessary, but can't really hurt...
there are likely more important error messages to be printed when
filesystem entry creation starts erroring out).
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Commit 02a52c5c8c ("selinux: move policy commit after updating
selinuxfs") moved the selinux_policy_commit() call out of
security_load_policy() into sel_write_load(), which caused a subtle yet
rather serious bug.
The problem is that security_load_policy() passes a reference to the
convert_params local variable to sidtab_convert(), which stores it in
the sidtab, where it may be accessed until the policy is swapped over
and RCU synchronized. Before 02a52c5c8c, selinux_policy_commit() was
called directly from security_load_policy(), so the convert_params
pointer remained valid all the way until the old sidtab was destroyed,
but now that's no longer the case and calls to sidtab_context_to_sid()
on the old sidtab after security_load_policy() returns may cause invalid
memory accesses.
This can be easily triggered using the stress test from commit
ee1a84fdfe ("selinux: overhaul sidtab to fix bug and improve
performance"):
```
function rand_cat() {
echo $(( $RANDOM % 1024 ))
}
function do_work() {
while true; do
echo -n "system_u:system_r:kernel_t:s0:c$(rand_cat),c$(rand_cat)" \
>/sys/fs/selinux/context 2>/dev/null || true
done
}
do_work >/dev/null &
do_work >/dev/null &
do_work >/dev/null &
while load_policy; do echo -n .; sleep 0.1; done
kill %1
kill %2
kill %3
```
Fix this by allocating the temporary sidtab convert structures
dynamically and passing them among the
selinux_policy_{load,cancel,commit} functions.
Fixes: 02a52c5c8c ("selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
[PM: merge fuzz in security.h and services.c]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
If sel_make_policy_nodes() fails, we should jump to 'out', not 'out1',
as the latter would incorrectly log an MAC_POLICY_LOAD audit record,
even though the policy hasn't actually been reloaded. The 'out1' jump
label now becomes unused and can be removed.
Fixes: 02a52c5c8c ("selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
It turns out that there are in fact userspace implementations that
care and this recent change caused a regression.
https://github.com/containers/buildah/issues/3071
As the motivation for the original change was future development,
and the impact is existing real world code just revert this change
and allow the ambiguity in v3 file caps.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 95ebabde38 ("capabilities: Don't allow writing ambiguous v3 file capabilities")
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
- RTM_NEWNEXTHOP et.al. that handle resilient groups will have a new nested
attribute, NHA_RES_GROUP, whose elements are attributes NHA_RES_GROUP_*.
- RTM_NEWNEXTHOPBUCKET et.al. is a suite of new messages that will
currently serve only for dumping of individual buckets of resilient next
hop groups. For nexthop group buckets, these messages will carry a nested
attribute NHA_RES_BUCKET, whose elements are attributes NHA_RES_BUCKET_*.
There are several reasons why a new suite of messages is created for
nexthop buckets instead of overloading the information on the existing
RTM_{NEW,DEL,GET}NEXTHOP messages.
First, a nexthop group can contain a large number of nexthop buckets (4k
is not unheard of). This imposes limits on the amount of information that
can be encoded for each nexthop bucket given a netlink message is limited
to 64k bytes.
Second, while RTM_NEWNEXTHOPBUCKET is only used for notifications at
this point, in the future it can be extended to provide user space with
control over nexthop buckets configuration.
- The new group type is NEXTHOP_GRP_TYPE_RES. Note that nexthop code is
adjusted to bounce groups with that type for now.
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
A typo is f out by codespell tool in 422th line of security.h:
$ codespell ./security/selinux/include/
./security.h:422: thie ==> the, this
Fix a typo found by codespell.
Signed-off-by: Xiong Zhenwu <xiong.zhenwu@zte.com.cn>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
A typo is found out by codespell tool in 16th line of hashtab.c
$ codespell ./security/selinux/ss/
./hashtab.c:16: rouding ==> rounding
Fix a typo found by codespell.
Signed-off-by: Xiong Zhenwu <xiong.zhenwu@zte.com.cn>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
SELinux stores the configuration state and the policy capabilities
in kernel memory. Changes to this data at runtime would have an impact
on the security guarantees provided by SELinux. Measuring this data
through IMA subsystem provides a tamper-resistant way for
an attestation service to remotely validate it at runtime.
Measure the configuration state and policy capabilities by calling
the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data().
To enable SELinux data measurement, the following steps are required:
1, Add "ima_policy=critical_data" to the kernel command line arguments
to enable measuring SELinux data at boot time.
For example,
BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.11.0-rc3+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset security=selinux ima_policy=critical_data
2, Add the following rule to /etc/ima/ima-policy
measure func=CRITICAL_DATA label=selinux
Sample measurement of SELinux state and policy capabilities:
10 2122...65d8 ima-buf sha256:13c2...1292 selinux-state 696e...303b
Execute the following command to extract the measured data
from the IMA's runtime measurements list:
grep "selinux-state" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p
The output should be a list of key-value pairs. For example,
initialized=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0;
To verify the measurement is consistent with the current SELinux state
reported on the system, compare the integer values in the following
files with those set in the IMA measurement (using the following commands):
- cat /sys/fs/selinux/enforce
- cat /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot
- cat /sys/fs/selinux/policy_capabilities/[capability_file]
Note that the actual verification would be against an expected state
and done on a separate system (likely an attestation server) requiring
"initialized=1;enforcing=1;checkreqprot=0;"
for a secure state and then whatever policy capabilities are actually
set in the expected policy (which can be extracted from the policy
itself via seinfo, for example).
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Now overlayfs allow unpriviliged mounts. That is root inside a non-init
user namespace can mount overlayfs. This is being added in 5.11 kernel.
Giuseppe tried to mount overlayfs with option "context" and it failed
with error -EACCESS.
$ su test
$ unshare -rm
$ mkdir -p lower upper work merged
$ mount -t overlay -o lowerdir=lower,workdir=work,upperdir=upper,userxattr,context='system_u:object_r:container_file_t:s0' none merged
This fails with -EACCESS. It works if option "-o context" is not specified.
Little debugging showed that selinux_set_mnt_opts() returns -EACCESS.
So this patch adds "overlay" to the list, where it is fine to specific
context from non init_user_ns.
Reported-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
[PM: trimmed the changelog from the description]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The functions defined in "arch/powerpc/kexec/ima.c" handle setting up
and freeing the resources required to carry over the IMA measurement
list from the current kernel to the next kernel across kexec system call.
These functions do not have architecture specific code, but are
currently limited to powerpc.
Move remove_ima_buffer() and setup_ima_buffer() calls into
of_kexec_alloc_and_setup_fdt() defined in "drivers/of/kexec.c".
Move the remaining architecture independent functions from
"arch/powerpc/kexec/ima.c" to "drivers/of/kexec.c".
Delete "arch/powerpc/kexec/ima.c" and "arch/powerpc/include/asm/ima.h".
Remove references to the deleted files and functions in powerpc and
in ima.
Co-developed-by: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210221174930.27324-11-nramas@linux.microsoft.com
The fields ima_buffer_addr and ima_buffer_size in "struct kimage_arch"
for powerpc are used to carry forward the IMA measurement list across
kexec system call. These fields are not architecture specific, but are
currently limited to powerpc.
arch_ima_add_kexec_buffer() defined in "arch/powerpc/kexec/ima.c"
sets ima_buffer_addr and ima_buffer_size for the kexec system call.
This function does not have architecture specific code, but is
currently limited to powerpc.
Move ima_buffer_addr and ima_buffer_size to "struct kimage".
Set ima_buffer_addr and ima_buffer_size in ima_add_kexec_buffer()
in security/integrity/ima/ima_kexec.c.
Co-developed-by: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210221174930.27324-9-nramas@linux.microsoft.com
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Merge tag 'keys-misc-20210126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull keyring updates from David Howells:
"Here's a set of minor keyrings fixes/cleanups that I've collected from
various people for the upcoming merge window.
A couple of them might, in theory, be visible to userspace:
- Make blacklist_vet_description() reject uppercase letters as they
don't match the all-lowercase hex string generated for a blacklist
search.
This may want reconsideration in the future, but, currently, you
can't add to the blacklist keyring from userspace and the only
source of blacklist keys generates lowercase descriptions.
- Fix blacklist_init() to use a new KEY_ALLOC_* flag to indicate that
it wants KEY_FLAG_KEEP to be set rather than passing KEY_FLAG_KEEP
into keyring_alloc() as KEY_FLAG_KEEP isn't a valid alloc flag.
This isn't currently a problem as the blacklist keyring isn't
currently writable by userspace.
The rest of the patches are cleanups and I don't think they should
have any visible effect"
* tag 'keys-misc-20210126' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
watch_queue: rectify kernel-doc for init_watch()
certs: Replace K{U,G}IDT_INIT() with GLOBAL_ROOT_{U,G}ID
certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusion
PKCS#7: Fix missing include
certs: Fix blacklisted hexadecimal hash string check
certs/blacklist: fix kernel doc interface issue
crypto: public_key: Remove redundant header file from public_key.h
keys: remove trailing semicolon in macro definition
crypto: pkcs7: Use match_string() helper to simplify the code
PKCS#7: drop function from kernel-doc pkcs7_validate_trust_one
encrypted-keys: Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones
crypto: asymmetric_keys: fix some comments in pkcs7_parser.h
KEYS: remove redundant memset
security: keys: delete repeated words in comments
KEYS: asymmetric: Fix kerneldoc
security/keys: use kvfree_sensitive()
watch_queue: Drop references to /dev/watch_queue
keys: Remove outdated __user annotations
security: keys: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
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Merge tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
"This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
maintainers.
Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
are just a few:
- Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
implementation of portable home directories in
systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
login time.
- It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
containers without having to change ownership permanently through
chown(2).
- It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
Linux subsystem.
- It is possible to share files between containers with
non-overlapping idmappings.
- Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
permission checking.
- They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
all files.
- Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
directory and container and vm scenario.
- Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
apply as long as the mount exists.
Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
this:
- systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
in their implementation of portable home directories.
https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/
- container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734
- The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
ported.
- ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.
I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:
https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdfhttps://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/
This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
xfs:
https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts
It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
merge this.
In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
testsuite.
Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
currently marked with.
The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
of extensibility.
The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
mount:
- The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.
- The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.
- The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.
- The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.
The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.
By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
behavioral or performance changes are observed.
The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:
1d7b902e28
In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed
and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The
patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or
complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and
xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and
will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify
that port has been done correctly.
The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped
mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most
valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform
mounts based on file descriptors only.
Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2()
RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time
we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and
path resolution.
While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount
proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not
possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in
the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing.
With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last
restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api,
covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the
crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount
tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This
syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and
projects.
There is a simple tool available at
https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped
that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this
patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you
decide to pull this in the following weeks:
Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home
directory:
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 28 04:00 ..
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 29 root root 4096 Oct 28 22:01 ..
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: mnt/my-file
# owner: u1001
# group: u1001
user::rw-
user:u1001:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: home/ubuntu/my-file
# owner: ubuntu
# group: ubuntu
user::rw-
user:ubuntu:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--"
* tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits)
xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl
xfs: support idmapped mounts
ext4: support idmapped mounts
fat: handle idmapped mounts
tests: add mount_setattr() selftests
fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
fs: add mount_setattr()
fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper
fs: split out functions to hold writers
namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt()
mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static
namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags
nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ima: handle idmapped mounts
apparmor: handle idmapped mounts
fs: make helpers idmap mount aware
exec: handle idmapped mounts
would_dump: handle idmapped mounts
...
Pull user namespace update from Eric Biederman:
"There are several pieces of active development, but only a single
change made it through the gauntlet to be ready for v5.12. That change
is tightening up the semantics of the v3 capabilities xattr. It is
just short of being a bug-fix/security issue as no user space is known
to even generate the problem case"
* 'userns-for-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
capabilities: Don't allow writing ambiguous v3 file capabilities
Pull RCU-safe common_lsm_audit() from Al Viro:
"Make common_lsm_audit() non-blocking and usable from RCU pathwalk
context.
We don't really need to grab/drop dentry in there - rcu_read_lock() is
enough. There's a couple of followups using that to simplify the
logics in selinux, but those hadn't soaked in -next yet, so they'll
have to go in next window"
* 'work.audit' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
make dump_common_audit_data() safe to be called from RCU pathwalk
new helper: d_find_alias_rcu()
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Merge tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.12-rc1-v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd
Pull tpm updates from Jarkko Sakkinen:
"New features:
- Cr50 I2C TPM driver
- sysfs exports of PCR registers in TPM 2.0 chips
Bug fixes:
- bug fixes for tpm_tis driver, which had a racy wait for hardware
state change to be ready to send a command to the TPM chip. The bug
has existed already since 2006, but has only made itself known in
recent past. This is the same as the "last time" :-)
- Otherwise there's bunch of fixes for not as alarming regressions. I
think the list is about the same as last time, except I added fixes
for some disjoint bugs in trusted keys that I found some time ago"
* tag 'tpmdd-next-v5.12-rc1-v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations
KEYS: trusted: Fix migratable=1 failing
KEYS: trusted: Fix incorrect handling of tpm_get_random()
tpm/ppi: Constify static struct attribute_group
ABI: add sysfs description for tpm exports of PCR registers
tpm: add sysfs exports for all banks of PCR registers
keys: Update comment for restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain
tpm: Remove tpm_dev_wq_lock
char: tpm: add i2c driver for cr50
tpm: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
tpm_tis: Clean up locality release
tpm_tis: Fix check_locality for correct locality acquisition
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Merge tag 'integrity-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar:
"New is IMA support for measuring kernel critical data, as per usual
based on policy. The first example measures the in memory SELinux
policy. The second example measures the kernel version.
In addition are four bug fixes to address memory leaks and a missing
'static' function declaration"
* tag 'integrity-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
integrity: Make function integrity_add_key() static
ima: Free IMA measurement buffer after kexec syscall
ima: Free IMA measurement buffer on error
IMA: Measure kernel version in early boot
selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hook
IMA: define a builtin critical data measurement policy
IMA: extend critical data hook to limit the measurement based on a label
IMA: limit critical data measurement based on a label
IMA: add policy rule to measure critical data
IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data
IMA: add support to measure buffer data hash
IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs
evm: Fix memleak in init_desc
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20210215' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"We've got a good handful of patches for SELinux this time around; with
everything passing the selinux-testsuite and applying cleanly to your
tree as of a few minutes ago. The highlights are:
- Add support for labeling anonymous inodes, and extend this new
support to userfaultfd.
- Fallback to SELinux genfs file labeling if the filesystem does not
have xattr support. This is useful for virtiofs which can vary in
its xattr support depending on the backing filesystem.
- Classify and handle MPTCP the same as TCP in SELinux.
- Ensure consistent behavior between inode_getxattr and
inode_listsecurity when the SELinux policy is not loaded. This
fixes a known problem with overlayfs.
- A couple of patches to prune some unused variables from the SELinux
code, mark private variables as static, and mark other variables as
__ro_after_init or __read_mostly"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20210215' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
fs: anon_inodes: rephrase to appropriate kernel-doc
userfaultfd: use secure anon inodes for userfaultfd
selinux: teach SELinux about anonymous inodes
fs: add LSM-supporting anon-inode interface
security: add inode_init_security_anon() LSM hook
selinux: fall back to SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS if no xattr support
selinux: mark selinux_xfrm_refcount as __read_mostly
selinux: mark some global variables __ro_after_init
selinux: make selinuxfs_mount static
selinux: drop the unnecessary aurule_callback variable
selinux: remove unused global variables
selinux: fix inconsistency between inode_getxattr and inode_listsecurity
selinux: handle MPTCP consistently with TCP
When TPM 2.0 trusted keys code was moved to the trusted keys subsystem,
the operations were unwrapped from tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops(),
which are used to take temporarily the ownership of the TPM chip. The
ownership is only taken inside tpm_send(), but this is not sufficient,
as in the key load TPM2_CC_LOAD, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL and TPM2_FLUSH_CONTEXT
need to be done as a one single atom.
Take the TPM chip ownership before sending anything with
tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops(), and use tpm_transmit_cmd() to send
TPM commands instead of tpm_send(), reverting back to the old behaviour.
Fixes: 2e19e10131 ("KEYS: trusted: Move TPM2 trusted keys code")
Reported-by: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Acked-by Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Consider the following transcript:
$ keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=helloworld keyhandle=80000000 migratable=1" @u
add_key: Invalid argument
The documentation has the following description:
migratable= 0|1 indicating permission to reseal to new PCR values,
default 1 (resealing allowed)
The consequence is that "migratable=1" should succeed. Fix this by
allowing this condition to pass instead of return -EINVAL.
[*] Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Fixes: d00a1c72f7 ("keys: add new trusted key-type")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
When tpm_get_random() was introduced, it defined the following API for the
return value:
1. A positive value tells how many bytes of random data was generated.
2. A negative value on error.
However, in the call sites the API was used incorrectly, i.e. as it would
only return negative values and otherwise zero. Returning he positive read
counts to the user space does not make any possible sense.
Fix this by returning -EIO when tpm_get_random() returns a positive value.
Fixes: 41ab999c80 ("tpm: Move tpm_get_random api into the TPM device driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Kent Yoder <key@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The sparse tool complains as follows:
security/integrity/digsig.c:146:12: warning:
symbol 'integrity_add_key' was not declared. Should it be static?
This function is not used outside of digsig.c, so this
commit marks it static.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 60740accf7 ("integrity: Load certs to the platform keyring")
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
IMA allocates kernel virtual memory to carry forward the measurement
list, from the current kernel to the next kernel on kexec system call,
in ima_add_kexec_buffer() function. This buffer is not freed before
completing the kexec system call resulting in memory leak.
Add ima_buffer field in "struct kimage" to store the virtual address
of the buffer allocated for the IMA measurement list.
Free the memory allocated for the IMA measurement list in
kimage_file_post_load_cleanup() function.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Fixes: 7b8589cc29 ("ima: on soft reboot, save the measurement list")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
IMA allocates kernel virtual memory to carry forward the measurement
list, from the current kernel to the next kernel on kexec system call,
in ima_add_kexec_buffer() function. In error code paths this memory
is not freed resulting in memory leak.
Free the memory allocated for the IMA measurement list in
the error code paths in ima_add_kexec_buffer() function.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Fixes: 7b8589cc29 ("ima: on soft reboot, save the measurement list")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
clang static analysis reports this representative problem:
label.c:1463:16: warning: Assigned value is garbage or undefined
label->hname = name;
^ ~~~~
In aa_update_label_name(), this the problem block of code
if (aa_label_acntsxprint(&name, ...) == -1)
return res;
On failure, aa_label_acntsxprint() has a more complicated return
that just -1. So check for a negative return.
It was also noted that the aa_label_acntsxprint() main comment refers
to a nonexistent parameter, so clean up the comment.
Fixes: f1bd904175 ("apparmor: add the base fns() for domain labels")
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Drop repeated words in comments.
{a, then, to}
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Delete the doubled word "then" in a comment.
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
With LSM stacking calling back into capable to check for MAC_ADMIN
for apparmor policy results in asking the other stacked LSMs for
MAC_ADMIN resulting in the other LSMs answering based on their
policy management.
For apparmor policy management we just need to call apparmor's
capability fn directly.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Previously the policy capable checks assumed they were using the
current task. Make them take the task label so the query can be
made against an arbitrary task.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
syzbot found WARNINGs in several smackfs write operations where
bytes count is passed to memdup_user_nul which exceeds
GFP MAX_ORDER. Check count size if bigger than PAGE_SIZE.
Per smackfs doc, smk_write_net4addr accepts any label or -CIPSO,
smk_write_net6addr accepts any label or -DELETE. I couldn't find
any general rule for other label lengths except SMK_LABELLEN,
SMK_LONGLABEL, SMK_CIPSOMAX which are documented.
Let's constrain, in general, smackfs label lengths for PAGE_SIZE.
Although fuzzer crashes write to smackfs/netlabel on 0x400000 length.
Here is a quick way to reproduce the WARNING:
python -c "print('A' * 0x400000)" > /sys/fs/smackfs/netlabel
Reported-by: syzbot+a71a442385a0b2815497@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sabyrzhan Tasbolatov <snovitoll@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Commit db68ce10c4 ("new helper: uaccess_kernel()") replaced
segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS) with uaccess_kernel(). But the correct
method for tomoyo to check whether current is a kernel thread in order
to assume that kernel threads are privileged for socket operations was
(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD). Now that uaccess_kernel() became 0 on x86,
tomoyo has to fix this problem. Do like commit 942cb357ae ("Smack:
Handle io_uring kernel thread privileges") does.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
syzbot is reporting that tomoyo's quota check is racy [1]. But this check
is tolerant of some degree of inaccuracy. Thus, teach KCSAN to ignore
this data race.
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=999533deec7ba6337f8aa25d8bd1a4d5f7e50476
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+0789a72b46fd91431bd8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
If a capability is stored on disk in v2 format cap_inode_getsecurity() will
currently return in v2 format unconditionally.
This is wrong: v2 cap should be equivalent to a v3 cap with zero rootid,
and so the same conversions performed on it.
If the rootid cannot be mapped, v3 is returned unconverted. Fix this so
that both v2 and v3 return -EOVERFLOW if the rootid (or the owner of the fs
user namespace in case of v2) cannot be mapped into the current user
namespace.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The integrity of a kernel can be verified by the boot loader on cold
boot, and during kexec, by the current running kernel, before it is
loaded. However, it is still possible that the new kernel being
loaded is older than the current kernel, and/or has known
vulnerabilities. Therefore, it is imperative that an attestation
service be able to verify the version of the kernel being loaded on
the client, from cold boot and subsequent kexec system calls,
ensuring that only kernels with versions known to be good are loaded.
Measure the kernel version using ima_measure_critical_data() early on
in the boot sequence, reducing the chances of known kernel
vulnerabilities being exploited. With IMA being part of the kernel,
this overall approach makes the measurement itself more trustworthy.
To enable measuring the kernel version "ima_policy=critical_data"
needs to be added to the kernel command line arguments.
For example,
BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.11.0-rc3+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset ima_policy=critical_data
If runtime measurement of the kernel version is ever needed, the
following should be added to /etc/ima/ima-policy:
measure func=CRITICAL_DATA label=kernel_info
To extract the measured data after boot, the following command can be used:
grep -m 1 "kernel_version" \
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements
Sample output from the command above:
10 a8297d408e9d5155728b619761d0dd4cedf5ef5f ima-buf
sha256:5660e19945be0119bc19cbbf8d9c33a09935ab5d30dad48aa11f879c67d70988
kernel_version 352e31312e302d7263332d31363138372d676564623634666537383234342d6469727479
The above hex-ascii string corresponds to the kernel version
(e.g. xxd -r -p):
5.11.0-rc3-16187-gedb64fe78244-dirty
Signed-off-by: Raphael Gianotti <raphgi@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
IMA does sometimes access the inode's i_uid and compares it against the
rules' fowner. Enable IMA to handle idmapped mounts by passing down the
mount's user namespace. We simply make use of the helpers we introduced
before. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so
non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-27-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
The i_uid and i_gid are mostly used when logging for AppArmor. This is
broken in a bunch of places where the global root id is reported instead
of the i_uid or i_gid of the file. Nonetheless, be kind and log the
mapped inode if we're coming from an idmapped mount. If the initial user
namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see
identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-26-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Extend some inode methods with an additional user namespace argument. A
filesystem that is aware of idmapped mounts will receive the user
namespace the mount has been marked with. This can be used for
additional permission checking and also to enable filesystems to
translate between uids and gids if they need to. We have implemented all
relevant helpers in earlier patches.
As requested we simply extend the exisiting inode method instead of
introducing new ones. This is a little more code churn but it's mostly
mechanical and doesnt't leave us with additional inode methods.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-25-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
When interacting with user namespace and non-user namespace aware
filesystem capabilities the vfs will perform various security checks to
determine whether or not the filesystem capabilities can be used by the
caller, whether they need to be removed and so on. The main
infrastructure for this resides in the capability codepaths but they are
called through the LSM security infrastructure even though they are not
technically an LSM or optional. This extends the existing security hooks
security_inode_removexattr(), security_inode_killpriv(),
security_inode_getsecurity() to pass down the mount's user namespace and
makes them aware of idmapped mounts.
In order to actually get filesystem capabilities from disk the
capability infrastructure exposes the get_vfs_caps_from_disk() helper.
For user namespace aware filesystem capabilities a root uid is stored
alongside the capabilities.
In order to determine whether the caller can make use of the filesystem
capability or whether it needs to be ignored it is translated according
to the superblock's user namespace. If it can be translated to uid 0
according to that id mapping the caller can use the filesystem
capabilities stored on disk. If we are accessing the inode that holds
the filesystem capabilities through an idmapped mount we map the root
uid according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are
identical to non-idmapped mounts: reading filesystem caps from disk
enforces that the root uid associated with the filesystem capability
must have a mapping in the superblock's user namespace and that the
caller is either in the same user namespace or is a descendant of the
superblock's user namespace. For filesystems that are mountable inside
user namespace the caller can just mount the filesystem and won't
usually need to idmap it. If they do want to idmap it they can create an
idmapped mount and mark it with a user namespace they created and which
is thus a descendant of s_user_ns. For filesystems that are not
mountable inside user namespaces the descendant rule is trivially true
because the s_user_ns will be the initial user namespace.
If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped
mounts will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-11-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
When interacting with extended attributes the vfs verifies that the
caller is privileged over the inode with which the extended attribute is
associated. For posix access and posix default extended attributes a uid
or gid can be stored on-disk. Let the functions handle posix extended
attributes on idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an
idmapped mount we need to map it according to the mount's user
namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts.
This has no effect for e.g. security xattrs since they don't store uids
or gids and don't perform permission checks on them like posix acls do.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-10-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.pizza>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
The posix acl permission checking helpers determine whether a caller is
privileged over an inode according to the acls associated with the
inode. Add helpers that make it possible to handle acls on idmapped
mounts.
The vfs and the filesystems targeted by this first iteration make use of
posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user() and posix_acl_fix_xattr_to_user() to
translate basic posix access and default permissions such as the
ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP type according to the initial user namespace (or
the superblock's user namespace) to and from the caller's current user
namespace. Adapt these two helpers to handle idmapped mounts whereby we
either map from or into the mount's user namespace depending on in which
direction we're translating.
Similarly, cap_convert_nscap() is used by the vfs to translate user
namespace and non-user namespace aware filesystem capabilities from the
superblock's user namespace to the caller's user namespace. Enable it to
handle idmapped mounts by accounting for the mount's user namespace.
In addition the fileystems targeted in the first iteration of this patch
series make use of the posix_acl_chmod() and, posix_acl_update_mode()
helpers. Both helpers perform permission checks on the target inode. Let
them handle idmapped mounts. These two helpers are called when posix
acls are set by the respective filesystems to handle this case we extend
the ->set() method to take an additional user namespace argument to pass
the mount's user namespace down.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-9-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
The inode_owner_or_capable() helper determines whether the caller is the
owner of the inode or is capable with respect to that inode. Allow it to
handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped
mount it according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks
are identical to non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is
passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical
behavior as before.
Similarly, allow the inode_init_owner() helper to handle idmapped
mounts. It initializes a new inode on idmapped mounts by mapping the
fsuid and fsgid of the caller from the mount's user namespace. If the
initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts
will see identical behavior as before.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-7-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
In order to determine whether a caller holds privilege over a given
inode the capability framework exposes the two helpers
privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid() and capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(). The former
verifies that the inode has a mapping in the caller's user namespace and
the latter additionally verifies that the caller has the requested
capability in their current user namespace.
If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount map it into the
mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to
non-idmapped inodes. If the initial user namespace is passed all
operations are a nop so non-idmapped mounts will not see a change in
behavior.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-5-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
KEY_FLAG_KEEP is not meant to be passed to keyring_alloc() or key_alloc(),
as these only take KEY_ALLOC_* flags. KEY_FLAG_KEEP has the same value as
KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION, but fortunately only key_create_or_update()
uses it. LSMs using the key_alloc hook don't check that flag.
KEY_FLAG_KEEP is then ignored but fortunately (again) the root user cannot
write to the blacklist keyring, so it is not possible to remove a key/hash
from it.
Fix this by adding a KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP flag that tells key_alloc() to set
KEY_FLAG_KEEP on the new key. blacklist_init() can then, correctly, pass
this to keyring_alloc().
We can also use this in ima_mok_init() rather than setting the flag
manually.
Note that this doesn't fix an observable bug with the current
implementation but it is required to allow addition of new hashes to the
blacklist in the future without making it possible for them to be removed.
Fixes: 734114f878 ("KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring")
Reported-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Reviewing use of memset in keyctl_pkey.c
keyctl_pkey_params_get prologue code to set params up
memset(params, 0, sizeof(*params));
params->encoding = "raw";
keyctl_pkey_query has the same prologue
and calls keyctl_pkey_params_get.
So remove the prologue.
Signed-off-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
Drop repeated words in comments.
{to, will, the}
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Use kvfree_sensitive() instead of open-coding it.
Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <efremov@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
The merged API doesn't use a watch_queue device, but instead relies on
pipes, so let the documentation reflect that.
Fixes: f7e47677e3 ("watch_queue: Add a key/keyring notification facility")
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
When the semantics of the ->read() handlers were changed such that "buffer"
is a kernel pointer, some __user annotations survived.
Since they're wrong now, get rid of them.
Fixes: d3ec10aa95 ("KEYS: Don't write out to userspace while holding key semaphore")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
In preparation to enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough for Clang, fix a warning
by explicitly adding a break statement instead of letting the code fall
through to the next case.
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/115
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
We are not guaranteed the locking environment that would prevent
dentry getting renamed right under us. And it's possible for
old long name to be freed after rename, leading to UAF here.
Cc: stable@kernel.org # v2.6.2+
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
SELinux stores the active policy in memory, so the changes to this data
at runtime would have an impact on the security guarantees provided
by SELinux. Measuring in-memory SELinux policy through IMA subsystem
provides a secure way for the attestation service to remotely validate
the policy contents at runtime.
Measure the hash of the loaded policy by calling the IMA hook
ima_measure_critical_data(). Since the size of the loaded policy
can be large (several MB), measure the hash of the policy instead of
the entire policy to avoid bloating the IMA log entry.
To enable SELinux data measurement, the following steps are required:
1, Add "ima_policy=critical_data" to the kernel command line arguments
to enable measuring SELinux data at boot time.
For example,
BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.10.0-rc1+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset security=selinux ima_policy=critical_data
2, Add the following rule to /etc/ima/ima-policy
measure func=CRITICAL_DATA label=selinux
Sample measurement of the hash of SELinux policy:
To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run
the following commands and verify the output hash values match.
sha256sum /sys/fs/selinux/policy | cut -d' ' -f 1
grep "selinux-policy-hash" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f 6
Note that the actual verification of SELinux policy would require loading
the expected policy into an identical kernel on a pristine/known-safe
system and run the sha256sum /sys/kernel/selinux/policy there to get
the expected hash.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Define a new critical data builtin policy to allow measuring
early kernel integrity critical data before a custom IMA policy
is loaded.
Update the documentation on kernel parameters to document
the new critical data builtin policy.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() does not support a way to
specify the source of the critical data provider. Thus, the data
measurement cannot be constrained based on the data source label
in the IMA policy.
Extend the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() to support passing
the data source label as an input parameter, so that the policy rule can
be used to limit the measurements based on the label.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Integrity critical data may belong to a single subsystem or it may
arise from cross subsystem interaction. Currently there is no mechanism
to group or limit the data based on certain label. Limiting and
grouping critical data based on a label would make it flexible and
configurable to measure.
Define "label:=", a new IMA policy condition, for the IMA func
CRITICAL_DATA to allow grouping and limiting measurement of integrity
critical data.
Limit the measurement to the labels that are specified in the IMA
policy - CRITICAL_DATA+"label:=". If "label:=" is not provided with
the func CRITICAL_DATA, measure all the input integrity critical data.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
A new IMA policy rule is needed for the IMA hook
ima_measure_critical_data() and the corresponding func CRITICAL_DATA for
measuring the input buffer. The policy rule should ensure the buffer
would get measured only when the policy rule allows the action. The
policy rule should also support the necessary constraints (flags etc.)
for integrity critical buffer data measurements.
Add policy rule support for measuring integrity critical data.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
IMA provides capabilities to measure file and buffer data. However,
various data structures, policies, and states stored in kernel memory
also impact the integrity of the system. Several kernel subsystems
contain such integrity critical data. These kernel subsystems help
protect the integrity of the system. Currently, IMA does not provide a
generic function for measuring kernel integrity critical data.
Define ima_measure_critical_data, a new IMA hook, to measure kernel
integrity critical data.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The original IMA buffer data measurement sizes were small (e.g. boot
command line), but the new buffer data measurement use cases have data
sizes that are a lot larger. Just as IMA measures the file data hash,
not the file data, IMA should similarly support the option for measuring
buffer data hash.
Introduce a boolean parameter to support measuring buffer data hash,
which would be much smaller, instead of the buffer itself.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
IMA functions such as ima_match_keyring(), process_buffer_measurement(),
ima_match_policy() etc. handle data specific to keyrings. Currently,
these constructs are not generic to handle any func specific data.
This makes it harder to extend them without code duplication.
Refactor the keyring specific measurement constructs to be generic and
reusable in other measurement scenarios.
Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This change uses the anon_inodes and LSM infrastructure introduced in
the previous patches to give SELinux the ability to control
anonymous-inode files that are created using the new
anon_inode_getfd_secure() function.
A SELinux policy author detects and controls these anonymous inodes by
adding a name-based type_transition rule that assigns a new security
type to anonymous-inode files created in some domain. The name used
for the name-based transition is the name associated with the
anonymous inode for file listings --- e.g., "[userfaultfd]" or
"[perf_event]".
Example:
type uffd_t;
type_transition sysadm_t sysadm_t : anon_inode uffd_t "[userfaultfd]";
allow sysadm_t uffd_t:anon_inode { create };
(The next patch in this series is necessary for making userfaultfd
support this new interface. The example above is just
for exposition.)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This change adds a new LSM hook, inode_init_security_anon(), that will
be used while creating secure anonymous inodes. The hook allows/denies
its creation and assigns a security context to the inode.
The new hook accepts an optional context_inode parameter that callers
can use to provide additional contextual information to security modules
for granting/denying permission to create an anon-inode of the same type.
This context_inode's security_context can also be used to initialize the
newly created anon-inode's security_context.
Signed-off-by: Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
When a superblock is assigned the SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR behavior by the
policy yet it lacks xattr support, try to fall back to genfs rather than
rejecting the mount. If a genfscon rule is found for the filesystem,
then change the behavior to SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS, otherwise reject the
mount as before. A similar fallback is already done in security_fs_use()
if no behavior specification is found for the given filesystem.
This is needed e.g. for virtiofs, which may or may not support xattrs
depending on the backing host filesystem.
Example:
# seinfo --genfs | grep ' ramfs'
genfscon ramfs / system_u:object_r:ramfs_t:s0
# echo '(fsuse xattr ramfs (system_u object_r fs_t ((s0) (s0))))' >ramfs_xattr.cil
# semodule -i ramfs_xattr.cil
# mount -t ramfs none /mnt
Before:
mount: /mnt: mount(2) system call failed: Operation not supported.
After:
(mount succeeds)
# ls -Zd /mnt
system_u:object_r:ramfs_t:s0 /mnt
See also:
https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20210105142148.GA3200@redhat.com/T/https://github.com/fedora-selinux/selinux-policy/pull/478
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
tmp_tfm is allocated, but not freed on subsequent kmalloc failure, which
leads to a memory leak. Free tmp_tfm.
Fixes: d46eb36995 ("evm: crypto hash replaced by shash")
Signed-off-by: Dinghao Liu <dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: formatted/reworded patch description]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This is motivated by a perfomance regression of selinux_xfrm_enabled()
that happened on a RHEL kernel due to false sharing between
selinux_xfrm_refcount and (the late) selinux_ss.policy_rwlock (i.e. the
.bss section memory layout changed such that they happened to share the
same cacheline). Since the policy rwlock's memory region was modified
upon each read-side critical section, the readers of
selinux_xfrm_refcount had frequent cache misses, eventually leading to a
significant performance degradation under a TCP SYN flood on a system
with many cores (32 in this case, but it's detectable on less cores as
well).
While upstream has since switched to RCU locking, so the same can no
longer happen here, selinux_xfrm_refcount could still share a cacheline
with another frequently written region, thus marking it __read_mostly
still makes sense. __read_mostly helps, because it will put the symbol
in a separate section along with other read-mostly variables, so there
should never be a clash with frequently written data.
Since selinux_xfrm_refcount is modified only in case of an explicit
action, it should be safe to do this (i.e. it shouldn't disrupt other
read-mostly variables too much).
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
All of these are never modified outside initcalls, so they can be
__ro_after_init.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
It is not referenced outside selinuxfs.c, so remove its extern header
declaration and make it static.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Its value is actually not changed anywhere, so it can be substituted for
a direct call to audit_update_lsm_rules().
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
All of sel_ib_pkey_list, sel_netif_list, sel_netnode_list, and
sel_netport_list are declared but never used. Remove them.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
When inode has no listxattr op of its own (e.g. squashfs) vfs_listxattr
calls the LSM inode_listsecurity hooks to list the xattrs that LSMs will
intercept in inode_getxattr hooks.
When selinux LSM is installed but not initialized, it will list the
security.selinux xattr in inode_listsecurity, but will not intercept it
in inode_getxattr. This results in -ENODATA for a getxattr call for an
xattr returned by listxattr.
This situation was manifested as overlayfs failure to copy up lower
files from squashfs when selinux is built-in but not initialized,
because ovl_copy_xattr() iterates the lower inode xattrs by
vfs_listxattr() and vfs_getxattr().
Match the logic of inode_listsecurity to that of inode_getxattr and
do not list the security.selinux xattr if selinux is not initialized.
Reported-by: Michael Labriola <michael.d.labriola@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Michael Labriola <michael.d.labriola@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-unionfs/2nv9d47zt7.fsf@aldarion.sourceruckus.org/
Fixes: c8e222616c ("selinux: allow reading labels before policy is loaded")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org#v5.9+
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The MPTCP protocol uses a specific protocol value, even if
it's an extension to TCP. Additionally, MPTCP sockets
could 'fall-back' to TCP at run-time, depending on peer MPTCP
support and available resources.
As a consequence of the specific protocol number, selinux
applies the raw_socket class to MPTCP sockets.
Existing TCP application converted to MPTCP - or forced to
use MPTCP socket with user-space hacks - will need an
updated policy to run successfully.
This change lets selinux attach the TCP socket class to
MPTCP sockets, too, so that no policy changes are needed in
the above scenario.
Note that the MPTCP is setting, propagating and updating the
security context on all the subflows and related request
socket.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/CAHC9VhTaK3xx0hEGByD2zxfF7fadyPP1kb-WeWH_YCyq9X-sRg@mail.gmail.com/T/#t
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
[PM: tweaked subject's prefix]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The v3 file capabilities have a uid field that records the filesystem
uid of the root user of the user namespace the file capabilities are
valid in.
When someone is silly enough to have the same underlying uid as the
root uid of multiple nested containers a v3 filesystem capability can
be ambiguous.
In the spirit of don't do that then, forbid writing a v3 filesystem
capability if it is ambiguous.
Fixes: 8db6c34f1d ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities")
Reviewed-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
in the face of io_uring's use of kernel threads.
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Merge tag 'Smack-for-5.11-io_uring-fix' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next
Pull smack fix from Casey Schaufler:
"Provide a fix for the incorrect handling of privilege in the face of
io_uring's use of kernel threads. That invalidated an long standing
assumption regarding the privilege of kernel threads.
The fix is simple and safe. It was provided by Jens Axboe and has been
tested"
* tag 'Smack-for-5.11-io_uring-fix' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
Smack: Handle io_uring kernel thread privileges
- Don't move BSS section around pointlessly in the x86 decompressor
- Refactor helper for discovering the EFI secure boot mode
- Wire up EFI secure boot to IMA for arm64
- Some fixes for the capsule loader
- Expose the RT_PROP table via the EFI test module
- Relax DT and kernel placement restrictions on ARM
+ followup fixes:
- fix the build breakage on IA64 caused by recent capsule loader changes
- suppress a type mismatch build warning in the expansion of
EFI_PHYS_ALIGN on ARM
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Merge tag 'efi_updates_for_v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull EFI updates from Borislav Petkov:
"These got delayed due to a last minute ia64 build issue which got
fixed in the meantime.
EFI updates collected by Ard Biesheuvel:
- Don't move BSS section around pointlessly in the x86 decompressor
- Refactor helper for discovering the EFI secure boot mode
- Wire up EFI secure boot to IMA for arm64
- Some fixes for the capsule loader
- Expose the RT_PROP table via the EFI test module
- Relax DT and kernel placement restrictions on ARM
with a few followup fixes:
- fix the build breakage on IA64 caused by recent capsule loader
changes
- suppress a type mismatch build warning in the expansion of
EFI_PHYS_ALIGN on ARM"
* tag 'efi_updates_for_v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
efi: arm: force use of unsigned type for EFI_PHYS_ALIGN
efi: ia64: disable the capsule loader
efi: stub: get rid of efi_get_max_fdt_addr()
efi/efi_test: read RuntimeServicesSupported
efi: arm: reduce minimum alignment of uncompressed kernel
efi: capsule: clean scatter-gather entries from the D-cache
efi: capsule: use atomic kmap for transient sglist mappings
efi: x86/xen: switch to efi_get_secureboot_mode helper
arm64/ima: add ima_arch support
ima: generalize x86/EFI arch glue for other EFI architectures
efi: generalize efi_get_secureboot
efi/libstub: EFI_GENERIC_STUB_INITRD_CMDLINE_LOADER should not default to yes
efi/x86: Only copy the compressed kernel image in efi_relocate_kernel()
efi/libstub/x86: simplify efi_is_native()
Smack assumes that kernel threads are privileged for smackfs
operations. This was necessary because the credential of the
kernel thread was not related to a user operation. With io_uring
the credential does reflect a user's rights and can be used.
Suggested-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Acked-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Merge tag 'ovl-update-5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs
Pull overlayfs updates from Miklos Szeredi:
- Allow unprivileged mounting in a user namespace.
For quite some time the security model of overlayfs has been that
operations on underlying layers shall be performed with the
privileges of the mounting task.
This way an unprvileged user cannot gain privileges by the act of
mounting an overlayfs instance. A full audit of all function calls
made by the overlayfs code has been performed to see whether they
conform to this model, and this branch contains some fixes in this
regard.
- Support running on copied filesystem images by optionally disabling
UUID verification.
- Bug fixes as well as documentation updates.
* tag 'ovl-update-5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs:
ovl: unprivieged mounts
ovl: do not get metacopy for userxattr
ovl: do not fail because of O_NOATIME
ovl: do not fail when setting origin xattr
ovl: user xattr
ovl: simplify file splice
ovl: make ioctl() safe
ovl: check privs before decoding file handle
vfs: verify source area in vfs_dedupe_file_range_one()
vfs: move cap_convert_nscap() call into vfs_setxattr()
ovl: fix incorrect extent info in metacopy case
ovl: expand warning in ovl_d_real()
ovl: document lower modification caveats
ovl: warn about orphan metacopy
ovl: doc clarification
ovl: introduce new "uuid=off" option for inodes index feature
ovl: propagate ovl_fs to ovl_decode_real_fh and ovl_encode_real_fh
set of corrections in function header comments.
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Merge tag 'Smack-for-5.11' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next
Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler:
"There are no functional changes. Just one minor code clean-up and a
set of corrections in function header comments"
* tag 'Smack-for-5.11' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
security/smack: remove unused varible 'rc'
Smack: fix kernel-doc interface on functions
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Merge tag 'integrity-v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Just three patches here. Other integrity changes are being upstreamed
via EFI (defines a common EFI secure and trusted boot IMA policy) and
BPF LSM (exporting the IMA file cache hash info based on inode).
The three patches included here:
- bug fix: fail calculating the file hash, when a file not opened for
read and the attempt to re-open it for read fails.
- defer processing the "ima_appraise" boot command line option to
avoid enabling different modes (e.g. fix, log) to when the secure
boot flag is available on arm.
- defines "ima-buf" as the default IMA buffer measurement template in
preparation for the builtin integrity "critical data" policy"
* tag 'integrity-v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: Don't modify file descriptor mode on the fly
ima: select ima-buf template for buffer measurement
ima: defer arch_ima_get_secureboot() call to IMA init time
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20201214' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"While we have a small number of SELinux patches for v5.11, there are a
few changes worth highlighting:
- Change the LSM network hooks to pass flowi_common structs instead
of the parent flowi struct as the LSMs do not currently need the
full flowi struct and they do not have enough information to use it
safely (missing information on the address family).
This patch was discussed both with Herbert Xu (representing team
netdev) and James Morris (representing team
LSMs-other-than-SELinux).
- Fix how we handle errors in inode_doinit_with_dentry() so that we
attempt to properly label the inode on following lookups instead of
continuing to treat it as unlabeled.
- Tweak the kernel logic around allowx, auditallowx, and dontauditx
SELinux policy statements such that the auditx/dontauditx are
effective even without the allowx statement.
Everything passes our test suite"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20201214' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
lsm,selinux: pass flowi_common instead of flowi to the LSM hooks
selinux: Fix fall-through warnings for Clang
selinux: drop super_block backpointer from superblock_security_struct
selinux: fix inode_doinit_with_dentry() LABEL_INVALID error handling
selinux: allow dontauditx and auditallowx rules to take effect without allowx
selinux: fix error initialization in inode_doinit_with_dentry()
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Merge tag 'audit-pr-20201214' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"A small set of audit patches for v5.11 with four patches in total and
only one of any real significance.
Richard's patch to trigger accompanying records causes the kernel to
emit additional related records when an audit event occurs; helping
provide some much needed context to events in the audit log. It is
also worth mentioning that this is a revised patch based on an earlier
attempt that had to be reverted in the v5.8 time frame.
Everything passes our test suite, and with no problems reported please
merge this for v5.11"
* tag 'audit-pr-20201214' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: replace atomic_add_return()
audit: fix macros warnings
audit: trigger accompanying records when no rules present
audit: fix a kernel-doc markup
Strangely I hadn't had noticed the existence of the list_entry_is_head()
in apparmor code when added the same one in the list.h. Luckily it's
fully identical and didn't break builds. In any case we don't need a
duplicate anymore, thus remove it from apparmor code.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201208100639.88182-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
Fixes: e130816164 ("include/linux/list.h: add a macro to test if entry is pointing to the head")
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E . Hallyn " <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Core:
- support "prefer busy polling" NAPI operation mode, where we defer softirq
for some time expecting applications to periodically busy poll
- AF_XDP: improve efficiency by more batching and hindering
the adjacency cache prefetcher
- af_packet: make packet_fanout.arr size configurable up to 64K
- tcp: optimize TCP zero copy receive in presence of partial or unaligned
reads making zero copy a performance win for much smaller messages
- XDP: add bulk APIs for returning / freeing frames
- sched: support fragmenting IP packets as they come out of conntrack
- net: allow virtual netdevs to forward UDP L4 and fraglist GSO skbs
BPF:
- BPF switch from crude rlimit-based to memcg-based memory accounting
- BPF type format information for kernel modules and related tracing
enhancements
- BPF implement task local storage for BPF LSM
- allow the FENTRY/FEXIT/RAW_TP tracing programs to use bpf_sk_storage
Protocols:
- mptcp: improve multiple xmit streams support, memory accounting and
many smaller improvements
- TLS: support CHACHA20-POLY1305 cipher
- seg6: add support for SRv6 End.DT4/DT6 behavior
- sctp: Implement RFC 6951: UDP Encapsulation of SCTP
- ppp_generic: add ability to bridge channels directly
- bridge: Connectivity Fault Management (CFM) support as is defined in
IEEE 802.1Q section 12.14.
Drivers:
- mlx5: make use of the new auxiliary bus to organize the driver internals
- mlx5: more accurate port TX timestamping support
- mlxsw:
- improve the efficiency of offloaded next hop updates by using
the new nexthop object API
- support blackhole nexthops
- support IEEE 802.1ad (Q-in-Q) bridging
- rtw88: major bluetooth co-existance improvements
- iwlwifi: support new 6 GHz frequency band
- ath11k: Fast Initial Link Setup (FILS)
- mt7915: dual band concurrent (DBDC) support
- net: ipa: add basic support for IPA v4.5
Refactor:
- a few pieces of in_interrupt() cleanup work from Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
- phy: add support for shared interrupts; get rid of multiple driver
APIs and have the drivers write a full IRQ handler, slight growth
of driver code should be compensated by the simpler API which
also allows shared IRQs
- add common code for handling netdev per-cpu counters
- move TX packet re-allocation from Ethernet switch tag drivers to
a central place
- improve efficiency and rename nla_strlcpy
- number of W=1 warning cleanups as we now catch those in a patchwork
build bot
Old code removal:
- wan: delete the DLCI / SDLA drivers
- wimax: move to staging
- wifi: remove old WDS wifi bridging support
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'net-next-5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next
Pull networking updates from Jakub Kicinski:
"Core:
- support "prefer busy polling" NAPI operation mode, where we defer
softirq for some time expecting applications to periodically busy
poll
- AF_XDP: improve efficiency by more batching and hindering the
adjacency cache prefetcher
- af_packet: make packet_fanout.arr size configurable up to 64K
- tcp: optimize TCP zero copy receive in presence of partial or
unaligned reads making zero copy a performance win for much smaller
messages
- XDP: add bulk APIs for returning / freeing frames
- sched: support fragmenting IP packets as they come out of conntrack
- net: allow virtual netdevs to forward UDP L4 and fraglist GSO skbs
BPF:
- BPF switch from crude rlimit-based to memcg-based memory accounting
- BPF type format information for kernel modules and related tracing
enhancements
- BPF implement task local storage for BPF LSM
- allow the FENTRY/FEXIT/RAW_TP tracing programs to use
bpf_sk_storage
Protocols:
- mptcp: improve multiple xmit streams support, memory accounting and
many smaller improvements
- TLS: support CHACHA20-POLY1305 cipher
- seg6: add support for SRv6 End.DT4/DT6 behavior
- sctp: Implement RFC 6951: UDP Encapsulation of SCTP
- ppp_generic: add ability to bridge channels directly
- bridge: Connectivity Fault Management (CFM) support as is defined
in IEEE 802.1Q section 12.14.
Drivers:
- mlx5: make use of the new auxiliary bus to organize the driver
internals
- mlx5: more accurate port TX timestamping support
- mlxsw:
- improve the efficiency of offloaded next hop updates by using
the new nexthop object API
- support blackhole nexthops
- support IEEE 802.1ad (Q-in-Q) bridging
- rtw88: major bluetooth co-existance improvements
- iwlwifi: support new 6 GHz frequency band
- ath11k: Fast Initial Link Setup (FILS)
- mt7915: dual band concurrent (DBDC) support
- net: ipa: add basic support for IPA v4.5
Refactor:
- a few pieces of in_interrupt() cleanup work from Sebastian Andrzej
Siewior
- phy: add support for shared interrupts; get rid of multiple driver
APIs and have the drivers write a full IRQ handler, slight growth
of driver code should be compensated by the simpler API which also
allows shared IRQs
- add common code for handling netdev per-cpu counters
- move TX packet re-allocation from Ethernet switch tag drivers to a
central place
- improve efficiency and rename nla_strlcpy
- number of W=1 warning cleanups as we now catch those in a patchwork
build bot
Old code removal:
- wan: delete the DLCI / SDLA drivers
- wimax: move to staging
- wifi: remove old WDS wifi bridging support"
* tag 'net-next-5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (1922 commits)
net: hns3: fix expression that is currently always true
net: fix proc_fs init handling in af_packet and tls
nfc: pn533: convert comma to semicolon
af_vsock: Assign the vsock transport considering the vsock address flags
af_vsock: Set VMADDR_FLAG_TO_HOST flag on the receive path
vsock_addr: Check for supported flag values
vm_sockets: Add VMADDR_FLAG_TO_HOST vsock flag
vm_sockets: Add flags field in the vsock address data structure
net: Disable NETIF_F_HW_TLS_TX when HW_CSUM is disabled
tcp: Add logic to check for SYN w/ data in tcp_simple_retransmit
net: mscc: ocelot: install MAC addresses in .ndo_set_rx_mode from process context
nfc: s3fwrn5: Release the nfc firmware
net: vxget: clean up sparse warnings
mlxsw: spectrum_router: Use eXtended mezzanine to offload IPv4 router
mlxsw: spectrum: Set KVH XLT cache mode for Spectrum2/3
mlxsw: spectrum_router_xm: Introduce basic XM cache flushing
mlxsw: reg: Add Router LPM Cache Enable Register
mlxsw: reg: Add Router LPM Cache ML Delete Register
mlxsw: spectrum_router_xm: Implement L-value tracking for M-index
mlxsw: reg: Add XM Router M Table Register
...
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Add speed testing on 1420-byte blocks for networking
Algorithms:
- Improve performance of chacha on ARM for network packets
- Improve performance of aegis128 on ARM for network packets
Drivers:
- Add support for Keem Bay OCS AES/SM4
- Add support for QAT 4xxx devices
- Enable crypto-engine retry mechanism in caam
- Enable support for crypto engine on sdm845 in qce
- Add HiSilicon PRNG driver support"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (161 commits)
crypto: qat - add capability detection logic in qat_4xxx
crypto: qat - add AES-XTS support for QAT GEN4 devices
crypto: qat - add AES-CTR support for QAT GEN4 devices
crypto: atmel-i2c - select CONFIG_BITREVERSE
crypto: hisilicon/trng - replace atomic_add_return()
crypto: keembay - Add support for Keem Bay OCS AES/SM4
dt-bindings: Add Keem Bay OCS AES bindings
crypto: aegis128 - avoid spurious references crypto_aegis128_update_simd
crypto: seed - remove trailing semicolon in macro definition
crypto: x86/poly1305 - Use TEST %reg,%reg instead of CMP $0,%reg
crypto: x86/sha512 - Use TEST %reg,%reg instead of CMP $0,%reg
crypto: aesni - Use TEST %reg,%reg instead of CMP $0,%reg
crypto: cpt - Fix sparse warnings in cptpf
hwrng: ks-sa - Add dependency on IOMEM and OF
crypto: lib/blake2s - Move selftest prototype into header file
crypto: arm/aes-ce - work around Cortex-A57/A72 silion errata
crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned accesses in ecdh_set_secret()
crypto: ccree - rework cache parameters handling
crypto: cavium - Use dma_set_mask_and_coherent to simplify code
crypto: marvell/octeontx - Use dma_set_mask_and_coherent to simplify code
...
cap_convert_nscap() does permission checking as well as conversion of the
xattr value conditionally based on fs's user-ns.
This is needed by overlayfs and probably other layered fs (ecryptfs) and is
what vfs_foo() is supposed to do anyway.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
pull request (net-next): ipsec-next 2020-12-12
Just one patch this time:
1) Redact the SA keys with kernel lockdown confidentiality.
If enabled, no secret keys are sent to uuserspace.
From Antony Antony.
* 'master' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec-next:
xfrm: redact SA secret with lockdown confidentiality
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201212085737.2101294-1-steffen.klassert@secunet.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Alexei Starovoitov says:
====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2020-12-03
The main changes are:
1) Support BTF in kernel modules, from Andrii.
2) Introduce preferred busy-polling, from Björn.
3) bpf_ima_inode_hash() and bpf_bprm_opts_set() helpers, from KP Singh.
4) Memcg-based memory accounting for bpf objects, from Roman.
5) Allow bpf_{s,g}etsockopt from cgroup bind{4,6} hooks, from Stanislav.
* https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (118 commits)
selftests/bpf: Fix invalid use of strncat in test_sockmap
libbpf: Use memcpy instead of strncpy to please GCC
selftests/bpf: Add fentry/fexit/fmod_ret selftest for kernel module
selftests/bpf: Add tp_btf CO-RE reloc test for modules
libbpf: Support attachment of BPF tracing programs to kernel modules
libbpf: Factor out low-level BPF program loading helper
bpf: Allow to specify kernel module BTFs when attaching BPF programs
bpf: Remove hard-coded btf_vmlinux assumption from BPF verifier
selftests/bpf: Add CO-RE relocs selftest relying on kernel module BTF
selftests/bpf: Add support for marking sub-tests as skipped
selftests/bpf: Add bpf_testmod kernel module for testing
libbpf: Add kernel module BTF support for CO-RE relocations
libbpf: Refactor CO-RE relocs to not assume a single BTF object
libbpf: Add internal helper to load BTF data by FD
bpf: Keep module's btf_data_size intact after load
bpf: Fix bpf_put_raw_tracepoint()'s use of __module_address()
selftests/bpf: Add Userspace tests for TCP_WINDOW_CLAMP
bpf: Adds support for setting window clamp
samples/bpf: Fix spelling mistake "recieving" -> "receiving"
bpf: Fix cold build of test_progs-no_alu32
...
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201204021936.85653-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
A followup change to tcp_request_sock_op would have to drop the 'const'
qualifier from the 'route_req' function as the
'security_inet_conn_request' call is moved there - and that function
expects a 'struct sock *'.
However, it turns out its also possible to add a const qualifier to
security_inet_conn_request instead.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Commit a408e4a86b ("ima: open a new file instance if no read
permissions") already introduced a second open to measure a file when the
original file descriptor does not allow it. However, it didn't remove the
existing method of changing the mode of the original file descriptor, which
is still necessary if the current process does not have enough privileges
to open a new one.
Changing the mode isn't really an option, as the filesystem might need to
do preliminary steps to make the read possible. Thus, this patch removes
the code and keeps the second open as the only option to measure a file
when it is unreadable with the original file descriptor.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.20.x: 0014cc04e8 ima: Set file->f_mode
Fixes: 2fe5d6def1 ("ima: integrity appraisal extension")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Since tomoyo_memory_ok() will check for null pointer returned by
kzalloc() in tomoyo_assign_profile(), tomoyo_assign_namespace(),
tomoyo_get_name() and tomoyo_commit_ok(), then emit OOM warnings
if needed. And this is the expected behavior as informed by
Tetsuo Handa.
Let's add __GFP_NOWARN to kzalloc() in those related functions.
Besides, to achieve this goal, remove the null check for entry
right after kzalloc() in tomoyo_assign_namespace().
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
redact XFRM SA secret in the netlink response to xfrm_get_sa()
or dumpall sa.
Enable lockdown, confidentiality mode, at boot or at run time.
e.g. when enabled:
cat /sys/kernel/security/lockdown
none integrity [confidentiality]
ip xfrm state
src 172.16.1.200 dst 172.16.1.100
proto esp spi 0x00000002 reqid 2 mode tunnel
replay-window 0
aead rfc4106(gcm(aes)) 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 96
note: the aead secret is redacted.
Redacting secret is also a FIPS 140-2 requirement.
v1->v2
- add size checks before memset calls
v2->v3
- replace spaces with tabs for consistency
v3->v4
- use kernel lockdown instead of a /proc setting
v4->v5
- remove kconfig option
Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
This is in preparation to add a helper for BPF LSM programs to use
IMA hashes when attached to LSM hooks. There are LSM hooks like
inode_unlink which do not have a struct file * argument and cannot
use the existing ima_file_hash API.
An inode based API is, therefore, useful in LSM based detections like an
executable trying to delete itself which rely on the inode_unlink LSM
hook.
Moreover, the ima_file_hash function does nothing with the struct file
pointer apart from calling file_inode on it and converting it to an
inode.
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20201124151210.1081188-2-kpsingh@chromium.org
As pointed out by Herbert in a recent related patch, the LSM hooks do
not have the necessary address family information to use the flowi
struct safely. As none of the LSMs currently use any of the protocol
specific flowi information, replace the flowi pointers with pointers
to the address family independent flowi_common struct.
Reported-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In preparation to enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough for Clang, fix a warning
by explicitly adding a break statement instead of letting the code fall
through to the next case.
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/115
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Provide the proposed description (add key) or the original description
(update/instantiate key) when preparsing a key so that the key type can
validate it against the data.
This is important for rxrpc server keys as we need to check that they have
the right amount of key material present - and it's better to do that when
the key is loaded rather than deep in trying to process a response packet.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
The default IMA template used for all policy rules is the value set
for CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE if the policy rule does not specify
a template. The default IMA template for buffer measurements should be
'ima-buf' - so that the measured buffer is correctly included in the IMA
measurement log entry.
With the default template format, buffer measurements are added to
the measurement list, but do not include the buffer data, making it
difficult, if not impossible, to validate. Including 'ima-buf'
template records in the measurement list by default, should not impact
existing attestation servers without 'ima-buf' template support.
Initialize a global 'ima-buf' template and select that template,
by default, for buffer measurements.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Currently <crypto/sha.h> contains declarations for both SHA-1 and SHA-2,
and <crypto/sha3.h> contains declarations for SHA-3.
This organization is inconsistent, but more importantly SHA-1 is no
longer considered to be cryptographically secure. So to the extent
possible, SHA-1 shouldn't be grouped together with any of the other SHA
versions, and usage of it should be phased out.
Therefore, split <crypto/sha.h> into two headers <crypto/sha1.h> and
<crypto/sha2.h>, and make everyone explicitly specify whether they want
the declarations for SHA-1, SHA-2, or both.
This avoids making the SHA-1 declarations visible to files that don't
want anything to do with SHA-1. It also prepares for potentially moving
sha1.h into a new insecure/ or dangerous/ directory.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This varible isn't used and can be removed to avoid a gcc warning:
security/smack/smack_lsm.c:3873:6: warning: variable ‘rc’ set but not
used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
Signed-off-by: Alex Shi <alex.shi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20201113' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fix from Paul Moore:
"One small SELinux patch to make sure we return an error code when an
allocation fails. It passes all of our tests, but given the nature of
the patch that isn't surprising"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20201113' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: Fix error return code in sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow()
Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2020-11-14
1) Add BTF generation for kernel modules and extend BTF infra in kernel
e.g. support for split BTF loading and validation, from Andrii Nakryiko.
2) Support for pointers beyond pkt_end to recognize LLVM generated patterns
on inlined branch conditions, from Alexei Starovoitov.
3) Implements bpf_local_storage for task_struct for BPF LSM, from KP Singh.
4) Enable FENTRY/FEXIT/RAW_TP tracing program to use the bpf_sk_storage
infra, from Martin KaFai Lau.
5) Add XDP bulk APIs that introduce a defer/flush mechanism to optimize the
XDP_REDIRECT path, from Lorenzo Bianconi.
6) Fix a potential (although rather theoretical) deadlock of hashtab in NMI
context, from Song Liu.
7) Fixes for cross and out-of-tree build of bpftool and runqslower allowing build
for different target archs on same source tree, from Jean-Philippe Brucker.
8) Fix error path in htab_map_alloc() triggered from syzbot, from Eric Dumazet.
9) Move functionality from test_tcpbpf_user into the test_progs framework so it
can run in BPF CI, from Alexander Duyck.
10) Lift hashtab key_size limit to be larger than MAX_BPF_STACK, from Florian Lehner.
Note that for the fix from Song we have seen a sparse report on context
imbalance which requires changes in sparse itself for proper annotation
detection where this is currently being discussed on linux-sparse among
developers [0]. Once we have more clarification/guidance after their fix,
Song will follow-up.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sparse/CAHk-=wh4bx8A8dHnX612MsDO13st6uzAz1mJ1PaHHVevJx_ZCw@mail.gmail.com/T/https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sparse/20201109221345.uklbp3lzgq6g42zb@ltop.local/T/
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (66 commits)
net: mlx5: Add xdp tx return bulking support
net: mvpp2: Add xdp tx return bulking support
net: mvneta: Add xdp tx return bulking support
net: page_pool: Add bulk support for ptr_ring
net: xdp: Introduce bulking for xdp tx return path
bpf: Expose bpf_d_path helper to sleepable LSM hooks
bpf: Augment the set of sleepable LSM hooks
bpf: selftest: Use bpf_sk_storage in FENTRY/FEXIT/RAW_TP
bpf: Allow using bpf_sk_storage in FENTRY/FEXIT/RAW_TP
bpf: Rename some functions in bpf_sk_storage
bpf: Folding omem_charge() into sk_storage_charge()
selftests/bpf: Add asm tests for pkt vs pkt_end comparison.
selftests/bpf: Add skb_pkt_end test
bpf: Support for pointers beyond pkt_end.
tools/bpf: Always run the *-clean recipes
tools/bpf: Add bootstrap/ to .gitignore
bpf: Fix NULL dereference in bpf_task_storage
tools/bpftool: Fix build slowdown
tools/runqslower: Build bpftool using HOSTCC
tools/runqslower: Enable out-of-tree build
...
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201114020819.29584-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
The are some kernel-doc interface issues:
security/smack/smackfs.c:1950: warning: Function parameter or member
'list' not described in 'smk_parse_label_list'
security/smack/smackfs.c:1950: warning: Excess function parameter
'private' description in 'smk_parse_label_list'
security/smack/smackfs.c:1979: warning: Function parameter or member
'list' not described in 'smk_destroy_label_list'
security/smack/smackfs.c:1979: warning: Excess function parameter 'head'
description in 'smk_destroy_label_list'
security/smack/smackfs.c:2141: warning: Function parameter or member
'count' not described in 'smk_read_logging'
security/smack/smackfs.c:2141: warning: Excess function parameter 'cn'
description in 'smk_read_logging'
security/smack/smackfs.c:2278: warning: Function parameter or member
'format' not described in 'smk_user_access'
Correct them in this patch.
Signed-off-by: Alex Shi <alex.shi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Fix to return a negative error code from the error handling case
instead of 0 in function sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow(), as done elsewhere
in this function.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 409dcf3153 ("selinux: Add a cache for quicker retreival of PKey SIDs")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Chen Zhou <chenzhou10@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
It appears to have been needed for selinux_complete_init() in the past,
but today it's useless.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Similar to bpf_local_storage for sockets and inodes add local storage
for task_struct.
The life-cycle of storage is managed with the life-cycle of the
task_struct. i.e. the storage is destroyed along with the owning task
with a callback to the bpf_task_storage_free from the task_free LSM
hook.
The BPF LSM allocates an __rcu pointer to the bpf_local_storage in
the security blob which are now stackable and can co-exist with other
LSMs.
The userspace map operations can be done by using a pid fd as a key
passed to the lookup, update and delete operations.
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20201106103747.2780972-3-kpsingh@chromium.org
Move the x86 IMA arch code into security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c,
so that we will be able to wire it up for arm64 in a future patch.
Co-developed-by: Chester Lin <clin@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Chester Lin <clin@suse.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
A previous fix, commit 83370b31a9 ("selinux: fix error initialization
in inode_doinit_with_dentry()"), changed how failures were handled
before a SELinux policy was loaded. Unfortunately that patch was
potentially problematic for two reasons: it set the isec->initialized
state without holding a lock, and it didn't set the inode's SELinux
label to the "default" for the particular filesystem. The later can
be a problem if/when a later attempt to revalidate the inode fails
and SELinux reverts to the existing inode label.
This patch should restore the default inode labeling that existed
before the original fix, without affecting the LABEL_INVALID marking
such that revalidation will still be attempted in the future.
Fixes: 83370b31a9 ("selinux: fix error initialization in inode_doinit_with_dentry()")
Reported-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Since wildcards that need recursion consume kernel stack memory (or might
cause CPU stall warning problem), we cannot allow infinite recursion.
Since TOMOYO 1.8 survived with 20 recursions limit for 5 years, nobody
would complain if applying this limit to TOMOYO 2.6.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Chester reports that it is necessary to introduce a new way to pass
the EFI secure boot status between the EFI stub and the core kernel
on ARM systems. The usual way of obtaining this information is by
checking the SecureBoot and SetupMode EFI variables, but this can
only be done after the EFI variable workqueue is created, which
occurs in a subsys_initcall(), whereas arch_ima_get_secureboot()
is called much earlier by the IMA framework.
However, the IMA framework itself is started as a late_initcall,
and the only reason the call to arch_ima_get_secureboot() occurs
so early is because it happens in the context of a __setup()
callback that parses the ima_appraise= command line parameter.
So let's refactor this code a little bit, by using a core_param()
callback to capture the command line argument, and deferring any
reasoning based on its contents to the IMA init routine.
Cc: Chester Lin <clin@suse.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20200904072905.25332-2-clin@suse.com/
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> [missing core_param()]
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: included linux/module.h]
Tested-by: Chester Lin <clin@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
clang warns about additions on NULL pointers being undefined in C:
security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c:226:59: warning: arithmetic on a null pointer treated as a cast from integer to pointer is a GNU extension [-Wnull-pointer-arithmetic]
securityfs_create_file(name, mode, parent, ((u8 *) NULL) + key,
Change the code to instead use a cast through uintptr_t to avoid
the warning.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
This allows for dontauditing very specific ioctls e.g. TCGETS without
dontauditing every ioctl or granting additional permissions.
Now either an allowx, dontauditx or auditallowx rules enables checking
for extended permissions.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Hettwer <j2468h@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Mark the inode security label as invalid if we cannot find
a dentry so that we will retry later rather than marking it
initialized with the unlabeled SID.
Fixes: 9287aed2ad ("selinux: Convert isec->lock into a spinlock")
Signed-off-by: Tianyue Ren <rentianyue@kylinos.cn>
[PM: minor comment tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
When there are no audit rules registered, mandatory records (config,
etc.) are missing their accompanying records (syscall, proctitle, etc.).
This is due to audit context dummy set on syscall entry based on absence
of rules that signals that no other records are to be printed. Clear the dummy
bit if any record is generated, open coding this in audit_log_start().
The proctitle context and dummy checks are pointless since the
proctitle record will not be printed if no syscall records are printed.
The fds array is reset to -1 after the first syscall to indicate it
isn't valid any more, but was never set to -1 when the context was
allocated to indicate it wasn't yet valid.
Check ctx->pwd in audit_log_name().
The audit_inode* functions can be called without going through
getname_flags() or getname_kernel() that sets audit_names and cwd, so
set the cwd in audit_alloc_name() if it has not already been done so due to
audit_names being valid and purge all other audit_getcwd() calls.
Revert the LSM dump_common_audit_data() LSM_AUDIT_DATA_* cases from the
ghak96 patch since they are no longer necessary due to cwd coverage in
audit_alloc_name().
Thanks to bauen1 <j2468h@googlemail.com> for reporting LSM situations in
which context->cwd is not valid, inadvertantly fixed by the ghak96 patch.
Please see upstream github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/120
This is also related to upstream github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/96
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Merge tag 'safesetid-5.10' of git://github.com/micah-morton/linux
Pull SafeSetID updates from Micah Morton:
"The changes are mostly contained to within the SafeSetID LSM, with the
exception of a few 1-line changes to change some ns_capable() calls to
ns_capable_setid() -- causing a flag (CAP_OPT_INSETID) to be set that
is examined by SafeSetID code and nothing else in the kernel.
The changes to SafeSetID internally allow for setting up GID
transition security policies, as already existed for UIDs"
* tag 'safesetid-5.10' of git://github.com/micah-morton/linux:
LSM: SafeSetID: Fix warnings reported by test bot
LSM: SafeSetID: Add GID security policy handling
LSM: Signal to SafeSetID when setting group IDs
A previous commit changed the notification mode from true/false to an
int, allowing notify-no, notify-yes, or signal-notify. This was
backwards compatible in the sense that any existing true/false user
would translate to either 0 (on notification sent) or 1, the latter
which mapped to TWA_RESUME. TWA_SIGNAL was assigned a value of 2.
Clean this up properly, and define a proper enum for the notification
mode. Now we have:
- TWA_NONE. This is 0, same as before the original change, meaning no
notification requested.
- TWA_RESUME. This is 1, same as before the original change, meaning
that we use TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME.
- TWA_SIGNAL. This uses TIF_SIGPENDING/JOBCTL_TASK_WORK for the
notification.
Clean up all the callers, switching their 0/1/false/true to using the
appropriate TWA_* mode for notifications.
Fixes: e91b481623 ("task_work: teach task_work_add() to do signal_wake_up()")
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Add redirect_neigh() BPF packet redirect helper, allowing to limit stack
traversal in common container configs and improving TCP back-pressure.
Daniel reports ~10Gbps => ~15Gbps single stream TCP performance gain.
Expand netlink policy support and improve policy export to user space.
(Ge)netlink core performs request validation according to declared
policies. Expand the expressiveness of those policies (min/max length
and bitmasks). Allow dumping policies for particular commands.
This is used for feature discovery by user space (instead of kernel
version parsing or trial and error).
Support IGMPv3/MLDv2 multicast listener discovery protocols in bridge.
Allow more than 255 IPv4 multicast interfaces.
Add support for Type of Service (ToS) reflection in SYN/SYN-ACK
packets of TCPv6.
In Multi-patch TCP (MPTCP) support concurrent transmission of data
on multiple subflows in a load balancing scenario. Enhance advertising
addresses via the RM_ADDR/ADD_ADDR options.
Support SMC-Dv2 version of SMC, which enables multi-subnet deployments.
Allow more calls to same peer in RxRPC.
Support two new Controller Area Network (CAN) protocols -
CAN-FD and ISO 15765-2:2016.
Add xfrm/IPsec compat layer, solving the 32bit user space on 64bit
kernel problem.
Add TC actions for implementing MPLS L2 VPNs.
Improve nexthop code - e.g. handle various corner cases when nexthop
objects are removed from groups better, skip unnecessary notifications
and make it easier to offload nexthops into HW by converting
to a blocking notifier.
Support adding and consuming TCP header options by BPF programs,
opening the doors for easy experimental and deployment-specific
TCP option use.
Reorganize TCP congestion control (CC) initialization to simplify life
of TCP CC implemented in BPF.
Add support for shipping BPF programs with the kernel and loading them
early on boot via the User Mode Driver mechanism, hence reusing all the
user space infra we have.
Support sleepable BPF programs, initially targeting LSM and tracing.
Add bpf_d_path() helper for returning full path for given 'struct path'.
Make bpf_tail_call compatible with bpf-to-bpf calls.
Allow BPF programs to call map_update_elem on sockmaps.
Add BPF Type Format (BTF) support for type and enum discovery, as
well as support for using BTF within the kernel itself (current use
is for pretty printing structures).
Support listing and getting information about bpf_links via the bpf
syscall.
Enhance kernel interfaces around NIC firmware update. Allow specifying
overwrite mask to control if settings etc. are reset during update;
report expected max time operation may take to users; support firmware
activation without machine reboot incl. limits of how much impact
reset may have (e.g. dropping link or not).
Extend ethtool configuration interface to report IEEE-standard
counters, to limit the need for per-vendor logic in user space.
Adopt or extend devlink use for debug, monitoring, fw update
in many drivers (dsa loop, ice, ionic, sja1105, qed, mlxsw,
mv88e6xxx, dpaa2-eth).
In mlxsw expose critical and emergency SFP module temperature alarms.
Refactor port buffer handling to make the defaults more suitable and
support setting these values explicitly via the DCBNL interface.
Add XDP support for Intel's igb driver.
Support offloading TC flower classification and filtering rules to
mscc_ocelot switches.
Add PTP support for Marvell Octeontx2 and PP2.2 hardware, as well as
fixed interval period pulse generator and one-step timestamping in
dpaa-eth.
Add support for various auth offloads in WiFi APs, e.g. SAE (WPA3)
offload.
Add Lynx PHY/PCS MDIO module, and convert various drivers which have
this HW to use it. Convert mvpp2 to split PCS.
Support Marvell Prestera 98DX3255 24-port switch ASICs, as well as
7-port Mediatek MT7531 IP.
Add initial support for QCA6390 and IPQ6018 in ath11k WiFi driver,
and wcn3680 support in wcn36xx.
Improve performance for packets which don't require much offloads
on recent Mellanox NICs by 20% by making multiple packets share
a descriptor entry.
Move chelsio inline crypto drivers (for TLS and IPsec) from the crypto
subtree to drivers/net. Move MDIO drivers out of the phy directory.
Clean up a lot of W=1 warnings, reportedly the actively developed
subsections of networking drivers should now build W=1 warning free.
Make sure drivers don't use in_interrupt() to dynamically adapt their
code. Convert tasklets to use new tasklet_setup API (sadly this
conversion is not yet complete).
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'net-next-5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next
Pull networking updates from Jakub Kicinski:
- Add redirect_neigh() BPF packet redirect helper, allowing to limit
stack traversal in common container configs and improving TCP
back-pressure.
Daniel reports ~10Gbps => ~15Gbps single stream TCP performance gain.
- Expand netlink policy support and improve policy export to user
space. (Ge)netlink core performs request validation according to
declared policies. Expand the expressiveness of those policies
(min/max length and bitmasks). Allow dumping policies for particular
commands. This is used for feature discovery by user space (instead
of kernel version parsing or trial and error).
- Support IGMPv3/MLDv2 multicast listener discovery protocols in
bridge.
- Allow more than 255 IPv4 multicast interfaces.
- Add support for Type of Service (ToS) reflection in SYN/SYN-ACK
packets of TCPv6.
- In Multi-patch TCP (MPTCP) support concurrent transmission of data on
multiple subflows in a load balancing scenario. Enhance advertising
addresses via the RM_ADDR/ADD_ADDR options.
- Support SMC-Dv2 version of SMC, which enables multi-subnet
deployments.
- Allow more calls to same peer in RxRPC.
- Support two new Controller Area Network (CAN) protocols - CAN-FD and
ISO 15765-2:2016.
- Add xfrm/IPsec compat layer, solving the 32bit user space on 64bit
kernel problem.
- Add TC actions for implementing MPLS L2 VPNs.
- Improve nexthop code - e.g. handle various corner cases when nexthop
objects are removed from groups better, skip unnecessary
notifications and make it easier to offload nexthops into HW by
converting to a blocking notifier.
- Support adding and consuming TCP header options by BPF programs,
opening the doors for easy experimental and deployment-specific TCP
option use.
- Reorganize TCP congestion control (CC) initialization to simplify
life of TCP CC implemented in BPF.
- Add support for shipping BPF programs with the kernel and loading
them early on boot via the User Mode Driver mechanism, hence reusing
all the user space infra we have.
- Support sleepable BPF programs, initially targeting LSM and tracing.
- Add bpf_d_path() helper for returning full path for given 'struct
path'.
- Make bpf_tail_call compatible with bpf-to-bpf calls.
- Allow BPF programs to call map_update_elem on sockmaps.
- Add BPF Type Format (BTF) support for type and enum discovery, as
well as support for using BTF within the kernel itself (current use
is for pretty printing structures).
- Support listing and getting information about bpf_links via the bpf
syscall.
- Enhance kernel interfaces around NIC firmware update. Allow
specifying overwrite mask to control if settings etc. are reset
during update; report expected max time operation may take to users;
support firmware activation without machine reboot incl. limits of
how much impact reset may have (e.g. dropping link or not).
- Extend ethtool configuration interface to report IEEE-standard
counters, to limit the need for per-vendor logic in user space.
- Adopt or extend devlink use for debug, monitoring, fw update in many
drivers (dsa loop, ice, ionic, sja1105, qed, mlxsw, mv88e6xxx,
dpaa2-eth).
- In mlxsw expose critical and emergency SFP module temperature alarms.
Refactor port buffer handling to make the defaults more suitable and
support setting these values explicitly via the DCBNL interface.
- Add XDP support for Intel's igb driver.
- Support offloading TC flower classification and filtering rules to
mscc_ocelot switches.
- Add PTP support for Marvell Octeontx2 and PP2.2 hardware, as well as
fixed interval period pulse generator and one-step timestamping in
dpaa-eth.
- Add support for various auth offloads in WiFi APs, e.g. SAE (WPA3)
offload.
- Add Lynx PHY/PCS MDIO module, and convert various drivers which have
this HW to use it. Convert mvpp2 to split PCS.
- Support Marvell Prestera 98DX3255 24-port switch ASICs, as well as
7-port Mediatek MT7531 IP.
- Add initial support for QCA6390 and IPQ6018 in ath11k WiFi driver,
and wcn3680 support in wcn36xx.
- Improve performance for packets which don't require much offloads on
recent Mellanox NICs by 20% by making multiple packets share a
descriptor entry.
- Move chelsio inline crypto drivers (for TLS and IPsec) from the
crypto subtree to drivers/net. Move MDIO drivers out of the phy
directory.
- Clean up a lot of W=1 warnings, reportedly the actively developed
subsections of networking drivers should now build W=1 warning free.
- Make sure drivers don't use in_interrupt() to dynamically adapt their
code. Convert tasklets to use new tasklet_setup API (sadly this
conversion is not yet complete).
* tag 'net-next-5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (2583 commits)
Revert "bpfilter: Fix build error with CONFIG_BPFILTER_UMH"
net, sockmap: Don't call bpf_prog_put() on NULL pointer
bpf, selftest: Fix flaky tcp_hdr_options test when adding addr to lo
bpf, sockmap: Add locking annotations to iterator
netfilter: nftables: allow re-computing sctp CRC-32C in 'payload' statements
net: fix pos incrementment in ipv6_route_seq_next
net/smc: fix invalid return code in smcd_new_buf_create()
net/smc: fix valid DMBE buffer sizes
net/smc: fix use-after-free of delayed events
bpfilter: Fix build error with CONFIG_BPFILTER_UMH
cxgb4/ch_ipsec: Replace the module name to ch_ipsec from chcr
net: sched: Fix suspicious RCU usage while accessing tcf_tunnel_info
bpf: Fix register equivalence tracking.
rxrpc: Fix loss of final ack on shutdown
rxrpc: Fix bundle counting for exclusive connections
netfilter: restore NF_INET_NUMHOOKS
ibmveth: Identify ingress large send packets.
ibmveth: Switch order of ibmveth_helper calls.
cxgb4: handle 4-tuple PEDIT to NAT mode translation
selftests: Add VRF route leaking tests
...
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Merge tag 'integrity-v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Continuing IMA policy rule cleanup and validation in particular for
measuring keys, adding/removing/updating informational and error
messages (e.g. "ima_appraise" boot command line option), and other bug
fixes (e.g. minimal data size validation before use, return code and
NULL pointer checking)"
* tag 'integrity-v5.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: Fix NULL pointer dereference in ima_file_hash
evm: Check size of security.evm before using it
ima: Remove semicolon at the end of ima_get_binary_runtime_size()
ima: Don't ignore errors from crypto_shash_update()
ima: Use kmemdup rather than kmalloc+memcpy
integrity: include keyring name for unknown key request
ima: limit secure boot feedback scope for appraise
integrity: invalid kernel parameters feedback
ima: add check for enforced appraise option
integrity: Use current_uid() in integrity_audit_message()
ima: Fail rule parsing when asymmetric key measurement isn't supportable
ima: Pre-parse the list of keyrings in a KEY_CHECK rule
Here is the big set of char, misc, and other assorted driver subsystem
patches for 5.10-rc1.
There's a lot of different things in here, all over the drivers/
directory. Some summaries:
- soundwire driver updates
- habanalabs driver updates
- extcon driver updates
- nitro_enclaves new driver
- fsl-mc driver and core updates
- mhi core and bus updates
- nvmem driver updates
- eeprom driver updates
- binder driver updates and fixes
- vbox minor bugfixes
- fsi driver updates
- w1 driver updates
- coresight driver updates
- interconnect driver updates
- misc driver updates
- other minor driver updates
All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported
issues.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Merge tag 'char-misc-5.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc
Pull char/misc driver updates from Greg KH:
"Here is the big set of char, misc, and other assorted driver subsystem
patches for 5.10-rc1.
There's a lot of different things in here, all over the drivers/
directory. Some summaries:
- soundwire driver updates
- habanalabs driver updates
- extcon driver updates
- nitro_enclaves new driver
- fsl-mc driver and core updates
- mhi core and bus updates
- nvmem driver updates
- eeprom driver updates
- binder driver updates and fixes
- vbox minor bugfixes
- fsi driver updates
- w1 driver updates
- coresight driver updates
- interconnect driver updates
- misc driver updates
- other minor driver updates
All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported
issues"
* tag 'char-misc-5.10-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc: (396 commits)
binder: fix UAF when releasing todo list
docs: w1: w1_therm: Fix broken xref, mistakes, clarify text
misc: Kconfig: fix a HISI_HIKEY_USB dependency
LSM: Fix type of id parameter in kernel_post_load_data prototype
misc: Kconfig: add a new dependency for HISI_HIKEY_USB
firmware_loader: fix a kernel-doc markup
w1: w1_therm: make w1_poll_completion static
binder: simplify the return expression of binder_mmap
test_firmware: Test partial read support
firmware: Add request_partial_firmware_into_buf()
firmware: Store opt_flags in fw_priv
fs/kernel_file_read: Add "offset" arg for partial reads
IMA: Add support for file reads without contents
LSM: Add "contents" flag to kernel_read_file hook
module: Call security_kernel_post_load_data()
firmware_loader: Use security_post_load_data()
LSM: Introduce kernel_post_load_data() hook
fs/kernel_read_file: Add file_size output argument
fs/kernel_read_file: Switch buffer size arg to size_t
fs/kernel_read_file: Remove redundant size argument
...
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20201012' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"A decent number of SELinux patches for v5.10, twenty two in total. The
highlights are listed below, but all of the patches pass our test
suite and merge cleanly.
- A number of changes to how the SELinux policy is loaded and managed
inside the kernel with the goal of improving the atomicity of a
SELinux policy load operation.
These changes account for the bulk of the diffstat as well as the
patch count. A special thanks to everyone who contributed patches
and fixes for this work.
- Convert the SELinux policy read-write lock to RCU.
- A tracepoint was added for audited SELinux access control events;
this should help provide a more unified backtrace across kernel and
userspace.
- Allow the removal of security.selinux xattrs when a SELinux policy
is not loaded.
- Enable policy capabilities in SELinux policies created with the
scripts/selinux/mdp tool.
- Provide some "no sooner than" dates for the SELinux checkreqprot
sysfs deprecation"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20201012' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: (22 commits)
selinux: provide a "no sooner than" date for the checkreqprot removal
selinux: Add helper functions to get and set checkreqprot
selinux: access policycaps with READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE
selinux: simplify away security_policydb_len()
selinux: move policy mutex to selinux_state, use in lockdep checks
selinux: fix error handling bugs in security_load_policy()
selinux: convert policy read-write lock to RCU
selinux: delete repeated words in comments
selinux: add basic filtering for audit trace events
selinux: add tracepoint on audited events
selinux: Create new booleans and class dirs out of tree
selinux: Standardize string literal usage for selinuxfs directory names
selinux: Refactor selinuxfs directory populating functions
selinux: Create function for selinuxfs directory cleanup
selinux: permit removing security.selinux xattr before policy load
selinux: fix memdup.cocci warnings
selinux: avoid dereferencing the policy prior to initialization
selinux: fix allocation failure check on newpolicy->sidtab
selinux: refactor changing booleans
selinux: move policy commit after updating selinuxfs
...
Two kernel test robot suggested clean-ups.
Teach Smack to use the IPv4 netlabel cache.
This results in a 12-14% improvement on TCP benchmarks.
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Merge tag 'Smack-for-5.10' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next
Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler:
"Two minor fixes and one performance enhancement to Smack. The
performance improvement is significant and the new code is more like
its counterpart in SELinux.
- Two kernel test robot suggested clean-ups.
- Teach Smack to use the IPv4 netlabel cache. This results in a
12-14% improvement on TCP benchmarks"
* tag 'Smack-for-5.10' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
Smack: Remove unnecessary variable initialization
Smack: Fix build when NETWORK_SECMARK is not set
Smack: Use the netlabel cache
Smack: Set socket labels only once
Smack: Consolidate uses of secmark into a function
Fix multiple cast-to-union warnings related to casting kuid_t and kgid_t
types to kid_t union type. Also fix incompatible type warning that
arises from accidental omission of "__rcu" qualifier on the struct
setid_ruleset pointer in the argument list for safesetid_file_read().
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Cedeno <thomascedeno@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
The SafeSetID LSM has functionality for restricting setuid() calls based
on its configured security policies. This patch adds the analogous
functionality for setgid() calls. This is mostly a copy-and-paste change
with some code deduplication, plus slight modifications/name changes to
the policy-rule-related structs (now contain GID rules in addition to
the UID ones) and some type generalization since SafeSetID now needs to
deal with kgid_t and kuid_t types.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Cedeno <thomascedeno@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Allow DRBG testing through user-space af_alg
- Add tcrypt speed testing support for keyed hashes
- Add type-safe init/exit hooks for ahash
Algorithms:
- Mark arc4 as obsolete and pending for future removal
- Mark anubis, khazad, sead and tea as obsolete
- Improve boot-time xor benchmark
- Add OSCCA SM2 asymmetric cipher algorithm and use it for integrity
Drivers:
- Fixes and enhancement for XTS in caam
- Add support for XIP8001B hwrng in xiphera-trng
- Add RNG and hash support in sun8i-ce/sun8i-ss
- Allow imx-rngc to be used by kernel entropy pool
- Use crypto engine in omap-sham
- Add support for Ingenic X1830 with ingenic"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (205 commits)
X.509: Fix modular build of public_key_sm2
crypto: xor - Remove unused variable count in do_xor_speed
X.509: fix error return value on the failed path
crypto: bcm - Verify GCM/CCM key length in setkey
crypto: qat - drop input parameter from adf_enable_aer()
crypto: qat - fix function parameters descriptions
crypto: atmel-tdes - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements
crypto: drivers - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements
hwrng: mxc-rnga - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements
hwrng: iproc-rng200 - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements
hwrng: stm32 - use semicolons rather than commas to separate statements
crypto: xor - use ktime for template benchmarking
crypto: xor - defer load time benchmark to a later time
crypto: hisilicon/zip - fix the uninitalized 'curr_qm_qp_num'
crypto: hisilicon/zip - fix the return value when device is busy
crypto: hisilicon/zip - fix zero length input in GZIP decompress
crypto: hisilicon/zip - fix the uncleared debug registers
lib/mpi: Fix unused variable warnings
crypto: x86/poly1305 - Remove assignments with no effect
hwrng: npcm - modify readl to readb
...
Pull compat iovec cleanups from Al Viro:
"Christoph's series around import_iovec() and compat variant thereof"
* 'work.iov_iter' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
security/keys: remove compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov
mm: remove compat_process_vm_{readv,writev}
fs: remove compat_sys_vmsplice
fs: remove the compat readv/writev syscalls
fs: remove various compat readv/writev helpers
iov_iter: transparently handle compat iovecs in import_iovec
iov_iter: refactor rw_copy_check_uvector and import_iovec
iov_iter: move rw_copy_check_uvector() into lib/iov_iter.c
compat.h: fix a spelling error in <linux/compat.h>
- Preliminary RISC-V enablement - the bulk of it will arrive via the RISCV tree.
- Relax decompressed image placement rules for 32-bit ARM
- Add support for passing MOK certificate table contents via a config table
rather than a EFI variable.
- Add support for 18 bit DIMM row IDs in the CPER records.
- Work around broken Dell firmware that passes the entire Boot#### variable
contents as the command line
- Add definition of the EFI_MEMORY_CPU_CRYPTO memory attribute so we can
identify it in the memory map listings.
- Don't abort the boot on arm64 if the EFI RNG protocol is available but
returns with an error
- Replace slashes with exclamation marks in efivarfs file names
- Split efi-pstore from the deprecated efivars sysfs code, so we can
disable the latter on !x86.
- Misc fixes, cleanups and updates.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Merge tag 'efi-core-2020-10-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull EFI changes from Ingo Molnar:
- Preliminary RISC-V enablement - the bulk of it will arrive via the
RISCV tree.
- Relax decompressed image placement rules for 32-bit ARM
- Add support for passing MOK certificate table contents via a config
table rather than a EFI variable.
- Add support for 18 bit DIMM row IDs in the CPER records.
- Work around broken Dell firmware that passes the entire Boot####
variable contents as the command line
- Add definition of the EFI_MEMORY_CPU_CRYPTO memory attribute so we
can identify it in the memory map listings.
- Don't abort the boot on arm64 if the EFI RNG protocol is available
but returns with an error
- Replace slashes with exclamation marks in efivarfs file names
- Split efi-pstore from the deprecated efivars sysfs code, so we can
disable the latter on !x86.
- Misc fixes, cleanups and updates.
* tag 'efi-core-2020-10-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (26 commits)
efi: mokvar: add missing include of asm/early_ioremap.h
efi: efivars: limit availability to X86 builds
efi: remove some false dependencies on CONFIG_EFI_VARS
efi: gsmi: fix false dependency on CONFIG_EFI_VARS
efi: efivars: un-export efivars_sysfs_init()
efi: pstore: move workqueue handling out of efivars
efi: pstore: disentangle from deprecated efivars module
efi: mokvar-table: fix some issues in new code
efi/arm64: libstub: Deal gracefully with EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL failure
efivarfs: Replace invalid slashes with exclamation marks in dentries.
efi: Delete deprecated parameter comments
efi/libstub: Fix missing-prototypes in string.c
efi: Add definition of EFI_MEMORY_CPU_CRYPTO and ability to report it
cper,edac,efi: Memory Error Record: bank group/address and chip id
edac,ghes,cper: Add Row Extension to Memory Error Record
efi/x86: Add a quirk to support command line arguments on Dell EFI firmware
efi/libstub: Add efi_warn and *_once logging helpers
integrity: Load certs from the EFI MOK config table
integrity: Move import of MokListRT certs to a separate routine
efi: Support for MOK variable config table
...
Since commit e2dc9bf3f5 ("umd: Transform fork_usermode_blob into
fork_usermode_driver") started calling execve() on a program written in
a local mount which is not connected to mount tree,
tomoyo_realpath_from_path() started returning a pathname in
"$fsname:/$pathname" format which violates TOMOYO's domainname rule that
it must start with "<$namespace>" followed by zero or more repetitions of
pathnames which start with '/'.
Since $fsname must not contain '.' since commit 79c0b2df79 ("add
filesystem subtype support"), tomoyo_correct_path() can recognize a token
which appears '/' before '.' appears (e.g. proc:/self/exe ) as a pathname
while rejecting a token which appears '.' before '/' appears (e.g.
exec.realpath="/bin/bash" ) as a condition parameter.
Therefore, accept domainnames which contain pathnames which do not start
with '/' but contain '/' before '.' (e.g. <kernel> tmpfs:/bpfilter_umh ).
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
The initialization of rc in smack_from_netlbl() is pointless.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To perform partial reads, callers of kernel_read_file*() must have a
non-NULL file_size argument and a preallocated buffer. The new "offset"
argument can then be used to seek to specific locations in the file to
fill the buffer to, at most, "buf_size" per call.
Where possible, the LSM hooks can report whether a full file has been
read or not so that the contents can be reasoned about.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-14-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
When the kernel_read_file LSM hook is called with contents=false, IMA
can appraise the file directly, without requiring a filled buffer. When
such a buffer is available, though, IMA can continue to use it instead
of forcing a double read here.
Signed-off-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200706232309.12010-10-scott.branden@broadcom.com/
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-13-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
As with the kernel_load_data LSM hook, add a "contents" flag to the
kernel_read_file LSM hook that indicates whether the LSM can expect
a matching call to the kernel_post_read_file LSM hook with the full
contents of the file. With the coming addition of partial file read
support for kernel_read_file*() API, the LSM will no longer be able
to always see the entire contents of a file during the read calls.
For cases where the LSM must read examine the complete file contents,
it will need to do so on its own every time the kernel_read_file
hook is called with contents=false (or reject such cases). Adjust all
existing LSMs to retain existing behavior.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-12-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Now that security_post_load_data() is wired up, use it instead
of the NULL file argument style of security_post_read_file(),
and update the security_kernel_load_data() call to indicate that a
security_kernel_post_load_data() call is expected.
Wire up the IMA check to match earlier logic. Perhaps a generalized
change to ima_post_load_data() might look something like this:
return process_buffer_measurement(buf, size,
kernel_load_data_id_str(load_id),
read_idmap[load_id] ?: FILE_CHECK,
0, NULL);
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-10-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
There are a few places in the kernel where LSMs would like to have
visibility into the contents of a kernel buffer that has been loaded or
read. While security_kernel_post_read_file() (which includes the
buffer) exists as a pairing for security_kernel_read_file(), no such
hook exists to pair with security_kernel_load_data().
Earlier proposals for just using security_kernel_post_read_file() with a
NULL file argument were rejected (i.e. "file" should always be valid for
the security_..._file hooks, but it appears at least one case was
left in the kernel during earlier refactoring. (This will be fixed in
a subsequent patch.)
Since not all cases of security_kernel_load_data() can have a single
contiguous buffer made available to the LSM hook (e.g. kexec image
segments are separately loaded), there needs to be a way for the LSM to
reason about its expectations of the hook coverage. In order to handle
this, add a "contents" argument to the "kernel_load_data" hook that
indicates if the newly added "kernel_post_load_data" hook will be called
with the full contents once loaded. That way, LSMs requiring full contents
can choose to unilaterally reject "kernel_load_data" with contents=false
(which is effectively the existing hook coverage), but when contents=true
they can allow it and later evaluate the "kernel_post_load_data" hook
once the buffer is loaded.
With this change, LSMs can gain coverage over non-file-backed data loads
(e.g. init_module(2) and firmware userspace helper), which will happen
in subsequent patches.
Additionally prepare IMA to start processing these cases.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-9-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
In preparation for adding partial read support, add an optional output
argument to kernel_read_file*() that reports the file size so callers
can reason more easily about their reading progress.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-8-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
In preparation for further refactoring of kernel_read_file*(), rename
the "max_size" argument to the more accurate "buf_size", and correct
its type to size_t. Add kerndoc to explain the specifics of how the
arguments will be used. Note that with buf_size now size_t, it can no
longer be negative (and was never called with a negative value). Adjust
callers to use it as a "maximum size" when *buf is NULL.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-7-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
In preparation for refactoring kernel_read_file*(), remove the redundant
"size" argument which is not needed: it can be included in the return
code, with callers adjusted. (VFS reads already cannot be larger than
INT_MAX.)
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-6-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Move kernel_read_file* out of linux/fs.h to its own linux/kernel_read_file.h
include file. That header gets pulled in just about everywhere
and doesn't really need functions not related to the general fs interface.
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200706232309.12010-2-scott.branden@broadcom.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-4-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER is a "how", not a "what", and confuses the LSMs
that are interested in filtering between types of things. The "how"
should be an internal detail made uninteresting to the LSMs.
Fixes: a098ecd2fa ("firmware: support loading into a pre-allocated buffer")
Fixes: fd90bc559b ("ima: based on policy verify firmware signatures (pre-allocated buffer)")
Fixes: 4f0496d8ff ("ima: based on policy warn about loading firmware (pre-allocated buffer)")
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Scott Branden <scott.branden@broadcom.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002173828.2099543-2-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Now that import_iovec handles compat iovecs, the native version of
keyctl_instantiate_key_iov can be used for the compat case as well.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Use in compat_syscall to import either native or the compat iovecs, and
remove the now superflous compat_import_iovec.
This removes the need for special compat logic in most callers, and
the remaining ones can still be simplified by using __import_iovec
with a bool compat parameter.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Two minor conflicts:
1) net/ipv4/route.c, adding a new local variable while
moving another local variable and removing it's
initial assignment.
2) drivers/net/dsa/microchip/ksz9477.c, overlapping changes.
One pretty prints the port mode differently, whilst another
changes the driver to try and obtain the port mode from
the port node rather than the switch node.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Use proper conditional compilation for the secmark field in
the network skb.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
ima_file_hash can be called when there is no iint->ima_hash available
even though the inode exists in the integrity cache. It is fairly
common for a file to not have a hash. (e.g. an mknodat, prior to the
file being closed).
Another example where this can happen (suggested by Jann Horn):
Process A does:
while(1) {
unlink("/tmp/imafoo");
fd = open("/tmp/imafoo", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0700);
if (fd == -1) {
perror("open");
continue;
}
write(fd, "A", 1);
close(fd);
}
and Process B does:
while (1) {
int fd = open("/tmp/imafoo", O_RDONLY);
if (fd == -1)
continue;
char *mapping = mmap(NULL, 0x1000, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC,
MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
if (mapping != MAP_FAILED)
munmap(mapping, 0x1000);
close(fd);
}
Due to the race to get the iint->mutex between ima_file_hash and
process_measurement iint->ima_hash could still be NULL.
Fixes: 6beea7afcc ("ima: add the ability to query the cached hash of a given file")
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Florent Revest <revest@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Because of system-specific EFI firmware limitations, EFI volatile
variables may not be capable of holding the required contents of
the Machine Owner Key (MOK) certificate store when the certificate
list grows above some size. Therefore, an EFI boot loader may pass
the MOK certs via a EFI configuration table created specifically for
this purpose to avoid this firmware limitation.
An EFI configuration table is a much more primitive mechanism
compared to EFI variables and is well suited for one-way passage
of static information from a pre-OS environment to the kernel.
This patch adds the support to load certs from the MokListRT
entry in the MOK variable configuration table, if it's present.
The pre-existing support to load certs from the MokListRT EFI
variable remains and is used if the EFI MOK configuration table
isn't present or can't be successfully used.
Signed-off-by: Lenny Szubowicz <lszubowi@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200905013107.10457-4-lszubowi@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Move the loading of certs from the UEFI MokListRT into a separate
routine to facilitate additional MokList functionality.
There is no visible functional change as a result of this patch.
Although the UEFI dbx certs are now loaded before the MokList certs,
they are loaded onto different key rings. So the order of the keys
on their respective key rings is the same.
Signed-off-by: Lenny Szubowicz <lszubowi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200905013107.10457-3-lszubowi@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
checkreqprot data member in selinux_state struct is accessed directly by
SELinux functions to get and set. This could cause unexpected read or
write access to this data member due to compiler optimizations and/or
compiler's reordering of access to this field.
Add helper functions to get and set checkreqprot data member in
selinux_state struct. These helper functions use READ_ONCE and
WRITE_ONCE macros to ensure atomic read or write of memory for
this data member.
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch checks the size for the EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG and
EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG types to ensure that the algorithm is read from
the buffer returned by vfs_getxattr_alloc().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19.x
Fixes: 5feeb61183 ("evm: Allow non-SHA1 digital signatures")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This patch removes the unnecessary semicolon at the end of
ima_get_binary_runtime_size().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d158847ae8 ("ima: maintain memory size needed for serializing the measurement list")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Errors returned by crypto_shash_update() are not checked in
ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm() and thus can be overwritten at the next
iteration of the loop. This patch adds a check after calling
crypto_shash_update() and returns immediately if the result is not zero.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3323eec921 ("integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Utilize the Netlabel cache mechanism for incoming packet matching.
Refactor the initialization of secattr structures, as it was being
done in two places.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Refactor the IP send checks so that the netlabel value
is set only when necessary, not on every send. Some functions
get renamed as the changes made the old name misleading.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Add a function smack_from_skb() that returns the Smack label
identified by a network secmark. Replace the explicit uses of
the secmark with this function.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Use READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE for all accesses to the
selinux_state.policycaps booleans to prevent compiler
mischief.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Depending on the IMA policy rule a key may be searched for in multiple
keyrings (e.g. .ima and .platform) and possibly not found. This patch
improves feedback by including the keyring "description" (name) in the
error message.
Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated commit message]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Only emit an unknown/invalid message when setting the IMA appraise mode
to anything other than "enforce", when secureboot is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: updated commit message]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The "enforce" string is allowed as an option for ima_appraise= kernel
paramenter per kernel-paramenters.txt and should be considered on the
parameter setup checking as a matter of completeness. Also it allows futher
checking on the options being passed by the user.
Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
We got slightly different patches removing a double word
in a comment in net/ipv4/raw.c - picked the version from net.
Simple conflict in drivers/net/ethernet/ibm/ibmvnic.c. Use cached
values instead of VNIC login response buffer (following what
commit 507ebe6444 ("ibmvnic: Fix use-after-free of VNIC login
response buffer") did).
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Measuring keys is currently only supported for asymmetric keys. In the
future, this might change.
For now, the "func=KEY_CHECK" and "keyrings=" options are only
appropriate when CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS is enabled. Make
this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume that
these policy language constructs are supported.
Fixes: 2b60c0eced ("IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy")
Fixes: 5808611ccc ("IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys")
Suggested-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The ima_keyrings buffer was used as a work buffer for strsep()-based
parsing of the "keyrings=" option of an IMA policy rule. This parsing
was re-performed each time an asymmetric key was added to a kernel
keyring for each loaded policy rule that contained a "keyrings=" option.
An example rule specifying this option is:
measure func=KEY_CHECK keyrings=a|b|c
The rule says to measure asymmetric keys added to any of the kernel
keyrings named "a", "b", or "c". The size of the buffer size was
equal to the size of the largest "keyrings=" value seen in a previously
loaded rule (5 + 1 for the NUL-terminator in the previous example) and
the buffer was pre-allocated at the time of policy load.
The pre-allocated buffer approach suffered from a couple bugs:
1) There was no locking around the use of the buffer so concurrent key
add operations, to two different keyrings, would result in the
strsep() loop of ima_match_keyring() to modify the buffer at the same
time. This resulted in unexpected results from ima_match_keyring()
and, therefore, could cause unintended keys to be measured or keys to
not be measured when IMA policy intended for them to be measured.
2) If the kstrdup() that initialized entry->keyrings in ima_parse_rule()
failed, the ima_keyrings buffer was freed and set to NULL even when a
valid KEY_CHECK rule was previously loaded. The next KEY_CHECK event
would trigger a call to strcpy() with a NULL destination pointer and
crash the kernel.
Remove the need for a pre-allocated global buffer by parsing the list of
keyrings in a KEY_CHECK rule at the time of policy load. The
ima_rule_entry will contain an array of string pointers which point to
the name of each keyring specified in the rule. No string processing
needs to happen at the time of asymmetric key add so iterating through
the list and doing a string comparison is all that's required at the
time of policy check.
In the process of changing how the "keyrings=" policy option is handled,
a couple additional bugs were fixed:
1) The rule parser accepted rules containing invalid "keyrings=" values
such as "a|b||c", "a|b|", or simply "|".
2) The /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy file did not display the entire
"keyrings=" value if the list of keyrings was longer than what could
fit in the fixed size tbuf buffer in ima_policy_show().
Fixes: 5c7bac9fb2 ("IMA: pre-allocate buffer to hold keyrings string")
Fixes: 2b60c0eced ("IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Remove the security_policydb_len() calls from sel_open_policy() and
instead update the inode size from the size returned from
security_read_policy().
Since after this change security_policydb_len() is only called from
security_load_policy(), remove it entirely and just open-code it there.
Also, since security_load_policy() is always called with policy_mutex
held, make it dereference the policy pointer directly and drop the
unnecessary RCU locking.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Move the mutex used to synchronize policy changes (reloads and setting
of booleans) from selinux_fs_info to selinux_state and use it in
lockdep checks for rcu_dereference_protected() calls in the security
server functions. This makes the dependency on the mutex explicit
in the code rather than relying on comments.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
There are a few bugs in the error handling for security_load_policy().
1) If the newpolicy->sidtab allocation fails then it leads to a NULL
dereference. Also the error code was not set to -ENOMEM on that
path.
2) If policydb_read() failed then we call policydb_destroy() twice
which meands we call kvfree(p->sym_val_to_name[i]) twice.
3) If policydb_load_isids() failed then we call sidtab_destroy() twice
and that results in a double free in the sidtab_destroy_tree()
function because entry.ptr_inner and entry.ptr_leaf are not set to
NULL.
One thing that makes this code nice to deal with is that none of the
functions return partially allocated data. In other words, the
policydb_read() either allocates everything successfully or it frees
all the data it allocates. It never returns a mix of allocated and
not allocated data.
I re-wrote this to only free the successfully allocated data which
avoids the double frees. I also re-ordered selinux_policy_free() so
it's in the reverse order of the allocation function.
Fixes: c7c556f1e8 ("selinux: refactor changing booleans")
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
[PM: partially merged by hand due to merge fuzz]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Similar to bpf_local_storage for sockets, add local storage for inodes.
The life-cycle of storage is managed with the life-cycle of the inode.
i.e. the storage is destroyed along with the owning inode.
The BPF LSM allocates an __rcu pointer to the bpf_local_storage in the
security blob which are now stackable and can co-exist with other LSMs.
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200825182919.1118197-6-kpsingh@chromium.org
Convert the policy read-write lock to RCU. This is significantly
simplified by the earlier work to encapsulate the policy data
structures and refactor the policy load and boolean setting logic.
Move the latest_granting sequence number into the selinux_policy
structure so that it can be updated atomically with the policy.
Since removing the policy rwlock and moving latest_granting reduces
the selinux_ss structure to nothing more than a wrapper around the
selinux_policy pointer, get rid of the extra layer of indirection.
At present this change merely passes a hardcoded 1 to
rcu_dereference_check() in the cases where we know we do not need to
take rcu_read_lock(), with the preceding comment explaining why.
Alternatively we could pass fsi->mutex down from selinuxfs and
apply a lockdep check on it instead.
Based in part on earlier attempts to convert the policy rwlock
to RCU by Kaigai Kohei [1] and by Peter Enderborg [2].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/6e2f9128-e191-ebb3-0e87-74bfccb0767f@tycho.nsa.gov/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20180530141104.28569-1-peter.enderborg@sony.com/
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Drop a repeated word in comments.
{open, is, then}
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
[PM: fix subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch adds further attributes to the event. These attributes are
helpful to understand the context of the message and can be used
to filter the events.
There are three common items. Source context, target context and tclass.
There are also items from the outcome of operation performed.
An event is similar to:
<...>-1309 [002] .... 6346.691689: selinux_audited:
requested=0x4000000 denied=0x4000000 audited=0x4000000
result=-13
scontext=system_u:system_r:cupsd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tcontext=system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 tclass=file
With systems where many denials are occurring, it is useful to apply a
filter. The filtering is a set of logic that is inserted with
the filter file. Example:
echo "tclass==\"file\" " > events/avc/selinux_audited/filter
This adds that we only get tclass=file.
The trace can also have extra properties. Adding the user stack
can be done with
echo 1 > options/userstacktrace
Now the output will be
runcon-1365 [003] .... 6960.955530: selinux_audited:
requested=0x4000000 denied=0x4000000 audited=0x4000000
result=-13
scontext=system_u:system_r:cupsd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tcontext=system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 tclass=file
runcon-1365 [003] .... 6960.955560: <user stack trace>
=> <00007f325b4ce45b>
=> <00005607093efa57>
Signed-off-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Reviewed-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The audit data currently captures which process and which target
is responsible for a denial. There is no data on where exactly in the
process that call occurred. Debugging can be made easier by being able to
reconstruct the unified kernel and userland stack traces [1]. Add a
tracepoint on the SELinux denials which can then be used by userland
(i.e. perf).
Although this patch could manually be added by each OS developer to
trouble shoot a denial, adding it to the kernel streamlines the
developers workflow.
It is possible to use perf for monitoring the event:
# perf record -e avc:selinux_audited -g -a
^C
# perf report -g
[...]
6.40% 6.40% audited=800000 tclass=4
|
__libc_start_main
|
|--4.60%--__GI___ioctl
| entry_SYSCALL_64
| do_syscall_64
| __x64_sys_ioctl
| ksys_ioctl
| binder_ioctl
| binder_set_nice
| can_nice
| capable
| security_capable
| cred_has_capability.isra.0
| slow_avc_audit
| common_lsm_audit
| avc_audit_post_callback
| avc_audit_post_callback
|
It is also possible to use the ftrace interface:
# echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/avc/selinux_audited/enable
# cat /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace
tracer: nop
entries-in-buffer/entries-written: 1/1 #P:8
[...]
dmesg-3624 [001] 13072.325358: selinux_denied: audited=800000 tclass=4
The tclass value can be mapped to a class by searching
security/selinux/flask.h. The audited value is a bit field of the
permissions described in security/selinux/av_permissions.h for the
corresponding class.
[1] https://source.android.com/devices/tech/debug/native_stack_dump
Signed-off-by: Thiébaud Weksteen <tweek@google.com>
Suggested-by: Joel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Enderborg <peter.enderborg@sony.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
In order to avoid concurrency issues around selinuxfs resource availability
during policy load, we first create new directories out of tree for
reloaded resources, then swap them in, and finally delete the old versions.
This fix focuses on concurrency in each of the two subtrees swapped, and
not concurrency between the trees. This means that it is still possible
that subsequent reads to eg the booleans directory and the class directory
during a policy load could see the old state for one and the new for the other.
The problem of ensuring that policy loads are fully atomic from the perspective
of userspace is larger than what is dealt with here. This commit focuses on
ensuring that the directories contents always match either the new or the old
policy state from the perspective of userspace.
In the previous implementation, on policy load /sys/fs/selinux is updated
by deleting the previous contents of
/sys/fs/selinux/{class,booleans} and then recreating them. This means
that there is a period of time when the contents of these directories do not
exist which can cause race conditions as userspace relies on them for
information about the policy. In addition, it means that error recovery in
the event of failure is challenging.
In order to demonstrate the race condition that this series fixes, you
can use the following commands:
while true; do cat /sys/fs/selinux/class/service/perms/status
>/dev/null; done &
while true; do load_policy; done;
In the existing code, this will display errors fairly often as the class
lookup fails. (In normal operation from systemd, this would result in a
permission check which would be allowed or denied based on policy settings
around unknown object classes.) After applying this patch series you
should expect to no longer see such error messages.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Burgener <dburgener@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Switch class and policy_capabilities directory names to be referred to with
global constants, consistent with booleans directory name. This will allow
for easy consistency of naming in future development.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Burgener <dburgener@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Make sel_make_bools and sel_make_classes take the specific elements of
selinux_fs_info that they need rather than the entire struct.
This will allow a future patch to pass temporary elements that are not in
the selinux_fs_info struct to these functions so that the original elements
can be preserved until we are ready to perform the switch over.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Burgener <dburgener@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Separating the cleanup from the creation will simplify two things in
future patches in this series. First, the creation can be made generic,
to create directories not tied to the selinux_fs_info structure. Second,
we will ultimately want to reorder creation and deletion so that the
deletions aren't performed until the new directory structures have already
been moved into place.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Burgener <dburgener@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Currently SELinux denies attempts to remove the security.selinux xattr
always, even when permissive or no policy is loaded. This was originally
motivated by the view that all files should be labeled, even if that label
is unlabeled_t, and we shouldn't permit files that were once labeled to
have their labels removed entirely. This however prevents removing
SELinux xattrs in the case where one "disables" SELinux by not loading
a policy (e.g. a system where runtime disable is removed and selinux=0
was not specified). Allow removing the xattr before SELinux is
initialized. We could conceivably permit it even after initialization
if permissive, or introduce a separate permission check here.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
exceptions may be traversed using list_for_each_entry_rcu()
outside of an RCU read side critical section BUT under the
protection of decgroup_mutex. Hence add the corresponding
lockdep expression to fix the following false-positive
warning:
[ 2.304417] =============================
[ 2.304418] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
[ 2.304420] 5.5.4-stable #17 Tainted: G E
[ 2.304422] -----------------------------
[ 2.304424] security/device_cgroup.c:355 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!
Signed-off-by: Amol Grover <frextrite@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Use kmemdup rather than duplicating its implementation
Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/api/memdup.cocci
Fixes: c7c556f1e8 ("selinux: refactor changing booleans")
CC: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@inria.fr>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Certain SELinux security server functions (e.g. security_port_sid,
called during bind) were not explicitly testing to see if SELinux
has been initialized (i.e. initial policy loaded) and handling
the no-policy-loaded case. In the past this happened to work
because the policydb was statically allocated and could always
be accessed, but with the recent encapsulation of policy state
and conversion to dynamic allocation, we can no longer access
the policy state prior to initialization. Add a test of
!selinux_initialized(state) to all of the exported functions that
were missing them and handle appropriately.
Fixes: 461698026f ("selinux: encapsulate policy state, refactor policy load")
Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The allocation check of newpolicy->sidtab is null checking if
newpolicy is null and not newpolicy->sidtab. Fix this.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Logically dead code")
Fixes: c7c556f1e8 ("selinux: refactor changing booleans")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Refactor the logic for changing SELinux policy booleans in a similar
manner to the refactoring of policy load, thereby reducing the
size of the critical section when the policy write-lock is held
and making it easier to convert the policy rwlock to RCU in the
future. Instead of directly modifying the policydb in place, modify
a copy and then swap it into place through a single pointer update.
Only fully copy the portions of the policydb that are affected by
boolean changes to avoid the full cost of a deep policydb copy.
Introduce another level of indirection for the sidtab since changing
booleans does not require updating the sidtab, unlike policy load.
While we are here, create a common helper for notifying
other kernel components and userspace of a policy change and call it
from both security_set_bools() and selinux_policy_commit().
Based on an old (2004) patch by Kaigai Kohei [1] to convert the policy
rwlock to RCU that was deferred at the time since it did not
significantly improve performance and introduced complexity. Peter
Enderborg later submitted a patch series to convert to RCU [2] that
would have made changing booleans a much more expensive operation
by requiring a full policydb_write();policydb_read(); sequence to
deep copy the entire policydb and also had concerns regarding
atomic allocations.
This change is now simplified by the earlier work to encapsulate
policy state in the selinux_policy struct and to refactor
policy load. After this change, the last major obstacle to
converting the policy rwlock to RCU is likely the sidtab live
convert support.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/6e2f9128-e191-ebb3-0e87-74bfccb0767f@tycho.nsa.gov/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20180530141104.28569-1-peter.enderborg@sony.com/
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
With the refactoring of the policy load logic in the security
server from the previous change, it is now possible to split out
the committing of the new policy from security_load_policy() and
perform it only after successful updating of selinuxfs. Change
security_load_policy() to return the newly populated policy
data structures to the caller, export selinux_policy_commit()
for external callers, and introduce selinux_policy_cancel() to
provide a way to cancel the policy load in the event of an error
during updating of the selinuxfs directory tree. Further, rework
the interfaces used by selinuxfs to get information from the policy
when creating the new directory tree to take and act upon the
new policy data structure rather than the current/active policy.
Update selinuxfs to use these updated and new interfaces. While
we are here, stop re-creating the policy_capabilities directory
on each policy load since it does not depend on the policy, and
stop trying to create the booleans and classes directories during
the initial creation of selinuxfs since no information is available
until first policy load.
After this change, a failure while updating the booleans and class
directories will cause the entire policy load to be canceled, leaving
the original policy intact, and policy load notifications to userspace
will only happen after a successful completion of updating those
directories. This does not (yet) provide full atomicity with respect
to the updating of the directory trees themselves.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Encapsulate the policy state in its own structure (struct
selinux_policy) that is separately allocated but referenced from the
selinux_ss structure. The policy state includes the SID table
(particularly the context structures), the policy database, and the
mapping between the kernel classes/permissions and the policy values.
Refactor the security server portion of the policy load logic to
cleanly separate loading of the new structures from committing the new
policy. Unify the initial policy load and reload code paths as much
as possible, avoiding duplicated code. Make sure we are taking the
policy read-lock prior to any dereferencing of the policy. Move the
copying of the policy capability booleans into the state structure
outside of the policy write-lock because they are separate from the
policy and are read outside of any policy lock; possibly they should
be using at least READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE or smp_load_acquire/store_release.
These changes simplify the policy loading logic, reduce the size of
the critical section while holding the policy write-lock, and should
facilitate future changes to e.g. refactor the entire policy reload
logic including the selinuxfs code to make the updating of the policy
and the selinuxfs directory tree atomic and/or to convert the policy
read-write lock to RCU.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Presently mdp does not enable any SELinux policy capabilities
in the dummy policy it generates. Thus, policies derived from
it will by default lack various features commonly used in modern
policies such as open permission, extended socket classes, network
peer controls, etc. Split the policy capability definitions out into
their own headers so that we can include them into mdp without pulling in
other kernel headers and extend mdp generate policycap statements for the
policy capabilities known to the kernel. Policy authors may wish to
selectively remove some of these from the generated policy.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Merge more updates from Andrew Morton:
- most of the rest of MM (memcg, hugetlb, vmscan, proc, compaction,
mempolicy, oom-kill, hugetlbfs, migration, thp, cma, util,
memory-hotplug, cleanups, uaccess, migration, gup, pagemap),
- various other subsystems (alpha, misc, sparse, bitmap, lib, bitops,
checkpatch, autofs, minix, nilfs, ufs, fat, signals, kmod, coredump,
exec, kdump, rapidio, panic, kcov, kgdb, ipc).
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (164 commits)
mm/gup: remove task_struct pointer for all gup code
mm: clean up the last pieces of page fault accountings
mm/xtensa: use general page fault accounting
mm/x86: use general page fault accounting
mm/sparc64: use general page fault accounting
mm/sparc32: use general page fault accounting
mm/sh: use general page fault accounting
mm/s390: use general page fault accounting
mm/riscv: use general page fault accounting
mm/powerpc: use general page fault accounting
mm/parisc: use general page fault accounting
mm/openrisc: use general page fault accounting
mm/nios2: use general page fault accounting
mm/nds32: use general page fault accounting
mm/mips: use general page fault accounting
mm/microblaze: use general page fault accounting
mm/m68k: use general page fault accounting
mm/ia64: use general page fault accounting
mm/hexagon: use general page fault accounting
mm/csky: use general page fault accounting
...
After the cleanup of page fault accounting, gup does not need to pass
task_struct around any more. Remove that parameter in the whole gup
stack.
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200707225021.200906-26-peterx@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Merge tag 'for-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"A couple of minor documentation updates only for this release"
* tag 'for-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
LSM: drop duplicated words in header file comments
Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones: security
As said by Linus:
A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use.
Otherwise it's actively misleading.
In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the
caller wants.
In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the
future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or
something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_.
The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information
that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory
objects.
Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently
added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit.
In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure
that it won't get optimized away by the compiler.
The renaming is done by using the command sequence:
git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\
xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/'
followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding
a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more]
Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Rationale:
Reduces attack surface on kernel devs opening the links for MITM
as HTTPS traffic is much harder to manipulate.
Deterministic algorithm:
For each file:
If not .svg:
For each line:
If doesn't contain `\bxmlns\b`:
For each link, `\bhttp://[^# \t\r\n]*(?:\w|/)`:
If both the HTTP and HTTPS versions
return 200 OK and serve the same content:
Replace HTTP with HTTPS.
Signed-off-by: Alexander A. Klimov <grandmaster@al2klimov.de>
Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Merge tag 'integrity-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"The nicest change is the IMA policy rule checking. The other changes
include allowing the kexec boot cmdline line measure policy rules to
be defined in terms of the inode associated with the kexec kernel
image, making the IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM, which governs the IMA
appraise mode (log, fix, enforce), a runtime decision based on the
secure boot mode of the system, and including errno in the audit log"
* tag 'integrity-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
integrity: remove redundant initialization of variable ret
ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime
ima: AppArmor satisfies the audit rule requirements
ima: Rename internal filter rule functions
ima: Support additional conditionals in the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function
ima: Use the common function to detect LSM conditionals in a rule
ima: Move comprehensive rule validation checks out of the token parser
ima: Use correct type for the args_p member of ima_rule_entry.lsm elements
ima: Shallow copy the args_p member of ima_rule_entry.lsm elements
ima: Fail rule parsing when appraise_flag=blacklist is unsupportable
ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEY_CHECK hook is combined with an invalid cond
ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook is combined with an invalid cond
ima: Fail rule parsing when buffer hook functions have an invalid action
ima: Free the entire rule if it fails to parse
ima: Free the entire rule when deleting a list of rules
ima: Have the LSM free its audit rule
IMA: Add audit log for failure conditions
integrity: Add errno field in audit message
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Merge tag 'Smack-for-5.9' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next
Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler:
"Minor fixes to Smack for the v5.9 release.
All were found by automated checkers and have straightforward
resolution"
* tag 'Smack-for-5.9' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
Smack: prevent underflow in smk_set_cipso()
Smack: fix another vsscanf out of bounds
Smack: fix use-after-free in smk_write_relabel_self()
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Merge tag 'cap-checkpoint-restore-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull checkpoint-restore updates from Christian Brauner:
"This enables unprivileged checkpoint/restore of processes.
Given that this work has been going on for quite some time the first
sentence in this summary is hopefully more exciting than the actual
final code changes required. Unprivileged checkpoint/restore has seen
a frequent increase in interest over the last two years and has thus
been one of the main topics for the combined containers &
checkpoint/restore microconference since at least 2018 (cf. [1]).
Here are just the three most frequent use-cases that were brought forward:
- The JVM developers are integrating checkpoint/restore into a Java
VM to significantly decrease the startup time.
- In high-performance computing environment a resource manager will
typically be distributing jobs where users are always running as
non-root. Long-running and "large" processes with significant
startup times are supposed to be checkpointed and restored with
CRIU.
- Container migration as a non-root user.
In all of these scenarios it is either desirable or required to run
without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. The userspace implementation of
checkpoint/restore CRIU already has the pull request for supporting
unprivileged checkpoint/restore up (cf. [2]).
To enable unprivileged checkpoint/restore a new dedicated capability
CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is introduced. This solution has last been
discussed in 2019 in a talk by Google at Linux Plumbers (cf. [1]
"Update on Task Migration at Google Using CRIU") with Adrian and
Nicolas providing the implementation now over the last months. In
essence, this allows the CRIU binary to be installed with the
CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE vfs capability set thereby enabling
unprivileged users to restore processes.
To make this possible the following permissions are altered:
- Selecting a specific PID via clone3() set_tid relaxed from userns
CAP_SYS_ADMIN to CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
- Selecting a specific PID via /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid relaxed
from userns CAP_SYS_ADMIN to CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
- Accessing /proc/pid/map_files relaxed from init userns
CAP_SYS_ADMIN to init userns CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
- Changing /proc/self/exe from userns CAP_SYS_ADMIN to userns
CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
Of these four changes the /proc/self/exe change deserves a few words
because the reasoning behind even restricting /proc/self/exe changes
in the first place is just full of historical quirks and tracking this
down was a questionable version of fun that I'd like to spare others.
In short, it is trivial to change /proc/self/exe as an unprivileged
user, i.e. without userns CAP_SYS_ADMIN right now. Either via ptrace()
or by simply intercepting the elf loader in userspace during exec.
Nicolas was nice enough to even provide a POC for the latter (cf. [3])
to illustrate this fact.
The original patchset which introduced PR_SET_MM_MAP had no
permissions around changing the exe link. They too argued that it is
trivial to spoof the exe link already which is true. The argument
brought up against this was that the Tomoyo LSM uses the exe link in
tomoyo_manager() to detect whether the calling process is a policy
manager. This caused changing the exe links to be guarded by userns
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
All in all this rather seems like a "better guard it with something
rather than nothing" argument which imho doesn't qualify as a great
security policy. Again, because spoofing the exe link is possible for
the calling process so even if this were security relevant it was
broken back then and would be broken today. So technically, dropping
all permissions around changing the exe link would probably be
possible and would send a clearer message to any userspace that relies
on /proc/self/exe for security reasons that they should stop doing
this but for now we're only relaxing the exe link permissions from
userns CAP_SYS_ADMIN to userns CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
There's a final uapi change in here. Changing the exe link used to
accidently return EINVAL when the caller lacked the necessary
permissions instead of the more correct EPERM. This pr contains a
commit fixing this. I assume that userspace won't notice or care and
if they do I will revert this commit. But since we are changing the
permissions anyway it seems like a good opportunity to try this fix.
With these changes merged unprivileged checkpoint/restore will be
possible and has already been tested by various users"
[1] LPC 2018
1. "Task Migration at Google Using CRIU"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yI_1cuhoDgA&t=12095
2. "Securely Migrating Untrusted Workloads with CRIU"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yI_1cuhoDgA&t=14400
LPC 2019
1. "CRIU and the PID dance"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LN2CUgp8deo&list=PLVsQ_xZBEyN30ZA3Pc9MZMFzdjwyz26dO&index=9&t=2m48s
2. "Update on Task Migration at Google Using CRIU"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LN2CUgp8deo&list=PLVsQ_xZBEyN30ZA3Pc9MZMFzdjwyz26dO&index=9&t=1h2m8s
[2] https://github.com/checkpoint-restore/criu/pull/1155
[3] https://github.com/nviennot/run_as_exe
* tag 'cap-checkpoint-restore-v5.9' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
selftests: add clone3() CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE test
prctl: exe link permission error changed from -EINVAL to -EPERM
prctl: Allow local CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE to change /proc/self/exe
proc: allow access in init userns for map_files with CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
pid_namespace: use checkpoint_restore_ns_capable() for ns_last_pid
pid: use checkpoint_restore_ns_capable() for set_tid
capabilities: Introduce CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
Pull execve updates from Eric Biederman:
"During the development of v5.7 I ran into bugs and quality of
implementation issues related to exec that could not be easily fixed
because of the way exec is implemented. So I have been diggin into
exec and cleaning up what I can.
This cycle I have been looking at different ideas and different
implementations to see what is possible to improve exec, and cleaning
the way exec interfaces with in kernel users. Only cleaning up the
interfaces of exec with rest of the kernel has managed to stabalize
and make it through review in time for v5.9-rc1 resulting in 2 sets of
changes this cycle.
- Implement kernel_execve
- Make the user mode driver code a better citizen
With kernel_execve the code size got a little larger as the copying of
parameters from userspace and copying of parameters from userspace is
now separate. The good news is kernel threads no longer need to play
games with set_fs to use exec. Which when combined with the rest of
Christophs set_fs changes should security bugs with set_fs much more
difficult"
* 'exec-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (23 commits)
exec: Implement kernel_execve
exec: Factor bprm_stack_limits out of prepare_arg_pages
exec: Factor bprm_execve out of do_execve_common
exec: Move bprm_mm_init into alloc_bprm
exec: Move initialization of bprm->filename into alloc_bprm
exec: Factor out alloc_bprm
exec: Remove unnecessary spaces from binfmts.h
umd: Stop using split_argv
umd: Remove exit_umh
bpfilter: Take advantage of the facilities of struct pid
exit: Factor thread_group_exited out of pidfd_poll
umd: Track user space drivers with struct pid
bpfilter: Move bpfilter_umh back into init data
exec: Remove do_execve_file
umh: Stop calling do_execve_file
umd: Transform fork_usermode_blob into fork_usermode_driver
umd: Rename umd_info.cmdline umd_info.driver_name
umd: For clarity rename umh_info umd_info
umh: Separate the user mode driver and the user mode helper support
umh: Remove call_usermodehelper_setup_file.
...
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Merge tag 'audit-pr-20200803' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit
Pull audit updates from Paul Moore:
"Aside from some smaller bug fixes, here are the highlights:
- add a new backlog wait metric to the audit status message, this is
intended to help admins determine how long processes have been
waiting for the audit backlog queue to clear
- generate audit records for nftables configuration changes
- generate CWD audit records for for the relevant LSM audit records"
* tag 'audit-pr-20200803' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit:
audit: report audit wait metric in audit status reply
audit: purge audit_log_string from the intra-kernel audit API
audit: issue CWD record to accompany LSM_AUDIT_DATA_* records
audit: use the proper gfp flags in the audit_log_nfcfg() calls
audit: remove unused !CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL __audit_inode* stubs
audit: add gfp parameter to audit_log_nfcfg
audit: log nftables configuration change events
audit: Use struct_size() helper in alloc_chunk
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20200803' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"Beyond the usual smattering of bug fixes, we've got three small
improvements worth highlighting:
- improved SELinux policy symbol table performance due to a reworking
of the insert and search functions
- allow reading of SELinux labels before the policy is loaded,
allowing for some more "exotic" initramfs approaches
- improved checking an error reporting about process
class/permissions during SELinux policy load"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20200803' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: complete the inlining of hashtab functions
selinux: prepare for inlining of hashtab functions
selinux: specialize symtab insert and search functions
selinux: Fix spelling mistakes in the comments
selinux: fixed a checkpatch warning with the sizeof macro
selinux: log error messages on required process class / permissions
scripts/selinux/mdp: fix initial SID handling
selinux: allow reading labels before policy is loaded
- Introduce CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO (Alexander Potapenko)
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Merge tag 'var-init-v5.9-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull automatic variable initialization updates from Kees Cook:
"This adds the "zero" init option from Clang, which is being used
widely in production builds of Android and Chrome OS (though it also
keeps the "pattern" init, which is better for debug builds).
- Introduce CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO (Alexander Potapenko)"
* tag 'var-init-v5.9-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
security: allow using Clang's zero initialization for stack variables
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Merge tag 'for-5.9/block-20200802' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block
Pull core block updates from Jens Axboe:
"Good amount of cleanups and tech debt removals in here, and as a
result, the diffstat shows a nice net reduction in code.
- Softirq completion cleanups (Christoph)
- Stop using ->queuedata (Christoph)
- Cleanup bd claiming (Christoph)
- Use check_events, moving away from the legacy media change
(Christoph)
- Use inode i_blkbits consistently (Christoph)
- Remove old unused writeback congestion bits (Christoph)
- Cleanup/unify submission path (Christoph)
- Use bio_uninit consistently, instead of bio_disassociate_blkg
(Christoph)
- sbitmap cleared bits handling (John)
- Request merging blktrace event addition (Jan)
- sysfs add/remove race fixes (Luis)
- blk-mq tag fixes/optimizations (Ming)
- Duplicate words in comments (Randy)
- Flush deferral cleanup (Yufen)
- IO context locking/retry fixes (John)
- struct_size() usage (Gustavo)
- blk-iocost fixes (Chengming)
- blk-cgroup IO stats fixes (Boris)
- Various little fixes"
* tag 'for-5.9/block-20200802' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block: (135 commits)
block: blk-timeout: delete duplicated word
block: blk-mq-sched: delete duplicated word
block: blk-mq: delete duplicated word
block: genhd: delete duplicated words
block: elevator: delete duplicated word and fix typos
block: bio: delete duplicated words
block: bfq-iosched: fix duplicated word
iocost_monitor: start from the oldest usage index
iocost: Fix check condition of iocg abs_vdebt
block: Remove callback typedefs for blk_mq_ops
block: Use non _rcu version of list functions for tag_set_list
blk-cgroup: show global disk stats in root cgroup io.stat
blk-cgroup: make iostat functions visible to stat printing
block: improve discard bio alignment in __blkdev_issue_discard()
block: change REQ_OP_ZONE_RESET and REQ_OP_ZONE_RESET_ALL to be odd numbers
block: defer flush request no matter whether we have elevator
block: make blk_timeout_init() static
block: remove retry loop in ioc_release_fn()
block: remove unnecessary ioc nested locking
block: integrate bd_start_claiming into __blkdev_get
...
The variable ret is being initialized with a value that is never read
and it is being updated later with a new value. The initialization is
redundant and can be removed.
Fixes: eb5798f2e2 ("integrity: convert digsig to akcipher api")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Addresses-Coverity: ("Unused value")
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
We have an upper bound on "maplevel" but forgot to check for negative
values.
Fixes: e114e47377 ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This is similar to commit 84e99e58e8 ("Smack: slab-out-of-bounds in
vsscanf") where we added a bounds check on "rule".
Reported-by: syzbot+a22c6092d003d6fe1122@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: f7112e6c9a ("Smack: allow for significantly longer Smack labels v4")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
audit_log_string() was inteded to be an internal audit function and
since there are only two internal uses, remove them. Purge all external
uses of it by restructuring code to use an existing audit_log_format()
or using audit_log_format().
Please see the upstream issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/84
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To allow the kernel not to play games with set_fs to call exec
implement kernel_execve. The function kernel_execve takes pointers
into kernel memory and copies the values pointed to onto the new
userspace stack.
The calls with arguments from kernel space of do_execve are replaced
with calls to kernel_execve.
The calls do_execve and do_execveat are made static as there are now
no callers outside of exec.
The comments that mention do_execve are updated to refer to
kernel_execve or execve depending on the circumstances. In addition
to correcting the comments, this makes it easy to grep for do_execve
and verify it is not used.
Inspired-by: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200627072704.2447163-1-hch@lst.de
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87wo365ikj.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM config allows enabling different "ima_appraise="
modes - log, fix, enforce - at run time, but not when IMA architecture
specific policies are enabled. This prevents properly labeling the
filesystem on systems where secure boot is supported, but not enabled on the
platform. Only when secure boot is actually enabled should these IMA
appraise modes be disabled.
This patch removes the compile time dependency and makes it a runtime
decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform.
Test results as follows:
-> x86-64 with secure boot enabled
[ 0.015637] Kernel command line: <...> ima_policy=appraise_tcb ima_appraise=fix
[ 0.015668] ima: Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=fix boot parameter option
-> powerpc with secure boot disabled
[ 0.000000] Kernel command line: <...> ima_policy=appraise_tcb ima_appraise=fix
[ 0.000000] Secure boot mode disabled
-> Running the system without secure boot and with both options set:
CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM=y
CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY=y
Audit prompts "missing-hash" but still allow execution and, consequently,
filesystem labeling:
type=INTEGRITY_DATA msg=audit(07/09/2020 12:30:27.778:1691) : pid=4976
uid=root auid=root ses=2
subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=appraise_data
cause=missing-hash comm=bash name=/usr/bin/evmctl dev="dm-0" ino=493150
res=no
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d958083a8f ("x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86")
Signed-off-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.0
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
AppArmor meets all the requirements for IMA in terms of audit rules
since commit e79c26d040 ("apparmor: Add support for audit rule
filtering"). Update IMA's Kconfig section for CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES to
reflect this.
Fixes: e79c26d040 ("apparmor: Add support for audit rule filtering")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Rename IMA's internal filter rule functions from security_filter_rule_*()
to ima_filter_rule_*(). This avoids polluting the security_* namespace,
which is typically reserved for general security subsystem
infrastructure.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: reword using the term "filter", not "audit"]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Take the properties of the kexec kernel's inode and the current task
ownership into consideration when matching a KEXEC_CMDLINE operation to
the rules in the IMA policy. This allows for some uniformity when
writing IMA policy rules for KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
and KEXEC_CMDLINE operations.
Prior to this patch, it was not possible to write a set of rules like
this:
dont_measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK obj_type=foo_t
dont_measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK obj_type=foo_t
dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE obj_type=foo_t
measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK
measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE
The inode information associated with the kernel being loaded by a
kexec_kernel_load(2) syscall can now be included in the decision to
measure or not
Additonally, the uid, euid, and subj_* conditionals can also now be
used in KEXEC_CMDLINE rules. There was no technical reason as to why
those conditionals weren't being considered previously other than
ima_match_rules() didn't have a valid inode to use so it immediately
bailed out for KEXEC_CMDLINE operations rather than going through the
full list of conditional comparisons.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Make broader use of ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond() to check if a given
rule contains an LSM conditional. This is a code cleanup and has no
user-facing change.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Use ima_validate_rule(), at the end of the token parsing stage, to
verify combinations of actions, hooks, and flags. This is useful to
increase readability by consolidating such checks into a single function
and also because rule conditionals can be specified in arbitrary order
making it difficult to do comprehensive rule validation until the entire
rule has been parsed.
This allows for the check that ties together the "keyrings" conditional
with the KEY_CHECK function hook to be moved into the final rule
validation.
The modsig check no longer needs to compiled conditionally because the
token parser will ensure that modsig support is enabled before accepting
"imasig|modsig" appraise type values. The final rule validation will
ensure that appraise_type and appraise_flag options are only present in
appraise rules.
Finally, this allows for the check that ties together the "pcr"
conditional with the measure action to be moved into the final rule
validation.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Make args_p be of the char pointer type rather than have it be a void
pointer that gets casted to char pointer when it is used. It is a simple
NUL-terminated string as returned by match_strdup().
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The args_p member is a simple string that is allocated by
ima_rule_init(). Shallow copy it like other non-LSM references in
ima_rule_entry structs.
There are no longer any necessary error path cleanups to do in
ima_lsm_copy_rule().
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Verifying that a file hash is not blacklisted is currently only
supported for files with appended signatures (modsig). In the future,
this might change.
For now, the "appraise_flag" option is only appropriate for appraise
actions and its "blacklist" value is only appropriate when
CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG is enabled and "appraise_flag=blacklist" is
only appropriate when "appraise_type=imasig|modsig" is also present.
Make this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume
that other uses of "appraise_flag=blacklist" are supported.
Fixes: 273df864cf ("ima: Check against blacklisted hashes for files with modsig")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reivewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
This patch introduces CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, a new capability facilitating
checkpoint/restore for non-root users.
Over the last years, The CRIU (Checkpoint/Restore In Userspace) team has
been asked numerous times if it is possible to checkpoint/restore a
process as non-root. The answer usually was: 'almost'.
The main blocker to restore a process as non-root was to control the PID
of the restored process. This feature available via the clone3 system
call, or via /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid is unfortunately guarded by
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
In the past two years, requests for non-root checkpoint/restore have
increased due to the following use cases:
* Checkpoint/Restore in an HPC environment in combination with a
resource manager distributing jobs where users are always running as
non-root. There is a desire to provide a way to checkpoint and
restore long running jobs.
* Container migration as non-root
* We have been in contact with JVM developers who are integrating
CRIU into a Java VM to decrease the startup time. These
checkpoint/restore applications are not meant to be running with
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
We have seen the following workarounds:
* Use a setuid wrapper around CRIU:
See https://github.com/FredHutch/slurm-examples/blob/master/checkpointer/lib/checkpointer/checkpointer-suid.c
* Use a setuid helper that writes to ns_last_pid.
Unfortunately, this helper delegation technique is impossible to use
with clone3, and is thus prone to races.
See https://github.com/twosigma/set_ns_last_pid
* Cycle through PIDs with fork() until the desired PID is reached:
This has been demonstrated to work with cycling rates of 100,000 PIDs/s
See https://github.com/twosigma/set_ns_last_pid
* Patch out the CAP_SYS_ADMIN check from the kernel
* Run the desired application in a new user and PID namespace to provide
a local CAP_SYS_ADMIN for controlling PIDs. This technique has limited
use in typical container environments (e.g., Kubernetes) as /proc is
typically protected with read-only layers (e.g., /proc/sys) for
hardening purposes. Read-only layers prevent additional /proc mounts
(due to proc's SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE property), making the use of new
PID namespaces limited as certain applications need access to /proc
matching their PID namespace.
The introduced capability allows to:
* Control PIDs when the current user is CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE capable
for the corresponding PID namespace via ns_last_pid/clone3.
* Open files in /proc/pid/map_files when the current user is
CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE capable in the root namespace, useful for
recovering files that are unreachable via the file system such as
deleted files, or memfd files.
See corresponding selftest for an example with clone3().
Signed-off-by: Adrian Reber <areber@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Viennot <Nicolas.Viennot@twosigma.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200719100418.2112740-2-areber@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
The KEY_CHECK function only supports the uid, pcr, and keyrings
conditionals. Make this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors
don't assume that other conditionals are supported.
Fixes: 5808611ccc ("IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
The KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function only supports the pcr conditional. Make
this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume that
other conditionals are supported.
Since KEXEC_CMDLINE's inception, ima_match_rules() has always returned
true on any loaded KEXEC_CMDLINE rule without any consideration for
other conditionals present in the rule. Make it clear that pcr is the
only supported KEXEC_CMDLINE conditional by returning an error during
policy load.
An example of why this is a problem can be explained with the following
rule:
dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE obj_type=foo_t
An IMA policy author would have assumed that rule is valid because the
parser accepted it but the result was that measurements for all
KEXEC_CMDLINE operations would be disabled.
Fixes: b0935123a1 ("IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Buffer based hook functions, such as KEXEC_CMDLINE and KEY_CHECK, can
only measure. The process_buffer_measurement() function quietly ignores
all actions except measure so make this behavior clear at the time of
policy load.
The parsing of the keyrings conditional had a check to ensure that it
was only specified with measure actions but the check should be on the
hook function and not the keyrings conditional since
"appraise func=KEY_CHECK" is not a valid rule.
Fixes: b0935123a1 ("IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments")
Fixes: 5808611ccc ("IMA: Add KEY_CHECK func to measure keys")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Use ima_free_rule() to fix memory leaks of allocated ima_rule_entry
members, such as .fsname and .keyrings, when an error is encountered
during rule parsing.
Set the args_p pointer to NULL after freeing it in the error path of
ima_lsm_rule_init() so that it isn't freed twice.
This fixes a memory leak seen when loading an rule that contains an
additional piece of allocated memory, such as an fsname, followed by an
invalid conditional:
# echo "measure fsname=tmpfs bad=cond" > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
-bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
# echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
# cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
unreferenced object 0xffff98e7e4ece6c0 (size 8):
comm "bash", pid 672, jiffies 4294791843 (age 21.855s)
hex dump (first 8 bytes):
74 6d 70 66 73 00 6b a5 tmpfs.k.
backtrace:
[<00000000abab7413>] kstrdup+0x2e/0x60
[<00000000f11ede32>] ima_parse_add_rule+0x7d4/0x1020
[<00000000f883dd7a>] ima_write_policy+0xab/0x1d0
[<00000000b17cf753>] vfs_write+0xde/0x1d0
[<00000000b8ddfdea>] ksys_write+0x68/0xe0
[<00000000b8e21e87>] do_syscall_64+0x56/0xa0
[<0000000089ea7b98>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Fixes: f1b08bbcbd ("ima: define a new policy condition based on the filesystem name")
Fixes: 2b60c0eced ("IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Create a function, ima_free_rule(), to free all memory associated with
an ima_rule_entry. Use the new function to fix memory leaks of allocated
ima_rule_entry members, such as .fsname and .keyrings, when deleting a
list of rules.
Make the existing ima_lsm_free_rule() function specific to the LSM
audit rule array of an ima_rule_entry and require that callers make an
additional call to kfree to free the ima_rule_entry itself.
This fixes a memory leak seen when loading by a valid rule that contains
an additional piece of allocated memory, such as an fsname, followed by
an invalid rule that triggers a policy load failure:
# echo -e "dont_measure fsname=securityfs\nbad syntax" > \
/sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
-bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
# echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
# cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
unreferenced object 0xffff9bab67ca12c0 (size 16):
comm "bash", pid 684, jiffies 4295212803 (age 252.344s)
hex dump (first 16 bytes):
73 65 63 75 72 69 74 79 66 73 00 6b 6b 6b 6b a5 securityfs.kkkk.
backtrace:
[<00000000adc80b1b>] kstrdup+0x2e/0x60
[<00000000d504cb0d>] ima_parse_add_rule+0x7d4/0x1020
[<00000000444825ac>] ima_write_policy+0xab/0x1d0
[<000000002b7f0d6c>] vfs_write+0xde/0x1d0
[<0000000096feedcf>] ksys_write+0x68/0xe0
[<0000000052b544a2>] do_syscall_64+0x56/0xa0
[<000000007ead1ba7>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Fixes: f1b08bbcbd ("ima: define a new policy condition based on the filesystem name")
Fixes: 2b60c0eced ("IMA: Read keyrings= option from the IMA policy")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Ask the LSM to free its audit rule rather than directly calling kfree().
Both AppArmor and SELinux do additional work in their audit_rule_free()
hooks. Fix memory leaks by allowing the LSMs to perform necessary work.
Fixes: b169424551 ("ima: use the lsm policy update notifier")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Error code is not included in the audit messages logged by
the integrity subsystem.
Define a new function integrity_audit_message() that takes error code
in the "errno" parameter. Add "errno" field in the audit messages logged
by the integrity subsystem and set the value passed in the "errno"
parameter.
[ 6.303048] audit: type=1804 audit(1592506281.627:2): pid=1 uid=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 subj=kernel op=measuring_key cause=ENOMEM comm="swapper/0" name=".builtin_trusted_keys" res=0 errno=-12
[ 7.987647] audit: type=1802 audit(1592506283.312:9): pid=1 uid=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 subj=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 op=policy_update cause=completed comm="systemd" res=1 errno=0
[ 8.019432] audit: type=1804 audit(1592506283.344:10): pid=1 uid=0 auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 subj=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 op=measuring_kexec_cmdline cause=hashing_error comm="systemd" name="kexec-cmdline" res=0 errno=-22
Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Suggested-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
smk_write_relabel_self() frees memory from the task's credentials with
no locking, which can easily cause a use-after-free because multiple
tasks can share the same credentials structure.
Fix this by using prepare_creds() and commit_creds() to correctly modify
the task's credentials.
Reproducer for "BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in smk_write_relabel_self":
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static void *thrproc(void *arg)
{
int fd = open("/sys/fs/smackfs/relabel-self", O_WRONLY);
for (;;) write(fd, "foo", 3);
}
int main()
{
pthread_t t;
pthread_create(&t, NULL, thrproc, NULL);
thrproc(NULL);
}
Reported-by: syzbot+e6416dabb497a650da40@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 38416e5393 ("Smack: limited capability for changing process label")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.4+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Move (most of) the definitions of hashtab_search() and hashtab_insert()
to the header file. In combination with the previous patch, this avoids
calling the callbacks indirectly by function pointers and allows for
better optimization, leading to a drastic performance improvement of
these operations.
With this patch, I measured a speed up in the following areas (measured
on x86_64 F32 VM with 4 CPUs):
1. Policy load (`load_policy`) - takes ~150 ms instead of ~230 ms.
2. `chcon -R unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0:c381,c519 /tmp/linux-src`
where /tmp/linux-src is an extracted linux-5.7 source tarball -
takes ~522 ms instead of ~576 ms. This is because of many
symtab_search() calls in string_to_context_struct() when there are
many categories specified in the context.
3. `stress-ng --msg 1 --msg-ops 10000000` - takes 12.41 s instead of
13.95 s (consumes 18.6 s of kernel CPU time instead of 21.6 s).
This is thanks to security_transition_sid() being ~43% faster after
this patch.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Refactor searching and inserting into hashtabs to pave the way for
converting hashtab_search() and hashtab_insert() to inline functions in
the next patch. This will avoid indirect calls and allow the compiler to
better optimize individual callers, leading to a significant performance
improvement.
In order to avoid the indirect calls, the key hashing and comparison
callbacks need to be extracted from the hashtab struct and passed
directly to hashtab_search()/_insert() by the callers so that the
callback address is always known at compile time. The kernel's
rhashtable library (<linux/rhashtable*.h>) does the same thing.
This of course makes the hashtab functions slightly easier to misuse by
passing a wrong callback set, but unfortunately there is no better way
to implement a hash table that is both generic and efficient in C. This
patch tries to somewhat mitigate this by only calling the hashtab
functions in the same file where the corresponding callbacks are
defined (wrapping them into more specialized functions as needed).
Note that this patch doesn't bring any benefit without also moving the
definitions of hashtab_search() and -_insert() to the header file, which
is done in a follow-up patch for easier review of the hashtab.c changes
in this patch.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This encapsulates symtab a little better and will help with further
refactoring later.
Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
The LSM_AUDIT_DATA_* records for PATH, FILE, IOCTL_OP, DENTRY and INODE
are incomplete without the task context of the AUDIT Current Working
Directory record. Add it.
This record addition can't use audit_dummy_context to determine whether
or not to store the record information since the LSM_AUDIT_DATA_*
records are initiated by various LSMs independent of any audit rules.
context->in_syscall is used to determine if it was called in user
context like audit_getname.
Please see the upstream issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/96
Adapted from Vladis Dronov's v2 patch.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
1) Fix hook iteration and default value for inode_copy_up_xattr
from KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
2) Fix the key_permission LSM hook function type
from Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
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Merge tag 'fixes-v5.8-rc3-a' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem fixes from James Morris:
"Two simple fixes for v5.8:
- Fix hook iteration and default value for inode_copy_up_xattr
(KP Singh)
- Fix the key_permission LSM hook function type (Sami Tolvanen)"
* tag 'fixes-v5.8-rc3-a' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
security: Fix hook iteration and default value for inode_copy_up_xattr
security: fix the key_permission LSM hook function type
`sizeof buf` changed to `sizeof(buf)`
Signed-off-by: Ethan Edwards <ethancarteredwards@gmail.com>
[PM: rewrote the subject line]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Registers 8-9 are used to store measurements of the kernel and its
command line (e.g., grub2 bootloader with tpm module enabled). IMA
should include them in the boot aggregate. Registers 8-9 should be
only included in non-SHA1 digests to avoid ambiguity.
Signed-off-by: Maurizio Drocco <maurizio.drocco@ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com> (TPM 1.2, TPM 2.0)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Move most of the block related definition out of fs.h into more suitable
headers.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
In general SELinux no longer treats undefined object classes or permissions
in the policy as a fatal error, instead handling them in accordance with
handle_unknown. However, the process class and process transition and
dyntransition permissions are still required to be defined due to
dependencies on these definitions for default labeling behaviors,
role and range transitions in older policy versions that lack an explicit
class field, and role allow checking. Log error messages in these cases
since otherwise the policy load will fail silently with no indication
to the user as to the underlying cause. While here, fix the checking for
process transition / dyntransition so that omitting either permission is
handled as an error; both are needed in order to ensure that role allow
checking is consistently applied.
Reported-by: bauen1 <j2468h@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch does for `getxattr` what commit 3e3e24b420 ("selinux: allow
labeling before policy is loaded") did for `setxattr`; it allows
querying the current SELinux label on disk before the policy is loaded.
One of the motivations described in that commit message also drives this
patch: for Fedora CoreOS (and eventually RHEL CoreOS), we want to be
able to move the root filesystem for example, from xfs to ext4 on RAID,
on first boot, at initrd time.[1]
Because such an operation works at the filesystem level, we need to be
able to read the SELinux labels first from the original root, and apply
them to the files of the new root. The previous commit enabled the
second part of this process; this commit enables the first part.
[1] https://github.com/coreos/fedora-coreos-tracker/issues/94
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Lebon <jlebon@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
inode_copy_up_xattr returns 0 to indicate the acceptance of the xattr
and 1 to reject it. If the LSM does not know about the xattr, it's
expected to return -EOPNOTSUPP, which is the correct default value for
this hook. BPF LSM, currently, uses 0 as the default value and thereby
falsely allows all overlay fs xattributes to be copied up.
The iteration logic is also updated from the "bail-on-fail"
call_int_hook to continue on the non-decisive -EOPNOTSUPP and bail out
on other values.
Fixes: 98e828a065 ("security: Refactor declaration of LSM hooks")
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20200621' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"Three small patches to fix problems in the SELinux code, all found via
clang.
Two patches fix potential double-free conditions and one fixes an
undefined return value"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20200621' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: fix undefined return of cond_evaluate_expr
selinux: fix a double free in cond_read_node()/cond_read_list()
selinux: fix double free
