Commit Graph

125 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Jinjie Ruan
546f02823d user_namespace: use kmemdup_array() instead of kmemdup() for multiple allocation
Let the kmemdup_array() take care about multiplication and possible
overflows.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240828072340.1249310-1-ruanjinjie@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Li zeming <zeming@nfschina.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-09-09 16:47:42 -07:00
Li zeming
6db9d31783 user_namespace: remove unnecessary NULL values from kbuf
kbuf is assigned first, so it does not need to initialize the assignment.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240115062519.31298-1-zeming@nfschina.com
Signed-off-by: Li zeming <zeming@nfschina.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2024-02-22 15:38:52 -08:00
Christian Brauner
783822e445 mnt_idmapping: decouple from namespaces
There's no reason we need to couple mnt idmapping to namespaces in the
way we currently do. Copy the idmapping when an idmapped mount is
created and don't take any reference on the namespace at all.

We also can't easily refcount struct uid_gid_map because it needs to
stay the size of a cacheline otherwise we risk performance regressions
(Ignoring for a second that right now struct uid_gid_map isn't actually
 64 byte but 72 but that's a fix for another patch series.).

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231122-vfs-mnt_idmap-v1-3-dae4abdde5bd@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2023-11-28 14:08:47 +01:00
Randy Dunlap
f73f6181eb userns: eliminate many kernel-doc warnings
Drop the kernel-doc "/**" notation from 8 structs or functions to
prevent 22 kernel-doc warnings  (samples below).

user_namespace.c:239: warning: Function parameter or member 'map_up' not described in 'idmap_key'
user_namespace.c:246: warning: Function parameter or member 'k' not described in 'cmp_map_id'
user_namespace.c:277: warning: Function parameter or member 'extents' not described in 'map_id_range_down_max'
user_namespace.c:295: warning: Function parameter or member 'extents' not described in 'map_id_range_down_base'
user_namespace.c:344: warning: Function parameter or member 'extents' not described in 'map_id_up_base'
user_namespace.c:364: warning: Function parameter or member 'extents' not described in 'map_id_up_max'
user_namespace.c:776: warning: Function parameter or member 'map' not described in 'insert_extent'
user_namespace.c:844: warning: Function parameter or member 'map' not described in 'sort_idmaps'

Fixes: 6397fac491 ("userns: bump idmap limits to 340")
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230830163215.13193-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
2023-11-18 15:00:01 +01:00
Linus Torvalds
8f6f76a6a2 As usual, lots of singleton and doubleton patches all over the tree and
there's little I can say which isn't in the individual changelogs.
 
 The lengthier patch series are
 
 - "kdump: use generic functions to simplify crashkernel reservation in
   arch", from Baoquan He.  This is mainly cleanups and consolidation of
   the "crashkernel=" kernel parameter handling.
 
 - After much discussion, David Laight's "minmax: Relax type checks in
   min() and max()" is here.  Hopefully reduces some typecasting and the
   use of min_t() and max_t().
 
 - A group of patches from Oleg Nesterov which clean up and slightly fix
   our handling of reads from /proc/PID/task/...  and which remove
   task_struct.therad_group.
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Merge tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2023-11-02-14-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm

Pull non-MM updates from Andrew Morton:
 "As usual, lots of singleton and doubleton patches all over the tree
  and there's little I can say which isn't in the individual changelogs.

  The lengthier patch series are

   - 'kdump: use generic functions to simplify crashkernel reservation
     in arch', from Baoquan He. This is mainly cleanups and
     consolidation of the 'crashkernel=' kernel parameter handling

   - After much discussion, David Laight's 'minmax: Relax type checks in
     min() and max()' is here. Hopefully reduces some typecasting and
     the use of min_t() and max_t()

   - A group of patches from Oleg Nesterov which clean up and slightly
     fix our handling of reads from /proc/PID/task/... and which remove
     task_struct.thread_group"

* tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2023-11-02-14-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (64 commits)
  scripts/gdb/vmalloc: disable on no-MMU
  scripts/gdb: fix usage of MOD_TEXT not defined when CONFIG_MODULES=n
  .mailmap: add address mapping for Tomeu Vizoso
  mailmap: update email address for Claudiu Beznea
  tools/testing/selftests/mm/run_vmtests.sh: lower the ptrace permissions
  .mailmap: map Benjamin Poirier's address
  scripts/gdb: add lx_current support for riscv
  ocfs2: fix a spelling typo in comment
  proc: test ProtectionKey in proc-empty-vm test
  proc: fix proc-empty-vm test with vsyscall
  fs/proc/base.c: remove unneeded semicolon
  do_io_accounting: use sig->stats_lock
  do_io_accounting: use __for_each_thread()
  ocfs2: replace BUG_ON() at ocfs2_num_free_extents() with ocfs2_error()
  ocfs2: fix a typo in a comment
  scripts/show_delta: add __main__ judgement before main code
  treewide: mark stuff as __ro_after_init
  fs: ocfs2: check status values
  proc: test /proc/${pid}/statm
  compiler.h: move __is_constexpr() to compiler.h
  ...
2023-11-02 20:53:31 -10:00
Alexey Dobriyan
68279f9c9f treewide: mark stuff as __ro_after_init
__read_mostly predates __ro_after_init. Many variables which are marked
__read_mostly should have been __ro_after_init from day 1.

Also, mark some stuff as "const" and "__init" while I'm at it.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: revert sysctl_nr_open_min, sysctl_nr_open_max changes due to arm warning]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style cleanups]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4f6bb9c0-abba-4ee4-a7aa-89265e886817@p183
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-10-18 14:43:23 -07:00
Christian Brauner
21ca59b365 binfmt_misc: enable sandboxed mounts
Enable unprivileged sandboxes to create their own binfmt_misc mounts.
This is based on Laurent's work in [1] but has been significantly
reworked to fix various issues we identified in earlier versions.

While binfmt_misc can currently only be mounted in the initial user
namespace, binary types registered in this binfmt_misc instance are
available to all sandboxes (Either by having them installed in the
sandbox or by registering the binary type with the F flag causing the
interpreter to be opened right away). So binfmt_misc binary types are
already delegated to sandboxes implicitly.

However, while a sandbox has access to all registered binary types in
binfmt_misc a sandbox cannot currently register its own binary types
in binfmt_misc. This has prevented various use-cases some of which were
already outlined in [1] but we have a range of issues associated with
this (cf. [3]-[5] below which are just a small sample).

Extend binfmt_misc to be mountable in non-initial user namespaces.
Similar to other filesystem such as nfsd, mqueue, and sunrpc we use
keyed superblock management. The key determines whether we need to
create a new superblock or can reuse an already existing one. We use the
user namespace of the mount as key. This means a new binfmt_misc
superblock is created once per user namespace creation. Subsequent
mounts of binfmt_misc in the same user namespace will mount the same
binfmt_misc instance. We explicitly do not create a new binfmt_misc
superblock on every binfmt_misc mount as the semantics for
load_misc_binary() line up with the keying model. This also allows us to
retrieve the relevant binfmt_misc instance based on the caller's user
namespace which can be done in a simple (bounded to 32 levels) loop.

Similar to the current binfmt_misc semantics allowing access to the
binary types in the initial binfmt_misc instance we do allow sandboxes
access to their parent's binfmt_misc mounts if they do not have created
a separate binfmt_misc instance.

Overall, this will unblock the use-cases mentioned below and in general
will also allow to support and harden execution of another
architecture's binaries in tight sandboxes. For instance, using the
unshare binary it possible to start a chroot of another architecture and
configure the binfmt_misc interpreter without being root to run the
binaries in this chroot and without requiring the host to modify its
binary type handlers.

Henning had already posted a few experiments in the cover letter at [1].
But here's an additional example where an unprivileged container
registers qemu-user-static binary handlers for various binary types in
its separate binfmt_misc mount and is then seamlessly able to start
containers with a different architecture without affecting the host:

root    [lxc monitor] /var/snap/lxd/common/lxd/containers f1
1000000  \_ /sbin/init
1000000      \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1000000      \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd
1000100      \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-networkd
1000101      \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-resolved
1000000      \_ /usr/sbin/cron -f
1000103      \_ /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-activation --syslog-only
1000000      \_ /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1000104      \_ /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1000000      \_ /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1000000      \_ /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1000107      \_ dnsmasq --conf-file=/dev/null -u lxc-dnsmasq --strict-order --bind-interfaces --pid-file=/run/lxc/dnsmasq.pid --liste
1000000      \_ [lxc monitor] /var/lib/lxc f1-s390x
1100000          \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/init
1100000              \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-journald
1100000              \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/cron -f
1100103              \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/dbus-daemon --system --address=systemd: --nofork --nopidfile --systemd-ac
1100000              \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/networkd-dispatcher --run-startup-triggers
1100104              \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -n -iNONE
1100000              \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-logind
1100000              \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud console 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000              \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/0 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000              \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/1 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000              \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/2 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000              \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /sbin/agetty -o -p -- \u --noclear --keep-baud pts/3 115200,38400,9600 vt220
1100000              \_ /usr/bin/qemu-s390x-static /lib/systemd/systemd-udevd

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20191216091220.465626-1-laurent@vivier.eu
[2]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/binfmt-misc-permission-denied
[3]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/lxd-binfmt-support-for-qemu-static-interpreters
[4]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/3-1-0-binfmt-support-service-in-unprivileged-guest-requires-write-access-on-hosts-proc-sys-fs-binfmt-misc
[5]: https://discuss.linuxcontainers.org/t/qemu-user-static-not-working-4-11

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191216091220.465626-2-laurent@vivier.eu (origin)
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028103114.2849140-2-brauner@kernel.org (v1)
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Henning Schild <henning.schild@siemens.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
/* v2 */
- Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>:
  - Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for userspace triggered allocations when a
    new binary type handler is registered.
- Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>:
  - Switch authorship to me. I refused to do that earlier even though
    Laurent said I should do so because I think it's genuinely bad form.
    But by now I have changed so many things that it'd be unfair to
    blame Laurent for any potential bugs in here.
  - Add more comments that explain what's going on.
  - Rename functions while changing them to better reflect what they are
    doing to make the code easier to understand.
  - In the first version when a specific binary type handler was removed
    either through a write to the entry's file or all binary type
    handlers were removed by a write to the binfmt_misc mount's status
    file all cleanup work happened during inode eviction.
    That includes removal of the relevant entries from entry list. While
    that works fine I disliked that model after thinking about it for a
    bit. Because it means that there was a window were someone has
    already removed a or all binary handlers but they could still be
    safely reached from load_misc_binary() when it has managed to take
    the read_lock() on the entries list while inode eviction was already
    happening. Again, that perfectly benign but it's cleaner to remove
    the binary handler from the list immediately meaning that ones the
    write to then entry's file or the binfmt_misc status file returns
    the binary type cannot be executed anymore. That gives stronger
    guarantees to the user.
2023-10-11 08:46:01 -07:00
Randy Dunlap
e227db4d4f userns: fix a struct's kernel-doc notation
Use the 'struct' keyword for a struct's kernel-doc notation to avoid a
kernel-doc warning:

kernel/user_namespace.c:232: warning: This comment starts with '/**', but isn't a kernel-doc comment. Refer Documentation/doc-guide/kernel-doc.rst
 * idmap_key struct holds the information necessary to find an idmapping in a

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230108021243.16683-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-02-02 22:50:04 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
493ffd6605 ucounts: Split rlimit and ucount values and max values
After the ucount rlimit code was merged a bunch of small but
 siginificant bugs were found and fixed.  At the time it was realized
 that part of the problem was that while the ucount rlimits were very
 similar to the oridinary ucounts (in being nested counts with limits)
 the semantics were slightly different and the code would be less error
 prone if there was less sharing.  This is the long awaited cleanup
 that should hopefully keep things more comprehensible and less error
 prone for whoever needs to touch that code next.
 
 Alexey Gladkov (1):
       ucounts: Split rlimit and ucount values and max values
 
  fs/exec.c                      |  2 +-
  fs/proc/array.c                |  2 +-
  include/linux/user_namespace.h | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
  kernel/fork.c                  | 12 ++++++------
  kernel/sys.c                   |  2 +-
  kernel/ucount.c                | 34 +++++++++++++++-------------------
  kernel/user_namespace.c        | 10 +++++-----
  7 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
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Merge tag 'ucount-rlimits-cleanups-for-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace

Pull ucounts update from Eric Biederman:
 "Split rlimit and ucount values and max values

  After the ucount rlimit code was merged a bunch of small but
  siginificant bugs were found and fixed. At the time it was realized
  that part of the problem was that while the ucount rlimits were very
  similar to the oridinary ucounts (in being nested counts with limits)
  the semantics were slightly different and the code would be less error
  prone if there was less sharing.

  This is the long awaited cleanup that should hopefully keep things
  more comprehensible and less error prone for whoever needs to touch
  that code next"

* tag 'ucount-rlimits-cleanups-for-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  ucounts: Split rlimit and ucount values and max values
2022-10-09 16:24:05 -07:00
Frederick Lawler
7cd4c5c210 security, lsm: Introduce security_create_user_ns()
User namespaces are an effective tool to allow programs to run with
permission without requiring the need for a program to run as root. User
namespaces may also be used as a sandboxing technique. However, attackers
sometimes leverage user namespaces as an initial attack vector to perform
some exploit. [1,2,3]

While it is not the unprivileged user namespace functionality, which
causes the kernel to be exploitable, users/administrators might want to
more granularly limit or at least monitor how various processes use this
functionality, while vulnerable kernel subsystems are being patched.

Preventing user namespace already creation comes in a few of forms in
order of granularity:

        1. /proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces sysctl
        2. Distro specific patch(es)
        3. CONFIG_USER_NS

To block a task based on its attributes, the LSM hook cred_prepare is a
decent candidate for use because it provides more granular control, and
it is called before create_user_ns():

        cred = prepare_creds()
                security_prepare_creds()
                        call_int_hook(cred_prepare, ...
        if (cred)
                create_user_ns(cred)

Since security_prepare_creds() is meant for LSMs to copy and prepare
credentials, access control is an unintended use of the hook. [4]
Further, security_prepare_creds() will always return a ENOMEM if the
hook returns any non-zero error code.

This hook also does not handle the clone3 case which requires us to
access a user space pointer to know if we're in the CLONE_NEW_USER
call path which may be subject to a TOCTTOU attack.

Lastly, cred_prepare is called in many call paths, and a targeted hook
further limits the frequency of calls which is a beneficial outcome.
Therefore introduce a new function security_create_user_ns() with an
accompanying userns_create LSM hook.

With the new userns_create hook, users will have more control over the
observability and access control over user namespace creation. Users
should expect that normal operation of user namespaces will behave as
usual, and only be impacted when controls are implemented by users or
administrators.

This hook takes the prepared creds for LSM authors to write policy
against. On success, the new namespace is applied to credentials,
otherwise an error is returned.

Links:
1. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0492
2. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25636
3. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-34918
4. https://lore.kernel.org/all/1c4b1c0d-12f6-6e9e-a6a3-cdce7418110c@schaufler-ca.com/

Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
2022-08-16 17:32:46 -04:00
Alexey Gladkov
de399236e2 ucounts: Split rlimit and ucount values and max values
Since the semantics of maximum rlimit values are different, it would be
better not to mix ucount and rlimit values. This will prevent the error
of using inc_count/dec_ucount for rlimit parameters.

This patch also renames the functions to emphasize the lack of
connection between rlimit and ucount.

v3:
- Fix BUG:KASAN:use-after-free_in_dec_ucount.

v2:
- Fix the array-index-out-of-bounds that was found by the lkp project.

Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220518171730.l65lmnnjtnxnftpq@example.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2022-05-18 18:24:57 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman
0ac983f512 ucounts: Fix systemd LimitNPROC with private users regression
Long story short recursively enforcing RLIMIT_NPROC when it is not
enforced on the process that creates a new user namespace, causes
currently working code to fail.  There is no reason to enforce
RLIMIT_NPROC recursively when we don't enforce it normally so update
the code to detect this case.

I would like to simply use capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) to detect when
RLIMIT_NPROC is not enforced upon the caller.  Unfortunately because
RLIMIT_NPROC is charged and checked for enforcement based upon the
real uid, using capable() which is euid based is inconsistent with reality.
Come as close as possible to testing for capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) by
testing for when the real uid would match the conditions when
CAP_SYS_RESOURCE would be present if the real uid was the effective
uid.

Reported-by: Etienne Dechamps <etienne@edechamps.fr>
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215596
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/e9589141-cfeb-90cd-2d0e-83a62787239a@edechamps.fr
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87sfs8jmpz.fsf_-_@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 21d1c5e386 ("Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts")
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2022-02-25 10:40:14 -06:00
Vasily Averin
30acd0bdfb memcg: enable accounting for new namesapces and struct nsproxy
Container admin can create new namespaces and force kernel to allocate up
to several pages of memory for the namespaces and its associated
structures.

Net and uts namespaces have enabled accounting for such allocations.  It
makes sense to account for rest ones to restrict the host's memory
consumption from inside the memcg-limited container.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/5525bcbf-533e-da27-79b7-158686c64e13@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Yutian Yang <nglaive@gmail.com>
Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan.x@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-09-03 09:58:12 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
c54b245d01 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull user namespace rlimit handling update from Eric Biederman:
 "This is the work mainly by Alexey Gladkov to limit rlimits to the
  rlimits of the user that created a user namespace, and to allow users
  to have stricter limits on the resources created within a user
  namespace."

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  cred: add missing return error code when set_cred_ucounts() failed
  ucounts: Silence warning in dec_rlimit_ucounts
  ucounts: Set ucount_max to the largest positive value the type can hold
  kselftests: Add test to check for rlimit changes in different user namespaces
  Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts
  Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts
  Reimplement RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE on top of ucounts
  Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts
  Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting
  Add a reference to ucounts for each cred
  Increase size of ucounts to atomic_long_t
2021-06-28 20:39:26 -07:00
Xiaofeng Cao
a12f4f85bc kernel/user_namespace.c: fix typos
change 'verifing' to 'verifying'
change 'certaint' to 'certain'
change 'approprpiate' to 'appropriate'

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210317100129.12440-1-caoxiaofeng@yulong.com
Signed-off-by: Xiaofeng Cao <caoxiaofeng@yulong.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-05-07 00:26:34 -07:00
Alexey Gladkov
c1ada3dc72 ucounts: Set ucount_max to the largest positive value the type can hold
The ns->ucount_max[] is signed long which is less than the rlimit size.
We have to protect ucount_max[] from overflow and only use the largest
value that we can hold.

On 32bit using "long" instead of "unsigned long" to hold the counts has
the downside that RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE and RLIMIT_MEMLOCK are limited to 2GiB
instead of 4GiB. I don't think anyone cares but it should be mentioned
in case someone does.

The RLIMIT_NPROC and RLIMIT_SIGPENDING used atomic_t so their maximum
hasn't changed.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1825a5dfa18bc5a570e79feb05e2bd07fd57e7e3.1619094428.git.legion@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2021-04-30 14:14:03 -05:00
Alexey Gladkov
d7c9e99aee Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts
The rlimit counter is tied to uid in the user_namespace. This allows
rlimit values to be specified in userns even if they are already
globally exceeded by the user. However, the value of the previous
user_namespaces cannot be exceeded.

Changelog

v11:
* Fix issue found by lkp robot.

v8:
* Fix issues found by lkp-tests project.

v7:
* Keep only ucounts for RLIMIT_MEMLOCK checks instead of struct cred.

v6:
* Fix bug in hugetlb_file_setup() detected by trinity.

Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/970d50c70c71bfd4496e0e8d2a0a32feebebb350.1619094428.git.legion@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2021-04-30 14:14:02 -05:00
Alexey Gladkov
d646969055 Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts
The rlimit counter is tied to uid in the user_namespace. This allows
rlimit values to be specified in userns even if they are already
globally exceeded by the user. However, the value of the previous
user_namespaces cannot be exceeded.

Changelog

v11:
* Revert most of changes to fix performance issues.

v10:
* Fix memory leak on get_ucounts failure.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/df9d7764dddd50f28616b7840de74ec0f81711a8.1619094428.git.legion@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2021-04-30 14:14:02 -05:00
Alexey Gladkov
6e52a9f053 Reimplement RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE on top of ucounts
The rlimit counter is tied to uid in the user_namespace. This allows
rlimit values to be specified in userns even if they are already
globally exceeded by the user. However, the value of the previous
user_namespaces cannot be exceeded.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2531f42f7884bbfee56a978040b3e0d25cdf6cde.1619094428.git.legion@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2021-04-30 14:14:01 -05:00
Alexey Gladkov
21d1c5e386 Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts
The rlimit counter is tied to uid in the user_namespace. This allows
rlimit values to be specified in userns even if they are already
globally exceeded by the user. However, the value of the previous
user_namespaces cannot be exceeded.

To illustrate the impact of rlimits, let's say there is a program that
does not fork. Some service-A wants to run this program as user X in
multiple containers. Since the program never fork the service wants to
set RLIMIT_NPROC=1.

service-A
 \- program (uid=1000, container1, rlimit_nproc=1)
 \- program (uid=1000, container2, rlimit_nproc=1)

The service-A sets RLIMIT_NPROC=1 and runs the program in container1.
When the service-A tries to run a program with RLIMIT_NPROC=1 in
container2 it fails since user X already has one running process.

We cannot use existing inc_ucounts / dec_ucounts because they do not
allow us to exceed the maximum for the counter. Some rlimits can be
overlimited by root or if the user has the appropriate capability.

Changelog

v11:
* Change inc_rlimit_ucounts() which now returns top value of ucounts.
* Drop inc_rlimit_ucounts_and_test() because the return code of
  inc_rlimit_ucounts() can be checked.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/c5286a8aa16d2d698c222f7532f3d735c82bc6bc.1619094428.git.legion@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2021-04-30 14:14:01 -05:00
Alexey Gladkov
905ae01c4a Add a reference to ucounts for each cred
For RLIMIT_NPROC and some other rlimits the user_struct that holds the
global limit is kept alive for the lifetime of a process by keeping it
in struct cred. Adding a pointer to ucounts in the struct cred will
allow to track RLIMIT_NPROC not only for user in the system, but for
user in the user_namespace.

Updating ucounts may require memory allocation which may fail. So, we
cannot change cred.ucounts in the commit_creds() because this function
cannot fail and it should always return 0. For this reason, we modify
cred.ucounts before calling the commit_creds().

Changelog

v6:
* Fix null-ptr-deref in is_ucounts_overlimit() detected by trinity. This
  error was caused by the fact that cred_alloc_blank() left the ucounts
  pointer empty.

Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b37aaef28d8b9b0d757e07ba6dd27281bbe39259.1619094428.git.legion@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2021-04-30 14:14:00 -05:00
Serge E. Hallyn
db2e718a47 capabilities: require CAP_SETFCAP to map uid 0
cap_setfcap is required to create file capabilities.

Since commit 8db6c34f1d ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities"),
a process running as uid 0 but without cap_setfcap is able to work
around this as follows: unshare a new user namespace which maps parent
uid 0 into the child namespace.

While this task will not have new capabilities against the parent
namespace, there is a loophole due to the way namespaced file
capabilities are represented as xattrs.  File capabilities valid in
userns 1 are distinguished from file capabilities valid in userns 2 by
the kuid which underlies uid 0.  Therefore the restricted root process
can unshare a new self-mapping namespace, add a namespaced file
capability onto a file, then use that file capability in the parent
namespace.

To prevent that, do not allow mapping parent uid 0 if the process which
opened the uid_map file does not have CAP_SETFCAP, which is the
capability for setting file capabilities.

As a further wrinkle: a task can unshare its user namespace, then open
its uid_map file itself, and map (only) its own uid.  In this case we do
not have the credential from before unshare, which was potentially more
restricted.  So, when creating a user namespace, we record whether the
creator had CAP_SETFCAP.  Then we can use that during map_write().

With this patch:

1. Unprivileged user can still unshare -Ur

   ubuntu@caps:~$ unshare -Ur
   root@caps:~# logout

2. Root user can still unshare -Ur

   ubuntu@caps:~$ sudo bash
   root@caps:/home/ubuntu# unshare -Ur
   root@caps:/home/ubuntu# logout

3. Root user without CAP_SETFCAP cannot unshare -Ur:

   root@caps:/home/ubuntu# /sbin/capsh --drop=cap_setfcap --
   root@caps:/home/ubuntu# /sbin/setcap cap_setfcap=p /sbin/setcap
   unable to set CAP_SETFCAP effective capability: Operation not permitted
   root@caps:/home/ubuntu# unshare -Ur
   unshare: write failed /proc/self/uid_map: Operation not permitted

Note: an alternative solution would be to allow uid 0 mappings by
processes without CAP_SETFCAP, but to prevent such a namespace from
writing any file capabilities.  This approach can be seen at [1].

Background history: commit 95ebabde38 ("capabilities: Don't allow
writing ambiguous v3 file capabilities") tried to fix the issue by
preventing v3 fscaps to be written to disk when the root uid would map
to the same uid in nested user namespaces.  This led to regressions for
various workloads.  For example, see [2].  Ultimately this is a valid
use-case we have to support meaning we had to revert this change in
3b0c2d3eaa ("Revert 95ebabde38 ("capabilities: Don't allow writing
ambiguous v3 file capabilities")").

Link: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux.git/log/?h=2021-04-15/setfcap-nsfscaps-v4 [1]
Link: https://github.com/containers/buildah/issues/3071 [2]
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Tested-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-04-20 14:28:33 -07:00
Linus Torvalds
f9b4240b07 fixes-v5.11
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Merge tag 'fixes-v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux

Pull misc fixes from Christian Brauner:
 "This contains several fixes which felt worth being combined into a
  single branch:

   - Use put_nsproxy() instead of open-coding it switch_task_namespaces()

   - Kirill's work to unify lifecycle management for all namespaces. The
     lifetime counters are used identically for all namespaces types.
     Namespaces may of course have additional unrelated counters and
     these are not altered. This work allows us to unify the type of the
     counters and reduces maintenance cost by moving the counter in one
     place and indicating that basic lifetime management is identical
     for all namespaces.

   - Peilin's fix adding three byte padding to Dmitry's
     PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO uapi struct to prevent an info leak.

   - Two smal patches to convert from the /* fall through */ comment
     annotation to the fallthrough keyword annotation which I had taken
     into my branch and into -next before df561f6688 ("treewide: Use
     fallthrough pseudo-keyword") made it upstream which fixed this
     tree-wide.

     Since I didn't want to invalidate all testing for other commits I
     didn't rebase and kept them"

* tag 'fixes-v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux:
  nsproxy: use put_nsproxy() in switch_task_namespaces()
  sys: Convert to the new fallthrough notation
  signal: Convert to the new fallthrough notation
  time: Use generic ns_common::count
  cgroup: Use generic ns_common::count
  mnt: Use generic ns_common::count
  user: Use generic ns_common::count
  pid: Use generic ns_common::count
  ipc: Use generic ns_common::count
  uts: Use generic ns_common::count
  net: Use generic ns_common::count
  ns: Add a common refcount into ns_common
  ptrace: Prevent kernel-infoleak in ptrace_get_syscall_info()
2020-12-14 16:40:27 -08:00
Randy Dunlap
7b7b8a2c95 kernel/: fix repeated words in comments
Fix multiple occurrences of duplicated words in kernel/.

Fix one typo/spello on the same line as a duplicate word.  Change one
instance of "the the" to "that the".  Otherwise just drop one of the
repeated words.

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/98202fa6-8919-ef63-9efe-c0fad5ca7af1@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-10-16 11:11:19 -07:00
Kirill Tkhai
265cbd62e0
user: Use generic ns_common::count
Switch over user namespaces to use the newly introduced common lifetime
counter.

Currently every namespace type has its own lifetime counter which is stored
in the specific namespace struct. The lifetime counters are used
identically for all namespaces types. Namespaces may of course have
additional unrelated counters and these are not altered.

This introduces a common lifetime counter into struct ns_common. The
ns_common struct encompasses information that all namespaces share. That
should include the lifetime counter since its common for all of them.

It also allows us to unify the type of the counters across all namespaces.
Most of them use refcount_t but one uses atomic_t and at least one uses
kref. Especially the last one doesn't make much sense since it's just a
wrapper around refcount_t since 2016 and actually complicates cleanup
operations by having to use container_of() to cast the correct namespace
struct out of struct ns_common.

Having the lifetime counter for the namespaces in one place reduces
maintenance cost. Not just because after switching all namespaces over we
will have removed more code than we added but also because the logic is
more easily understandable and we indicate to the user that the basic
lifetime requirements for all namespaces are currently identical.

Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/159644979754.604812.601625186726406922.stgit@localhost.localdomain
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
2020-08-19 14:14:12 +02:00
Christian Brauner
f2a8d52e0a
nsproxy: add struct nsset
Add a simple struct nsset. It holds all necessary pieces to switch to a new
set of namespaces without leaving a task in a half-switched state which we
will make use of in the next patch. This patch switches the existing setns
logic over without causing a change in setns() behavior. This brings
setns() closer to how unshare() works(). The prepare_ns() function is
responsible to prepare all necessary information. This has two reasons.
First it minimizes dependencies between individual namespaces, i.e. all
install handler can expect that all fields are properly initialized
independent in what order they are called in. Second, this makes the code
easier to maintain and easier to follow if it needs to be changed.

The prepare_ns() helper will only be switched over to use a flags argument
in the next patch. Here it will still use nstype as a simple integer
argument which was argued would be clearer. I'm not particularly
opinionated about this if it really helps or not. The struct nsset itself
already contains the flags field since its name already indicates that it
can contain information required by different namespaces. None of this
should have functional consequences.

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200505140432.181565-2-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
2020-05-09 13:57:12 +02:00
Linus Torvalds
c84ca912b0 Keyrings namespacing
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Merge tag 'keys-namespace-20190627' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs

Pull keyring namespacing from David Howells:
 "These patches help make keys and keyrings more namespace aware.

  Firstly some miscellaneous patches to make the process easier:

   - Simplify key index_key handling so that the word-sized chunks
     assoc_array requires don't have to be shifted about, making it
     easier to add more bits into the key.

   - Cache the hash value in the key so that we don't have to calculate
     on every key we examine during a search (it involves a bunch of
     multiplications).

   - Allow keying_search() to search non-recursively.

  Then the main patches:

   - Make it so that keyring names are per-user_namespace from the point
     of view of KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING so that they're not
     accessible cross-user_namespace.

     keyctl_capabilities() shows KEYCTL_CAPS1_NS_KEYRING_NAME for this.

   - Move the user and user-session keyrings to the user_namespace
     rather than the user_struct. This prevents them propagating
     directly across user_namespaces boundaries (ie. the KEY_SPEC_*
     flags will only pick from the current user_namespace).

   - Make it possible to include the target namespace in which the key
     shall operate in the index_key. This will allow the possibility of
     multiple keys with the same description, but different target
     domains to be held in the same keyring.

     keyctl_capabilities() shows KEYCTL_CAPS1_NS_KEY_TAG for this.

   - Make it so that keys are implicitly invalidated by removal of a
     domain tag, causing them to be garbage collected.

   - Institute a network namespace domain tag that allows keys to be
     differentiated by the network namespace in which they operate. New
     keys that are of a type marked 'KEY_TYPE_NET_DOMAIN' are assigned
     the network domain in force when they are created.

   - Make it so that the desired network namespace can be handed down
     into the request_key() mechanism. This allows AFS, NFS, etc. to
     request keys specific to the network namespace of the superblock.

     This also means that the keys in the DNS record cache are
     thenceforth namespaced, provided network filesystems pass the
     appropriate network namespace down into dns_query().

     For DNS, AFS and NFS are good, whilst CIFS and Ceph are not. Other
     cache keyrings, such as idmapper keyrings, also need to set the
     domain tag - for which they need access to the network namespace of
     the superblock"

* tag 'keys-namespace-20190627' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
  keys: Pass the network namespace into request_key mechanism
  keys: Network namespace domain tag
  keys: Garbage collect keys for which the domain has been removed
  keys: Include target namespace in match criteria
  keys: Move the user and user-session keyrings to the user_namespace
  keys: Namespace keyring names
  keys: Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searches
  keys: Cache the hash value to avoid lots of recalculation
  keys: Simplify key description management
2019-07-08 19:36:47 -07:00
David Howells
0f44e4d976 keys: Move the user and user-session keyrings to the user_namespace
Move the user and user-session keyrings to the user_namespace struct rather
than pinning them from the user_struct struct.  This prevents these
keyrings from propagating across user-namespaces boundaries with regard to
the KEY_SPEC_* flags, thereby making them more useful in a containerised
environment.

The issue is that a single user_struct may be represent UIDs in several
different namespaces.

The way the patch does this is by attaching a 'register keyring' in each
user_namespace and then sticking the user and user-session keyrings into
that.  It can then be searched to retrieve them.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
2019-06-26 21:02:32 +01:00
David Howells
b206f281d0 keys: Namespace keyring names
Keyring names are held in a single global list that any process can pick
from by means of keyctl_join_session_keyring (provided the keyring grants
Search permission).  This isn't very container friendly, however.

Make the following changes:

 (1) Make default session, process and thread keyring names begin with a
     '.' instead of '_'.

 (2) Keyrings whose names begin with a '.' aren't added to the list.  Such
     keyrings are system specials.

 (3) Replace the global list with per-user_namespace lists.  A keyring adds
     its name to the list for the user_namespace that it is currently in.

 (4) When a user_namespace is deleted, it just removes itself from the
     keyring name list.

The global keyring_name_lock is retained for accessing the name lists.
This allows (4) to work.

This can be tested by:

	# keyctl newring foo @s
	995906392
	# unshare -U
	$ keyctl show
	...
	 995906392 --alswrv  65534 65534   \_ keyring: foo
	...
	$ keyctl session foo
	Joined session keyring: 935622349

As can be seen, a new session keyring was created.

The capability bit KEYCTL_CAPS1_NS_KEYRING_NAME is set if the kernel is
employing this feature.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2019-06-26 21:02:32 +01:00
Thomas Gleixner
b886d83c5b treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 441
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation version 2 of the license

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-only

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 315 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190115.503150771@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-06-05 17:37:17 +02:00
Jann Horn
d2f007dbe7 userns: also map extents in the reverse map to kernel IDs
The current logic first clones the extent array and sorts both copies, then
maps the lower IDs of the forward mapping into the lower namespace, but
doesn't map the lower IDs of the reverse mapping.

This means that code in a nested user namespace with >5 extents will see
incorrect IDs. It also breaks some access checks, like
inode_owner_or_capable() and privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(), so a process
can incorrectly appear to be capable relative to an inode.

To fix it, we have to make sure that the "lower_first" members of extents
in both arrays are translated; and we have to make sure that the reverse
map is sorted *after* the translation (since otherwise the translation can
break the sorting).

This is CVE-2018-18955.

Fixes: 6397fac491 ("userns: bump idmap limits to 340")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Tested-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-11-07 23:51:16 -06:00
Jann Horn
5820f140ed userns: move user access out of the mutex
The old code would hold the userns_state_mutex indefinitely if
memdup_user_nul stalled due to e.g. a userfault region. Prevent that by
moving the memdup_user_nul in front of the mutex_lock().

Note: This changes the error precedence of invalid buf/count/*ppos vs
map already written / capabilities missing.

Fixes: 22d917d80e ("userns: Rework the user_namespace adding uid/gid...")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2018-08-11 02:05:53 -05:00
Kees Cook
6da2ec5605 treewide: kmalloc() -> kmalloc_array()
The kmalloc() function has a 2-factor argument form, kmalloc_array(). This
patch replaces cases of:

        kmalloc(a * b, gfp)

with:
        kmalloc_array(a * b, gfp)

as well as handling cases of:

        kmalloc(a * b * c, gfp)

with:

        kmalloc(array3_size(a, b, c), gfp)

as it's slightly less ugly than:

        kmalloc_array(array_size(a, b), c, gfp)

This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like:

        kmalloc(4 * 1024, gfp)

though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion.

Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were
dropped, since they're redundant.

The tools/ directory was manually excluded, since it has its own
implementation of kmalloc().

The Coccinelle script used for this was:

// Fix redundant parens around sizeof().
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING, E;
@@

(
  kmalloc(
-	(sizeof(TYPE)) * E
+	sizeof(TYPE) * E
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(sizeof(THING)) * E
+	sizeof(THING) * E
  , ...)
)

// Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens.
@@
expression COUNT;
typedef u8;
typedef __u8;
@@

(
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(u8) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(char) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT)
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(u8) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(__u8) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(char) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT
+	COUNT
  , ...)
)

// 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant.
@@
type TYPE;
expression THING;
identifier COUNT_ID;
constant COUNT_CONST;
@@

(
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID)
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST)
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID)
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID
+	COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST)
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST
+	COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
)

// 2-factor product, only identifiers.
@@
identifier SIZE, COUNT;
@@

- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	SIZE * COUNT
+	COUNT, SIZE
  , ...)

// 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with
// redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING;
identifier STRIDE, COUNT;
type TYPE;
@@

(
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING))
  , ...)
)

// 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed.
@@
expression THING1, THING2;
identifier COUNT;
type TYPE1, TYPE2;
@@

(
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT)
+	array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2))
  , ...)
)

// 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed.
@@
identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT;
@@

(
  kmalloc(
-	(COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE)
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE
+	array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE)
  , ...)
)

// Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products,
// when they're not all constants...
@@
expression E1, E2, E3;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@

(
  kmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(E1) * E2 * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(E1) * (E2) * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	(E1) * (E2) * (E3)
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
|
  kmalloc(
-	E1 * E2 * E3
+	array3_size(E1, E2, E3)
  , ...)
)

// And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants,
// keeping sizeof() as the second factor argument.
@@
expression THING, E1, E2;
type TYPE;
constant C1, C2, C3;
@@

(
  kmalloc(sizeof(THING) * C2, ...)
|
  kmalloc(sizeof(TYPE) * C2, ...)
|
  kmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...)
|
  kmalloc(C1 * C2, ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * (E2)
+	E2, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(TYPE) * E2
+	E2, sizeof(TYPE)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * (E2)
+	E2, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	sizeof(THING) * E2
+	E2, sizeof(THING)
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	(E1) * E2
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	(E1) * (E2)
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
|
- kmalloc
+ kmalloc_array
  (
-	E1 * E2
+	E1, E2
  , ...)
)

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-06-12 16:19:22 -07:00
Seth Forshee
73f03c2b4b fuse: Restrict allow_other to the superblock's namespace or a descendant
Unprivileged users are normally restricted from mounting with the
allow_other option by system policy, but this could be bypassed for a mount
done with user namespace root permissions. In such cases allow_other should
not allow users outside the userns to access the mount as doing so would
give the unprivileged user the ability to manipulate processes it would
otherwise be unable to manipulate. Restrict allow_other to apply to users
in the same userns used at mount or a descendant of that namespace. Also
export current_in_userns() for use by fuse when built as a module.

Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Dongsu Park <dongsu@kinvolk.io>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
2018-03-20 17:11:44 +01:00
Linus Torvalds
758f875848 Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull user namespace update from Eric Biederman:
 "The only change that is production ready this round is the work to
  increase the number of uid and gid mappings a user namespace can
  support from 5 to 340.

  This code was carefully benchmarked and it was confirmed that in the
  existing cases the performance remains the same. In the worst case
  with 340 mappings an cache cold stat times go from 158ns to 248ns.
  That is noticable but still quite small, and only the people who are
  doing crazy things pay the cost.

  This work uncovered some documentation and cleanup opportunities in
  the mapping code, and patches to make those cleanups and improve the
  documentation will be coming in the next merge window"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
  userns: Simplify insert_extent
  userns: Make map_id_down a wrapper for map_id_range_down
  userns: Don't read extents twice in m_start
  userns: Simplify the user and group mapping functions
  userns: Don't special case a count of 0
  userns: bump idmap limits to 340
  userns: use union in {g,u}idmap struct
2017-11-16 12:20:15 -08:00
Eric W. Biederman
3fda0e737e userns: Simplify insert_extent
Consolidate the code to write to the new mapping at the end of the
function to remove the duplication.  Move the increase in the number
of mappings into insert_extent, keeping the logic together.

Just a small increase in readability and maintainability.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-10-31 17:23:13 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman
ece6613397 userns: Make map_id_down a wrapper for map_id_range_down
There is no good reason for this code duplication, the number of cache
line accesses not the number of instructions are the bottleneck in
this code.

Therefore simplify maintenance by removing unnecessary code.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-10-31 17:23:13 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman
d5e7b3c5f5 userns: Don't read extents twice in m_start
This is important so reading /proc/<pid>/{uid_map,gid_map,projid_map} while
the map is being written does not do strange things.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-10-31 17:23:12 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman
3edf652fa1 userns: Simplify the user and group mapping functions
Consolidate reading the number of extents and computing the return
value in the map_id_down, map_id_range_down and map_id_range.

This removal of one read of extents makes one smp_rmb unnecessary
and makes the code safe it is executed during the map write.  Reading
the number of extents twice and depending on the result being the same
is not safe, as it could be 0 the first time and > 5 the second time,
which would lead to misinterpreting the union fields.

The consolidation of the return value just removes a duplicate
caluculation which should make it easier to understand and maintain
the code.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-10-31 17:23:12 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman
11a8b9270e userns: Don't special case a count of 0
We can always use a count of 1 so there is no reason to have
a special case of a count of 0.

Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-10-31 17:23:11 -05:00
Christian Brauner
6397fac491 userns: bump idmap limits to 340
There are quite some use cases where users run into the current limit for
{g,u}id mappings. Consider a user requesting us to map everything but 999, and
1001 for a given range of 1000000000 with a sub{g,u}id layout of:

some-user:100000:1000000000
some-user:999:1
some-user:1000:1
some-user:1001:1
some-user:1002:1

This translates to:

MAPPING-TYPE | CONTAINER |    HOST |     RANGE |
-------------|-----------|---------|-----------|
         uid |       999 |     999 |         1 |
         uid |      1001 |    1001 |         1 |
         uid |         0 | 1000000 |       999 |
         uid |      1000 | 1001000 |         1 |
         uid |      1002 | 1001002 | 999998998 |
------------------------------------------------
         gid |       999 |     999 |         1 |
         gid |      1001 |    1001 |         1 |
         gid |         0 | 1000000 |       999 |
         gid |      1000 | 1001000 |         1 |
         gid |      1002 | 1001002 | 999998998 |

which is already the current limit.

As discussed at LPC simply bumping the number of limits is not going to work
since this would mean that struct uid_gid_map won't fit into a single cache-line
anymore thereby regressing performance for the base-cases. The same problem
seems to arise when using a single pointer. So the idea is to use

struct uid_gid_extent {
	u32 first;
	u32 lower_first;
	u32 count;
};

struct uid_gid_map { /* 64 bytes -- 1 cache line */
	u32 nr_extents;
	union {
		struct uid_gid_extent extent[UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS];
		struct {
			struct uid_gid_extent *forward;
			struct uid_gid_extent *reverse;
		};
	};
};

For the base cases we will only use the struct uid_gid_extent extent member. If
we go over UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS mappings we perform a single 4k
kmalloc() which means we can have a maximum of 340 mappings
(340 * size(struct uid_gid_extent) = 4080). For the latter case we use two
pointers "forward" and "reverse". The forward pointer points to an array sorted
by "first" and the reverse pointer points to an array sorted by "lower_first".
We can then perform binary search on those arrays.

Performance Testing:
When Eric introduced the extent-based struct uid_gid_map approach he measured
the performanc impact of his idmap changes:

> My benchmark consisted of going to single user mode where nothing else was
> running. On an ext4 filesystem opening 1,000,000 files and looping through all
> of the files 1000 times and calling fstat on the individuals files. This was
> to ensure I was benchmarking stat times where the inodes were in the kernels
> cache, but the inode values were not in the processors cache. My results:

> v3.4-rc1:         ~= 156ns (unmodified v3.4-rc1 with user namespace support disabled)
> v3.4-rc1-userns-: ~= 155ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support disabled)
> v3.4-rc1-userns+: ~= 164ns (v3.4-rc1 with my user namespace patches and user namespace support enabled)

I used an identical approach on my laptop. Here's a thorough description of what
I did. I built a 4.14.0-rc4 mainline kernel with my new idmap patches applied. I
booted into single user mode and used an ext4 filesystem to open/create
1,000,000 files. Then I looped through all of the files calling fstat() on each
of them 1000 times and calculated the mean fstat() time for a single file. (The
test program can be found below.)

Here are the results. For fun, I compared the first version of my patch which
scaled linearly with the new version of the patch:

|   # MAPPINGS |   PATCH-V1 | PATCH-NEW |
|--------------|------------|-----------|
|   0 mappings |     158 ns |   158 ns  |
|   1 mappings |     164 ns |   157 ns  |
|   2 mappings |     170 ns |   158 ns  |
|   3 mappings |     175 ns |   161 ns  |
|   5 mappings |     187 ns |   165 ns  |
|  10 mappings |     218 ns |   199 ns  |
|  50 mappings |     528 ns |   218 ns  |
| 100 mappings |     980 ns |   229 ns  |
| 200 mappings |    1880 ns |   239 ns  |
| 300 mappings |    2760 ns |   240 ns  |
| 340 mappings | not tested |   248 ns  |

Here's the test program I used. I asked Eric what he did and this is a more
"advanced" implementation of the idea. It's pretty straight-forward:

 #define __GNU_SOURCE
 #define __STDC_FORMAT_MACROS
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <dirent.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <inttypes.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <sys/time.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>

 int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 {
 	int ret;
 	size_t i, k;
 	int fd[1000000];
 	int times[1000];
 	char pathname[4096];
 	struct stat st;
 	struct timeval t1, t2;
 	uint64_t time_in_mcs;
 	uint64_t sum = 0;

 	if (argc != 2) {
 		fprintf(stderr, "Please specify a directory where to create "
 				"the test files\n");
 		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
 	}

 	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(fd) / sizeof(fd[0]); i++) {
 		sprintf(pathname, "%s/idmap_test_%zu", argv[1], i);
 		fd[i]= open(pathname, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH);
 		if (fd[i] < 0) {
 			ssize_t j;
 			for (j = i; j >= 0; j--)
 				close(fd[j]);
 			exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
 		}
 	}

 	for (k = 0; k < 1000; k++) {
 		ret = gettimeofday(&t1, NULL);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			goto close_all;

 		for (i = 0; i < sizeof(fd) / sizeof(fd[0]); i++) {
 			ret = fstat(fd[i], &st);
 			if (ret < 0)
 				goto close_all;
 		}

 		ret = gettimeofday(&t2, NULL);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			goto close_all;

 		time_in_mcs = (1000000 * t2.tv_sec + t2.tv_usec) -
 			      (1000000 * t1.tv_sec + t1.tv_usec);
 		printf("Total time in micro seconds:       %" PRIu64 "\n",
 		       time_in_mcs);
 		printf("Total time in nanoseconds:         %" PRIu64 "\n",
 		       time_in_mcs * 1000);
 		printf("Time per file in nanoseconds:      %" PRIu64 "\n",
 		       (time_in_mcs * 1000) / 1000000);
 		times[k] = (time_in_mcs * 1000) / 1000000;
 	}

 close_all:
 	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(fd) / sizeof(fd[0]); i++)
 		close(fd[i]);

 	if (ret < 0)
 		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);

 	for (k = 0; k < 1000; k++) {
 		sum += times[k];
 	}

 	printf("Mean time per file in nanoseconds: %" PRIu64 "\n", sum / 1000);

 	exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);;
 }

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
CC: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
CC: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-10-31 17:23:04 -05:00
Mark Rutland
6aa7de0591 locking/atomics: COCCINELLE/treewide: Convert trivial ACCESS_ONCE() patterns to READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE()
Please do not apply this to mainline directly, instead please re-run the
coccinelle script shown below and apply its output.

For several reasons, it is desirable to use {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() in
preference to ACCESS_ONCE(), and new code is expected to use one of the
former. So far, there's been no reason to change most existing uses of
ACCESS_ONCE(), as these aren't harmful, and changing them results in
churn.

However, for some features, the read/write distinction is critical to
correct operation. To distinguish these cases, separate read/write
accessors must be used. This patch migrates (most) remaining
ACCESS_ONCE() instances to {READ,WRITE}_ONCE(), using the following
coccinelle script:

----
// Convert trivial ACCESS_ONCE() uses to equivalent READ_ONCE() and
// WRITE_ONCE()

// $ make coccicheck COCCI=/home/mark/once.cocci SPFLAGS="--include-headers" MODE=patch

virtual patch

@ depends on patch @
expression E1, E2;
@@

- ACCESS_ONCE(E1) = E2
+ WRITE_ONCE(E1, E2)

@ depends on patch @
expression E;
@@

- ACCESS_ONCE(E)
+ READ_ONCE(E)
----

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: davem@davemloft.net
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: mpe@ellerman.id.au
Cc: shuah@kernel.org
Cc: snitzer@redhat.com
Cc: thor.thayer@linux.intel.com
Cc: tj@kernel.org
Cc: viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Cc: will.deacon@arm.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1508792849-3115-19-git-send-email-paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-10-25 11:01:08 +02:00
Eric W. Biederman
a2b426267c userns,pidns: Verify the userns for new pid namespaces
It is pointless and confusing to allow a pid namespace hierarchy and
the user namespace hierarchy to get out of sync.  The owner of a child
pid namespace should be the owner of the parent pid namespace or
a descendant of the owner of the parent pid namespace.

Otherwise it is possible to construct scenarios where a process has a
capability over a parent pid namespace but does not have the
capability over a child pid namespace.  Which confusingly makes
permission checks non-transitive.

It requires use of setns into a pid namespace (but not into a user
namespace) to create such a scenario.

Add the function in_userns to help in making this determination.

v2: Optimized in_userns by using level as suggested
    by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>

Ref: 49f4d8b93c ("pidns: Capture the user namespace and filter ns_last_pid")
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2017-07-20 07:43:58 -05:00
Ingo Molnar
3f07c01441 sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to <linux/sched/signal.h>
We are going to split <linux/sched/signal.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.

Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/signal.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.

Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.

Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-03-02 08:42:29 +01:00
Eric W. Biederman
7872559664 Merge branch 'nsfs-ioctls' into HEAD
From: Andrey Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>

Each namespace has an owning user namespace and now there is not way
to discover these relationships.

Pid and user namepaces are hierarchical. There is no way to discover
parent-child relationships too.

Why we may want to know relationships between namespaces?

One use would be visualization, in order to understand the running
system.  Another would be to answer the question: what capability does
process X have to perform operations on a resource governed by namespace
Y?

One more use-case (which usually called abnormal) is checkpoint/restart.
In CRIU we are going to dump and restore nested namespaces.

There [1] was a discussion about which interface to choose to determing
relationships between namespaces.

Eric suggested to add two ioctl-s [2]:
> Grumble, Grumble.  I think this may actually a case for creating ioctls
> for these two cases.  Now that random nsfs file descriptors are bind
> mountable the original reason for using proc files is not as pressing.
>
> One ioctl for the user namespace that owns a file descriptor.
> One ioctl for the parent namespace of a namespace file descriptor.

Here is an implementaions of these ioctl-s.

$ man man7/namespaces.7
...
Since  Linux  4.X,  the  following  ioctl(2)  calls are supported for
namespace file descriptors.  The correct syntax is:

      fd = ioctl(ns_fd, ioctl_type);

where ioctl_type is one of the following:

NS_GET_USERNS
      Returns a file descriptor that refers to an owning user names‐
      pace.

NS_GET_PARENT
      Returns  a  file descriptor that refers to a parent namespace.
      This ioctl(2) can be used for pid  and  user  namespaces.  For
      user namespaces, NS_GET_PARENT and NS_GET_USERNS have the same
      meaning.

In addition to generic ioctl(2) errors, the following  specific  ones
can occur:

EINVAL NS_GET_PARENT was called for a nonhierarchical namespace.

EPERM  The  requested  namespace  is outside of the current namespace
      scope.

[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/7/6/158
[2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/7/9/101

Changes for v2:
* don't return ENOENT for init_user_ns and init_pid_ns. There is nothing
  outside of the init namespace, so we can return EPERM in this case too.
  > The fewer special cases the easier the code is to get
  > correct, and the easier it is to read. // Eric

Changes for v3:
* rename ns->get_owner() to ns->owner(). get_* usually means that it
  grabs a reference.

Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: "Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: "W. Trevor King" <wking@tremily.us>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
2016-09-22 20:00:36 -05:00
Andrey Vagin
a7306ed8d9 nsfs: add ioctl to get a parent namespace
Pid and user namepaces are hierarchical. There is no way to discover
parent-child relationships.

In a future we will use this interface to dump and restore nested
namespaces.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-09-22 19:59:41 -05:00
Andrey Vagin
bcac25a58b kernel: add a helper to get an owning user namespace for a namespace
Return -EPERM if an owning user namespace is outside of a process
current user namespace.

v2: In a first version ns_get_owner returned ENOENT for init_user_ns.
    This special cases was removed from this version. There is nothing
    outside of init_user_ns, so we can return EPERM.
v3: rename ns->get_owner() to ns->owner(). get_* usually means that it
grabs a reference.

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-09-22 19:59:39 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman
df75e7748b userns: When the per user per user namespace limit is reached return ENOSPC
The current error codes returned when a the per user per user
namespace limit are hit (EINVAL, EUSERS, and ENFILE) are wrong.  I
asked for advice on linux-api and it we made clear that those were
the wrong error code, but a correct effor code was not suggested.

The best general error code I have found for hitting a resource limit
is ENOSPC.  It is not perfect but as it is unambiguous it will serve
until someone comes up with a better error code.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-09-22 13:25:56 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman
25f9c0817c userns: Generalize the user namespace count into ucount
The same kind of recursive sane default limit and policy
countrol that has been implemented for the user namespace
is desirable for the other namespaces, so generalize
the user namespace refernce count into a ucount.

Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-08-08 14:41:52 -05:00
Eric W. Biederman
f6b2db1a3e userns: Make the count of user namespaces per user
Add a structure that is per user and per user ns and use it to hold
the count of user namespaces.  This makes prevents one user from
creating denying service to another user by creating the maximum
number of user namespaces.

Rename the sysctl export of the maximum count from
/proc/sys/userns/max_user_namespaces to /proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces
to reflect that the count is now per user.

Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
2016-08-08 14:40:30 -05:00