mirror of
https://github.com/torvalds/linux.git
synced 2024-10-22 21:20:52 +00:00
master
166 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Linus Torvalds
|
f8ffbc365f |
struct fd layout change (and conversion to accessor helpers)
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iHUEABYIAB0WIQQqUNBr3gm4hGXdBJlZ7Krx/gZQ6wUCZvDNmgAKCRBZ7Krx/gZQ 63zrAP9vI0rf55v27twiabe9LnI7aSx5ckoqXxFIFxyT3dOYpQD/bPmoApnWDD3d 592+iDgLsema/H/0/CqfqlaNtDNY8Q0= =HUl5 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'pull-stable-struct_fd' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull 'struct fd' updates from Al Viro: "Just the 'struct fd' layout change, with conversion to accessor helpers" * tag 'pull-stable-struct_fd' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: add struct fd constructors, get rid of __to_fd() struct fd: representation change introduce fd_file(), convert all accessors to it. |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
a430d95c5e |
lsm/stable-6.12 PR 20240911
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJIBAABCAAyFiEES0KozwfymdVUl37v6iDy2pc3iXMFAmbiGGAUHHBhdWxAcGF1 bC1tb29yZS5jb20ACgkQ6iDy2pc3iXPU8BAA1+A15pmS34I9pq7c8TmRz3rNEs/a zrW1aWJ0X/+axNS7sW3Pwtt1EKuaOhskKU8gNSieRhljC8rgXIVjZzLw6Atgcr5k upulGbU9TXyVisYN+PWv9/84ito6/nYsKb7Mg3nUVsdodtIFVnsk1fxYLPHQEBig Pl3i26U3VqH93Kz0W5vs/QR2uduPB8ZyscdTgcbrY9Vv1Y7IDZ2g9QsJVKLvbQKL qcPK1JkHa+sBPJxDqS9A40zgbLbdPQgWQzsXX3dz822w1Ga7FIHSqxMBA6HwHZ+L kV4P58wVfavhwt/cQSKMWI/yiGPMMd0B6yD+m8ojOvGfOfRCWxGMmEMqHNuZ3m7k Bfll5ZgZTY8phUUhiNf3nxO3F3MM/5bHdhPOj3RReqbAbS6uWr4/fThPDYY/zIo6 NCY3HGxx3Ae64uQ01gC2p/czC50jDsMwlbXiZbrgdBhjBm/CVk5ozb80mLVcGrLB +6XMzzSbC8IaNAH2fDmUJ2ABdwyNPgsSOTGZVzIanpxu1SU2/yk3SMxkp8fv5s36 wLeODUVcLgsjVV538Mkm6PGTE4TlXaH9yi6apMyJAGp0vPYx5c3Xxk2y5A5cur5p hcrbDiX2QgeqFbwsz36incmPmbef2NU2c8feR8XLtPJuwNIeRcMSje0pnkaFlRmb TAUJ1sDQAzZ8Fy0= =HIAO -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240911' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore: - Move the LSM framework to static calls This transitions the vast majority of the LSM callbacks into static calls. Those callbacks which haven't been converted were left as-is due to the general ugliness of the changes required to support the static call conversion; we can revisit those callbacks at a future date. - Add the Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) LSM This adds a new LSM, Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE). There is plenty of documentation about IPE in this patches, so I'll refrain from going into too much detail here, but the basic motivation behind IPE is to provide a mechanism such that administrators can restrict execution to only those binaries which come from integrity protected storage, e.g. a dm-verity protected filesystem. You will notice that IPE requires additional LSM hooks in the initramfs, dm-verity, and fs-verity code, with the associated patches carrying ACK/review tags from the associated maintainers. We couldn't find an obvious maintainer for the initramfs code, but the IPE patchset has been widely posted over several years. Both Deven Bowers and Fan Wu have contributed to IPE's development over the past several years, with Fan Wu agreeing to serve as the IPE maintainer moving forward. Once IPE is accepted into your tree, I'll start working with Fan to ensure he has the necessary accounts, keys, etc. so that he can start submitting IPE pull requests to you directly during the next merge window. - Move the lifecycle management of the LSM blobs to the LSM framework Management of the LSM blobs (the LSM state buffers attached to various kernel structs, typically via a void pointer named "security" or similar) has been mixed, some blobs were allocated/managed by individual LSMs, others were managed by the LSM framework itself. Starting with this pull we move management of all the LSM blobs, minus the XFRM blob, into the framework itself, improving consistency across LSMs, and reducing the amount of duplicated code across LSMs. Due to some additional work required to migrate the XFRM blob, it has been left as a todo item for a later date; from a practical standpoint this omission should have little impact as only SELinux provides a XFRM LSM implementation. - Fix problems with the LSM's handling of F_SETOWN The LSM hook for the fcntl(F_SETOWN) operation had a couple of problems: it was racy with itself, and it was disconnected from the associated DAC related logic in such a way that the LSM state could be updated in cases where the DAC state would not. We fix both of these problems by moving the security_file_set_fowner() hook into the same section of code where the DAC attributes are updated. Not only does this resolve the DAC/LSM synchronization issue, but as that code block is protected by a lock, it also resolve the race condition. - Fix potential problems with the security_inode_free() LSM hook Due to use of RCU to protect inodes and the placement of the LSM hook associated with freeing the inode, there is a bit of a challenge when it comes to managing any LSM state associated with an inode. The VFS folks are not open to relocating the LSM hook so we have to get creative when it comes to releasing an inode's LSM state. Traditionally we have used a single LSM callback within the hook that is triggered when the inode is "marked for death", but not actually released due to RCU. Unfortunately, this causes problems for LSMs which want to take an action when the inode's associated LSM state is actually released; so we add an additional LSM callback, inode_free_security_rcu(), that is called when the inode's LSM state is released in the RCU free callback. - Refactor two LSM hooks to better fit the LSM return value patterns The vast majority of the LSM hooks follow the "return 0 on success, negative values on failure" pattern, however, there are a small handful that have unique return value behaviors which has caused confusion in the past and makes it difficult for the BPF verifier to properly vet BPF LSM programs. This includes patches to convert two of these"special" LSM hooks to the common 0/-ERRNO pattern. - Various cleanups and improvements A handful of patches to remove redundant code, better leverage the IS_ERR_OR_NULL() helper, add missing "static" markings, and do some minor style fixups. * tag 'lsm-pr-20240911' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (40 commits) security: Update file_set_fowner documentation fs: Fix file_set_fowner LSM hook inconsistencies lsm: Use IS_ERR_OR_NULL() helper function lsm: remove LSM_COUNT and LSM_CONFIG_COUNT ipe: Remove duplicated include in ipe.c lsm: replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls lsm: count the LSMs enabled at compile time kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling init/main.c: Initialize early LSMs after arch code, static keys and calls. MAINTAINERS: add IPE entry with Fan Wu as maintainer documentation: add IPE documentation ipe: kunit test for parser scripts: add boot policy generation program ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider fsverity: expose verified fsverity built-in signatures to LSMs lsm: add security_inode_setintegrity() hook ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider dm-verity: expose root hash digest and signature data to LSMs block,lsm: add LSM blob and new LSM hooks for block devices ipe: add permissive toggle ... |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
3352633ce6 |
vfs-6.12.file
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iHUEABYKAB0WIQRAhzRXHqcMeLMyaSiRxhvAZXjcogUCZuQEwAAKCRCRxhvAZXjc
osS0AQCgIpvey9oW5DMyMw6Bv0hFMRv95gbNQZfHy09iK+NMNAD9GALhb/4cMIVB
7YrZGXEz454lpgcs8AnrOVjVNfctOQg=
=e9s9
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'vfs-6.12.file' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull vfs file updates from Christian Brauner:
"This is the work to cleanup and shrink struct file significantly.
Right now, (focusing on x86) struct file is 232 bytes. After this
series struct file will be 184 bytes aka 3 cacheline and a spare 8
bytes for future extensions at the end of the struct.
With struct file being as ubiquitous as it is this should make a
difference for file heavy workloads and allow further optimizations in
the future.
- struct fown_struct was embedded into struct file letting it take up
32 bytes in total when really it shouldn't even be embedded in
struct file in the first place. Instead, actual users of struct
fown_struct now allocate the struct on demand. This frees up 24
bytes.
- Move struct file_ra_state into the union containg the cleanup hooks
and move f_iocb_flags out of the union. This closes a 4 byte hole
we created earlier and brings struct file to 192 bytes. Which means
struct file is 3 cachelines and we managed to shrink it by 40
bytes.
- Reorder struct file so that nothing crosses a cacheline.
I suspect that in the future we will end up reordering some members
to mitigate false sharing issues or just because someone does
actually provide really good perf data.
- Shrinking struct file to 192 bytes is only part of the work.
Files use a slab that is SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU and when a kmem cache
is created with SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU the free pointer must be
located outside of the object because the cache doesn't know what
part of the memory can safely be overwritten as it may be needed to
prevent object recycling.
That has the consequence that SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU may end up
adding a new cacheline.
So this also contains work to add a new kmem_cache_create_rcu()
function that allows the caller to specify an offset where the
freelist pointer is supposed to be placed. Thus avoiding the
implicit addition of a fourth cacheline.
- And finally this removes the f_version member in struct file.
The f_version member isn't particularly well-defined. It is mainly
used as a cookie to detect concurrent seeks when iterating
directories. But it is also abused by some subsystems for
completely unrelated things.
It is mostly a directory and filesystem specific thing that doesn't
really need to live in struct file and with its wonky semantics it
really lacks a specific function.
For pipes, f_version is (ab)used to defer poll notifications until
a write has happened. And struct pipe_inode_info is used by
multiple struct files in their ->private_data so there's no chance
of pushing that down into file->private_data without introducing
another pointer indirection.
But pipes don't rely on f_pos_lock so this adds a union into struct
file encompassing f_pos_lock and a pipe specific f_pipe member that
pipes can use. This union of course can be extended to other file
types and is similar to what we do in struct inode already"
* tag 'vfs-6.12.file' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: (26 commits)
fs: remove f_version
pipe: use f_pipe
fs: add f_pipe
ubifs: store cookie in private data
ufs: store cookie in private data
udf: store cookie in private data
proc: store cookie in private data
ocfs2: store cookie in private data
input: remove f_version abuse
ext4: store cookie in private data
ext2: store cookie in private data
affs: store cookie in private data
fs: add generic_llseek_cookie()
fs: use must_set_pos()
fs: add must_set_pos()
fs: add vfs_setpos_cookie()
s390: remove unused f_version
ceph: remove unused f_version
adi: remove unused f_version
mm: Removed @freeptr_offset to prevent doc warning
...
|
||
Mickaël Salaün
|
26f204380a |
fs: Fix file_set_fowner LSM hook inconsistencies
The fcntl's F_SETOWN command sets the process that handle SIGIO/SIGURG
for the related file descriptor. Before this change, the
file_set_fowner LSM hook was always called, ignoring the VFS logic which
may not actually change the process that handles SIGIO (e.g. TUN, TTY,
dnotify), nor update the related UID/EUID.
Moreover, because security_file_set_fowner() was called without lock
(e.g. f_owner.lock), concurrent F_SETOWN commands could result to a race
condition and inconsistent LSM states (e.g. SELinux's fown_sid) compared
to struct fown_struct's UID/EUID.
This change makes sure the LSM states are always in sync with the VFS
state by moving the security_file_set_fowner() call close to the
UID/EUID updates and using the same f_owner.lock .
Rename f_modown() to __f_setown() to simplify code.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Fixes:
|
||
Christian Brauner
|
1934b21261 |
file: reclaim 24 bytes from f_owner
We do embedd struct fown_struct into struct file letting it take up 32
bytes in total. We could tweak struct fown_struct to be more compact but
really it shouldn't even be embedded in struct file in the first place.
Instead, actual users of struct fown_struct should allocate the struct
on demand. This frees up 24 bytes in struct file.
That will have some potentially user-visible changes for the ownership
fcntl()s. Some of them can now fail due to allocation failures.
Practically, that probably will almost never happen as the allocations
are small and they only happen once per file.
The fown_struct is used during kill_fasync() which is used by e.g.,
pipes to generate a SIGIO signal. Sending of such signals is conditional
on userspace having set an owner for the file using one of the F_OWNER
fcntl()s. Such users will be unaffected if struct fown_struct is
allocated during the fcntl() call.
There are a few subsystems that call __f_setown() expecting
file->f_owner to be allocated:
(1) tun devices
file->f_op->fasync::tun_chr_fasync()
-> __f_setown()
There are no callers of tun_chr_fasync().
(2) tty devices
file->f_op->fasync::tty_fasync()
-> __tty_fasync()
-> __f_setown()
tty_fasync() has no additional callers but __tty_fasync() has. Note
that __tty_fasync() only calls __f_setown() if the @on argument is
true. It's called from:
file->f_op->release::tty_release()
-> tty_release()
-> __tty_fasync()
-> __f_setown()
tty_release() calls __tty_fasync() with @on false
=> __f_setown() is never called from tty_release().
=> All callers of tty_release() are safe as well.
file->f_op->release::tty_open()
-> tty_release()
-> __tty_fasync()
-> __f_setown()
__tty_hangup() calls __tty_fasync() with @on false
=> __f_setown() is never called from tty_release().
=> All callers of __tty_hangup() are safe as well.
From the callchains it's obvious that (1) and (2) end up getting called
via file->f_op->fasync(). That can happen either through the F_SETFL
fcntl() with the FASYNC flag raised or via the FIOASYNC ioctl(). If
FASYNC is requested and the file isn't already FASYNC then
file->f_op->fasync() is called with @on true which ends up causing both
(1) and (2) to call __f_setown().
(1) and (2) are the only subsystems that call __f_setown() from the
file->f_op->fasync() handler. So both (1) and (2) have been updated to
allocate a struct fown_struct prior to calling fasync_helper() to
register with the fasync infrastructure. That's safe as they both call
fasync_helper() which also does allocations if @on is true.
The other interesting case are file leases:
(3) file leases
lease_manager_ops->lm_setup::lease_setup()
-> __f_setown()
Which in turn is called from:
generic_add_lease()
-> lease_manager_ops->lm_setup::lease_setup()
-> __f_setown()
So here again we can simply make generic_add_lease() allocate struct
fown_struct prior to the lease_manager_ops->lm_setup::lease_setup()
which happens under a spinlock.
With that the two remaining subsystems that call __f_setown() are:
(4) dnotify
(5) sockets
Both have their own custom ioctls to set struct fown_struct and both
have been converted to allocate a struct fown_struct on demand from
their respective ioctls.
Interactions with O_PATH are fine as well e.g., when opening a /dev/tty
as O_PATH then no file->f_op->open() happens thus no file->f_owner is
allocated. That's fine as no file operation will be set for those and
the device has never been opened. fcntl()s called on such things will
just allocate a ->f_owner on demand. Although I have zero idea why'd you
care about f_owner on an O_PATH fd.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240813-work-f_owner-v2-1-4e9343a79f9f@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
|
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
820a185896 |
fcntl: add F_CREATED_QUERY
Systemd has a helper called openat_report_new() that returns whether a
file was created anew or it already existed before for cases where
O_CREAT has to be used without O_EXCL (cf. [1]). That apparently isn't
something that's specific to systemd but it's where I noticed it.
The current logic is that it first attempts to open the file without
O_CREAT | O_EXCL and if it gets ENOENT the helper tries again with both
flags. If that succeeds all is well. If it now reports EEXIST it
retries.
That works fairly well but some corner cases make this more involved. If
this operates on a dangling symlink the first openat() without O_CREAT |
O_EXCL will return ENOENT but the second openat() with O_CREAT | O_EXCL
will fail with EEXIST. The reason is that openat() without O_CREAT |
O_EXCL follows the symlink while O_CREAT | O_EXCL doesn't for security
reasons. So it's not something we can really change unless we add an
explicit opt-in via O_FOLLOW which seems really ugly.
The caller could try and use fanotify() to register to listen for
creation events in the directory before calling openat(). The caller
could then compare the returned tid to its own tid to ensure that even
in threaded environments it actually created the file. That might work
but is a lot of work for something that should be fairly simple and I'm
uncertain about it's reliability.
The caller could use a bpf lsm hook to hook into security_file_open() to
figure out whether they created the file. That also seems a bit wild.
So let's add F_CREATED_QUERY which allows the caller to check whether
they actually did create the file. That has caveats of course but I
don't think they are problematic:
* In multi-threaded environments a thread can only be sure that it did
create the file if it calls openat() with O_CREAT. In other words,
it's obviously not enough to just go through it's fdtable and check
these fds because another thread could've created the file.
* If there's any codepaths where an openat() with O_CREAT would yield
the same struct file as that of another thread it would obviously
cause wrong results. I'm not aware of any such codepaths from openat()
itself. Imho, that would be a bug.
* Related to the previous point, calling the new fcntl() on files created
and opened via special-purpose system calls or ioctl()s would cause
wrong results only if the affected subsystem a) raises FMODE_CREATED
and b) may return the same struct file for two different calls. I'm
not seeing anything outside of regular VFS code that raises
FMODE_CREATED.
There is code for b) in e.g., the drm layer where the same struct file
is resurfaced but again FMODE_CREATED isn't used and it would be very
misleading if it did.
Link:
|
||
Al Viro
|
1da91ea87a |
introduce fd_file(), convert all accessors to it.
For any changes of struct fd representation we need to
turn existing accesses to fields into calls of wrappers.
Accesses to struct fd::flags are very few (3 in linux/file.h,
1 in net/socket.c, 3 in fs/overlayfs/file.c and 3 more in
explicit initializers).
Those can be dealt with in the commit converting to
new layout; accesses to struct fd::file are too many for that.
This commit converts (almost) all of f.file to
fd_file(f). It's not entirely mechanical ('file' is used as
a member name more than just in struct fd) and it does not
even attempt to distinguish the uses in pointer context from
those in boolean context; the latter will be eventually turned
into a separate helper (fd_empty()).
NOTE: mass conversion to fd_empty(), tempting as it
might be, is a bad idea; better do that piecewise in commit
that convert from fdget...() to CLASS(...).
[conflicts in fs/fhandle.c, kernel/bpf/syscall.c, mm/memcontrol.c
caught by git; fs/stat.c one got caught by git grep]
[fs/xattr.c conflict]
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
|
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
c62b758bae
|
fcntl: add F_DUPFD_QUERY fcntl()
Often userspace needs to know whether two file descriptors refer to the
same struct file. For example, systemd uses this to filter out duplicate
file descriptors in it's file descriptor store (cf. [1]) and vulkan uses
it to compare dma-buf fds (cf. [2]).
The only api we provided for this was kcmp() but that's not generally
available or might be disallowed because it is way more powerful (allows
ordering of file pointers, operates on non-current task) etc. So give
userspace a simple way of comparing two file descriptors for sameness
adding a new fcntl() F_DUDFD_QUERY.
Link:
|
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
54126fafea |
vfs-6.9.iomap
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iHUEABYKAB0WIQRAhzRXHqcMeLMyaSiRxhvAZXjcogUCZem4UQAKCRCRxhvAZXjc ouERAQDg63R9s3bKmUgGqngf9cfr//VCTE+WVARwOUTdn2iDbwEA1IME7X1kL/Vz EdhEjyqO6xom+ao/Vqxe0XIDNz70vgs= =8RdE -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'vfs-6.9.iomap' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs Pull iomap updates from Christian Brauner: - Restore read-write hints in struct bio through the bi_write_hint member for the sake of UFS devices in mobile applications. This can result in up to 40% lower write amplification in UFS devices. The patch series that builds on this will be coming in via the SCSI maintainers (Bart) - Overhaul the iomap writeback code. Afterwards ->map_blocks() is able to map multiple blocks at once as long as they're in the same folio. This reduces CPU usage for buffered write workloads on e.g., xfs on systems with lots of cores (Christoph) - Record processed bytes in iomap_iter() trace event (Kassey) - Extend iomap_writepage_map() trace event after Christoph's ->map_block() changes to map mutliple blocks at once (Zhang) * tag 'vfs-6.9.iomap' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: (22 commits) iomap: Add processed for iomap_iter iomap: add pos and dirty_len into trace_iomap_writepage_map block, fs: Restore the per-bio/request data lifetime fields fs: Propagate write hints to the struct block_device inode fs: Move enum rw_hint into a new header file fs: Split fcntl_rw_hint() fs: Verify write lifetime constants at compile time fs: Fix rw_hint validation iomap: pass the length of the dirty region to ->map_blocks iomap: map multiple blocks at a time iomap: submit ioends immediately iomap: factor out a iomap_writepage_map_block helper iomap: only call mapping_set_error once for each failed bio iomap: don't chain bios iomap: move the iomap_sector sector calculation out of iomap_add_to_ioend iomap: clean up the iomap_alloc_ioend calling convention iomap: move all remaining per-folio logic into iomap_writepage_map iomap: factor out a iomap_writepage_handle_eof helper iomap: move the PF_MEMALLOC check to iomap_writepages iomap: move the io_folios field out of struct iomap_ioend ... |
||
Dmitry Antipov
|
d0089603fa |
fs: prefer kfree_rcu() in fasync_remove_entry()
In 'fasync_remove_entry()', prefer 'kfree_rcu()' over 'call_rcu()' with dummy 'fasync_free_rcu()' callback. This is mostly intended in attempt to fix weird https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=6a64ad907e361e49e92d1c4c114128a1bda2ed7f, where kmemleak may consider 'fa' as unreferenced during RCU grace period. See https://lore.kernel.org/stable/20230930174657.800551-1-joel@joelfernandes.org as well. Comments are highly appreciated. Ever since |
||
Bart Van Assche
|
ea7d898676
|
fs: Propagate write hints to the struct block_device inode
Write hints applied with F_SET_RW_HINT on a block device affect the block device inode only. Propagate these hints to the inode associated with struct block_device because that is the inode used when writing back dirty pages. Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: Kanchan Joshi <joshi.k@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240202203926.2478590-6-bvanassche@acm.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> |
||
|
Bart Van Assche
|
fe3944fb24
|
fs: Move enum rw_hint into a new header file
Move enum rw_hint into a new header file to prepare for using this data type in the block layer. Add the attribute __packed to reduce the space occupied by instances of this data type from four bytes to one byte. Change the data type of i_write_hint from u8 into enum rw_hint. Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Acked-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> # for the F2FS part Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240202203926.2478590-5-bvanassche@acm.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> |
||
|
Bart Van Assche
|
1505ba06e5
|
fs: Split fcntl_rw_hint()
Split fcntl_rw_hint() such that there is one helper function per fcntl. Use READ_ONCE() and WRITE_ONCE() to access the i_write_hint member instead of protecting such accesses with the inode lock. READ_ONCE() is not used in I/O path code that reads i_write_hint. Users who want F_SET_RW_HINT to affect I/O need to make sure that F_SET_RW_HINT has completed before I/O is submitted that should use the configured write hint. Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Kanchan Joshi <joshi.k@samsung.com> Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240202203926.2478590-4-bvanassche@acm.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> |
||
|
Bart Van Assche
|
e769779c0c
|
fs: Verify write lifetime constants at compile time
The code in fs/fcntl.c converts RWH_* constants to and from WRITE_LIFE_* constants using casts. Verify at compile time that these casts will yield the intended effect. Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240202203926.2478590-3-bvanassche@acm.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> |
||
|
Bart Van Assche
|
ec16b147a5
|
fs: Fix rw_hint validation
Reject values that are valid rw_hints after truncation but not before
truncation by passing an untruncated value to rw_hint_valid().
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Kanchan Joshi <joshi.k@samsung.com>
Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Fixes:
|
||
Alexey Dobriyan
|
68279f9c9f |
treewide: mark stuff as __ro_after_init
__read_mostly predates __ro_after_init. Many variables which are marked __read_mostly should have been __ro_after_init from day 1. Also, mark some stuff as "const" and "__init" while I'm at it. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: revert sysctl_nr_open_min, sysctl_nr_open_max changes due to arm warning] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style cleanups] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/4f6bb9c0-abba-4ee4-a7aa-89265e886817@p183 Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> |
||
Luca Vizzarro
|
bccb5c397f |
fcntl: Cast commands with int args explicitly
According to the fcntl API specification commands that expect an integer, hence not a pointer, always take an int and not long. In order to avoid access to undefined bits, we should explicitly cast the argument to int. Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <Kevin.Brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Cc: Szabolcs Nagy <Szabolcs.Nagy@arm.com> Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <Mark.Rutland@arm.com> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-morello@op-lists.linaro.org Signed-off-by: Luca Vizzarro <Luca.Vizzarro@arm.com> Message-Id: <20230414152459.816046-2-Luca.Vizzarro@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
05e6295f7b |
fs.idmapped.v6.3
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iHUEABYKAB0WIQRAhzRXHqcMeLMyaSiRxhvAZXjcogUCY+5NlQAKCRCRxhvAZXjc
orOaAP9i2h3OJy95nO2Fpde0Bt2UT+oulKCCcGlvXJ8/+TQpyQD/ZQq47gFQ0EAz
Br5NxeyGeecAb0lHpFz+CpLGsxMrMwQ=
=+BG5
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'fs.idmapped.v6.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping
Pull vfs idmapping updates from Christian Brauner:
- Last cycle we introduced the dedicated struct mnt_idmap type for
mount idmapping and the required infrastucture in
|
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
01beba7957
|
fs: port inode_owner_or_capable() to mnt_idmap
Convert to struct mnt_idmap.
Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in
|
||
Jeff Layton
|
5970e15dbc |
filelock: move file locking definitions to separate header file
The file locking definitions have lived in fs.h since the dawn of time, but they are only used by a small subset of the source files that include it. Move the file locking definitions to a new header file, and add the appropriate #include directives to the source files that need them. By doing this we trim down fs.h a bit and limit the amount of rebuilding that has to be done when we make changes to the file locking APIs. Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Acked-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Acked-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Acked-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Acked-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> |
||
|
Al Viro
|
164f4064ca |
keep iocb_flags() result cached in struct file
* calculate at the time we set FMODE_OPENED (do_dentry_open() for normal opens, alloc_file() for pipe()/socket()/etc.) * update when handling F_SETFL * keep in a new field - file->f_iocb_flags; since that thing is needed only before the refcount reaches zero, we can put it into the same anon union where ->f_rcuhead and ->f_llist live - those are used only after refcount reaches zero. Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
||
NeilBrown
|
a2ad63daa8 |
VFS: add FMODE_CAN_ODIRECT file flag
Currently various places test if direct IO is possible on a file by checking for the existence of the direct_IO address space operation. This is a poor choice, as the direct_IO operation may not be used - it is only used if the generic_file_*_iter functions are called for direct IO and some filesystems - particularly NFS - don't do this. Instead, introduce a new f_mode flag: FMODE_CAN_ODIRECT and change the various places to check this (avoiding pointer dereferences). do_dentry_open() will set this flag if ->direct_IO is present, so filesystems do not need to be changed. NFS *is* changed, to set the flag explicitly and discard the direct_IO entry in the address_space_operations for files. Other filesystems which currently use noop_direct_IO could usefully be changed to set this flag instead. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/164859778128.29473.15189737957277399416.stgit@noble.brown Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Tested-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Cc: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> |
||
Christoph Hellwig
|
7b12e49669 |
fs: remove fs.f_write_hint
The value is now completely unused except for reporting it back through the F_GET_FILE_RW_HINT ioctl, so remove the value and the two ioctls for it. Trying to use the F_SET_FILE_RW_HINT and F_GET_FILE_RW_HINT fcntls will now return EINVAL, just like it would on a kernel that never supported this functionality in the first place. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220308060529.736277-3-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
14726903c8 |
Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)
Merge misc updates from Andrew Morton: "173 patches. Subsystems affected by this series: ia64, ocfs2, block, and mm (debug, pagecache, gup, swap, shmem, memcg, selftests, pagemap, mremap, bootmem, sparsemem, vmalloc, kasan, pagealloc, memory-failure, hugetlb, userfaultfd, vmscan, compaction, mempolicy, memblock, oom-kill, migration, ksm, percpu, vmstat, and madvise)" * emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (173 commits) mm/madvise: add MADV_WILLNEED to process_madvise() mm/vmstat: remove unneeded return value mm/vmstat: simplify the array size calculation mm/vmstat: correct some wrong comments mm/percpu,c: remove obsolete comments of pcpu_chunk_populated() selftests: vm: add COW time test for KSM pages selftests: vm: add KSM merging time test mm: KSM: fix data type selftests: vm: add KSM merging across nodes test selftests: vm: add KSM zero page merging test selftests: vm: add KSM unmerge test selftests: vm: add KSM merge test mm/migrate: correct kernel-doc notation mm: wire up syscall process_mrelease mm: introduce process_mrelease system call memblock: make memblock_find_in_range method private mm/mempolicy.c: use in_task() in mempolicy_slab_node() mm/mempolicy: unify the create() func for bind/interleave/prefer-many policies mm/mempolicy: advertise new MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY mm/hugetlb: add support for mempolicy MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY ... |
||
Vasily Averin
|
839d68206d |
memcg: enable accounting for fasync_cache
fasync_struct is used by almost all character device drivers to set up the fasync queue, and for regular files by the file lease code. This structure is quite small but long-living and it can be assigned for any open file. It makes sense to account for its allocations to restrict the host's memory consumption from inside the memcg-limited container. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1b408625-d71c-0b26-b0b6-9baf00f93e69@virtuozzo.com Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org> Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Cc: Yutian Yang <nglaive@gmail.com> Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan.x@bytedance.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
||
Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi
|
2f488f698f |
fcntl: fix potential deadlock for &fasync_struct.fa_lock
There is an existing lock hierarchy of
&dev->event_lock --> &fasync_struct.fa_lock --> &f->f_owner.lock
from the following call chain:
input_inject_event():
spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->event_lock,...);
input_handle_event():
input_pass_values():
input_to_handler():
evdev_events():
evdev_pass_values():
spin_lock(&client->buffer_lock);
__pass_event():
kill_fasync():
kill_fasync_rcu():
read_lock(&fa->fa_lock);
send_sigio():
read_lock_irqsave(&fown->lock,...);
&dev->event_lock is HARDIRQ-safe, so interrupts have to be disabled
while grabbing &fasync_struct.fa_lock, otherwise we invert the lock
hierarchy. However, since kill_fasync which calls kill_fasync_rcu is
an exported symbol, it may not necessarily be called with interrupts
disabled.
As kill_fasync_rcu may be called with interrupts disabled (for
example, in the call chain above), we replace calls to
read_lock/read_unlock on &fasync_struct.fa_lock in kill_fasync_rcu
with read_lock_irqsave/read_unlock_irqrestore.
Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <desmondcheongzx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
|
||
|
Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi
|
f671a691e2 |
fcntl: fix potential deadlocks for &fown_struct.lock
Syzbot reports a potential deadlock in do_fcntl: ======================================================== WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected 5.12.0-syzkaller #0 Not tainted -------------------------------------------------------- syz-executor132/8391 just changed the state of lock: ffff888015967bf8 (&f->f_owner.lock){.+..}-{2:2}, at: f_getown_ex fs/fcntl.c:211 [inline] ffff888015967bf8 (&f->f_owner.lock){.+..}-{2:2}, at: do_fcntl+0x8b4/0x1200 fs/fcntl.c:395 but this lock was taken by another, HARDIRQ-safe lock in the past: (&dev->event_lock){-...}-{2:2} and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them. other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &dev->event_lock --> &new->fa_lock --> &f->f_owner.lock Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&f->f_owner.lock); local_irq_disable(); lock(&dev->event_lock); lock(&new->fa_lock); <Interrupt> lock(&dev->event_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** This happens because there is a lock hierarchy of &dev->event_lock --> &new->fa_lock --> &f->f_owner.lock from the following call chain: input_inject_event(): spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->event_lock,...); input_handle_event(): input_pass_values(): input_to_handler(): evdev_events(): evdev_pass_values(): spin_lock(&client->buffer_lock); __pass_event(): kill_fasync(): kill_fasync_rcu(): read_lock(&fa->fa_lock); send_sigio(): read_lock_irqsave(&fown->lock,...); However, since &dev->event_lock is HARDIRQ-safe, interrupts have to be disabled while grabbing &f->f_owner.lock, otherwise we invert the lock hierarchy. Hence, we replace calls to read_lock/read_unlock on &f->f_owner.lock, with read_lock_irq/read_unlock_irq. Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+e6d5398a02c516ce5e70@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <desmondcheongzx@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> |
||
Gustavo A. R. Silva
|
e8865537a6 |
fcntl: Fix unreachable code in do_fcntl()
Fix the following warning:
fs/fcntl.c:373:3: warning: fallthrough annotation in unreachable code [-Wimplicit-fallthrough]
fallthrough;
^
include/linux/compiler_attributes.h:210:41: note: expanded from macro 'fallthrough'
# define fallthrough __attribute__((__fallthrough__))
by placing the fallthrough; statement inside ifdeffery.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
|
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
7d6beb71da |
idmapped-mounts-v5.12
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iHUEABYKAB0WIQRAhzRXHqcMeLMyaSiRxhvAZXjcogUCYCegywAKCRCRxhvAZXjc
ouJ6AQDlf+7jCQlQdeKKoN9QDFfMzG1ooemat36EpRRTONaGuAD8D9A4sUsG4+5f
4IU5Lj9oY4DEmF8HenbWK2ZHsesL2Qg=
=yPaw
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
"This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
maintainers.
Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
are just a few:
- Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
implementation of portable home directories in
systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
login time.
- It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
containers without having to change ownership permanently through
chown(2).
- It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
Linux subsystem.
- It is possible to share files between containers with
non-overlapping idmappings.
- Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
permission checking.
- They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
all files.
- Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
directory and container and vm scenario.
- Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
apply as long as the mount exists.
Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
this:
- systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
in their implementation of portable home directories.
https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/
- container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734
- The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
ported.
- ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.
I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:
https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf
https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/
This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
xfs:
https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts
It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
merge this.
In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
testsuite.
Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
currently marked with.
The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
of extensibility.
The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
mount:
- The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.
- The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.
- The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.
- The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.
The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.
By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
behavioral or performance changes are observed.
The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:
|
||
Pavel Tikhomirov
|
cc4a3f885e |
fcntl: make F_GETOWN(EX) return 0 on dead owner task
Currently there is no way to differentiate the file with alive owner from the file with dead owner but pid of the owner reused. That's why CRIU can't actually know if it needs to restore file owner or not, because if it restores owner but actual owner was dead, this can introduce unexpected signals to the "false"-owner (which reused the pid). Let's change the api, so that F_GETOWN(EX) returns 0 in case actual owner is dead already. This comports with the POSIX spec, which states that a PID of 0 indicates that no signal will be sent. Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com> Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> |
||
Christian Brauner
|
9eccd12ce7
|
fcntl: handle idmapped mounts
Enable the setfl() helper to handle idmapped mounts by passing down the mount's user namespace. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-20-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> |
||
|
Christian Brauner
|
21cb47be6f
|
inode: make init and permission helpers idmapped mount aware
The inode_owner_or_capable() helper determines whether the caller is the owner of the inode or is capable with respect to that inode. Allow it to handle idmapped mounts. If the inode is accessed through an idmapped mount it according to the mount's user namespace. Afterwards the checks are identical to non-idmapped mounts. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Similarly, allow the inode_init_owner() helper to handle idmapped mounts. It initializes a new inode on idmapped mounts by mapping the fsuid and fsgid of the caller from the mount's user namespace. If the initial user namespace is passed nothing changes so non-idmapped mounts will see identical behavior as before. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-7-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> |
||
Boqun Feng
|
8d1ddb5e79 |
fcntl: Fix potential deadlock in send_sig{io, urg}()
Syzbot reports a potential deadlock found by the newly added recursive read deadlock detection in lockdep: [...] ======================================================== [...] WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected [...] 5.9.0-rc2-syzkaller #0 Not tainted [...] -------------------------------------------------------- [...] syz-executor.1/10214 just changed the state of lock: [...] ffff88811f506338 (&f->f_owner.lock){.+..}-{2:2}, at: send_sigurg+0x1d/0x200 [...] but this lock was taken by another, HARDIRQ-safe lock in the past: [...] (&dev->event_lock){-...}-{2:2} [...] [...] [...] and interrupts could create inverse lock ordering between them. [...] [...] [...] other info that might help us debug this: [...] Chain exists of: [...] &dev->event_lock --> &new->fa_lock --> &f->f_owner.lock [...] [...] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario: [...] [...] CPU0 CPU1 [...] ---- ---- [...] lock(&f->f_owner.lock); [...] local_irq_disable(); [...] lock(&dev->event_lock); [...] lock(&new->fa_lock); [...] <Interrupt> [...] lock(&dev->event_lock); [...] [...] *** DEADLOCK *** The corresponding deadlock case is as followed: CPU 0 CPU 1 CPU 2 read_lock(&fown->lock); spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->event_lock, ...) write_lock_irq(&filp->f_owner.lock); // wait for the lock read_lock(&fown-lock); // have to wait until the writer release // due to the fairness <interrupted> spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->event_lock); // wait for the lock The lock dependency on CPU 1 happens if there exists a call sequence: input_inject_event(): spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->event_lock,...); input_handle_event(): input_pass_values(): input_to_handler(): handler->event(): // evdev_event() evdev_pass_values(): spin_lock(&client->buffer_lock); __pass_event(): kill_fasync(): kill_fasync_rcu(): read_lock(&fa->fa_lock); send_sigio(): read_lock(&fown->lock); To fix this, make the reader in send_sigurg() and send_sigio() use read_lock_irqsave() and read_lock_irqrestore(). Reported-by: syzbot+22e87cdf94021b984aa6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+c5e32344981ad9f33750@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> |
||
|
Gustavo A. R. Silva
|
df561f6688 |
treewide: Use fallthrough pseudo-keyword
Replace the existing /* fall through */ comments and its variants with the new pseudo-keyword macro fallthrough[1]. Also, remove unnecessary fall-through markings when it is the case. [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.7/process/deprecated.html?highlight=fallthrough#implicit-switch-case-fall-through Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org> |
||
Kees Cook
|
0a68ff5e2e |
fcntl: Distribute switch variables for initialization
Variables declared in a switch statement before any case statements
cannot be automatically initialized with compiler instrumentation (as
they are not part of any execution flow). With GCC's proposed automatic
stack variable initialization feature, this triggers a warning (and they
don't get initialized). Clang's automatic stack variable initialization
(via CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL=y) doesn't throw a warning, but it also
doesn't initialize such variables[1]. Note that these warnings (or silent
skipping) happen before the dead-store elimination optimization phase,
so even when the automatic initializations are later elided in favor of
direct initializations, the warnings remain.
To avoid these problems, move such variables into the "case" where
they're used or lift them up into the main function body.
fs/fcntl.c: In function ‘send_sigio_to_task’:
fs/fcntl.c:738:20: warning: statement will never be executed [-Wswitch-unreachable]
738 | kernel_siginfo_t si;
| ^~
[1] https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=44916
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
|
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
5bf9a06a5f |
Merge branch 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull misc vfs cleanups from Al Viro: "No common topic, just three cleanups". * 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: make __d_alloc() static fs/namespace: add __user to open_tree and move_mount syscalls fs/fnctl: fix missing __user in fcntl_rw_hint() |
||
Eugene Syromiatnikov
|
9a7f12edf8 |
fcntl: fix typo in RWH_WRITE_LIFE_NOT_SET r/w hint name
According to commit message in the original commit |
||
Ben Dooks
|
e200327708 |
fs/fnctl: fix missing __user in fcntl_rw_hint()
The fcntl_rw_hint() has a missing __user annotation in the code when assinging argp. Add this to fix the following sparse warnings: fs/fcntl.c:280:22: warning: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces) fs/fcntl.c:280:22: expected unsigned long long [usertype] *argp fs/fcntl.c:280:22: got unsigned long long [noderef] [usertype] <asn:1> * fs/fcntl.c:287:34: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) fs/fcntl.c:287:34: expected void [noderef] <asn:1> *to fs/fcntl.c:287:34: got unsigned long long [usertype] *argp fs/fcntl.c:291:40: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) fs/fcntl.c:291:40: expected void const [noderef] <asn:1> *from fs/fcntl.c:291:40: got unsigned long long [usertype] *argp fs/fcntl.c:303:34: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) fs/fcntl.c:303:34: expected void [noderef] <asn:1> *to fs/fcntl.c:303:34: got unsigned long long [usertype] *argp fs/fcntl.c:307:40: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) fs/fcntl.c:307:40: expected void const [noderef] <asn:1> *from fs/fcntl.c:307:40: got unsigned long long [usertype] *argp Signed-off-by: Ben Dooks <ben.dooks@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
||
Gustavo A. R. Silva
|
0a4c92657f |
fs: mark expected switch fall-throughs
In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch cases where we are expecting to fall through. This patch fixes the following warnings: fs/affs/affs.h:124:38: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] fs/configfs/dir.c:1692:11: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] fs/configfs/dir.c:1694:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] fs/ceph/file.c:249:3: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] fs/ext4/hash.c:233:15: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] fs/ext4/hash.c:246:15: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] fs/ext2/inode.c:1237:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] fs/ext2/inode.c:1244:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] fs/ext4/indirect.c:1182:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] fs/ext4/indirect.c:1188:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] fs/ext4/indirect.c:1432:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] fs/ext4/indirect.c:1440:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] fs/f2fs/node.c:618:8: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] fs/f2fs/node.c:620:8: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] fs/btrfs/ref-verify.c:522:15: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] fs/gfs2/bmap.c:711:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] fs/gfs2/bmap.c:722:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] fs/jffs2/fs.c:339:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c:429:12: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] fs/ufs/util.h:62:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] fs/ufs/util.h:43:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] fs/fcntl.c:770:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] fs/seq_file.c:319:10: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] fs/libfs.c:148:11: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] fs/libfs.c:150:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] fs/signalfd.c:178:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] fs/locks.c:1473:16: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] Warning level 3 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=3 This patch is part of the ongoing efforts to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough. Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> |
||
Eric W. Biederman
|
ae7795bc61 |
signal: Distinguish between kernel_siginfo and siginfo
Linus recently observed that if we did not worry about the padding member in struct siginfo it is only about 48 bytes, and 48 bytes is much nicer than 128 bytes for allocating on the stack and copying around in the kernel. The obvious thing of only adding the padding when userspace is including siginfo.h won't work as there are sigframe definitions in the kernel that embed struct siginfo. So split siginfo in two; kernel_siginfo and siginfo. Keeping the traditional name for the userspace definition. While the version that is used internally to the kernel and ultimately will not be padded to 128 bytes is called kernel_siginfo. The definition of struct kernel_siginfo I have put in include/signal_types.h A set of buildtime checks has been added to verify the two structures have the same field offsets. To make it easy to verify the change kernel_siginfo retains the same size as siginfo. The reduction in size comes in a following change. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> |
||
|
Eric W. Biederman
|
84fe4cc09a |
signal: Don't send signals to tasks that don't exist
Recently syzbot reported crashes in send_sigio_to_task and
send_sigurg_to_task in linux-next. Despite finding a reproducer
syzbot apparently did not bisected this or otherwise track down the
offending commit in linux-next.
I happened to see this report and examined the code because I had
recently changed these functions as part of making PIDTYPE_TGID a real
pid type so that fork would does not need to restart when receiving a
signal. By examination I see that I spotted a bug in the code
that could explain the reported crashes.
When I took Oleg's suggestion and optimized send_sigurg and send_sigio
to only send to a single task when type is PIDTYPE_PID or PIDTYPE_TGID
I failed to handle pids that no longer point to tasks. The macro
do_each_pid_task simply iterates for zero iterations. With pid_task
an explicit NULL test is needed.
Update the code to include the missing NULL test.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Eric W. Biederman
|
40b3b02535 |
signal: Pass pid type into do_send_sig_info
This passes the information we already have at the call sight into do_send_sig_info. Ultimately allowing for better handling of signals sent to a group of processes during fork. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> |
||
|
Eric W. Biederman
|
9c2db00778 |
signal: Pass pid type into send_sigio_to_task & send_sigurg_to_task
This information is already present and using it directly simplifies the logic of the code. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> |
||
|
Eric W. Biederman
|
019191342f |
signal: Use PIDTYPE_TGID to clearly store where file signals will be sent
When f_setown is called a pid and a pid type are stored. Replace the use of PIDTYPE_PID with PIDTYPE_TGID as PIDTYPE_TGID goes to the entire thread group. Replace the use of PIDTYPE_MAX with PIDTYPE_PID as PIDTYPE_PID now is only for a thread. Update the users of __f_setown to use PIDTYPE_TGID instead of PIDTYPE_PID. For now the code continues to capture task_pid (when task_tgid would really be appropriate), and iterate on PIDTYPE_PID (even when type == PIDTYPE_TGID) out of an abundance of caution to preserve existing behavior. Oleg Nesterov suggested using the test to ensure we use PIDTYPE_PID for tgid lookup also be used to avoid taking the tasklist lock. Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> |
||
Mike Kravetz
|
5d752600a8 |
mm: restructure memfd code
With the addition of memfd hugetlbfs support, we now have the situation where memfd depends on TMPFS -or- HUGETLBFS. Previously, memfd was only supported on tmpfs, so it made sense that the code resided in shmem.c. In the current code, memfd is only functional if TMPFS is defined. If HUGETLFS is defined and TMPFS is not defined, then memfd functionality will not be available for hugetlbfs. This does not cause BUGs, just a lack of potentially desired functionality. Code is restructured in the following way: - include/linux/memfd.h is a new file containing memfd specific definitions previously contained in shmem_fs.h. - mm/memfd.c is a new file containing memfd specific code previously contained in shmem.c. - memfd specific code is removed from shmem_fs.h and shmem.c. - A new config option MEMFD_CREATE is added that is defined if TMPFS or HUGETLBFS is defined. No functional changes are made to the code: restructuring only. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180415182119.4517-4-mike.kravetz@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Marc-Andr Lureau <marcandre.lureau@gmail.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
||
Kirill Tkhai
|
7a107c0f55 |
fasync: Fix deadlock between task-context and interrupt-context kill_fasync()
I observed the following deadlock between them:
[task 1] [task 2] [task 3]
kill_fasync() mm_update_next_owner() copy_process()
spin_lock_irqsave(&fa->fa_lock) read_lock(&tasklist_lock) write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock)
send_sigio() <IRQ> ...
read_lock(&fown->lock) kill_fasync() ...
read_lock(&tasklist_lock) spin_lock_irqsave(&fa->fa_lock) ...
Task 1 can't acquire read locked tasklist_lock, since there is
already task 3 expressed its wish to take the lock exclusive.
Task 2 holds the read locked lock, but it can't take the spin lock.
Also, there is possible another deadlock (which I haven't observed):
[task 1] [task 2]
f_getown() kill_fasync()
read_lock(&f_own->lock) spin_lock_irqsave(&fa->fa_lock,)
<IRQ> send_sigio() write_lock_irq(&f_own->lock)
kill_fasync() read_lock(&fown->lock)
spin_lock_irqsave(&fa->fa_lock,)
Actually, we do not need exclusive fa->fa_lock in kill_fasync_rcu(),
as it guarantees fa->fa_file->f_owner integrity only. It may seem,
that it used to give a task a small possibility to receive two sequential
signals, if there are two parallel kill_fasync() callers, and task
handles the first signal fastly, but the behaviour won't become
different, since there is exclusive sighand lock in do_send_sig_info().
The patch converts fa_lock into rwlock_t, and this fixes two above
deadlocks, as rwlock is allowed to be taken from interrupt handler
by qrwlock design.
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
|
||
Dominik Brodowski
|
e02af2ff65 |
fs: add do_compat_fcntl64() helper; remove in-kernel call to compat syscall
Using the fs-internal do_compat_fcntl64() helper allows us to get rid of the fs-internal call to the compat_sys_fcntl64() syscall. This patch is part of a series which removes in-kernel calls to syscalls. On this basis, the syscall entry path can be streamlined. For details, see http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180325162527.GA17492@light.dominikbrodowski.net Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> |
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
a9a08845e9 |
vfs: do bulk POLL* -> EPOLL* replacement
This is the mindless scripted replacement of kernel use of POLL*
variables as described by Al, done by this script:
for V in IN OUT PRI ERR RDNORM RDBAND WRNORM WRBAND HUP RDHUP NVAL MSG; do
L=`git grep -l -w POLL$V | grep -v '^t' | grep -v /um/ | grep -v '^sa' | grep -v '/poll.h$'|grep -v '^D'`
for f in $L; do sed -i "-es/^\([^\"]*\)\(\<POLL$V\>\)/\\1E\\2/" $f; done
done
with de-mangling cleanups yet to come.
NOTE! On almost all architectures, the EPOLL* constants have the same
values as the POLL* constants do. But they keyword here is "almost".
For various bad reasons they aren't the same, and epoll() doesn't
actually work quite correctly in some cases due to this on Sparc et al.
The next patch from Al will sort out the final differences, and we
should be all done.
Scripted-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
||
|
Linus Torvalds
|
ee5daa1361 |
Merge branch 'work.poll2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull more poll annotation updates from Al Viro:
"This is preparation to solving the problems you've mentioned in the
original poll series.
After this series, the kernel is ready for running
for V in IN OUT PRI ERR RDNORM RDBAND WRNORM WRBAND HUP RDHUP NVAL MSG; do
L=`git grep -l -w POLL$V | grep -v '^t' | grep -v /um/ | grep -v '^sa' | grep -v '/poll.h$'|grep -v '^D'`
for f in $L; do sed -i "-es/^\([^\"]*\)\(\<POLL$V\>\)/\\1E\\2/" $f; done
done
as a for bulk search-and-replace.
After that, the kernel is ready to apply the patch to unify
{de,}mangle_poll(), and then get rid of kernel-side POLL... uses
entirely, and we should be all done with that stuff.
Basically, that's what you suggested wrt KPOLL..., except that we can
use EPOLL... instead - they already are arch-independent (and equal to
what is currently kernel-side POLL...).
After the preparations (in this series) switch to returning EPOLL...
from ->poll() instances is completely mechanical and kernel-side
POLL... can go away. The last step (killing kernel-side POLL... and
unifying {de,}mangle_poll() has to be done after the
search-and-replace job, since we need userland-side POLL... for
unified {de,}mangle_poll(), thus the cherry-pick at the last step.
After that we will have:
- POLL{IN,OUT,...} *not* in __poll_t, so any stray instances of
->poll() still using those will be caught by sparse.
- eventpoll.c and select.c warning-free wrt __poll_t
- no more kernel-side definitions of POLL... - userland ones are
visible through the entire kernel (and used pretty much only for
mangle/demangle)
- same behavior as after the first series (i.e. sparc et.al. epoll(2)
working correctly)"
* 'work.poll2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
annotate ep_scan_ready_list()
ep_send_events_proc(): return result via esed->res
preparation to switching ->poll() to returning EPOLL...
add EPOLLNVAL, annotate EPOLL... and event_poll->event
use linux/poll.h instead of asm/poll.h
xen: fix poll misannotation
smc: missing poll annotations
|
||
|
Al Viro
|
cfe39442ab |
use linux/poll.h instead of asm/poll.h
The only place that has any business including asm/poll.h is linux/poll.h. Fortunately, asm/poll.h had only been included in 3 places beyond that one, and all of them are trivial to switch to using linux/poll.h. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |