kmsan: fix kmsan_copy_to_user() on arches with overlapping address spaces

Comparing pointers with TASK_SIZE does not make sense when kernel and
userspace overlap.  Assume that we are handling user memory access in this
case.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240621113706.315500-7-iii@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
Cc: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Ilya Leoshkevich 2024-06-21 13:34:50 +02:00 committed by Andrew Morton
parent 59af945630
commit f926e9326f

View File

@ -267,7 +267,8 @@ void kmsan_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, size_t to_copy,
return;
ua_flags = user_access_save();
if ((u64)to < TASK_SIZE) {
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NON_OVERLAPPING_ADDRESS_SPACE) ||
(u64)to < TASK_SIZE) {
/* This is a user memory access, check it. */
kmsan_internal_check_memory((void *)from, to_copy - left, to,
REASON_COPY_TO_USER);