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scsi sg: remove incorrect scsi command checking logic
The SCSI_IOCTL_SEND_COMMAND ioctl has interesting scsi command "security" checking. If the file was opened read-only (but only in that case), it will fetch the first byte of the command from user space, and do "sg_allow_access()" on it. That, in turn, will check that "blk_verify_command()" is ok with that command byte. If that passes, it will then do call "sg_scsi_ioctl()" to execute the command. This is entirely nonsensical for several reasons. It's nonsensical simply because it's racy: after it copies the command byte from user mode to check it, user mode could just change the byte before it is actually submitted later by "sg_scsi_ioctl()". But it is nonsensical also because "sg_scsi_ioctl()" itself already does blk_verify_command() on the command properly after it has been copied from user space. So it is an incorrect implementation of a pointless check. Remove it. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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@ -1103,15 +1103,6 @@ sg_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd_in, unsigned long arg)
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case SCSI_IOCTL_SEND_COMMAND:
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if (atomic_read(&sdp->detaching))
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return -ENODEV;
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if (read_only) {
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unsigned char opcode = WRITE_6;
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Scsi_Ioctl_Command __user *siocp = p;
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if (copy_from_user(&opcode, siocp->data, 1))
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return -EFAULT;
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if (sg_allow_access(filp, &opcode))
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return -EPERM;
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}
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return sg_scsi_ioctl(sdp->device->request_queue, NULL, filp->f_mode, p);
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case SG_SET_DEBUG:
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result = get_user(val, ip);
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