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x86/bugs: Fix BHI documentation
Fix up some inaccuracies in the BHI documentation.
Fixes: ec9404e40e
("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8c84f7451bfe0dd08543c6082a383f390d4aa7e2.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
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@ -439,11 +439,11 @@ The possible values in this file are:
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- System is protected by retpoline
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* - BHI: BHI_DIS_S
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- System is protected by BHI_DIS_S
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* - BHI: SW loop; KVM SW loop
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* - BHI: SW loop, KVM SW loop
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- System is protected by software clearing sequence
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* - BHI: Syscall hardening
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- Syscalls are hardened against BHI
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* - BHI: Syscall hardening; KVM: SW loop
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* - BHI: Syscall hardening, KVM: SW loop
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- System is protected from userspace attacks by syscall hardening; KVM is protected by software clearing sequence
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Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU
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@ -666,13 +666,14 @@ kernel command line.
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of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence.
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on
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unconditionally enable.
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(default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as
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needed.
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off
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unconditionally disable.
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Disable the mitigation.
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auto
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enable if hardware mitigation
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control(BHI_DIS_S) is available, otherwise
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enable alternate mitigation in KVM.
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Enable the HW mitigation if needed, but
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*don't* enable the SW mitigation except for KVM.
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The system may be vulnerable.
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For spectre_v2_user see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
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@ -3444,6 +3444,7 @@
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retbleed=off [X86]
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spec_rstack_overflow=off [X86]
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spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
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spectre_bhi=off [X86]
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spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
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srbds=off [X86,INTEL]
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ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
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@ -6069,11 +6070,12 @@
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deployment of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB
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clearing sequence.
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on - unconditionally enable.
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off - unconditionally disable.
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auto - (default) enable hardware mitigation
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(BHI_DIS_S) if available, otherwise enable
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alternate mitigation in KVM.
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on - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation
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as needed.
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off - Disable the mitigation.
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auto - Enable the HW mitigation if needed, but
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*don't* enable the SW mitigation except
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for KVM. The system may be vulnerable.
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spectre_v2= [X86,EARLY] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
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(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
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