mirror of
https://github.com/torvalds/linux.git
synced 2024-12-25 20:32:22 +00:00
arm64: KVM: Propagate full Spectre v2 workaround state to KVM guests
Recent commits added the explicit notion of "workaround not required" to the state of the Spectre v2 (aka. BP_HARDENING) workaround, where we just had "needed" and "unknown" before. Export this knowledge to the rest of the kernel and enhance the existing kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor() to report this new state as well. Export this new state to guests when they use KVM's firmware interface emulation. Signed-off-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
80f393a23b
commit
c118bbb527
@ -362,7 +362,11 @@ static inline void kvm_vcpu_pmu_restore_host(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {}
|
||||
static inline void kvm_arm_vhe_guest_enter(void) {}
|
||||
static inline void kvm_arm_vhe_guest_exit(void) {}
|
||||
|
||||
static inline bool kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor(void)
|
||||
#define KVM_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN -1
|
||||
#define KVM_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED 0
|
||||
#define KVM_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED 1
|
||||
|
||||
static inline int kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
switch(read_cpuid_part()) {
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
|
||||
@ -370,10 +374,12 @@ static inline bool kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor(void)
|
||||
case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A12:
|
||||
case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15:
|
||||
case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17:
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
return KVM_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A7:
|
||||
return KVM_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
return KVM_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -614,6 +614,12 @@ static inline bool system_uses_irq_prio_masking(void)
|
||||
cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_IRQ_PRIO_MASKING);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#define ARM64_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN -1
|
||||
#define ARM64_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED 0
|
||||
#define ARM64_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED 1
|
||||
|
||||
int get_spectre_v2_workaround_state(void);
|
||||
|
||||
#define ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN -1
|
||||
#define ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE 0
|
||||
#define ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL 1
|
||||
|
@ -620,9 +620,21 @@ static inline void kvm_arm_vhe_guest_exit(void)
|
||||
isb();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static inline bool kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor(void)
|
||||
#define KVM_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN -1
|
||||
#define KVM_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED 0
|
||||
#define KVM_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED 1
|
||||
|
||||
static inline int kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR);
|
||||
switch (get_spectre_v2_workaround_state()) {
|
||||
case ARM64_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED:
|
||||
return KVM_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED;
|
||||
case ARM64_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED:
|
||||
return KVM_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED;
|
||||
case ARM64_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN:
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return KVM_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#define KVM_SSBD_UNKNOWN -1
|
||||
|
@ -554,6 +554,17 @@ cpu_enable_cache_maint_trap(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
|
||||
static bool __hardenbp_enab = true;
|
||||
static bool __spectrev2_safe = true;
|
||||
|
||||
int get_spectre_v2_workaround_state(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (__spectrev2_safe)
|
||||
return ARM64_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!__hardenbp_enab)
|
||||
return ARM64_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN;
|
||||
|
||||
return ARM64_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* List of CPUs that do not need any Spectre-v2 mitigation at all.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@ -854,13 +865,15 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
|
||||
ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
|
||||
char *buf)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (__spectrev2_safe)
|
||||
switch (get_spectre_v2_workaround_state()) {
|
||||
case ARM64_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED:
|
||||
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
|
||||
|
||||
if (__hardenbp_enab)
|
||||
case ARM64_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED:
|
||||
return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: Branch predictor hardening\n");
|
||||
|
||||
return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
|
||||
case ARM64_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN:
|
||||
default:
|
||||
return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev,
|
||||
|
@ -401,8 +401,16 @@ int kvm_hvc_call_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
|
||||
feature = smccc_get_arg1(vcpu);
|
||||
switch(feature) {
|
||||
case ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1:
|
||||
if (kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor())
|
||||
switch (kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor()) {
|
||||
case KVM_BP_HARDEN_UNKNOWN:
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case KVM_BP_HARDEN_WA_NEEDED:
|
||||
val = SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case KVM_BP_HARDEN_NOT_REQUIRED:
|
||||
val = SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2:
|
||||
switch (kvm_arm_have_ssbd()) {
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user