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bpf: Inherit system settings for CPU security mitigations
Currently, there exists a system-wide setting related to CPU security mitigations, denoted as 'mitigations='. When set to 'mitigations=off', it deactivates all optional CPU mitigations. Therefore, if we implement a system-wide 'mitigations=off' setting, it should inherently bypass Spectre v1 and Spectre v4 in the BPF subsystem. Please note that there is also a more specific 'nospectre_v1' setting on x86 and ppc architectures, though it is not currently exported. For the time being, let's disregard more fine-grained options. This idea emerged during our discussion about potential Spectre v1 attacks with Luis [0]. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/b4fc15f7-b204-767e-ebb9-fdb4233961fb@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Acked-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org> Cc: Luis Gerhorst <gerhorst@cs.fau.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231005084123.1338-1-laoar.shao@gmail.com
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@ -2164,12 +2164,12 @@ static inline bool bpf_allow_uninit_stack(void)
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static inline bool bpf_bypass_spec_v1(void)
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{
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return perfmon_capable();
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return perfmon_capable() || cpu_mitigations_off();
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}
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static inline bool bpf_bypass_spec_v4(void)
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{
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return perfmon_capable();
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return perfmon_capable() || cpu_mitigations_off();
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}
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int bpf_map_new_fd(struct bpf_map *map, int flags);
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