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parisc: Fix ptrace syscall number modification
Commit910cd32e55
("parisc: Fix and enable seccomp filter support") introduced a regression in ptrace-based syscall tampering: when tracer changes syscall number to -1, the kernel fails to initialize %r28 with -ENOSYS and subsequently fails to return the error code of the failed syscall to userspace. This erroneous behaviour could be observed with a simple strace syscall fault injection command which is expected to print something like this: $ strace -a0 -ewrite -einject=write:error=enospc echo hello write(1, "hello\n", 6) = -1 ENOSPC (No space left on device) (INJECTED) write(2, "echo: ", 6) = -1 ENOSPC (No space left on device) (INJECTED) write(2, "write error", 11) = -1 ENOSPC (No space left on device) (INJECTED) write(2, "\n", 1) = -1 ENOSPC (No space left on device) (INJECTED) +++ exited with 1 +++ After commit910cd32e55
it loops printing something like this instead: write(1, "hello\n", 6../strace: Failed to tamper with process 12345: unexpectedly got no error (return value 0, error 0) ) = 0 (INJECTED) This bug was found by strace test suite. Fixes:910cd32e55
("parisc: Fix and enable seccomp filter support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.5+ Signed-off-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
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@ -308,15 +308,29 @@ long compat_arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request,
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long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
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tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs)) {
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if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)) {
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int rc = tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs);
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/*
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* Tracing decided this syscall should not happen or the
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* debugger stored an invalid system call number. Skip
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* the system call and the system call restart handling.
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* As tracesys_next does not set %r28 to -ENOSYS
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* when %r20 is set to -1, initialize it here.
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*/
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regs->gr[20] = -1UL;
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goto out;
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regs->gr[28] = -ENOSYS;
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if (rc) {
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/*
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* A nonzero return code from
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* tracehook_report_syscall_entry() tells us
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* to prevent the syscall execution. Skip
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* the syscall call and the syscall restart handling.
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*
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* Note that the tracer may also just change
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* regs->gr[20] to an invalid syscall number,
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* that is handled by tracesys_next.
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*/
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regs->gr[20] = -1UL;
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return -1;
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}
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}
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/* Do the secure computing check after ptrace. */
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@ -340,7 +354,6 @@ long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
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regs->gr[24] & 0xffffffff,
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regs->gr[23] & 0xffffffff);
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out:
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/*
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* Sign extend the syscall number to 64bit since it may have been
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* modified by a compat ptrace call
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