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SUNRPC: Avoid relying on crypto API to derive CBC-CTS output IV
Scott reports SUNRPC self-test failures regarding the output IV on arm64 when using the SIMD accelerated implementation of AES in CBC mode with ciphertext stealing ("cts(cbc(aes))" in crypto API speak). These failures are the result of the fact that, while RFC 3962 does specify what the output IV should be and includes test vectors for it, the general concept of an output IV is poorly defined, and generally, not specified by the various algorithms implemented by the crypto API. Only algorithms that support transparent chaining (e.g., CBC mode on a block boundary) have requirements on the output IV, but ciphertext stealing (CTS) is fundamentally about how to encapsulate CBC in a way where the length of the entire message may not be an integral multiple of the cipher block size, and the concept of an output IV does not exist here because it has no defined purpose past the end of the message. The generic CTS template takes advantage of this chaining capability of the CBC implementations, and as a result, happens to return an output IV, simply because it passes its IV buffer directly to the encapsulated CBC implementation, which operates on full blocks only, and always returns an IV. This output IV happens to match how RFC 3962 defines it, even though the CTS template itself does not contain any output IV logic whatsoever, and, for this reason, lacks any test vectors that exercise this accidental output IV generation. The arm64 SIMD implementation of cts(cbc(aes)) does not use the generic CTS template at all, but instead, implements the CBC mode and ciphertext stealing directly, and therefore does not encapsule a CBC implementation that returns an output IV in the same way. The arm64 SIMD implementation complies with the specification and passes all internal tests, but when invoked by the SUNRPC code, fails to produce the expected output IV and causes its selftests to fail. Given that the output IV is defined as the penultimate block (where the final block may smaller than the block size), we can quite easily derive it in the caller by copying the appropriate slice of ciphertext after encryption. Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com> Cc: Anna Schumaker <anna@kernel.org> Cc: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Reported-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com> Tested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
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@ -639,6 +639,16 @@ gss_krb5_cts_crypt(struct crypto_sync_skcipher *cipher, struct xdr_buf *buf,
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ret = write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(buf, offset, data, len);
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#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KUNIT)
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/*
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* CBC-CTS does not define an output IV but RFC 3962 defines it as the
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* penultimate block of ciphertext, so copy that into the IV buffer
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* before returning.
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*/
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if (encrypt)
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memcpy(iv, data, crypto_sync_skcipher_ivsize(cipher));
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#endif
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out:
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kfree(data);
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return ret;
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