x86/speculation/mmio: Enable CPU Fill buffer clearing on idle

When the CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities,
Fill Buffer Stale Data Propagator (FBSDP) can propagate stale data out
of Fill buffer to uncore buffer when CPU goes idle. Stale data can then
be exploited with other variants using MMIO operations.

Mitigate it by clearing the Fill buffer before entering idle state.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
This commit is contained in:
Pawan Gupta 2022-05-19 20:31:12 -07:00 committed by Borislav Petkov
parent e5925fb867
commit 99a83db5a6

View File

@ -433,6 +433,14 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void)
else
static_branch_enable(&mmio_stale_data_clear);
/*
* If Processor-MMIO-Stale-Data bug is present and Fill Buffer data can
* be propagated to uncore buffers, clearing the Fill buffers on idle
* is required irrespective of SMT state.
*/
if (!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO))
static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
/*
* Check if the system has the right microcode.
*
@ -1225,6 +1233,8 @@ static void update_indir_branch_cond(void)
/* Update the static key controlling the MDS CPU buffer clear in idle */
static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
{
u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
/*
* Enable the idle clearing if SMT is active on CPUs which are
* affected only by MSBDS and not any other MDS variant.
@ -1236,10 +1246,12 @@ static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
return;
if (sched_smt_active())
if (sched_smt_active()) {
static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
else
} else if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF ||
(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO)) {
static_branch_disable(&mds_idle_clear);
}
}
#define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n"