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PCI: hv: Add validation for untrusted Hyper-V values

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For additional robustness in the face of Hyper-V errors or malicious
behavior, validate all values that originate from packets that Hyper-V
has sent to the guest in the host-to-guest ring buffer.  Ensure that
invalid values cannot cause data being copied out of the bounds of the
source buffer in hv_pci_onchannelcallback().

While at it, remove a redundant validation in hv_pci_generic_compl():
hv_pci_onchannelcallback() already ensures that all processed incoming
packets are "at least as large as [in fact larger than] a response".

Signed-off-by: Andrea Parri (Microsoft) <parri.andrea@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220511223207.3386-2-parri.andrea@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
This commit is contained in:
Andrea Parri (Microsoft) 2022-05-12 00:32:06 +02:00 committed by Wei Liu
parent a2bad844a6
commit 9937fa6d1e
1 changed files with 24 additions and 9 deletions
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33
drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c
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@ -981,11 +981,7 @@ static void hv_pci_generic_compl(void *context, struct pci_response *resp,
{
struct hv_pci_compl *comp_pkt = context;
if (resp_packet_size >= offsetofend(struct pci_response, status))
comp_pkt->completion_status = resp->status;
else
comp_pkt->completion_status = -1;
comp_pkt->completion_status = resp->status;
complete(&comp_pkt->host_event);
}
@ -1606,8 +1602,13 @@ static void hv_pci_compose_compl(void *context, struct pci_response *resp,
struct pci_create_int_response *int_resp =
(struct pci_create_int_response *)resp;
if (resp_packet_size < sizeof(*int_resp)) {
comp_pkt->comp_pkt.completion_status = -1;
goto out;
}
comp_pkt->comp_pkt.completion_status = resp->status;
comp_pkt->int_desc = int_resp->int_desc;
out:
complete(&comp_pkt->comp_pkt.host_event);
}
@ -2291,12 +2292,14 @@ static void q_resource_requirements(void *context, struct pci_response *resp,
struct q_res_req_compl *completion = context;
struct pci_q_res_req_response *q_res_req =
(struct pci_q_res_req_response *)resp;
s32 status;
int i;
if (resp->status < 0) {
status = (resp_packet_size < sizeof(*q_res_req)) ? -1 : resp->status;
if (status < 0) {
dev_err(&completion->hpdev->hbus->hdev->device,
"query resource requirements failed: %x\n",
resp->status);
status);
} else {
for (i = 0; i < PCI_STD_NUM_BARS; i++) {
completion->hpdev->probed_bar[i] =
@ -2848,7 +2851,8 @@ static void hv_pci_onchannelcallback(void *context)
case PCI_BUS_RELATIONS:
bus_rel = (struct pci_bus_relations *)buffer;
if (bytes_recvd <
if (bytes_recvd < sizeof(*bus_rel) ||
bytes_recvd <
struct_size(bus_rel, func,
bus_rel->device_count)) {
dev_err(&hbus->hdev->device,
@ -2862,7 +2866,8 @@ static void hv_pci_onchannelcallback(void *context)
case PCI_BUS_RELATIONS2:
bus_rel2 = (struct pci_bus_relations2 *)buffer;
if (bytes_recvd <
if (bytes_recvd < sizeof(*bus_rel2) ||
bytes_recvd <
struct_size(bus_rel2, func,
bus_rel2->device_count)) {
dev_err(&hbus->hdev->device,
@ -2876,6 +2881,11 @@ static void hv_pci_onchannelcallback(void *context)
case PCI_EJECT:
dev_message = (struct pci_dev_incoming *)buffer;
if (bytes_recvd < sizeof(*dev_message)) {
dev_err(&hbus->hdev->device,
"eject message too small\n");
break;
}
hpdev = get_pcichild_wslot(hbus,
dev_message->wslot.slot);
if (hpdev) {
@ -2887,6 +2897,11 @@ static void hv_pci_onchannelcallback(void *context)
case PCI_INVALIDATE_BLOCK:
inval = (struct pci_dev_inval_block *)buffer;
if (bytes_recvd < sizeof(*inval)) {
dev_err(&hbus->hdev->device,
"invalidate message too small\n");
break;
}
hpdev = get_pcichild_wslot(hbus,
inval->wslot.slot);
if (hpdev) {