diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 1d7122a1883e..125914536825 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1118,6 +1118,13 @@ config X86_LOCAL_APIC
 	depends on X86_64 || SMP || X86_32_NON_STANDARD || X86_UP_APIC || PCI_MSI
 	select IRQ_DOMAIN_HIERARCHY
 
+config ACPI_MADT_WAKEUP
+	def_bool y
+	depends on X86_64
+	depends on ACPI
+	depends on SMP
+	depends on X86_LOCAL_APIC
+
 config X86_IO_APIC
 	def_bool y
 	depends on X86_LOCAL_APIC || X86_UP_IOAPIC
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/core.c
index b31ef2424d19..0f81f70aca82 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/core.c
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ static bool noinstr intel_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)
 {
 	switch (attr) {
 	case CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO:
-	case CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED:
 	case CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT:
 	case CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT:
 		return true;
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
index c1cb90369915..078e2bac2553 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 #include <linux/cpufeature.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/kexec.h>
 #include <asm/coco.h>
 #include <asm/tdx.h>
 #include <asm/vmx.h>
@@ -14,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <asm/insn.h>
 #include <asm/insn-eval.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
+#include <asm/set_memory.h>
 
 /* MMIO direction */
 #define EPT_READ	0
@@ -38,6 +40,8 @@
 
 #define TDREPORT_SUBTYPE_0	0
 
+static atomic_long_t nr_shared;
+
 /* Called from __tdx_hypercall() for unrecoverable failure */
 noinstr void __noreturn __tdx_hypercall_failed(void)
 {
@@ -798,28 +802,124 @@ static bool tdx_enc_status_changed(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages, bool enc)
 	return true;
 }
 
-static bool tdx_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,
-					  bool enc)
+static int tdx_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,
+					 bool enc)
 {
 	/*
 	 * Only handle shared->private conversion here.
 	 * See the comment in tdx_early_init().
 	 */
-	if (enc)
-		return tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc);
-	return true;
+	if (enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc))
+		return -EIO;
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
-static bool tdx_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,
+static int tdx_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,
 					 bool enc)
 {
 	/*
 	 * Only handle private->shared conversion here.
 	 * See the comment in tdx_early_init().
 	 */
-	if (!enc)
-		return tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc);
-	return true;
+	if (!enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc))
+		return -EIO;
+
+	if (enc)
+		atomic_long_sub(numpages, &nr_shared);
+	else
+		atomic_long_add(numpages, &nr_shared);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Stop new private<->shared conversions */
+static void tdx_kexec_begin(void)
+{
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Crash kernel reaches here with interrupts disabled: can't wait for
+	 * conversions to finish.
+	 *
+	 * If race happened, just report and proceed.
+	 */
+	if (!set_memory_enc_stop_conversion())
+		pr_warn("Failed to stop shared<->private conversions\n");
+}
+
+/* Walk direct mapping and convert all shared memory back to private */
+static void tdx_kexec_finish(void)
+{
+	unsigned long addr, end;
+	long found = 0, shared;
+
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE))
+		return;
+
+	lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
+
+	addr = PAGE_OFFSET;
+	end  = PAGE_OFFSET + get_max_mapped();
+
+	while (addr < end) {
+		unsigned long size;
+		unsigned int level;
+		pte_t *pte;
+
+		pte = lookup_address(addr, &level);
+		size = page_level_size(level);
+
+		if (pte && pte_decrypted(*pte)) {
+			int pages = size / PAGE_SIZE;
+
+			/*
+			 * Touching memory with shared bit set triggers implicit
+			 * conversion to shared.
+			 *
+			 * Make sure nobody touches the shared range from
+			 * now on.
+			 */
+			set_pte(pte, __pte(0));
+
+			/*
+			 * Memory encryption state persists across kexec.
+			 * If tdx_enc_status_changed() fails in the first
+			 * kernel, it leaves memory in an unknown state.
+			 *
+			 * If that memory remains shared, accessing it in the
+			 * *next* kernel through a private mapping will result
+			 * in an unrecoverable guest shutdown.
+			 *
+			 * The kdump kernel boot is not impacted as it uses
+			 * a pre-reserved memory range that is always private.
+			 * However, gathering crash information could lead to
+			 * a crash if it accesses unconverted memory through
+			 * a private mapping which is possible when accessing
+			 * that memory through /proc/vmcore, for example.
+			 *
+			 * In all cases, print error info in order to leave
+			 * enough bread crumbs for debugging.
+			 */
+			if (!tdx_enc_status_changed(addr, pages, true)) {
+				pr_err("Failed to unshare range %#lx-%#lx\n",
+				       addr, addr + size);
+			}
+
+			found += pages;
+		}
+
+		addr += size;
+	}
+
+	__flush_tlb_all();
+
+	shared = atomic_long_read(&nr_shared);
+	if (shared != found) {
+		pr_err("shared page accounting is off\n");
+		pr_err("nr_shared = %ld, nr_found = %ld\n", shared, found);
+	}
 }
 
 void __init tdx_early_init(void)
@@ -881,6 +981,9 @@ void __init tdx_early_init(void)
 	x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required  = tdx_cache_flush_required;
 	x86_platform.guest.enc_tlb_flush_required    = tdx_tlb_flush_required;
 
+	x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_begin	     = tdx_kexec_begin;
+	x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_finish	     = tdx_kexec_finish;
+
 	/*
 	 * TDX intercepts the RDMSR to read the X2APIC ID in the parallel
 	 * bringup low level code. That raises #VE which cannot be handled
diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c
index 768d73de0d09..b4a851d27c7c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c
@@ -523,9 +523,9 @@ static int hv_mark_gpa_visibility(u16 count, const u64 pfn[],
  * transition is complete, hv_vtom_set_host_visibility() marks the pages
  * as "present" again.
  */
-static bool hv_vtom_clear_present(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecount, bool enc)
+static int hv_vtom_clear_present(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecount, bool enc)
 {
-	return !set_memory_np(kbuffer, pagecount);
+	return set_memory_np(kbuffer, pagecount);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -536,20 +536,19 @@ static bool hv_vtom_clear_present(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecount, bool enc
  * with host. This function works as wrap of hv_mark_gpa_visibility()
  * with memory base and size.
  */
-static bool hv_vtom_set_host_visibility(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecount, bool enc)
+static int hv_vtom_set_host_visibility(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecount, bool enc)
 {
 	enum hv_mem_host_visibility visibility = enc ?
 			VMBUS_PAGE_NOT_VISIBLE : VMBUS_PAGE_VISIBLE_READ_WRITE;
 	u64 *pfn_array;
 	phys_addr_t paddr;
+	int i, pfn, err;
 	void *vaddr;
 	int ret = 0;
-	bool result = true;
-	int i, pfn;
 
 	pfn_array = kmalloc(HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!pfn_array) {
-		result = false;
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		goto err_set_memory_p;
 	}
 
@@ -568,10 +567,8 @@ static bool hv_vtom_set_host_visibility(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecount, bo
 		if (pfn == HV_MAX_MODIFY_GPA_REP_COUNT || i == pagecount - 1) {
 			ret = hv_mark_gpa_visibility(pfn, pfn_array,
 						     visibility);
-			if (ret) {
-				result = false;
+			if (ret)
 				goto err_free_pfn_array;
-			}
 			pfn = 0;
 		}
 	}
@@ -586,10 +583,11 @@ err_set_memory_p:
 	 * order to avoid leaving the memory range in a "broken" state. Setting
 	 * the PRESENT bits shouldn't fail, but return an error if it does.
 	 */
-	if (set_memory_p(kbuffer, pagecount))
-		result = false;
+	err = set_memory_p(kbuffer, pagecount);
+	if (err && !ret)
+		ret = err;
 
-	return result;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static bool hv_vtom_tlb_flush_required(bool private)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h
index 5af926c050f0..21bc53f5ed0c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h
@@ -78,6 +78,13 @@ static inline bool acpi_skip_set_wakeup_address(void)
 
 #define acpi_skip_set_wakeup_address acpi_skip_set_wakeup_address
 
+union acpi_subtable_headers;
+
+int __init acpi_parse_mp_wake(union acpi_subtable_headers *header,
+			      const unsigned long end);
+
+void asm_acpi_mp_play_dead(u64 reset_vector, u64 pgd_pa);
+
 /*
  * Check if the CPU can handle C2 and deeper
  */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h
index cc9ccf61b6bd..14d72727d7ee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/init.h
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 
 struct x86_mapping_info {
 	void *(*alloc_pgt_page)(void *); /* allocate buf for page table */
+	void (*free_pgt_page)(void *, void *); /* free buf for page table */
 	void *context;			 /* context for alloc_pgt_page */
 	unsigned long page_flag;	 /* page flag for PMD or PUD entry */
 	unsigned long offset;		 /* ident mapping offset */
@@ -16,4 +17,6 @@ struct x86_mapping_info {
 int kernel_ident_mapping_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pgd_t *pgd_page,
 				unsigned long pstart, unsigned long pend);
 
+void kernel_ident_mapping_free(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pgd_t *pgd);
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_INIT_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 65b8e5bb902c..e39311a89bf4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -140,6 +140,11 @@ static inline int pte_young(pte_t pte)
 	return pte_flags(pte) & _PAGE_ACCESSED;
 }
 
+static inline bool pte_decrypted(pte_t pte)
+{
+	return cc_mkdec(pte_val(pte)) == pte_val(pte);
+}
+
 #define pmd_dirty pmd_dirty
 static inline bool pmd_dirty(pmd_t pmd)
 {
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
index b78644962626..2f321137736c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h
@@ -549,6 +549,7 @@ enum pg_level {
 	PG_LEVEL_2M,
 	PG_LEVEL_1G,
 	PG_LEVEL_512G,
+	PG_LEVEL_256T,
 	PG_LEVEL_NUM
 };
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h
index 9aee31862b4a..4b2abce2e3e7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h
@@ -49,8 +49,11 @@ int set_memory_wb(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
 int set_memory_np(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
 int set_memory_p(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
 int set_memory_4k(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
+
+bool set_memory_enc_stop_conversion(void);
 int set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
 int set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
+
 int set_memory_np_noalias(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
 int set_memory_nonglobal(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
 int set_memory_global(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h
index a35936b512fe..ca073f40698f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ struct smp_ops {
 	int (*cpu_disable)(void);
 	void (*cpu_die)(unsigned int cpu);
 	void (*play_dead)(void);
+	void (*stop_this_cpu)(void);
 
 	void (*send_call_func_ipi)(const struct cpumask *mask);
 	void (*send_call_func_single_ipi)(int cpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
index 6149eabe200f..213cf5379a5a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h
@@ -149,12 +149,22 @@ struct x86_init_acpi {
  * @enc_status_change_finish	Notify HV after the encryption status of a range is changed
  * @enc_tlb_flush_required	Returns true if a TLB flush is needed before changing page encryption status
  * @enc_cache_flush_required	Returns true if a cache flush is needed before changing page encryption status
+ * @enc_kexec_begin		Begin the two-step process of converting shared memory back
+ *				to private. It stops the new conversions from being started
+ *				and waits in-flight conversions to finish, if possible.
+ * @enc_kexec_finish		Finish the two-step process of converting shared memory to
+ *				private. All memory is private after the call when
+ *				the function returns.
+ *				It is called on only one CPU while the others are shut down
+ *				and with interrupts disabled.
  */
 struct x86_guest {
-	bool (*enc_status_change_prepare)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
-	bool (*enc_status_change_finish)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
+	int (*enc_status_change_prepare)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
+	int (*enc_status_change_finish)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc);
 	bool (*enc_tlb_flush_required)(bool enc);
 	bool (*enc_cache_flush_required)(void);
+	void (*enc_kexec_begin)(void);
+	void (*enc_kexec_finish)(void);
 };
 
 /**
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/Makefile
index fc17b3f136fe..842a5f449404 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/Makefile
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI)		+= boot.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_SLEEP)	+= sleep.o wakeup_$(BITS).o
 obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_APEI)		+= apei.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_CPPC_LIB)	+= cppc.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_MADT_WAKEUP)	+= madt_wakeup.o madt_playdead.o
 
 ifneq ($(CONFIG_ACPI_PROCESSOR),)
 obj-y				+= cstate.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
index 4bf82dbd2a6b..9f4618dcd704 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
@@ -67,13 +67,6 @@ static bool has_lapic_cpus __initdata;
 static bool acpi_support_online_capable;
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-/* Physical address of the Multiprocessor Wakeup Structure mailbox */
-static u64 acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr;
-/* Virtual address of the Multiprocessor Wakeup Structure mailbox */
-static struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup_mailbox *acpi_mp_wake_mailbox;
-#endif
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_IO_APIC
 /*
  * Locks related to IOAPIC hotplug
@@ -341,60 +334,6 @@ acpi_parse_lapic_nmi(union acpi_subtable_headers * header, const unsigned long e
 
 	return 0;
 }
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-static int acpi_wakeup_cpu(u32 apicid, unsigned long start_ip)
-{
-	/*
-	 * Remap mailbox memory only for the first call to acpi_wakeup_cpu().
-	 *
-	 * Wakeup of secondary CPUs is fully serialized in the core code.
-	 * No need to protect acpi_mp_wake_mailbox from concurrent accesses.
-	 */
-	if (!acpi_mp_wake_mailbox) {
-		acpi_mp_wake_mailbox = memremap(acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr,
-						sizeof(*acpi_mp_wake_mailbox),
-						MEMREMAP_WB);
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * Mailbox memory is shared between the firmware and OS. Firmware will
-	 * listen on mailbox command address, and once it receives the wakeup
-	 * command, the CPU associated with the given apicid will be booted.
-	 *
-	 * The value of 'apic_id' and 'wakeup_vector' must be visible to the
-	 * firmware before the wakeup command is visible.  smp_store_release()
-	 * ensures ordering and visibility.
-	 */
-	acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->apic_id	    = apicid;
-	acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->wakeup_vector = start_ip;
-	smp_store_release(&acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->command,
-			  ACPI_MP_WAKE_COMMAND_WAKEUP);
-
-	/*
-	 * Wait for the CPU to wake up.
-	 *
-	 * The CPU being woken up is essentially in a spin loop waiting to be
-	 * woken up. It should not take long for it wake up and acknowledge by
-	 * zeroing out ->command.
-	 *
-	 * ACPI specification doesn't provide any guidance on how long kernel
-	 * has to wait for a wake up acknowledgement. It also doesn't provide
-	 * a way to cancel a wake up request if it takes too long.
-	 *
-	 * In TDX environment, the VMM has control over how long it takes to
-	 * wake up secondary. It can postpone scheduling secondary vCPU
-	 * indefinitely. Giving up on wake up request and reporting error opens
-	 * possible attack vector for VMM: it can wake up a secondary CPU when
-	 * kernel doesn't expect it. Wait until positive result of the wake up
-	 * request.
-	 */
-	while (READ_ONCE(acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->command))
-		cpu_relax();
-
-	return 0;
-}
-#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_IO_APIC
@@ -1124,29 +1063,6 @@ static int __init acpi_parse_madt_lapic_entries(void)
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-static int __init acpi_parse_mp_wake(union acpi_subtable_headers *header,
-				     const unsigned long end)
-{
-	struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup *mp_wake;
-
-	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP))
-		return -ENODEV;
-
-	mp_wake = (struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup *)header;
-	if (BAD_MADT_ENTRY(mp_wake, end))
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	acpi_table_print_madt_entry(&header->common);
-
-	acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr = mp_wake->base_address;
-
-	apic_update_callback(wakeup_secondary_cpu_64, acpi_wakeup_cpu);
-
-	return 0;
-}
-#endif				/* CONFIG_X86_64 */
 #endif				/* CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC */
 
 #ifdef	CONFIG_X86_IO_APIC
@@ -1343,7 +1259,7 @@ static void __init acpi_process_madt(void)
 				smp_found_config = 1;
 			}
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_MADT_WAKEUP
 			/*
 			 * Parse MADT MP Wake entry.
 			 */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_playdead.S b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_playdead.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4e498d28cdc8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_playdead.S
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include <asm/page_types.h>
+#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
+
+	.text
+	.align PAGE_SIZE
+
+/*
+ * asm_acpi_mp_play_dead() - Hand over control of the CPU to the BIOS
+ *
+ * rdi: Address of the ACPI MADT MPWK ResetVector
+ * rsi: PGD of the identity mapping
+ */
+SYM_FUNC_START(asm_acpi_mp_play_dead)
+	/* Turn off global entries. Following CR3 write will flush them. */
+	movq	%cr4, %rdx
+	andq	$~(X86_CR4_PGE), %rdx
+	movq	%rdx, %cr4
+
+	/* Switch to identity mapping */
+	movq	%rsi, %cr3
+
+	/* Jump to reset vector */
+	ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
+	jmp	*%rdi
+SYM_FUNC_END(asm_acpi_mp_play_dead)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6cfe762be28b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c
@@ -0,0 +1,292 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+#include <linux/acpi.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/kexec.h>
+#include <linux/memblock.h>
+#include <linux/pgtable.h>
+#include <linux/sched/hotplug.h>
+#include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/barrier.h>
+#include <asm/init.h>
+#include <asm/intel_pt.h>
+#include <asm/nmi.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/reboot.h>
+
+/* Physical address of the Multiprocessor Wakeup Structure mailbox */
+static u64 acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr __ro_after_init;
+
+/* Virtual address of the Multiprocessor Wakeup Structure mailbox */
+static struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup_mailbox *acpi_mp_wake_mailbox __ro_after_init;
+
+static u64 acpi_mp_pgd __ro_after_init;
+static u64 acpi_mp_reset_vector_paddr __ro_after_init;
+
+static void acpi_mp_stop_this_cpu(void)
+{
+	asm_acpi_mp_play_dead(acpi_mp_reset_vector_paddr, acpi_mp_pgd);
+}
+
+static void acpi_mp_play_dead(void)
+{
+	play_dead_common();
+	asm_acpi_mp_play_dead(acpi_mp_reset_vector_paddr, acpi_mp_pgd);
+}
+
+static void acpi_mp_cpu_die(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+	u32 apicid = per_cpu(x86_cpu_to_apicid, cpu);
+	unsigned long timeout;
+
+	/*
+	 * Use TEST mailbox command to prove that BIOS got control over
+	 * the CPU before declaring it dead.
+	 *
+	 * BIOS has to clear 'command' field of the mailbox.
+	 */
+	acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->apic_id = apicid;
+	smp_store_release(&acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->command,
+			  ACPI_MP_WAKE_COMMAND_TEST);
+
+	/* Don't wait longer than a second. */
+	timeout = USEC_PER_SEC;
+	while (READ_ONCE(acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->command) && --timeout)
+		udelay(1);
+
+	if (!timeout)
+		pr_err("Failed to hand over CPU %d to BIOS\n", cpu);
+}
+
+/* The argument is required to match type of x86_mapping_info::alloc_pgt_page */
+static void __init *alloc_pgt_page(void *dummy)
+{
+	return memblock_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE);
+}
+
+static void __init free_pgt_page(void *pgt, void *dummy)
+{
+	return memblock_free(pgt, PAGE_SIZE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Make sure asm_acpi_mp_play_dead() is present in the identity mapping at
+ * the same place as in the kernel page tables. asm_acpi_mp_play_dead() switches
+ * to the identity mapping and the function has be present at the same spot in
+ * the virtual address space before and after switching page tables.
+ */
+static int __init init_transition_pgtable(pgd_t *pgd)
+{
+	pgprot_t prot = PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC_NOENC;
+	unsigned long vaddr, paddr;
+	p4d_t *p4d;
+	pud_t *pud;
+	pmd_t *pmd;
+	pte_t *pte;
+
+	vaddr = (unsigned long)asm_acpi_mp_play_dead;
+	pgd += pgd_index(vaddr);
+	if (!pgd_present(*pgd)) {
+		p4d = (p4d_t *)alloc_pgt_page(NULL);
+		if (!p4d)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(__pa(p4d) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
+	}
+	p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, vaddr);
+	if (!p4d_present(*p4d)) {
+		pud = (pud_t *)alloc_pgt_page(NULL);
+		if (!pud)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(__pa(pud) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
+	}
+	pud = pud_offset(p4d, vaddr);
+	if (!pud_present(*pud)) {
+		pmd = (pmd_t *)alloc_pgt_page(NULL);
+		if (!pmd)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		set_pud(pud, __pud(__pa(pmd) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
+	}
+	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, vaddr);
+	if (!pmd_present(*pmd)) {
+		pte = (pte_t *)alloc_pgt_page(NULL);
+		if (!pte)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(__pa(pte) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
+	}
+	pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, vaddr);
+
+	paddr = __pa(vaddr);
+	set_pte(pte, pfn_pte(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, prot));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init acpi_mp_setup_reset(u64 reset_vector)
+{
+	struct x86_mapping_info info = {
+		.alloc_pgt_page = alloc_pgt_page,
+		.free_pgt_page	= free_pgt_page,
+		.page_flag      = __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC,
+		.kernpg_flag    = _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC,
+	};
+	pgd_t *pgd;
+
+	pgd = alloc_pgt_page(NULL);
+	if (!pgd)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	for (int i = 0; i < nr_pfn_mapped; i++) {
+		unsigned long mstart, mend;
+
+		mstart = pfn_mapped[i].start << PAGE_SHIFT;
+		mend   = pfn_mapped[i].end << PAGE_SHIFT;
+		if (kernel_ident_mapping_init(&info, pgd, mstart, mend)) {
+			kernel_ident_mapping_free(&info, pgd);
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (kernel_ident_mapping_init(&info, pgd,
+				      PAGE_ALIGN_DOWN(reset_vector),
+				      PAGE_ALIGN(reset_vector + 1))) {
+		kernel_ident_mapping_free(&info, pgd);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (init_transition_pgtable(pgd)) {
+		kernel_ident_mapping_free(&info, pgd);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	smp_ops.play_dead = acpi_mp_play_dead;
+	smp_ops.stop_this_cpu = acpi_mp_stop_this_cpu;
+	smp_ops.cpu_die = acpi_mp_cpu_die;
+
+	acpi_mp_reset_vector_paddr = reset_vector;
+	acpi_mp_pgd = __pa(pgd);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int acpi_wakeup_cpu(u32 apicid, unsigned long start_ip)
+{
+	if (!acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr) {
+		pr_warn_once("No MADT mailbox: cannot bringup secondary CPUs. Booting with kexec?\n");
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Remap mailbox memory only for the first call to acpi_wakeup_cpu().
+	 *
+	 * Wakeup of secondary CPUs is fully serialized in the core code.
+	 * No need to protect acpi_mp_wake_mailbox from concurrent accesses.
+	 */
+	if (!acpi_mp_wake_mailbox) {
+		acpi_mp_wake_mailbox = memremap(acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr,
+						sizeof(*acpi_mp_wake_mailbox),
+						MEMREMAP_WB);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Mailbox memory is shared between the firmware and OS. Firmware will
+	 * listen on mailbox command address, and once it receives the wakeup
+	 * command, the CPU associated with the given apicid will be booted.
+	 *
+	 * The value of 'apic_id' and 'wakeup_vector' must be visible to the
+	 * firmware before the wakeup command is visible.  smp_store_release()
+	 * ensures ordering and visibility.
+	 */
+	acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->apic_id	    = apicid;
+	acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->wakeup_vector = start_ip;
+	smp_store_release(&acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->command,
+			  ACPI_MP_WAKE_COMMAND_WAKEUP);
+
+	/*
+	 * Wait for the CPU to wake up.
+	 *
+	 * The CPU being woken up is essentially in a spin loop waiting to be
+	 * woken up. It should not take long for it wake up and acknowledge by
+	 * zeroing out ->command.
+	 *
+	 * ACPI specification doesn't provide any guidance on how long kernel
+	 * has to wait for a wake up acknowledgment. It also doesn't provide
+	 * a way to cancel a wake up request if it takes too long.
+	 *
+	 * In TDX environment, the VMM has control over how long it takes to
+	 * wake up secondary. It can postpone scheduling secondary vCPU
+	 * indefinitely. Giving up on wake up request and reporting error opens
+	 * possible attack vector for VMM: it can wake up a secondary CPU when
+	 * kernel doesn't expect it. Wait until positive result of the wake up
+	 * request.
+	 */
+	while (READ_ONCE(acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->command))
+		cpu_relax();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void acpi_mp_disable_offlining(struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup *mp_wake)
+{
+	cpu_hotplug_disable_offlining();
+
+	/*
+	 * ACPI MADT doesn't allow to offline a CPU after it was onlined. This
+	 * limits kexec: the second kernel won't be able to use more than one CPU.
+	 *
+	 * To prevent a kexec kernel from onlining secondary CPUs invalidate the
+	 * mailbox address in the ACPI MADT wakeup structure which prevents a
+	 * kexec kernel to use it.
+	 *
+	 * This is safe as the booting kernel has the mailbox address cached
+	 * already and acpi_wakeup_cpu() uses the cached value to bring up the
+	 * secondary CPUs.
+	 *
+	 * Note: This is a Linux specific convention and not covered by the
+	 *       ACPI specification.
+	 */
+	mp_wake->mailbox_address = 0;
+}
+
+int __init acpi_parse_mp_wake(union acpi_subtable_headers *header,
+			      const unsigned long end)
+{
+	struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup *mp_wake;
+
+	mp_wake = (struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup *)header;
+
+	/*
+	 * Cannot use the standard BAD_MADT_ENTRY() to sanity check the @mp_wake
+	 * entry.  'sizeof (struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup)' can be larger
+	 * than the actual size of the MP wakeup entry in ACPI table because the
+	 * 'reset_vector' is only available in the V1 MP wakeup structure.
+	 */
+	if (!mp_wake)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (end - (unsigned long)mp_wake < ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_SIZE_V0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (mp_wake->header.length < ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_SIZE_V0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	acpi_table_print_madt_entry(&header->common);
+
+	acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr = mp_wake->mailbox_address;
+
+	if (mp_wake->version >= ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_VERSION_V1 &&
+	    mp_wake->header.length >= ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_SIZE_V1) {
+		if (acpi_mp_setup_reset(mp_wake->reset_vector)) {
+			pr_warn("Failed to setup MADT reset vector\n");
+			acpi_mp_disable_offlining(mp_wake);
+		}
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * CPU offlining requires version 1 of the ACPI MADT wakeup
+		 * structure.
+		 */
+		acpi_mp_disable_offlining(mp_wake);
+	}
+
+	apic_update_callback(wakeup_secondary_cpu_64, acpi_wakeup_cpu);
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/pseudo_lock.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/pseudo_lock.c
index aacf236dfe3b..1bbfd3c1e300 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/pseudo_lock.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/pseudo_lock.c
@@ -292,9 +292,8 @@ static void pseudo_lock_region_clear(struct pseudo_lock_region *plr)
  */
 static int pseudo_lock_region_init(struct pseudo_lock_region *plr)
 {
-	struct cpu_cacheinfo *ci;
+	struct cacheinfo *ci;
 	int ret;
-	int i;
 
 	/* Pick the first cpu we find that is associated with the cache. */
 	plr->cpu = cpumask_first(&plr->d->cpu_mask);
@@ -306,15 +305,11 @@ static int pseudo_lock_region_init(struct pseudo_lock_region *plr)
 		goto out_region;
 	}
 
-	ci = get_cpu_cacheinfo(plr->cpu);
-
-	plr->size = rdtgroup_cbm_to_size(plr->s->res, plr->d, plr->cbm);
-
-	for (i = 0; i < ci->num_leaves; i++) {
-		if (ci->info_list[i].level == plr->s->res->cache_level) {
-			plr->line_size = ci->info_list[i].coherency_line_size;
-			return 0;
-		}
+	ci = get_cpu_cacheinfo_level(plr->cpu, plr->s->res->cache_level);
+	if (ci) {
+		plr->line_size = ci->coherency_line_size;
+		plr->size = rdtgroup_cbm_to_size(plr->s->res, plr->d, plr->cbm);
+		return 0;
 	}
 
 	ret = -1;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
index 02f213f1c51c..cb68a121dabb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
@@ -1450,18 +1450,14 @@ out:
 unsigned int rdtgroup_cbm_to_size(struct rdt_resource *r,
 				  struct rdt_domain *d, unsigned long cbm)
 {
-	struct cpu_cacheinfo *ci;
 	unsigned int size = 0;
-	int num_b, i;
+	struct cacheinfo *ci;
+	int num_b;
 
 	num_b = bitmap_weight(&cbm, r->cache.cbm_len);
-	ci = get_cpu_cacheinfo(cpumask_any(&d->cpu_mask));
-	for (i = 0; i < ci->num_leaves; i++) {
-		if (ci->info_list[i].level == r->cache_level) {
-			size = ci->info_list[i].size / r->cache.cbm_len * num_b;
-			break;
-		}
-	}
+	ci = get_cpu_cacheinfo_level(cpumask_any(&d->cpu_mask), r->cache_level);
+	if (ci)
+		size = ci->size / r->cache.cbm_len * num_b;
 
 	return size;
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
index f06501445cd9..340af8155658 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
@@ -128,6 +128,18 @@ void native_machine_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs)
 #ifdef CONFIG_HPET_TIMER
 	hpet_disable();
 #endif
+
+	/*
+	 * Non-crash kexec calls enc_kexec_begin() while scheduling is still
+	 * active. This allows the callback to wait until all in-flight
+	 * shared<->private conversions are complete. In a crash scenario,
+	 * enc_kexec_begin() gets called after all but one CPU have been shut
+	 * down and interrupts have been disabled. This allows the callback to
+	 * detect a race with the conversion and report it.
+	 */
+	x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_begin();
+	x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_finish();
+
 	crash_save_cpu(regs, safe_smp_processor_id());
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c b/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c
index 68b09f718f10..4893d30ce438 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c
@@ -828,7 +828,7 @@ u64 __init e820__memblock_alloc_reserved(u64 size, u64 align)
 /*
  * Find the highest page frame number we have available
  */
-static unsigned long __init e820_end_pfn(unsigned long limit_pfn, enum e820_type type)
+static unsigned long __init e820__end_ram_pfn(unsigned long limit_pfn)
 {
 	int i;
 	unsigned long last_pfn = 0;
@@ -839,7 +839,8 @@ static unsigned long __init e820_end_pfn(unsigned long limit_pfn, enum e820_type
 		unsigned long start_pfn;
 		unsigned long end_pfn;
 
-		if (entry->type != type)
+		if (entry->type != E820_TYPE_RAM &&
+		    entry->type != E820_TYPE_ACPI)
 			continue;
 
 		start_pfn = entry->addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
@@ -865,12 +866,12 @@ static unsigned long __init e820_end_pfn(unsigned long limit_pfn, enum e820_type
 
 unsigned long __init e820__end_of_ram_pfn(void)
 {
-	return e820_end_pfn(MAX_ARCH_PFN, E820_TYPE_RAM);
+	return e820__end_ram_pfn(MAX_ARCH_PFN);
 }
 
 unsigned long __init e820__end_of_low_ram_pfn(void)
 {
-	return e820_end_pfn(1UL << (32 - PAGE_SHIFT), E820_TYPE_RAM);
+	return e820__end_ram_pfn(1UL << (32 - PAGE_SHIFT));
 }
 
 static void __init early_panic(char *msg)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index b8441147eb5e..f63f8fd00a91 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -835,6 +835,13 @@ void __noreturn stop_this_cpu(void *dummy)
 	 */
 	cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, &cpus_stop_mask);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+	if (smp_ops.stop_this_cpu) {
+		smp_ops.stop_this_cpu();
+		unreachable();
+	}
+#endif
+
 	for (;;) {
 		/*
 		 * Use native_halt() so that memory contents don't change
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
index f3130f762784..0e0a4cf6b5eb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <linux/objtool.h>
 #include <linux/pgtable.h>
+#include <linux/kexec.h>
 #include <acpi/reboot.h>
 #include <asm/io.h>
 #include <asm/apic.h>
@@ -716,6 +717,14 @@ static void native_machine_emergency_restart(void)
 
 void native_machine_shutdown(void)
 {
+	/*
+	 * Call enc_kexec_begin() while all CPUs are still active and
+	 * interrupts are enabled. This will allow all in-flight memory
+	 * conversions to finish cleanly.
+	 */
+	if (kexec_in_progress)
+		x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_begin();
+
 	/* Stop the cpus and apics */
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_IO_APIC
 	/*
@@ -752,6 +761,9 @@ void native_machine_shutdown(void)
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 	x86_platform.iommu_shutdown();
 #endif
+
+	if (kexec_in_progress)
+		x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_finish();
 }
 
 static void __machine_emergency_restart(int emergency)
@@ -868,6 +880,12 @@ static int crash_nmi_callback(unsigned int val, struct pt_regs *regs)
 	cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization();
 
 	atomic_dec(&waiting_for_crash_ipi);
+
+	if (smp_ops.stop_this_cpu) {
+		smp_ops.stop_this_cpu();
+		unreachable();
+	}
+
 	/* Assume hlt works */
 	halt();
 	for (;;)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S
index 56cab1bb25f5..042c9a0334e9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@
  */
 
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <linux/stringify.h>
+#include <asm/alternative.h>
 #include <asm/page_types.h>
 #include <asm/kexec.h>
 #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
@@ -145,16 +147,15 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped)
 	 * Set cr4 to a known state:
 	 *  - physical address extension enabled
 	 *  - 5-level paging, if it was enabled before
+	 *  - Machine check exception on TDX guest, if it was enabled before.
+	 *    Clearing MCE might not be allowed in TDX guests, depending on setup.
+	 *
+	 * Use R13 that contains the original CR4 value, read in relocate_kernel().
+	 * PAE is always set in the original CR4.
 	 */
-	movl	$X86_CR4_PAE, %eax
-	testq	$X86_CR4_LA57, %r13
-	jz	1f
-	orl	$X86_CR4_LA57, %eax
-1:
-	movq	%rax, %cr4
-
-	jmp 1f
-1:
+	andl	$(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_LA57), %r13d
+	ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(orl $X86_CR4_MCE, %r13d), X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST
+	movq	%r13, %cr4
 
 	/* Flush the TLB (needed?) */
 	movq	%r9, %cr3
@@ -165,9 +166,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped)
 	 * used by kexec. Flush the caches before copying the kernel.
 	 */
 	testq	%r12, %r12
-	jz 1f
+	jz .Lsme_off
 	wbinvd
-1:
+.Lsme_off:
 
 	movq	%rcx, %r11
 	call	swap_pages
@@ -187,7 +188,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped)
 	 */
 
 	testq	%r11, %r11
-	jnz 1f
+	jnz .Lrelocate
 	xorl	%eax, %eax
 	xorl	%ebx, %ebx
 	xorl    %ecx, %ecx
@@ -208,7 +209,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped)
 	ret
 	int3
 
-1:
+.Lrelocate:
 	popq	%rdx
 	leaq	PAGE_SIZE(%r10), %rsp
 	ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
index d5dc5a92635a..82b128d3f309 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c
@@ -134,10 +134,12 @@ struct x86_cpuinit_ops x86_cpuinit = {
 
 static void default_nmi_init(void) { };
 
-static bool enc_status_change_prepare_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) { return true; }
-static bool enc_status_change_finish_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) { return true; }
+static int enc_status_change_prepare_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) { return 0; }
+static int enc_status_change_finish_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc) { return 0; }
 static bool enc_tlb_flush_required_noop(bool enc) { return false; }
 static bool enc_cache_flush_required_noop(void) { return false; }
+static void enc_kexec_begin_noop(void) {}
+static void enc_kexec_finish_noop(void) {}
 static bool is_private_mmio_noop(u64 addr) {return false; }
 
 struct x86_platform_ops x86_platform __ro_after_init = {
@@ -161,6 +163,8 @@ struct x86_platform_ops x86_platform __ro_after_init = {
 		.enc_status_change_finish  = enc_status_change_finish_noop,
 		.enc_tlb_flush_required	   = enc_tlb_flush_required_noop,
 		.enc_cache_flush_required  = enc_cache_flush_required_noop,
+		.enc_kexec_begin	   = enc_kexec_begin_noop,
+		.enc_kexec_finish	   = enc_kexec_finish_noop,
 	},
 };
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c b/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c
index 968d7005f4a7..c45127265f2f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c
@@ -4,6 +4,79 @@
  * included by both the compressed kernel and the regular kernel.
  */
 
+static void free_pte(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pmd_t *pmd)
+{
+	pte_t *pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, 0);
+
+	info->free_pgt_page(pte, info->context);
+}
+
+static void free_pmd(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pud_t *pud)
+{
+	pmd_t *pmd = pmd_offset(pud, 0);
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PMD; i++) {
+		if (!pmd_present(pmd[i]))
+			continue;
+
+		if (pmd_leaf(pmd[i]))
+			continue;
+
+		free_pte(info, &pmd[i]);
+	}
+
+	info->free_pgt_page(pmd, info->context);
+}
+
+static void free_pud(struct x86_mapping_info *info, p4d_t *p4d)
+{
+	pud_t *pud = pud_offset(p4d, 0);
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PUD; i++) {
+		if (!pud_present(pud[i]))
+			continue;
+
+		if (pud_leaf(pud[i]))
+			continue;
+
+		free_pmd(info, &pud[i]);
+	}
+
+	info->free_pgt_page(pud, info->context);
+}
+
+static void free_p4d(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pgd_t *pgd)
+{
+	p4d_t *p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, 0);
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_P4D; i++) {
+		if (!p4d_present(p4d[i]))
+			continue;
+
+		free_pud(info, &p4d[i]);
+	}
+
+	if (pgtable_l5_enabled())
+		info->free_pgt_page(p4d, info->context);
+}
+
+void kernel_ident_mapping_free(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pgd_t *pgd)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PGD; i++) {
+		if (!pgd_present(pgd[i]))
+			continue;
+
+		free_p4d(info, &pgd[i]);
+	}
+
+	info->free_pgt_page(pgd, info->context);
+}
+
 static void ident_pmd_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pmd_t *pmd_page,
 			   unsigned long addr, unsigned long end)
 {
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
index 7e177856ee4f..28002cc7a37d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
@@ -469,7 +469,9 @@ phys_pte_init(pte_t *pte_page, unsigned long paddr, unsigned long paddr_end,
 			    !e820__mapped_any(paddr & PAGE_MASK, paddr_next,
 					     E820_TYPE_RAM) &&
 			    !e820__mapped_any(paddr & PAGE_MASK, paddr_next,
-					     E820_TYPE_RESERVED_KERN))
+					     E820_TYPE_RESERVED_KERN) &&
+			    !e820__mapped_any(paddr & PAGE_MASK, paddr_next,
+					     E820_TYPE_ACPI))
 				set_pte_init(pte, __pte(0), init);
 			continue;
 		}
@@ -524,7 +526,9 @@ phys_pmd_init(pmd_t *pmd_page, unsigned long paddr, unsigned long paddr_end,
 			    !e820__mapped_any(paddr & PMD_MASK, paddr_next,
 					     E820_TYPE_RAM) &&
 			    !e820__mapped_any(paddr & PMD_MASK, paddr_next,
-					     E820_TYPE_RESERVED_KERN))
+					     E820_TYPE_RESERVED_KERN) &&
+			    !e820__mapped_any(paddr & PMD_MASK, paddr_next,
+					     E820_TYPE_ACPI))
 				set_pmd_init(pmd, __pmd(0), init);
 			continue;
 		}
@@ -611,7 +615,9 @@ phys_pud_init(pud_t *pud_page, unsigned long paddr, unsigned long paddr_end,
 			    !e820__mapped_any(paddr & PUD_MASK, paddr_next,
 					     E820_TYPE_RAM) &&
 			    !e820__mapped_any(paddr & PUD_MASK, paddr_next,
-					     E820_TYPE_RESERVED_KERN))
+					     E820_TYPE_RESERVED_KERN) &&
+			    !e820__mapped_any(paddr & PUD_MASK, paddr_next,
+					     E820_TYPE_ACPI))
 				set_pud_init(pud, __pud(0), init);
 			continue;
 		}
@@ -698,7 +704,9 @@ phys_p4d_init(p4d_t *p4d_page, unsigned long paddr, unsigned long paddr_end,
 			    !e820__mapped_any(paddr & P4D_MASK, paddr_next,
 					     E820_TYPE_RAM) &&
 			    !e820__mapped_any(paddr & P4D_MASK, paddr_next,
-					     E820_TYPE_RESERVED_KERN))
+					     E820_TYPE_RESERVED_KERN) &&
+			    !e820__mapped_any(paddr & P4D_MASK, paddr_next,
+					     E820_TYPE_ACPI))
 				set_p4d_init(p4d, __p4d(0), init);
 			continue;
 		}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
index 422602f6039b..e7b67519ddb5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ static void enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size, bool enc)
 #endif
 }
 
-static bool amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
+static int amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
 {
 	/*
 	 * To maintain the security guarantees of SEV-SNP guests, make sure
@@ -292,11 +292,11 @@ static bool amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool
 	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP) && !enc)
 		snp_set_memory_shared(vaddr, npages);
 
-	return true;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /* Return true unconditionally: return value doesn't matter for the SEV side */
-static bool amd_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
+static int amd_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)
 {
 	/*
 	 * After memory is mapped encrypted in the page table, validate it
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ static bool amd_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool e
 	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 		enc_dec_hypercall(vaddr, npages << PAGE_SHIFT, enc);
 
-	return true;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static void __init __set_clr_pte_enc(pte_t *kpte, int level, bool enc)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
index 19fdfbb171ed..443a97e515c0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c
@@ -662,8 +662,9 @@ static inline pgprot_t verify_rwx(pgprot_t old, pgprot_t new, unsigned long star
 
 /*
  * Lookup the page table entry for a virtual address in a specific pgd.
- * Return a pointer to the entry, the level of the mapping, and the effective
- * NX and RW bits of all page table levels.
+ * Return a pointer to the entry (or NULL if the entry does not exist),
+ * the level of the entry, and the effective NX and RW bits of all
+ * page table levels.
  */
 pte_t *lookup_address_in_pgd_attr(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long address,
 				  unsigned int *level, bool *nx, bool *rw)
@@ -672,13 +673,14 @@ pte_t *lookup_address_in_pgd_attr(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long address,
 	pud_t *pud;
 	pmd_t *pmd;
 
-	*level = PG_LEVEL_NONE;
+	*level = PG_LEVEL_256T;
 	*nx = false;
 	*rw = true;
 
 	if (pgd_none(*pgd))
 		return NULL;
 
+	*level = PG_LEVEL_512G;
 	*nx |= pgd_flags(*pgd) & _PAGE_NX;
 	*rw &= pgd_flags(*pgd) & _PAGE_RW;
 
@@ -686,10 +688,10 @@ pte_t *lookup_address_in_pgd_attr(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long address,
 	if (p4d_none(*p4d))
 		return NULL;
 
-	*level = PG_LEVEL_512G;
 	if (p4d_leaf(*p4d) || !p4d_present(*p4d))
 		return (pte_t *)p4d;
 
+	*level = PG_LEVEL_1G;
 	*nx |= p4d_flags(*p4d) & _PAGE_NX;
 	*rw &= p4d_flags(*p4d) & _PAGE_RW;
 
@@ -697,10 +699,10 @@ pte_t *lookup_address_in_pgd_attr(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long address,
 	if (pud_none(*pud))
 		return NULL;
 
-	*level = PG_LEVEL_1G;
 	if (pud_leaf(*pud) || !pud_present(*pud))
 		return (pte_t *)pud;
 
+	*level = PG_LEVEL_2M;
 	*nx |= pud_flags(*pud) & _PAGE_NX;
 	*rw &= pud_flags(*pud) & _PAGE_RW;
 
@@ -708,15 +710,13 @@ pte_t *lookup_address_in_pgd_attr(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long address,
 	if (pmd_none(*pmd))
 		return NULL;
 
-	*level = PG_LEVEL_2M;
 	if (pmd_leaf(*pmd) || !pmd_present(*pmd))
 		return (pte_t *)pmd;
 
+	*level = PG_LEVEL_4K;
 	*nx |= pmd_flags(*pmd) & _PAGE_NX;
 	*rw &= pmd_flags(*pmd) & _PAGE_RW;
 
-	*level = PG_LEVEL_4K;
-
 	return pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address);
 }
 
@@ -736,9 +736,8 @@ pte_t *lookup_address_in_pgd(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long address,
  * Lookup the page table entry for a virtual address. Return a pointer
  * to the entry and the level of the mapping.
  *
- * Note: We return pud and pmd either when the entry is marked large
- * or when the present bit is not set. Otherwise we would return a
- * pointer to a nonexisting mapping.
+ * Note: the function returns p4d, pud or pmd either when the entry is marked
+ * large or when the present bit is not set. Otherwise it returns NULL.
  */
 pte_t *lookup_address(unsigned long address, unsigned int *level)
 {
@@ -2196,7 +2195,8 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
 		cpa_flush(&cpa, x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required());
 
 	/* Notify hypervisor that we are about to set/clr encryption attribute. */
-	if (!x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare(addr, numpages, enc))
+	ret = x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare(addr, numpages, enc);
+	if (ret)
 		goto vmm_fail;
 
 	ret = __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, 1);
@@ -2214,24 +2214,61 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
 		return ret;
 
 	/* Notify hypervisor that we have successfully set/clr encryption attribute. */
-	if (!x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish(addr, numpages, enc))
+	ret = x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish(addr, numpages, enc);
+	if (ret)
 		goto vmm_fail;
 
 	return 0;
 
 vmm_fail:
-	WARN_ONCE(1, "CPA VMM failure to convert memory (addr=%p, numpages=%d) to %s.\n",
-		  (void *)addr, numpages, enc ? "private" : "shared");
+	WARN_ONCE(1, "CPA VMM failure to convert memory (addr=%p, numpages=%d) to %s: %d\n",
+		  (void *)addr, numpages, enc ? "private" : "shared", ret);
 
-	return -EIO;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The lock serializes conversions between private and shared memory.
+ *
+ * It is taken for read on conversion. A write lock guarantees that no
+ * concurrent conversions are in progress.
+ */
+static DECLARE_RWSEM(mem_enc_lock);
+
+/*
+ * Stop new private<->shared conversions.
+ *
+ * Taking the exclusive mem_enc_lock waits for in-flight conversions to complete.
+ * The lock is not released to prevent new conversions from being started.
+ */
+bool set_memory_enc_stop_conversion(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * In a crash scenario, sleep is not allowed. Try to take the lock.
+	 * Failure indicates that there is a race with the conversion.
+	 */
+	if (oops_in_progress)
+		return down_write_trylock(&mem_enc_lock);
+
+	down_write(&mem_enc_lock);
+
+	return true;
 }
 
 static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
 {
-	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT))
-		return __set_memory_enc_pgtable(addr, numpages, enc);
+	int ret = 0;
 
-	return 0;
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
+		if (!down_read_trylock(&mem_enc_lock))
+			return -EBUSY;
+
+		ret = __set_memory_enc_pgtable(addr, numpages, enc);
+
+		up_read(&mem_enc_lock);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 int set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/tables.c b/drivers/acpi/tables.c
index b976e5fc3fbc..9e1b01c35070 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/tables.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/tables.c
@@ -198,6 +198,20 @@ void acpi_table_print_madt_entry(struct acpi_subtable_header *header)
 		}
 		break;
 
+	case ACPI_MADT_TYPE_MULTIPROC_WAKEUP:
+		{
+			struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup *p =
+				(struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup *)header;
+			u64 reset_vector = 0;
+
+			if (p->version >= ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_VERSION_V1)
+				reset_vector = p->reset_vector;
+
+			pr_debug("MP Wakeup (version[%d], mailbox[%#llx], reset[%#llx])\n",
+				 p->version, p->mailbox_address, reset_vector);
+		}
+		break;
+
 	case ACPI_MADT_TYPE_CORE_PIC:
 		{
 			struct acpi_madt_core_pic *p = (struct acpi_madt_core_pic *)header;
diff --git a/include/acpi/actbl2.h b/include/acpi/actbl2.h
index ae747c89d92c..e27958ef8264 100644
--- a/include/acpi/actbl2.h
+++ b/include/acpi/actbl2.h
@@ -1194,11 +1194,23 @@ struct acpi_madt_generic_translator {
 
 struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup {
 	struct acpi_subtable_header header;
-	u16 mailbox_version;
+	u16 version;
 	u32 reserved;		/* reserved - must be zero */
-	u64 base_address;
+	u64 mailbox_address;
+	u64 reset_vector;
 };
 
+/* Values for Version field above */
+
+enum acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup_version {
+	ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_VERSION_NONE = 0,
+	ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_VERSION_V1 = 1,
+	ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_VERSION_RESERVED = 2, /* 2 and greater are reserved */
+};
+
+#define ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_SIZE_V0	16
+#define ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_SIZE_V1	24
+
 #define ACPI_MULTIPROC_WAKEUP_MB_OS_SIZE        2032
 #define ACPI_MULTIPROC_WAKEUP_MB_FIRMWARE_SIZE  2048
 
@@ -1211,7 +1223,8 @@ struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup_mailbox {
 	u8 reserved_firmware[ACPI_MULTIPROC_WAKEUP_MB_FIRMWARE_SIZE];	/* reserved for firmware use */
 };
 
-#define ACPI_MP_WAKE_COMMAND_WAKEUP    1
+#define ACPI_MP_WAKE_COMMAND_WAKEUP	1
+#define ACPI_MP_WAKE_COMMAND_TEST	2
 
 /* 17: CPU Core Interrupt Controller (ACPI 6.5) */
 
diff --git a/include/linux/cacheinfo.h b/include/linux/cacheinfo.h
index 2cb15fe4fe12..3dde175f4108 100644
--- a/include/linux/cacheinfo.h
+++ b/include/linux/cacheinfo.h
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 #define _LINUX_CACHEINFO_H
 
 #include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/cpuhplock.h>
 #include <linux/cpumask.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 
@@ -112,24 +113,38 @@ int acpi_get_cache_info(unsigned int cpu,
 
 const struct attribute_group *cache_get_priv_group(struct cacheinfo *this_leaf);
 
+/*
+ * Get the cacheinfo structure for the cache associated with @cpu at
+ * level @level.
+ * cpuhp lock must be held.
+ */
+static inline struct cacheinfo *get_cpu_cacheinfo_level(int cpu, int level)
+{
+	struct cpu_cacheinfo *ci = get_cpu_cacheinfo(cpu);
+	int i;
+
+	lockdep_assert_cpus_held();
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ci->num_leaves; i++) {
+		if (ci->info_list[i].level == level) {
+			if (ci->info_list[i].attributes & CACHE_ID)
+				return &ci->info_list[i];
+			return NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
 /*
  * Get the id of the cache associated with @cpu at level @level.
  * cpuhp lock must be held.
  */
 static inline int get_cpu_cacheinfo_id(int cpu, int level)
 {
-	struct cpu_cacheinfo *ci = get_cpu_cacheinfo(cpu);
-	int i;
+	struct cacheinfo *ci = get_cpu_cacheinfo_level(cpu, level);
 
-	for (i = 0; i < ci->num_leaves; i++) {
-		if (ci->info_list[i].level == level) {
-			if (ci->info_list[i].attributes & CACHE_ID)
-				return ci->info_list[i].id;
-			return -1;
-		}
-	}
-
-	return -1;
+	return ci ? ci->id : -1;
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64
diff --git a/include/linux/cc_platform.h b/include/linux/cc_platform.h
index 60693a145894..caa4b4430634 100644
--- a/include/linux/cc_platform.h
+++ b/include/linux/cc_platform.h
@@ -81,16 +81,6 @@ enum cc_attr {
 	 */
 	CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP,
 
-	/**
-	 * @CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED: Hotplug is not supported or disabled.
-	 *
-	 * The platform/OS is running as a guest/virtual machine does not
-	 * support CPU hotplug feature.
-	 *
-	 * Examples include TDX Guest.
-	 */
-	CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED,
-
 	/**
 	 * @CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP: AMD SNP enabled on the host.
 	 *
diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h
index 861c3bfc5f17..a8926d0a28cd 100644
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
 #include <linux/cpumask.h>
 #include <linux/cpuhotplug.h>
+#include <linux/cpuhplock.h>
 #include <linux/cpu_smt.h>
 
 struct device;
@@ -132,38 +133,6 @@ static inline int add_cpu(unsigned int cpu) { return 0;}
 #endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
 extern const struct bus_type cpu_subsys;
 
-extern int lockdep_is_cpus_held(void);
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU
-extern void cpus_write_lock(void);
-extern void cpus_write_unlock(void);
-extern void cpus_read_lock(void);
-extern void cpus_read_unlock(void);
-extern int  cpus_read_trylock(void);
-extern void lockdep_assert_cpus_held(void);
-extern void cpu_hotplug_disable(void);
-extern void cpu_hotplug_enable(void);
-void clear_tasks_mm_cpumask(int cpu);
-int remove_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
-int cpu_device_down(struct device *dev);
-extern void smp_shutdown_nonboot_cpus(unsigned int primary_cpu);
-
-#else /* CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU */
-
-static inline void cpus_write_lock(void) { }
-static inline void cpus_write_unlock(void) { }
-static inline void cpus_read_lock(void) { }
-static inline void cpus_read_unlock(void) { }
-static inline int  cpus_read_trylock(void) { return true; }
-static inline void lockdep_assert_cpus_held(void) { }
-static inline void cpu_hotplug_disable(void) { }
-static inline void cpu_hotplug_enable(void) { }
-static inline int remove_cpu(unsigned int cpu) { return -EPERM; }
-static inline void smp_shutdown_nonboot_cpus(unsigned int primary_cpu) { }
-#endif	/* !CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU */
-
-DEFINE_LOCK_GUARD_0(cpus_read_lock, cpus_read_lock(), cpus_read_unlock())
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP_SMP
 extern int freeze_secondary_cpus(int primary);
 extern void thaw_secondary_cpus(void);
diff --git a/include/linux/cpuhplock.h b/include/linux/cpuhplock.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f7aa20f62b87
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/cpuhplock.h
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * include/linux/cpuhplock.h - CPU hotplug locking
+ *
+ * Locking functions for CPU hotplug.
+ */
+#ifndef _LINUX_CPUHPLOCK_H_
+#define _LINUX_CPUHPLOCK_H_
+
+#include <linux/cleanup.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+
+struct device;
+
+extern int lockdep_is_cpus_held(void);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU
+void cpus_write_lock(void);
+void cpus_write_unlock(void);
+void cpus_read_lock(void);
+void cpus_read_unlock(void);
+int  cpus_read_trylock(void);
+void lockdep_assert_cpus_held(void);
+void cpu_hotplug_disable_offlining(void);
+void cpu_hotplug_disable(void);
+void cpu_hotplug_enable(void);
+void clear_tasks_mm_cpumask(int cpu);
+int remove_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
+int cpu_device_down(struct device *dev);
+void smp_shutdown_nonboot_cpus(unsigned int primary_cpu);
+
+#else /* CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU */
+
+static inline void cpus_write_lock(void) { }
+static inline void cpus_write_unlock(void) { }
+static inline void cpus_read_lock(void) { }
+static inline void cpus_read_unlock(void) { }
+static inline int  cpus_read_trylock(void) { return true; }
+static inline void lockdep_assert_cpus_held(void) { }
+static inline void cpu_hotplug_disable_offlining(void) { }
+static inline void cpu_hotplug_disable(void) { }
+static inline void cpu_hotplug_enable(void) { }
+static inline int remove_cpu(unsigned int cpu) { return -EPERM; }
+static inline void smp_shutdown_nonboot_cpus(unsigned int primary_cpu) { }
+#endif	/* !CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU */
+
+DEFINE_LOCK_GUARD_0(cpus_read_lock, cpus_read_lock(), cpus_read_unlock())
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_CPUHPLOCK_H_ */
diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c
index 5123121b1c48..1209ddaec026 100644
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -483,6 +483,8 @@ static int cpu_hotplug_disabled;
 
 DEFINE_STATIC_PERCPU_RWSEM(cpu_hotplug_lock);
 
+static bool cpu_hotplug_offline_disabled __ro_after_init;
+
 void cpus_read_lock(void)
 {
 	percpu_down_read(&cpu_hotplug_lock);
@@ -542,6 +544,14 @@ static void lockdep_release_cpus_lock(void)
 	rwsem_release(&cpu_hotplug_lock.dep_map, _THIS_IP_);
 }
 
+/* Declare CPU offlining not supported */
+void cpu_hotplug_disable_offlining(void)
+{
+	cpu_maps_update_begin();
+	cpu_hotplug_offline_disabled = true;
+	cpu_maps_update_done();
+}
+
 /*
  * Wait for currently running CPU hotplug operations to complete (if any) and
  * disable future CPU hotplug (from sysfs). The 'cpu_add_remove_lock' protects
@@ -1471,7 +1481,7 @@ static int cpu_down_maps_locked(unsigned int cpu, enum cpuhp_state target)
 	 * If the platform does not support hotplug, report it explicitly to
 	 * differentiate it from a transient offlining failure.
 	 */
-	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED))
+	if (cpu_hotplug_offline_disabled)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	if (cpu_hotplug_disabled)
 		return -EBUSY;