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Merge branch 'for-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bluetooth/bluetooth
This commit is contained in:
commit
8b87efba61
@ -90,7 +90,6 @@ static const struct usb_device_id ath3k_table[] = {
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{ USB_DEVICE(0x0b05, 0x17d0) },
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{ USB_DEVICE(0x0CF3, 0x0036) },
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{ USB_DEVICE(0x0CF3, 0x3004) },
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{ USB_DEVICE(0x0CF3, 0x3005) },
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{ USB_DEVICE(0x0CF3, 0x3008) },
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{ USB_DEVICE(0x0CF3, 0x311D) },
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{ USB_DEVICE(0x0CF3, 0x311E) },
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@ -140,7 +139,6 @@ static const struct usb_device_id ath3k_blist_tbl[] = {
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{ USB_DEVICE(0x0b05, 0x17d0), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 },
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{ USB_DEVICE(0x0CF3, 0x0036), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 },
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{ USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0x3004), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 },
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{ USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0x3005), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 },
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{ USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0x3008), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 },
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{ USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0x311D), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 },
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{ USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0x311E), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 },
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@ -162,7 +162,6 @@ static const struct usb_device_id blacklist_table[] = {
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{ USB_DEVICE(0x0b05, 0x17d0), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 },
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{ USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0x0036), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 },
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{ USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0x3004), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 },
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{ USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0x3005), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 },
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{ USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0x3008), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 },
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{ USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0x311d), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 },
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{ USB_DEVICE(0x0cf3, 0x311e), .driver_info = BTUSB_ATH3012 },
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@ -406,6 +406,7 @@ static int h5_rx_3wire_hdr(struct hci_uart *hu, unsigned char c)
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H5_HDR_PKT_TYPE(hdr) != HCI_3WIRE_LINK_PKT) {
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BT_ERR("Non-link packet received in non-active state");
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h5_reset_rx(h5);
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return 0;
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}
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h5->rx_func = h5_rx_payload;
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@ -289,10 +289,20 @@ static void hci_conn_timeout(struct work_struct *work)
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{
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struct hci_conn *conn = container_of(work, struct hci_conn,
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disc_work.work);
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int refcnt = atomic_read(&conn->refcnt);
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BT_DBG("hcon %p state %s", conn, state_to_string(conn->state));
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if (atomic_read(&conn->refcnt))
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WARN_ON(refcnt < 0);
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/* FIXME: It was observed that in pairing failed scenario, refcnt
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* drops below 0. Probably this is because l2cap_conn_del calls
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* l2cap_chan_del for each channel, and inside l2cap_chan_del conn is
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* dropped. After that loop hci_chan_del is called which also drops
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* conn. For now make sure that ACL is alive if refcnt is higher then 0,
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* otherwise drop it.
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*/
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if (refcnt > 0)
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return;
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switch (conn->state) {
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@ -385,6 +385,16 @@ static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = {
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{ CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP },
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};
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static u8 get_auth_method(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
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{
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/* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST WORKS */
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if (local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY ||
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remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY)
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return JUST_WORKS;
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return gen_method[remote_io][local_io];
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}
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static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
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u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
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{
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@ -401,14 +411,11 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
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BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io);
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/* If neither side wants MITM, use JUST WORKS */
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/* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST WORKS */
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/* Otherwise, look up method from the table */
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if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM) ||
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local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY ||
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remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY)
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if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM))
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method = JUST_WORKS;
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else
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method = gen_method[remote_io][local_io];
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method = get_auth_method(smp, local_io, remote_io);
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/* If not bonding, don't ask user to confirm a Zero TK */
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if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING) && method == JUST_CFM)
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@ -669,7 +676,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
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{
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struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
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struct smp_chan *smp;
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u8 key_size, auth;
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u8 key_size, auth, sec_level;
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int ret;
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BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
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@ -695,7 +702,19 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
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/* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
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auth = req->auth_req;
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conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
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sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
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if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level)
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conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
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/* If we need MITM check that it can be acheived */
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if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
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u8 method;
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method = get_auth_method(smp, conn->hcon->io_capability,
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req->io_capability);
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if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
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return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
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}
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build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
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@ -743,6 +762,16 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
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if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
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return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
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/* If we need MITM check that it can be acheived */
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if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
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u8 method;
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method = get_auth_method(smp, req->io_capability,
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rsp->io_capability);
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if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
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return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
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}
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get_random_bytes(smp->prnd, sizeof(smp->prnd));
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smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
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@ -838,6 +867,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
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struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
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struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
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struct smp_chan *smp;
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u8 sec_level;
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BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
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@ -847,7 +877,9 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
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if (!(conn->hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER))
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return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
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hcon->pending_sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(rp->auth_req);
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sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(rp->auth_req);
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if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
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hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
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if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
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return 0;
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@ -901,9 +933,12 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
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if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level))
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return 1;
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if (sec_level > hcon->pending_sec_level)
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hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
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if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER)
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if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, sec_level))
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goto done;
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if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
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return 0;
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if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags))
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return 0;
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@ -918,7 +953,7 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
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* requires it.
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*/
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if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT ||
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sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
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hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
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authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM;
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if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER) {
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@ -937,9 +972,6 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
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set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
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done:
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hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
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return 0;
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}
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