Merge branch 'for-next/pkey-signal' into for-next/core

* for-next/pkey-signal:
  : Bring arm64 pkey signal delivery in line with the x86 behaviour
  selftests/mm: Fix unused function warning for aarch64_write_signal_pkey()
  selftests/mm: Define PKEY_UNRESTRICTED for pkey_sighandler_tests
  selftests/mm: Enable pkey_sighandler_tests on arm64
  selftests/mm: Use generic pkey register manipulation
  arm64: signal: Remove unused macro
  arm64: signal: Remove unnecessary check when saving POE state
  arm64: signal: Improve POR_EL0 handling to avoid uaccess failures
  firmware: arm_sdei: Fix the input parameter of cpuhp_remove_state()
  Revert "kasan: Disable Software Tag-Based KASAN with GCC"
  kasan: Fix Software Tag-Based KASAN with GCC
  kasan: Disable Software Tag-Based KASAN with GCC
  Documentation/protection-keys: add AArch64 to documentation
  arm64: set POR_EL0 for kernel threads

# Conflicts:
#	arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c

Documentation/core-api/protection-keys.rst

@@ -12,7 +12,10 @@ Pkeys Userspace (PKU) is a feature which can be found on:
         * Intel server CPUs, Skylake and later
         * Intel client CPUs, Tiger Lake (11th Gen Core) and later
         * Future AMD CPUs
+        * arm64 CPUs implementing the Permission Overlay Extension (FEAT_S1POE)
 
+x86_64
+======
 Pkeys work by dedicating 4 previously Reserved bits in each page table entry to
 a "protection key", giving 16 possible keys.
 
@@ -28,6 +31,22 @@ register.  The feature is only available in 64-bit mode, even though there is
 theoretically space in the PAE PTEs.  These permissions are enforced on data
 access only and have no effect on instruction fetches.
 
+arm64
+=====
+
+Pkeys use 3 bits in each page table entry, to encode a "protection key index",
+giving 8 possible keys.
+
+Protections for each key are defined with a per-CPU user-writable system
+register (POR_EL0).  This is a 64-bit register encoding read, write and execute
+overlay permissions for each protection key index.
+
+Being a CPU register, POR_EL0 is inherently thread-local, potentially giving
+each thread a different set of protections from every other thread.
+
+Unlike x86_64, the protection key permissions also apply to instruction
+fetches.
+
 Syscalls
 ========
 
@@ -38,11 +57,10 @@ There are 3 system calls which directly interact with pkeys::
 	int pkey_mprotect(unsigned long start, size_t len,
 			  unsigned long prot, int pkey);
 
-Before a pkey can be used, it must first be allocated with
+Before a pkey can be used, it must first be allocated with pkey_alloc().  An
-pkey_alloc().  An application calls the WRPKRU instruction
+application writes to the architecture specific CPU register directly in order
-directly in order to change access permissions to memory covered
+to change access permissions to memory covered with a key.  In this example
-with a key.  In this example WRPKRU is wrapped by a C function
+this is wrapped by a C function called pkey_set().
-called pkey_set().
 ::
 
 	int real_prot = PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE;
@@ -64,9 +82,9 @@ is no longer in use::
 	munmap(ptr, PAGE_SIZE);
 	pkey_free(pkey);
 
-.. note:: pkey_set() is a wrapper for the RDPKRU and WRPKRU instructions.
+.. note:: pkey_set() is a wrapper around writing to the CPU register.
-          An example implementation can be found in
+          Example implementations can be found in
-          tools/testing/selftests/x86/protection_keys.c.
+          tools/testing/selftests/mm/pkey-{arm64,powerpc,x86}.h
 
 Behavior
 ========
@@ -96,3 +114,7 @@ with a read()::
 The kernel will send a SIGSEGV in both cases, but si_code will be set
 to SEGV_PKERR when violating protection keys versus SEGV_ACCERR when
 the plain mprotect() permissions are violated.
+
+Note that kernel accesses from a kthread (such as io_uring) will use a default
+value for the protection key register and so will not be consistent with
+userspace's value of the register or mprotect().

arch/arm64/kernel/process.c

@@ -466,6 +466,9 @@ int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
 
 		p->thread.cpu_context.x19 = (unsigned long)args->fn;
 		p->thread.cpu_context.x20 = (unsigned long)args->fn_arg;
+
+		if (system_supports_poe())
+			p->thread.por_el0 = POR_EL0_INIT;
 	}
 	p->thread.cpu_context.pc = (unsigned long)ret_from_fork;
 	p->thread.cpu_context.sp = (unsigned long)childregs;

arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/ratelimit.h>
 #include <linux/rseq.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/pkeys.h>
 
 #include <asm/daifflags.h>
 #include <asm/debug-monitors.h>
@@ -72,10 +73,62 @@ struct rt_sigframe_user_layout {
 	unsigned long end_offset;
 };
 
-#define BASE_SIGFRAME_SIZE round_up(sizeof(struct rt_sigframe), 16)
+/*
+ * Holds any EL0-controlled state that influences unprivileged memory accesses.
+ * This includes both accesses done in userspace and uaccess done in the kernel.
+ *
+ * This state needs to be carefully managed to ensure that it doesn't cause
+ * uaccess to fail when setting up the signal frame, and the signal handler
+ * itself also expects a well-defined state when entered.
+ */
+struct user_access_state {
+	u64 por_el0;
+};
+
 #define TERMINATOR_SIZE round_up(sizeof(struct _aarch64_ctx), 16)
 #define EXTRA_CONTEXT_SIZE round_up(sizeof(struct extra_context), 16)
 
+/*
+ * Save the user access state into ua_state and reset it to disable any
+ * restrictions.
+ */
+static void save_reset_user_access_state(struct user_access_state *ua_state)
+{
+	if (system_supports_poe()) {
+		u64 por_enable_all = 0;
+
+		for (int pkey = 0; pkey < arch_max_pkey(); pkey++)
+			por_enable_all |= POE_RXW << (pkey * POR_BITS_PER_PKEY);
+
+		ua_state->por_el0 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_POR_EL0);
+		write_sysreg_s(por_enable_all, SYS_POR_EL0);
+		/* Ensure that any subsequent uaccess observes the updated value */
+		isb();
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the user access state for invoking the signal handler.
+ *
+ * No uaccess should be done after that function is called.
+ */
+static void set_handler_user_access_state(void)
+{
+	if (system_supports_poe())
+		write_sysreg_s(POR_EL0_INIT, SYS_POR_EL0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Restore the user access state to the values saved in ua_state.
+ *
+ * No uaccess should be done after that function is called.
+ */
+static void restore_user_access_state(const struct user_access_state *ua_state)
+{
+	if (system_supports_poe())
+		write_sysreg_s(ua_state->por_el0, SYS_POR_EL0);
+}
+
 static void init_user_layout(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user)
 {
 	const size_t reserved_size =
@@ -269,18 +322,20 @@ static int restore_fpmr_context(struct user_ctxs *user)
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int preserve_poe_context(struct poe_context __user *ctx)
+static int preserve_poe_context(struct poe_context __user *ctx,
+				const struct user_access_state *ua_state)
 {
 	int err = 0;
 
 	__put_user_error(POE_MAGIC, &ctx->head.magic, err);
 	__put_user_error(sizeof(*ctx), &ctx->head.size, err);
-	__put_user_error(read_sysreg_s(SYS_POR_EL0), &ctx->por_el0, err);
+	__put_user_error(ua_state->por_el0, &ctx->por_el0, err);
 
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int restore_poe_context(struct user_ctxs *user)
+static int restore_poe_context(struct user_ctxs *user,
+			       struct user_access_state *ua_state)
 {
 	u64 por_el0;
 	int err = 0;
@@ -290,7 +345,7 @@ static int restore_poe_context(struct user_ctxs *user)
 
 	__get_user_error(por_el0, &(user->poe->por_el0), err);
 	if (!err)
-		write_sysreg_s(por_el0, SYS_POR_EL0);
+		ua_state->por_el0 = por_el0;
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -946,7 +1001,8 @@ invalid:
 }
 
 static int restore_sigframe(struct pt_regs *regs,
-			    struct rt_sigframe __user *sf)
+			    struct rt_sigframe __user *sf,
+			    struct user_access_state *ua_state)
 {
 	sigset_t set;
 	int i, err;
@@ -998,7 +1054,7 @@ static int restore_sigframe(struct pt_regs *regs,
 		err = restore_zt_context(&user);
 
 	if (err == 0 && system_supports_poe() && user.poe)
-		err = restore_poe_context(&user);
+		err = restore_poe_context(&user, ua_state);
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -1059,6 +1115,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(rt_sigreturn)
 {
 	struct pt_regs *regs = current_pt_regs();
 	struct rt_sigframe __user *frame;
+	struct user_access_state ua_state;
 
 	/* Always make any pending restarted system calls return -EINTR */
 	current->restart_block.fn = do_no_restart_syscall;
@@ -1075,7 +1132,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(rt_sigreturn)
 	if (!access_ok(frame, sizeof (*frame)))
 		goto badframe;
 
-	if (restore_sigframe(regs, frame))
+	if (restore_sigframe(regs, frame, &ua_state))
 		goto badframe;
 
 	if (gcs_restore_signal())
@@ -1084,6 +1141,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(rt_sigreturn)
 	if (restore_altstack(&frame->uc.uc_stack))
 		goto badframe;
 
+	restore_user_access_state(&ua_state);
+
 	return regs->regs[0];
 
 badframe:
@@ -1198,7 +1257,8 @@ static int setup_sigframe_layout(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 }
 
 static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
-			  struct pt_regs *regs, sigset_t *set)
+			  struct pt_regs *regs, sigset_t *set,
+			  const struct user_access_state *ua_state)
 {
 	int i, err = 0;
 	struct rt_sigframe __user *sf = user->sigframe;
@@ -1262,14 +1322,13 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 		err |= preserve_fpmr_context(fpmr_ctx);
 	}
 
-	if (system_supports_poe() && err == 0 && user->poe_offset) {
+	if (system_supports_poe() && err == 0) {
 		struct poe_context __user *poe_ctx =
 			apply_user_offset(user, user->poe_offset);
 
-		err |= preserve_poe_context(poe_ctx);
+		err |= preserve_poe_context(poe_ctx, ua_state);
 	}
 
-
 	/* ZA state if present */
 	if (system_supports_sme() && err == 0 && user->za_offset) {
 		struct za_context __user *za_ctx =
@@ -1447,9 +1506,6 @@ static int setup_return(struct pt_regs *regs, struct ksignal *ksig,
 		sme_smstop();
 	}
 
-	if (system_supports_poe())
-		write_sysreg_s(POR_EL0_INIT, SYS_POR_EL0);
-
 	if (ksig->ka.sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER)
 		sigtramp = ksig->ka.sa.sa_restorer;
 	else
@@ -1465,6 +1521,7 @@ static int setup_rt_frame(int usig, struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t *set,
 {
 	struct rt_sigframe_user_layout user;
 	struct rt_sigframe __user *frame;
+	struct user_access_state ua_state;
 	int err = 0;
 
 	fpsimd_signal_preserve_current_state();
@@ -1472,13 +1529,14 @@ static int setup_rt_frame(int usig, struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t *set,
 	if (get_sigframe(&user, ksig, regs))
 		return 1;
 
+	save_reset_user_access_state(&ua_state);
 	frame = user.sigframe;
 
 	__put_user_error(0, &frame->uc.uc_flags, err);
 	__put_user_error(NULL, &frame->uc.uc_link, err);
 
 	err |= __save_altstack(&frame->uc.uc_stack, regs->sp);
-	err |= setup_sigframe(&user, regs, set);
+	err |= setup_sigframe(&user, regs, set, &ua_state);
 	if (err == 0) {
 		err = setup_return(regs, ksig, &user, usig);
 		if (ksig->ka.sa.sa_flags & SA_SIGINFO) {
@@ -1488,6 +1546,11 @@ static int setup_rt_frame(int usig, struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t *set,
 		}
 	}
 
+	if (err == 0)
+		set_handler_user_access_state();
+	else
+		restore_user_access_state(&ua_state);
+
 	return err;
 }
 

drivers/firmware/arm_sdei.c

@@ -763,7 +763,7 @@ static int sdei_device_freeze(struct device *dev)
 	int err;
 
 	/* unregister private events */
-	cpuhp_remove_state(sdei_entry_point);
+	cpuhp_remove_state(sdei_hp_state);
 
 	err = sdei_unregister_shared();
 	if (err)

include/linux/compiler-gcc.h

@@ -80,7 +80,11 @@
 #define __noscs __attribute__((__no_sanitize__("shadow-call-stack")))
 #endif
 
+#ifdef __SANITIZE_HWADDRESS__
+#define __no_sanitize_address __attribute__((__no_sanitize__("hwaddress")))
+#else
 #define __no_sanitize_address __attribute__((__no_sanitize_address__))
+#endif
 
 #if defined(__SANITIZE_THREAD__)
 #define __no_sanitize_thread __attribute__((__no_sanitize_thread__))

tools/testing/selftests/mm/Makefile

@@ -105,12 +105,12 @@ endif
 ifeq ($(CAN_BUILD_X86_64),1)
 TEST_GEN_FILES += $(BINARIES_64)
 endif
-else
 
-ifneq (,$(filter $(ARCH),arm64 powerpc))
+else ifeq ($(ARCH),arm64)
+TEST_GEN_FILES += protection_keys
+TEST_GEN_FILES += pkey_sighandler_tests
+else ifeq ($(ARCH),powerpc)
 TEST_GEN_FILES += protection_keys
-endif
-
 endif
 
 ifneq (,$(filter $(ARCH),arm64 mips64 parisc64 powerpc riscv64 s390x sparc64 x86_64 s390))

tools/testing/selftests/mm/pkey-arm64.h

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #define NR_RESERVED_PKEYS	1 /* pkey-0 */
 
 #define PKEY_ALLOW_ALL		0x77777777
+#define PKEY_REG_ALLOW_NONE	0x0
 
 #define PKEY_BITS_PER_PKEY	4
 #define PAGE_SIZE		sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE)
@@ -126,7 +127,7 @@ static inline u64 get_pkey_bits(u64 reg, int pkey)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void aarch64_write_signal_pkey(ucontext_t *uctxt, u64 pkey)
+static inline void aarch64_write_signal_pkey(ucontext_t *uctxt, u64 pkey)
 {
 	struct _aarch64_ctx *ctx = GET_UC_RESV_HEAD(uctxt);
 	struct poe_context *poe_ctx =

tools/testing/selftests/mm/pkey-helpers.h

@@ -112,6 +112,13 @@ void record_pkey_malloc(void *ptr, long size, int prot);
 #define PKEY_MASK	(PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE)
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * FIXME: Remove once the generic PKEY_UNRESTRICTED definition is merged.
+ */
+#ifndef PKEY_UNRESTRICTED
+#define PKEY_UNRESTRICTED 0x0
+#endif
+
 #ifndef set_pkey_bits
 static inline u64 set_pkey_bits(u64 reg, int pkey, u64 flags)
 {

tools/testing/selftests/mm/pkey-x86.h

@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
 #define PAGE_SIZE		4096
 #define MB			(1<<20)
 
+#define PKEY_REG_ALLOW_NONE	0x55555555
+
 static inline void __page_o_noops(void)
 {
 	/* 8-bytes of instruction * 512 bytes = 1 page */

tools/testing/selftests/mm/pkey_sighandler_tests.c

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
  */
 #define _GNU_SOURCE
 #define __SANE_USERSPACE_TYPES__
+#include <linux/mman.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <sys/syscall.h>
 #include <string.h>
@@ -59,12 +60,58 @@ long syscall_raw(long n, long a1, long a2, long a3, long a4, long a5, long a6)
 		      : "=a"(ret)
 		      : "a"(n), "b"(a1), "c"(a2), "d"(a3), "S"(a4), "D"(a5)
 		      : "memory");
+#elif defined __aarch64__
+	register long x0 asm("x0") = a1;
+	register long x1 asm("x1") = a2;
+	register long x2 asm("x2") = a3;
+	register long x3 asm("x3") = a4;
+	register long x4 asm("x4") = a5;
+	register long x5 asm("x5") = a6;
+	register long x8 asm("x8") = n;
+	asm volatile ("svc #0"
+		      : "=r"(x0)
+		      : "r"(x0), "r"(x1), "r"(x2), "r"(x3), "r"(x4), "r"(x5), "r"(x8)
+		      : "memory");
+	ret = x0;
 #else
 # error syscall_raw() not implemented
 #endif
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static inline long clone_raw(unsigned long flags, void *stack,
+			     int *parent_tid, int *child_tid)
+{
+	long a1 = flags;
+	long a2 = (long)stack;
+	long a3 = (long)parent_tid;
+#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__i386)
+	long a4 = (long)child_tid;
+	long a5 = 0;
+#elif defined(__aarch64__)
+	long a4 = 0;
+	long a5 = (long)child_tid;
+#else
+# error clone_raw() not implemented
+#endif
+
+	return syscall_raw(SYS_clone, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the most restrictive pkey register value that can be used by the
+ * tests.
+ */
+static inline u64 pkey_reg_restrictive_default(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Disallow everything except execution on pkey 0, so that each caller
+	 * doesn't need to enable it explicitly (the selftest code runs with
+	 * its code mapped with pkey 0).
+	 */
+	return set_pkey_bits(PKEY_REG_ALLOW_NONE, 0, PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS);
+}
+
 static void sigsegv_handler(int signo, siginfo_t *info, void *ucontext)
 {
 	pthread_mutex_lock(&mutex);
@@ -113,7 +160,7 @@ static void raise_sigusr2(void)
 static void *thread_segv_with_pkey0_disabled(void *ptr)
 {
 	/* Disable MPK 0 (and all others too) */
-	__write_pkey_reg(0x55555555);
+	__write_pkey_reg(pkey_reg_restrictive_default());
 
 	/* Segfault (with SEGV_MAPERR) */
 	*(int *) (0x1) = 1;
@@ -123,7 +170,7 @@ static void *thread_segv_with_pkey0_disabled(void *ptr)
 static void *thread_segv_pkuerr_stack(void *ptr)
 {
 	/* Disable MPK 0 (and all others too) */
-	__write_pkey_reg(0x55555555);
+	__write_pkey_reg(pkey_reg_restrictive_default());
 
 	/* After we disable MPK 0, we can't access the stack to return */
 	return NULL;
@@ -133,6 +180,7 @@ static void *thread_segv_maperr_ptr(void *ptr)
 {
 	stack_t *stack = ptr;
 	int *bad = (int *)1;
+	u64 pkey_reg;
 
 	/*
 	 * Setup alternate signal stack, which should be pkey_mprotect()ed by
@@ -142,7 +190,9 @@ static void *thread_segv_maperr_ptr(void *ptr)
 	syscall_raw(SYS_sigaltstack, (long)stack, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
 
 	/* Disable MPK 0.  Only MPK 1 is enabled. */
-	__write_pkey_reg(0x55555551);
+	pkey_reg = pkey_reg_restrictive_default();
+	pkey_reg = set_pkey_bits(pkey_reg, 1, PKEY_UNRESTRICTED);
+	__write_pkey_reg(pkey_reg);
 
 	/* Segfault */
 	*bad = 1;
@@ -240,6 +290,7 @@ static void test_sigsegv_handler_with_different_pkey_for_stack(void)
 	int pkey;
 	int parent_pid = 0;
 	int child_pid = 0;
+	u64 pkey_reg;
 
 	sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO | SA_ONSTACK;
 
@@ -257,7 +308,10 @@ static void test_sigsegv_handler_with_different_pkey_for_stack(void)
 	assert(stack != MAP_FAILED);
 
 	/* Allow access to MPK 0 and MPK 1 */
-	__write_pkey_reg(0x55555550);
+	pkey_reg = pkey_reg_restrictive_default();
+	pkey_reg = set_pkey_bits(pkey_reg, 0, PKEY_UNRESTRICTED);
+	pkey_reg = set_pkey_bits(pkey_reg, 1, PKEY_UNRESTRICTED);
+	__write_pkey_reg(pkey_reg);
 
 	/* Protect the new stack with MPK 1 */
 	pkey = pkey_alloc(0, 0);
@@ -272,14 +326,13 @@ static void test_sigsegv_handler_with_different_pkey_for_stack(void)
 	memset(&siginfo, 0, sizeof(siginfo));
 
 	/* Use clone to avoid newer glibcs using rseq on new threads */
-	long ret = syscall_raw(SYS_clone,
+	long ret = clone_raw(CLONE_VM | CLONE_FS | CLONE_FILES |
-			       CLONE_VM | CLONE_FS | CLONE_FILES |
+			     CLONE_SIGHAND | CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_SYSVSEM |
-			       CLONE_SIGHAND | CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_SYSVSEM |
+			     CLONE_PARENT_SETTID | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID |
-			       CLONE_PARENT_SETTID | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID |
+			     CLONE_DETACHED,
-			       CLONE_DETACHED,
+			     stack + STACK_SIZE,
-			       (long) ((char *)(stack) + STACK_SIZE),
+			     &parent_pid,
-			       (long) &parent_pid,
+			     &child_pid);
-			       (long) &child_pid, 0, 0);
 
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		errno = -ret;
@@ -307,7 +360,13 @@ static void test_sigsegv_handler_with_different_pkey_for_stack(void)
 static void test_pkru_preserved_after_sigusr1(void)
 {
 	struct sigaction sa;
-	unsigned long pkru = 0x45454544;
+	u64 pkey_reg;
+
+	/* Allow access to MPK 0 and an arbitrary set of keys */
+	pkey_reg = pkey_reg_restrictive_default();
+	pkey_reg = set_pkey_bits(pkey_reg, 0, PKEY_UNRESTRICTED);
+	pkey_reg = set_pkey_bits(pkey_reg, 3, PKEY_UNRESTRICTED);
+	pkey_reg = set_pkey_bits(pkey_reg, 7, PKEY_UNRESTRICTED);
 
 	sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
 
@@ -320,7 +379,7 @@ static void test_pkru_preserved_after_sigusr1(void)
 
 	memset(&siginfo, 0, sizeof(siginfo));
 
-	__write_pkey_reg(pkru);
+	__write_pkey_reg(pkey_reg);
 
 	raise(SIGUSR1);
 
@@ -330,7 +389,7 @@ static void test_pkru_preserved_after_sigusr1(void)
 	pthread_mutex_unlock(&mutex);
 
 	/* Ensure the pkru value is the same after returning from signal. */
-	ksft_test_result(pkru == __read_pkey_reg() &&
+	ksft_test_result(pkey_reg == __read_pkey_reg() &&
 			 siginfo.si_signo == SIGUSR1,
 			 "%s\n", __func__);
 }
@@ -347,6 +406,7 @@ static noinline void *thread_sigusr2_self(void *ptr)
 		'S', 'I', 'G', 'U', 'S', 'R', '2',
 		'.', '.', '.', '\n', '\0'};
 	stack_t *stack = ptr;
+	u64 pkey_reg;
 
 	/*
 	 * Setup alternate signal stack, which should be pkey_mprotect()ed by
@@ -356,7 +416,9 @@ static noinline void *thread_sigusr2_self(void *ptr)
 	syscall(SYS_sigaltstack, (long)stack, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
 
 	/* Disable MPK 0.  Only MPK 2 is enabled. */
-	__write_pkey_reg(0x55555545);
+	pkey_reg = pkey_reg_restrictive_default();
+	pkey_reg = set_pkey_bits(pkey_reg, 2, PKEY_UNRESTRICTED);
+	__write_pkey_reg(pkey_reg);
 
 	raise_sigusr2();
 
@@ -384,6 +446,7 @@ static void test_pkru_sigreturn(void)
 	int pkey;
 	int parent_pid = 0;
 	int child_pid = 0;
+	u64 pkey_reg;
 
 	sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
 	sa.sa_flags = 0;
@@ -418,7 +481,10 @@ static void test_pkru_sigreturn(void)
 	 * the current thread's stack is protected by the default MPK 0. Hence
 	 * both need to be enabled.
 	 */
-	__write_pkey_reg(0x55555544);
+	pkey_reg = pkey_reg_restrictive_default();
+	pkey_reg = set_pkey_bits(pkey_reg, 0, PKEY_UNRESTRICTED);
+	pkey_reg = set_pkey_bits(pkey_reg, 2, PKEY_UNRESTRICTED);
+	__write_pkey_reg(pkey_reg);
 
 	/* Protect the stack with MPK 2 */
 	pkey = pkey_alloc(0, 0);
@@ -431,14 +497,13 @@ static void test_pkru_sigreturn(void)
 	sigstack.ss_size = STACK_SIZE;
 
 	/* Use clone to avoid newer glibcs using rseq on new threads */
-	long ret = syscall_raw(SYS_clone,
+	long ret = clone_raw(CLONE_VM | CLONE_FS | CLONE_FILES |
-			       CLONE_VM | CLONE_FS | CLONE_FILES |
+			     CLONE_SIGHAND | CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_SYSVSEM |
-			       CLONE_SIGHAND | CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_SYSVSEM |
+			     CLONE_PARENT_SETTID | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID |
-			       CLONE_PARENT_SETTID | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID |
+			     CLONE_DETACHED,
-			       CLONE_DETACHED,
+			     stack + STACK_SIZE,
-			       (long) ((char *)(stack) + STACK_SIZE),
+			     &parent_pid,
-			       (long) &parent_pid,
+			     &child_pid);
-			       (long) &child_pid, 0, 0);
 
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		errno = -ret;