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instrumented.h: add KMSAN support
To avoid false positives, KMSAN needs to unpoison the data copied from the userspace. To detect infoleaks - check the memory buffer passed to copy_to_user(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220915150417.722975-19-glider@google.com Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
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/*
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* This header provides generic wrappers for memory access instrumentation that
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* the compiler cannot emit for: KASAN, KCSAN.
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* the compiler cannot emit for: KASAN, KCSAN, KMSAN.
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*/
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#ifndef _LINUX_INSTRUMENTED_H
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#define _LINUX_INSTRUMENTED_H
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@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
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#include <linux/compiler.h>
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#include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
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#include <linux/kcsan-checks.h>
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#include <linux/kmsan-checks.h>
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#include <linux/types.h>
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/**
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@ -117,6 +118,7 @@ instrument_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
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{
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kasan_check_read(from, n);
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kcsan_check_read(from, n);
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kmsan_copy_to_user(to, from, n, 0);
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}
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/**
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@ -151,6 +153,7 @@ static __always_inline void
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instrument_copy_from_user_after(const void *to, const void __user *from,
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unsigned long n, unsigned long left)
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{
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kmsan_unpoison_memory(to, n - left);
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}
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/**
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@ -162,10 +165,14 @@ instrument_copy_from_user_after(const void *to, const void __user *from,
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*
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* @to destination variable, may not be address-taken
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*/
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#define instrument_get_user(to) \
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({ \
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#define instrument_get_user(to) \
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({ \
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u64 __tmp = (u64)(to); \
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kmsan_unpoison_memory(&__tmp, sizeof(__tmp)); \
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to = __tmp; \
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})
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/**
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* instrument_put_user() - add instrumentation to put_user()-like macros
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*
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@ -177,8 +184,9 @@ instrument_copy_from_user_after(const void *to, const void __user *from,
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* @ptr userspace pointer to copy to
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* @size number of bytes to copy
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*/
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#define instrument_put_user(from, ptr, size) \
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({ \
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#define instrument_put_user(from, ptr, size) \
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({ \
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kmsan_copy_to_user(ptr, &from, sizeof(from), 0); \
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})
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#endif /* _LINUX_INSTRUMENTED_H */
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@ -46,6 +46,21 @@ void kmsan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size);
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*/
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void kmsan_check_memory(const void *address, size_t size);
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/**
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* kmsan_copy_to_user() - Notify KMSAN about a data transfer to userspace.
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* @to: destination address in the userspace.
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* @from: source address in the kernel.
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* @to_copy: number of bytes to copy.
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* @left: number of bytes not copied.
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*
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* If this is a real userspace data transfer, KMSAN checks the bytes that were
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* actually copied to ensure there was no information leak. If @to belongs to
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* the kernel space (which is possible for compat syscalls), KMSAN just copies
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* the metadata.
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*/
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void kmsan_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, size_t to_copy,
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size_t left);
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#else
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static inline void kmsan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size,
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@ -58,6 +73,10 @@ static inline void kmsan_unpoison_memory(const void *address, size_t size)
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static inline void kmsan_check_memory(const void *address, size_t size)
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{
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}
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static inline void kmsan_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from,
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size_t to_copy, size_t left)
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{
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}
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#endif
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@ -205,6 +205,44 @@ void kmsan_iounmap_page_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
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kmsan_leave_runtime();
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}
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void kmsan_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, size_t to_copy,
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size_t left)
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{
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unsigned long ua_flags;
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if (!kmsan_enabled || kmsan_in_runtime())
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return;
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/*
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* At this point we've copied the memory already. It's hard to check it
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* before copying, as the size of actually copied buffer is unknown.
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*/
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/* copy_to_user() may copy zero bytes. No need to check. */
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if (!to_copy)
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return;
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/* Or maybe copy_to_user() failed to copy anything. */
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if (to_copy <= left)
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return;
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ua_flags = user_access_save();
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if ((u64)to < TASK_SIZE) {
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/* This is a user memory access, check it. */
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kmsan_internal_check_memory((void *)from, to_copy - left, to,
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REASON_COPY_TO_USER);
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} else {
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/* Otherwise this is a kernel memory access. This happens when a
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* compat syscall passes an argument allocated on the kernel
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* stack to a real syscall.
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* Don't check anything, just copy the shadow of the copied
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* bytes.
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*/
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kmsan_internal_memmove_metadata((void *)to, (void *)from,
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to_copy - left);
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}
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user_access_restore(ua_flags);
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmsan_copy_to_user);
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/* Functions from kmsan-checks.h follow. */
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void kmsan_poison_memory(const void *address, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
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{
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