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Documentation/x86: Document SGX kernel architecture
Document the Intel SGX kernel architecture. The fine-grained architecture details can be looked up from Intel SDM Volume 3D. Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201112220135.165028-24-jarkko@kernel.org
This commit is contained in:
Jarkko Sakkinen
Borislav Petkov
parent
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commit
3fa97bf001
@ -33,3 +33,4 @@ x86-specific Documentation
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i386/index
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x86_64/index
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sva
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sgx
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211
Documentation/x86/sgx.rst
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211
Documentation/x86/sgx.rst
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.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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===============================
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Software Guard eXtensions (SGX)
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===============================
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Overview
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========
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Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) hardware enables for user space applications
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to set aside private memory regions of code and data:
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* Privileged (ring-0) ENCLS functions orchestrate the construction of the.
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regions.
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* Unprivileged (ring-3) ENCLU functions allow an application to enter and
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execute inside the regions.
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These memory regions are called enclaves. An enclave can be only entered at a
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fixed set of entry points. Each entry point can hold a single hardware thread
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at a time. While the enclave is loaded from a regular binary file by using
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ENCLS functions, only the threads inside the enclave can access its memory. The
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region is denied from outside access by the CPU, and encrypted before it leaves
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from LLC.
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The support can be determined by
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``grep sgx /proc/cpuinfo``
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SGX must both be supported in the processor and enabled by the BIOS. If SGX
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appears to be unsupported on a system which has hardware support, ensure
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support is enabled in the BIOS. If a BIOS presents a choice between "Enabled"
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and "Software Enabled" modes for SGX, choose "Enabled".
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Enclave Page Cache
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==================
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SGX utilizes an *Enclave Page Cache (EPC)* to store pages that are associated
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with an enclave. It is contained in a BIOS-reserved region of physical memory.
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Unlike pages used for regular memory, pages can only be accessed from outside of
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the enclave during enclave construction with special, limited SGX instructions.
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Only a CPU executing inside an enclave can directly access enclave memory.
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However, a CPU executing inside an enclave may access normal memory outside the
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enclave.
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The kernel manages enclave memory similar to how it treats device memory.
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Enclave Page Types
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------------------
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**SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS)**
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Enclave's address range, attributes and other global data are defined
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by this structure.
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**Regular (REG)**
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Regular EPC pages contain the code and data of an enclave.
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**Thread Control Structure (TCS)**
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Thread Control Structure pages define the entry points to an enclave and
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track the execution state of an enclave thread.
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**Version Array (VA)**
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Version Array pages contain 512 slots, each of which can contain a version
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number for a page evicted from the EPC.
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Enclave Page Cache Map
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----------------------
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The processor tracks EPC pages in a hardware metadata structure called the
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*Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM)*. The EPCM contains an entry for each EPC page
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which describes the owning enclave, access rights and page type among the other
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things.
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EPCM permissions are separate from the normal page tables. This prevents the
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kernel from, for instance, allowing writes to data which an enclave wishes to
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remain read-only. EPCM permissions may only impose additional restrictions on
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top of normal x86 page permissions.
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For all intents and purposes, the SGX architecture allows the processor to
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invalidate all EPCM entries at will. This requires that software be prepared to
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handle an EPCM fault at any time. In practice, this can happen on events like
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power transitions when the ephemeral key that encrypts enclave memory is lost.
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Application interface
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=====================
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Enclave build functions
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-----------------------
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In addition to the traditional compiler and linker build process, SGX has a
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separate enclave “build” process. Enclaves must be built before they can be
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executed (entered). The first step in building an enclave is opening the
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**/dev/sgx_enclave** device. Since enclave memory is protected from direct
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access, special privileged instructions are Then used to copy data into enclave
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pages and establish enclave page permissions.
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.. kernel-doc:: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
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:functions: sgx_ioc_enclave_create
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sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages
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sgx_ioc_enclave_init
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sgx_ioc_enclave_provision
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Enclave vDSO
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------------
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Entering an enclave can only be done through SGX-specific EENTER and ERESUME
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functions, and is a non-trivial process. Because of the complexity of
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transitioning to and from an enclave, enclaves typically utilize a library to
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handle the actual transitions. This is roughly analogous to how glibc
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implementations are used by most applications to wrap system calls.
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Another crucial characteristic of enclaves is that they can generate exceptions
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as part of their normal operation that need to be handled in the enclave or are
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unique to SGX.
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Instead of the traditional signal mechanism to handle these exceptions, SGX
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can leverage special exception fixup provided by the vDSO. The kernel-provided
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vDSO function wraps low-level transitions to/from the enclave like EENTER and
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ERESUME. The vDSO function intercepts exceptions that would otherwise generate
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a signal and return the fault information directly to its caller. This avoids
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the need to juggle signal handlers.
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.. kernel-doc:: arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
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:functions: vdso_sgx_enter_enclave_t
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ksgxd
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=====
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SGX support includes a kernel thread called *ksgxwapd*.
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EPC sanitization
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----------------
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ksgxd is started when SGX initializes. Enclave memory is typically ready
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For use when the processor powers on or resets. However, if SGX has been in
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use since the reset, enclave pages may be in an inconsistent state. This might
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occur after a crash and kexec() cycle, for instance. At boot, ksgxd
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reinitializes all enclave pages so that they can be allocated and re-used.
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The sanitization is done by going through EPC address space and applying the
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EREMOVE function to each physical page. Some enclave pages like SECS pages have
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hardware dependencies on other pages which prevents EREMOVE from functioning.
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Executing two EREMOVE passes removes the dependencies.
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Page reclaimer
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--------------
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Similar to the core kswapd, ksgxd, is responsible for managing the
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overcommitment of enclave memory. If the system runs out of enclave memory,
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*ksgxwapd* “swaps” enclave memory to normal memory.
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Launch Control
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==============
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SGX provides a launch control mechanism. After all enclave pages have been
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copied, kernel executes EINIT function, which initializes the enclave. Only after
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this the CPU can execute inside the enclave.
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ENIT function takes an RSA-3072 signature of the enclave measurement. The function
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checks that the measurement is correct and signature is signed with the key
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hashed to the four **IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH{0, 1, 2, 3}** MSRs representing the
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SHA256 of a public key.
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Those MSRs can be configured by the BIOS to be either readable or writable.
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Linux supports only writable configuration in order to give full control to the
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kernel on launch control policy. Before calling EINIT function, the driver sets
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the MSRs to match the enclave's signing key.
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Encryption engines
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==================
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In order to conceal the enclave data while it is out of the CPU package, the
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memory controller has an encryption engine to transparently encrypt and decrypt
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enclave memory.
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In CPUs prior to Ice Lake, the Memory Encryption Engine (MEE) is used to
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encrypt pages leaving the CPU caches. MEE uses a n-ary Merkle tree with root in
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SRAM to maintain integrity of the encrypted data. This provides integrity and
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anti-replay protection but does not scale to large memory sizes because the time
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required to update the Merkle tree grows logarithmically in relation to the
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memory size.
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CPUs starting from Icelake use Total Memory Encryption (TME) in the place of
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MEE. TME-based SGX implementations do not have an integrity Merkle tree, which
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means integrity and replay-attacks are not mitigated. B, it includes
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additional changes to prevent cipher text from being returned and SW memory
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aliases from being Created.
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DMA to enclave memory is blocked by range registers on both MEE and TME systems
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(SDM section 41.10).
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Usage Models
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============
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Shared Library
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--------------
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Sensitive data and the code that acts on it is partitioned from the application
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into a separate library. The library is then linked as a DSO which can be loaded
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into an enclave. The application can then make individual function calls into
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the enclave through special SGX instructions. A run-time within the enclave is
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configured to marshal function parameters into and out of the enclave and to
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call the correct library function.
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Application Container
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---------------------
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An application may be loaded into a container enclave which is specially
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configured with a library OS and run-time which permits the application to run.
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The enclave run-time and library OS work together to execute the application
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when a thread enters the enclave.
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