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landlock: Explain file descriptor access rights
Starting with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE, it is worth explaining why we choose to restrict access checks at open time. This new "File descriptor access rights" section is complementary to the existing "Inode access rights" section. Add a new guiding principle related to this section. Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221209193813.972012-1-mic@digikod.net [mic: Include the latest Günther's suggestion, and fix spelling] Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Landlock LSM: kernel documentation
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==================================
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:Author: Mickaël Salaün
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:Date: September 2022
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:Date: December 2022
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Landlock's goal is to create scoped access-control (i.e. sandboxing). To
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harden a whole system, this feature should be available to any process,
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@ -41,12 +41,16 @@ Guiding principles for safe access controls
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processes.
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* Computation related to Landlock operations (e.g. enforcing a ruleset) shall
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only impact the processes requesting them.
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* Resources (e.g. file descriptors) directly obtained from the kernel by a
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sandboxed process shall retain their scoped accesses (at the time of resource
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acquisition) whatever process use them.
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Cf. `File descriptor access rights`_.
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Design choices
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==============
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Filesystem access rights
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------------------------
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Inode access rights
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-------------------
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All access rights are tied to an inode and what can be accessed through it.
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Reading the content of a directory does not imply to be allowed to read the
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@ -57,6 +61,30 @@ directory, not the unlinked inode. This is the reason why
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``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE`` or ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER`` are not
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allowed to be tied to files but only to directories.
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File descriptor access rights
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-----------------------------
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Access rights are checked and tied to file descriptors at open time. The
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underlying principle is that equivalent sequences of operations should lead to
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the same results, when they are executed under the same Landlock domain.
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Taking the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE`` right as an example, it may be
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allowed to open a file for writing without being allowed to
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:manpage:`ftruncate` the resulting file descriptor if the related file
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hierarchy doesn't grant such access right. The following sequences of
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operations have the same semantic and should then have the same result:
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* ``truncate(path);``
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* ``int fd = open(path, O_WRONLY); ftruncate(fd); close(fd);``
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Similarly to file access modes (e.g. ``O_RDWR``), Landlock access rights
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attached to file descriptors are retained even if they are passed between
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processes (e.g. through a Unix domain socket). Such access rights will then be
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enforced even if the receiving process is not sandboxed by Landlock. Indeed,
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this is required to keep a consistent access control over the whole system, and
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this avoids unattended bypasses through file descriptor passing (i.e. confused
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deputy attack).
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Tests
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=====
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