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evm: properly handle INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS EVM status
Unless an LSM labels a file during d_instantiate(), newly created files are not labeled with an initial security.evm xattr, until the file closes. EVM, before allowing a protected, security xattr to be written, verifies the existing 'security.evm' value is good. For newly created files without a security.evm label, this verification prevents writing any protected, security xattrs, until the file closes. Following is the example when this happens: fd = open("foo", O_CREAT | O_WRONLY, 0644); setxattr("foo", "security.SMACK64", value, sizeof(value), 0); close(fd); While INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS status is handled in other places, such as evm_inode_setattr(), it does not handle it in all cases in evm_protect_xattr(). By limiting the use of INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS to newly created files, we can now allow setting "protected" xattrs. Changelog: - limit the use of INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS to IMA identified new files Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> 3.14+
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@ -285,6 +285,13 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
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goto out;
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}
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evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
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if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) {
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struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
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iint = integrity_iint_find(dentry->d_inode);
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if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE))
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return 0;
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}
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out:
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if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS)
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integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, dentry->d_inode,
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