x86/uaccess: Don't leak the AC flag into __put_user() value evaluation

When calling __put_user(foo(), ptr), the __put_user() macro would call
foo() in between __uaccess_begin() and __uaccess_end().  If that code
were buggy, then those bugs would be run without SMAP protection.

Fortunately, there seem to be few instances of the problem in the
kernel. Nevertheless, __put_user() should be fixed to avoid doing this.
Therefore, evaluate __put_user()'s argument before setting AC.

This issue was noticed when an objtool hack by Peter Zijlstra complained
about genregs_get() and I compared the assembly output to the C source.

 [ bp: Massage commit message and fixed up whitespace. ]

Fixes: 11f1a4b975 ("x86: reorganize SMAP handling in user space accesses")
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190225125231.845656645@infradead.org
This commit is contained in:
Andy Lutomirski 2019-02-22 17:17:04 -08:00 committed by Borislav Petkov
parent f331e766c4
commit 2a418cf3f5

View File

@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ do { \
__put_user_goto(x, ptr, "l", "k", "ir", label); \
break; \
case 8: \
__put_user_goto_u64((__typeof__(*ptr))(x), ptr, label); \
__put_user_goto_u64(x, ptr, label); \
break; \
default: \
__put_user_bad(); \
@ -431,8 +431,10 @@ do { \
({ \
__label__ __pu_label; \
int __pu_err = -EFAULT; \
__typeof__(*(ptr)) __pu_val; \
__pu_val = x; \
__uaccess_begin(); \
__put_user_size((x), (ptr), (size), __pu_label); \
__put_user_size(__pu_val, (ptr), (size), __pu_label); \
__pu_err = 0; \
__pu_label: \
__uaccess_end(); \