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fs/proc/task_mmu.c: shift mm_access() from m_start() to proc_maps_open()
A simple test-case from Kirill Shutemov cat /proc/self/maps >/dev/null chmod +x /proc/self/net/packet exec /proc/self/net/packet makes lockdep unhappy, cat/exec take seq_file->lock + cred_guard_mutex in the opposite order. It's a false positive and probably we should not allow "chmod +x" on proc files. Still I think that we should avoid mm_access() and cred_guard_mutex in sys_read() paths, security checking should happen at open time. Besides, this doesn't even look right if the task changes its ->mm between m_stop() and m_start(). Add the new "mm_struct *mm" member into struct proc_maps_private and change proc_maps_open() to initialize it using proc_mem_open(). Change m_start() to use priv->mm if atomic_inc_not_zero(mm_users) succeeds or return NULL (eof) otherwise. The only complication is that proc_maps_open() users should additionally do mmdrop() in fop->release(), add the new proc_map_release() helper for that. Note: this is the user-visible change, if the task execs after open("maps") the new ->mm won't be visible via this file. I hope this is fine, and this matches /proc/pid/mem bahaviour. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reported-by: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ extern int proc_remount(struct super_block *, int *, char *);
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struct proc_maps_private {
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struct pid *pid;
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struct task_struct *task;
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struct mm_struct *mm;
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#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
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struct vm_area_struct *tail_vma;
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#endif
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@ -165,9 +165,9 @@ static void *m_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
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if (!priv->task)
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return ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
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mm = mm_access(priv->task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
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if (!mm || IS_ERR(mm))
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return mm;
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mm = priv->mm;
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if (!mm || !atomic_inc_not_zero(&mm->mm_users))
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return NULL;
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down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
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tail_vma = get_gate_vma(mm);
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@ -240,9 +240,28 @@ static int proc_maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
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return -ENOMEM;
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priv->pid = proc_pid(inode);
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priv->mm = proc_mem_open(inode, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
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if (IS_ERR(priv->mm)) {
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int err = PTR_ERR(priv->mm);
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seq_release_private(inode, file);
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return err;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static int proc_map_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
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{
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struct seq_file *seq = file->private_data;
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struct proc_maps_private *priv = seq->private;
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if (priv->mm)
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mmdrop(priv->mm);
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return seq_release_private(inode, file);
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}
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static int do_maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
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const struct seq_operations *ops)
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{
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@ -398,14 +417,14 @@ const struct file_operations proc_pid_maps_operations = {
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.open = pid_maps_open,
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.read = seq_read,
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.llseek = seq_lseek,
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.release = seq_release_private,
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.release = proc_map_release,
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};
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const struct file_operations proc_tid_maps_operations = {
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.open = tid_maps_open,
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.read = seq_read,
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.llseek = seq_lseek,
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.release = seq_release_private,
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.release = proc_map_release,
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};
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/*
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@ -680,14 +699,14 @@ const struct file_operations proc_pid_smaps_operations = {
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.open = pid_smaps_open,
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.read = seq_read,
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.llseek = seq_lseek,
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.release = seq_release_private,
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.release = proc_map_release,
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};
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const struct file_operations proc_tid_smaps_operations = {
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.open = tid_smaps_open,
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.read = seq_read,
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.llseek = seq_lseek,
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.release = seq_release_private,
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.release = proc_map_release,
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};
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/*
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@ -1544,13 +1563,13 @@ const struct file_operations proc_pid_numa_maps_operations = {
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.open = pid_numa_maps_open,
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.read = seq_read,
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.llseek = seq_lseek,
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.release = seq_release_private,
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.release = proc_map_release,
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};
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const struct file_operations proc_tid_numa_maps_operations = {
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.open = tid_numa_maps_open,
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.read = seq_read,
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.llseek = seq_lseek,
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.release = seq_release_private,
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.release = proc_map_release,
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};
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#endif /* CONFIG_NUMA */
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