linux/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c

610 lines
17 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

/*
* kaslr.c
*
* This contains the routines needed to generate a reasonable level of
* entropy to choose a randomized kernel base address offset in support
* of Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization (KASLR). Additionally
* handles walking the physical memory maps (and tracking memory regions
* to avoid) in order to select a physical memory location that can
* contain the entire properly aligned running kernel image.
*
*/
#include "misc.h"
#include "error.h"
#include "../boot.h"
#include <generated/compile.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/uts.h>
#include <linux/utsname.h>
#include <generated/utsrelease.h>
/* Simplified build-specific string for starting entropy. */
static const char build_str[] = UTS_RELEASE " (" LINUX_COMPILE_BY "@"
LINUX_COMPILE_HOST ") (" LINUX_COMPILER ") " UTS_VERSION;
static unsigned long rotate_xor(unsigned long hash, const void *area,
size_t size)
{
size_t i;
unsigned long *ptr = (unsigned long *)area;
for (i = 0; i < size / sizeof(hash); i++) {
/* Rotate by odd number of bits and XOR. */
hash = (hash << ((sizeof(hash) * 8) - 7)) | (hash >> 7);
hash ^= ptr[i];
}
return hash;
}
/* Attempt to create a simple but unpredictable starting entropy. */
x86/mm: Refactor KASLR entropy functions Move the KASLR entropy functions into arch/x86/lib to be used in early kernel boot for KASLR memory randomization. Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Popov <alpopov@ptsecurity.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466556426-32664-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-22 00:46:58 +00:00
static unsigned long get_boot_seed(void)
{
unsigned long hash = 0;
hash = rotate_xor(hash, build_str, sizeof(build_str));
hash = rotate_xor(hash, boot_params, sizeof(*boot_params));
return hash;
}
x86/mm: Refactor KASLR entropy functions Move the KASLR entropy functions into arch/x86/lib to be used in early kernel boot for KASLR memory randomization. Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Popov <alpopov@ptsecurity.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466556426-32664-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-22 00:46:58 +00:00
#define KASLR_COMPRESSED_BOOT
#include "../../lib/kaslr.c"
struct mem_vector {
unsigned long long start;
unsigned long long size;
};
/* Only supporting at most 4 unusable memmap regions with kaslr */
#define MAX_MEMMAP_REGIONS 4
static bool memmap_too_large;
enum mem_avoid_index {
MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE = 0,
MEM_AVOID_INITRD,
MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE,
MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS,
MEM_AVOID_MEMMAP_BEGIN,
MEM_AVOID_MEMMAP_END = MEM_AVOID_MEMMAP_BEGIN + MAX_MEMMAP_REGIONS - 1,
MEM_AVOID_MAX,
};
static struct mem_vector mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_MAX];
static bool mem_overlaps(struct mem_vector *one, struct mem_vector *two)
{
/* Item one is entirely before item two. */
if (one->start + one->size <= two->start)
return false;
/* Item one is entirely after item two. */
if (one->start >= two->start + two->size)
return false;
return true;
}
/**
* _memparse - Parse a string with mem suffixes into a number
* @ptr: Where parse begins
* @retptr: (output) Optional pointer to next char after parse completes
*
* Parses a string into a number. The number stored at @ptr is
* potentially suffixed with K, M, G, T, P, E.
*/
static unsigned long long _memparse(const char *ptr, char **retptr)
{
char *endptr; /* Local pointer to end of parsed string */
unsigned long long ret = simple_strtoull(ptr, &endptr, 0);
switch (*endptr) {
case 'E':
case 'e':
ret <<= 10;
case 'P':
case 'p':
ret <<= 10;
case 'T':
case 't':
ret <<= 10;
case 'G':
case 'g':
ret <<= 10;
case 'M':
case 'm':
ret <<= 10;
case 'K':
case 'k':
ret <<= 10;
endptr++;
default:
break;
}
if (retptr)
*retptr = endptr;
return ret;
}
static int
parse_memmap(char *p, unsigned long long *start, unsigned long long *size)
{
char *oldp;
if (!p)
return -EINVAL;
/* We don't care about this option here */
if (!strncmp(p, "exactmap", 8))
return -EINVAL;
oldp = p;
*size = _memparse(p, &p);
if (p == oldp)
return -EINVAL;
switch (*p) {
case '@':
/* Skip this region, usable */
*start = 0;
*size = 0;
return 0;
case '#':
case '$':
case '!':
*start = _memparse(p + 1, &p);
return 0;
}
return -EINVAL;
}
static void mem_avoid_memmap(void)
{
char arg[128];
int rc;
int i;
char *str;
/* See if we have any memmap areas */
rc = cmdline_find_option("memmap", arg, sizeof(arg));
if (rc <= 0)
return;
i = 0;
str = arg;
while (str && (i < MAX_MEMMAP_REGIONS)) {
int rc;
unsigned long long start, size;
char *k = strchr(str, ',');
if (k)
*k++ = 0;
rc = parse_memmap(str, &start, &size);
if (rc < 0)
break;
str = k;
/* A usable region that should not be skipped */
if (size == 0)
continue;
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_MEMMAP_BEGIN + i].start = start;
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_MEMMAP_BEGIN + i].size = size;
i++;
}
/* More than 4 memmaps, fail kaslr */
if ((i >= MAX_MEMMAP_REGIONS) && str)
memmap_too_large = true;
}
/*
* In theory, KASLR can put the kernel anywhere in the range of [16M, 64T).
* The mem_avoid array is used to store the ranges that need to be avoided
* when KASLR searches for an appropriate random address. We must avoid any
* regions that are unsafe to overlap with during decompression, and other
* things like the initrd, cmdline and boot_params. This comment seeks to
* explain mem_avoid as clearly as possible since incorrect mem_avoid
* memory ranges lead to really hard to debug boot failures.
*
* The initrd, cmdline, and boot_params are trivial to identify for
* avoiding. They are MEM_AVOID_INITRD, MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE, and
* MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS respectively below.
*
* What is not obvious how to avoid is the range of memory that is used
* during decompression (MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE below). This range must cover
* the compressed kernel (ZO) and its run space, which is used to extract
* the uncompressed kernel (VO) and relocs.
*
* ZO's full run size sits against the end of the decompression buffer, so
* we can calculate where text, data, bss, etc of ZO are positioned more
* easily.
*
* For additional background, the decompression calculations can be found
* in header.S, and the memory diagram is based on the one found in misc.c.
*
* The following conditions are already enforced by the image layouts and
* associated code:
* - input + input_size >= output + output_size
* - kernel_total_size <= init_size
* - kernel_total_size <= output_size (see Note below)
* - output + init_size >= output + output_size
*
* (Note that kernel_total_size and output_size have no fundamental
* relationship, but output_size is passed to choose_random_location
* as a maximum of the two. The diagram is showing a case where
* kernel_total_size is larger than output_size, but this case is
* handled by bumping output_size.)
*
* The above conditions can be illustrated by a diagram:
*
* 0 output input input+input_size output+init_size
* | | | | |
* | | | | |
* |-----|--------|--------|--------------|-----------|--|-------------|
* | | |
* | | |
* output+init_size-ZO_INIT_SIZE output+output_size output+kernel_total_size
*
* [output, output+init_size) is the entire memory range used for
* extracting the compressed image.
*
* [output, output+kernel_total_size) is the range needed for the
* uncompressed kernel (VO) and its run size (bss, brk, etc).
*
* [output, output+output_size) is VO plus relocs (i.e. the entire
* uncompressed payload contained by ZO). This is the area of the buffer
* written to during decompression.
*
* [output+init_size-ZO_INIT_SIZE, output+init_size) is the worst-case
* range of the copied ZO and decompression code. (i.e. the range
* covered backwards of size ZO_INIT_SIZE, starting from output+init_size.)
*
* [input, input+input_size) is the original copied compressed image (ZO)
* (i.e. it does not include its run size). This range must be avoided
* because it contains the data used for decompression.
*
* [input+input_size, output+init_size) is [_text, _end) for ZO. This
* range includes ZO's heap and stack, and must be avoided since it
* performs the decompression.
*
* Since the above two ranges need to be avoided and they are adjacent,
* they can be merged, resulting in: [input, output+init_size) which
* becomes the MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE below.
*/
static void mem_avoid_init(unsigned long input, unsigned long input_size,
unsigned long output)
{
unsigned long init_size = boot_params->hdr.init_size;
u64 initrd_start, initrd_size;
u64 cmd_line, cmd_line_size;
char *ptr;
/*
* Avoid the region that is unsafe to overlap during
* decompression.
*/
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE].start = input;
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE].size = (output + init_size) - input;
x86/KASLR: Build identity mappings on demand Currently KASLR only supports relocation in a small physical range (from 16M to 1G), due to using the initial kernel page table identity mapping. To support ranges above this, we need to have an identity mapping for the desired memory range before we can decompress (and later run) the kernel. 32-bit kernels already have the needed identity mapping. This patch adds identity mappings for the needed memory ranges on 64-bit kernels. This happens in two possible boot paths: If loaded via startup_32(), we need to set up the needed identity map. If loaded from a 64-bit bootloader, the bootloader will have already set up an identity mapping, and we'll start via the compressed kernel's startup_64(). In this case, the bootloader's page tables need to be avoided while selecting the new uncompressed kernel location. If not, the decompressor could overwrite them during decompression. To accomplish this, we could walk the pagetable and find every page that is used, and add them to mem_avoid, but this needs extra code and will require increasing the size of the mem_avoid array. Instead, we can create a new set of page tables for our own identity mapping instead. The pages for the new page table will come from the _pagetable section of the compressed kernel, which means they are already contained by in mem_avoid array. To do this, we reuse the code from the uncompressed kernel's identity mapping routines. The _pgtable will be shared by both the 32-bit and 64-bit paths to reduce init_size, as now the compressed kernel's _rodata to _end will contribute to init_size. To handle the possible mappings, we need to increase the existing page table buffer size: When booting via startup_64(), we need to cover the old VO, params, cmdline and uncompressed kernel. In an extreme case we could have them all beyond the 512G boundary, which needs (2+2)*4 pages with 2M mappings. And we'll need 2 for first 2M for VGA RAM. One more is needed for level4. This gets us to 19 pages total. When booting via startup_32(), KASLR could move the uncompressed kernel above 4G, so we need to create extra identity mappings, which should only need (2+2) pages at most when it is beyond the 512G boundary. So 19 pages is sufficient for this case as well. The resulting BOOT_*PGT_SIZE defines use the "_SIZE" suffix on their names to maintain logical consistency with the existing BOOT_HEAP_SIZE and BOOT_STACK_SIZE defines. This patch is based on earlier patches from Yinghai Lu and Baoquan He. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: lasse.collin@tukaani.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462572095-11754-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-06 22:01:35 +00:00
add_identity_map(mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE].start,
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE].size);
/* Avoid initrd. */
initrd_start = (u64)boot_params->ext_ramdisk_image << 32;
initrd_start |= boot_params->hdr.ramdisk_image;
initrd_size = (u64)boot_params->ext_ramdisk_size << 32;
initrd_size |= boot_params->hdr.ramdisk_size;
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_INITRD].start = initrd_start;
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_INITRD].size = initrd_size;
x86/KASLR: Build identity mappings on demand Currently KASLR only supports relocation in a small physical range (from 16M to 1G), due to using the initial kernel page table identity mapping. To support ranges above this, we need to have an identity mapping for the desired memory range before we can decompress (and later run) the kernel. 32-bit kernels already have the needed identity mapping. This patch adds identity mappings for the needed memory ranges on 64-bit kernels. This happens in two possible boot paths: If loaded via startup_32(), we need to set up the needed identity map. If loaded from a 64-bit bootloader, the bootloader will have already set up an identity mapping, and we'll start via the compressed kernel's startup_64(). In this case, the bootloader's page tables need to be avoided while selecting the new uncompressed kernel location. If not, the decompressor could overwrite them during decompression. To accomplish this, we could walk the pagetable and find every page that is used, and add them to mem_avoid, but this needs extra code and will require increasing the size of the mem_avoid array. Instead, we can create a new set of page tables for our own identity mapping instead. The pages for the new page table will come from the _pagetable section of the compressed kernel, which means they are already contained by in mem_avoid array. To do this, we reuse the code from the uncompressed kernel's identity mapping routines. The _pgtable will be shared by both the 32-bit and 64-bit paths to reduce init_size, as now the compressed kernel's _rodata to _end will contribute to init_size. To handle the possible mappings, we need to increase the existing page table buffer size: When booting via startup_64(), we need to cover the old VO, params, cmdline and uncompressed kernel. In an extreme case we could have them all beyond the 512G boundary, which needs (2+2)*4 pages with 2M mappings. And we'll need 2 for first 2M for VGA RAM. One more is needed for level4. This gets us to 19 pages total. When booting via startup_32(), KASLR could move the uncompressed kernel above 4G, so we need to create extra identity mappings, which should only need (2+2) pages at most when it is beyond the 512G boundary. So 19 pages is sufficient for this case as well. The resulting BOOT_*PGT_SIZE defines use the "_SIZE" suffix on their names to maintain logical consistency with the existing BOOT_HEAP_SIZE and BOOT_STACK_SIZE defines. This patch is based on earlier patches from Yinghai Lu and Baoquan He. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: lasse.collin@tukaani.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462572095-11754-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-06 22:01:35 +00:00
/* No need to set mapping for initrd, it will be handled in VO. */
/* Avoid kernel command line. */
cmd_line = (u64)boot_params->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32;
cmd_line |= boot_params->hdr.cmd_line_ptr;
/* Calculate size of cmd_line. */
ptr = (char *)(unsigned long)cmd_line;
for (cmd_line_size = 0; ptr[cmd_line_size++]; )
;
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE].start = cmd_line;
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE].size = cmd_line_size;
x86/KASLR: Build identity mappings on demand Currently KASLR only supports relocation in a small physical range (from 16M to 1G), due to using the initial kernel page table identity mapping. To support ranges above this, we need to have an identity mapping for the desired memory range before we can decompress (and later run) the kernel. 32-bit kernels already have the needed identity mapping. This patch adds identity mappings for the needed memory ranges on 64-bit kernels. This happens in two possible boot paths: If loaded via startup_32(), we need to set up the needed identity map. If loaded from a 64-bit bootloader, the bootloader will have already set up an identity mapping, and we'll start via the compressed kernel's startup_64(). In this case, the bootloader's page tables need to be avoided while selecting the new uncompressed kernel location. If not, the decompressor could overwrite them during decompression. To accomplish this, we could walk the pagetable and find every page that is used, and add them to mem_avoid, but this needs extra code and will require increasing the size of the mem_avoid array. Instead, we can create a new set of page tables for our own identity mapping instead. The pages for the new page table will come from the _pagetable section of the compressed kernel, which means they are already contained by in mem_avoid array. To do this, we reuse the code from the uncompressed kernel's identity mapping routines. The _pgtable will be shared by both the 32-bit and 64-bit paths to reduce init_size, as now the compressed kernel's _rodata to _end will contribute to init_size. To handle the possible mappings, we need to increase the existing page table buffer size: When booting via startup_64(), we need to cover the old VO, params, cmdline and uncompressed kernel. In an extreme case we could have them all beyond the 512G boundary, which needs (2+2)*4 pages with 2M mappings. And we'll need 2 for first 2M for VGA RAM. One more is needed for level4. This gets us to 19 pages total. When booting via startup_32(), KASLR could move the uncompressed kernel above 4G, so we need to create extra identity mappings, which should only need (2+2) pages at most when it is beyond the 512G boundary. So 19 pages is sufficient for this case as well. The resulting BOOT_*PGT_SIZE defines use the "_SIZE" suffix on their names to maintain logical consistency with the existing BOOT_HEAP_SIZE and BOOT_STACK_SIZE defines. This patch is based on earlier patches from Yinghai Lu and Baoquan He. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: lasse.collin@tukaani.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462572095-11754-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-06 22:01:35 +00:00
add_identity_map(mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE].start,
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE].size);
/* Avoid boot parameters. */
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS].start = (unsigned long)boot_params;
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS].size = sizeof(*boot_params);
x86/KASLR: Build identity mappings on demand Currently KASLR only supports relocation in a small physical range (from 16M to 1G), due to using the initial kernel page table identity mapping. To support ranges above this, we need to have an identity mapping for the desired memory range before we can decompress (and later run) the kernel. 32-bit kernels already have the needed identity mapping. This patch adds identity mappings for the needed memory ranges on 64-bit kernels. This happens in two possible boot paths: If loaded via startup_32(), we need to set up the needed identity map. If loaded from a 64-bit bootloader, the bootloader will have already set up an identity mapping, and we'll start via the compressed kernel's startup_64(). In this case, the bootloader's page tables need to be avoided while selecting the new uncompressed kernel location. If not, the decompressor could overwrite them during decompression. To accomplish this, we could walk the pagetable and find every page that is used, and add them to mem_avoid, but this needs extra code and will require increasing the size of the mem_avoid array. Instead, we can create a new set of page tables for our own identity mapping instead. The pages for the new page table will come from the _pagetable section of the compressed kernel, which means they are already contained by in mem_avoid array. To do this, we reuse the code from the uncompressed kernel's identity mapping routines. The _pgtable will be shared by both the 32-bit and 64-bit paths to reduce init_size, as now the compressed kernel's _rodata to _end will contribute to init_size. To handle the possible mappings, we need to increase the existing page table buffer size: When booting via startup_64(), we need to cover the old VO, params, cmdline and uncompressed kernel. In an extreme case we could have them all beyond the 512G boundary, which needs (2+2)*4 pages with 2M mappings. And we'll need 2 for first 2M for VGA RAM. One more is needed for level4. This gets us to 19 pages total. When booting via startup_32(), KASLR could move the uncompressed kernel above 4G, so we need to create extra identity mappings, which should only need (2+2) pages at most when it is beyond the 512G boundary. So 19 pages is sufficient for this case as well. The resulting BOOT_*PGT_SIZE defines use the "_SIZE" suffix on their names to maintain logical consistency with the existing BOOT_HEAP_SIZE and BOOT_STACK_SIZE defines. This patch is based on earlier patches from Yinghai Lu and Baoquan He. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: lasse.collin@tukaani.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462572095-11754-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-06 22:01:35 +00:00
add_identity_map(mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS].start,
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS].size);
/* We don't need to set a mapping for setup_data. */
/* Mark the memmap regions we need to avoid */
mem_avoid_memmap();
x86/KASLR: Build identity mappings on demand Currently KASLR only supports relocation in a small physical range (from 16M to 1G), due to using the initial kernel page table identity mapping. To support ranges above this, we need to have an identity mapping for the desired memory range before we can decompress (and later run) the kernel. 32-bit kernels already have the needed identity mapping. This patch adds identity mappings for the needed memory ranges on 64-bit kernels. This happens in two possible boot paths: If loaded via startup_32(), we need to set up the needed identity map. If loaded from a 64-bit bootloader, the bootloader will have already set up an identity mapping, and we'll start via the compressed kernel's startup_64(). In this case, the bootloader's page tables need to be avoided while selecting the new uncompressed kernel location. If not, the decompressor could overwrite them during decompression. To accomplish this, we could walk the pagetable and find every page that is used, and add them to mem_avoid, but this needs extra code and will require increasing the size of the mem_avoid array. Instead, we can create a new set of page tables for our own identity mapping instead. The pages for the new page table will come from the _pagetable section of the compressed kernel, which means they are already contained by in mem_avoid array. To do this, we reuse the code from the uncompressed kernel's identity mapping routines. The _pgtable will be shared by both the 32-bit and 64-bit paths to reduce init_size, as now the compressed kernel's _rodata to _end will contribute to init_size. To handle the possible mappings, we need to increase the existing page table buffer size: When booting via startup_64(), we need to cover the old VO, params, cmdline and uncompressed kernel. In an extreme case we could have them all beyond the 512G boundary, which needs (2+2)*4 pages with 2M mappings. And we'll need 2 for first 2M for VGA RAM. One more is needed for level4. This gets us to 19 pages total. When booting via startup_32(), KASLR could move the uncompressed kernel above 4G, so we need to create extra identity mappings, which should only need (2+2) pages at most when it is beyond the 512G boundary. So 19 pages is sufficient for this case as well. The resulting BOOT_*PGT_SIZE defines use the "_SIZE" suffix on their names to maintain logical consistency with the existing BOOT_HEAP_SIZE and BOOT_STACK_SIZE defines. This patch is based on earlier patches from Yinghai Lu and Baoquan He. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: lasse.collin@tukaani.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462572095-11754-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-06 22:01:35 +00:00
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_VERBOSE_BOOTUP
/* Make sure video RAM can be used. */
add_identity_map(0, PMD_SIZE);
#endif
}
/*
* Does this memory vector overlap a known avoided area? If so, record the
* overlap region with the lowest address.
*/
static bool mem_avoid_overlap(struct mem_vector *img,
struct mem_vector *overlap)
{
int i;
struct setup_data *ptr;
unsigned long earliest = img->start + img->size;
bool is_overlapping = false;
for (i = 0; i < MEM_AVOID_MAX; i++) {
if (mem_overlaps(img, &mem_avoid[i]) &&
mem_avoid[i].start < earliest) {
*overlap = mem_avoid[i];
earliest = overlap->start;
is_overlapping = true;
}
}
/* Avoid all entries in the setup_data linked list. */
ptr = (struct setup_data *)(unsigned long)boot_params->hdr.setup_data;
while (ptr) {
struct mem_vector avoid;
avoid.start = (unsigned long)ptr;
avoid.size = sizeof(*ptr) + ptr->len;
if (mem_overlaps(img, &avoid) && (avoid.start < earliest)) {
*overlap = avoid;
earliest = overlap->start;
is_overlapping = true;
}
ptr = (struct setup_data *)(unsigned long)ptr->next;
}
return is_overlapping;
}
x86/KASLR: Add 'struct slot_area' to manage random_addr slots In order to support KASLR moving the kernel anywhere in physical memory (which could be up to 64TB), we need to handle counting the potential randomization locations in a more efficient manner. In the worst case with 64TB, there could be roughly 32 * 1024 * 1024 randomization slots if CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN is 0x1000000. Currently the starting address of candidate positions is stored into the slots[] array, one at a time. This method would cost too much memory and it's also very inefficient to get and save the slot information into the slot array one by one. This patch introduces 'struct slot_area' to manage each contiguous region of randomization slots. Each slot_area will contain the starting address and how many available slots are in this area. As with the original code, the slot_areas[] will avoid the mem_avoid[] regions. Since setup_data is a linked list, it could contain an unknown number of memory regions to be avoided, which could cause us to fragment the contiguous memory that the slot_area array is tracking. In normal operation this level of fragmentation will be extremely rare, but we choose a suitably large value (100) for the array. If setup_data forces the slot_area array to become highly fragmented and there are more slots available beyond the first 100 found, the rest will be ignored for KASLR selection. The function store_slot_info() is used to calculate the number of slots available in the passed-in memory region and stores it into slot_areas[] after adjusting for alignment and size requirements. Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> [ Rewrote changelog, squashed with new functions. ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: lasse.collin@tukaani.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462825332-10505-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-09 20:22:06 +00:00
struct slot_area {
unsigned long addr;
int num;
};
#define MAX_SLOT_AREA 100
static struct slot_area slot_areas[MAX_SLOT_AREA];
static unsigned long slot_max;
x86/KASLR: Add 'struct slot_area' to manage random_addr slots In order to support KASLR moving the kernel anywhere in physical memory (which could be up to 64TB), we need to handle counting the potential randomization locations in a more efficient manner. In the worst case with 64TB, there could be roughly 32 * 1024 * 1024 randomization slots if CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN is 0x1000000. Currently the starting address of candidate positions is stored into the slots[] array, one at a time. This method would cost too much memory and it's also very inefficient to get and save the slot information into the slot array one by one. This patch introduces 'struct slot_area' to manage each contiguous region of randomization slots. Each slot_area will contain the starting address and how many available slots are in this area. As with the original code, the slot_areas[] will avoid the mem_avoid[] regions. Since setup_data is a linked list, it could contain an unknown number of memory regions to be avoided, which could cause us to fragment the contiguous memory that the slot_area array is tracking. In normal operation this level of fragmentation will be extremely rare, but we choose a suitably large value (100) for the array. If setup_data forces the slot_area array to become highly fragmented and there are more slots available beyond the first 100 found, the rest will be ignored for KASLR selection. The function store_slot_info() is used to calculate the number of slots available in the passed-in memory region and stores it into slot_areas[] after adjusting for alignment and size requirements. Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> [ Rewrote changelog, squashed with new functions. ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: lasse.collin@tukaani.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462825332-10505-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-09 20:22:06 +00:00
static unsigned long slot_area_index;
static void store_slot_info(struct mem_vector *region, unsigned long image_size)
{
struct slot_area slot_area;
if (slot_area_index == MAX_SLOT_AREA)
return;
slot_area.addr = region->start;
slot_area.num = (region->size - image_size) /
CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN + 1;
if (slot_area.num > 0) {
slot_areas[slot_area_index++] = slot_area;
slot_max += slot_area.num;
}
}
static unsigned long slots_fetch_random(void)
{
unsigned long slot;
int i;
/* Handle case of no slots stored. */
if (slot_max == 0)
return 0;
x86/mm: Refactor KASLR entropy functions Move the KASLR entropy functions into arch/x86/lib to be used in early kernel boot for KASLR memory randomization. Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Popov <alpopov@ptsecurity.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466556426-32664-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-22 00:46:58 +00:00
slot = kaslr_get_random_long("Physical") % slot_max;
for (i = 0; i < slot_area_index; i++) {
if (slot >= slot_areas[i].num) {
slot -= slot_areas[i].num;
continue;
}
return slot_areas[i].addr + slot * CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN;
}
if (i == slot_area_index)
debug_putstr("slots_fetch_random() failed!?\n");
return 0;
}
x86/boot/e820: Separate the E820 ABI structures from the in-kernel structures Linus pointed out that relying on the compiler to pack structures with enums is fragile not just for the kernel, but for external tooling as well which might rely on our UAPI headers. So separate the two from each other: introduce 'struct boot_e820_entry', which is the boot protocol entry format. This actually simplifies the code, as e820__update_table() is now never called directly with boot protocol table entries - we can rely on append_e820_table() and do a e820__update_table() call afterwards. ( This will allow further simplifications of __e820__update_table(), but that will be done in a separate patch. ) This change also has the side effect of not modifying the bootparams structure anymore - which might be useful for debugging. In theory we could even constify the boot_params structure - at least from the E820 code's point of view. Remove the uapi/asm/e820/types.h file, as it's not used anymore - all kernel side E820 types are defined in asm/e820/types.h. Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Huang, Ying <ying.huang@intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rjw@sisk.pl> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang@gmail.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-01-29 11:56:13 +00:00
static void process_e820_entry(struct boot_e820_entry *entry,
unsigned long minimum,
unsigned long image_size)
{
struct mem_vector region, overlap;
struct slot_area slot_area;
unsigned long start_orig;
/* Skip non-RAM entries. */
if (entry->type != E820_TYPE_RAM)
return;
/* On 32-bit, ignore entries entirely above our maximum. */
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32) && entry->addr >= KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE)
return;
/* Ignore entries entirely below our minimum. */
if (entry->addr + entry->size < minimum)
return;
region.start = entry->addr;
region.size = entry->size;
/* Give up if slot area array is full. */
while (slot_area_index < MAX_SLOT_AREA) {
start_orig = region.start;
/* Potentially raise address to minimum location. */
if (region.start < minimum)
region.start = minimum;
/* Potentially raise address to meet alignment needs. */
region.start = ALIGN(region.start, CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN);
/* Did we raise the address above this e820 region? */
if (region.start > entry->addr + entry->size)
return;
/* Reduce size by any delta from the original address. */
region.size -= region.start - start_orig;
/* On 32-bit, reduce region size to fit within max size. */
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32) &&
region.start + region.size > KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE)
region.size = KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE - region.start;
/* Return if region can't contain decompressed kernel */
if (region.size < image_size)
return;
/* If nothing overlaps, store the region and return. */
if (!mem_avoid_overlap(&region, &overlap)) {
store_slot_info(&region, image_size);
return;
}
/* Store beginning of region if holds at least image_size. */
if (overlap.start > region.start + image_size) {
struct mem_vector beginning;
beginning.start = region.start;
beginning.size = overlap.start - region.start;
store_slot_info(&beginning, image_size);
}
/* Return if overlap extends to or past end of region. */
if (overlap.start + overlap.size >= region.start + region.size)
return;
/* Clip off the overlapping region and start over. */
region.size -= overlap.start - region.start + overlap.size;
region.start = overlap.start + overlap.size;
}
}
x86/KASLR: Add virtual address choosing function To support randomizing the kernel virtual address separately from the physical address, this patch adds find_random_virt_addr() to choose a slot anywhere between LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR and KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE. Since this address is virtual, not physical, we can place the kernel anywhere in this region, as long as it is aligned and (in the case of kernel being larger than the slot size) placed with enough room to load the entire kernel image. For clarity and readability, find_random_addr() is renamed to find_random_phys_addr() and has "size" renamed to "image_size" to match find_random_virt_addr(). Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> [ Rewrote changelog, refactored slot calculation for readability. ] [ Renamed find_random_phys_addr() and size argument. ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: lasse.collin@tukaani.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462825332-10505-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-09 20:22:08 +00:00
static unsigned long find_random_phys_addr(unsigned long minimum,
unsigned long image_size)
{
int i;
unsigned long addr;
/* Check if we had too many memmaps. */
if (memmap_too_large) {
debug_putstr("Aborted e820 scan (more than 4 memmap= args)!\n");
return 0;
}
/* Make sure minimum is aligned. */
minimum = ALIGN(minimum, CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN);
/* Verify potential e820 positions, appending to slots list. */
for (i = 0; i < boot_params->e820_entries; i++) {
process_e820_entry(&boot_params->e820_table[i], minimum,
x86/KASLR: Add virtual address choosing function To support randomizing the kernel virtual address separately from the physical address, this patch adds find_random_virt_addr() to choose a slot anywhere between LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR and KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE. Since this address is virtual, not physical, we can place the kernel anywhere in this region, as long as it is aligned and (in the case of kernel being larger than the slot size) placed with enough room to load the entire kernel image. For clarity and readability, find_random_addr() is renamed to find_random_phys_addr() and has "size" renamed to "image_size" to match find_random_virt_addr(). Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> [ Rewrote changelog, refactored slot calculation for readability. ] [ Renamed find_random_phys_addr() and size argument. ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: lasse.collin@tukaani.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462825332-10505-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-09 20:22:08 +00:00
image_size);
if (slot_area_index == MAX_SLOT_AREA) {
debug_putstr("Aborted e820 scan (slot_areas full)!\n");
break;
}
}
return slots_fetch_random();
}
x86/KASLR: Add virtual address choosing function To support randomizing the kernel virtual address separately from the physical address, this patch adds find_random_virt_addr() to choose a slot anywhere between LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR and KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE. Since this address is virtual, not physical, we can place the kernel anywhere in this region, as long as it is aligned and (in the case of kernel being larger than the slot size) placed with enough room to load the entire kernel image. For clarity and readability, find_random_addr() is renamed to find_random_phys_addr() and has "size" renamed to "image_size" to match find_random_virt_addr(). Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> [ Rewrote changelog, refactored slot calculation for readability. ] [ Renamed find_random_phys_addr() and size argument. ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: lasse.collin@tukaani.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462825332-10505-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-09 20:22:08 +00:00
static unsigned long find_random_virt_addr(unsigned long minimum,
unsigned long image_size)
{
unsigned long slots, random_addr;
/* Make sure minimum is aligned. */
minimum = ALIGN(minimum, CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN);
/* Align image_size for easy slot calculations. */
image_size = ALIGN(image_size, CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN);
/*
* There are how many CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN-sized slots
* that can hold image_size within the range of minimum to
* KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE?
*/
slots = (KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE - minimum - image_size) /
CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN + 1;
x86/mm: Refactor KASLR entropy functions Move the KASLR entropy functions into arch/x86/lib to be used in early kernel boot for KASLR memory randomization. Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Popov <alpopov@ptsecurity.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466556426-32664-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-22 00:46:58 +00:00
random_addr = kaslr_get_random_long("Virtual") % slots;
x86/KASLR: Add virtual address choosing function To support randomizing the kernel virtual address separately from the physical address, this patch adds find_random_virt_addr() to choose a slot anywhere between LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR and KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE. Since this address is virtual, not physical, we can place the kernel anywhere in this region, as long as it is aligned and (in the case of kernel being larger than the slot size) placed with enough room to load the entire kernel image. For clarity and readability, find_random_addr() is renamed to find_random_phys_addr() and has "size" renamed to "image_size" to match find_random_virt_addr(). Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> [ Rewrote changelog, refactored slot calculation for readability. ] [ Renamed find_random_phys_addr() and size argument. ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: lasse.collin@tukaani.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462825332-10505-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-09 20:22:08 +00:00
return random_addr * CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN + minimum;
}
/*
* Since this function examines addresses much more numerically,
* it takes the input and output pointers as 'unsigned long'.
*/
x86/KASLR: Randomize virtual address separately The current KASLR implementation randomizes the physical and virtual addresses of the kernel together (both are offset by the same amount). It calculates the delta of the physical address where vmlinux was linked to load and where it is finally loaded. If the delta is not equal to 0 (i.e. the kernel was relocated), relocation handling needs be done. On 64-bit, this patch randomizes both the physical address where kernel is decompressed and the virtual address where kernel text is mapped and will execute from. We now have two values being chosen, so the function arguments are reorganized to pass by pointer so they can be directly updated. Since relocation handling only depends on the virtual address, we must check the virtual delta, not the physical delta for processing kernel relocations. This also populates the page table for the new virtual address range. 32-bit does not support a separate virtual address, so it continues to use the physical offset for its virtual offset. Additionally updates the sanity checks done on the resulting kernel addresses since they are potentially separate now. [kees: rewrote changelog, limited virtual split to 64-bit only, update checks] [kees: fix CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=n boot failure] Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464216334-17200-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-25 22:45:32 +00:00
void choose_random_location(unsigned long input,
unsigned long input_size,
unsigned long *output,
unsigned long output_size,
unsigned long *virt_addr)
{
x86/KASLR: Allow randomization below the load address Currently the kernel image physical address randomization's lower boundary is the original kernel load address. For bootloaders that load kernels into very high memory (e.g. kexec), this means randomization takes place in a very small window at the top of memory, ignoring the large region of physical memory below the load address. Since mem_avoid[] is already correctly tracking the regions that must be avoided, this patch changes the minimum address to whatever is less: 512M (to conservatively avoid unknown things in lower memory) or the load address. Now, for example, if the kernel is loaded at 8G, [512M, 8G) will be added to the list of possible physical memory positions. Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> [ Rewrote the changelog, refactored the code to use min(). ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464216334-17200-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org [ Edited the changelog some more, plus the code comment as well. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-25 22:45:34 +00:00
unsigned long random_addr, min_addr;
x86/KASLR: Randomize virtual address separately The current KASLR implementation randomizes the physical and virtual addresses of the kernel together (both are offset by the same amount). It calculates the delta of the physical address where vmlinux was linked to load and where it is finally loaded. If the delta is not equal to 0 (i.e. the kernel was relocated), relocation handling needs be done. On 64-bit, this patch randomizes both the physical address where kernel is decompressed and the virtual address where kernel text is mapped and will execute from. We now have two values being chosen, so the function arguments are reorganized to pass by pointer so they can be directly updated. Since relocation handling only depends on the virtual address, we must check the virtual delta, not the physical delta for processing kernel relocations. This also populates the page table for the new virtual address range. 32-bit does not support a separate virtual address, so it continues to use the physical offset for its virtual offset. Additionally updates the sanity checks done on the resulting kernel addresses since they are potentially separate now. [kees: rewrote changelog, limited virtual split to 64-bit only, update checks] [kees: fix CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=n boot failure] Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464216334-17200-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-25 22:45:32 +00:00
/* By default, keep output position unchanged. */
*virt_addr = *output;
if (cmdline_find_option_bool("nokaslr")) {
warn("KASLR disabled: 'nokaslr' on cmdline.");
x86/KASLR: Randomize virtual address separately The current KASLR implementation randomizes the physical and virtual addresses of the kernel together (both are offset by the same amount). It calculates the delta of the physical address where vmlinux was linked to load and where it is finally loaded. If the delta is not equal to 0 (i.e. the kernel was relocated), relocation handling needs be done. On 64-bit, this patch randomizes both the physical address where kernel is decompressed and the virtual address where kernel text is mapped and will execute from. We now have two values being chosen, so the function arguments are reorganized to pass by pointer so they can be directly updated. Since relocation handling only depends on the virtual address, we must check the virtual delta, not the physical delta for processing kernel relocations. This also populates the page table for the new virtual address range. 32-bit does not support a separate virtual address, so it continues to use the physical offset for its virtual offset. Additionally updates the sanity checks done on the resulting kernel addresses since they are potentially separate now. [kees: rewrote changelog, limited virtual split to 64-bit only, update checks] [kees: fix CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=n boot failure] Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464216334-17200-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-25 22:45:32 +00:00
return;
}
boot_params->hdr.loadflags |= KASLR_FLAG;
/* Prepare to add new identity pagetables on demand. */
initialize_identity_maps();
/* Record the various known unsafe memory ranges. */
x86/KASLR: Randomize virtual address separately The current KASLR implementation randomizes the physical and virtual addresses of the kernel together (both are offset by the same amount). It calculates the delta of the physical address where vmlinux was linked to load and where it is finally loaded. If the delta is not equal to 0 (i.e. the kernel was relocated), relocation handling needs be done. On 64-bit, this patch randomizes both the physical address where kernel is decompressed and the virtual address where kernel text is mapped and will execute from. We now have two values being chosen, so the function arguments are reorganized to pass by pointer so they can be directly updated. Since relocation handling only depends on the virtual address, we must check the virtual delta, not the physical delta for processing kernel relocations. This also populates the page table for the new virtual address range. 32-bit does not support a separate virtual address, so it continues to use the physical offset for its virtual offset. Additionally updates the sanity checks done on the resulting kernel addresses since they are potentially separate now. [kees: rewrote changelog, limited virtual split to 64-bit only, update checks] [kees: fix CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=n boot failure] Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464216334-17200-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-25 22:45:32 +00:00
mem_avoid_init(input, input_size, *output);
x86/KASLR: Allow randomization below the load address Currently the kernel image physical address randomization's lower boundary is the original kernel load address. For bootloaders that load kernels into very high memory (e.g. kexec), this means randomization takes place in a very small window at the top of memory, ignoring the large region of physical memory below the load address. Since mem_avoid[] is already correctly tracking the regions that must be avoided, this patch changes the minimum address to whatever is less: 512M (to conservatively avoid unknown things in lower memory) or the load address. Now, for example, if the kernel is loaded at 8G, [512M, 8G) will be added to the list of possible physical memory positions. Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> [ Rewrote the changelog, refactored the code to use min(). ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464216334-17200-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org [ Edited the changelog some more, plus the code comment as well. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-25 22:45:34 +00:00
/*
* Low end of the randomization range should be the
* smaller of 512M or the initial kernel image
* location:
*/
min_addr = min(*output, 512UL << 20);
/* Walk e820 and find a random address. */
x86/KASLR: Allow randomization below the load address Currently the kernel image physical address randomization's lower boundary is the original kernel load address. For bootloaders that load kernels into very high memory (e.g. kexec), this means randomization takes place in a very small window at the top of memory, ignoring the large region of physical memory below the load address. Since mem_avoid[] is already correctly tracking the regions that must be avoided, this patch changes the minimum address to whatever is less: 512M (to conservatively avoid unknown things in lower memory) or the load address. Now, for example, if the kernel is loaded at 8G, [512M, 8G) will be added to the list of possible physical memory positions. Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> [ Rewrote the changelog, refactored the code to use min(). ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464216334-17200-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org [ Edited the changelog some more, plus the code comment as well. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-25 22:45:34 +00:00
random_addr = find_random_phys_addr(min_addr, output_size);
if (!random_addr) {
warn("Physical KASLR disabled: no suitable memory region!");
x86/KASLR: Randomize virtual address separately The current KASLR implementation randomizes the physical and virtual addresses of the kernel together (both are offset by the same amount). It calculates the delta of the physical address where vmlinux was linked to load and where it is finally loaded. If the delta is not equal to 0 (i.e. the kernel was relocated), relocation handling needs be done. On 64-bit, this patch randomizes both the physical address where kernel is decompressed and the virtual address where kernel text is mapped and will execute from. We now have two values being chosen, so the function arguments are reorganized to pass by pointer so they can be directly updated. Since relocation handling only depends on the virtual address, we must check the virtual delta, not the physical delta for processing kernel relocations. This also populates the page table for the new virtual address range. 32-bit does not support a separate virtual address, so it continues to use the physical offset for its virtual offset. Additionally updates the sanity checks done on the resulting kernel addresses since they are potentially separate now. [kees: rewrote changelog, limited virtual split to 64-bit only, update checks] [kees: fix CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=n boot failure] Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464216334-17200-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-25 22:45:32 +00:00
} else {
/* Update the new physical address location. */
if (*output != random_addr) {
add_identity_map(random_addr, output_size);
*output = random_addr;
}
}
/* This actually loads the identity pagetable on x86_64. */
x86/KASLR: Build identity mappings on demand Currently KASLR only supports relocation in a small physical range (from 16M to 1G), due to using the initial kernel page table identity mapping. To support ranges above this, we need to have an identity mapping for the desired memory range before we can decompress (and later run) the kernel. 32-bit kernels already have the needed identity mapping. This patch adds identity mappings for the needed memory ranges on 64-bit kernels. This happens in two possible boot paths: If loaded via startup_32(), we need to set up the needed identity map. If loaded from a 64-bit bootloader, the bootloader will have already set up an identity mapping, and we'll start via the compressed kernel's startup_64(). In this case, the bootloader's page tables need to be avoided while selecting the new uncompressed kernel location. If not, the decompressor could overwrite them during decompression. To accomplish this, we could walk the pagetable and find every page that is used, and add them to mem_avoid, but this needs extra code and will require increasing the size of the mem_avoid array. Instead, we can create a new set of page tables for our own identity mapping instead. The pages for the new page table will come from the _pagetable section of the compressed kernel, which means they are already contained by in mem_avoid array. To do this, we reuse the code from the uncompressed kernel's identity mapping routines. The _pgtable will be shared by both the 32-bit and 64-bit paths to reduce init_size, as now the compressed kernel's _rodata to _end will contribute to init_size. To handle the possible mappings, we need to increase the existing page table buffer size: When booting via startup_64(), we need to cover the old VO, params, cmdline and uncompressed kernel. In an extreme case we could have them all beyond the 512G boundary, which needs (2+2)*4 pages with 2M mappings. And we'll need 2 for first 2M for VGA RAM. One more is needed for level4. This gets us to 19 pages total. When booting via startup_32(), KASLR could move the uncompressed kernel above 4G, so we need to create extra identity mappings, which should only need (2+2) pages at most when it is beyond the 512G boundary. So 19 pages is sufficient for this case as well. The resulting BOOT_*PGT_SIZE defines use the "_SIZE" suffix on their names to maintain logical consistency with the existing BOOT_HEAP_SIZE and BOOT_STACK_SIZE defines. This patch is based on earlier patches from Yinghai Lu and Baoquan He. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: lasse.collin@tukaani.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462572095-11754-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-06 22:01:35 +00:00
finalize_identity_maps();
x86/KASLR: Randomize virtual address separately The current KASLR implementation randomizes the physical and virtual addresses of the kernel together (both are offset by the same amount). It calculates the delta of the physical address where vmlinux was linked to load and where it is finally loaded. If the delta is not equal to 0 (i.e. the kernel was relocated), relocation handling needs be done. On 64-bit, this patch randomizes both the physical address where kernel is decompressed and the virtual address where kernel text is mapped and will execute from. We now have two values being chosen, so the function arguments are reorganized to pass by pointer so they can be directly updated. Since relocation handling only depends on the virtual address, we must check the virtual delta, not the physical delta for processing kernel relocations. This also populates the page table for the new virtual address range. 32-bit does not support a separate virtual address, so it continues to use the physical offset for its virtual offset. Additionally updates the sanity checks done on the resulting kernel addresses since they are potentially separate now. [kees: rewrote changelog, limited virtual split to 64-bit only, update checks] [kees: fix CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=n boot failure] Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464216334-17200-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-25 22:45:32 +00:00
/* Pick random virtual address starting from LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR. */
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
random_addr = find_random_virt_addr(LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR, output_size);
*virt_addr = random_addr;
}