2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2008-10-19 03:28:07 +00:00
|
|
|
* device_cgroup.c - device cgroup subsystem
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Copyright 2007 IBM Corp
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/device_cgroup.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/cgroup.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/ctype.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/list.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
|
2008-04-29 08:00:14 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
|
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 08:04:11 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/slab.h>
|
2008-10-19 03:28:07 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
|
2009-04-02 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/mutex.h>
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define ACC_MKNOD 1
|
|
|
|
#define ACC_READ 2
|
|
|
|
#define ACC_WRITE 4
|
|
|
|
#define ACC_MASK (ACC_MKNOD | ACC_READ | ACC_WRITE)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define DEV_BLOCK 1
|
|
|
|
#define DEV_CHAR 2
|
|
|
|
#define DEV_ALL 4 /* this represents all devices */
|
|
|
|
|
2009-04-02 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
static DEFINE_MUTEX(devcgroup_mutex);
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* whitelist locking rules:
|
2009-04-02 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
* hold devcgroup_mutex for update/read.
|
2008-10-19 03:28:07 +00:00
|
|
|
* hold rcu_read_lock() for read.
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct dev_whitelist_item {
|
|
|
|
u32 major, minor;
|
|
|
|
short type;
|
|
|
|
short access;
|
|
|
|
struct list_head list;
|
devcgroup: relax white-list protection down to RCU
Currently this list is protected with a simple spinlock, even for reading
from one. This is OK, but can be better.
Actually I want it to be better very much, since after replacing the
OpenVZ device permissions engine with the cgroup-based one I noticed, that
we set 12 default device permissions for each newly created container (for
/dev/null, full, terminals, ect devices), and people sometimes have up to
20 perms more, so traversing the ~30-40 elements list under a spinlock
doesn't seem very good.
Here's the RCU protection for white-list - dev_whitelist_item-s are added
and removed under the devcg->lock, but are looked up in permissions
checking under the rcu_read_lock.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-25 08:47:07 +00:00
|
|
|
struct rcu_head rcu;
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct dev_cgroup {
|
|
|
|
struct cgroup_subsys_state css;
|
|
|
|
struct list_head whitelist;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2008-06-06 05:46:24 +00:00
|
|
|
static inline struct dev_cgroup *css_to_devcgroup(struct cgroup_subsys_state *s)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return container_of(s, struct dev_cgroup, css);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
static inline struct dev_cgroup *cgroup_to_devcgroup(struct cgroup *cgroup)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2008-06-06 05:46:24 +00:00
|
|
|
return css_to_devcgroup(cgroup_subsys_state(cgroup, devices_subsys_id));
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-07-25 08:47:03 +00:00
|
|
|
static inline struct dev_cgroup *task_devcgroup(struct task_struct *task)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return css_to_devcgroup(task_subsys_state(task, devices_subsys_id));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
struct cgroup_subsys devices_subsys;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int devcgroup_can_attach(struct cgroup_subsys *ss,
|
2011-05-26 23:25:19 +00:00
|
|
|
struct cgroup *new_cgroup, struct task_struct *task)
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (current != task && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
|
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2009-04-02 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
* called under devcgroup_mutex
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int dev_whitelist_copy(struct list_head *dest, struct list_head *orig)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct dev_whitelist_item *wh, *tmp, *new;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry(wh, orig, list) {
|
2008-10-19 03:28:06 +00:00
|
|
|
new = kmemdup(wh, sizeof(*wh), GFP_KERNEL);
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!new)
|
|
|
|
goto free_and_exit;
|
|
|
|
list_add_tail(&new->list, dest);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
free_and_exit:
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry_safe(wh, tmp, dest, list) {
|
|
|
|
list_del(&wh->list);
|
|
|
|
kfree(wh);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Stupid prototype - don't bother combining existing entries */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2009-04-02 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
* called under devcgroup_mutex
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int dev_whitelist_add(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup,
|
|
|
|
struct dev_whitelist_item *wh)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2008-06-06 05:46:28 +00:00
|
|
|
struct dev_whitelist_item *whcopy, *walk;
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-10-19 03:28:06 +00:00
|
|
|
whcopy = kmemdup(wh, sizeof(*wh), GFP_KERNEL);
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!whcopy)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
2008-06-06 05:46:28 +00:00
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry(walk, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) {
|
|
|
|
if (walk->type != wh->type)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (walk->major != wh->major)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (walk->minor != wh->minor)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
walk->access |= wh->access;
|
|
|
|
kfree(whcopy);
|
|
|
|
whcopy = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (whcopy != NULL)
|
devcgroup: relax white-list protection down to RCU
Currently this list is protected with a simple spinlock, even for reading
from one. This is OK, but can be better.
Actually I want it to be better very much, since after replacing the
OpenVZ device permissions engine with the cgroup-based one I noticed, that
we set 12 default device permissions for each newly created container (for
/dev/null, full, terminals, ect devices), and people sometimes have up to
20 perms more, so traversing the ~30-40 elements list under a spinlock
doesn't seem very good.
Here's the RCU protection for white-list - dev_whitelist_item-s are added
and removed under the devcg->lock, but are looked up in permissions
checking under the rcu_read_lock.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-25 08:47:07 +00:00
|
|
|
list_add_tail_rcu(&whcopy->list, &dev_cgroup->whitelist);
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
devcgroup: relax white-list protection down to RCU
Currently this list is protected with a simple spinlock, even for reading
from one. This is OK, but can be better.
Actually I want it to be better very much, since after replacing the
OpenVZ device permissions engine with the cgroup-based one I noticed, that
we set 12 default device permissions for each newly created container (for
/dev/null, full, terminals, ect devices), and people sometimes have up to
20 perms more, so traversing the ~30-40 elements list under a spinlock
doesn't seem very good.
Here's the RCU protection for white-list - dev_whitelist_item-s are added
and removed under the devcg->lock, but are looked up in permissions
checking under the rcu_read_lock.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-25 08:47:07 +00:00
|
|
|
static void whitelist_item_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct dev_whitelist_item *item;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
item = container_of(rcu, struct dev_whitelist_item, rcu);
|
|
|
|
kfree(item);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2009-04-02 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
* called under devcgroup_mutex
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void dev_whitelist_rm(struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup,
|
|
|
|
struct dev_whitelist_item *wh)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct dev_whitelist_item *walk, *tmp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry_safe(walk, tmp, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) {
|
|
|
|
if (walk->type == DEV_ALL)
|
|
|
|
goto remove;
|
|
|
|
if (walk->type != wh->type)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (walk->major != ~0 && walk->major != wh->major)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (walk->minor != ~0 && walk->minor != wh->minor)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
remove:
|
|
|
|
walk->access &= ~wh->access;
|
|
|
|
if (!walk->access) {
|
devcgroup: relax white-list protection down to RCU
Currently this list is protected with a simple spinlock, even for reading
from one. This is OK, but can be better.
Actually I want it to be better very much, since after replacing the
OpenVZ device permissions engine with the cgroup-based one I noticed, that
we set 12 default device permissions for each newly created container (for
/dev/null, full, terminals, ect devices), and people sometimes have up to
20 perms more, so traversing the ~30-40 elements list under a spinlock
doesn't seem very good.
Here's the RCU protection for white-list - dev_whitelist_item-s are added
and removed under the devcg->lock, but are looked up in permissions
checking under the rcu_read_lock.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-25 08:47:07 +00:00
|
|
|
list_del_rcu(&walk->list);
|
|
|
|
call_rcu(&walk->rcu, whitelist_item_free);
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* called from kernel/cgroup.c with cgroup_lock() held.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static struct cgroup_subsys_state *devcgroup_create(struct cgroup_subsys *ss,
|
|
|
|
struct cgroup *cgroup)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup, *parent_dev_cgroup;
|
|
|
|
struct cgroup *parent_cgroup;
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dev_cgroup = kzalloc(sizeof(*dev_cgroup), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!dev_cgroup)
|
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
|
|
|
|
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev_cgroup->whitelist);
|
|
|
|
parent_cgroup = cgroup->parent;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (parent_cgroup == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
struct dev_whitelist_item *wh;
|
|
|
|
wh = kmalloc(sizeof(*wh), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (!wh) {
|
|
|
|
kfree(dev_cgroup);
|
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
wh->minor = wh->major = ~0;
|
|
|
|
wh->type = DEV_ALL;
|
2008-07-25 08:47:08 +00:00
|
|
|
wh->access = ACC_MASK;
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
list_add(&wh->list, &dev_cgroup->whitelist);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
parent_dev_cgroup = cgroup_to_devcgroup(parent_cgroup);
|
2009-04-02 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&devcgroup_mutex);
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = dev_whitelist_copy(&dev_cgroup->whitelist,
|
|
|
|
&parent_dev_cgroup->whitelist);
|
2009-04-02 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&devcgroup_mutex);
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
|
|
kfree(dev_cgroup);
|
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(ret);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return &dev_cgroup->css;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void devcgroup_destroy(struct cgroup_subsys *ss,
|
|
|
|
struct cgroup *cgroup)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup;
|
|
|
|
struct dev_whitelist_item *wh, *tmp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dev_cgroup = cgroup_to_devcgroup(cgroup);
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry_safe(wh, tmp, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) {
|
|
|
|
list_del(&wh->list);
|
|
|
|
kfree(wh);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kfree(dev_cgroup);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define DEVCG_ALLOW 1
|
|
|
|
#define DEVCG_DENY 2
|
2008-04-29 08:00:14 +00:00
|
|
|
#define DEVCG_LIST 3
|
|
|
|
|
2008-07-13 19:14:02 +00:00
|
|
|
#define MAJMINLEN 13
|
2008-04-29 08:00:14 +00:00
|
|
|
#define ACCLEN 4
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void set_access(char *acc, short access)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int idx = 0;
|
2008-04-29 08:00:14 +00:00
|
|
|
memset(acc, 0, ACCLEN);
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (access & ACC_READ)
|
|
|
|
acc[idx++] = 'r';
|
|
|
|
if (access & ACC_WRITE)
|
|
|
|
acc[idx++] = 'w';
|
|
|
|
if (access & ACC_MKNOD)
|
|
|
|
acc[idx++] = 'm';
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static char type_to_char(short type)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (type == DEV_ALL)
|
|
|
|
return 'a';
|
|
|
|
if (type == DEV_CHAR)
|
|
|
|
return 'c';
|
|
|
|
if (type == DEV_BLOCK)
|
|
|
|
return 'b';
|
|
|
|
return 'X';
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-29 08:00:14 +00:00
|
|
|
static void set_majmin(char *str, unsigned m)
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (m == ~0)
|
2008-07-25 08:47:08 +00:00
|
|
|
strcpy(str, "*");
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
2008-07-25 08:47:08 +00:00
|
|
|
sprintf(str, "%u", m);
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-04-29 08:00:14 +00:00
|
|
|
static int devcgroup_seq_read(struct cgroup *cgroup, struct cftype *cft,
|
|
|
|
struct seq_file *m)
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-04-29 08:00:14 +00:00
|
|
|
struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup = cgroup_to_devcgroup(cgroup);
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
struct dev_whitelist_item *wh;
|
2008-04-29 08:00:14 +00:00
|
|
|
char maj[MAJMINLEN], min[MAJMINLEN], acc[ACCLEN];
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
devcgroup: relax white-list protection down to RCU
Currently this list is protected with a simple spinlock, even for reading
from one. This is OK, but can be better.
Actually I want it to be better very much, since after replacing the
OpenVZ device permissions engine with the cgroup-based one I noticed, that
we set 12 default device permissions for each newly created container (for
/dev/null, full, terminals, ect devices), and people sometimes have up to
20 perms more, so traversing the ~30-40 elements list under a spinlock
doesn't seem very good.
Here's the RCU protection for white-list - dev_whitelist_item-s are added
and removed under the devcg->lock, but are looked up in permissions
checking under the rcu_read_lock.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-25 08:47:07 +00:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry_rcu(wh, &devcgroup->whitelist, list) {
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
set_access(acc, wh->access);
|
2008-04-29 08:00:14 +00:00
|
|
|
set_majmin(maj, wh->major);
|
|
|
|
set_majmin(min, wh->minor);
|
|
|
|
seq_printf(m, "%c %s:%s %s\n", type_to_char(wh->type),
|
|
|
|
maj, min, acc);
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
devcgroup: relax white-list protection down to RCU
Currently this list is protected with a simple spinlock, even for reading
from one. This is OK, but can be better.
Actually I want it to be better very much, since after replacing the
OpenVZ device permissions engine with the cgroup-based one I noticed, that
we set 12 default device permissions for each newly created container (for
/dev/null, full, terminals, ect devices), and people sometimes have up to
20 perms more, so traversing the ~30-40 elements list under a spinlock
doesn't seem very good.
Here's the RCU protection for white-list - dev_whitelist_item-s are added
and removed under the devcg->lock, but are looked up in permissions
checking under the rcu_read_lock.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-25 08:47:07 +00:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-29 08:00:14 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* may_access_whitelist:
|
|
|
|
* does the access granted to dev_cgroup c contain the access
|
|
|
|
* requested in whitelist item refwh.
|
|
|
|
* return 1 if yes, 0 if no.
|
2009-04-02 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
* call with devcgroup_mutex held
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int may_access_whitelist(struct dev_cgroup *c,
|
|
|
|
struct dev_whitelist_item *refwh)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct dev_whitelist_item *whitem;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry(whitem, &c->whitelist, list) {
|
|
|
|
if (whitem->type & DEV_ALL)
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
if ((refwh->type & DEV_BLOCK) && !(whitem->type & DEV_BLOCK))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if ((refwh->type & DEV_CHAR) && !(whitem->type & DEV_CHAR))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (whitem->major != ~0 && whitem->major != refwh->major)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (whitem->minor != ~0 && whitem->minor != refwh->minor)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
2008-07-13 19:14:04 +00:00
|
|
|
if (refwh->access & (~whitem->access))
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* parent_has_perm:
|
|
|
|
* when adding a new allow rule to a device whitelist, the rule
|
|
|
|
* must be allowed in the parent device
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2008-07-25 08:47:03 +00:00
|
|
|
static int parent_has_perm(struct dev_cgroup *childcg,
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
struct dev_whitelist_item *wh)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2008-07-25 08:47:03 +00:00
|
|
|
struct cgroup *pcg = childcg->css.cgroup->parent;
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
struct dev_cgroup *parent;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!pcg)
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
parent = cgroup_to_devcgroup(pcg);
|
2008-10-19 03:28:07 +00:00
|
|
|
return may_access_whitelist(parent, wh);
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Modify the whitelist using allow/deny rules.
|
|
|
|
* CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed for this. It's at least separate from CAP_MKNOD
|
|
|
|
* so we can give a container CAP_MKNOD to let it create devices but not
|
|
|
|
* modify the whitelist.
|
|
|
|
* It seems likely we'll want to add a CAP_CONTAINER capability to allow
|
|
|
|
* us to also grant CAP_SYS_ADMIN to containers without giving away the
|
|
|
|
* device whitelist controls, but for now we'll stick with CAP_SYS_ADMIN
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Taking rules away is always allowed (given CAP_SYS_ADMIN). Granting
|
|
|
|
* new access is only allowed if you're in the top-level cgroup, or your
|
|
|
|
* parent cgroup has the access you're asking for.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2008-07-25 08:47:03 +00:00
|
|
|
static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup,
|
|
|
|
int filetype, const char *buffer)
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-07-25 08:47:03 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *b;
|
2008-07-25 08:47:08 +00:00
|
|
|
char *endp;
|
2008-10-19 03:28:07 +00:00
|
|
|
int count;
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
struct dev_whitelist_item wh;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
|
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(&wh, 0, sizeof(wh));
|
|
|
|
b = buffer;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (*b) {
|
|
|
|
case 'a':
|
|
|
|
wh.type = DEV_ALL;
|
|
|
|
wh.access = ACC_MASK;
|
2008-07-04 17:00:07 +00:00
|
|
|
wh.major = ~0;
|
|
|
|
wh.minor = ~0;
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
goto handle;
|
|
|
|
case 'b':
|
|
|
|
wh.type = DEV_BLOCK;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 'c':
|
|
|
|
wh.type = DEV_CHAR;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
2008-07-25 08:47:03 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
b++;
|
2008-07-25 08:47:03 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!isspace(*b))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
b++;
|
|
|
|
if (*b == '*') {
|
|
|
|
wh.major = ~0;
|
|
|
|
b++;
|
|
|
|
} else if (isdigit(*b)) {
|
2008-07-25 08:47:08 +00:00
|
|
|
wh.major = simple_strtoul(b, &endp, 10);
|
|
|
|
b = endp;
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2008-07-25 08:47:03 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-07-25 08:47:03 +00:00
|
|
|
if (*b != ':')
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
b++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* read minor */
|
|
|
|
if (*b == '*') {
|
|
|
|
wh.minor = ~0;
|
|
|
|
b++;
|
|
|
|
} else if (isdigit(*b)) {
|
2008-07-25 08:47:08 +00:00
|
|
|
wh.minor = simple_strtoul(b, &endp, 10);
|
|
|
|
b = endp;
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2008-07-25 08:47:03 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-07-25 08:47:03 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!isspace(*b))
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
for (b++, count = 0; count < 3; count++, b++) {
|
|
|
|
switch (*b) {
|
|
|
|
case 'r':
|
|
|
|
wh.access |= ACC_READ;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 'w':
|
|
|
|
wh.access |= ACC_WRITE;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 'm':
|
|
|
|
wh.access |= ACC_MKNOD;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case '\n':
|
|
|
|
case '\0':
|
|
|
|
count = 3;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
2008-07-25 08:47:03 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
handle:
|
|
|
|
switch (filetype) {
|
|
|
|
case DEVCG_ALLOW:
|
2008-07-25 08:47:03 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!parent_has_perm(devcgroup, &wh))
|
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
return dev_whitelist_add(devcgroup, &wh);
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
case DEVCG_DENY:
|
|
|
|
dev_whitelist_rm(devcgroup, &wh);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
2008-07-25 08:47:03 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-07-25 08:47:03 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-07-25 08:47:03 +00:00
|
|
|
static int devcgroup_access_write(struct cgroup *cgrp, struct cftype *cft,
|
|
|
|
const char *buffer)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int retval;
|
2009-04-02 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
mutex_lock(&devcgroup_mutex);
|
2008-07-25 08:47:03 +00:00
|
|
|
retval = devcgroup_update_access(cgroup_to_devcgroup(cgrp),
|
|
|
|
cft->private, buffer);
|
2009-04-02 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
mutex_unlock(&devcgroup_mutex);
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
return retval;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static struct cftype dev_cgroup_files[] = {
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.name = "allow",
|
2008-07-25 08:47:03 +00:00
|
|
|
.write_string = devcgroup_access_write,
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
.private = DEVCG_ALLOW,
|
|
|
|
},
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.name = "deny",
|
2008-07-25 08:47:03 +00:00
|
|
|
.write_string = devcgroup_access_write,
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
.private = DEVCG_DENY,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2008-04-29 08:00:14 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.name = "list",
|
|
|
|
.read_seq_string = devcgroup_seq_read,
|
|
|
|
.private = DEVCG_LIST,
|
|
|
|
},
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int devcgroup_populate(struct cgroup_subsys *ss,
|
|
|
|
struct cgroup *cgroup)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return cgroup_add_files(cgroup, ss, dev_cgroup_files,
|
|
|
|
ARRAY_SIZE(dev_cgroup_files));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct cgroup_subsys devices_subsys = {
|
|
|
|
.name = "devices",
|
|
|
|
.can_attach = devcgroup_can_attach,
|
|
|
|
.create = devcgroup_create,
|
2010-04-21 07:02:11 +00:00
|
|
|
.destroy = devcgroup_destroy,
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
.populate = devcgroup_populate,
|
|
|
|
.subsys_id = devices_subsys_id,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int devcgroup_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup;
|
|
|
|
struct dev_whitelist_item *wh;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dev_t device = inode->i_rdev;
|
|
|
|
if (!device)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode) && !S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
devcgroup: relax white-list protection down to RCU
Currently this list is protected with a simple spinlock, even for reading
from one. This is OK, but can be better.
Actually I want it to be better very much, since after replacing the
OpenVZ device permissions engine with the cgroup-based one I noticed, that
we set 12 default device permissions for each newly created container (for
/dev/null, full, terminals, ect devices), and people sometimes have up to
20 perms more, so traversing the ~30-40 elements list under a spinlock
doesn't seem very good.
Here's the RCU protection for white-list - dev_whitelist_item-s are added
and removed under the devcg->lock, but are looked up in permissions
checking under the rcu_read_lock.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-25 08:47:07 +00:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
2008-09-02 21:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dev_cgroup = task_devcgroup(current);
|
|
|
|
|
devcgroup: relax white-list protection down to RCU
Currently this list is protected with a simple spinlock, even for reading
from one. This is OK, but can be better.
Actually I want it to be better very much, since after replacing the
OpenVZ device permissions engine with the cgroup-based one I noticed, that
we set 12 default device permissions for each newly created container (for
/dev/null, full, terminals, ect devices), and people sometimes have up to
20 perms more, so traversing the ~30-40 elements list under a spinlock
doesn't seem very good.
Here's the RCU protection for white-list - dev_whitelist_item-s are added
and removed under the devcg->lock, but are looked up in permissions
checking under the rcu_read_lock.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-25 08:47:07 +00:00
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry_rcu(wh, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) {
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (wh->type & DEV_ALL)
|
2009-06-17 23:26:33 +00:00
|
|
|
goto found;
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((wh->type & DEV_BLOCK) && !S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if ((wh->type & DEV_CHAR) && !S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (wh->major != ~0 && wh->major != imajor(inode))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (wh->minor != ~0 && wh->minor != iminor(inode))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
2009-06-17 23:26:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && !(wh->access & ACC_WRITE))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if ((mask & MAY_READ) && !(wh->access & ACC_READ))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
2009-06-17 23:26:33 +00:00
|
|
|
found:
|
devcgroup: relax white-list protection down to RCU
Currently this list is protected with a simple spinlock, even for reading
from one. This is OK, but can be better.
Actually I want it to be better very much, since after replacing the
OpenVZ device permissions engine with the cgroup-based one I noticed, that
we set 12 default device permissions for each newly created container (for
/dev/null, full, terminals, ect devices), and people sometimes have up to
20 perms more, so traversing the ~30-40 elements list under a spinlock
doesn't seem very good.
Here's the RCU protection for white-list - dev_whitelist_item-s are added
and removed under the devcg->lock, but are looked up in permissions
checking under the rcu_read_lock.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-25 08:47:07 +00:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-09-02 21:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
devcgroup: relax white-list protection down to RCU
Currently this list is protected with a simple spinlock, even for reading
from one. This is OK, but can be better.
Actually I want it to be better very much, since after replacing the
OpenVZ device permissions engine with the cgroup-based one I noticed, that
we set 12 default device permissions for each newly created container (for
/dev/null, full, terminals, ect devices), and people sometimes have up to
20 perms more, so traversing the ~30-40 elements list under a spinlock
doesn't seem very good.
Here's the RCU protection for white-list - dev_whitelist_item-s are added
and removed under the devcg->lock, but are looked up in permissions
checking under the rcu_read_lock.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-25 08:47:07 +00:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int devcgroup_inode_mknod(int mode, dev_t dev)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup;
|
|
|
|
struct dev_whitelist_item *wh;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-08 02:07:46 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!S_ISBLK(mode) && !S_ISCHR(mode))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
devcgroup: relax white-list protection down to RCU
Currently this list is protected with a simple spinlock, even for reading
from one. This is OK, but can be better.
Actually I want it to be better very much, since after replacing the
OpenVZ device permissions engine with the cgroup-based one I noticed, that
we set 12 default device permissions for each newly created container (for
/dev/null, full, terminals, ect devices), and people sometimes have up to
20 perms more, so traversing the ~30-40 elements list under a spinlock
doesn't seem very good.
Here's the RCU protection for white-list - dev_whitelist_item-s are added
and removed under the devcg->lock, but are looked up in permissions
checking under the rcu_read_lock.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-25 08:47:07 +00:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
2008-09-02 21:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dev_cgroup = task_devcgroup(current);
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-08 02:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
list_for_each_entry_rcu(wh, &dev_cgroup->whitelist, list) {
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (wh->type & DEV_ALL)
|
2009-06-17 23:26:33 +00:00
|
|
|
goto found;
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((wh->type & DEV_BLOCK) && !S_ISBLK(mode))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if ((wh->type & DEV_CHAR) && !S_ISCHR(mode))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (wh->major != ~0 && wh->major != MAJOR(dev))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (wh->minor != ~0 && wh->minor != MINOR(dev))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
2009-06-17 23:26:33 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!(wh->access & ACC_MKNOD))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
2009-06-17 23:26:33 +00:00
|
|
|
found:
|
devcgroup: relax white-list protection down to RCU
Currently this list is protected with a simple spinlock, even for reading
from one. This is OK, but can be better.
Actually I want it to be better very much, since after replacing the
OpenVZ device permissions engine with the cgroup-based one I noticed, that
we set 12 default device permissions for each newly created container (for
/dev/null, full, terminals, ect devices), and people sometimes have up to
20 perms more, so traversing the ~30-40 elements list under a spinlock
doesn't seem very good.
Here's the RCU protection for white-list - dev_whitelist_item-s are added
and removed under the devcg->lock, but are looked up in permissions
checking under the rcu_read_lock.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-25 08:47:07 +00:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-09-02 21:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
devcgroup: relax white-list protection down to RCU
Currently this list is protected with a simple spinlock, even for reading
from one. This is OK, but can be better.
Actually I want it to be better very much, since after replacing the
OpenVZ device permissions engine with the cgroup-based one I noticed, that
we set 12 default device permissions for each newly created container (for
/dev/null, full, terminals, ect devices), and people sometimes have up to
20 perms more, so traversing the ~30-40 elements list under a spinlock
doesn't seem very good.
Here's the RCU protection for white-list - dev_whitelist_item-s are added
and removed under the devcg->lock, but are looked up in permissions
checking under the rcu_read_lock.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-25 08:47:07 +00:00
|
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
2008-09-02 21:35:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-04-29 08:00:10 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
}
|