linux/fs/tracefs/event_inode.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* event_inode.c - part of tracefs, a pseudo file system for activating tracing
*
* Copyright (C) 2020-23 VMware Inc, author: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
* Copyright (C) 2020-23 VMware Inc, author: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com>
*
* eventfs is used to dynamically create inodes and dentries based on the
* meta data provided by the tracing system.
*
* eventfs stores the meta-data of files/dirs and holds off on creating
* inodes/dentries of the files. When accessed, the eventfs will create the
* inodes/dentries in a just-in-time (JIT) manner. The eventfs will clean up
* and delete the inodes/dentries when they are no longer referenced.
*/
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/tracefs.h>
#include <linux/kref.h>
#include <linux/delay.h>
#include "internal.h"
struct eventfs_inode {
struct list_head e_top_files;
};
/*
* struct eventfs_file - hold the properties of the eventfs files and
* directories.
* @name: the name of the file or directory to create
* @d_parent: holds parent's dentry
* @dentry: once accessed holds dentry
* @list: file or directory to be added to parent directory
* @ei: list of files and directories within directory
* @fop: file_operations for file or directory
* @iop: inode_operations for file or directory
* @data: something that the caller will want to get to later on
* @mode: the permission that the file or directory should have
*/
struct eventfs_file {
const char *name;
struct dentry *d_parent;
struct dentry *dentry;
struct list_head list;
struct eventfs_inode *ei;
const struct file_operations *fop;
const struct inode_operations *iop;
/*
* Union - used for deletion
* @del_list: list of eventfs_file to delete
* @rcu: eventfs_file to delete in RCU
* @is_freed: node is freed if one of the above is set
*/
union {
struct list_head del_list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
unsigned long is_freed;
};
void *data;
umode_t mode;
};
static DEFINE_MUTEX(eventfs_mutex);
DEFINE_STATIC_SRCU(eventfs_srcu);
static struct dentry *eventfs_root_lookup(struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry,
unsigned int flags);
static int dcache_dir_open_wrapper(struct inode *inode, struct file *file);
eventfs: Remember what dentries were created on dir open Using the following code with libtracefs: int dfd; // create the directory events/kprobes/kp1 tracefs_kprobe_raw(NULL, "kp1", "schedule_timeout", "time=$arg1"); // Open the kprobes directory dfd = tracefs_instance_file_open(NULL, "events/kprobes", O_RDONLY); // Do a lookup of the kprobes/kp1 directory (by looking at enable) tracefs_file_exists(NULL, "events/kprobes/kp1/enable"); // Now create a new entry in the kprobes directory tracefs_kprobe_raw(NULL, "kp2", "schedule_hrtimeout", "expires=$arg1"); // Do another lookup to create the dentries tracefs_file_exists(NULL, "events/kprobes/kp2/enable")) // Close the directory close(dfd); What happened above, the first open (dfd) will call dcache_dir_open_wrapper() that will create the dentries and up their ref counts. Now the creation of "kp2" will add another dentry within the kprobes directory. Upon the close of dfd, eventfs_release() will now do a dput for all the entries in kprobes. But this is where the problem lies. The open only upped the dentry of kp1 and not kp2. Now the close is decrementing both kp1 and kp2, which causes kp2 to get a negative count. Doing a "trace-cmd reset" which deletes all the kprobes cause the kernel to crash! (due to the messed up accounting of the ref counts). To solve this, save all the dentries that are opened in the dcache_dir_open_wrapper() into an array, and use this array to know what dentries to do a dput on in eventfs_release(). Since the dcache_dir_open_wrapper() calls dcache_dir_open() which uses the file->private_data, we need to also add a wrapper around dcache_readdir() that uses the cursor assigned to the file->private_data. This is because the dentries need to also be saved in the file->private_data. To do this create the structure: struct dentry_list { void *cursor; struct dentry **dentries; }; Which will hold both the cursor and the dentries. Some shuffling around is needed to make sure that dcache_dir_open() and dcache_readdir() only see the cursor. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230919211804.230edf1e@gandalf.local.home/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230922163446.1431d4fa@gandalf.local.home Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Fixes: 63940449555e7 ("eventfs: Implement eventfs lookup, read, open functions") Reported-by: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2023-09-22 20:34:46 +00:00
static int dcache_readdir_wrapper(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx);
static int eventfs_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file);
static const struct inode_operations eventfs_root_dir_inode_operations = {
.lookup = eventfs_root_lookup,
};
static const struct file_operations eventfs_file_operations = {
.open = dcache_dir_open_wrapper,
.read = generic_read_dir,
eventfs: Remember what dentries were created on dir open Using the following code with libtracefs: int dfd; // create the directory events/kprobes/kp1 tracefs_kprobe_raw(NULL, "kp1", "schedule_timeout", "time=$arg1"); // Open the kprobes directory dfd = tracefs_instance_file_open(NULL, "events/kprobes", O_RDONLY); // Do a lookup of the kprobes/kp1 directory (by looking at enable) tracefs_file_exists(NULL, "events/kprobes/kp1/enable"); // Now create a new entry in the kprobes directory tracefs_kprobe_raw(NULL, "kp2", "schedule_hrtimeout", "expires=$arg1"); // Do another lookup to create the dentries tracefs_file_exists(NULL, "events/kprobes/kp2/enable")) // Close the directory close(dfd); What happened above, the first open (dfd) will call dcache_dir_open_wrapper() that will create the dentries and up their ref counts. Now the creation of "kp2" will add another dentry within the kprobes directory. Upon the close of dfd, eventfs_release() will now do a dput for all the entries in kprobes. But this is where the problem lies. The open only upped the dentry of kp1 and not kp2. Now the close is decrementing both kp1 and kp2, which causes kp2 to get a negative count. Doing a "trace-cmd reset" which deletes all the kprobes cause the kernel to crash! (due to the messed up accounting of the ref counts). To solve this, save all the dentries that are opened in the dcache_dir_open_wrapper() into an array, and use this array to know what dentries to do a dput on in eventfs_release(). Since the dcache_dir_open_wrapper() calls dcache_dir_open() which uses the file->private_data, we need to also add a wrapper around dcache_readdir() that uses the cursor assigned to the file->private_data. This is because the dentries need to also be saved in the file->private_data. To do this create the structure: struct dentry_list { void *cursor; struct dentry **dentries; }; Which will hold both the cursor and the dentries. Some shuffling around is needed to make sure that dcache_dir_open() and dcache_readdir() only see the cursor. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230919211804.230edf1e@gandalf.local.home/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230922163446.1431d4fa@gandalf.local.home Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Fixes: 63940449555e7 ("eventfs: Implement eventfs lookup, read, open functions") Reported-by: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2023-09-22 20:34:46 +00:00
.iterate_shared = dcache_readdir_wrapper,
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
.release = eventfs_release,
};
/**
* create_file - create a file in the tracefs filesystem
* @name: the name of the file to create.
* @mode: the permission that the file should have.
* @parent: parent dentry for this file.
* @data: something that the caller will want to get to later on.
* @fop: struct file_operations that should be used for this file.
*
* This is the basic "create a file" function for tracefs. It allows for a
* wide range of flexibility in creating a file.
*
* This function will return a pointer to a dentry if it succeeds. This
* pointer must be passed to the tracefs_remove() function when the file is
* to be removed (no automatic cleanup happens if your module is unloaded,
* you are responsible here.) If an error occurs, %NULL will be returned.
*
* If tracefs is not enabled in the kernel, the value -%ENODEV will be
* returned.
*/
static struct dentry *create_file(const char *name, umode_t mode,
struct dentry *parent, void *data,
const struct file_operations *fop)
{
struct tracefs_inode *ti;
struct dentry *dentry;
struct inode *inode;
if (!(mode & S_IFMT))
mode |= S_IFREG;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!S_ISREG(mode)))
return NULL;
dentry = eventfs_start_creating(name, parent);
if (IS_ERR(dentry))
return dentry;
inode = tracefs_get_inode(dentry->d_sb);
if (unlikely(!inode))
return eventfs_failed_creating(dentry);
inode->i_mode = mode;
inode->i_fop = fop;
inode->i_private = data;
ti = get_tracefs(inode);
ti->flags |= TRACEFS_EVENT_INODE;
d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
fsnotify_create(dentry->d_parent->d_inode, dentry);
return eventfs_end_creating(dentry);
};
/**
* create_dir - create a dir in the tracefs filesystem
* @name: the name of the file to create.
* @parent: parent dentry for this file.
* @data: something that the caller will want to get to later on.
*
* This is the basic "create a dir" function for eventfs. It allows for a
* wide range of flexibility in creating a dir.
*
* This function will return a pointer to a dentry if it succeeds. This
* pointer must be passed to the tracefs_remove() function when the file is
* to be removed (no automatic cleanup happens if your module is unloaded,
* you are responsible here.) If an error occurs, %NULL will be returned.
*
* If tracefs is not enabled in the kernel, the value -%ENODEV will be
* returned.
*/
static struct dentry *create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent, void *data)
{
struct tracefs_inode *ti;
struct dentry *dentry;
struct inode *inode;
dentry = eventfs_start_creating(name, parent);
if (IS_ERR(dentry))
return dentry;
inode = tracefs_get_inode(dentry->d_sb);
if (unlikely(!inode))
return eventfs_failed_creating(dentry);
inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRWXU | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO;
inode->i_op = &eventfs_root_dir_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &eventfs_file_operations;
inode->i_private = data;
ti = get_tracefs(inode);
ti->flags |= TRACEFS_EVENT_INODE;
inc_nlink(inode);
d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
inc_nlink(dentry->d_parent->d_inode);
fsnotify_mkdir(dentry->d_parent->d_inode, dentry);
return eventfs_end_creating(dentry);
}
/**
* eventfs_set_ef_status_free - set the ef->status to free
tracefs/eventfs: Use dput to free the toplevel events directory Currently when rmdir on an instance is done, eventfs_remove_events_dir() is called and it does a dput on the dentry and then frees the eventfs_inode that represents the events directory. But there's no protection against a reader reading the top level events directory at the same time and we can get a use after free error. Instead, use the dput() associated to the dentry to also free the eventfs_inode associated to the events directory, as that will get called when the last reference to the directory is released. This issue triggered the following KASAN report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888120130ca0 by task ftracetest/1201 CPU: 4 PID: 1201 Comm: ftracetest Not tainted 6.5.0-test-10737-g469e0a8194e7 #13 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x90 print_report+0xcf/0x670 ? __pfx_ring_buffer_record_off+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2b/0x70 ? __virt_addr_valid+0xd9/0x160 kasan_report+0xd4/0x110 ? eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 ? eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 ? eventfs_root_lookup+0x33/0x1b0 __lookup_slow+0x194/0x2a0 ? __pfx___lookup_slow+0x10/0x10 ? down_read+0x11c/0x330 walk_component+0x166/0x220 link_path_walk.part.0.constprop.0+0x3a3/0x5a0 ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access+0x82/0x90 ? __pfx_link_path_walk.part.0.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 path_openat+0x143/0x11f0 ? __lock_acquire+0xa1a/0x3220 ? __pfx_path_openat+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 do_filp_open+0x166/0x290 ? __pfx_do_filp_open+0x10/0x10 ? lock_is_held_type+0xce/0x120 ? preempt_count_sub+0xb7/0x100 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x50 ? alloc_fd+0x1a0/0x320 do_sys_openat2+0x126/0x160 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10 ? __might_resched+0x2cf/0x3b0 ? __fget_light+0xdf/0x100 __x64_sys_openat+0xcd/0x140 ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10 ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x22/0x90 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 RIP: 0033:0x7f1dceef5e51 Code: 75 57 89 f0 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 49 80 3d 9a 27 0e 00 00 74 6d 89 da 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 93 00 00 00 48 8b 54 24 28 64 48 2b 14 25 RSP: 002b:00007fff2cddf380 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000241 RCX: 00007f1dceef5e51 RDX: 0000000000000241 RSI: 000055d7520677d0 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c RBP: 000055d7520677d0 R08: 000000000000001e R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 00000000000001b6 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 000055d752035678 R15: 000055d752067788 </TASK> Allocated by task 1200: kasan_save_stack+0x2f/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x8b/0x90 eventfs_create_events_dir+0x54/0x220 create_event_toplevel_files+0x42/0x130 event_trace_add_tracer+0x33/0x180 trace_array_create_dir+0x52/0xf0 trace_array_create+0x361/0x410 instance_mkdir+0x6b/0xb0 tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x57/0x80 vfs_mkdir+0x275/0x380 do_mkdirat+0x1da/0x210 __x64_sys_mkdir+0x74/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Freed by task 1251: kasan_save_stack+0x2f/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x27/0x40 __kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x180 __kmem_cache_free+0x149/0x2e0 event_trace_del_tracer+0xcb/0x120 __remove_instance+0x16a/0x340 instance_rmdir+0x77/0xa0 tracefs_syscall_rmdir+0x77/0xc0 vfs_rmdir+0xed/0x2d0 do_rmdir+0x235/0x280 __x64_sys_rmdir+0x5f/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888120130ca0 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-16 of size 16 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of freed 16-byte region [ffff888120130ca0, ffff888120130cb0) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:000000004dbddbb0 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x120130 flags: 0x17ffffc0000800(slab|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) page_type: 0xffffffff() raw: 0017ffffc0000800 ffff8881000423c0 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000800080 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888120130b80: 00 00 fc fc 00 05 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 02 fc fc ffff888120130c00: 00 07 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc >ffff888120130c80: 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc ^ ffff888120130d00: 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc ffff888120130d80: 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc ================================================================== Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230907024803.250873643@goodmis.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/1cb3aee2-19af-c472-e265-05176fe9bd84@huawei.com/ Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Fixes: 5bdcd5f5331a2 eventfs: ("Implement removal of meta data from eventfs") Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org> Tested-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org> Reported-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2023-09-07 02:47:11 +00:00
* @ti: the tracefs_inode of the dentry
* @dentry: dentry who's status to be freed
*
* eventfs_set_ef_status_free will be called if no more
* references remain
*/
tracefs/eventfs: Use dput to free the toplevel events directory Currently when rmdir on an instance is done, eventfs_remove_events_dir() is called and it does a dput on the dentry and then frees the eventfs_inode that represents the events directory. But there's no protection against a reader reading the top level events directory at the same time and we can get a use after free error. Instead, use the dput() associated to the dentry to also free the eventfs_inode associated to the events directory, as that will get called when the last reference to the directory is released. This issue triggered the following KASAN report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888120130ca0 by task ftracetest/1201 CPU: 4 PID: 1201 Comm: ftracetest Not tainted 6.5.0-test-10737-g469e0a8194e7 #13 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x90 print_report+0xcf/0x670 ? __pfx_ring_buffer_record_off+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2b/0x70 ? __virt_addr_valid+0xd9/0x160 kasan_report+0xd4/0x110 ? eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 ? eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 ? eventfs_root_lookup+0x33/0x1b0 __lookup_slow+0x194/0x2a0 ? __pfx___lookup_slow+0x10/0x10 ? down_read+0x11c/0x330 walk_component+0x166/0x220 link_path_walk.part.0.constprop.0+0x3a3/0x5a0 ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access+0x82/0x90 ? __pfx_link_path_walk.part.0.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 path_openat+0x143/0x11f0 ? __lock_acquire+0xa1a/0x3220 ? __pfx_path_openat+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 do_filp_open+0x166/0x290 ? __pfx_do_filp_open+0x10/0x10 ? lock_is_held_type+0xce/0x120 ? preempt_count_sub+0xb7/0x100 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x50 ? alloc_fd+0x1a0/0x320 do_sys_openat2+0x126/0x160 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10 ? __might_resched+0x2cf/0x3b0 ? __fget_light+0xdf/0x100 __x64_sys_openat+0xcd/0x140 ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10 ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x22/0x90 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 RIP: 0033:0x7f1dceef5e51 Code: 75 57 89 f0 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 49 80 3d 9a 27 0e 00 00 74 6d 89 da 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 93 00 00 00 48 8b 54 24 28 64 48 2b 14 25 RSP: 002b:00007fff2cddf380 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000241 RCX: 00007f1dceef5e51 RDX: 0000000000000241 RSI: 000055d7520677d0 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c RBP: 000055d7520677d0 R08: 000000000000001e R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 00000000000001b6 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 000055d752035678 R15: 000055d752067788 </TASK> Allocated by task 1200: kasan_save_stack+0x2f/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x8b/0x90 eventfs_create_events_dir+0x54/0x220 create_event_toplevel_files+0x42/0x130 event_trace_add_tracer+0x33/0x180 trace_array_create_dir+0x52/0xf0 trace_array_create+0x361/0x410 instance_mkdir+0x6b/0xb0 tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x57/0x80 vfs_mkdir+0x275/0x380 do_mkdirat+0x1da/0x210 __x64_sys_mkdir+0x74/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Freed by task 1251: kasan_save_stack+0x2f/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x27/0x40 __kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x180 __kmem_cache_free+0x149/0x2e0 event_trace_del_tracer+0xcb/0x120 __remove_instance+0x16a/0x340 instance_rmdir+0x77/0xa0 tracefs_syscall_rmdir+0x77/0xc0 vfs_rmdir+0xed/0x2d0 do_rmdir+0x235/0x280 __x64_sys_rmdir+0x5f/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888120130ca0 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-16 of size 16 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of freed 16-byte region [ffff888120130ca0, ffff888120130cb0) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:000000004dbddbb0 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x120130 flags: 0x17ffffc0000800(slab|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) page_type: 0xffffffff() raw: 0017ffffc0000800 ffff8881000423c0 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000800080 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888120130b80: 00 00 fc fc 00 05 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 02 fc fc ffff888120130c00: 00 07 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc >ffff888120130c80: 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc ^ ffff888120130d00: 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc ffff888120130d80: 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc ================================================================== Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230907024803.250873643@goodmis.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/1cb3aee2-19af-c472-e265-05176fe9bd84@huawei.com/ Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Fixes: 5bdcd5f5331a2 eventfs: ("Implement removal of meta data from eventfs") Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org> Tested-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org> Reported-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2023-09-07 02:47:11 +00:00
void eventfs_set_ef_status_free(struct tracefs_inode *ti, struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct tracefs_inode *ti_parent;
tracefs/eventfs: Use dput to free the toplevel events directory Currently when rmdir on an instance is done, eventfs_remove_events_dir() is called and it does a dput on the dentry and then frees the eventfs_inode that represents the events directory. But there's no protection against a reader reading the top level events directory at the same time and we can get a use after free error. Instead, use the dput() associated to the dentry to also free the eventfs_inode associated to the events directory, as that will get called when the last reference to the directory is released. This issue triggered the following KASAN report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888120130ca0 by task ftracetest/1201 CPU: 4 PID: 1201 Comm: ftracetest Not tainted 6.5.0-test-10737-g469e0a8194e7 #13 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x90 print_report+0xcf/0x670 ? __pfx_ring_buffer_record_off+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2b/0x70 ? __virt_addr_valid+0xd9/0x160 kasan_report+0xd4/0x110 ? eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 ? eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 ? eventfs_root_lookup+0x33/0x1b0 __lookup_slow+0x194/0x2a0 ? __pfx___lookup_slow+0x10/0x10 ? down_read+0x11c/0x330 walk_component+0x166/0x220 link_path_walk.part.0.constprop.0+0x3a3/0x5a0 ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access+0x82/0x90 ? __pfx_link_path_walk.part.0.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 path_openat+0x143/0x11f0 ? __lock_acquire+0xa1a/0x3220 ? __pfx_path_openat+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 do_filp_open+0x166/0x290 ? __pfx_do_filp_open+0x10/0x10 ? lock_is_held_type+0xce/0x120 ? preempt_count_sub+0xb7/0x100 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x50 ? alloc_fd+0x1a0/0x320 do_sys_openat2+0x126/0x160 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10 ? __might_resched+0x2cf/0x3b0 ? __fget_light+0xdf/0x100 __x64_sys_openat+0xcd/0x140 ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10 ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x22/0x90 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 RIP: 0033:0x7f1dceef5e51 Code: 75 57 89 f0 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 49 80 3d 9a 27 0e 00 00 74 6d 89 da 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 93 00 00 00 48 8b 54 24 28 64 48 2b 14 25 RSP: 002b:00007fff2cddf380 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000241 RCX: 00007f1dceef5e51 RDX: 0000000000000241 RSI: 000055d7520677d0 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c RBP: 000055d7520677d0 R08: 000000000000001e R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 00000000000001b6 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 000055d752035678 R15: 000055d752067788 </TASK> Allocated by task 1200: kasan_save_stack+0x2f/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x8b/0x90 eventfs_create_events_dir+0x54/0x220 create_event_toplevel_files+0x42/0x130 event_trace_add_tracer+0x33/0x180 trace_array_create_dir+0x52/0xf0 trace_array_create+0x361/0x410 instance_mkdir+0x6b/0xb0 tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x57/0x80 vfs_mkdir+0x275/0x380 do_mkdirat+0x1da/0x210 __x64_sys_mkdir+0x74/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Freed by task 1251: kasan_save_stack+0x2f/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x27/0x40 __kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x180 __kmem_cache_free+0x149/0x2e0 event_trace_del_tracer+0xcb/0x120 __remove_instance+0x16a/0x340 instance_rmdir+0x77/0xa0 tracefs_syscall_rmdir+0x77/0xc0 vfs_rmdir+0xed/0x2d0 do_rmdir+0x235/0x280 __x64_sys_rmdir+0x5f/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888120130ca0 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-16 of size 16 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of freed 16-byte region [ffff888120130ca0, ffff888120130cb0) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:000000004dbddbb0 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x120130 flags: 0x17ffffc0000800(slab|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) page_type: 0xffffffff() raw: 0017ffffc0000800 ffff8881000423c0 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000800080 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888120130b80: 00 00 fc fc 00 05 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 02 fc fc ffff888120130c00: 00 07 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc >ffff888120130c80: 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc ^ ffff888120130d00: 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc ffff888120130d80: 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc ================================================================== Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230907024803.250873643@goodmis.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/1cb3aee2-19af-c472-e265-05176fe9bd84@huawei.com/ Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Fixes: 5bdcd5f5331a2 eventfs: ("Implement removal of meta data from eventfs") Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org> Tested-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org> Reported-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2023-09-07 02:47:11 +00:00
struct eventfs_inode *ei;
tracefs/eventfs: Free top level files on removal When an instance is removed, the top level files of the eventfs directory are not cleaned up. Call the eventfs_remove() on each of the entries to free them. This was found via kmemleak: unreferenced object 0xffff8881047c1280 (size 96): comm "mkdir", pid 924, jiffies 4294906489 (age 2013.077s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 18 31 ed 03 81 88 ff ff 00 31 09 24 81 88 ff ff .1.......1.$.... 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 98 19 7c 04 81 88 ff ff ..........|..... backtrace: [<000000000fa46b4d>] kmalloc_trace+0x2a/0xa0 [<00000000e729cd0c>] eventfs_prepare_ef.constprop.0+0x3a/0x160 [<000000009032e6a8>] eventfs_add_events_file+0xa0/0x160 [<00000000fe968442>] create_event_toplevel_files+0x6f/0x130 [<00000000e364d173>] event_trace_add_tracer+0x14/0x140 [<00000000411840fa>] trace_array_create_dir+0x52/0xf0 [<00000000967804fa>] trace_array_create+0x208/0x370 [<00000000da505565>] instance_mkdir+0x6b/0xb0 [<00000000dc1215af>] tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x5b/0x90 [<00000000a8aca289>] vfs_mkdir+0x272/0x380 [<000000007709b242>] do_mkdirat+0xfc/0x1d0 [<00000000c0b6d219>] __x64_sys_mkdir+0x78/0xa0 [<0000000097b5dd4b>] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [<00000000a3f00cfa>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 unreferenced object 0xffff888103ed3118 (size 8): comm "mkdir", pid 924, jiffies 4294906489 (age 2013.077s) hex dump (first 8 bytes): 65 6e 61 62 6c 65 00 00 enable.. backtrace: [<0000000010f75127>] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x51/0x160 [<000000004b3eca91>] kstrdup+0x34/0x60 [<0000000050074d7a>] eventfs_prepare_ef.constprop.0+0x53/0x160 [<000000009032e6a8>] eventfs_add_events_file+0xa0/0x160 [<00000000fe968442>] create_event_toplevel_files+0x6f/0x130 [<00000000e364d173>] event_trace_add_tracer+0x14/0x140 [<00000000411840fa>] trace_array_create_dir+0x52/0xf0 [<00000000967804fa>] trace_array_create+0x208/0x370 [<00000000da505565>] instance_mkdir+0x6b/0xb0 [<00000000dc1215af>] tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x5b/0x90 [<00000000a8aca289>] vfs_mkdir+0x272/0x380 [<000000007709b242>] do_mkdirat+0xfc/0x1d0 [<00000000c0b6d219>] __x64_sys_mkdir+0x78/0xa0 [<0000000097b5dd4b>] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [<00000000a3f00cfa>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230907175859.6fedbaa2@gandalf.local.home Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Cc: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com> Cc: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Fixes: 5bdcd5f5331a2 eventfs: ("Implement removal of meta data from eventfs") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2023-09-07 21:58:59 +00:00
struct eventfs_file *ef, *tmp;
tracefs/eventfs: Use dput to free the toplevel events directory Currently when rmdir on an instance is done, eventfs_remove_events_dir() is called and it does a dput on the dentry and then frees the eventfs_inode that represents the events directory. But there's no protection against a reader reading the top level events directory at the same time and we can get a use after free error. Instead, use the dput() associated to the dentry to also free the eventfs_inode associated to the events directory, as that will get called when the last reference to the directory is released. This issue triggered the following KASAN report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888120130ca0 by task ftracetest/1201 CPU: 4 PID: 1201 Comm: ftracetest Not tainted 6.5.0-test-10737-g469e0a8194e7 #13 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x90 print_report+0xcf/0x670 ? __pfx_ring_buffer_record_off+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2b/0x70 ? __virt_addr_valid+0xd9/0x160 kasan_report+0xd4/0x110 ? eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 ? eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 ? eventfs_root_lookup+0x33/0x1b0 __lookup_slow+0x194/0x2a0 ? __pfx___lookup_slow+0x10/0x10 ? down_read+0x11c/0x330 walk_component+0x166/0x220 link_path_walk.part.0.constprop.0+0x3a3/0x5a0 ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access+0x82/0x90 ? __pfx_link_path_walk.part.0.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 path_openat+0x143/0x11f0 ? __lock_acquire+0xa1a/0x3220 ? __pfx_path_openat+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 do_filp_open+0x166/0x290 ? __pfx_do_filp_open+0x10/0x10 ? lock_is_held_type+0xce/0x120 ? preempt_count_sub+0xb7/0x100 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x50 ? alloc_fd+0x1a0/0x320 do_sys_openat2+0x126/0x160 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10 ? __might_resched+0x2cf/0x3b0 ? __fget_light+0xdf/0x100 __x64_sys_openat+0xcd/0x140 ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10 ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x22/0x90 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 RIP: 0033:0x7f1dceef5e51 Code: 75 57 89 f0 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 49 80 3d 9a 27 0e 00 00 74 6d 89 da 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 93 00 00 00 48 8b 54 24 28 64 48 2b 14 25 RSP: 002b:00007fff2cddf380 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000241 RCX: 00007f1dceef5e51 RDX: 0000000000000241 RSI: 000055d7520677d0 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c RBP: 000055d7520677d0 R08: 000000000000001e R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 00000000000001b6 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 000055d752035678 R15: 000055d752067788 </TASK> Allocated by task 1200: kasan_save_stack+0x2f/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x8b/0x90 eventfs_create_events_dir+0x54/0x220 create_event_toplevel_files+0x42/0x130 event_trace_add_tracer+0x33/0x180 trace_array_create_dir+0x52/0xf0 trace_array_create+0x361/0x410 instance_mkdir+0x6b/0xb0 tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x57/0x80 vfs_mkdir+0x275/0x380 do_mkdirat+0x1da/0x210 __x64_sys_mkdir+0x74/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Freed by task 1251: kasan_save_stack+0x2f/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x27/0x40 __kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x180 __kmem_cache_free+0x149/0x2e0 event_trace_del_tracer+0xcb/0x120 __remove_instance+0x16a/0x340 instance_rmdir+0x77/0xa0 tracefs_syscall_rmdir+0x77/0xc0 vfs_rmdir+0xed/0x2d0 do_rmdir+0x235/0x280 __x64_sys_rmdir+0x5f/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888120130ca0 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-16 of size 16 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of freed 16-byte region [ffff888120130ca0, ffff888120130cb0) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:000000004dbddbb0 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x120130 flags: 0x17ffffc0000800(slab|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) page_type: 0xffffffff() raw: 0017ffffc0000800 ffff8881000423c0 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000800080 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888120130b80: 00 00 fc fc 00 05 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 02 fc fc ffff888120130c00: 00 07 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc >ffff888120130c80: 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc ^ ffff888120130d00: 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc ffff888120130d80: 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc ================================================================== Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230907024803.250873643@goodmis.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/1cb3aee2-19af-c472-e265-05176fe9bd84@huawei.com/ Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Fixes: 5bdcd5f5331a2 eventfs: ("Implement removal of meta data from eventfs") Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org> Tested-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org> Reported-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2023-09-07 02:47:11 +00:00
/* The top level events directory may be freed by this */
if (unlikely(ti->flags & TRACEFS_EVENT_TOP_INODE)) {
tracefs/eventfs: Free top level files on removal When an instance is removed, the top level files of the eventfs directory are not cleaned up. Call the eventfs_remove() on each of the entries to free them. This was found via kmemleak: unreferenced object 0xffff8881047c1280 (size 96): comm "mkdir", pid 924, jiffies 4294906489 (age 2013.077s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 18 31 ed 03 81 88 ff ff 00 31 09 24 81 88 ff ff .1.......1.$.... 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 98 19 7c 04 81 88 ff ff ..........|..... backtrace: [<000000000fa46b4d>] kmalloc_trace+0x2a/0xa0 [<00000000e729cd0c>] eventfs_prepare_ef.constprop.0+0x3a/0x160 [<000000009032e6a8>] eventfs_add_events_file+0xa0/0x160 [<00000000fe968442>] create_event_toplevel_files+0x6f/0x130 [<00000000e364d173>] event_trace_add_tracer+0x14/0x140 [<00000000411840fa>] trace_array_create_dir+0x52/0xf0 [<00000000967804fa>] trace_array_create+0x208/0x370 [<00000000da505565>] instance_mkdir+0x6b/0xb0 [<00000000dc1215af>] tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x5b/0x90 [<00000000a8aca289>] vfs_mkdir+0x272/0x380 [<000000007709b242>] do_mkdirat+0xfc/0x1d0 [<00000000c0b6d219>] __x64_sys_mkdir+0x78/0xa0 [<0000000097b5dd4b>] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [<00000000a3f00cfa>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 unreferenced object 0xffff888103ed3118 (size 8): comm "mkdir", pid 924, jiffies 4294906489 (age 2013.077s) hex dump (first 8 bytes): 65 6e 61 62 6c 65 00 00 enable.. backtrace: [<0000000010f75127>] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x51/0x160 [<000000004b3eca91>] kstrdup+0x34/0x60 [<0000000050074d7a>] eventfs_prepare_ef.constprop.0+0x53/0x160 [<000000009032e6a8>] eventfs_add_events_file+0xa0/0x160 [<00000000fe968442>] create_event_toplevel_files+0x6f/0x130 [<00000000e364d173>] event_trace_add_tracer+0x14/0x140 [<00000000411840fa>] trace_array_create_dir+0x52/0xf0 [<00000000967804fa>] trace_array_create+0x208/0x370 [<00000000da505565>] instance_mkdir+0x6b/0xb0 [<00000000dc1215af>] tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x5b/0x90 [<00000000a8aca289>] vfs_mkdir+0x272/0x380 [<000000007709b242>] do_mkdirat+0xfc/0x1d0 [<00000000c0b6d219>] __x64_sys_mkdir+0x78/0xa0 [<0000000097b5dd4b>] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [<00000000a3f00cfa>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230907175859.6fedbaa2@gandalf.local.home Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Cc: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com> Cc: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Fixes: 5bdcd5f5331a2 eventfs: ("Implement removal of meta data from eventfs") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2023-09-07 21:58:59 +00:00
LIST_HEAD(ef_del_list);
mutex_lock(&eventfs_mutex);
tracefs/eventfs: Use dput to free the toplevel events directory Currently when rmdir on an instance is done, eventfs_remove_events_dir() is called and it does a dput on the dentry and then frees the eventfs_inode that represents the events directory. But there's no protection against a reader reading the top level events directory at the same time and we can get a use after free error. Instead, use the dput() associated to the dentry to also free the eventfs_inode associated to the events directory, as that will get called when the last reference to the directory is released. This issue triggered the following KASAN report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888120130ca0 by task ftracetest/1201 CPU: 4 PID: 1201 Comm: ftracetest Not tainted 6.5.0-test-10737-g469e0a8194e7 #13 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x90 print_report+0xcf/0x670 ? __pfx_ring_buffer_record_off+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2b/0x70 ? __virt_addr_valid+0xd9/0x160 kasan_report+0xd4/0x110 ? eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 ? eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 ? eventfs_root_lookup+0x33/0x1b0 __lookup_slow+0x194/0x2a0 ? __pfx___lookup_slow+0x10/0x10 ? down_read+0x11c/0x330 walk_component+0x166/0x220 link_path_walk.part.0.constprop.0+0x3a3/0x5a0 ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access+0x82/0x90 ? __pfx_link_path_walk.part.0.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 path_openat+0x143/0x11f0 ? __lock_acquire+0xa1a/0x3220 ? __pfx_path_openat+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 do_filp_open+0x166/0x290 ? __pfx_do_filp_open+0x10/0x10 ? lock_is_held_type+0xce/0x120 ? preempt_count_sub+0xb7/0x100 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x50 ? alloc_fd+0x1a0/0x320 do_sys_openat2+0x126/0x160 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10 ? __might_resched+0x2cf/0x3b0 ? __fget_light+0xdf/0x100 __x64_sys_openat+0xcd/0x140 ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10 ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x22/0x90 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 RIP: 0033:0x7f1dceef5e51 Code: 75 57 89 f0 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 49 80 3d 9a 27 0e 00 00 74 6d 89 da 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 93 00 00 00 48 8b 54 24 28 64 48 2b 14 25 RSP: 002b:00007fff2cddf380 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000241 RCX: 00007f1dceef5e51 RDX: 0000000000000241 RSI: 000055d7520677d0 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c RBP: 000055d7520677d0 R08: 000000000000001e R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 00000000000001b6 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 000055d752035678 R15: 000055d752067788 </TASK> Allocated by task 1200: kasan_save_stack+0x2f/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x8b/0x90 eventfs_create_events_dir+0x54/0x220 create_event_toplevel_files+0x42/0x130 event_trace_add_tracer+0x33/0x180 trace_array_create_dir+0x52/0xf0 trace_array_create+0x361/0x410 instance_mkdir+0x6b/0xb0 tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x57/0x80 vfs_mkdir+0x275/0x380 do_mkdirat+0x1da/0x210 __x64_sys_mkdir+0x74/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Freed by task 1251: kasan_save_stack+0x2f/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x27/0x40 __kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x180 __kmem_cache_free+0x149/0x2e0 event_trace_del_tracer+0xcb/0x120 __remove_instance+0x16a/0x340 instance_rmdir+0x77/0xa0 tracefs_syscall_rmdir+0x77/0xc0 vfs_rmdir+0xed/0x2d0 do_rmdir+0x235/0x280 __x64_sys_rmdir+0x5f/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888120130ca0 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-16 of size 16 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of freed 16-byte region [ffff888120130ca0, ffff888120130cb0) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:000000004dbddbb0 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x120130 flags: 0x17ffffc0000800(slab|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) page_type: 0xffffffff() raw: 0017ffffc0000800 ffff8881000423c0 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000800080 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888120130b80: 00 00 fc fc 00 05 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 02 fc fc ffff888120130c00: 00 07 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc >ffff888120130c80: 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc ^ ffff888120130d00: 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc ffff888120130d80: 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc ================================================================== Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230907024803.250873643@goodmis.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/1cb3aee2-19af-c472-e265-05176fe9bd84@huawei.com/ Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Fixes: 5bdcd5f5331a2 eventfs: ("Implement removal of meta data from eventfs") Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org> Tested-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org> Reported-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2023-09-07 02:47:11 +00:00
ei = ti->private;
tracefs/eventfs: Free top level files on removal When an instance is removed, the top level files of the eventfs directory are not cleaned up. Call the eventfs_remove() on each of the entries to free them. This was found via kmemleak: unreferenced object 0xffff8881047c1280 (size 96): comm "mkdir", pid 924, jiffies 4294906489 (age 2013.077s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 18 31 ed 03 81 88 ff ff 00 31 09 24 81 88 ff ff .1.......1.$.... 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 98 19 7c 04 81 88 ff ff ..........|..... backtrace: [<000000000fa46b4d>] kmalloc_trace+0x2a/0xa0 [<00000000e729cd0c>] eventfs_prepare_ef.constprop.0+0x3a/0x160 [<000000009032e6a8>] eventfs_add_events_file+0xa0/0x160 [<00000000fe968442>] create_event_toplevel_files+0x6f/0x130 [<00000000e364d173>] event_trace_add_tracer+0x14/0x140 [<00000000411840fa>] trace_array_create_dir+0x52/0xf0 [<00000000967804fa>] trace_array_create+0x208/0x370 [<00000000da505565>] instance_mkdir+0x6b/0xb0 [<00000000dc1215af>] tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x5b/0x90 [<00000000a8aca289>] vfs_mkdir+0x272/0x380 [<000000007709b242>] do_mkdirat+0xfc/0x1d0 [<00000000c0b6d219>] __x64_sys_mkdir+0x78/0xa0 [<0000000097b5dd4b>] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [<00000000a3f00cfa>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 unreferenced object 0xffff888103ed3118 (size 8): comm "mkdir", pid 924, jiffies 4294906489 (age 2013.077s) hex dump (first 8 bytes): 65 6e 61 62 6c 65 00 00 enable.. backtrace: [<0000000010f75127>] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x51/0x160 [<000000004b3eca91>] kstrdup+0x34/0x60 [<0000000050074d7a>] eventfs_prepare_ef.constprop.0+0x53/0x160 [<000000009032e6a8>] eventfs_add_events_file+0xa0/0x160 [<00000000fe968442>] create_event_toplevel_files+0x6f/0x130 [<00000000e364d173>] event_trace_add_tracer+0x14/0x140 [<00000000411840fa>] trace_array_create_dir+0x52/0xf0 [<00000000967804fa>] trace_array_create+0x208/0x370 [<00000000da505565>] instance_mkdir+0x6b/0xb0 [<00000000dc1215af>] tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x5b/0x90 [<00000000a8aca289>] vfs_mkdir+0x272/0x380 [<000000007709b242>] do_mkdirat+0xfc/0x1d0 [<00000000c0b6d219>] __x64_sys_mkdir+0x78/0xa0 [<0000000097b5dd4b>] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [<00000000a3f00cfa>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230907175859.6fedbaa2@gandalf.local.home Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Cc: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com> Cc: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Fixes: 5bdcd5f5331a2 eventfs: ("Implement removal of meta data from eventfs") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2023-09-07 21:58:59 +00:00
/* Record all the top level files */
list_for_each_entry_srcu(ef, &ei->e_top_files, list,
lockdep_is_held(&eventfs_mutex)) {
list_add_tail(&ef->del_list, &ef_del_list);
}
/* Nothing should access this, but just in case! */
ti->private = NULL;
mutex_unlock(&eventfs_mutex);
/* Now safely free the top level files and their children */
list_for_each_entry_safe(ef, tmp, &ef_del_list, del_list) {
list_del(&ef->del_list);
eventfs_remove(ef);
}
tracefs/eventfs: Use dput to free the toplevel events directory Currently when rmdir on an instance is done, eventfs_remove_events_dir() is called and it does a dput on the dentry and then frees the eventfs_inode that represents the events directory. But there's no protection against a reader reading the top level events directory at the same time and we can get a use after free error. Instead, use the dput() associated to the dentry to also free the eventfs_inode associated to the events directory, as that will get called when the last reference to the directory is released. This issue triggered the following KASAN report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888120130ca0 by task ftracetest/1201 CPU: 4 PID: 1201 Comm: ftracetest Not tainted 6.5.0-test-10737-g469e0a8194e7 #13 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x90 print_report+0xcf/0x670 ? __pfx_ring_buffer_record_off+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2b/0x70 ? __virt_addr_valid+0xd9/0x160 kasan_report+0xd4/0x110 ? eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 ? eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 ? eventfs_root_lookup+0x33/0x1b0 __lookup_slow+0x194/0x2a0 ? __pfx___lookup_slow+0x10/0x10 ? down_read+0x11c/0x330 walk_component+0x166/0x220 link_path_walk.part.0.constprop.0+0x3a3/0x5a0 ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access+0x82/0x90 ? __pfx_link_path_walk.part.0.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 path_openat+0x143/0x11f0 ? __lock_acquire+0xa1a/0x3220 ? __pfx_path_openat+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 do_filp_open+0x166/0x290 ? __pfx_do_filp_open+0x10/0x10 ? lock_is_held_type+0xce/0x120 ? preempt_count_sub+0xb7/0x100 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x50 ? alloc_fd+0x1a0/0x320 do_sys_openat2+0x126/0x160 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10 ? __might_resched+0x2cf/0x3b0 ? __fget_light+0xdf/0x100 __x64_sys_openat+0xcd/0x140 ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10 ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x22/0x90 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 RIP: 0033:0x7f1dceef5e51 Code: 75 57 89 f0 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 49 80 3d 9a 27 0e 00 00 74 6d 89 da 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 93 00 00 00 48 8b 54 24 28 64 48 2b 14 25 RSP: 002b:00007fff2cddf380 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000241 RCX: 00007f1dceef5e51 RDX: 0000000000000241 RSI: 000055d7520677d0 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c RBP: 000055d7520677d0 R08: 000000000000001e R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 00000000000001b6 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 000055d752035678 R15: 000055d752067788 </TASK> Allocated by task 1200: kasan_save_stack+0x2f/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x8b/0x90 eventfs_create_events_dir+0x54/0x220 create_event_toplevel_files+0x42/0x130 event_trace_add_tracer+0x33/0x180 trace_array_create_dir+0x52/0xf0 trace_array_create+0x361/0x410 instance_mkdir+0x6b/0xb0 tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x57/0x80 vfs_mkdir+0x275/0x380 do_mkdirat+0x1da/0x210 __x64_sys_mkdir+0x74/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Freed by task 1251: kasan_save_stack+0x2f/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x27/0x40 __kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x180 __kmem_cache_free+0x149/0x2e0 event_trace_del_tracer+0xcb/0x120 __remove_instance+0x16a/0x340 instance_rmdir+0x77/0xa0 tracefs_syscall_rmdir+0x77/0xc0 vfs_rmdir+0xed/0x2d0 do_rmdir+0x235/0x280 __x64_sys_rmdir+0x5f/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888120130ca0 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-16 of size 16 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of freed 16-byte region [ffff888120130ca0, ffff888120130cb0) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:000000004dbddbb0 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x120130 flags: 0x17ffffc0000800(slab|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) page_type: 0xffffffff() raw: 0017ffffc0000800 ffff8881000423c0 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000800080 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888120130b80: 00 00 fc fc 00 05 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 02 fc fc ffff888120130c00: 00 07 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc >ffff888120130c80: 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc ^ ffff888120130d00: 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc ffff888120130d80: 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc ================================================================== Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230907024803.250873643@goodmis.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/1cb3aee2-19af-c472-e265-05176fe9bd84@huawei.com/ Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Fixes: 5bdcd5f5331a2 eventfs: ("Implement removal of meta data from eventfs") Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org> Tested-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org> Reported-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2023-09-07 02:47:11 +00:00
kfree(ei);
tracefs/eventfs: Free top level files on removal When an instance is removed, the top level files of the eventfs directory are not cleaned up. Call the eventfs_remove() on each of the entries to free them. This was found via kmemleak: unreferenced object 0xffff8881047c1280 (size 96): comm "mkdir", pid 924, jiffies 4294906489 (age 2013.077s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 18 31 ed 03 81 88 ff ff 00 31 09 24 81 88 ff ff .1.......1.$.... 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 98 19 7c 04 81 88 ff ff ..........|..... backtrace: [<000000000fa46b4d>] kmalloc_trace+0x2a/0xa0 [<00000000e729cd0c>] eventfs_prepare_ef.constprop.0+0x3a/0x160 [<000000009032e6a8>] eventfs_add_events_file+0xa0/0x160 [<00000000fe968442>] create_event_toplevel_files+0x6f/0x130 [<00000000e364d173>] event_trace_add_tracer+0x14/0x140 [<00000000411840fa>] trace_array_create_dir+0x52/0xf0 [<00000000967804fa>] trace_array_create+0x208/0x370 [<00000000da505565>] instance_mkdir+0x6b/0xb0 [<00000000dc1215af>] tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x5b/0x90 [<00000000a8aca289>] vfs_mkdir+0x272/0x380 [<000000007709b242>] do_mkdirat+0xfc/0x1d0 [<00000000c0b6d219>] __x64_sys_mkdir+0x78/0xa0 [<0000000097b5dd4b>] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [<00000000a3f00cfa>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 unreferenced object 0xffff888103ed3118 (size 8): comm "mkdir", pid 924, jiffies 4294906489 (age 2013.077s) hex dump (first 8 bytes): 65 6e 61 62 6c 65 00 00 enable.. backtrace: [<0000000010f75127>] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x51/0x160 [<000000004b3eca91>] kstrdup+0x34/0x60 [<0000000050074d7a>] eventfs_prepare_ef.constprop.0+0x53/0x160 [<000000009032e6a8>] eventfs_add_events_file+0xa0/0x160 [<00000000fe968442>] create_event_toplevel_files+0x6f/0x130 [<00000000e364d173>] event_trace_add_tracer+0x14/0x140 [<00000000411840fa>] trace_array_create_dir+0x52/0xf0 [<00000000967804fa>] trace_array_create+0x208/0x370 [<00000000da505565>] instance_mkdir+0x6b/0xb0 [<00000000dc1215af>] tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x5b/0x90 [<00000000a8aca289>] vfs_mkdir+0x272/0x380 [<000000007709b242>] do_mkdirat+0xfc/0x1d0 [<00000000c0b6d219>] __x64_sys_mkdir+0x78/0xa0 [<0000000097b5dd4b>] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [<00000000a3f00cfa>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230907175859.6fedbaa2@gandalf.local.home Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Cc: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com> Cc: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Fixes: 5bdcd5f5331a2 eventfs: ("Implement removal of meta data from eventfs") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2023-09-07 21:58:59 +00:00
return;
tracefs/eventfs: Use dput to free the toplevel events directory Currently when rmdir on an instance is done, eventfs_remove_events_dir() is called and it does a dput on the dentry and then frees the eventfs_inode that represents the events directory. But there's no protection against a reader reading the top level events directory at the same time and we can get a use after free error. Instead, use the dput() associated to the dentry to also free the eventfs_inode associated to the events directory, as that will get called when the last reference to the directory is released. This issue triggered the following KASAN report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888120130ca0 by task ftracetest/1201 CPU: 4 PID: 1201 Comm: ftracetest Not tainted 6.5.0-test-10737-g469e0a8194e7 #13 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x90 print_report+0xcf/0x670 ? __pfx_ring_buffer_record_off+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2b/0x70 ? __virt_addr_valid+0xd9/0x160 kasan_report+0xd4/0x110 ? eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 ? eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 ? eventfs_root_lookup+0x33/0x1b0 __lookup_slow+0x194/0x2a0 ? __pfx___lookup_slow+0x10/0x10 ? down_read+0x11c/0x330 walk_component+0x166/0x220 link_path_walk.part.0.constprop.0+0x3a3/0x5a0 ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access+0x82/0x90 ? __pfx_link_path_walk.part.0.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 path_openat+0x143/0x11f0 ? __lock_acquire+0xa1a/0x3220 ? __pfx_path_openat+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 do_filp_open+0x166/0x290 ? __pfx_do_filp_open+0x10/0x10 ? lock_is_held_type+0xce/0x120 ? preempt_count_sub+0xb7/0x100 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x50 ? alloc_fd+0x1a0/0x320 do_sys_openat2+0x126/0x160 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10 ? __might_resched+0x2cf/0x3b0 ? __fget_light+0xdf/0x100 __x64_sys_openat+0xcd/0x140 ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10 ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x22/0x90 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 RIP: 0033:0x7f1dceef5e51 Code: 75 57 89 f0 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 49 80 3d 9a 27 0e 00 00 74 6d 89 da 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 93 00 00 00 48 8b 54 24 28 64 48 2b 14 25 RSP: 002b:00007fff2cddf380 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000241 RCX: 00007f1dceef5e51 RDX: 0000000000000241 RSI: 000055d7520677d0 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c RBP: 000055d7520677d0 R08: 000000000000001e R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 00000000000001b6 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 000055d752035678 R15: 000055d752067788 </TASK> Allocated by task 1200: kasan_save_stack+0x2f/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x8b/0x90 eventfs_create_events_dir+0x54/0x220 create_event_toplevel_files+0x42/0x130 event_trace_add_tracer+0x33/0x180 trace_array_create_dir+0x52/0xf0 trace_array_create+0x361/0x410 instance_mkdir+0x6b/0xb0 tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x57/0x80 vfs_mkdir+0x275/0x380 do_mkdirat+0x1da/0x210 __x64_sys_mkdir+0x74/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Freed by task 1251: kasan_save_stack+0x2f/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x27/0x40 __kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x180 __kmem_cache_free+0x149/0x2e0 event_trace_del_tracer+0xcb/0x120 __remove_instance+0x16a/0x340 instance_rmdir+0x77/0xa0 tracefs_syscall_rmdir+0x77/0xc0 vfs_rmdir+0xed/0x2d0 do_rmdir+0x235/0x280 __x64_sys_rmdir+0x5f/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888120130ca0 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-16 of size 16 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of freed 16-byte region [ffff888120130ca0, ffff888120130cb0) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:000000004dbddbb0 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x120130 flags: 0x17ffffc0000800(slab|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) page_type: 0xffffffff() raw: 0017ffffc0000800 ffff8881000423c0 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000800080 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888120130b80: 00 00 fc fc 00 05 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 02 fc fc ffff888120130c00: 00 07 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc >ffff888120130c80: 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc ^ ffff888120130d00: 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc ffff888120130d80: 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc ================================================================== Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230907024803.250873643@goodmis.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/1cb3aee2-19af-c472-e265-05176fe9bd84@huawei.com/ Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Fixes: 5bdcd5f5331a2 eventfs: ("Implement removal of meta data from eventfs") Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org> Tested-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org> Reported-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2023-09-07 02:47:11 +00:00
}
tracefs/eventfs: Free top level files on removal When an instance is removed, the top level files of the eventfs directory are not cleaned up. Call the eventfs_remove() on each of the entries to free them. This was found via kmemleak: unreferenced object 0xffff8881047c1280 (size 96): comm "mkdir", pid 924, jiffies 4294906489 (age 2013.077s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 18 31 ed 03 81 88 ff ff 00 31 09 24 81 88 ff ff .1.......1.$.... 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 98 19 7c 04 81 88 ff ff ..........|..... backtrace: [<000000000fa46b4d>] kmalloc_trace+0x2a/0xa0 [<00000000e729cd0c>] eventfs_prepare_ef.constprop.0+0x3a/0x160 [<000000009032e6a8>] eventfs_add_events_file+0xa0/0x160 [<00000000fe968442>] create_event_toplevel_files+0x6f/0x130 [<00000000e364d173>] event_trace_add_tracer+0x14/0x140 [<00000000411840fa>] trace_array_create_dir+0x52/0xf0 [<00000000967804fa>] trace_array_create+0x208/0x370 [<00000000da505565>] instance_mkdir+0x6b/0xb0 [<00000000dc1215af>] tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x5b/0x90 [<00000000a8aca289>] vfs_mkdir+0x272/0x380 [<000000007709b242>] do_mkdirat+0xfc/0x1d0 [<00000000c0b6d219>] __x64_sys_mkdir+0x78/0xa0 [<0000000097b5dd4b>] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [<00000000a3f00cfa>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 unreferenced object 0xffff888103ed3118 (size 8): comm "mkdir", pid 924, jiffies 4294906489 (age 2013.077s) hex dump (first 8 bytes): 65 6e 61 62 6c 65 00 00 enable.. backtrace: [<0000000010f75127>] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x51/0x160 [<000000004b3eca91>] kstrdup+0x34/0x60 [<0000000050074d7a>] eventfs_prepare_ef.constprop.0+0x53/0x160 [<000000009032e6a8>] eventfs_add_events_file+0xa0/0x160 [<00000000fe968442>] create_event_toplevel_files+0x6f/0x130 [<00000000e364d173>] event_trace_add_tracer+0x14/0x140 [<00000000411840fa>] trace_array_create_dir+0x52/0xf0 [<00000000967804fa>] trace_array_create+0x208/0x370 [<00000000da505565>] instance_mkdir+0x6b/0xb0 [<00000000dc1215af>] tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x5b/0x90 [<00000000a8aca289>] vfs_mkdir+0x272/0x380 [<000000007709b242>] do_mkdirat+0xfc/0x1d0 [<00000000c0b6d219>] __x64_sys_mkdir+0x78/0xa0 [<0000000097b5dd4b>] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [<00000000a3f00cfa>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230907175859.6fedbaa2@gandalf.local.home Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Cc: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com> Cc: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Fixes: 5bdcd5f5331a2 eventfs: ("Implement removal of meta data from eventfs") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2023-09-07 21:58:59 +00:00
mutex_lock(&eventfs_mutex);
ti_parent = get_tracefs(dentry->d_parent->d_inode);
if (!ti_parent || !(ti_parent->flags & TRACEFS_EVENT_INODE))
goto out;
ef = dentry->d_fsdata;
if (!ef)
goto out;
/*
* If ef was freed, then the LSB bit is set for d_fsdata.
* But this should not happen, as it should still have a
* ref count that prevents it. Warn in case it does.
*/
if (WARN_ON_ONCE((unsigned long)ef & 1))
goto out;
dentry->d_fsdata = NULL;
ef->dentry = NULL;
out:
mutex_unlock(&eventfs_mutex);
}
/**
* eventfs_post_create_dir - post create dir routine
* @ef: eventfs_file of recently created dir
*
* Map the meta-data of files within an eventfs dir to their parent dentry
*/
static void eventfs_post_create_dir(struct eventfs_file *ef)
{
struct eventfs_file *ef_child;
struct tracefs_inode *ti;
/* srcu lock already held */
/* fill parent-child relation */
list_for_each_entry_srcu(ef_child, &ef->ei->e_top_files, list,
srcu_read_lock_held(&eventfs_srcu)) {
ef_child->d_parent = ef->dentry;
}
ti = get_tracefs(ef->dentry->d_inode);
ti->private = ef->ei;
}
/**
* create_dentry - helper function to create dentry
* @ef: eventfs_file of file or directory to create
* @parent: parent dentry
* @lookup: true if called from lookup routine
*
* Used to create a dentry for file/dir, executes post dentry creation routine
*/
static struct dentry *
create_dentry(struct eventfs_file *ef, struct dentry *parent, bool lookup)
{
bool invalidate = false;
struct dentry *dentry;
mutex_lock(&eventfs_mutex);
if (ef->is_freed) {
mutex_unlock(&eventfs_mutex);
return NULL;
}
if (ef->dentry) {
dentry = ef->dentry;
/* On dir open, up the ref count */
if (!lookup)
dget(dentry);
mutex_unlock(&eventfs_mutex);
return dentry;
}
mutex_unlock(&eventfs_mutex);
if (!lookup)
inode_lock(parent->d_inode);
if (ef->ei)
dentry = create_dir(ef->name, parent, ef->data);
else
dentry = create_file(ef->name, ef->mode, parent,
ef->data, ef->fop);
if (!lookup)
inode_unlock(parent->d_inode);
mutex_lock(&eventfs_mutex);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(dentry)) {
/* If the ef was already updated get it */
dentry = ef->dentry;
if (dentry && !lookup)
dget(dentry);
mutex_unlock(&eventfs_mutex);
return dentry;
}
if (!ef->dentry && !ef->is_freed) {
ef->dentry = dentry;
if (ef->ei)
eventfs_post_create_dir(ef);
dentry->d_fsdata = ef;
} else {
/* A race here, should try again (unless freed) */
invalidate = true;
/*
* Should never happen unless we get here due to being freed.
* Otherwise it means two dentries exist with the same name.
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(!ef->is_freed);
}
mutex_unlock(&eventfs_mutex);
if (invalidate)
d_invalidate(dentry);
if (lookup || invalidate)
dput(dentry);
return invalidate ? NULL : dentry;
}
static bool match_event_file(struct eventfs_file *ef, const char *name)
{
bool ret;
mutex_lock(&eventfs_mutex);
ret = !ef->is_freed && strcmp(ef->name, name) == 0;
mutex_unlock(&eventfs_mutex);
return ret;
}
/**
* eventfs_root_lookup - lookup routine to create file/dir
* @dir: in which a lookup is being done
* @dentry: file/dir dentry
* @flags: to pass as flags parameter to simple lookup
*
* Used to create a dynamic file/dir within @dir. Use the eventfs_inode
* list of meta data to find the information needed to create the file/dir.
*/
static struct dentry *eventfs_root_lookup(struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct tracefs_inode *ti;
struct eventfs_inode *ei;
struct eventfs_file *ef;
struct dentry *ret = NULL;
int idx;
ti = get_tracefs(dir);
if (!(ti->flags & TRACEFS_EVENT_INODE))
return NULL;
ei = ti->private;
idx = srcu_read_lock(&eventfs_srcu);
list_for_each_entry_srcu(ef, &ei->e_top_files, list,
srcu_read_lock_held(&eventfs_srcu)) {
if (!match_event_file(ef, dentry->d_name.name))
continue;
ret = simple_lookup(dir, dentry, flags);
create_dentry(ef, ef->d_parent, true);
break;
}
srcu_read_unlock(&eventfs_srcu, idx);
return ret;
}
eventfs: Remember what dentries were created on dir open Using the following code with libtracefs: int dfd; // create the directory events/kprobes/kp1 tracefs_kprobe_raw(NULL, "kp1", "schedule_timeout", "time=$arg1"); // Open the kprobes directory dfd = tracefs_instance_file_open(NULL, "events/kprobes", O_RDONLY); // Do a lookup of the kprobes/kp1 directory (by looking at enable) tracefs_file_exists(NULL, "events/kprobes/kp1/enable"); // Now create a new entry in the kprobes directory tracefs_kprobe_raw(NULL, "kp2", "schedule_hrtimeout", "expires=$arg1"); // Do another lookup to create the dentries tracefs_file_exists(NULL, "events/kprobes/kp2/enable")) // Close the directory close(dfd); What happened above, the first open (dfd) will call dcache_dir_open_wrapper() that will create the dentries and up their ref counts. Now the creation of "kp2" will add another dentry within the kprobes directory. Upon the close of dfd, eventfs_release() will now do a dput for all the entries in kprobes. But this is where the problem lies. The open only upped the dentry of kp1 and not kp2. Now the close is decrementing both kp1 and kp2, which causes kp2 to get a negative count. Doing a "trace-cmd reset" which deletes all the kprobes cause the kernel to crash! (due to the messed up accounting of the ref counts). To solve this, save all the dentries that are opened in the dcache_dir_open_wrapper() into an array, and use this array to know what dentries to do a dput on in eventfs_release(). Since the dcache_dir_open_wrapper() calls dcache_dir_open() which uses the file->private_data, we need to also add a wrapper around dcache_readdir() that uses the cursor assigned to the file->private_data. This is because the dentries need to also be saved in the file->private_data. To do this create the structure: struct dentry_list { void *cursor; struct dentry **dentries; }; Which will hold both the cursor and the dentries. Some shuffling around is needed to make sure that dcache_dir_open() and dcache_readdir() only see the cursor. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230919211804.230edf1e@gandalf.local.home/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230922163446.1431d4fa@gandalf.local.home Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Fixes: 63940449555e7 ("eventfs: Implement eventfs lookup, read, open functions") Reported-by: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2023-09-22 20:34:46 +00:00
struct dentry_list {
void *cursor;
struct dentry **dentries;
};
/**
* eventfs_release - called to release eventfs file/dir
* @inode: inode to be released
* @file: file to be released (not used)
*/
static int eventfs_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct tracefs_inode *ti;
eventfs: Remember what dentries were created on dir open Using the following code with libtracefs: int dfd; // create the directory events/kprobes/kp1 tracefs_kprobe_raw(NULL, "kp1", "schedule_timeout", "time=$arg1"); // Open the kprobes directory dfd = tracefs_instance_file_open(NULL, "events/kprobes", O_RDONLY); // Do a lookup of the kprobes/kp1 directory (by looking at enable) tracefs_file_exists(NULL, "events/kprobes/kp1/enable"); // Now create a new entry in the kprobes directory tracefs_kprobe_raw(NULL, "kp2", "schedule_hrtimeout", "expires=$arg1"); // Do another lookup to create the dentries tracefs_file_exists(NULL, "events/kprobes/kp2/enable")) // Close the directory close(dfd); What happened above, the first open (dfd) will call dcache_dir_open_wrapper() that will create the dentries and up their ref counts. Now the creation of "kp2" will add another dentry within the kprobes directory. Upon the close of dfd, eventfs_release() will now do a dput for all the entries in kprobes. But this is where the problem lies. The open only upped the dentry of kp1 and not kp2. Now the close is decrementing both kp1 and kp2, which causes kp2 to get a negative count. Doing a "trace-cmd reset" which deletes all the kprobes cause the kernel to crash! (due to the messed up accounting of the ref counts). To solve this, save all the dentries that are opened in the dcache_dir_open_wrapper() into an array, and use this array to know what dentries to do a dput on in eventfs_release(). Since the dcache_dir_open_wrapper() calls dcache_dir_open() which uses the file->private_data, we need to also add a wrapper around dcache_readdir() that uses the cursor assigned to the file->private_data. This is because the dentries need to also be saved in the file->private_data. To do this create the structure: struct dentry_list { void *cursor; struct dentry **dentries; }; Which will hold both the cursor and the dentries. Some shuffling around is needed to make sure that dcache_dir_open() and dcache_readdir() only see the cursor. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230919211804.230edf1e@gandalf.local.home/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230922163446.1431d4fa@gandalf.local.home Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Fixes: 63940449555e7 ("eventfs: Implement eventfs lookup, read, open functions") Reported-by: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2023-09-22 20:34:46 +00:00
struct dentry_list *dlist = file->private_data;
void *cursor;
int i;
ti = get_tracefs(inode);
if (!(ti->flags & TRACEFS_EVENT_INODE))
return -EINVAL;
eventfs: Remember what dentries were created on dir open Using the following code with libtracefs: int dfd; // create the directory events/kprobes/kp1 tracefs_kprobe_raw(NULL, "kp1", "schedule_timeout", "time=$arg1"); // Open the kprobes directory dfd = tracefs_instance_file_open(NULL, "events/kprobes", O_RDONLY); // Do a lookup of the kprobes/kp1 directory (by looking at enable) tracefs_file_exists(NULL, "events/kprobes/kp1/enable"); // Now create a new entry in the kprobes directory tracefs_kprobe_raw(NULL, "kp2", "schedule_hrtimeout", "expires=$arg1"); // Do another lookup to create the dentries tracefs_file_exists(NULL, "events/kprobes/kp2/enable")) // Close the directory close(dfd); What happened above, the first open (dfd) will call dcache_dir_open_wrapper() that will create the dentries and up their ref counts. Now the creation of "kp2" will add another dentry within the kprobes directory. Upon the close of dfd, eventfs_release() will now do a dput for all the entries in kprobes. But this is where the problem lies. The open only upped the dentry of kp1 and not kp2. Now the close is decrementing both kp1 and kp2, which causes kp2 to get a negative count. Doing a "trace-cmd reset" which deletes all the kprobes cause the kernel to crash! (due to the messed up accounting of the ref counts). To solve this, save all the dentries that are opened in the dcache_dir_open_wrapper() into an array, and use this array to know what dentries to do a dput on in eventfs_release(). Since the dcache_dir_open_wrapper() calls dcache_dir_open() which uses the file->private_data, we need to also add a wrapper around dcache_readdir() that uses the cursor assigned to the file->private_data. This is because the dentries need to also be saved in the file->private_data. To do this create the structure: struct dentry_list { void *cursor; struct dentry **dentries; }; Which will hold both the cursor and the dentries. Some shuffling around is needed to make sure that dcache_dir_open() and dcache_readdir() only see the cursor. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230919211804.230edf1e@gandalf.local.home/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230922163446.1431d4fa@gandalf.local.home Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Fixes: 63940449555e7 ("eventfs: Implement eventfs lookup, read, open functions") Reported-by: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2023-09-22 20:34:46 +00:00
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!dlist))
return -EINVAL;
for (i = 0; dlist->dentries && dlist->dentries[i]; i++) {
eventfs: Remember what dentries were created on dir open Using the following code with libtracefs: int dfd; // create the directory events/kprobes/kp1 tracefs_kprobe_raw(NULL, "kp1", "schedule_timeout", "time=$arg1"); // Open the kprobes directory dfd = tracefs_instance_file_open(NULL, "events/kprobes", O_RDONLY); // Do a lookup of the kprobes/kp1 directory (by looking at enable) tracefs_file_exists(NULL, "events/kprobes/kp1/enable"); // Now create a new entry in the kprobes directory tracefs_kprobe_raw(NULL, "kp2", "schedule_hrtimeout", "expires=$arg1"); // Do another lookup to create the dentries tracefs_file_exists(NULL, "events/kprobes/kp2/enable")) // Close the directory close(dfd); What happened above, the first open (dfd) will call dcache_dir_open_wrapper() that will create the dentries and up their ref counts. Now the creation of "kp2" will add another dentry within the kprobes directory. Upon the close of dfd, eventfs_release() will now do a dput for all the entries in kprobes. But this is where the problem lies. The open only upped the dentry of kp1 and not kp2. Now the close is decrementing both kp1 and kp2, which causes kp2 to get a negative count. Doing a "trace-cmd reset" which deletes all the kprobes cause the kernel to crash! (due to the messed up accounting of the ref counts). To solve this, save all the dentries that are opened in the dcache_dir_open_wrapper() into an array, and use this array to know what dentries to do a dput on in eventfs_release(). Since the dcache_dir_open_wrapper() calls dcache_dir_open() which uses the file->private_data, we need to also add a wrapper around dcache_readdir() that uses the cursor assigned to the file->private_data. This is because the dentries need to also be saved in the file->private_data. To do this create the structure: struct dentry_list { void *cursor; struct dentry **dentries; }; Which will hold both the cursor and the dentries. Some shuffling around is needed to make sure that dcache_dir_open() and dcache_readdir() only see the cursor. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230919211804.230edf1e@gandalf.local.home/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230922163446.1431d4fa@gandalf.local.home Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Fixes: 63940449555e7 ("eventfs: Implement eventfs lookup, read, open functions") Reported-by: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2023-09-22 20:34:46 +00:00
dput(dlist->dentries[i]);
}
eventfs: Remember what dentries were created on dir open Using the following code with libtracefs: int dfd; // create the directory events/kprobes/kp1 tracefs_kprobe_raw(NULL, "kp1", "schedule_timeout", "time=$arg1"); // Open the kprobes directory dfd = tracefs_instance_file_open(NULL, "events/kprobes", O_RDONLY); // Do a lookup of the kprobes/kp1 directory (by looking at enable) tracefs_file_exists(NULL, "events/kprobes/kp1/enable"); // Now create a new entry in the kprobes directory tracefs_kprobe_raw(NULL, "kp2", "schedule_hrtimeout", "expires=$arg1"); // Do another lookup to create the dentries tracefs_file_exists(NULL, "events/kprobes/kp2/enable")) // Close the directory close(dfd); What happened above, the first open (dfd) will call dcache_dir_open_wrapper() that will create the dentries and up their ref counts. Now the creation of "kp2" will add another dentry within the kprobes directory. Upon the close of dfd, eventfs_release() will now do a dput for all the entries in kprobes. But this is where the problem lies. The open only upped the dentry of kp1 and not kp2. Now the close is decrementing both kp1 and kp2, which causes kp2 to get a negative count. Doing a "trace-cmd reset" which deletes all the kprobes cause the kernel to crash! (due to the messed up accounting of the ref counts). To solve this, save all the dentries that are opened in the dcache_dir_open_wrapper() into an array, and use this array to know what dentries to do a dput on in eventfs_release(). Since the dcache_dir_open_wrapper() calls dcache_dir_open() which uses the file->private_data, we need to also add a wrapper around dcache_readdir() that uses the cursor assigned to the file->private_data. This is because the dentries need to also be saved in the file->private_data. To do this create the structure: struct dentry_list { void *cursor; struct dentry **dentries; }; Which will hold both the cursor and the dentries. Some shuffling around is needed to make sure that dcache_dir_open() and dcache_readdir() only see the cursor. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230919211804.230edf1e@gandalf.local.home/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230922163446.1431d4fa@gandalf.local.home Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Fixes: 63940449555e7 ("eventfs: Implement eventfs lookup, read, open functions") Reported-by: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2023-09-22 20:34:46 +00:00
cursor = dlist->cursor;
kfree(dlist->dentries);
kfree(dlist);
file->private_data = cursor;
return dcache_dir_close(inode, file);
}
/**
* dcache_dir_open_wrapper - eventfs open wrapper
* @inode: not used
* @file: dir to be opened (to create its child)
*
* Used to dynamically create the file/dir within @file. @file is really a
* directory and all the files/dirs of the children within @file will be
* created. If any of the files/dirs have already been created, their
* reference count will be incremented.
*/
static int dcache_dir_open_wrapper(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct tracefs_inode *ti;
struct eventfs_inode *ei;
struct eventfs_file *ef;
eventfs: Remember what dentries were created on dir open Using the following code with libtracefs: int dfd; // create the directory events/kprobes/kp1 tracefs_kprobe_raw(NULL, "kp1", "schedule_timeout", "time=$arg1"); // Open the kprobes directory dfd = tracefs_instance_file_open(NULL, "events/kprobes", O_RDONLY); // Do a lookup of the kprobes/kp1 directory (by looking at enable) tracefs_file_exists(NULL, "events/kprobes/kp1/enable"); // Now create a new entry in the kprobes directory tracefs_kprobe_raw(NULL, "kp2", "schedule_hrtimeout", "expires=$arg1"); // Do another lookup to create the dentries tracefs_file_exists(NULL, "events/kprobes/kp2/enable")) // Close the directory close(dfd); What happened above, the first open (dfd) will call dcache_dir_open_wrapper() that will create the dentries and up their ref counts. Now the creation of "kp2" will add another dentry within the kprobes directory. Upon the close of dfd, eventfs_release() will now do a dput for all the entries in kprobes. But this is where the problem lies. The open only upped the dentry of kp1 and not kp2. Now the close is decrementing both kp1 and kp2, which causes kp2 to get a negative count. Doing a "trace-cmd reset" which deletes all the kprobes cause the kernel to crash! (due to the messed up accounting of the ref counts). To solve this, save all the dentries that are opened in the dcache_dir_open_wrapper() into an array, and use this array to know what dentries to do a dput on in eventfs_release(). Since the dcache_dir_open_wrapper() calls dcache_dir_open() which uses the file->private_data, we need to also add a wrapper around dcache_readdir() that uses the cursor assigned to the file->private_data. This is because the dentries need to also be saved in the file->private_data. To do this create the structure: struct dentry_list { void *cursor; struct dentry **dentries; }; Which will hold both the cursor and the dentries. Some shuffling around is needed to make sure that dcache_dir_open() and dcache_readdir() only see the cursor. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230919211804.230edf1e@gandalf.local.home/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230922163446.1431d4fa@gandalf.local.home Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Fixes: 63940449555e7 ("eventfs: Implement eventfs lookup, read, open functions") Reported-by: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2023-09-22 20:34:46 +00:00
struct dentry_list *dlist;
struct dentry **dentries = NULL;
struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file);
eventfs: Remember what dentries were created on dir open Using the following code with libtracefs: int dfd; // create the directory events/kprobes/kp1 tracefs_kprobe_raw(NULL, "kp1", "schedule_timeout", "time=$arg1"); // Open the kprobes directory dfd = tracefs_instance_file_open(NULL, "events/kprobes", O_RDONLY); // Do a lookup of the kprobes/kp1 directory (by looking at enable) tracefs_file_exists(NULL, "events/kprobes/kp1/enable"); // Now create a new entry in the kprobes directory tracefs_kprobe_raw(NULL, "kp2", "schedule_hrtimeout", "expires=$arg1"); // Do another lookup to create the dentries tracefs_file_exists(NULL, "events/kprobes/kp2/enable")) // Close the directory close(dfd); What happened above, the first open (dfd) will call dcache_dir_open_wrapper() that will create the dentries and up their ref counts. Now the creation of "kp2" will add another dentry within the kprobes directory. Upon the close of dfd, eventfs_release() will now do a dput for all the entries in kprobes. But this is where the problem lies. The open only upped the dentry of kp1 and not kp2. Now the close is decrementing both kp1 and kp2, which causes kp2 to get a negative count. Doing a "trace-cmd reset" which deletes all the kprobes cause the kernel to crash! (due to the messed up accounting of the ref counts). To solve this, save all the dentries that are opened in the dcache_dir_open_wrapper() into an array, and use this array to know what dentries to do a dput on in eventfs_release(). Since the dcache_dir_open_wrapper() calls dcache_dir_open() which uses the file->private_data, we need to also add a wrapper around dcache_readdir() that uses the cursor assigned to the file->private_data. This is because the dentries need to also be saved in the file->private_data. To do this create the structure: struct dentry_list { void *cursor; struct dentry **dentries; }; Which will hold both the cursor and the dentries. Some shuffling around is needed to make sure that dcache_dir_open() and dcache_readdir() only see the cursor. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230919211804.230edf1e@gandalf.local.home/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230922163446.1431d4fa@gandalf.local.home Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Fixes: 63940449555e7 ("eventfs: Implement eventfs lookup, read, open functions") Reported-by: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2023-09-22 20:34:46 +00:00
struct dentry *d;
struct inode *f_inode = file_inode(file);
eventfs: Remember what dentries were created on dir open Using the following code with libtracefs: int dfd; // create the directory events/kprobes/kp1 tracefs_kprobe_raw(NULL, "kp1", "schedule_timeout", "time=$arg1"); // Open the kprobes directory dfd = tracefs_instance_file_open(NULL, "events/kprobes", O_RDONLY); // Do a lookup of the kprobes/kp1 directory (by looking at enable) tracefs_file_exists(NULL, "events/kprobes/kp1/enable"); // Now create a new entry in the kprobes directory tracefs_kprobe_raw(NULL, "kp2", "schedule_hrtimeout", "expires=$arg1"); // Do another lookup to create the dentries tracefs_file_exists(NULL, "events/kprobes/kp2/enable")) // Close the directory close(dfd); What happened above, the first open (dfd) will call dcache_dir_open_wrapper() that will create the dentries and up their ref counts. Now the creation of "kp2" will add another dentry within the kprobes directory. Upon the close of dfd, eventfs_release() will now do a dput for all the entries in kprobes. But this is where the problem lies. The open only upped the dentry of kp1 and not kp2. Now the close is decrementing both kp1 and kp2, which causes kp2 to get a negative count. Doing a "trace-cmd reset" which deletes all the kprobes cause the kernel to crash! (due to the messed up accounting of the ref counts). To solve this, save all the dentries that are opened in the dcache_dir_open_wrapper() into an array, and use this array to know what dentries to do a dput on in eventfs_release(). Since the dcache_dir_open_wrapper() calls dcache_dir_open() which uses the file->private_data, we need to also add a wrapper around dcache_readdir() that uses the cursor assigned to the file->private_data. This is because the dentries need to also be saved in the file->private_data. To do this create the structure: struct dentry_list { void *cursor; struct dentry **dentries; }; Which will hold both the cursor and the dentries. Some shuffling around is needed to make sure that dcache_dir_open() and dcache_readdir() only see the cursor. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230919211804.230edf1e@gandalf.local.home/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230922163446.1431d4fa@gandalf.local.home Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Fixes: 63940449555e7 ("eventfs: Implement eventfs lookup, read, open functions") Reported-by: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2023-09-22 20:34:46 +00:00
int cnt = 0;
int idx;
eventfs: Remember what dentries were created on dir open Using the following code with libtracefs: int dfd; // create the directory events/kprobes/kp1 tracefs_kprobe_raw(NULL, "kp1", "schedule_timeout", "time=$arg1"); // Open the kprobes directory dfd = tracefs_instance_file_open(NULL, "events/kprobes", O_RDONLY); // Do a lookup of the kprobes/kp1 directory (by looking at enable) tracefs_file_exists(NULL, "events/kprobes/kp1/enable"); // Now create a new entry in the kprobes directory tracefs_kprobe_raw(NULL, "kp2", "schedule_hrtimeout", "expires=$arg1"); // Do another lookup to create the dentries tracefs_file_exists(NULL, "events/kprobes/kp2/enable")) // Close the directory close(dfd); What happened above, the first open (dfd) will call dcache_dir_open_wrapper() that will create the dentries and up their ref counts. Now the creation of "kp2" will add another dentry within the kprobes directory. Upon the close of dfd, eventfs_release() will now do a dput for all the entries in kprobes. But this is where the problem lies. The open only upped the dentry of kp1 and not kp2. Now the close is decrementing both kp1 and kp2, which causes kp2 to get a negative count. Doing a "trace-cmd reset" which deletes all the kprobes cause the kernel to crash! (due to the messed up accounting of the ref counts). To solve this, save all the dentries that are opened in the dcache_dir_open_wrapper() into an array, and use this array to know what dentries to do a dput on in eventfs_release(). Since the dcache_dir_open_wrapper() calls dcache_dir_open() which uses the file->private_data, we need to also add a wrapper around dcache_readdir() that uses the cursor assigned to the file->private_data. This is because the dentries need to also be saved in the file->private_data. To do this create the structure: struct dentry_list { void *cursor; struct dentry **dentries; }; Which will hold both the cursor and the dentries. Some shuffling around is needed to make sure that dcache_dir_open() and dcache_readdir() only see the cursor. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230919211804.230edf1e@gandalf.local.home/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230922163446.1431d4fa@gandalf.local.home Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Fixes: 63940449555e7 ("eventfs: Implement eventfs lookup, read, open functions") Reported-by: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2023-09-22 20:34:46 +00:00
int ret;
ti = get_tracefs(f_inode);
if (!(ti->flags & TRACEFS_EVENT_INODE))
return -EINVAL;
eventfs: Remember what dentries were created on dir open Using the following code with libtracefs: int dfd; // create the directory events/kprobes/kp1 tracefs_kprobe_raw(NULL, "kp1", "schedule_timeout", "time=$arg1"); // Open the kprobes directory dfd = tracefs_instance_file_open(NULL, "events/kprobes", O_RDONLY); // Do a lookup of the kprobes/kp1 directory (by looking at enable) tracefs_file_exists(NULL, "events/kprobes/kp1/enable"); // Now create a new entry in the kprobes directory tracefs_kprobe_raw(NULL, "kp2", "schedule_hrtimeout", "expires=$arg1"); // Do another lookup to create the dentries tracefs_file_exists(NULL, "events/kprobes/kp2/enable")) // Close the directory close(dfd); What happened above, the first open (dfd) will call dcache_dir_open_wrapper() that will create the dentries and up their ref counts. Now the creation of "kp2" will add another dentry within the kprobes directory. Upon the close of dfd, eventfs_release() will now do a dput for all the entries in kprobes. But this is where the problem lies. The open only upped the dentry of kp1 and not kp2. Now the close is decrementing both kp1 and kp2, which causes kp2 to get a negative count. Doing a "trace-cmd reset" which deletes all the kprobes cause the kernel to crash! (due to the messed up accounting of the ref counts). To solve this, save all the dentries that are opened in the dcache_dir_open_wrapper() into an array, and use this array to know what dentries to do a dput on in eventfs_release(). Since the dcache_dir_open_wrapper() calls dcache_dir_open() which uses the file->private_data, we need to also add a wrapper around dcache_readdir() that uses the cursor assigned to the file->private_data. This is because the dentries need to also be saved in the file->private_data. To do this create the structure: struct dentry_list { void *cursor; struct dentry **dentries; }; Which will hold both the cursor and the dentries. Some shuffling around is needed to make sure that dcache_dir_open() and dcache_readdir() only see the cursor. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230919211804.230edf1e@gandalf.local.home/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230922163446.1431d4fa@gandalf.local.home Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Fixes: 63940449555e7 ("eventfs: Implement eventfs lookup, read, open functions") Reported-by: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2023-09-22 20:34:46 +00:00
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(file->private_data))
return -EINVAL;
dlist = kmalloc(sizeof(*dlist), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dlist)
return -ENOMEM;
ei = ti->private;
idx = srcu_read_lock(&eventfs_srcu);
list_for_each_entry_srcu(ef, &ei->e_top_files, list,
srcu_read_lock_held(&eventfs_srcu)) {
eventfs: Remember what dentries were created on dir open Using the following code with libtracefs: int dfd; // create the directory events/kprobes/kp1 tracefs_kprobe_raw(NULL, "kp1", "schedule_timeout", "time=$arg1"); // Open the kprobes directory dfd = tracefs_instance_file_open(NULL, "events/kprobes", O_RDONLY); // Do a lookup of the kprobes/kp1 directory (by looking at enable) tracefs_file_exists(NULL, "events/kprobes/kp1/enable"); // Now create a new entry in the kprobes directory tracefs_kprobe_raw(NULL, "kp2", "schedule_hrtimeout", "expires=$arg1"); // Do another lookup to create the dentries tracefs_file_exists(NULL, "events/kprobes/kp2/enable")) // Close the directory close(dfd); What happened above, the first open (dfd) will call dcache_dir_open_wrapper() that will create the dentries and up their ref counts. Now the creation of "kp2" will add another dentry within the kprobes directory. Upon the close of dfd, eventfs_release() will now do a dput for all the entries in kprobes. But this is where the problem lies. The open only upped the dentry of kp1 and not kp2. Now the close is decrementing both kp1 and kp2, which causes kp2 to get a negative count. Doing a "trace-cmd reset" which deletes all the kprobes cause the kernel to crash! (due to the messed up accounting of the ref counts). To solve this, save all the dentries that are opened in the dcache_dir_open_wrapper() into an array, and use this array to know what dentries to do a dput on in eventfs_release(). Since the dcache_dir_open_wrapper() calls dcache_dir_open() which uses the file->private_data, we need to also add a wrapper around dcache_readdir() that uses the cursor assigned to the file->private_data. This is because the dentries need to also be saved in the file->private_data. To do this create the structure: struct dentry_list { void *cursor; struct dentry **dentries; }; Which will hold both the cursor and the dentries. Some shuffling around is needed to make sure that dcache_dir_open() and dcache_readdir() only see the cursor. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230919211804.230edf1e@gandalf.local.home/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230922163446.1431d4fa@gandalf.local.home Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Fixes: 63940449555e7 ("eventfs: Implement eventfs lookup, read, open functions") Reported-by: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2023-09-22 20:34:46 +00:00
d = create_dentry(ef, dentry, false);
if (d) {
struct dentry **tmp;
tmp = krealloc(dentries, sizeof(d) * (cnt + 2), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tmp)
break;
tmp[cnt] = d;
tmp[cnt + 1] = NULL;
cnt++;
dentries = tmp;
}
}
srcu_read_unlock(&eventfs_srcu, idx);
eventfs: Remember what dentries were created on dir open Using the following code with libtracefs: int dfd; // create the directory events/kprobes/kp1 tracefs_kprobe_raw(NULL, "kp1", "schedule_timeout", "time=$arg1"); // Open the kprobes directory dfd = tracefs_instance_file_open(NULL, "events/kprobes", O_RDONLY); // Do a lookup of the kprobes/kp1 directory (by looking at enable) tracefs_file_exists(NULL, "events/kprobes/kp1/enable"); // Now create a new entry in the kprobes directory tracefs_kprobe_raw(NULL, "kp2", "schedule_hrtimeout", "expires=$arg1"); // Do another lookup to create the dentries tracefs_file_exists(NULL, "events/kprobes/kp2/enable")) // Close the directory close(dfd); What happened above, the first open (dfd) will call dcache_dir_open_wrapper() that will create the dentries and up their ref counts. Now the creation of "kp2" will add another dentry within the kprobes directory. Upon the close of dfd, eventfs_release() will now do a dput for all the entries in kprobes. But this is where the problem lies. The open only upped the dentry of kp1 and not kp2. Now the close is decrementing both kp1 and kp2, which causes kp2 to get a negative count. Doing a "trace-cmd reset" which deletes all the kprobes cause the kernel to crash! (due to the messed up accounting of the ref counts). To solve this, save all the dentries that are opened in the dcache_dir_open_wrapper() into an array, and use this array to know what dentries to do a dput on in eventfs_release(). Since the dcache_dir_open_wrapper() calls dcache_dir_open() which uses the file->private_data, we need to also add a wrapper around dcache_readdir() that uses the cursor assigned to the file->private_data. This is because the dentries need to also be saved in the file->private_data. To do this create the structure: struct dentry_list { void *cursor; struct dentry **dentries; }; Which will hold both the cursor and the dentries. Some shuffling around is needed to make sure that dcache_dir_open() and dcache_readdir() only see the cursor. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230919211804.230edf1e@gandalf.local.home/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230922163446.1431d4fa@gandalf.local.home Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Fixes: 63940449555e7 ("eventfs: Implement eventfs lookup, read, open functions") Reported-by: "Masami Hiramatsu (Google)" <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2023-09-22 20:34:46 +00:00
ret = dcache_dir_open(inode, file);
/*
* dcache_dir_open() sets file->private_data to a dentry cursor.
* Need to save that but also save all the dentries that were
* opened by this function.
*/
dlist->cursor = file->private_data;
dlist->dentries = dentries;
file->private_data = dlist;
return ret;
}
/*
* This just sets the file->private_data back to the cursor and back.
*/
static int dcache_readdir_wrapper(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
{
struct dentry_list *dlist = file->private_data;
int ret;
file->private_data = dlist->cursor;
ret = dcache_readdir(file, ctx);
dlist->cursor = file->private_data;
file->private_data = dlist;
return ret;
}
/**
* eventfs_prepare_ef - helper function to prepare eventfs_file
* @name: the name of the file/directory to create.
* @mode: the permission that the file should have.
* @fop: struct file_operations that should be used for this file/directory.
* @iop: struct inode_operations that should be used for this file/directory.
* @data: something that the caller will want to get to later on. The
* inode.i_private pointer will point to this value on the open() call.
*
* This function allocates and fills the eventfs_file structure.
*/
static struct eventfs_file *eventfs_prepare_ef(const char *name, umode_t mode,
const struct file_operations *fop,
const struct inode_operations *iop,
void *data)
{
struct eventfs_file *ef;
ef = kzalloc(sizeof(*ef), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ef)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
ef->name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ef->name) {
kfree(ef);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
if (S_ISDIR(mode)) {
ef->ei = kzalloc(sizeof(*ef->ei), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ef->ei) {
kfree(ef->name);
kfree(ef);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ef->ei->e_top_files);
} else {
ef->ei = NULL;
}
ef->iop = iop;
ef->fop = fop;
ef->mode = mode;
ef->data = data;
return ef;
}
/**
* eventfs_create_events_dir - create the trace event structure
* @name: the name of the directory to create.
* @parent: parent dentry for this file. This should be a directory dentry
* if set. If this parameter is NULL, then the directory will be
* created in the root of the tracefs filesystem.
*
* This function creates the top of the trace event directory.
*/
struct dentry *eventfs_create_events_dir(const char *name,
struct dentry *parent)
{
struct dentry *dentry = tracefs_start_creating(name, parent);
struct eventfs_inode *ei;
struct tracefs_inode *ti;
struct inode *inode;
if (security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS))
return NULL;
if (IS_ERR(dentry))
return dentry;
ei = kzalloc(sizeof(*ei), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ei)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
inode = tracefs_get_inode(dentry->d_sb);
if (unlikely(!inode)) {
kfree(ei);
tracefs_failed_creating(dentry);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ei->e_top_files);
ti = get_tracefs(inode);
tracefs/eventfs: Use dput to free the toplevel events directory Currently when rmdir on an instance is done, eventfs_remove_events_dir() is called and it does a dput on the dentry and then frees the eventfs_inode that represents the events directory. But there's no protection against a reader reading the top level events directory at the same time and we can get a use after free error. Instead, use the dput() associated to the dentry to also free the eventfs_inode associated to the events directory, as that will get called when the last reference to the directory is released. This issue triggered the following KASAN report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888120130ca0 by task ftracetest/1201 CPU: 4 PID: 1201 Comm: ftracetest Not tainted 6.5.0-test-10737-g469e0a8194e7 #13 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x90 print_report+0xcf/0x670 ? __pfx_ring_buffer_record_off+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2b/0x70 ? __virt_addr_valid+0xd9/0x160 kasan_report+0xd4/0x110 ? eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 ? eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 eventfs_root_lookup+0x88/0x1b0 ? eventfs_root_lookup+0x33/0x1b0 __lookup_slow+0x194/0x2a0 ? __pfx___lookup_slow+0x10/0x10 ? down_read+0x11c/0x330 walk_component+0x166/0x220 link_path_walk.part.0.constprop.0+0x3a3/0x5a0 ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access+0x82/0x90 ? __pfx_link_path_walk.part.0.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 path_openat+0x143/0x11f0 ? __lock_acquire+0xa1a/0x3220 ? __pfx_path_openat+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 do_filp_open+0x166/0x290 ? __pfx_do_filp_open+0x10/0x10 ? lock_is_held_type+0xce/0x120 ? preempt_count_sub+0xb7/0x100 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x50 ? alloc_fd+0x1a0/0x320 do_sys_openat2+0x126/0x160 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10 ? __might_resched+0x2cf/0x3b0 ? __fget_light+0xdf/0x100 __x64_sys_openat+0xcd/0x140 ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10 ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x22/0x90 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x7d/0x100 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 RIP: 0033:0x7f1dceef5e51 Code: 75 57 89 f0 25 00 00 41 00 3d 00 00 41 00 74 49 80 3d 9a 27 0e 00 00 74 6d 89 da 48 89 ee bf 9c ff ff ff b8 01 01 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 0f 87 93 00 00 00 48 8b 54 24 28 64 48 2b 14 25 RSP: 002b:00007fff2cddf380 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000241 RCX: 00007f1dceef5e51 RDX: 0000000000000241 RSI: 000055d7520677d0 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c RBP: 000055d7520677d0 R08: 000000000000001e R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 00000000000001b6 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 000055d752035678 R15: 000055d752067788 </TASK> Allocated by task 1200: kasan_save_stack+0x2f/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x8b/0x90 eventfs_create_events_dir+0x54/0x220 create_event_toplevel_files+0x42/0x130 event_trace_add_tracer+0x33/0x180 trace_array_create_dir+0x52/0xf0 trace_array_create+0x361/0x410 instance_mkdir+0x6b/0xb0 tracefs_syscall_mkdir+0x57/0x80 vfs_mkdir+0x275/0x380 do_mkdirat+0x1da/0x210 __x64_sys_mkdir+0x74/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Freed by task 1251: kasan_save_stack+0x2f/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x27/0x40 __kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x180 __kmem_cache_free+0x149/0x2e0 event_trace_del_tracer+0xcb/0x120 __remove_instance+0x16a/0x340 instance_rmdir+0x77/0xa0 tracefs_syscall_rmdir+0x77/0xc0 vfs_rmdir+0xed/0x2d0 do_rmdir+0x235/0x280 __x64_sys_rmdir+0x5f/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888120130ca0 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-16 of size 16 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of freed 16-byte region [ffff888120130ca0, ffff888120130cb0) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:000000004dbddbb0 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x120130 flags: 0x17ffffc0000800(slab|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) page_type: 0xffffffff() raw: 0017ffffc0000800 ffff8881000423c0 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000800080 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888120130b80: 00 00 fc fc 00 05 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 02 fc fc ffff888120130c00: 00 07 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc >ffff888120130c80: 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc ^ ffff888120130d00: 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc fa fb fc fc ffff888120130d80: 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc 00 00 fc fc ================================================================== Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230907024803.250873643@goodmis.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/1cb3aee2-19af-c472-e265-05176fe9bd84@huawei.com/ Cc: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Fixes: 5bdcd5f5331a2 eventfs: ("Implement removal of meta data from eventfs") Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org> Tested-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org> Reported-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2023-09-07 02:47:11 +00:00
ti->flags |= TRACEFS_EVENT_INODE | TRACEFS_EVENT_TOP_INODE;
ti->private = ei;
inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRWXU | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO;
inode->i_op = &eventfs_root_dir_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &eventfs_file_operations;
/* directory inodes start off with i_nlink == 2 (for "." entry) */
inc_nlink(inode);
d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
inc_nlink(dentry->d_parent->d_inode);
fsnotify_mkdir(dentry->d_parent->d_inode, dentry);
return tracefs_end_creating(dentry);
}
/**
* eventfs_add_subsystem_dir - add eventfs subsystem_dir to list to create later
* @name: the name of the file to create.
* @parent: parent dentry for this dir.
*
* This function adds eventfs subsystem dir to list.
* And all these dirs are created on the fly when they are looked up,
* and the dentry and inodes will be removed when they are done.
*/
struct eventfs_file *eventfs_add_subsystem_dir(const char *name,
struct dentry *parent)
{
struct tracefs_inode *ti_parent;
struct eventfs_inode *ei_parent;
struct eventfs_file *ef;
if (security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS))
return NULL;
if (!parent)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
ti_parent = get_tracefs(parent->d_inode);
ei_parent = ti_parent->private;
ef = eventfs_prepare_ef(name, S_IFDIR, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(ef))
return ef;
mutex_lock(&eventfs_mutex);
list_add_tail(&ef->list, &ei_parent->e_top_files);
ef->d_parent = parent;
mutex_unlock(&eventfs_mutex);
return ef;
}
/**
* eventfs_add_dir - add eventfs dir to list to create later
* @name: the name of the file to create.
* @ef_parent: parent eventfs_file for this dir.
*
* This function adds eventfs dir to list.
* And all these dirs are created on the fly when they are looked up,
* and the dentry and inodes will be removed when they are done.
*/
struct eventfs_file *eventfs_add_dir(const char *name,
struct eventfs_file *ef_parent)
{
struct eventfs_file *ef;
if (security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS))
return NULL;
if (!ef_parent)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
ef = eventfs_prepare_ef(name, S_IFDIR, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(ef))
return ef;
mutex_lock(&eventfs_mutex);
list_add_tail(&ef->list, &ef_parent->ei->e_top_files);
ef->d_parent = ef_parent->dentry;
mutex_unlock(&eventfs_mutex);
return ef;
}
/**
* eventfs_add_events_file - add the data needed to create a file for later reference
* @name: the name of the file to create.
* @mode: the permission that the file should have.
* @parent: parent dentry for this file.
* @data: something that the caller will want to get to later on.
* @fop: struct file_operations that should be used for this file.
*
* This function is used to add the information needed to create a
* dentry/inode within the top level events directory. The file created
* will have the @mode permissions. The @data will be used to fill the
* inode.i_private when the open() call is done. The dentry and inodes are
* all created when they are referenced, and removed when they are no
* longer referenced.
*/
int eventfs_add_events_file(const char *name, umode_t mode,
struct dentry *parent, void *data,
const struct file_operations *fop)
{
struct tracefs_inode *ti;
struct eventfs_inode *ei;
struct eventfs_file *ef;
if (security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS))
return -ENODEV;
if (!parent)
return -EINVAL;
if (!(mode & S_IFMT))
mode |= S_IFREG;
if (!parent->d_inode)
return -EINVAL;
ti = get_tracefs(parent->d_inode);
if (!(ti->flags & TRACEFS_EVENT_INODE))
return -EINVAL;
ei = ti->private;
ef = eventfs_prepare_ef(name, mode, fop, NULL, data);
if (IS_ERR(ef))
return -ENOMEM;
mutex_lock(&eventfs_mutex);
list_add_tail(&ef->list, &ei->e_top_files);
ef->d_parent = parent;
mutex_unlock(&eventfs_mutex);
return 0;
}
/**
* eventfs_add_file - add eventfs file to list to create later
* @name: the name of the file to create.
* @mode: the permission that the file should have.
* @ef_parent: parent eventfs_file for this file.
* @data: something that the caller will want to get to later on.
* @fop: struct file_operations that should be used for this file.
*
* This function is used to add the information needed to create a
* file within a subdirectory of the events directory. The file created
* will have the @mode permissions. The @data will be used to fill the
* inode.i_private when the open() call is done. The dentry and inodes are
* all created when they are referenced, and removed when they are no
* longer referenced.
*/
int eventfs_add_file(const char *name, umode_t mode,
struct eventfs_file *ef_parent,
void *data,
const struct file_operations *fop)
{
struct eventfs_file *ef;
if (security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS))
return -ENODEV;
if (!ef_parent)
return -EINVAL;
if (!(mode & S_IFMT))
mode |= S_IFREG;
ef = eventfs_prepare_ef(name, mode, fop, NULL, data);
if (IS_ERR(ef))
return -ENOMEM;
mutex_lock(&eventfs_mutex);
list_add_tail(&ef->list, &ef_parent->ei->e_top_files);
ef->d_parent = ef_parent->dentry;
mutex_unlock(&eventfs_mutex);
return 0;
}
static void free_ef(struct rcu_head *head)
{
struct eventfs_file *ef = container_of(head, struct eventfs_file, rcu);
kfree(ef->name);
kfree(ef->ei);
kfree(ef);
}
/**
* eventfs_remove_rec - remove eventfs dir or file from list
* @ef: eventfs_file to be removed.
* @head: to create list of eventfs_file to be deleted
* @level: to check recursion depth
*
* The helper function eventfs_remove_rec() is used to clean up and free the
* associated data from eventfs for both of the added functions.
*/
static void eventfs_remove_rec(struct eventfs_file *ef, struct list_head *head, int level)
{
struct eventfs_file *ef_child;
if (!ef)
return;
/*
* Check recursion depth. It should never be greater than 3:
* 0 - events/
* 1 - events/group/
* 2 - events/group/event/
* 3 - events/group/event/file
*/
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(level > 3))
return;
if (ef->ei) {
/* search for nested folders or files */
list_for_each_entry_srcu(ef_child, &ef->ei->e_top_files, list,
lockdep_is_held(&eventfs_mutex)) {
eventfs_remove_rec(ef_child, head, level + 1);
}
}
list_del_rcu(&ef->list);
list_add_tail(&ef->del_list, head);
}
/**
* eventfs_remove - remove eventfs dir or file from list
* @ef: eventfs_file to be removed.
*
* This function acquire the eventfs_mutex lock and call eventfs_remove_rec()
*/
void eventfs_remove(struct eventfs_file *ef)
{
struct eventfs_file *tmp;
LIST_HEAD(ef_del_list);
struct dentry *dentry_list = NULL;
struct dentry *dentry;
if (!ef)
return;
mutex_lock(&eventfs_mutex);
eventfs_remove_rec(ef, &ef_del_list, 0);
list_for_each_entry_safe(ef, tmp, &ef_del_list, del_list) {
if (ef->dentry) {
unsigned long ptr = (unsigned long)dentry_list;
/* Keep the dentry from being freed yet */
dget(ef->dentry);
/*
* Paranoid: The dget() above should prevent the dentry
* from being freed and calling eventfs_set_ef_status_free().
* But just in case, set the link list LSB pointer to 1
* and have eventfs_set_ef_status_free() check that to
* make sure that if it does happen, it will not think
* the d_fsdata is an event_file.
*
* For this to work, no event_file should be allocated
* on a odd space, as the ef should always be allocated
* to be at least word aligned. Check for that too.
*/
WARN_ON_ONCE(ptr & 1);
ef->dentry->d_fsdata = (void *)(ptr | 1);
dentry_list = ef->dentry;
ef->dentry = NULL;
}
call_srcu(&eventfs_srcu, &ef->rcu, free_ef);
}
mutex_unlock(&eventfs_mutex);
while (dentry_list) {
unsigned long ptr;
dentry = dentry_list;
ptr = (unsigned long)dentry->d_fsdata & ~1UL;
dentry_list = (struct dentry *)ptr;
dentry->d_fsdata = NULL;
d_invalidate(dentry);
mutex_lock(&eventfs_mutex);
/* dentry should now have at least a single reference */
WARN_ONCE((int)d_count(dentry) < 1,
"dentry %p less than one reference (%d) after invalidate\n",
dentry, d_count(dentry));
mutex_unlock(&eventfs_mutex);
dput(dentry);
}
}
/**
* eventfs_remove_events_dir - remove eventfs dir or file from list
* @dentry: events's dentry to be removed.
*
* This function remove events main directory
*/
void eventfs_remove_events_dir(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct tracefs_inode *ti;
if (!dentry || !dentry->d_inode)
return;
ti = get_tracefs(dentry->d_inode);
if (!ti || !(ti->flags & TRACEFS_EVENT_INODE))
return;
d_invalidate(dentry);
dput(dentry);
}