linux/mm/kasan/common.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* This file contains common KASAN code.
*
* Copyright (c) 2014 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
* Author: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
*
* Some code borrowed from https://github.com/xairy/kasan-prototype by
* Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
*/
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kasan.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <linux/memory.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/printk.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/stacktrace.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/bug.h>
#include "kasan.h"
#include "../slab.h"
rcu: kasan: record and print call_rcu() call stack Patch series "kasan: memorize and print call_rcu stack", v8. This patchset improves KASAN reports by making them to have call_rcu() call stack information. It is useful for programmers to solve use-after-free or double-free memory issue. The KASAN report was as follows(cleaned up slightly): BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kasan_rcu_reclaim+0x58/0x60 Freed by task 0: kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x24/0x38 kasan_set_free_info+0x18/0x20 __kasan_slab_free+0x10c/0x170 kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18 kfree+0x98/0x270 kasan_rcu_reclaim+0x1c/0x60 Last call_rcu(): kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbc/0xd0 call_rcu+0x8c/0x580 kasan_rcu_uaf+0xf4/0xf8 Generic KASAN will record the last two call_rcu() call stacks and print up to 2 call_rcu() call stacks in KASAN report. it is only suitable for generic KASAN. This feature considers the size of struct kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta, we try to optimize the structure layout and size, lets it get better memory consumption. [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198437 [2]https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/kasan-dev/better$20stack$20traces$20for$20rcu%7Csort:date/kasan-dev/KQsjT_88hDE/7rNUZprRBgAJ This patch (of 4): This feature will record the last two call_rcu() call stacks and prints up to 2 call_rcu() call stacks in KASAN report. When call_rcu() is called, we store the call_rcu() call stack into slub alloc meta-data, so that the KASAN report can print rcu stack. [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198437 [2]https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/kasan-dev/better$20stack$20traces$20for$20rcu%7Csort:date/kasan-dev/KQsjT_88hDE/7rNUZprRBgAJ [walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com: build fix] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710162401.23816-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710162123.23713-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200601050847.1096-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200601050927.1153-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07 06:24:35 +00:00
depot_stack_handle_t kasan_save_stack(gfp_t flags)
{
unsigned long entries[KASAN_STACK_DEPTH];
mm/kasan: Simplify stacktrace handling Replace the indirection through struct stack_trace by using the storage array based interfaces. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> Cc: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Cc: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Cc: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Cc: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch> Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com> Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie> Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com> Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Cc: Tom Zanussi <tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com> Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190425094801.963261479@linutronix.de
2019-04-25 09:45:02 +00:00
unsigned int nr_entries;
mm/kasan: Simplify stacktrace handling Replace the indirection through struct stack_trace by using the storage array based interfaces. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com> Cc: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> Cc: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Cc: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Cc: linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com Cc: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Cc: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch> Cc: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Maarten Lankhorst <maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com> Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie> Cc: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com> Cc: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Cc: Tom Zanussi <tom.zanussi@linux.intel.com> Cc: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190425094801.963261479@linutronix.de
2019-04-25 09:45:02 +00:00
nr_entries = stack_trace_save(entries, ARRAY_SIZE(entries), 0);
nr_entries = filter_irq_stacks(entries, nr_entries);
return stack_depot_save(entries, nr_entries, flags);
}
kasan: record and print the free track Move free track from kasan_alloc_meta to kasan_free_meta in order to make struct kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta size are both 16 bytes. It is a good size because it is the minimal redzone size and a good number of alignment. For free track, we make some modifications as shown below: 1) Remove the free_track from struct kasan_alloc_meta. 2) Add the free_track into struct kasan_free_meta. 3) Add a macro KASAN_KMALLOC_FREETRACK in order to check whether it can print free stack in KASAN report. [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198437 [walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com: build fix] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710162440.23887-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Co-developed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com> Cc: "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200601051022.1230-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07 06:24:39 +00:00
void kasan_set_track(struct kasan_track *track, gfp_t flags)
{
track->pid = current->pid;
rcu: kasan: record and print call_rcu() call stack Patch series "kasan: memorize and print call_rcu stack", v8. This patchset improves KASAN reports by making them to have call_rcu() call stack information. It is useful for programmers to solve use-after-free or double-free memory issue. The KASAN report was as follows(cleaned up slightly): BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kasan_rcu_reclaim+0x58/0x60 Freed by task 0: kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 kasan_set_track+0x24/0x38 kasan_set_free_info+0x18/0x20 __kasan_slab_free+0x10c/0x170 kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18 kfree+0x98/0x270 kasan_rcu_reclaim+0x1c/0x60 Last call_rcu(): kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbc/0xd0 call_rcu+0x8c/0x580 kasan_rcu_uaf+0xf4/0xf8 Generic KASAN will record the last two call_rcu() call stacks and print up to 2 call_rcu() call stacks in KASAN report. it is only suitable for generic KASAN. This feature considers the size of struct kasan_alloc_meta and kasan_free_meta, we try to optimize the structure layout and size, lets it get better memory consumption. [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198437 [2]https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/kasan-dev/better$20stack$20traces$20for$20rcu%7Csort:date/kasan-dev/KQsjT_88hDE/7rNUZprRBgAJ This patch (of 4): This feature will record the last two call_rcu() call stacks and prints up to 2 call_rcu() call stacks in KASAN report. When call_rcu() is called, we store the call_rcu() call stack into slub alloc meta-data, so that the KASAN report can print rcu stack. [1]https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198437 [2]https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/kasan-dev/better$20stack$20traces$20for$20rcu%7Csort:date/kasan-dev/KQsjT_88hDE/7rNUZprRBgAJ [walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com: build fix] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710162401.23816-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Suggested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com> Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710162123.23713-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200601050847.1096-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200601050927.1153-1-walter-zh.wu@mediatek.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-07 06:24:35 +00:00
track->stack = kasan_save_stack(flags);
}
#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)
void kasan_enable_current(void)
{
current->kasan_depth++;
}
void kasan_disable_current(void)
{
current->kasan_depth--;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */
void __kasan_unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size)
{
unpoison_range(address, size);
}
#if CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
/* Unpoison the entire stack for a task. */
void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task)
{
void *base = task_stack_page(task);
unpoison_range(base, THREAD_SIZE);
}
/* Unpoison the stack for the current task beyond a watermark sp value. */
asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark)
{
/*
* Calculate the task stack base address. Avoid using 'current'
* because this function is called by early resume code which hasn't
* yet set up the percpu register (%gs).
*/
void *base = (void *)((unsigned long)watermark & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1));
unpoison_range(base, watermark - base);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_STACK */
kasan, mm: allow cache merging with no metadata The reason cache merging is disabled with KASAN is because KASAN puts its metadata right after the allocated object. When the merged caches have slightly different sizes, the metadata ends up in different places, which KASAN doesn't support. It might be possible to adjust the metadata allocation algorithm and make it friendly to the cache merging code. Instead this change takes a simpler approach and allows merging caches when no metadata is present. Which is the case for hardware tag-based KASAN with kasan.mode=prod. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/37497e940bfd4b32c0a93a702a9ae4cf061d5392.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Ia114847dfb2244f297d2cb82d592bf6a07455dba Co-developed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22 20:03:31 +00:00
/*
* Only allow cache merging when stack collection is disabled and no metadata
* is present.
*/
slab_flags_t __kasan_never_merge(void)
{
if (kasan_stack_collection_enabled())
return SLAB_KASAN;
return 0;
}
void __kasan_alloc_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
{
u8 tag;
unsigned long i;
if (unlikely(PageHighMem(page)))
return;
tag = random_tag();
for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++)
page_kasan_tag_set(page + i, tag);
unpoison_range(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order);
}
void __kasan_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
{
if (likely(!PageHighMem(page)))
poison_range(page_address(page),
PAGE_SIZE << order,
KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
}
/*
* Adaptive redzone policy taken from the userspace AddressSanitizer runtime.
* For larger allocations larger redzones are used.
*/
static inline unsigned int optimal_redzone(unsigned int object_size)
{
return
object_size <= 64 - 16 ? 16 :
object_size <= 128 - 32 ? 32 :
object_size <= 512 - 64 ? 64 :
object_size <= 4096 - 128 ? 128 :
object_size <= (1 << 14) - 256 ? 256 :
object_size <= (1 << 15) - 512 ? 512 :
object_size <= (1 << 16) - 1024 ? 1024 : 2048;
}
void __kasan_cache_create(struct kmem_cache *cache, unsigned int *size,
slab_flags_t *flags)
{
kasan: sanitize objects when metadata doesn't fit KASAN marks caches that are sanitized with the SLAB_KASAN cache flag. Currently if the metadata that is appended after the object (stores e.g. stack trace ids) doesn't fit into KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE (can only happen with SLAB, see the comment in the patch), KASAN turns off sanitization completely. With this change sanitization of the object data is always enabled. However the metadata is only stored when it fits. Instead of checking for SLAB_KASAN flag accross the code to find out whether the metadata is there, use cache->kasan_info.alloc/free_meta_offset. As 0 can be a valid value for free_meta_offset, introduce KASAN_NO_FREE_META as an indicator that the free metadata is missing. Without this change all sanitized KASAN objects would be put into quarantine with generic KASAN. With this change, only the objects that have metadata (i.e. when it fits) are put into quarantine, the rest is freed right away. Along the way rework __kasan_cache_create() and add claryfying comments. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/aee34b87a5e4afe586c2ac6a0b32db8dc4dcc2dc.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Icd947e2bea054cb5cfbdc6cf6652227d97032dcb Co-developed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22 20:03:28 +00:00
unsigned int ok_size;
unsigned int optimal_size;
/*
* SLAB_KASAN is used to mark caches as ones that are sanitized by
* KASAN. Currently this flag is used in two places:
* 1. In slab_ksize() when calculating the size of the accessible
* memory within the object.
* 2. In slab_common.c to prevent merging of sanitized caches.
*/
*flags |= SLAB_KASAN;
kasan: sanitize objects when metadata doesn't fit KASAN marks caches that are sanitized with the SLAB_KASAN cache flag. Currently if the metadata that is appended after the object (stores e.g. stack trace ids) doesn't fit into KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE (can only happen with SLAB, see the comment in the patch), KASAN turns off sanitization completely. With this change sanitization of the object data is always enabled. However the metadata is only stored when it fits. Instead of checking for SLAB_KASAN flag accross the code to find out whether the metadata is there, use cache->kasan_info.alloc/free_meta_offset. As 0 can be a valid value for free_meta_offset, introduce KASAN_NO_FREE_META as an indicator that the free metadata is missing. Without this change all sanitized KASAN objects would be put into quarantine with generic KASAN. With this change, only the objects that have metadata (i.e. when it fits) are put into quarantine, the rest is freed right away. Along the way rework __kasan_cache_create() and add claryfying comments. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/aee34b87a5e4afe586c2ac6a0b32db8dc4dcc2dc.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Icd947e2bea054cb5cfbdc6cf6652227d97032dcb Co-developed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22 20:03:28 +00:00
if (!kasan_stack_collection_enabled())
kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters Hardware tag-based KASAN mode is intended to eventually be used in production as a security mitigation. Therefore there's a need for finer control over KASAN features and for an existence of a kill switch. This change adds a few boot parameters for hardware tag-based KASAN that allow to disable or otherwise control particular KASAN features. The features that can be controlled are: 1. Whether KASAN is enabled at all. 2. Whether KASAN collects and saves alloc/free stacks. 3. Whether KASAN panics on a detected bug or not. With this change a new boot parameter kasan.mode allows to choose one of three main modes: - kasan.mode=off - KASAN is disabled, no tag checks are performed - kasan.mode=prod - only essential production features are enabled - kasan.mode=full - all KASAN features are enabled The chosen mode provides default control values for the features mentioned above. However it's also possible to override the default values by providing: - kasan.stacktrace=off/on - enable alloc/free stack collection (default: on for mode=full, otherwise off) - kasan.fault=report/panic - only report tag fault or also panic (default: report) If kasan.mode parameter is not provided, it defaults to full when CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL is enabled, and to prod otherwise. It is essential that switching between these modes doesn't require rebuilding the kernel with different configs, as this is required by the Android GKI (Generic Kernel Image) initiative [1]. [1] https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/kernel/generic-kernel-image [andreyknvl@google.com: don't use read-only static keys] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f2ded589eba1597f7360a972226083de9afd86e2.1607537948.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cb093613879d8d8841173f090133eddeb4c35f1f.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/If7d37003875b2ed3e0935702c8015c223d6416a4 Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22 20:03:06 +00:00
return;
kasan: sanitize objects when metadata doesn't fit KASAN marks caches that are sanitized with the SLAB_KASAN cache flag. Currently if the metadata that is appended after the object (stores e.g. stack trace ids) doesn't fit into KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE (can only happen with SLAB, see the comment in the patch), KASAN turns off sanitization completely. With this change sanitization of the object data is always enabled. However the metadata is only stored when it fits. Instead of checking for SLAB_KASAN flag accross the code to find out whether the metadata is there, use cache->kasan_info.alloc/free_meta_offset. As 0 can be a valid value for free_meta_offset, introduce KASAN_NO_FREE_META as an indicator that the free metadata is missing. Without this change all sanitized KASAN objects would be put into quarantine with generic KASAN. With this change, only the objects that have metadata (i.e. when it fits) are put into quarantine, the rest is freed right away. Along the way rework __kasan_cache_create() and add claryfying comments. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/aee34b87a5e4afe586c2ac6a0b32db8dc4dcc2dc.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Icd947e2bea054cb5cfbdc6cf6652227d97032dcb Co-developed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22 20:03:28 +00:00
ok_size = *size;
/* Add alloc meta into redzone. */
cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = *size;
*size += sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta);
kasan: sanitize objects when metadata doesn't fit KASAN marks caches that are sanitized with the SLAB_KASAN cache flag. Currently if the metadata that is appended after the object (stores e.g. stack trace ids) doesn't fit into KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE (can only happen with SLAB, see the comment in the patch), KASAN turns off sanitization completely. With this change sanitization of the object data is always enabled. However the metadata is only stored when it fits. Instead of checking for SLAB_KASAN flag accross the code to find out whether the metadata is there, use cache->kasan_info.alloc/free_meta_offset. As 0 can be a valid value for free_meta_offset, introduce KASAN_NO_FREE_META as an indicator that the free metadata is missing. Without this change all sanitized KASAN objects would be put into quarantine with generic KASAN. With this change, only the objects that have metadata (i.e. when it fits) are put into quarantine, the rest is freed right away. Along the way rework __kasan_cache_create() and add claryfying comments. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/aee34b87a5e4afe586c2ac6a0b32db8dc4dcc2dc.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Icd947e2bea054cb5cfbdc6cf6652227d97032dcb Co-developed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22 20:03:28 +00:00
/*
* If alloc meta doesn't fit, don't add it.
* This can only happen with SLAB, as it has KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE equal
* to KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE and doesn't fall back to page_alloc for
* larger sizes.
*/
if (*size > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE) {
cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset = 0;
*size = ok_size;
/* Continue, since free meta might still fit. */
}
kasan: sanitize objects when metadata doesn't fit KASAN marks caches that are sanitized with the SLAB_KASAN cache flag. Currently if the metadata that is appended after the object (stores e.g. stack trace ids) doesn't fit into KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE (can only happen with SLAB, see the comment in the patch), KASAN turns off sanitization completely. With this change sanitization of the object data is always enabled. However the metadata is only stored when it fits. Instead of checking for SLAB_KASAN flag accross the code to find out whether the metadata is there, use cache->kasan_info.alloc/free_meta_offset. As 0 can be a valid value for free_meta_offset, introduce KASAN_NO_FREE_META as an indicator that the free metadata is missing. Without this change all sanitized KASAN objects would be put into quarantine with generic KASAN. With this change, only the objects that have metadata (i.e. when it fits) are put into quarantine, the rest is freed right away. Along the way rework __kasan_cache_create() and add claryfying comments. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/aee34b87a5e4afe586c2ac6a0b32db8dc4dcc2dc.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Icd947e2bea054cb5cfbdc6cf6652227d97032dcb Co-developed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22 20:03:28 +00:00
/* Only the generic mode uses free meta or flexible redzones. */
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC)) {
cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = KASAN_NO_FREE_META;
return;
}
/*
kasan: sanitize objects when metadata doesn't fit KASAN marks caches that are sanitized with the SLAB_KASAN cache flag. Currently if the metadata that is appended after the object (stores e.g. stack trace ids) doesn't fit into KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE (can only happen with SLAB, see the comment in the patch), KASAN turns off sanitization completely. With this change sanitization of the object data is always enabled. However the metadata is only stored when it fits. Instead of checking for SLAB_KASAN flag accross the code to find out whether the metadata is there, use cache->kasan_info.alloc/free_meta_offset. As 0 can be a valid value for free_meta_offset, introduce KASAN_NO_FREE_META as an indicator that the free metadata is missing. Without this change all sanitized KASAN objects would be put into quarantine with generic KASAN. With this change, only the objects that have metadata (i.e. when it fits) are put into quarantine, the rest is freed right away. Along the way rework __kasan_cache_create() and add claryfying comments. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/aee34b87a5e4afe586c2ac6a0b32db8dc4dcc2dc.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Icd947e2bea054cb5cfbdc6cf6652227d97032dcb Co-developed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22 20:03:28 +00:00
* Add free meta into redzone when it's not possible to store
* it in the object. This is the case when:
* 1. Object is SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, which means that it can
* be touched after it was freed, or
* 2. Object has a constructor, which means it's expected to
* retain its content until the next allocation, or
* 3. Object is too small.
* Otherwise cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = 0 is implied.
*/
kasan: sanitize objects when metadata doesn't fit KASAN marks caches that are sanitized with the SLAB_KASAN cache flag. Currently if the metadata that is appended after the object (stores e.g. stack trace ids) doesn't fit into KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE (can only happen with SLAB, see the comment in the patch), KASAN turns off sanitization completely. With this change sanitization of the object data is always enabled. However the metadata is only stored when it fits. Instead of checking for SLAB_KASAN flag accross the code to find out whether the metadata is there, use cache->kasan_info.alloc/free_meta_offset. As 0 can be a valid value for free_meta_offset, introduce KASAN_NO_FREE_META as an indicator that the free metadata is missing. Without this change all sanitized KASAN objects would be put into quarantine with generic KASAN. With this change, only the objects that have metadata (i.e. when it fits) are put into quarantine, the rest is freed right away. Along the way rework __kasan_cache_create() and add claryfying comments. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/aee34b87a5e4afe586c2ac6a0b32db8dc4dcc2dc.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Icd947e2bea054cb5cfbdc6cf6652227d97032dcb Co-developed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22 20:03:28 +00:00
if ((cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU) || cache->ctor ||
cache->object_size < sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta)) {
ok_size = *size;
cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = *size;
*size += sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta);
/* If free meta doesn't fit, don't add it. */
if (*size > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE) {
cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset = KASAN_NO_FREE_META;
*size = ok_size;
}
}
kasan: sanitize objects when metadata doesn't fit KASAN marks caches that are sanitized with the SLAB_KASAN cache flag. Currently if the metadata that is appended after the object (stores e.g. stack trace ids) doesn't fit into KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE (can only happen with SLAB, see the comment in the patch), KASAN turns off sanitization completely. With this change sanitization of the object data is always enabled. However the metadata is only stored when it fits. Instead of checking for SLAB_KASAN flag accross the code to find out whether the metadata is there, use cache->kasan_info.alloc/free_meta_offset. As 0 can be a valid value for free_meta_offset, introduce KASAN_NO_FREE_META as an indicator that the free metadata is missing. Without this change all sanitized KASAN objects would be put into quarantine with generic KASAN. With this change, only the objects that have metadata (i.e. when it fits) are put into quarantine, the rest is freed right away. Along the way rework __kasan_cache_create() and add claryfying comments. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/aee34b87a5e4afe586c2ac6a0b32db8dc4dcc2dc.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Icd947e2bea054cb5cfbdc6cf6652227d97032dcb Co-developed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22 20:03:28 +00:00
/* Calculate size with optimal redzone. */
optimal_size = cache->object_size + optimal_redzone(cache->object_size);
/* Limit it with KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE (relevant for SLAB only). */
if (optimal_size > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE)
optimal_size = KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE;
/* Use optimal size if the size with added metas is not large enough. */
if (*size < optimal_size)
*size = optimal_size;
}
size_t __kasan_metadata_size(struct kmem_cache *cache)
{
kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters Hardware tag-based KASAN mode is intended to eventually be used in production as a security mitigation. Therefore there's a need for finer control over KASAN features and for an existence of a kill switch. This change adds a few boot parameters for hardware tag-based KASAN that allow to disable or otherwise control particular KASAN features. The features that can be controlled are: 1. Whether KASAN is enabled at all. 2. Whether KASAN collects and saves alloc/free stacks. 3. Whether KASAN panics on a detected bug or not. With this change a new boot parameter kasan.mode allows to choose one of three main modes: - kasan.mode=off - KASAN is disabled, no tag checks are performed - kasan.mode=prod - only essential production features are enabled - kasan.mode=full - all KASAN features are enabled The chosen mode provides default control values for the features mentioned above. However it's also possible to override the default values by providing: - kasan.stacktrace=off/on - enable alloc/free stack collection (default: on for mode=full, otherwise off) - kasan.fault=report/panic - only report tag fault or also panic (default: report) If kasan.mode parameter is not provided, it defaults to full when CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL is enabled, and to prod otherwise. It is essential that switching between these modes doesn't require rebuilding the kernel with different configs, as this is required by the Android GKI (Generic Kernel Image) initiative [1]. [1] https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/kernel/generic-kernel-image [andreyknvl@google.com: don't use read-only static keys] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f2ded589eba1597f7360a972226083de9afd86e2.1607537948.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cb093613879d8d8841173f090133eddeb4c35f1f.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/If7d37003875b2ed3e0935702c8015c223d6416a4 Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22 20:03:06 +00:00
if (!kasan_stack_collection_enabled())
return 0;
return (cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset ?
sizeof(struct kasan_alloc_meta) : 0) +
(cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset ?
sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta) : 0);
}
struct kasan_alloc_meta *kasan_get_alloc_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
const void *object)
{
kasan: sanitize objects when metadata doesn't fit KASAN marks caches that are sanitized with the SLAB_KASAN cache flag. Currently if the metadata that is appended after the object (stores e.g. stack trace ids) doesn't fit into KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE (can only happen with SLAB, see the comment in the patch), KASAN turns off sanitization completely. With this change sanitization of the object data is always enabled. However the metadata is only stored when it fits. Instead of checking for SLAB_KASAN flag accross the code to find out whether the metadata is there, use cache->kasan_info.alloc/free_meta_offset. As 0 can be a valid value for free_meta_offset, introduce KASAN_NO_FREE_META as an indicator that the free metadata is missing. Without this change all sanitized KASAN objects would be put into quarantine with generic KASAN. With this change, only the objects that have metadata (i.e. when it fits) are put into quarantine, the rest is freed right away. Along the way rework __kasan_cache_create() and add claryfying comments. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/aee34b87a5e4afe586c2ac6a0b32db8dc4dcc2dc.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Icd947e2bea054cb5cfbdc6cf6652227d97032dcb Co-developed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22 20:03:28 +00:00
if (!cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset)
return NULL;
return kasan_reset_tag(object) + cache->kasan_info.alloc_meta_offset;
}
kasan: sanitize objects when metadata doesn't fit KASAN marks caches that are sanitized with the SLAB_KASAN cache flag. Currently if the metadata that is appended after the object (stores e.g. stack trace ids) doesn't fit into KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE (can only happen with SLAB, see the comment in the patch), KASAN turns off sanitization completely. With this change sanitization of the object data is always enabled. However the metadata is only stored when it fits. Instead of checking for SLAB_KASAN flag accross the code to find out whether the metadata is there, use cache->kasan_info.alloc/free_meta_offset. As 0 can be a valid value for free_meta_offset, introduce KASAN_NO_FREE_META as an indicator that the free metadata is missing. Without this change all sanitized KASAN objects would be put into quarantine with generic KASAN. With this change, only the objects that have metadata (i.e. when it fits) are put into quarantine, the rest is freed right away. Along the way rework __kasan_cache_create() and add claryfying comments. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/aee34b87a5e4afe586c2ac6a0b32db8dc4dcc2dc.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Icd947e2bea054cb5cfbdc6cf6652227d97032dcb Co-developed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22 20:03:28 +00:00
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
struct kasan_free_meta *kasan_get_free_meta(struct kmem_cache *cache,
const void *object)
{
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct kasan_free_meta) > 32);
kasan: sanitize objects when metadata doesn't fit KASAN marks caches that are sanitized with the SLAB_KASAN cache flag. Currently if the metadata that is appended after the object (stores e.g. stack trace ids) doesn't fit into KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE (can only happen with SLAB, see the comment in the patch), KASAN turns off sanitization completely. With this change sanitization of the object data is always enabled. However the metadata is only stored when it fits. Instead of checking for SLAB_KASAN flag accross the code to find out whether the metadata is there, use cache->kasan_info.alloc/free_meta_offset. As 0 can be a valid value for free_meta_offset, introduce KASAN_NO_FREE_META as an indicator that the free metadata is missing. Without this change all sanitized KASAN objects would be put into quarantine with generic KASAN. With this change, only the objects that have metadata (i.e. when it fits) are put into quarantine, the rest is freed right away. Along the way rework __kasan_cache_create() and add claryfying comments. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/aee34b87a5e4afe586c2ac6a0b32db8dc4dcc2dc.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Icd947e2bea054cb5cfbdc6cf6652227d97032dcb Co-developed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22 20:03:28 +00:00
if (cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset == KASAN_NO_FREE_META)
return NULL;
return kasan_reset_tag(object) + cache->kasan_info.free_meta_offset;
}
kasan: sanitize objects when metadata doesn't fit KASAN marks caches that are sanitized with the SLAB_KASAN cache flag. Currently if the metadata that is appended after the object (stores e.g. stack trace ids) doesn't fit into KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE (can only happen with SLAB, see the comment in the patch), KASAN turns off sanitization completely. With this change sanitization of the object data is always enabled. However the metadata is only stored when it fits. Instead of checking for SLAB_KASAN flag accross the code to find out whether the metadata is there, use cache->kasan_info.alloc/free_meta_offset. As 0 can be a valid value for free_meta_offset, introduce KASAN_NO_FREE_META as an indicator that the free metadata is missing. Without this change all sanitized KASAN objects would be put into quarantine with generic KASAN. With this change, only the objects that have metadata (i.e. when it fits) are put into quarantine, the rest is freed right away. Along the way rework __kasan_cache_create() and add claryfying comments. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/aee34b87a5e4afe586c2ac6a0b32db8dc4dcc2dc.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Icd947e2bea054cb5cfbdc6cf6652227d97032dcb Co-developed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22 20:03:28 +00:00
#endif
void __kasan_poison_slab(struct page *page)
{
unsigned long i;
for (i = 0; i < compound_nr(page); i++)
page_kasan_tag_reset(page + i);
poison_range(page_address(page), page_size(page),
KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
}
void __kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
{
unpoison_range(object, cache->object_size);
}
void __kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
{
poison_range(object, cache->object_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
}
/*
* This function assigns a tag to an object considering the following:
* 1. A cache might have a constructor, which might save a pointer to a slab
* object somewhere (e.g. in the object itself). We preassign a tag for
* each object in caches with constructors during slab creation and reuse
* the same tag each time a particular object is allocated.
* 2. A cache might be SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, which means objects can be
* accessed after being freed. We preassign tags for objects in these
* caches as well.
* 3. For SLAB allocator we can't preassign tags randomly since the freelist
* is stored as an array of indexes instead of a linked list. Assign tags
* based on objects indexes, so that objects that are next to each other
* get different tags.
*/
static u8 assign_tag(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
bool init, bool keep_tag)
{
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
return 0xff;
/*
* 1. When an object is kmalloc()'ed, two hooks are called:
* kasan_slab_alloc() and kasan_kmalloc(). We assign the
* tag only in the first one.
* 2. We reuse the same tag for krealloc'ed objects.
*/
if (keep_tag)
return get_tag(object);
/*
* If the cache neither has a constructor nor has SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU
* set, assign a tag when the object is being allocated (init == false).
*/
if (!cache->ctor && !(cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU))
return init ? KASAN_TAG_KERNEL : random_tag();
/* For caches that either have a constructor or SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU: */
#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB
/* For SLAB assign tags based on the object index in the freelist. */
return (u8)obj_to_index(cache, virt_to_page(object), (void *)object);
#else
/*
* For SLUB assign a random tag during slab creation, otherwise reuse
* the already assigned tag.
*/
return init ? random_tag() : get_tag(object);
#endif
}
void * __must_check __kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
const void *object)
{
struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters Hardware tag-based KASAN mode is intended to eventually be used in production as a security mitigation. Therefore there's a need for finer control over KASAN features and for an existence of a kill switch. This change adds a few boot parameters for hardware tag-based KASAN that allow to disable or otherwise control particular KASAN features. The features that can be controlled are: 1. Whether KASAN is enabled at all. 2. Whether KASAN collects and saves alloc/free stacks. 3. Whether KASAN panics on a detected bug or not. With this change a new boot parameter kasan.mode allows to choose one of three main modes: - kasan.mode=off - KASAN is disabled, no tag checks are performed - kasan.mode=prod - only essential production features are enabled - kasan.mode=full - all KASAN features are enabled The chosen mode provides default control values for the features mentioned above. However it's also possible to override the default values by providing: - kasan.stacktrace=off/on - enable alloc/free stack collection (default: on for mode=full, otherwise off) - kasan.fault=report/panic - only report tag fault or also panic (default: report) If kasan.mode parameter is not provided, it defaults to full when CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL is enabled, and to prod otherwise. It is essential that switching between these modes doesn't require rebuilding the kernel with different configs, as this is required by the Android GKI (Generic Kernel Image) initiative [1]. [1] https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/kernel/generic-kernel-image [andreyknvl@google.com: don't use read-only static keys] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f2ded589eba1597f7360a972226083de9afd86e2.1607537948.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cb093613879d8d8841173f090133eddeb4c35f1f.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/If7d37003875b2ed3e0935702c8015c223d6416a4 Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22 20:03:06 +00:00
if (kasan_stack_collection_enabled()) {
alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
kasan: sanitize objects when metadata doesn't fit KASAN marks caches that are sanitized with the SLAB_KASAN cache flag. Currently if the metadata that is appended after the object (stores e.g. stack trace ids) doesn't fit into KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE (can only happen with SLAB, see the comment in the patch), KASAN turns off sanitization completely. With this change sanitization of the object data is always enabled. However the metadata is only stored when it fits. Instead of checking for SLAB_KASAN flag accross the code to find out whether the metadata is there, use cache->kasan_info.alloc/free_meta_offset. As 0 can be a valid value for free_meta_offset, introduce KASAN_NO_FREE_META as an indicator that the free metadata is missing. Without this change all sanitized KASAN objects would be put into quarantine with generic KASAN. With this change, only the objects that have metadata (i.e. when it fits) are put into quarantine, the rest is freed right away. Along the way rework __kasan_cache_create() and add claryfying comments. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/aee34b87a5e4afe586c2ac6a0b32db8dc4dcc2dc.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Icd947e2bea054cb5cfbdc6cf6652227d97032dcb Co-developed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22 20:03:28 +00:00
if (alloc_meta)
__memset(alloc_meta, 0, sizeof(*alloc_meta));
kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters Hardware tag-based KASAN mode is intended to eventually be used in production as a security mitigation. Therefore there's a need for finer control over KASAN features and for an existence of a kill switch. This change adds a few boot parameters for hardware tag-based KASAN that allow to disable or otherwise control particular KASAN features. The features that can be controlled are: 1. Whether KASAN is enabled at all. 2. Whether KASAN collects and saves alloc/free stacks. 3. Whether KASAN panics on a detected bug or not. With this change a new boot parameter kasan.mode allows to choose one of three main modes: - kasan.mode=off - KASAN is disabled, no tag checks are performed - kasan.mode=prod - only essential production features are enabled - kasan.mode=full - all KASAN features are enabled The chosen mode provides default control values for the features mentioned above. However it's also possible to override the default values by providing: - kasan.stacktrace=off/on - enable alloc/free stack collection (default: on for mode=full, otherwise off) - kasan.fault=report/panic - only report tag fault or also panic (default: report) If kasan.mode parameter is not provided, it defaults to full when CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL is enabled, and to prod otherwise. It is essential that switching between these modes doesn't require rebuilding the kernel with different configs, as this is required by the Android GKI (Generic Kernel Image) initiative [1]. [1] https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/kernel/generic-kernel-image [andreyknvl@google.com: don't use read-only static keys] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f2ded589eba1597f7360a972226083de9afd86e2.1607537948.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cb093613879d8d8841173f090133eddeb4c35f1f.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/If7d37003875b2ed3e0935702c8015c223d6416a4 Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22 20:03:06 +00:00
}
/* Tag is ignored in set_tag() without CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS */
object = set_tag(object, assign_tag(cache, object, true, false));
return (void *)object;
}
static bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
unsigned long ip, bool quarantine)
{
u8 tag;
void *tagged_object;
tag = get_tag(object);
tagged_object = object;
object = kasan_reset_tag(object);
if (unlikely(nearest_obj(cache, virt_to_head_page(object), object) !=
object)) {
kasan_report_invalid_free(tagged_object, ip);
return true;
}
/* RCU slabs could be legally used after free within the RCU period */
if (unlikely(cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU))
return false;
if (check_invalid_free(tagged_object)) {
kasan_report_invalid_free(tagged_object, ip);
return true;
}
poison_range(object, cache->object_size, KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE);
kasan: add and integrate kasan boot parameters Hardware tag-based KASAN mode is intended to eventually be used in production as a security mitigation. Therefore there's a need for finer control over KASAN features and for an existence of a kill switch. This change adds a few boot parameters for hardware tag-based KASAN that allow to disable or otherwise control particular KASAN features. The features that can be controlled are: 1. Whether KASAN is enabled at all. 2. Whether KASAN collects and saves alloc/free stacks. 3. Whether KASAN panics on a detected bug or not. With this change a new boot parameter kasan.mode allows to choose one of three main modes: - kasan.mode=off - KASAN is disabled, no tag checks are performed - kasan.mode=prod - only essential production features are enabled - kasan.mode=full - all KASAN features are enabled The chosen mode provides default control values for the features mentioned above. However it's also possible to override the default values by providing: - kasan.stacktrace=off/on - enable alloc/free stack collection (default: on for mode=full, otherwise off) - kasan.fault=report/panic - only report tag fault or also panic (default: report) If kasan.mode parameter is not provided, it defaults to full when CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL is enabled, and to prod otherwise. It is essential that switching between these modes doesn't require rebuilding the kernel with different configs, as this is required by the Android GKI (Generic Kernel Image) initiative [1]. [1] https://source.android.com/devices/architecture/kernel/generic-kernel-image [andreyknvl@google.com: don't use read-only static keys] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/f2ded589eba1597f7360a972226083de9afd86e2.1607537948.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cb093613879d8d8841173f090133eddeb4c35f1f.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/If7d37003875b2ed3e0935702c8015c223d6416a4 Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22 20:03:06 +00:00
if (!kasan_stack_collection_enabled())
return false;
kasan: sanitize objects when metadata doesn't fit KASAN marks caches that are sanitized with the SLAB_KASAN cache flag. Currently if the metadata that is appended after the object (stores e.g. stack trace ids) doesn't fit into KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE (can only happen with SLAB, see the comment in the patch), KASAN turns off sanitization completely. With this change sanitization of the object data is always enabled. However the metadata is only stored when it fits. Instead of checking for SLAB_KASAN flag accross the code to find out whether the metadata is there, use cache->kasan_info.alloc/free_meta_offset. As 0 can be a valid value for free_meta_offset, introduce KASAN_NO_FREE_META as an indicator that the free metadata is missing. Without this change all sanitized KASAN objects would be put into quarantine with generic KASAN. With this change, only the objects that have metadata (i.e. when it fits) are put into quarantine, the rest is freed right away. Along the way rework __kasan_cache_create() and add claryfying comments. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/aee34b87a5e4afe586c2ac6a0b32db8dc4dcc2dc.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Icd947e2bea054cb5cfbdc6cf6652227d97032dcb Co-developed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22 20:03:28 +00:00
if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine))
return false;
kasan_set_free_info(cache, object, tag);
kasan: sanitize objects when metadata doesn't fit KASAN marks caches that are sanitized with the SLAB_KASAN cache flag. Currently if the metadata that is appended after the object (stores e.g. stack trace ids) doesn't fit into KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE (can only happen with SLAB, see the comment in the patch), KASAN turns off sanitization completely. With this change sanitization of the object data is always enabled. However the metadata is only stored when it fits. Instead of checking for SLAB_KASAN flag accross the code to find out whether the metadata is there, use cache->kasan_info.alloc/free_meta_offset. As 0 can be a valid value for free_meta_offset, introduce KASAN_NO_FREE_META as an indicator that the free metadata is missing. Without this change all sanitized KASAN objects would be put into quarantine with generic KASAN. With this change, only the objects that have metadata (i.e. when it fits) are put into quarantine, the rest is freed right away. Along the way rework __kasan_cache_create() and add claryfying comments. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/aee34b87a5e4afe586c2ac6a0b32db8dc4dcc2dc.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Icd947e2bea054cb5cfbdc6cf6652227d97032dcb Co-developed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-12-22 20:03:28 +00:00
return quarantine_put(cache, object);
}
bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, unsigned long ip)
{
return ____kasan_slab_free(cache, object, ip, true);
}
void __kasan_slab_free_mempool(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
{
struct page *page;
page = virt_to_head_page(ptr);
/*
* Even though this function is only called for kmem_cache_alloc and
* kmalloc backed mempool allocations, those allocations can still be
* !PageSlab() when the size provided to kmalloc is larger than
* KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE, and kmalloc falls back onto page_alloc.
*/
if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page))) {
if (ptr != page_address(page)) {
kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
return;
}
poison_range(ptr, page_size(page), KASAN_FREE_PAGE);
} else {
____kasan_slab_free(page->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false);
}
}
static void set_alloc_info(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object, gfp_t flags)
{
kasan: sanitize objects when metadata doesn't fit KASAN marks caches that are sanitized with the SLAB_KASAN cache flag. Currently if the metadata that is appended after the object (stores e.g. stack trace ids) doesn't fit into KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE (can only happen with SLAB, see the comment in the patch), KASAN turns off sanitization completely. With this change sanitization of the object data is always enabled. However the metadata is only stored when it fits. Instead of checking for SLAB_KASAN flag accross the code to find out whether the metadata is there, use cache->kasan_info.alloc/free_meta_offset. As 0 can be a valid value for free_meta_offset, introduce KASAN_NO_FREE_META as an indicator that the free metadata is missing. Without this change all sanitized KASAN objects would be put into quarantine with generic KASAN. With this change, only the objects that have metadata (i.e. when it fits) are put into quarantine, the rest is freed right away. Along the way rework __kasan_cache_create() and add claryfying comments. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/aee34b87a5e4afe586c2ac6a0b32db8dc4dcc2dc.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Icd947e2bea054cb5cfbdc6cf6652227d97032dcb Co-developed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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struct kasan_alloc_meta *alloc_meta;
alloc_meta = kasan_get_alloc_meta(cache, object);
if (alloc_meta)
kasan_set_track(&alloc_meta->alloc_track, flags);
}
static void *____kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
size_t size, gfp_t flags, bool keep_tag)
{
unsigned long redzone_start;
unsigned long redzone_end;
u8 tag;
if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flags))
quarantine_reduce();
if (unlikely(object == NULL))
return NULL;
redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(object + size),
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KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
redzone_end = round_up((unsigned long)object + cache->object_size,
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KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
tag = assign_tag(cache, object, false, keep_tag);
/* Tag is ignored in set_tag without CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS */
unpoison_range(set_tag(object, tag), size);
poison_range((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE);
kasan: sanitize objects when metadata doesn't fit KASAN marks caches that are sanitized with the SLAB_KASAN cache flag. Currently if the metadata that is appended after the object (stores e.g. stack trace ids) doesn't fit into KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE (can only happen with SLAB, see the comment in the patch), KASAN turns off sanitization completely. With this change sanitization of the object data is always enabled. However the metadata is only stored when it fits. Instead of checking for SLAB_KASAN flag accross the code to find out whether the metadata is there, use cache->kasan_info.alloc/free_meta_offset. As 0 can be a valid value for free_meta_offset, introduce KASAN_NO_FREE_META as an indicator that the free metadata is missing. Without this change all sanitized KASAN objects would be put into quarantine with generic KASAN. With this change, only the objects that have metadata (i.e. when it fits) are put into quarantine, the rest is freed right away. Along the way rework __kasan_cache_create() and add claryfying comments. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/aee34b87a5e4afe586c2ac6a0b32db8dc4dcc2dc.1606162397.git.andreyknvl@google.com Link: https://linux-review.googlesource.com/id/Icd947e2bea054cb5cfbdc6cf6652227d97032dcb Co-developed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Tested-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com> Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com> Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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if (kasan_stack_collection_enabled())
set_alloc_info(cache, (void *)object, flags);
return set_tag(object, tag);
}
void * __must_check __kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache,
void *object, gfp_t flags)
{
return ____kasan_kmalloc(cache, object, cache->object_size, flags, false);
}
void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
size_t size, gfp_t flags)
{
return ____kasan_kmalloc(cache, object, size, flags, true);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_kmalloc);
void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
gfp_t flags)
{
struct page *page;
unsigned long redzone_start;
unsigned long redzone_end;
if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flags))
quarantine_reduce();
if (unlikely(ptr == NULL))
return NULL;
page = virt_to_page(ptr);
redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size),
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KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + page_size(page);
unpoison_range(ptr, size);
poison_range((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE);
return (void *)ptr;
}
void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
{
struct page *page;
if (unlikely(object == ZERO_SIZE_PTR))
return (void *)object;
page = virt_to_head_page(object);
if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page)))
return __kasan_kmalloc_large(object, size, flags);
else
return ____kasan_kmalloc(page->slab_cache, object, size,
flags, true);
}
void __kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
{
if (ptr != page_address(virt_to_head_page(ptr)))
kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip);
/* The object will be poisoned by kasan_free_pages(). */
}