linux/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
* PF_INET6 socket protocol family
* Linux INET6 implementation
*
* Authors:
* Pedro Roque <roque@di.fc.ul.pt>
*
* Adapted from linux/net/ipv4/af_inet.c
*
* Fixes:
* piggy, Karl Knutson : Socket protocol table
* Hideaki YOSHIFUJI : sin6_scope_id support
* Arnaldo Melo : check proc_net_create return, cleanups
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "IPv6: " fmt
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/socket.h>
#include <linux/in.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/timer.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/sockios.h>
#include <linux/net.h>
#include <linux/fcntl.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include <linux/stat.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 08:04:11 +00:00
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/inet.h>
#include <linux/netdevice.h>
#include <linux/icmpv6.h>
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
#include <net/ipv6.h>
#include <net/udp.h>
[NET]: Supporting UDP-Lite (RFC 3828) in Linux This is a revision of the previously submitted patch, which alters the way files are organized and compiled in the following manner: * UDP and UDP-Lite now use separate object files * source file dependencies resolved via header files net/ipv{4,6}/udp_impl.h * order of inclusion files in udp.c/udplite.c adapted accordingly [NET/IPv4]: Support for the UDP-Lite protocol (RFC 3828) This patch adds support for UDP-Lite to the IPv4 stack, provided as an extension to the existing UDPv4 code: * generic routines are all located in net/ipv4/udp.c * UDP-Lite specific routines are in net/ipv4/udplite.c * MIB/statistics support in /proc/net/snmp and /proc/net/udplite * shared API with extensions for partial checksum coverage [NET/IPv6]: Extension for UDP-Lite over IPv6 It extends the existing UDPv6 code base with support for UDP-Lite in the same manner as per UDPv4. In particular, * UDPv6 generic and shared code is in net/ipv6/udp.c * UDP-Litev6 specific extensions are in net/ipv6/udplite.c * MIB/statistics support in /proc/net/snmp6 and /proc/net/udplite6 * support for IPV6_ADDRFORM * aligned the coding style of protocol initialisation with af_inet6.c * made the error handling in udpv6_queue_rcv_skb consistent; to return `-1' on error on all error cases * consolidation of shared code [NET]: UDP-Lite Documentation and basic XFRM/Netfilter support The UDP-Lite patch further provides * API documentation for UDP-Lite * basic xfrm support * basic netfilter support for IPv4 and IPv6 (LOG target) Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-11-27 19:10:57 +00:00
#include <net/udplite.h>
#include <net/tcp.h>
#include <net/ping.h>
#include <net/protocol.h>
#include <net/inet_common.h>
#include <net/route.h>
#include <net/transp_v6.h>
#include <net/ip6_route.h>
#include <net/addrconf.h>
#include <net/ipv6_stubs.h>
#include <net/ndisc.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_TUNNEL
#include <net/ip6_tunnel.h>
#endif
#include <net/calipso.h>
#include <net/seg6.h>
#include <net/rpl.h>
#include <net/compat.h>
#include <net/xfrm.h>
ipv6: ioam: Data plane support for Pre-allocated Trace Implement support for processing the IOAM Pre-allocated Trace with IPv6, see [1] and [2]. Introduce a new IPv6 Hop-by-Hop TLV option, see IANA [3]. A new per-interface sysctl is introduced. The value is a boolean to accept (=1) or ignore (=0, by default) IPv6 IOAM options on ingress for an interface: - net.ipv6.conf.XXX.ioam6_enabled Two other sysctls are introduced to define IOAM IDs, represented by an integer. They are respectively per-namespace and per-interface: - net.ipv6.ioam6_id - net.ipv6.conf.XXX.ioam6_id The value of the first one represents the IOAM ID of the node itself (u32; max and default value = U32_MAX>>8, due to hop limit concatenation) while the other represents the IOAM ID of an interface (u16; max and default value = U16_MAX). Each "ioam6_id" sysctl has a "_wide" equivalent: - net.ipv6.ioam6_id_wide - net.ipv6.conf.XXX.ioam6_id_wide The value of the first one represents the wide IOAM ID of the node itself (u64; max and default value = U64_MAX>>8, due to hop limit concatenation) while the other represents the wide IOAM ID of an interface (u32; max and default value = U32_MAX). The use of short and wide equivalents is not exclusive, a deployment could choose to leverage both. For example, net.ipv6.conf.XXX.ioam6_id (short format) could be an identifier for a physical interface, whereas net.ipv6.conf.XXX.ioam6_id_wide (wide format) could be an identifier for a logical sub-interface. Documentation about new sysctls is provided at the end of this patchset. Two relativistic hash tables are used: one for IOAM namespaces, the other for IOAM schemas. A namespace can only have a single active schema and a schema can only be attached to a single namespace (1:1 relationship). [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ippm-ioam-ipv6-options [2] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ippm-ioam-data [3] https://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-parameters/ipv6-parameters.xhtml#ipv6-parameters-2 Signed-off-by: Justin Iurman <justin.iurman@uliege.be> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-07-20 19:42:57 +00:00
#include <net/ioam6.h>
#include <net/rawv6.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/mroute6.h>
#include "ip6_offload.h"
MODULE_AUTHOR("Cast of dozens");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("IPv6 protocol stack for Linux");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
/* The inetsw6 table contains everything that inet6_create needs to
* build a new socket.
*/
static struct list_head inetsw6[SOCK_MAX];
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(inetsw6_lock);
struct ipv6_params ipv6_defaults = {
.disable_ipv6 = 0,
.autoconf = 1,
};
net/ipv6/af_inet6.c: checkpatch cleanup af_inet6.c:80: ERROR: do not initialise statics to 0 or NULL af_inet6.c:259: ERROR: spaces required around that '=' (ctx:VxV) af_inet6.c:394: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:412: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:422: ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition af_inet6.c:425: ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition af_inet6.c:433: ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition af_inet6.c:437: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:446: ERROR: spaces required around that '=' (ctx:VxV) af_inet6.c:478: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:485: ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line af_inet6.c:485: ERROR: space required before the open parenthesis '(' af_inet6.c:513: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:629: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:647: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:687: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:709: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:1073: ERROR: space required before the open parenthesis '(' Signed-off-by: Eldad Zack <eldad@fogrefinery.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-05-05 10:13:53 +00:00
static int disable_ipv6_mod;
module_param_named(disable, disable_ipv6_mod, int, 0444);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(disable, "Disable IPv6 module such that it is non-functional");
module_param_named(disable_ipv6, ipv6_defaults.disable_ipv6, int, 0444);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(disable_ipv6, "Disable IPv6 on all interfaces");
module_param_named(autoconf, ipv6_defaults.autoconf, int, 0444);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(autoconf, "Enable IPv6 address autoconfiguration on all interfaces");
net: vrf: Fix crash when IPv6 is disabled at boot time Frank Kellermann reported a kernel crash with 4.5.0 when IPv6 is disabled at boot using the kernel option ipv6.disable=1. Using current net-next with the boot option: $ ip link add red type vrf table 1001 Generates: [12210.919584] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000748 [12210.921341] IP: [<ffffffff814b30e3>] fib6_get_table+0x2c/0x5a [12210.922537] PGD b79e3067 PUD bb32b067 PMD 0 [12210.923479] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [12210.924001] Modules linked in: ipvlan 8021q garp mrp stp llc [12210.925130] CPU: 3 PID: 1177 Comm: ip Not tainted 4.7.0-rc1+ #235 [12210.926168] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.7.5-20140531_083030-gandalf 04/01/2014 [12210.928065] task: ffff8800b9ac4640 ti: ffff8800bacac000 task.ti: ffff8800bacac000 [12210.929328] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814b30e3>] [<ffffffff814b30e3>] fib6_get_table+0x2c/0x5a [12210.930697] RSP: 0018:ffff8800bacaf888 EFLAGS: 00010202 [12210.931563] RAX: 0000000000000748 RBX: ffffffff81a9e280 RCX: ffff8800b9ac4e28 [12210.932688] RDX: 00000000000000e9 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 0000000000000286 [12210.933820] RBP: ffff8800bacaf898 R08: ffff8800b9ac4df0 R09: 000000000052001b [12210.934941] R10: 00000000657c0000 R11: 000000000000c649 R12: 00000000000003e9 [12210.936032] R13: 00000000000003e9 R14: ffff8800bace7800 R15: ffff8800bb3ec000 [12210.937103] FS: 00007faa1766c700(0000) GS:ffff88013ac00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [12210.938321] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [12210.939166] CR2: 0000000000000748 CR3: 00000000b79d6000 CR4: 00000000000406e0 [12210.940278] Stack: [12210.940603] ffff8800bb3ec000 ffffffff81a9e280 ffff8800bacaf8c8 ffffffff814b3135 [12210.941818] ffff8800bb3ec000 ffffffff81a9e280 ffffffff81a9e280 ffff8800bace7800 [12210.943040] ffff8800bacaf8f0 ffffffff81397c88 ffff8800bb3ec000 ffffffff81a9e280 [12210.944288] Call Trace: [12210.944688] [<ffffffff814b3135>] fib6_new_table+0x24/0x8a [12210.945516] [<ffffffff81397c88>] vrf_dev_init+0xd4/0x162 [12210.946328] [<ffffffff814091e1>] register_netdevice+0x100/0x396 [12210.947209] [<ffffffff8139823d>] vrf_newlink+0x40/0xb3 [12210.948001] [<ffffffff814187f0>] rtnl_newlink+0x5d3/0x6d5 ... The problem above is due to the fact that the fib hash table is not allocated when IPv6 is disabled at boot. As for the VRF driver it should not do any IPv6 initializations if IPv6 is disabled, so it needs to know if IPv6 is disabled at boot. The disable parameter is private to the IPv6 module, so provide an accessor for modules to determine if IPv6 was disabled at boot time. Fixes: 35402e3136634 ("net: Add IPv6 support to VRF device") Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-06-09 17:21:00 +00:00
bool ipv6_mod_enabled(void)
{
return disable_ipv6_mod == 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ipv6_mod_enabled);
static __inline__ struct ipv6_pinfo *inet6_sk_generic(struct sock *sk)
{
const int offset = sk->sk_prot->obj_size - sizeof(struct ipv6_pinfo);
return (struct ipv6_pinfo *)(((u8 *)sk) + offset);
}
static int inet6_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
int kern)
{
struct inet_sock *inet;
struct ipv6_pinfo *np;
struct sock *sk;
struct inet_protosw *answer;
struct proto *answer_prot;
unsigned char answer_flags;
int try_loading_module = 0;
int err;
if (protocol < 0 || protocol >= IPPROTO_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
/* Look for the requested type/protocol pair. */
lookup_protocol:
err = -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(answer, &inetsw6[sock->type], list) {
err = 0;
/* Check the non-wild match. */
if (protocol == answer->protocol) {
if (protocol != IPPROTO_IP)
break;
} else {
/* Check for the two wild cases. */
if (IPPROTO_IP == protocol) {
protocol = answer->protocol;
break;
}
if (IPPROTO_IP == answer->protocol)
break;
}
err = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
}
if (err) {
if (try_loading_module < 2) {
rcu_read_unlock();
/*
* Be more specific, e.g. net-pf-10-proto-132-type-1
* (net-pf-PF_INET6-proto-IPPROTO_SCTP-type-SOCK_STREAM)
*/
if (++try_loading_module == 1)
request_module("net-pf-%d-proto-%d-type-%d",
PF_INET6, protocol, sock->type);
/*
* Fall back to generic, e.g. net-pf-10-proto-132
* (net-pf-PF_INET6-proto-IPPROTO_SCTP)
*/
else
request_module("net-pf-%d-proto-%d",
PF_INET6, protocol);
goto lookup_protocol;
} else
goto out_rcu_unlock;
}
err = -EPERM;
net: Allow userns root to control ipv6 Allow an unpriviled user who has created a user namespace, and then created a network namespace to effectively use the new network namespace, by reducing capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) and capable(CAP_NET_RAW) calls to be ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN), or capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW) calls. Settings that merely control a single network device are allowed. Either the network device is a logical network device where restrictions make no difference or the network device is hardware NIC that has been explicity moved from the initial network namespace. In general policy and network stack state changes are allowed while resource control is left unchanged. Allow the SIOCSIFADDR ioctl to add ipv6 addresses. Allow the SIOCDIFADDR ioctl to delete ipv6 addresses. Allow the SIOCADDRT ioctl to add ipv6 routes. Allow the SIOCDELRT ioctl to delete ipv6 routes. Allow creation of ipv6 raw sockets. Allow setting the IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST socket option. Allow setting the IPV6_FL_A_RENEW parameter of the IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MGR socket option. Allow setting the IPV6_TRANSPARENT socket option. Allow setting the IPV6_HOPOPTS socket option. Allow setting the IPV6_RTHDRDSTOPTS socket option. Allow setting the IPV6_DSTOPTS socket option. Allow setting the IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY socket option. Allow setting the IPV6_XFRM_POLICY socket option. Allow sending packets with the IPV6_2292HOPOPTS control message. Allow sending packets with the IPV6_2292DSTOPTS control message. Allow sending packets with the IPV6_RTHDRDSTOPTS control message. Allow setting the multicast routing socket options on non multicast routing sockets. Allow the SIOCADDTUNNEL, SIOCCHGTUNNEL, and SIOCDELTUNNEL ioctls for setting up, changing and deleting tunnels over ipv6. Allow the SIOCADDTUNNEL, SIOCCHGTUNNEL, SIOCDELTUNNEL ioctls for setting up, changing and deleting ipv6 over ipv4 tunnels. Allow the SIOCADDPRL, SIOCDELPRL, SIOCCHGPRL ioctls for adding, deleting, and changing the potential router list for ISATAP tunnels. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-11-16 03:03:06 +00:00
if (sock->type == SOCK_RAW && !kern &&
!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW))
goto out_rcu_unlock;
sock->ops = answer->ops;
answer_prot = answer->prot;
answer_flags = answer->flags;
rcu_read_unlock();
WARN_ON(!answer_prot->slab);
err = -ENOBUFS;
sk = sk_alloc(net, PF_INET6, GFP_KERNEL, answer_prot, kern);
if (!sk)
goto out;
sock_init_data(sock, sk);
err = 0;
if (INET_PROTOSW_REUSE & answer_flags)
sk->sk_reuse = SK_CAN_REUSE;
inet = inet_sk(sk);
inet->is_icsk = (INET_PROTOSW_ICSK & answer_flags) != 0;
if (SOCK_RAW == sock->type) {
inet->inet_num = protocol;
if (IPPROTO_RAW == protocol)
inet->hdrincl = 1;
}
sk->sk_destruct = inet_sock_destruct;
sk->sk_family = PF_INET6;
sk->sk_protocol = protocol;
sk->sk_backlog_rcv = answer->prot->backlog_rcv;
inet_sk(sk)->pinet6 = np = inet6_sk_generic(sk);
np->hop_limit = -1;
np->mcast_hops = IPV6_DEFAULT_MCASTHOPS;
np->mc_loop = 1;
np->mc_all = 1;
np->pmtudisc = IPV6_PMTUDISC_WANT;
np->repflow = net->ipv6.sysctl.flowlabel_reflect & FLOWLABEL_REFLECT_ESTABLISHED;
sk->sk_ipv6only = net->ipv6.sysctl.bindv6only;
/* Init the ipv4 part of the socket since we can have sockets
* using v6 API for ipv4.
*/
inet->uc_ttl = -1;
inet->mc_loop = 1;
inet->mc_ttl = 1;
inet->mc_index = 0;
RCU_INIT_POINTER(inet->mc_list, NULL);
inet->rcv_tos = 0;
if (READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_no_pmtu_disc))
inet->pmtudisc = IP_PMTUDISC_DONT;
else
inet->pmtudisc = IP_PMTUDISC_WANT;
/*
* Increment only the relevant sk_prot->socks debug field, this changes
* the previous behaviour of incrementing both the equivalent to
* answer->prot->socks (inet6_sock_nr) and inet_sock_nr.
*
* This allows better debug granularity as we'll know exactly how many
* UDPv6, TCPv6, etc socks were allocated, not the sum of all IPv6
* transport protocol socks. -acme
*/
sk_refcnt_debug_inc(sk);
if (inet->inet_num) {
/* It assumes that any protocol which allows
* the user to assign a number at socket
* creation time automatically shares.
*/
inet->inet_sport = htons(inet->inet_num);
err = sk->sk_prot->hash(sk);
if (err) {
sk_common_release(sk);
goto out;
}
}
if (sk->sk_prot->init) {
err = sk->sk_prot->init(sk);
if (err) {
sk_common_release(sk);
goto out;
}
}
if (!kern) {
err = BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_SOCK(sk);
if (err) {
sk_common_release(sk);
goto out;
}
}
out:
return err;
out_rcu_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out;
}
static int __inet6_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len,
u32 flags)
{
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)uaddr;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
__be32 v4addr = 0;
unsigned short snum;
bool saved_ipv6only;
int addr_type = 0;
int err = 0;
if (addr->sin6_family != AF_INET6)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
addr_type = ipv6_addr_type(&addr->sin6_addr);
if ((addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST) && sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM)
return -EINVAL;
snum = ntohs(addr->sin6_port);
if (!(flags & BIND_NO_CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE) &&
snum && inet_port_requires_bind_service(net, snum) &&
!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE))
return -EACCES;
if (flags & BIND_WITH_LOCK)
lock_sock(sk);
/* Check these errors (active socket, double bind). */
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE || inet->inet_num) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* Check if the address belongs to the host. */
if (addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED) {
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
int chk_addr_ret;
/* Binding to v4-mapped address on a v6-only socket
* makes no sense
*/
if (ipv6_only_sock(sk)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
rcu_read_lock();
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if) {
dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(net, sk->sk_bound_dev_if);
if (!dev) {
err = -ENODEV;
goto out_unlock;
}
}
/* Reproduce AF_INET checks to make the bindings consistent */
v4addr = addr->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3];
chk_addr_ret = inet_addr_type_dev_table(net, dev, v4addr);
rcu_read_unlock();
if (!inet_addr_valid_or_nonlocal(net, inet, v4addr,
chk_addr_ret)) {
err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
goto out;
}
} else {
if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY) {
struct net_device *dev = NULL;
rcu_read_lock();
if (__ipv6_addr_needs_scope_id(addr_type)) {
if (addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) &&
addr->sin6_scope_id) {
/* Override any existing binding, if another one
* is supplied by user.
*/
sk->sk_bound_dev_if = addr->sin6_scope_id;
}
/* Binding to link-local address requires an interface */
if (!sk->sk_bound_dev_if) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
}
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if) {
dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(net, sk->sk_bound_dev_if);
if (!dev) {
err = -ENODEV;
goto out_unlock;
}
}
/* ipv4 addr of the socket is invalid. Only the
* unspecified and mapped address have a v4 equivalent.
*/
v4addr = LOOPBACK4_IPV6;
if (!(addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST)) {
if (!ipv6_can_nonlocal_bind(net, inet) &&
!ipv6_chk_addr(net, &addr->sin6_addr,
dev, 0)) {
err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
goto out_unlock;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
}
inet->inet_rcv_saddr = v4addr;
inet->inet_saddr = v4addr;
sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr = addr->sin6_addr;
if (!(addr_type & IPV6_ADDR_MULTICAST))
np->saddr = addr->sin6_addr;
2018-01-25 07:15:27 +00:00
saved_ipv6only = sk->sk_ipv6only;
if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY && addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED)
sk->sk_ipv6only = 1;
/* Make sure we are allowed to bind here. */
bpf: Post-hooks for sys_bind "Post-hooks" are hooks that are called right before returning from sys_bind. At this time IP and port are already allocated and no further changes to `struct sock` can happen before returning from sys_bind but BPF program has a chance to inspect the socket and change sys_bind result. Specifically it can e.g. inspect what port was allocated and if it doesn't satisfy some policy, BPF program can force sys_bind to fail and return EPERM to user. Another example of usage is recording the IP:port pair to some map to use it in later calls to sys_connect. E.g. if some TCP server inside cgroup was bound to some IP:port_n, it can be recorded to a map. And later when some TCP client inside same cgroup is trying to connect to 127.0.0.1:port_n, BPF hook for sys_connect can override the destination and connect application to IP:port_n instead of 127.0.0.1:port_n. That helps forcing all applications inside a cgroup to use desired IP and not break those applications if they e.g. use localhost to communicate between each other. == Implementation details == Post-hooks are implemented as two new attach types `BPF_CGROUP_INET4_POST_BIND` and `BPF_CGROUP_INET6_POST_BIND` for existing prog type `BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK`. Separate attach types for IPv4 and IPv6 are introduced to avoid access to IPv6 field in `struct sock` from `inet_bind()` and to IPv4 field from `inet6_bind()` since those fields might not make sense in such cases. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-03-30 22:08:07 +00:00
if (snum || !(inet->bind_address_no_port ||
(flags & BIND_FORCE_ADDRESS_NO_PORT))) {
bpf: Post-hooks for sys_bind "Post-hooks" are hooks that are called right before returning from sys_bind. At this time IP and port are already allocated and no further changes to `struct sock` can happen before returning from sys_bind but BPF program has a chance to inspect the socket and change sys_bind result. Specifically it can e.g. inspect what port was allocated and if it doesn't satisfy some policy, BPF program can force sys_bind to fail and return EPERM to user. Another example of usage is recording the IP:port pair to some map to use it in later calls to sys_connect. E.g. if some TCP server inside cgroup was bound to some IP:port_n, it can be recorded to a map. And later when some TCP client inside same cgroup is trying to connect to 127.0.0.1:port_n, BPF hook for sys_connect can override the destination and connect application to IP:port_n instead of 127.0.0.1:port_n. That helps forcing all applications inside a cgroup to use desired IP and not break those applications if they e.g. use localhost to communicate between each other. == Implementation details == Post-hooks are implemented as two new attach types `BPF_CGROUP_INET4_POST_BIND` and `BPF_CGROUP_INET6_POST_BIND` for existing prog type `BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK`. Separate attach types for IPv4 and IPv6 are introduced to avoid access to IPv6 field in `struct sock` from `inet_bind()` and to IPv4 field from `inet6_bind()` since those fields might not make sense in such cases. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-03-30 22:08:07 +00:00
if (sk->sk_prot->get_port(sk, snum)) {
sk->sk_ipv6only = saved_ipv6only;
inet_reset_saddr(sk);
err = -EADDRINUSE;
goto out;
}
if (!(flags & BIND_FROM_BPF)) {
err = BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET6_POST_BIND(sk);
if (err) {
sk->sk_ipv6only = saved_ipv6only;
inet_reset_saddr(sk);
net: bpf: Handle return value of BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET{4,6}_POST_BIND() The return value of BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET{4,6}_POST_BIND() in __inet_bind() is not handled properly. While the return value is non-zero, it will set inet_saddr and inet_rcv_saddr to 0 and exit: err = BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_POST_BIND(sk); if (err) { inet->inet_saddr = inet->inet_rcv_saddr = 0; goto out_release_sock; } Let's take UDP for example and see what will happen. For UDP socket, it will be added to 'udp_prot.h.udp_table->hash' and 'udp_prot.h.udp_table->hash2' after the sk->sk_prot->get_port() called success. If 'inet->inet_rcv_saddr' is specified here, then 'sk' will be in the 'hslot2' of 'hash2' that it don't belong to (because inet_saddr is changed to 0), and UDP packet received will not be passed to this sock. If 'inet->inet_rcv_saddr' is not specified here, the sock will work fine, as it can receive packet properly, which is wired, as the 'bind()' is already failed. To undo the get_port() operation, introduce the 'put_port' field for 'struct proto'. For TCP proto, it is inet_put_port(); For UDP proto, it is udp_lib_unhash(); For icmp proto, it is ping_unhash(). Therefore, after sys_bind() fail caused by BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET4_POST_BIND(), it will be unbinded, which means that it can try to be binded to another port. Signed-off-by: Menglong Dong <imagedong@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220106132022.3470772-2-imagedong@tencent.com
2022-01-06 13:20:20 +00:00
if (sk->sk_prot->put_port)
sk->sk_prot->put_port(sk);
goto out;
}
bpf: Post-hooks for sys_bind "Post-hooks" are hooks that are called right before returning from sys_bind. At this time IP and port are already allocated and no further changes to `struct sock` can happen before returning from sys_bind but BPF program has a chance to inspect the socket and change sys_bind result. Specifically it can e.g. inspect what port was allocated and if it doesn't satisfy some policy, BPF program can force sys_bind to fail and return EPERM to user. Another example of usage is recording the IP:port pair to some map to use it in later calls to sys_connect. E.g. if some TCP server inside cgroup was bound to some IP:port_n, it can be recorded to a map. And later when some TCP client inside same cgroup is trying to connect to 127.0.0.1:port_n, BPF hook for sys_connect can override the destination and connect application to IP:port_n instead of 127.0.0.1:port_n. That helps forcing all applications inside a cgroup to use desired IP and not break those applications if they e.g. use localhost to communicate between each other. == Implementation details == Post-hooks are implemented as two new attach types `BPF_CGROUP_INET4_POST_BIND` and `BPF_CGROUP_INET6_POST_BIND` for existing prog type `BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK`. Separate attach types for IPv4 and IPv6 are introduced to avoid access to IPv6 field in `struct sock` from `inet_bind()` and to IPv4 field from `inet6_bind()` since those fields might not make sense in such cases. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-03-30 22:08:07 +00:00
}
}
2018-01-25 07:15:27 +00:00
if (addr_type != IPV6_ADDR_ANY)
sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_BINDADDR_LOCK;
if (snum)
sk->sk_userlocks |= SOCK_BINDPORT_LOCK;
inet->inet_sport = htons(inet->inet_num);
inet->inet_dport = 0;
inet->inet_daddr = 0;
out:
if (flags & BIND_WITH_LOCK)
release_sock(sk);
return err;
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
goto out;
}
/* bind for INET6 API */
int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
u32 flags = BIND_WITH_LOCK;
ipv6: annotate some data-races around sk->sk_prot IPv6 has this hack changing sk->sk_prot when an IPv6 socket is 'converted' to an IPv4 one with IPV6_ADDRFORM option. This operation is only performed for TCP and UDP, knowing their 'struct proto' for the two network families are populated in the same way, and can not disappear while a reader might use and dereference sk->sk_prot. If we think about it all reads of sk->sk_prot while either socket lock or RTNL is not acquired should be using READ_ONCE(). Also note that other layers like MPTCP, XFRM, CHELSIO_TLS also write over sk->sk_prot. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in inet6_recvmsg / ipv6_setsockopt write to 0xffff8881386f7aa8 of 8 bytes by task 26932 on cpu 0: do_ipv6_setsockopt net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:492 [inline] ipv6_setsockopt+0x3758/0x3910 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:1019 udpv6_setsockopt+0x85/0x90 net/ipv6/udp.c:1649 sock_common_setsockopt+0x5d/0x70 net/core/sock.c:3489 __sys_setsockopt+0x209/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2180 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2191 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2188 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x62/0x70 net/socket.c:2188 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae read to 0xffff8881386f7aa8 of 8 bytes by task 26911 on cpu 1: inet6_recvmsg+0x7a/0x210 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:659 ____sys_recvmsg+0x16c/0x320 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] do_recvmmsg+0x3f5/0xae0 net/socket.c:2768 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2847 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2870 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2863 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xde/0x160 net/socket.c:2863 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae value changed: 0xffffffff85e0e980 -> 0xffffffff85e01580 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 26911 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc2-syzkaller-00316-g0457e5153e0e-dirty #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-02-17 23:48:41 +00:00
const struct proto *prot;
int err = 0;
ipv6: annotate some data-races around sk->sk_prot IPv6 has this hack changing sk->sk_prot when an IPv6 socket is 'converted' to an IPv4 one with IPV6_ADDRFORM option. This operation is only performed for TCP and UDP, knowing their 'struct proto' for the two network families are populated in the same way, and can not disappear while a reader might use and dereference sk->sk_prot. If we think about it all reads of sk->sk_prot while either socket lock or RTNL is not acquired should be using READ_ONCE(). Also note that other layers like MPTCP, XFRM, CHELSIO_TLS also write over sk->sk_prot. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in inet6_recvmsg / ipv6_setsockopt write to 0xffff8881386f7aa8 of 8 bytes by task 26932 on cpu 0: do_ipv6_setsockopt net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:492 [inline] ipv6_setsockopt+0x3758/0x3910 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:1019 udpv6_setsockopt+0x85/0x90 net/ipv6/udp.c:1649 sock_common_setsockopt+0x5d/0x70 net/core/sock.c:3489 __sys_setsockopt+0x209/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2180 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2191 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2188 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x62/0x70 net/socket.c:2188 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae read to 0xffff8881386f7aa8 of 8 bytes by task 26911 on cpu 1: inet6_recvmsg+0x7a/0x210 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:659 ____sys_recvmsg+0x16c/0x320 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] do_recvmmsg+0x3f5/0xae0 net/socket.c:2768 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2847 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2870 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2863 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xde/0x160 net/socket.c:2863 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae value changed: 0xffffffff85e0e980 -> 0xffffffff85e01580 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 26911 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc2-syzkaller-00316-g0457e5153e0e-dirty #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-02-17 23:48:41 +00:00
/* IPV6_ADDRFORM can change sk->sk_prot under us. */
prot = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_prot);
/* If the socket has its own bind function then use it. */
ipv6: annotate some data-races around sk->sk_prot IPv6 has this hack changing sk->sk_prot when an IPv6 socket is 'converted' to an IPv4 one with IPV6_ADDRFORM option. This operation is only performed for TCP and UDP, knowing their 'struct proto' for the two network families are populated in the same way, and can not disappear while a reader might use and dereference sk->sk_prot. If we think about it all reads of sk->sk_prot while either socket lock or RTNL is not acquired should be using READ_ONCE(). Also note that other layers like MPTCP, XFRM, CHELSIO_TLS also write over sk->sk_prot. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in inet6_recvmsg / ipv6_setsockopt write to 0xffff8881386f7aa8 of 8 bytes by task 26932 on cpu 0: do_ipv6_setsockopt net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:492 [inline] ipv6_setsockopt+0x3758/0x3910 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:1019 udpv6_setsockopt+0x85/0x90 net/ipv6/udp.c:1649 sock_common_setsockopt+0x5d/0x70 net/core/sock.c:3489 __sys_setsockopt+0x209/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2180 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2191 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2188 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x62/0x70 net/socket.c:2188 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae read to 0xffff8881386f7aa8 of 8 bytes by task 26911 on cpu 1: inet6_recvmsg+0x7a/0x210 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:659 ____sys_recvmsg+0x16c/0x320 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] do_recvmmsg+0x3f5/0xae0 net/socket.c:2768 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2847 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2870 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2863 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xde/0x160 net/socket.c:2863 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae value changed: 0xffffffff85e0e980 -> 0xffffffff85e01580 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 26911 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc2-syzkaller-00316-g0457e5153e0e-dirty #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-02-17 23:48:41 +00:00
if (prot->bind)
return prot->bind(sk, uaddr, addr_len);
if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
/* BPF prog is run before any checks are done so that if the prog
* changes context in a wrong way it will be caught.
*/
err = BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_BIND_LOCK(sk, uaddr,
CGROUP_INET6_BIND, &flags);
if (err)
return err;
return __inet6_bind(sk, uaddr, addr_len, flags);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet6_bind);
int inet6_release(struct socket *sock)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
if (!sk)
return -EINVAL;
/* Free mc lists */
ipv6_sock_mc_close(sk);
/* Free ac lists */
ipv6_sock_ac_close(sk);
return inet_release(sock);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet6_release);
void inet6_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt;
/* Release rx options */
net/ipv6/af_inet6.c: checkpatch cleanup af_inet6.c:80: ERROR: do not initialise statics to 0 or NULL af_inet6.c:259: ERROR: spaces required around that '=' (ctx:VxV) af_inet6.c:394: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:412: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:422: ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition af_inet6.c:425: ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition af_inet6.c:433: ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition af_inet6.c:437: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:446: ERROR: spaces required around that '=' (ctx:VxV) af_inet6.c:478: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:485: ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line af_inet6.c:485: ERROR: space required before the open parenthesis '(' af_inet6.c:513: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:629: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:647: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:687: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:709: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:1073: ERROR: space required before the open parenthesis '(' Signed-off-by: Eldad Zack <eldad@fogrefinery.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-05-05 10:13:53 +00:00
skb = xchg(&np->pktoptions, NULL);
kfree_skb(skb);
net/ipv6/af_inet6.c: checkpatch cleanup af_inet6.c:80: ERROR: do not initialise statics to 0 or NULL af_inet6.c:259: ERROR: spaces required around that '=' (ctx:VxV) af_inet6.c:394: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:412: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:422: ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition af_inet6.c:425: ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition af_inet6.c:433: ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition af_inet6.c:437: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:446: ERROR: spaces required around that '=' (ctx:VxV) af_inet6.c:478: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:485: ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line af_inet6.c:485: ERROR: space required before the open parenthesis '(' af_inet6.c:513: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:629: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:647: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:687: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:709: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:1073: ERROR: space required before the open parenthesis '(' Signed-off-by: Eldad Zack <eldad@fogrefinery.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-05-05 10:13:53 +00:00
skb = xchg(&np->rxpmtu, NULL);
kfree_skb(skb);
/* Free flowlabels */
fl6_free_socklist(sk);
/* Free tx options */
opt = xchg((__force struct ipv6_txoptions **)&np->opt, NULL);
if (opt) {
atomic_sub(opt->tot_len, &sk->sk_omem_alloc);
txopt_put(opt);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet6_destroy_sock);
/*
* This does both peername and sockname.
*/
int inet6_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
bpf: Add get{peer, sock}name attach types for sock_addr As stated in 983695fa6765 ("bpf: fix unconnected udp hooks"), the objective for the existing cgroup connect/sendmsg/recvmsg/bind BPF hooks is to be transparent to applications. In Cilium we make use of these hooks [0] in order to enable E-W load balancing for existing Kubernetes service types for all Cilium managed nodes in the cluster. Those backends can be local or remote. The main advantage of this approach is that it operates as close as possible to the socket, and therefore allows to avoid packet-based NAT given in connect/sendmsg/recvmsg hooks we only need to xlate sock addresses. This also allows to expose NodePort services on loopback addresses in the host namespace, for example. As another advantage, this also efficiently blocks bind requests for applications in the host namespace for exposed ports. However, one missing item is that we also need to perform reverse xlation for inet{,6}_getname() hooks such that we can return the service IP/port tuple back to the application instead of the remote peer address. The vast majority of applications does not bother about getpeername(), but in a few occasions we've seen breakage when validating the peer's address since it returns unexpectedly the backend tuple instead of the service one. Therefore, this trivial patch allows to customise and adds a getpeername() as well as getsockname() BPF cgroup hook for both IPv4 and IPv6 in order to address this situation. Simple example: # ./cilium/cilium service list ID Frontend Service Type Backend 1 1.2.3.4:80 ClusterIP 1 => 10.0.0.10:80 Before; curl's verbose output example, no getpeername() reverse xlation: # curl --verbose 1.2.3.4 * Rebuilt URL to: 1.2.3.4/ * Trying 1.2.3.4... * TCP_NODELAY set * Connected to 1.2.3.4 (10.0.0.10) port 80 (#0) > GET / HTTP/1.1 > Host: 1.2.3.4 > User-Agent: curl/7.58.0 > Accept: */* [...] After; with getpeername() reverse xlation: # curl --verbose 1.2.3.4 * Rebuilt URL to: 1.2.3.4/ * Trying 1.2.3.4... * TCP_NODELAY set * Connected to 1.2.3.4 (1.2.3.4) port 80 (#0) > GET / HTTP/1.1 > Host: 1.2.3.4 > User-Agent: curl/7.58.0 > Accept: */* [...] Originally, I had both under a BPF_CGROUP_INET{4,6}_GETNAME type and exposed peer to the context similar as in inet{,6}_getname() fashion, but API-wise this is suboptimal as it always enforces programs having to test for ctx->peer which can easily be missed, hence BPF_CGROUP_INET{4,6}_GET{PEER,SOCK}NAME split. Similarly, the checked return code is on tnum_range(1, 1), but if a use case comes up in future, it can easily be changed to return an error code instead. Helper and ctx member access is the same as with connect/sendmsg/etc hooks. [0] https://github.com/cilium/cilium/blob/master/bpf/bpf_sock.c Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com> Acked-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/61a479d759b2482ae3efb45546490bacd796a220.1589841594.git.daniel@iogearbox.net
2020-05-18 22:45:45 +00:00
int peer)
{
net/ipv6/af_inet6.c: checkpatch cleanup af_inet6.c:80: ERROR: do not initialise statics to 0 or NULL af_inet6.c:259: ERROR: spaces required around that '=' (ctx:VxV) af_inet6.c:394: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:412: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:422: ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition af_inet6.c:425: ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition af_inet6.c:433: ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition af_inet6.c:437: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:446: ERROR: spaces required around that '=' (ctx:VxV) af_inet6.c:478: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:485: ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line af_inet6.c:485: ERROR: space required before the open parenthesis '(' af_inet6.c:513: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:629: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:647: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:687: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:709: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:1073: ERROR: space required before the open parenthesis '(' Signed-off-by: Eldad Zack <eldad@fogrefinery.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-05-05 10:13:53 +00:00
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)uaddr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
sin->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sin->sin6_flowinfo = 0;
sin->sin6_scope_id = 0;
inet: remove races in inet{6}_getname() syzbot reported data-races in inet_getname() multiple times, it is time we fix this instead of pretending applications should not trigger them. getsockname() and getpeername() are not really considered fast path. v2: added the missing BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG() declaration needed when CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF=n, as reported by kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> syzbot typical report: BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __inet_hash_connect / inet_getname write to 0xffff888136d66cf8 of 2 bytes by task 14374 on cpu 1: __inet_hash_connect+0x7ec/0x950 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:831 inet_hash_connect+0x85/0x90 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:853 tcp_v4_connect+0x782/0xbb0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:275 __inet_stream_connect+0x156/0x6e0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:664 inet_stream_connect+0x44/0x70 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:728 __sys_connect_file net/socket.c:1896 [inline] __sys_connect+0x254/0x290 net/socket.c:1913 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1923 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1920 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1920 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae read to 0xffff888136d66cf8 of 2 bytes by task 14408 on cpu 0: inet_getname+0x11f/0x170 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:790 __sys_getsockname+0x11d/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1946 __do_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1961 [inline] __se_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1958 [inline] __x64_sys_getsockname+0x3e/0x50 net/socket.c:1958 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae value changed: 0x0000 -> 0xdee0 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 14408 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc3-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026213014.3026708-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2021-10-26 21:30:14 +00:00
lock_sock(sk);
if (peer) {
inet: remove races in inet{6}_getname() syzbot reported data-races in inet_getname() multiple times, it is time we fix this instead of pretending applications should not trigger them. getsockname() and getpeername() are not really considered fast path. v2: added the missing BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG() declaration needed when CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF=n, as reported by kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> syzbot typical report: BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __inet_hash_connect / inet_getname write to 0xffff888136d66cf8 of 2 bytes by task 14374 on cpu 1: __inet_hash_connect+0x7ec/0x950 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:831 inet_hash_connect+0x85/0x90 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:853 tcp_v4_connect+0x782/0xbb0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:275 __inet_stream_connect+0x156/0x6e0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:664 inet_stream_connect+0x44/0x70 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:728 __sys_connect_file net/socket.c:1896 [inline] __sys_connect+0x254/0x290 net/socket.c:1913 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1923 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1920 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1920 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae read to 0xffff888136d66cf8 of 2 bytes by task 14408 on cpu 0: inet_getname+0x11f/0x170 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:790 __sys_getsockname+0x11d/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1946 __do_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1961 [inline] __se_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1958 [inline] __x64_sys_getsockname+0x3e/0x50 net/socket.c:1958 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae value changed: 0x0000 -> 0xdee0 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 14408 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc3-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026213014.3026708-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2021-10-26 21:30:14 +00:00
if (!inet->inet_dport ||
(((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_CLOSE | TCPF_SYN_SENT)) &&
peer == 1)) {
release_sock(sk);
return -ENOTCONN;
inet: remove races in inet{6}_getname() syzbot reported data-races in inet_getname() multiple times, it is time we fix this instead of pretending applications should not trigger them. getsockname() and getpeername() are not really considered fast path. v2: added the missing BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG() declaration needed when CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF=n, as reported by kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> syzbot typical report: BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __inet_hash_connect / inet_getname write to 0xffff888136d66cf8 of 2 bytes by task 14374 on cpu 1: __inet_hash_connect+0x7ec/0x950 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:831 inet_hash_connect+0x85/0x90 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:853 tcp_v4_connect+0x782/0xbb0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:275 __inet_stream_connect+0x156/0x6e0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:664 inet_stream_connect+0x44/0x70 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:728 __sys_connect_file net/socket.c:1896 [inline] __sys_connect+0x254/0x290 net/socket.c:1913 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1923 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1920 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1920 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae read to 0xffff888136d66cf8 of 2 bytes by task 14408 on cpu 0: inet_getname+0x11f/0x170 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:790 __sys_getsockname+0x11d/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1946 __do_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1961 [inline] __se_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1958 [inline] __x64_sys_getsockname+0x3e/0x50 net/socket.c:1958 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae value changed: 0x0000 -> 0xdee0 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 14408 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc3-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026213014.3026708-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2021-10-26 21:30:14 +00:00
}
sin->sin6_port = inet->inet_dport;
sin->sin6_addr = sk->sk_v6_daddr;
if (np->sndflow)
sin->sin6_flowinfo = np->flow_label;
inet: remove races in inet{6}_getname() syzbot reported data-races in inet_getname() multiple times, it is time we fix this instead of pretending applications should not trigger them. getsockname() and getpeername() are not really considered fast path. v2: added the missing BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG() declaration needed when CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF=n, as reported by kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> syzbot typical report: BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __inet_hash_connect / inet_getname write to 0xffff888136d66cf8 of 2 bytes by task 14374 on cpu 1: __inet_hash_connect+0x7ec/0x950 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:831 inet_hash_connect+0x85/0x90 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:853 tcp_v4_connect+0x782/0xbb0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:275 __inet_stream_connect+0x156/0x6e0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:664 inet_stream_connect+0x44/0x70 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:728 __sys_connect_file net/socket.c:1896 [inline] __sys_connect+0x254/0x290 net/socket.c:1913 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1923 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1920 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1920 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae read to 0xffff888136d66cf8 of 2 bytes by task 14408 on cpu 0: inet_getname+0x11f/0x170 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:790 __sys_getsockname+0x11d/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1946 __do_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1961 [inline] __se_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1958 [inline] __x64_sys_getsockname+0x3e/0x50 net/socket.c:1958 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae value changed: 0x0000 -> 0xdee0 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 14408 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc3-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026213014.3026708-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2021-10-26 21:30:14 +00:00
BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG(sk, (struct sockaddr *)sin,
CGROUP_INET6_GETPEERNAME);
} else {
if (ipv6_addr_any(&sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr))
sin->sin6_addr = np->saddr;
else
sin->sin6_addr = sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr;
sin->sin6_port = inet->inet_sport;
inet: remove races in inet{6}_getname() syzbot reported data-races in inet_getname() multiple times, it is time we fix this instead of pretending applications should not trigger them. getsockname() and getpeername() are not really considered fast path. v2: added the missing BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG() declaration needed when CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF=n, as reported by kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> syzbot typical report: BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __inet_hash_connect / inet_getname write to 0xffff888136d66cf8 of 2 bytes by task 14374 on cpu 1: __inet_hash_connect+0x7ec/0x950 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:831 inet_hash_connect+0x85/0x90 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:853 tcp_v4_connect+0x782/0xbb0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:275 __inet_stream_connect+0x156/0x6e0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:664 inet_stream_connect+0x44/0x70 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:728 __sys_connect_file net/socket.c:1896 [inline] __sys_connect+0x254/0x290 net/socket.c:1913 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1923 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1920 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1920 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae read to 0xffff888136d66cf8 of 2 bytes by task 14408 on cpu 0: inet_getname+0x11f/0x170 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:790 __sys_getsockname+0x11d/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1946 __do_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1961 [inline] __se_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1958 [inline] __x64_sys_getsockname+0x3e/0x50 net/socket.c:1958 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae value changed: 0x0000 -> 0xdee0 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 14408 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc3-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026213014.3026708-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2021-10-26 21:30:14 +00:00
BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG(sk, (struct sockaddr *)sin,
CGROUP_INET6_GETSOCKNAME);
}
sin->sin6_scope_id = ipv6_iface_scope_id(&sin->sin6_addr,
sk->sk_bound_dev_if);
inet: remove races in inet{6}_getname() syzbot reported data-races in inet_getname() multiple times, it is time we fix this instead of pretending applications should not trigger them. getsockname() and getpeername() are not really considered fast path. v2: added the missing BPF_CGROUP_RUN_SA_PROG() declaration needed when CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF=n, as reported by kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> syzbot typical report: BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __inet_hash_connect / inet_getname write to 0xffff888136d66cf8 of 2 bytes by task 14374 on cpu 1: __inet_hash_connect+0x7ec/0x950 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:831 inet_hash_connect+0x85/0x90 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:853 tcp_v4_connect+0x782/0xbb0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:275 __inet_stream_connect+0x156/0x6e0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:664 inet_stream_connect+0x44/0x70 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:728 __sys_connect_file net/socket.c:1896 [inline] __sys_connect+0x254/0x290 net/socket.c:1913 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1923 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1920 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1920 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae read to 0xffff888136d66cf8 of 2 bytes by task 14408 on cpu 0: inet_getname+0x11f/0x170 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:790 __sys_getsockname+0x11d/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1946 __do_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1961 [inline] __se_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1958 [inline] __x64_sys_getsockname+0x3e/0x50 net/socket.c:1958 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xa0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae value changed: 0x0000 -> 0xdee0 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 14408 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc3-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211026213014.3026708-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2021-10-26 21:30:14 +00:00
release_sock(sk);
net: make getname() functions return length rather than use int* parameter Changes since v1: Added changes in these files: drivers/infiniband/hw/usnic/usnic_transport.c drivers/staging/lustre/lnet/lnet/lib-socket.c drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_login.c drivers/vhost/net.c fs/dlm/lowcomms.c fs/ocfs2/cluster/tcp.c security/tomoyo/network.c Before: All these functions either return a negative error indicator, or store length of sockaddr into "int *socklen" parameter and return zero on success. "int *socklen" parameter is awkward. For example, if caller does not care, it still needs to provide on-stack storage for the value it does not need. None of the many FOO_getname() functions of various protocols ever used old value of *socklen. They always just overwrite it. This change drops this parameter, and makes all these functions, on success, return length of sockaddr. It's always >= 0 and can be differentiated from an error. Tests in callers are changed from "if (err)" to "if (err < 0)", where needed. rpc_sockname() lost "int buflen" parameter, since its only use was to be passed to kernel_getsockname() as &buflen and subsequently not used in any way. Userspace API is not changed. text data bss dec hex filename 30108430 2633624 873672 33615726 200ef6e vmlinux.before.o 30108109 2633612 873672 33615393 200ee21 vmlinux.o Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> CC: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org CC: linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org CC: linux-decnet-user@lists.sourceforge.net CC: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org CC: linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org CC: linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org CC: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org CC: linux-x25@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-12 19:00:20 +00:00
return sizeof(*sin);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet6_getname);
int inet6_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
ipv6: annotate some data-races around sk->sk_prot IPv6 has this hack changing sk->sk_prot when an IPv6 socket is 'converted' to an IPv4 one with IPV6_ADDRFORM option. This operation is only performed for TCP and UDP, knowing their 'struct proto' for the two network families are populated in the same way, and can not disappear while a reader might use and dereference sk->sk_prot. If we think about it all reads of sk->sk_prot while either socket lock or RTNL is not acquired should be using READ_ONCE(). Also note that other layers like MPTCP, XFRM, CHELSIO_TLS also write over sk->sk_prot. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in inet6_recvmsg / ipv6_setsockopt write to 0xffff8881386f7aa8 of 8 bytes by task 26932 on cpu 0: do_ipv6_setsockopt net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:492 [inline] ipv6_setsockopt+0x3758/0x3910 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:1019 udpv6_setsockopt+0x85/0x90 net/ipv6/udp.c:1649 sock_common_setsockopt+0x5d/0x70 net/core/sock.c:3489 __sys_setsockopt+0x209/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2180 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2191 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2188 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x62/0x70 net/socket.c:2188 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae read to 0xffff8881386f7aa8 of 8 bytes by task 26911 on cpu 1: inet6_recvmsg+0x7a/0x210 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:659 ____sys_recvmsg+0x16c/0x320 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] do_recvmmsg+0x3f5/0xae0 net/socket.c:2768 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2847 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2870 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2863 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xde/0x160 net/socket.c:2863 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae value changed: 0xffffffff85e0e980 -> 0xffffffff85e01580 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 26911 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc2-syzkaller-00316-g0457e5153e0e-dirty #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-02-17 23:48:41 +00:00
const struct proto *prot;
net/ipv6/af_inet6.c: checkpatch cleanup af_inet6.c:80: ERROR: do not initialise statics to 0 or NULL af_inet6.c:259: ERROR: spaces required around that '=' (ctx:VxV) af_inet6.c:394: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:412: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:422: ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition af_inet6.c:425: ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition af_inet6.c:433: ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition af_inet6.c:437: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:446: ERROR: spaces required around that '=' (ctx:VxV) af_inet6.c:478: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:485: ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line af_inet6.c:485: ERROR: space required before the open parenthesis '(' af_inet6.c:513: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:629: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:647: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:687: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:709: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:1073: ERROR: space required before the open parenthesis '(' Signed-off-by: Eldad Zack <eldad@fogrefinery.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-05-05 10:13:53 +00:00
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCADDRT:
case SIOCDELRT: {
struct in6_rtmsg rtmsg;
if (copy_from_user(&rtmsg, argp, sizeof(rtmsg)))
return -EFAULT;
return ipv6_route_ioctl(net, cmd, &rtmsg);
}
case SIOCSIFADDR:
return addrconf_add_ifaddr(net, argp);
case SIOCDIFADDR:
return addrconf_del_ifaddr(net, argp);
case SIOCSIFDSTADDR:
return addrconf_set_dstaddr(net, argp);
default:
ipv6: annotate some data-races around sk->sk_prot IPv6 has this hack changing sk->sk_prot when an IPv6 socket is 'converted' to an IPv4 one with IPV6_ADDRFORM option. This operation is only performed for TCP and UDP, knowing their 'struct proto' for the two network families are populated in the same way, and can not disappear while a reader might use and dereference sk->sk_prot. If we think about it all reads of sk->sk_prot while either socket lock or RTNL is not acquired should be using READ_ONCE(). Also note that other layers like MPTCP, XFRM, CHELSIO_TLS also write over sk->sk_prot. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in inet6_recvmsg / ipv6_setsockopt write to 0xffff8881386f7aa8 of 8 bytes by task 26932 on cpu 0: do_ipv6_setsockopt net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:492 [inline] ipv6_setsockopt+0x3758/0x3910 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:1019 udpv6_setsockopt+0x85/0x90 net/ipv6/udp.c:1649 sock_common_setsockopt+0x5d/0x70 net/core/sock.c:3489 __sys_setsockopt+0x209/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2180 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2191 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2188 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x62/0x70 net/socket.c:2188 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae read to 0xffff8881386f7aa8 of 8 bytes by task 26911 on cpu 1: inet6_recvmsg+0x7a/0x210 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:659 ____sys_recvmsg+0x16c/0x320 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] do_recvmmsg+0x3f5/0xae0 net/socket.c:2768 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2847 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2870 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2863 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xde/0x160 net/socket.c:2863 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae value changed: 0xffffffff85e0e980 -> 0xffffffff85e01580 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 26911 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc2-syzkaller-00316-g0457e5153e0e-dirty #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-02-17 23:48:41 +00:00
/* IPV6_ADDRFORM can change sk->sk_prot under us. */
prot = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_prot);
if (!prot->ioctl)
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
ipv6: annotate some data-races around sk->sk_prot IPv6 has this hack changing sk->sk_prot when an IPv6 socket is 'converted' to an IPv4 one with IPV6_ADDRFORM option. This operation is only performed for TCP and UDP, knowing their 'struct proto' for the two network families are populated in the same way, and can not disappear while a reader might use and dereference sk->sk_prot. If we think about it all reads of sk->sk_prot while either socket lock or RTNL is not acquired should be using READ_ONCE(). Also note that other layers like MPTCP, XFRM, CHELSIO_TLS also write over sk->sk_prot. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in inet6_recvmsg / ipv6_setsockopt write to 0xffff8881386f7aa8 of 8 bytes by task 26932 on cpu 0: do_ipv6_setsockopt net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:492 [inline] ipv6_setsockopt+0x3758/0x3910 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:1019 udpv6_setsockopt+0x85/0x90 net/ipv6/udp.c:1649 sock_common_setsockopt+0x5d/0x70 net/core/sock.c:3489 __sys_setsockopt+0x209/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2180 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2191 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2188 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x62/0x70 net/socket.c:2188 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae read to 0xffff8881386f7aa8 of 8 bytes by task 26911 on cpu 1: inet6_recvmsg+0x7a/0x210 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:659 ____sys_recvmsg+0x16c/0x320 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] do_recvmmsg+0x3f5/0xae0 net/socket.c:2768 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2847 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2870 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2863 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xde/0x160 net/socket.c:2863 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae value changed: 0xffffffff85e0e980 -> 0xffffffff85e01580 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 26911 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc2-syzkaller-00316-g0457e5153e0e-dirty #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-02-17 23:48:41 +00:00
return prot->ioctl(sk, cmd, arg);
}
/*NOTREACHED*/
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet6_ioctl);
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
struct compat_in6_rtmsg {
struct in6_addr rtmsg_dst;
struct in6_addr rtmsg_src;
struct in6_addr rtmsg_gateway;
u32 rtmsg_type;
u16 rtmsg_dst_len;
u16 rtmsg_src_len;
u32 rtmsg_metric;
u32 rtmsg_info;
u32 rtmsg_flags;
s32 rtmsg_ifindex;
};
static int inet6_compat_routing_ioctl(struct sock *sk, unsigned int cmd,
struct compat_in6_rtmsg __user *ur)
{
struct in6_rtmsg rt;
if (copy_from_user(&rt.rtmsg_dst, &ur->rtmsg_dst,
3 * sizeof(struct in6_addr)) ||
get_user(rt.rtmsg_type, &ur->rtmsg_type) ||
get_user(rt.rtmsg_dst_len, &ur->rtmsg_dst_len) ||
get_user(rt.rtmsg_src_len, &ur->rtmsg_src_len) ||
get_user(rt.rtmsg_metric, &ur->rtmsg_metric) ||
get_user(rt.rtmsg_info, &ur->rtmsg_info) ||
get_user(rt.rtmsg_flags, &ur->rtmsg_flags) ||
get_user(rt.rtmsg_ifindex, &ur->rtmsg_ifindex))
return -EFAULT;
return ipv6_route_ioctl(sock_net(sk), cmd, &rt);
}
int inet6_compat_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
void __user *argp = compat_ptr(arg);
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCADDRT:
case SIOCDELRT:
return inet6_compat_routing_ioctl(sk, cmd, argp);
default:
return -ENOIOCTLCMD;
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet6_compat_ioctl);
#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
INDIRECT_CALLABLE_DECLARE(int udpv6_sendmsg(struct sock *, struct msghdr *,
size_t));
int inet6_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
ipv6: annotate some data-races around sk->sk_prot IPv6 has this hack changing sk->sk_prot when an IPv6 socket is 'converted' to an IPv4 one with IPV6_ADDRFORM option. This operation is only performed for TCP and UDP, knowing their 'struct proto' for the two network families are populated in the same way, and can not disappear while a reader might use and dereference sk->sk_prot. If we think about it all reads of sk->sk_prot while either socket lock or RTNL is not acquired should be using READ_ONCE(). Also note that other layers like MPTCP, XFRM, CHELSIO_TLS also write over sk->sk_prot. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in inet6_recvmsg / ipv6_setsockopt write to 0xffff8881386f7aa8 of 8 bytes by task 26932 on cpu 0: do_ipv6_setsockopt net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:492 [inline] ipv6_setsockopt+0x3758/0x3910 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:1019 udpv6_setsockopt+0x85/0x90 net/ipv6/udp.c:1649 sock_common_setsockopt+0x5d/0x70 net/core/sock.c:3489 __sys_setsockopt+0x209/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2180 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2191 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2188 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x62/0x70 net/socket.c:2188 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae read to 0xffff8881386f7aa8 of 8 bytes by task 26911 on cpu 1: inet6_recvmsg+0x7a/0x210 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:659 ____sys_recvmsg+0x16c/0x320 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] do_recvmmsg+0x3f5/0xae0 net/socket.c:2768 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2847 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2870 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2863 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xde/0x160 net/socket.c:2863 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae value changed: 0xffffffff85e0e980 -> 0xffffffff85e01580 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 26911 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc2-syzkaller-00316-g0457e5153e0e-dirty #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-02-17 23:48:41 +00:00
const struct proto *prot;
if (unlikely(inet_send_prepare(sk)))
return -EAGAIN;
ipv6: annotate some data-races around sk->sk_prot IPv6 has this hack changing sk->sk_prot when an IPv6 socket is 'converted' to an IPv4 one with IPV6_ADDRFORM option. This operation is only performed for TCP and UDP, knowing their 'struct proto' for the two network families are populated in the same way, and can not disappear while a reader might use and dereference sk->sk_prot. If we think about it all reads of sk->sk_prot while either socket lock or RTNL is not acquired should be using READ_ONCE(). Also note that other layers like MPTCP, XFRM, CHELSIO_TLS also write over sk->sk_prot. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in inet6_recvmsg / ipv6_setsockopt write to 0xffff8881386f7aa8 of 8 bytes by task 26932 on cpu 0: do_ipv6_setsockopt net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:492 [inline] ipv6_setsockopt+0x3758/0x3910 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:1019 udpv6_setsockopt+0x85/0x90 net/ipv6/udp.c:1649 sock_common_setsockopt+0x5d/0x70 net/core/sock.c:3489 __sys_setsockopt+0x209/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2180 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2191 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2188 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x62/0x70 net/socket.c:2188 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae read to 0xffff8881386f7aa8 of 8 bytes by task 26911 on cpu 1: inet6_recvmsg+0x7a/0x210 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:659 ____sys_recvmsg+0x16c/0x320 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] do_recvmmsg+0x3f5/0xae0 net/socket.c:2768 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2847 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2870 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2863 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xde/0x160 net/socket.c:2863 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae value changed: 0xffffffff85e0e980 -> 0xffffffff85e01580 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 26911 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc2-syzkaller-00316-g0457e5153e0e-dirty #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-02-17 23:48:41 +00:00
/* IPV6_ADDRFORM can change sk->sk_prot under us. */
prot = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_prot);
return INDIRECT_CALL_2(prot->sendmsg, tcp_sendmsg, udpv6_sendmsg,
sk, msg, size);
}
INDIRECT_CALLABLE_DECLARE(int udpv6_recvmsg(struct sock *, struct msghdr *,
size_t, int, int *));
int inet6_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size,
int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
ipv6: annotate some data-races around sk->sk_prot IPv6 has this hack changing sk->sk_prot when an IPv6 socket is 'converted' to an IPv4 one with IPV6_ADDRFORM option. This operation is only performed for TCP and UDP, knowing their 'struct proto' for the two network families are populated in the same way, and can not disappear while a reader might use and dereference sk->sk_prot. If we think about it all reads of sk->sk_prot while either socket lock or RTNL is not acquired should be using READ_ONCE(). Also note that other layers like MPTCP, XFRM, CHELSIO_TLS also write over sk->sk_prot. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in inet6_recvmsg / ipv6_setsockopt write to 0xffff8881386f7aa8 of 8 bytes by task 26932 on cpu 0: do_ipv6_setsockopt net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:492 [inline] ipv6_setsockopt+0x3758/0x3910 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:1019 udpv6_setsockopt+0x85/0x90 net/ipv6/udp.c:1649 sock_common_setsockopt+0x5d/0x70 net/core/sock.c:3489 __sys_setsockopt+0x209/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2180 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2191 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2188 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x62/0x70 net/socket.c:2188 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae read to 0xffff8881386f7aa8 of 8 bytes by task 26911 on cpu 1: inet6_recvmsg+0x7a/0x210 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:659 ____sys_recvmsg+0x16c/0x320 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] do_recvmmsg+0x3f5/0xae0 net/socket.c:2768 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2847 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2870 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2863 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xde/0x160 net/socket.c:2863 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae value changed: 0xffffffff85e0e980 -> 0xffffffff85e01580 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 26911 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc2-syzkaller-00316-g0457e5153e0e-dirty #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-02-17 23:48:41 +00:00
const struct proto *prot;
int addr_len = 0;
int err;
if (likely(!(flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE)))
sock_rps_record_flow(sk);
ipv6: annotate some data-races around sk->sk_prot IPv6 has this hack changing sk->sk_prot when an IPv6 socket is 'converted' to an IPv4 one with IPV6_ADDRFORM option. This operation is only performed for TCP and UDP, knowing their 'struct proto' for the two network families are populated in the same way, and can not disappear while a reader might use and dereference sk->sk_prot. If we think about it all reads of sk->sk_prot while either socket lock or RTNL is not acquired should be using READ_ONCE(). Also note that other layers like MPTCP, XFRM, CHELSIO_TLS also write over sk->sk_prot. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in inet6_recvmsg / ipv6_setsockopt write to 0xffff8881386f7aa8 of 8 bytes by task 26932 on cpu 0: do_ipv6_setsockopt net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:492 [inline] ipv6_setsockopt+0x3758/0x3910 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:1019 udpv6_setsockopt+0x85/0x90 net/ipv6/udp.c:1649 sock_common_setsockopt+0x5d/0x70 net/core/sock.c:3489 __sys_setsockopt+0x209/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2180 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2191 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2188 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x62/0x70 net/socket.c:2188 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae read to 0xffff8881386f7aa8 of 8 bytes by task 26911 on cpu 1: inet6_recvmsg+0x7a/0x210 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:659 ____sys_recvmsg+0x16c/0x320 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] do_recvmmsg+0x3f5/0xae0 net/socket.c:2768 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2847 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2870 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2863 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xde/0x160 net/socket.c:2863 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae value changed: 0xffffffff85e0e980 -> 0xffffffff85e01580 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 26911 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc2-syzkaller-00316-g0457e5153e0e-dirty #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-02-17 23:48:41 +00:00
/* IPV6_ADDRFORM can change sk->sk_prot under us. */
prot = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_prot);
err = INDIRECT_CALL_2(prot->recvmsg, tcp_recvmsg, udpv6_recvmsg,
sk, msg, size, flags, &addr_len);
if (err >= 0)
msg->msg_namelen = addr_len;
return err;
}
const struct proto_ops inet6_stream_ops = {
.family = PF_INET6,
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.release = inet6_release,
.bind = inet6_bind,
.connect = inet_stream_connect, /* ok */
.socketpair = sock_no_socketpair, /* a do nothing */
.accept = inet_accept, /* ok */
.getname = inet6_getname,
.poll = tcp_poll, /* ok */
.ioctl = inet6_ioctl, /* must change */
.gettstamp = sock_gettstamp,
.listen = inet_listen, /* ok */
.shutdown = inet_shutdown, /* ok */
.setsockopt = sock_common_setsockopt, /* ok */
.getsockopt = sock_common_getsockopt, /* ok */
.sendmsg = inet6_sendmsg, /* retpoline's sake */
.recvmsg = inet6_recvmsg, /* retpoline's sake */
tcp: add TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE support for zerocopy receive When adding tcp mmap() implementation, I forgot that socket lock had to be taken before current->mm->mmap_sem. syzbot eventually caught the bug. Since we can not lock the socket in tcp mmap() handler we have to split the operation in two phases. 1) mmap() on a tcp socket simply reserves VMA space, and nothing else. This operation does not involve any TCP locking. 2) getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE, ...) implements the transfert of pages from skbs to one VMA. This operation only uses down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem) after holding TCP lock, thus solving the lockdep issue. This new implementation was suggested by Andy Lutomirski with great details. Benefits are : - Better scalability, in case multiple threads reuse VMAS (without mmap()/munmap() calls) since mmap_sem wont be write locked. - Better error recovery. The previous mmap() model had to provide the expected size of the mapping. If for some reason one part could not be mapped (partial MSS), the whole operation had to be aborted. With the tcp_zerocopy_receive struct, kernel can report how many bytes were successfuly mapped, and how many bytes should be read to skip the problematic sequence. - No more memory allocation to hold an array of page pointers. 16 MB mappings needed 32 KB for this array, potentially using vmalloc() :/ - skbs are freed while mmap_sem has been released Following patch makes the change in tcp_mmap tool to demonstrate one possible use of mmap() and setsockopt(... TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE ...) Note that memcg might require additional changes. Fixes: 93ab6cc69162 ("tcp: implement mmap() for zero copy receive") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-04-27 15:58:08 +00:00
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
tcp: implement mmap() for zero copy receive Some networks can make sure TCP payload can exactly fit 4KB pages, with well chosen MSS/MTU and architectures. Implement mmap() system call so that applications can avoid copying data without complex splice() games. Note that a successful mmap( X bytes) on TCP socket is consuming bytes, as if recvmsg() has been done. (tp->copied += X) Only PROT_READ mappings are accepted, as skb page frags are fundamentally shared and read only. If tcp_mmap() finds data that is not a full page, or a patch of urgent data, -EINVAL is returned, no bytes are consumed. Application must fallback to recvmsg() to read the problematic sequence. mmap() wont block, regardless of socket being in blocking or non-blocking mode. If not enough bytes are in receive queue, mmap() would return -EAGAIN, or -EIO if socket is in a state where no other bytes can be added into receive queue. An application might use SO_RCVLOWAT, poll() and/or ioctl( FIONREAD) to efficiently use mmap() On the sender side, MSG_EOR might help to clearly separate unaligned headers and 4K-aligned chunks if necessary. Tested: mlx4 (cx-3) 40Gbit NIC, with tcp_mmap program provided in following patch. MTU set to 4168 (4096 TCP payload, 40 bytes IPv6 header, 32 bytes TCP header) Without mmap() (tcp_mmap -s) received 32768 MB (0 % mmap'ed) in 8.13342 s, 33.7961 Gbit, cpu usage user:0.034 sys:3.778, 116.333 usec per MB, 63062 c-switches received 32768 MB (0 % mmap'ed) in 8.14501 s, 33.748 Gbit, cpu usage user:0.029 sys:3.997, 122.864 usec per MB, 61903 c-switches received 32768 MB (0 % mmap'ed) in 8.11723 s, 33.8635 Gbit, cpu usage user:0.048 sys:3.964, 122.437 usec per MB, 62983 c-switches received 32768 MB (0 % mmap'ed) in 8.39189 s, 32.7552 Gbit, cpu usage user:0.038 sys:4.181, 128.754 usec per MB, 55834 c-switches With mmap() on receiver (tcp_mmap -s -z) received 32768 MB (100 % mmap'ed) in 8.03083 s, 34.2278 Gbit, cpu usage user:0.024 sys:1.466, 45.4712 usec per MB, 65479 c-switches received 32768 MB (100 % mmap'ed) in 7.98805 s, 34.4111 Gbit, cpu usage user:0.026 sys:1.401, 43.5486 usec per MB, 65447 c-switches received 32768 MB (100 % mmap'ed) in 7.98377 s, 34.4296 Gbit, cpu usage user:0.028 sys:1.452, 45.166 usec per MB, 65496 c-switches received 32768 MB (99.9969 % mmap'ed) in 8.01838 s, 34.281 Gbit, cpu usage user:0.02 sys:1.446, 44.7388 usec per MB, 65505 c-switches Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-04-16 17:33:38 +00:00
.mmap = tcp_mmap,
tcp: add TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE support for zerocopy receive When adding tcp mmap() implementation, I forgot that socket lock had to be taken before current->mm->mmap_sem. syzbot eventually caught the bug. Since we can not lock the socket in tcp mmap() handler we have to split the operation in two phases. 1) mmap() on a tcp socket simply reserves VMA space, and nothing else. This operation does not involve any TCP locking. 2) getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE, ...) implements the transfert of pages from skbs to one VMA. This operation only uses down_read(&current->mm->mmap_sem) after holding TCP lock, thus solving the lockdep issue. This new implementation was suggested by Andy Lutomirski with great details. Benefits are : - Better scalability, in case multiple threads reuse VMAS (without mmap()/munmap() calls) since mmap_sem wont be write locked. - Better error recovery. The previous mmap() model had to provide the expected size of the mapping. If for some reason one part could not be mapped (partial MSS), the whole operation had to be aborted. With the tcp_zerocopy_receive struct, kernel can report how many bytes were successfuly mapped, and how many bytes should be read to skip the problematic sequence. - No more memory allocation to hold an array of page pointers. 16 MB mappings needed 32 KB for this array, potentially using vmalloc() :/ - skbs are freed while mmap_sem has been released Following patch makes the change in tcp_mmap tool to demonstrate one possible use of mmap() and setsockopt(... TCP_ZEROCOPY_RECEIVE ...) Note that memcg might require additional changes. Fixes: 93ab6cc69162 ("tcp: implement mmap() for zero copy receive") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-04-27 15:58:08 +00:00
#endif
.sendpage = inet_sendpage,
.sendmsg_locked = tcp_sendmsg_locked,
.sendpage_locked = tcp_sendpage_locked,
.splice_read = tcp_splice_read,
.read_sock = tcp_read_sock,
.read_skb = tcp_read_skb,
.peek_len = tcp_peek_len,
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
.compat_ioctl = inet6_compat_ioctl,
#endif
.set_rcvlowat = tcp_set_rcvlowat,
};
const struct proto_ops inet6_dgram_ops = {
.family = PF_INET6,
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.release = inet6_release,
.bind = inet6_bind,
.connect = inet_dgram_connect, /* ok */
.socketpair = sock_no_socketpair, /* a do nothing */
.accept = sock_no_accept, /* a do nothing */
.getname = inet6_getname,
.poll = udp_poll, /* ok */
.ioctl = inet6_ioctl, /* must change */
.gettstamp = sock_gettstamp,
.listen = sock_no_listen, /* ok */
.shutdown = inet_shutdown, /* ok */
.setsockopt = sock_common_setsockopt, /* ok */
.getsockopt = sock_common_getsockopt, /* ok */
.sendmsg = inet6_sendmsg, /* retpoline's sake */
.recvmsg = inet6_recvmsg, /* retpoline's sake */
.read_skb = udp_read_skb,
.mmap = sock_no_mmap,
.sendpage = sock_no_sendpage,
.set_peek_off = sk_set_peek_off,
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
.compat_ioctl = inet6_compat_ioctl,
#endif
};
static const struct net_proto_family inet6_family_ops = {
.family = PF_INET6,
.create = inet6_create,
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
};
int inet6_register_protosw(struct inet_protosw *p)
{
struct list_head *lh;
struct inet_protosw *answer;
struct list_head *last_perm;
int protocol = p->protocol;
int ret;
spin_lock_bh(&inetsw6_lock);
ret = -EINVAL;
if (p->type >= SOCK_MAX)
goto out_illegal;
/* If we are trying to override a permanent protocol, bail. */
answer = NULL;
ret = -EPERM;
last_perm = &inetsw6[p->type];
list_for_each(lh, &inetsw6[p->type]) {
answer = list_entry(lh, struct inet_protosw, list);
/* Check only the non-wild match. */
if (INET_PROTOSW_PERMANENT & answer->flags) {
if (protocol == answer->protocol)
break;
last_perm = lh;
}
answer = NULL;
}
if (answer)
goto out_permanent;
/* Add the new entry after the last permanent entry if any, so that
* the new entry does not override a permanent entry when matched with
* a wild-card protocol. But it is allowed to override any existing
* non-permanent entry. This means that when we remove this entry, the
* system automatically returns to the old behavior.
*/
list_add_rcu(&p->list, last_perm);
ret = 0;
out:
spin_unlock_bh(&inetsw6_lock);
return ret;
out_permanent:
pr_err("Attempt to override permanent protocol %d\n", protocol);
goto out;
out_illegal:
pr_err("Ignoring attempt to register invalid socket type %d\n",
p->type);
goto out;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet6_register_protosw);
void
inet6_unregister_protosw(struct inet_protosw *p)
{
if (INET_PROTOSW_PERMANENT & p->flags) {
pr_err("Attempt to unregister permanent protocol %d\n",
p->protocol);
} else {
spin_lock_bh(&inetsw6_lock);
list_del_rcu(&p->list);
spin_unlock_bh(&inetsw6_lock);
synchronize_net();
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet6_unregister_protosw);
int inet6_sk_rebuild_header(struct sock *sk)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct dst_entry *dst;
dst = __sk_dst_check(sk, np->dst_cookie);
if (!dst) {
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct in6_addr *final_p, final;
struct flowi6 fl6;
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_proto = sk->sk_protocol;
fl6.daddr = sk->sk_v6_daddr;
fl6.saddr = np->saddr;
fl6.flowlabel = np->flow_label;
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
fl6.fl6_dport = inet->inet_dport;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet->inet_sport;
fl6.flowi6_uid = sk->sk_uid;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi_common(&fl6));
rcu_read_lock();
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt),
&final);
rcu_read_unlock();
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sock_net(sk), sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
sk->sk_route_caps = 0;
sk->sk_err_soft = -PTR_ERR(dst);
return PTR_ERR(dst);
}
ip6_dst_store(sk, dst, NULL, NULL);
}
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet6_sk_rebuild_header);
bool ipv6_opt_accepted(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct inet6_skb_parm *opt)
{
const struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
if (np->rxopt.all) {
if (((opt->flags & IP6SKB_HOPBYHOP) &&
(np->rxopt.bits.hopopts || np->rxopt.bits.ohopopts)) ||
(ip6_flowinfo((struct ipv6hdr *) skb_network_header(skb)) &&
np->rxopt.bits.rxflow) ||
(opt->srcrt && (np->rxopt.bits.srcrt ||
np->rxopt.bits.osrcrt)) ||
((opt->dst1 || opt->dst0) &&
(np->rxopt.bits.dstopts || np->rxopt.bits.odstopts)))
return true;
}
return false;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ipv6_opt_accepted);
static struct packet_type ipv6_packet_type __read_mostly = {
.type = cpu_to_be16(ETH_P_IPV6),
.func = ipv6_rcv,
.list_func = ipv6_list_rcv,
};
static int __init ipv6_packet_init(void)
{
dev_add_pack(&ipv6_packet_type);
return 0;
}
static void ipv6_packet_cleanup(void)
{
dev_remove_pack(&ipv6_packet_type);
}
static int __net_init ipv6_init_mibs(struct net *net)
{
net: Explicitly initialize u64_stats_sync structures for lockdep In order to enable lockdep on seqcount/seqlock structures, we must explicitly initialize any locks. The u64_stats_sync structure, uses a seqcount, and thus we need to introduce a u64_stats_init() function and use it to initialize the structure. This unfortunately adds a lot of fairly trivial initialization code to a number of drivers. But the benefit of ensuring correctness makes this worth while. Because these changes are required for lockdep to be enabled, and the changes are quite trivial, I've not yet split this patch out into 30-some separate patches, as I figured it would be better to get the various maintainers thoughts on how to best merge this change along with the seqcount lockdep enablement. Feedback would be appreciated! Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Jesse Gross <jesse@nicira.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Mirko Lindner <mlindner@marvell.com> Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Cc: Roger Luethi <rl@hellgate.ch> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com> Cc: Wensong Zhang <wensong@linux-vs.org> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1381186321-4906-2-git-send-email-john.stultz@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2013-10-07 22:51:58 +00:00
int i;
net->mib.udp_stats_in6 = alloc_percpu(struct udp_mib);
if (!net->mib.udp_stats_in6)
return -ENOMEM;
net->mib.udplite_stats_in6 = alloc_percpu(struct udp_mib);
if (!net->mib.udplite_stats_in6)
goto err_udplite_mib;
net->mib.ipv6_statistics = alloc_percpu(struct ipstats_mib);
if (!net->mib.ipv6_statistics)
goto err_ip_mib;
net: Explicitly initialize u64_stats_sync structures for lockdep In order to enable lockdep on seqcount/seqlock structures, we must explicitly initialize any locks. The u64_stats_sync structure, uses a seqcount, and thus we need to introduce a u64_stats_init() function and use it to initialize the structure. This unfortunately adds a lot of fairly trivial initialization code to a number of drivers. But the benefit of ensuring correctness makes this worth while. Because these changes are required for lockdep to be enabled, and the changes are quite trivial, I've not yet split this patch out into 30-some separate patches, as I figured it would be better to get the various maintainers thoughts on how to best merge this change along with the seqcount lockdep enablement. Feedback would be appreciated! Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Jesse Gross <jesse@nicira.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Mirko Lindner <mlindner@marvell.com> Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Cc: Roger Luethi <rl@hellgate.ch> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com> Cc: Wensong Zhang <wensong@linux-vs.org> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1381186321-4906-2-git-send-email-john.stultz@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2013-10-07 22:51:58 +00:00
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
struct ipstats_mib *af_inet6_stats;
af_inet6_stats = per_cpu_ptr(net->mib.ipv6_statistics, i);
net: Explicitly initialize u64_stats_sync structures for lockdep In order to enable lockdep on seqcount/seqlock structures, we must explicitly initialize any locks. The u64_stats_sync structure, uses a seqcount, and thus we need to introduce a u64_stats_init() function and use it to initialize the structure. This unfortunately adds a lot of fairly trivial initialization code to a number of drivers. But the benefit of ensuring correctness makes this worth while. Because these changes are required for lockdep to be enabled, and the changes are quite trivial, I've not yet split this patch out into 30-some separate patches, as I figured it would be better to get the various maintainers thoughts on how to best merge this change along with the seqcount lockdep enablement. Feedback would be appreciated! Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Jesse Gross <jesse@nicira.com> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Mirko Lindner <mlindner@marvell.com> Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Cc: Roger Luethi <rl@hellgate.ch> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com> Cc: Wensong Zhang <wensong@linux-vs.org> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1381186321-4906-2-git-send-email-john.stultz@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2013-10-07 22:51:58 +00:00
u64_stats_init(&af_inet6_stats->syncp);
}
net->mib.icmpv6_statistics = alloc_percpu(struct icmpv6_mib);
if (!net->mib.icmpv6_statistics)
goto err_icmp_mib;
net->mib.icmpv6msg_statistics = kzalloc(sizeof(struct icmpv6msg_mib),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!net->mib.icmpv6msg_statistics)
goto err_icmpmsg_mib;
return 0;
err_icmpmsg_mib:
free_percpu(net->mib.icmpv6_statistics);
err_icmp_mib:
free_percpu(net->mib.ipv6_statistics);
err_ip_mib:
free_percpu(net->mib.udplite_stats_in6);
err_udplite_mib:
free_percpu(net->mib.udp_stats_in6);
return -ENOMEM;
}
static void ipv6_cleanup_mibs(struct net *net)
{
free_percpu(net->mib.udp_stats_in6);
free_percpu(net->mib.udplite_stats_in6);
free_percpu(net->mib.ipv6_statistics);
free_percpu(net->mib.icmpv6_statistics);
kfree(net->mib.icmpv6msg_statistics);
}
static int __net_init inet6_net_init(struct net *net)
{
int err = 0;
net->ipv6.sysctl.bindv6only = 0;
net->ipv6.sysctl.icmpv6_time = 1*HZ;
net->ipv6.sysctl.icmpv6_echo_ignore_all = 0;
net->ipv6.sysctl.icmpv6_echo_ignore_multicast = 0;
net->ipv6.sysctl.icmpv6_echo_ignore_anycast = 0;
/* By default, rate limit error messages.
* Except for pmtu discovery, it would break it.
* proc_do_large_bitmap needs pointer to the bitmap.
*/
bitmap_set(net->ipv6.sysctl.icmpv6_ratemask, 0, ICMPV6_ERRMSG_MAX + 1);
bitmap_clear(net->ipv6.sysctl.icmpv6_ratemask, ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG, 1);
net->ipv6.sysctl.icmpv6_ratemask_ptr = net->ipv6.sysctl.icmpv6_ratemask;
net->ipv6.sysctl.flowlabel_consistency = 1;
net->ipv6.sysctl.auto_flowlabels = IP6_DEFAULT_AUTO_FLOW_LABELS;
net->ipv6.sysctl.idgen_retries = 3;
net->ipv6.sysctl.idgen_delay = 1 * HZ;
net->ipv6.sysctl.flowlabel_state_ranges = 0;
ipv6: Implement limits on Hop-by-Hop and Destination options RFC 8200 (IPv6) defines Hop-by-Hop options and Destination options extension headers. Both of these carry a list of TLVs which is only limited by the maximum length of the extension header (2048 bytes). By the spec a host must process all the TLVs in these options, however these could be used as a fairly obvious denial of service attack. I think this could in fact be a significant DOS vector on the Internet, one mitigating factor might be that many FWs drop all packets with EH (and obviously this is only IPv6) so an Internet wide attack might not be so effective (yet!). By my calculation, the worse case packet with TLVs in a standard 1500 byte MTU packet that would be processed by the stack contains 1282 invidual TLVs (including pad TLVS) or 724 two byte TLVs. I wrote a quick test program that floods a whole bunch of these packets to a host and sure enough there is substantial time spent in ip6_parse_tlv. These packets contain nothing but unknown TLVS (that are ignored), TLV padding, and bogus UDP header with zero payload length. 25.38% [kernel] [k] __fib6_clean_all 21.63% [kernel] [k] ip6_parse_tlv 4.21% [kernel] [k] __local_bh_enable_ip 2.18% [kernel] [k] ip6_pol_route.isra.39 1.98% [kernel] [k] fib6_walk_continue 1.88% [kernel] [k] _raw_write_lock_bh 1.65% [kernel] [k] dst_release This patch adds configurable limits to Destination and Hop-by-Hop options. There are three limits that may be set: - Limit the number of options in a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options extension header. - Limit the byte length of a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options extension header. - Disallow unrecognized options in a Hop-by-Hop or Destination options extension header. The limits are set in corresponding sysctls: ipv6.sysctl.max_dst_opts_cnt ipv6.sysctl.max_hbh_opts_cnt ipv6.sysctl.max_dst_opts_len ipv6.sysctl.max_hbh_opts_len If a max_*_opts_cnt is less than zero then unknown TLVs are disallowed. The number of known TLVs that are allowed is the absolute value of this number. If a limit is exceeded when processing an extension header the packet is dropped. Default values are set to 8 for options counts, and set to INT_MAX for maximum length. Note the choice to limit options to 8 is an arbitrary guess (roughly based on the fact that the stack supports three HBH options and just one destination option). These limits have being proposed in draft-ietf-6man-rfc6434-bis. Tested (by Martin Lau) I tested out 1 thread (i.e. one raw_udp process). I changed the net.ipv6.max_dst_(opts|hbh)_number between 8 to 2048. With sysctls setting to 2048, the softirq% is packed to 100%. With 8, the softirq% is almost unnoticable from mpstat. v2; - Code and documention cleanup. - Change references of RFC2460 to be RFC8200. - Add reference to RFC6434-bis where the limits will be in standard. Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <tom@quantonium.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-10-30 21:16:00 +00:00
net->ipv6.sysctl.max_dst_opts_cnt = IP6_DEFAULT_MAX_DST_OPTS_CNT;
net->ipv6.sysctl.max_hbh_opts_cnt = IP6_DEFAULT_MAX_HBH_OPTS_CNT;
net->ipv6.sysctl.max_dst_opts_len = IP6_DEFAULT_MAX_DST_OPTS_LEN;
net->ipv6.sysctl.max_hbh_opts_len = IP6_DEFAULT_MAX_HBH_OPTS_LEN;
net: ipv6: Emit notification when fib hardware flags are changed After installing a route to the kernel, user space receives an acknowledgment, which means the route was installed in the kernel, but not necessarily in hardware. The asynchronous nature of route installation in hardware can lead to a routing daemon advertising a route before it was actually installed in hardware. This can result in packet loss or mis-routed packets until the route is installed in hardware. It is also possible for a route already installed in hardware to change its action and therefore its flags. For example, a host route that is trapping packets can be "promoted" to perform decapsulation following the installation of an IPinIP/VXLAN tunnel. Emit RTM_NEWROUTE notifications whenever RTM_F_OFFLOAD/RTM_F_TRAP flags are changed. The aim is to provide an indication to user-space (e.g., routing daemons) about the state of the route in hardware. Introduce a sysctl that controls this behavior. Keep the default value at 0 (i.e., do not emit notifications) for several reasons: - Multiple RTM_NEWROUTE notification per-route might confuse existing routing daemons. - Convergence reasons in routing daemons. - The extra notifications will negatively impact the insertion rate. - Not all users are interested in these notifications. Move fib6_info_hw_flags_set() to C file because it is no longer a short function. Signed-off-by: Amit Cohen <amcohen@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2021-02-01 19:47:55 +00:00
net->ipv6.sysctl.fib_notify_on_flag_change = 0;
atomic_set(&net->ipv6.fib6_sernum, 1);
ipv6: ioam: Data plane support for Pre-allocated Trace Implement support for processing the IOAM Pre-allocated Trace with IPv6, see [1] and [2]. Introduce a new IPv6 Hop-by-Hop TLV option, see IANA [3]. A new per-interface sysctl is introduced. The value is a boolean to accept (=1) or ignore (=0, by default) IPv6 IOAM options on ingress for an interface: - net.ipv6.conf.XXX.ioam6_enabled Two other sysctls are introduced to define IOAM IDs, represented by an integer. They are respectively per-namespace and per-interface: - net.ipv6.ioam6_id - net.ipv6.conf.XXX.ioam6_id The value of the first one represents the IOAM ID of the node itself (u32; max and default value = U32_MAX>>8, due to hop limit concatenation) while the other represents the IOAM ID of an interface (u16; max and default value = U16_MAX). Each "ioam6_id" sysctl has a "_wide" equivalent: - net.ipv6.ioam6_id_wide - net.ipv6.conf.XXX.ioam6_id_wide The value of the first one represents the wide IOAM ID of the node itself (u64; max and default value = U64_MAX>>8, due to hop limit concatenation) while the other represents the wide IOAM ID of an interface (u32; max and default value = U32_MAX). The use of short and wide equivalents is not exclusive, a deployment could choose to leverage both. For example, net.ipv6.conf.XXX.ioam6_id (short format) could be an identifier for a physical interface, whereas net.ipv6.conf.XXX.ioam6_id_wide (wide format) could be an identifier for a logical sub-interface. Documentation about new sysctls is provided at the end of this patchset. Two relativistic hash tables are used: one for IOAM namespaces, the other for IOAM schemas. A namespace can only have a single active schema and a schema can only be attached to a single namespace (1:1 relationship). [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ippm-ioam-ipv6-options [2] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ippm-ioam-data [3] https://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-parameters/ipv6-parameters.xhtml#ipv6-parameters-2 Signed-off-by: Justin Iurman <justin.iurman@uliege.be> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-07-20 19:42:57 +00:00
net->ipv6.sysctl.ioam6_id = IOAM6_DEFAULT_ID;
net->ipv6.sysctl.ioam6_id_wide = IOAM6_DEFAULT_ID_WIDE;
err = ipv6_init_mibs(net);
if (err)
return err;
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
err = udp6_proc_init(net);
if (err)
goto out;
err = tcp6_proc_init(net);
if (err)
goto proc_tcp6_fail;
err = ac6_proc_init(net);
if (err)
goto proc_ac6_fail;
#endif
return err;
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
proc_ac6_fail:
tcp6_proc_exit(net);
proc_tcp6_fail:
udp6_proc_exit(net);
out:
ipv6_cleanup_mibs(net);
return err;
#endif
}
static void __net_exit inet6_net_exit(struct net *net)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
udp6_proc_exit(net);
tcp6_proc_exit(net);
ac6_proc_exit(net);
#endif
ipv6_cleanup_mibs(net);
}
static struct pernet_operations inet6_net_ops = {
.init = inet6_net_init,
.exit = inet6_net_exit,
};
static int ipv6_route_input(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
ip6_route_input(skb);
return skb_dst(skb)->error;
}
static const struct ipv6_stub ipv6_stub_impl = {
.ipv6_sock_mc_join = ipv6_sock_mc_join,
.ipv6_sock_mc_drop = ipv6_sock_mc_drop,
.ipv6_dst_lookup_flow = ip6_dst_lookup_flow,
.ipv6_route_input = ipv6_route_input,
.fib6_get_table = fib6_get_table,
.fib6_table_lookup = fib6_table_lookup,
.fib6_lookup = fib6_lookup,
.fib6_select_path = fib6_select_path,
.ip6_mtu_from_fib6 = ip6_mtu_from_fib6,
.fib6_nh_init = fib6_nh_init,
.fib6_nh_release = fib6_nh_release,
.fib6_nh_release_dsts = fib6_nh_release_dsts,
.fib6_update_sernum = fib6_update_sernum_stub,
.fib6_rt_update = fib6_rt_update,
.ip6_del_rt = ip6_del_rt,
.udpv6_encap_enable = udpv6_encap_enable,
.ndisc_send_na = ndisc_send_na,
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XFRM)
.xfrm6_local_rxpmtu = xfrm6_local_rxpmtu,
.xfrm6_udp_encap_rcv = xfrm6_udp_encap_rcv,
.xfrm6_rcv_encap = xfrm6_rcv_encap,
#endif
.nd_tbl = &nd_tbl,
.ipv6_fragment = ip6_fragment,
.ipv6_dev_find = ipv6_dev_find,
};
bpf: Hooks for sys_connect == The problem == See description of the problem in the initial patch of this patch set. == The solution == The patch provides much more reliable in-kernel solution for the 2nd part of the problem: making outgoing connecttion from desired IP. It adds new attach types `BPF_CGROUP_INET4_CONNECT` and `BPF_CGROUP_INET6_CONNECT` for program type `BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR` that can be used to override both source and destination of a connection at connect(2) time. Local end of connection can be bound to desired IP using newly introduced BPF-helper `bpf_bind()`. It allows to bind to only IP though, and doesn't support binding to port, i.e. leverages `IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT` socket option. There are two reasons for this: * looking for a free port is expensive and can affect performance significantly; * there is no use-case for port. As for remote end (`struct sockaddr *` passed by user), both parts of it can be overridden, remote IP and remote port. It's useful if an application inside cgroup wants to connect to another application inside same cgroup or to itself, but knows nothing about IP assigned to the cgroup. Support is added for IPv4 and IPv6, for TCP and UDP. IPv4 and IPv6 have separate attach types for same reason as sys_bind hooks, i.e. to prevent reading from / writing to e.g. user_ip6 fields when user passes sockaddr_in since it'd be out-of-bound. == Implementation notes == The patch introduces new field in `struct proto`: `pre_connect` that is a pointer to a function with same signature as `connect` but is called before it. The reason is in some cases BPF hooks should be called way before control is passed to `sk->sk_prot->connect`. Specifically `inet_dgram_connect` autobinds socket before calling `sk->sk_prot->connect` and there is no way to call `bpf_bind()` from hooks from e.g. `ip4_datagram_connect` or `ip6_datagram_connect` since it'd cause double-bind. On the other hand `proto.pre_connect` provides a flexible way to add BPF hooks for connect only for necessary `proto` and call them at desired time before `connect`. Since `bpf_bind()` is allowed to bind only to IP and autobind in `inet_dgram_connect` binds only port there is no chance of double-bind. bpf_bind() sets `force_bind_address_no_port` to bind to only IP despite of value of `bind_address_no_port` socket field. bpf_bind() sets `with_lock` to `false` when calling to __inet_bind() and __inet6_bind() since all call-sites, where bpf_bind() is called, already hold socket lock. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-03-30 22:08:05 +00:00
static const struct ipv6_bpf_stub ipv6_bpf_stub_impl = {
.inet6_bind = __inet6_bind,
.udp6_lib_lookup = __udp6_lib_lookup,
bpf: Hooks for sys_connect == The problem == See description of the problem in the initial patch of this patch set. == The solution == The patch provides much more reliable in-kernel solution for the 2nd part of the problem: making outgoing connecttion from desired IP. It adds new attach types `BPF_CGROUP_INET4_CONNECT` and `BPF_CGROUP_INET6_CONNECT` for program type `BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR` that can be used to override both source and destination of a connection at connect(2) time. Local end of connection can be bound to desired IP using newly introduced BPF-helper `bpf_bind()`. It allows to bind to only IP though, and doesn't support binding to port, i.e. leverages `IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT` socket option. There are two reasons for this: * looking for a free port is expensive and can affect performance significantly; * there is no use-case for port. As for remote end (`struct sockaddr *` passed by user), both parts of it can be overridden, remote IP and remote port. It's useful if an application inside cgroup wants to connect to another application inside same cgroup or to itself, but knows nothing about IP assigned to the cgroup. Support is added for IPv4 and IPv6, for TCP and UDP. IPv4 and IPv6 have separate attach types for same reason as sys_bind hooks, i.e. to prevent reading from / writing to e.g. user_ip6 fields when user passes sockaddr_in since it'd be out-of-bound. == Implementation notes == The patch introduces new field in `struct proto`: `pre_connect` that is a pointer to a function with same signature as `connect` but is called before it. The reason is in some cases BPF hooks should be called way before control is passed to `sk->sk_prot->connect`. Specifically `inet_dgram_connect` autobinds socket before calling `sk->sk_prot->connect` and there is no way to call `bpf_bind()` from hooks from e.g. `ip4_datagram_connect` or `ip6_datagram_connect` since it'd cause double-bind. On the other hand `proto.pre_connect` provides a flexible way to add BPF hooks for connect only for necessary `proto` and call them at desired time before `connect`. Since `bpf_bind()` is allowed to bind only to IP and autobind in `inet_dgram_connect` binds only port there is no chance of double-bind. bpf_bind() sets `force_bind_address_no_port` to bind to only IP despite of value of `bind_address_no_port` socket field. bpf_bind() sets `with_lock` to `false` when calling to __inet_bind() and __inet6_bind() since all call-sites, where bpf_bind() is called, already hold socket lock. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-03-30 22:08:05 +00:00
};
static int __init inet6_init(void)
{
struct list_head *r;
int err = 0;
sock_skb_cb_check_size(sizeof(struct inet6_skb_parm));
/* Register the socket-side information for inet6_create. */
net/ipv6/af_inet6.c: checkpatch cleanup af_inet6.c:80: ERROR: do not initialise statics to 0 or NULL af_inet6.c:259: ERROR: spaces required around that '=' (ctx:VxV) af_inet6.c:394: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:412: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:422: ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition af_inet6.c:425: ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition af_inet6.c:433: ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition af_inet6.c:437: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:446: ERROR: spaces required around that '=' (ctx:VxV) af_inet6.c:478: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:485: ERROR: that open brace { should be on the previous line af_inet6.c:485: ERROR: space required before the open parenthesis '(' af_inet6.c:513: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:629: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:647: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:687: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:709: WARNING: EXPORT_SYMBOL(foo); should immediately follow its function/variable af_inet6.c:1073: ERROR: space required before the open parenthesis '(' Signed-off-by: Eldad Zack <eldad@fogrefinery.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-05-05 10:13:53 +00:00
for (r = &inetsw6[0]; r < &inetsw6[SOCK_MAX]; ++r)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(r);
if (disable_ipv6_mod) {
pr_info("Loaded, but administratively disabled, reboot required to enable\n");
goto out;
}
raw_hashinfo_init(&raw_v6_hashinfo);
err = proto_register(&tcpv6_prot, 1);
if (err)
goto out;
err = proto_register(&udpv6_prot, 1);
if (err)
goto out_unregister_tcp_proto;
[NET]: Supporting UDP-Lite (RFC 3828) in Linux This is a revision of the previously submitted patch, which alters the way files are organized and compiled in the following manner: * UDP and UDP-Lite now use separate object files * source file dependencies resolved via header files net/ipv{4,6}/udp_impl.h * order of inclusion files in udp.c/udplite.c adapted accordingly [NET/IPv4]: Support for the UDP-Lite protocol (RFC 3828) This patch adds support for UDP-Lite to the IPv4 stack, provided as an extension to the existing UDPv4 code: * generic routines are all located in net/ipv4/udp.c * UDP-Lite specific routines are in net/ipv4/udplite.c * MIB/statistics support in /proc/net/snmp and /proc/net/udplite * shared API with extensions for partial checksum coverage [NET/IPv6]: Extension for UDP-Lite over IPv6 It extends the existing UDPv6 code base with support for UDP-Lite in the same manner as per UDPv4. In particular, * UDPv6 generic and shared code is in net/ipv6/udp.c * UDP-Litev6 specific extensions are in net/ipv6/udplite.c * MIB/statistics support in /proc/net/snmp6 and /proc/net/udplite6 * support for IPV6_ADDRFORM * aligned the coding style of protocol initialisation with af_inet6.c * made the error handling in udpv6_queue_rcv_skb consistent; to return `-1' on error on all error cases * consolidation of shared code [NET]: UDP-Lite Documentation and basic XFRM/Netfilter support The UDP-Lite patch further provides * API documentation for UDP-Lite * basic xfrm support * basic netfilter support for IPv4 and IPv6 (LOG target) Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-11-27 19:10:57 +00:00
err = proto_register(&udplitev6_prot, 1);
if (err)
goto out_unregister_udp_proto;
[NET]: Supporting UDP-Lite (RFC 3828) in Linux This is a revision of the previously submitted patch, which alters the way files are organized and compiled in the following manner: * UDP and UDP-Lite now use separate object files * source file dependencies resolved via header files net/ipv{4,6}/udp_impl.h * order of inclusion files in udp.c/udplite.c adapted accordingly [NET/IPv4]: Support for the UDP-Lite protocol (RFC 3828) This patch adds support for UDP-Lite to the IPv4 stack, provided as an extension to the existing UDPv4 code: * generic routines are all located in net/ipv4/udp.c * UDP-Lite specific routines are in net/ipv4/udplite.c * MIB/statistics support in /proc/net/snmp and /proc/net/udplite * shared API with extensions for partial checksum coverage [NET/IPv6]: Extension for UDP-Lite over IPv6 It extends the existing UDPv6 code base with support for UDP-Lite in the same manner as per UDPv4. In particular, * UDPv6 generic and shared code is in net/ipv6/udp.c * UDP-Litev6 specific extensions are in net/ipv6/udplite.c * MIB/statistics support in /proc/net/snmp6 and /proc/net/udplite6 * support for IPV6_ADDRFORM * aligned the coding style of protocol initialisation with af_inet6.c * made the error handling in udpv6_queue_rcv_skb consistent; to return `-1' on error on all error cases * consolidation of shared code [NET]: UDP-Lite Documentation and basic XFRM/Netfilter support The UDP-Lite patch further provides * API documentation for UDP-Lite * basic xfrm support * basic netfilter support for IPv4 and IPv6 (LOG target) Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-11-27 19:10:57 +00:00
err = proto_register(&rawv6_prot, 1);
if (err)
goto out_unregister_udplite_proto;
err = proto_register(&pingv6_prot, 1);
if (err)
goto out_unregister_raw_proto;
/* We MUST register RAW sockets before we create the ICMP6,
* IGMP6, or NDISC control sockets.
*/
err = rawv6_init();
if (err)
goto out_unregister_ping_proto;
/* Register the family here so that the init calls below will
* be able to create sockets. (?? is this dangerous ??)
*/
err = sock_register(&inet6_family_ops);
if (err)
goto out_sock_register_fail;
/*
* ipngwg API draft makes clear that the correct semantics
* for TCP and UDP is to consider one TCP and UDP instance
* in a host available by both INET and INET6 APIs and
* able to communicate via both network protocols.
*/
err = register_pernet_subsys(&inet6_net_ops);
if (err)
goto register_pernet_fail;
err = ip6_mr_init();
if (err)
goto ipmr_fail;
ipv6: reorder icmpv6_init() and ip6_mr_init() Andrey reported the following kernel crash: kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 14446 Comm: syz-executor6 Not tainted 4.10.0+ #82 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff88001f311700 task.stack: ffff88001f6e8000 RIP: 0010:ip6mr_sk_done+0x15a/0x3d0 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1618 RSP: 0018:ffff88001f6ef418 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff10003edde8c RCX: ffffc900043ee000 RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: ffffffff83e3b3f8 RDI: 0000000000000020 RBP: ffff88001f6ef508 R08: fffffbfff0dcc5d8 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffffff86e62ec0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88001f6ef4e0 R15: ffff8800380a0040 FS: 00007f7a52cec700(0000) GS:ffff88003ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000061c500 CR3: 000000001f1ae000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 DR0: 0000000020000000 DR1: 0000000020000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600 Call Trace: rawv6_close+0x4c/0x80 net/ipv6/raw.c:1217 inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:425 inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:432 sock_release+0x8d/0x1e0 net/socket.c:597 __sock_create+0x39d/0x880 net/socket.c:1226 sock_create_kern+0x3f/0x50 net/socket.c:1243 inet_ctl_sock_create+0xbb/0x280 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1526 icmpv6_sk_init+0x163/0x500 net/ipv6/icmp.c:954 ops_init+0x10a/0x550 net/core/net_namespace.c:115 setup_net+0x261/0x660 net/core/net_namespace.c:291 copy_net_ns+0x27e/0x540 net/core/net_namespace.c:396 9pnet_virtio: no channels available for device ./file1 create_new_namespaces+0x437/0x9b0 kernel/nsproxy.c:106 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xae/0x1e0 kernel/nsproxy.c:205 SYSC_unshare kernel/fork.c:2281 [inline] SyS_unshare+0x64e/0x1000 kernel/fork.c:2231 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 This is because net->ipv6.mr6_tables is not initialized at that point, ip6mr_rules_init() is not called yet, therefore on the error path when we iterator the list, we trigger this oops. Fix this by reordering ip6mr_rules_init() before icmpv6_sk_init(). Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-05 20:34:53 +00:00
err = icmpv6_init();
if (err)
goto icmp_fail;
err = ndisc_init();
if (err)
goto ndisc_fail;
err = igmp6_init();
if (err)
goto igmp_fail;
err = ipv6_netfilter_init();
if (err)
goto netfilter_fail;
/* Create /proc/foo6 entries. */
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
err = -ENOMEM;
if (raw6_proc_init())
goto proc_raw6_fail;
[NET]: Supporting UDP-Lite (RFC 3828) in Linux This is a revision of the previously submitted patch, which alters the way files are organized and compiled in the following manner: * UDP and UDP-Lite now use separate object files * source file dependencies resolved via header files net/ipv{4,6}/udp_impl.h * order of inclusion files in udp.c/udplite.c adapted accordingly [NET/IPv4]: Support for the UDP-Lite protocol (RFC 3828) This patch adds support for UDP-Lite to the IPv4 stack, provided as an extension to the existing UDPv4 code: * generic routines are all located in net/ipv4/udp.c * UDP-Lite specific routines are in net/ipv4/udplite.c * MIB/statistics support in /proc/net/snmp and /proc/net/udplite * shared API with extensions for partial checksum coverage [NET/IPv6]: Extension for UDP-Lite over IPv6 It extends the existing UDPv6 code base with support for UDP-Lite in the same manner as per UDPv4. In particular, * UDPv6 generic and shared code is in net/ipv6/udp.c * UDP-Litev6 specific extensions are in net/ipv6/udplite.c * MIB/statistics support in /proc/net/snmp6 and /proc/net/udplite6 * support for IPV6_ADDRFORM * aligned the coding style of protocol initialisation with af_inet6.c * made the error handling in udpv6_queue_rcv_skb consistent; to return `-1' on error on all error cases * consolidation of shared code [NET]: UDP-Lite Documentation and basic XFRM/Netfilter support The UDP-Lite patch further provides * API documentation for UDP-Lite * basic xfrm support * basic netfilter support for IPv4 and IPv6 (LOG target) Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-11-27 19:10:57 +00:00
if (udplite6_proc_init())
goto proc_udplite6_fail;
if (ipv6_misc_proc_init())
goto proc_misc6_fail;
if (if6_proc_init())
goto proc_if6_fail;
#endif
err = ip6_route_init();
if (err)
goto ip6_route_fail;
err = ndisc_late_init();
if (err)
goto ndisc_late_fail;
err = ip6_flowlabel_init();
if (err)
goto ip6_flowlabel_fail;
err = ipv6_anycast_init();
if (err)
goto ipv6_anycast_fail;
err = addrconf_init();
if (err)
goto addrconf_fail;
/* Init v6 extension headers. */
err = ipv6_exthdrs_init();
if (err)
goto ipv6_exthdrs_fail;
err = ipv6_frag_init();
if (err)
goto ipv6_frag_fail;
/* Init v6 transport protocols. */
err = udpv6_init();
if (err)
goto udpv6_fail;
err = udplitev6_init();
if (err)
goto udplitev6_fail;
err = udpv6_offload_init();
if (err)
goto udpv6_offload_fail;
err = tcpv6_init();
if (err)
goto tcpv6_fail;
err = ipv6_packet_init();
if (err)
goto ipv6_packet_fail;
err = pingv6_init();
if (err)
goto pingv6_fail;
err = calipso_init();
if (err)
goto calipso_fail;
err = seg6_init();
if (err)
goto seg6_fail;
err = rpl_init();
if (err)
goto rpl_fail;
ipv6: ioam: Data plane support for Pre-allocated Trace Implement support for processing the IOAM Pre-allocated Trace with IPv6, see [1] and [2]. Introduce a new IPv6 Hop-by-Hop TLV option, see IANA [3]. A new per-interface sysctl is introduced. The value is a boolean to accept (=1) or ignore (=0, by default) IPv6 IOAM options on ingress for an interface: - net.ipv6.conf.XXX.ioam6_enabled Two other sysctls are introduced to define IOAM IDs, represented by an integer. They are respectively per-namespace and per-interface: - net.ipv6.ioam6_id - net.ipv6.conf.XXX.ioam6_id The value of the first one represents the IOAM ID of the node itself (u32; max and default value = U32_MAX>>8, due to hop limit concatenation) while the other represents the IOAM ID of an interface (u16; max and default value = U16_MAX). Each "ioam6_id" sysctl has a "_wide" equivalent: - net.ipv6.ioam6_id_wide - net.ipv6.conf.XXX.ioam6_id_wide The value of the first one represents the wide IOAM ID of the node itself (u64; max and default value = U64_MAX>>8, due to hop limit concatenation) while the other represents the wide IOAM ID of an interface (u32; max and default value = U32_MAX). The use of short and wide equivalents is not exclusive, a deployment could choose to leverage both. For example, net.ipv6.conf.XXX.ioam6_id (short format) could be an identifier for a physical interface, whereas net.ipv6.conf.XXX.ioam6_id_wide (wide format) could be an identifier for a logical sub-interface. Documentation about new sysctls is provided at the end of this patchset. Two relativistic hash tables are used: one for IOAM namespaces, the other for IOAM schemas. A namespace can only have a single active schema and a schema can only be attached to a single namespace (1:1 relationship). [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ippm-ioam-ipv6-options [2] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ippm-ioam-data [3] https://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-parameters/ipv6-parameters.xhtml#ipv6-parameters-2 Signed-off-by: Justin Iurman <justin.iurman@uliege.be> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-07-20 19:42:57 +00:00
err = ioam6_init();
if (err)
goto ioam6_fail;
err = igmp6_late_init();
if (err)
goto igmp6_late_err;
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
err = ipv6_sysctl_register();
if (err)
goto sysctl_fail;
#endif
/* ensure that ipv6 stubs are visible only after ipv6 is ready */
wmb();
ipv6_stub = &ipv6_stub_impl;
bpf: Hooks for sys_connect == The problem == See description of the problem in the initial patch of this patch set. == The solution == The patch provides much more reliable in-kernel solution for the 2nd part of the problem: making outgoing connecttion from desired IP. It adds new attach types `BPF_CGROUP_INET4_CONNECT` and `BPF_CGROUP_INET6_CONNECT` for program type `BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR` that can be used to override both source and destination of a connection at connect(2) time. Local end of connection can be bound to desired IP using newly introduced BPF-helper `bpf_bind()`. It allows to bind to only IP though, and doesn't support binding to port, i.e. leverages `IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT` socket option. There are two reasons for this: * looking for a free port is expensive and can affect performance significantly; * there is no use-case for port. As for remote end (`struct sockaddr *` passed by user), both parts of it can be overridden, remote IP and remote port. It's useful if an application inside cgroup wants to connect to another application inside same cgroup or to itself, but knows nothing about IP assigned to the cgroup. Support is added for IPv4 and IPv6, for TCP and UDP. IPv4 and IPv6 have separate attach types for same reason as sys_bind hooks, i.e. to prevent reading from / writing to e.g. user_ip6 fields when user passes sockaddr_in since it'd be out-of-bound. == Implementation notes == The patch introduces new field in `struct proto`: `pre_connect` that is a pointer to a function with same signature as `connect` but is called before it. The reason is in some cases BPF hooks should be called way before control is passed to `sk->sk_prot->connect`. Specifically `inet_dgram_connect` autobinds socket before calling `sk->sk_prot->connect` and there is no way to call `bpf_bind()` from hooks from e.g. `ip4_datagram_connect` or `ip6_datagram_connect` since it'd cause double-bind. On the other hand `proto.pre_connect` provides a flexible way to add BPF hooks for connect only for necessary `proto` and call them at desired time before `connect`. Since `bpf_bind()` is allowed to bind only to IP and autobind in `inet_dgram_connect` binds only port there is no chance of double-bind. bpf_bind() sets `force_bind_address_no_port` to bind to only IP despite of value of `bind_address_no_port` socket field. bpf_bind() sets `with_lock` to `false` when calling to __inet_bind() and __inet6_bind() since all call-sites, where bpf_bind() is called, already hold socket lock. Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
2018-03-30 22:08:05 +00:00
ipv6_bpf_stub = &ipv6_bpf_stub_impl;
out:
return err;
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
sysctl_fail:
igmp6_late_cleanup();
#endif
igmp6_late_err:
ipv6: ioam: Data plane support for Pre-allocated Trace Implement support for processing the IOAM Pre-allocated Trace with IPv6, see [1] and [2]. Introduce a new IPv6 Hop-by-Hop TLV option, see IANA [3]. A new per-interface sysctl is introduced. The value is a boolean to accept (=1) or ignore (=0, by default) IPv6 IOAM options on ingress for an interface: - net.ipv6.conf.XXX.ioam6_enabled Two other sysctls are introduced to define IOAM IDs, represented by an integer. They are respectively per-namespace and per-interface: - net.ipv6.ioam6_id - net.ipv6.conf.XXX.ioam6_id The value of the first one represents the IOAM ID of the node itself (u32; max and default value = U32_MAX>>8, due to hop limit concatenation) while the other represents the IOAM ID of an interface (u16; max and default value = U16_MAX). Each "ioam6_id" sysctl has a "_wide" equivalent: - net.ipv6.ioam6_id_wide - net.ipv6.conf.XXX.ioam6_id_wide The value of the first one represents the wide IOAM ID of the node itself (u64; max and default value = U64_MAX>>8, due to hop limit concatenation) while the other represents the wide IOAM ID of an interface (u32; max and default value = U32_MAX). The use of short and wide equivalents is not exclusive, a deployment could choose to leverage both. For example, net.ipv6.conf.XXX.ioam6_id (short format) could be an identifier for a physical interface, whereas net.ipv6.conf.XXX.ioam6_id_wide (wide format) could be an identifier for a logical sub-interface. Documentation about new sysctls is provided at the end of this patchset. Two relativistic hash tables are used: one for IOAM namespaces, the other for IOAM schemas. A namespace can only have a single active schema and a schema can only be attached to a single namespace (1:1 relationship). [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ippm-ioam-ipv6-options [2] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ippm-ioam-data [3] https://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-parameters/ipv6-parameters.xhtml#ipv6-parameters-2 Signed-off-by: Justin Iurman <justin.iurman@uliege.be> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-07-20 19:42:57 +00:00
ioam6_exit();
ioam6_fail:
rpl_exit();
rpl_fail:
seg6_exit();
seg6_fail:
calipso_exit();
calipso_fail:
pingv6_exit();
pingv6_fail:
ipv6_packet_cleanup();
ipv6_packet_fail:
tcpv6_exit();
tcpv6_fail:
udpv6_offload_exit();
udpv6_offload_fail:
udplitev6_exit();
udplitev6_fail:
udpv6_exit();
udpv6_fail:
ipv6_frag_exit();
ipv6_frag_fail:
ipv6_exthdrs_exit();
ipv6_exthdrs_fail:
addrconf_cleanup();
addrconf_fail:
ipv6_anycast_cleanup();
ipv6_anycast_fail:
ip6_flowlabel_cleanup();
ip6_flowlabel_fail:
ndisc_late_cleanup();
ndisc_late_fail:
ip6_route_cleanup();
ip6_route_fail:
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
if6_proc_exit();
proc_if6_fail:
ipv6_misc_proc_exit();
proc_misc6_fail:
[NET]: Supporting UDP-Lite (RFC 3828) in Linux This is a revision of the previously submitted patch, which alters the way files are organized and compiled in the following manner: * UDP and UDP-Lite now use separate object files * source file dependencies resolved via header files net/ipv{4,6}/udp_impl.h * order of inclusion files in udp.c/udplite.c adapted accordingly [NET/IPv4]: Support for the UDP-Lite protocol (RFC 3828) This patch adds support for UDP-Lite to the IPv4 stack, provided as an extension to the existing UDPv4 code: * generic routines are all located in net/ipv4/udp.c * UDP-Lite specific routines are in net/ipv4/udplite.c * MIB/statistics support in /proc/net/snmp and /proc/net/udplite * shared API with extensions for partial checksum coverage [NET/IPv6]: Extension for UDP-Lite over IPv6 It extends the existing UDPv6 code base with support for UDP-Lite in the same manner as per UDPv4. In particular, * UDPv6 generic and shared code is in net/ipv6/udp.c * UDP-Litev6 specific extensions are in net/ipv6/udplite.c * MIB/statistics support in /proc/net/snmp6 and /proc/net/udplite6 * support for IPV6_ADDRFORM * aligned the coding style of protocol initialisation with af_inet6.c * made the error handling in udpv6_queue_rcv_skb consistent; to return `-1' on error on all error cases * consolidation of shared code [NET]: UDP-Lite Documentation and basic XFRM/Netfilter support The UDP-Lite patch further provides * API documentation for UDP-Lite * basic xfrm support * basic netfilter support for IPv4 and IPv6 (LOG target) Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-11-27 19:10:57 +00:00
udplite6_proc_exit();
proc_udplite6_fail:
raw6_proc_exit();
proc_raw6_fail:
#endif
ipv6_netfilter_fini();
netfilter_fail:
igmp6_cleanup();
igmp_fail:
ndisc_cleanup();
ndisc_fail:
icmpv6_cleanup();
icmp_fail:
ip6_mr_cleanup();
ipv6: reorder icmpv6_init() and ip6_mr_init() Andrey reported the following kernel crash: kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 14446 Comm: syz-executor6 Not tainted 4.10.0+ #82 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff88001f311700 task.stack: ffff88001f6e8000 RIP: 0010:ip6mr_sk_done+0x15a/0x3d0 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1618 RSP: 0018:ffff88001f6ef418 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff10003edde8c RCX: ffffc900043ee000 RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: ffffffff83e3b3f8 RDI: 0000000000000020 RBP: ffff88001f6ef508 R08: fffffbfff0dcc5d8 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffffff86e62ec0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88001f6ef4e0 R15: ffff8800380a0040 FS: 00007f7a52cec700(0000) GS:ffff88003ec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000061c500 CR3: 000000001f1ae000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 DR0: 0000000020000000 DR1: 0000000020000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600 Call Trace: rawv6_close+0x4c/0x80 net/ipv6/raw.c:1217 inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:425 inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:432 sock_release+0x8d/0x1e0 net/socket.c:597 __sock_create+0x39d/0x880 net/socket.c:1226 sock_create_kern+0x3f/0x50 net/socket.c:1243 inet_ctl_sock_create+0xbb/0x280 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:1526 icmpv6_sk_init+0x163/0x500 net/ipv6/icmp.c:954 ops_init+0x10a/0x550 net/core/net_namespace.c:115 setup_net+0x261/0x660 net/core/net_namespace.c:291 copy_net_ns+0x27e/0x540 net/core/net_namespace.c:396 9pnet_virtio: no channels available for device ./file1 create_new_namespaces+0x437/0x9b0 kernel/nsproxy.c:106 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xae/0x1e0 kernel/nsproxy.c:205 SYSC_unshare kernel/fork.c:2281 [inline] SyS_unshare+0x64e/0x1000 kernel/fork.c:2231 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xc2 This is because net->ipv6.mr6_tables is not initialized at that point, ip6mr_rules_init() is not called yet, therefore on the error path when we iterator the list, we trigger this oops. Fix this by reordering ip6mr_rules_init() before icmpv6_sk_init(). Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-05 20:34:53 +00:00
ipmr_fail:
unregister_pernet_subsys(&inet6_net_ops);
register_pernet_fail:
sock_unregister(PF_INET6);
rtnl_unregister_all(PF_INET6);
out_sock_register_fail:
rawv6_exit();
out_unregister_ping_proto:
proto_unregister(&pingv6_prot);
out_unregister_raw_proto:
proto_unregister(&rawv6_prot);
[NET]: Supporting UDP-Lite (RFC 3828) in Linux This is a revision of the previously submitted patch, which alters the way files are organized and compiled in the following manner: * UDP and UDP-Lite now use separate object files * source file dependencies resolved via header files net/ipv{4,6}/udp_impl.h * order of inclusion files in udp.c/udplite.c adapted accordingly [NET/IPv4]: Support for the UDP-Lite protocol (RFC 3828) This patch adds support for UDP-Lite to the IPv4 stack, provided as an extension to the existing UDPv4 code: * generic routines are all located in net/ipv4/udp.c * UDP-Lite specific routines are in net/ipv4/udplite.c * MIB/statistics support in /proc/net/snmp and /proc/net/udplite * shared API with extensions for partial checksum coverage [NET/IPv6]: Extension for UDP-Lite over IPv6 It extends the existing UDPv6 code base with support for UDP-Lite in the same manner as per UDPv4. In particular, * UDPv6 generic and shared code is in net/ipv6/udp.c * UDP-Litev6 specific extensions are in net/ipv6/udplite.c * MIB/statistics support in /proc/net/snmp6 and /proc/net/udplite6 * support for IPV6_ADDRFORM * aligned the coding style of protocol initialisation with af_inet6.c * made the error handling in udpv6_queue_rcv_skb consistent; to return `-1' on error on all error cases * consolidation of shared code [NET]: UDP-Lite Documentation and basic XFRM/Netfilter support The UDP-Lite patch further provides * API documentation for UDP-Lite * basic xfrm support * basic netfilter support for IPv4 and IPv6 (LOG target) Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-11-27 19:10:57 +00:00
out_unregister_udplite_proto:
proto_unregister(&udplitev6_prot);
out_unregister_udp_proto:
proto_unregister(&udpv6_prot);
out_unregister_tcp_proto:
proto_unregister(&tcpv6_prot);
goto out;
}
module_init(inet6_init);
MODULE_ALIAS_NETPROTO(PF_INET6);