2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
config ARM64
|
|
|
|
def_bool y
|
2015-06-10 16:08:53 +00:00
|
|
|
select ACPI_CCA_REQUIRED if ACPI
|
2015-03-24 17:58:51 +00:00
|
|
|
select ACPI_GENERIC_GSI if ACPI
|
2017-03-31 17:51:01 +00:00
|
|
|
select ACPI_GTDT if ACPI
|
2017-06-14 16:37:12 +00:00
|
|
|
select ACPI_IORT if ACPI
|
2015-03-24 14:02:51 +00:00
|
|
|
select ACPI_REDUCED_HARDWARE_ONLY if ACPI
|
2016-06-10 19:55:19 +00:00
|
|
|
select ACPI_MCFG if ACPI
|
2016-09-27 20:54:14 +00:00
|
|
|
select ACPI_SPCR_TABLE if ACPI
|
2018-05-11 23:58:01 +00:00
|
|
|
select ACPI_PPTT if ACPI
|
2016-09-22 08:35:18 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_CLOCKSOURCE_DATA
|
2017-01-10 21:35:50 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VIRTUAL
|
2015-11-20 02:19:29 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED
|
2016-06-20 10:56:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_HAS_ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE if ACPI
|
2015-04-14 22:48:00 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE
|
2018-04-24 15:25:47 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_HAS_FAST_MULTIPLIER
|
include/linux/string.h: add the option of fortified string.h functions
This adds support for compiling with a rough equivalent to the glibc
_FORTIFY_SOURCE=1 feature, providing compile-time and runtime buffer
overflow checks for string.h functions when the compiler determines the
size of the source or destination buffer at compile-time. Unlike glibc,
it covers buffer reads in addition to writes.
GNU C __builtin_*_chk intrinsics are avoided because they would force a
much more complex implementation. They aren't designed to detect read
overflows and offer no real benefit when using an implementation based
on inline checks. Inline checks don't add up to much code size and
allow full use of the regular string intrinsics while avoiding the need
for a bunch of _chk functions and per-arch assembly to avoid wrapper
overhead.
This detects various overflows at compile-time in various drivers and
some non-x86 core kernel code. There will likely be issues caught in
regular use at runtime too.
Future improvements left out of initial implementation for simplicity,
as it's all quite optional and can be done incrementally:
* Some of the fortified string functions (strncpy, strcat), don't yet
place a limit on reads from the source based on __builtin_object_size of
the source buffer.
* Extending coverage to more string functions like strlcat.
* It should be possible to optionally use __builtin_object_size(x, 1) for
some functions (C strings) to detect intra-object overflows (like
glibc's _FORTIFY_SOURCE=2), but for now this takes the conservative
approach to avoid likely compatibility issues.
* The compile-time checks should be made available via a separate config
option which can be enabled by default (or always enabled) once enough
time has passed to get the issues it catches fixed.
Kees said:
"This is great to have. While it was out-of-tree code, it would have
blocked at least CVE-2016-3858 from being exploitable (improper size
argument to strlcpy()). I've sent a number of fixes for
out-of-bounds-reads that this detected upstream already"
[arnd@arndb.de: x86: fix fortified memcpy]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170627150047.660360-1-arnd@arndb.de
[keescook@chromium.org: avoid panic() in favor of BUG()]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170626235122.GA25261@beast
[keescook@chromium.org: move from -mm, add ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE, tweak Kconfig help]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170526095404.20439-1-danielmicay@gmail.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1497903987-21002-8-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-07-12 21:36:10 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
|
2014-12-13 00:57:44 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
|
2017-07-06 22:39:17 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE if (MEMORY_ISOLATION && COMPACTION) || CMA
|
2016-06-16 16:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_HAS_KCOV
|
2018-01-29 20:20:19 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_HAS_MEMBARRIER_SYNC_CORE
|
2018-06-08 00:06:08 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_HAS_PTE_SPECIAL
|
2017-02-21 15:09:33 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY
|
2014-08-08 21:23:25 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN
|
2017-02-07 00:31:57 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
|
|
|
|
select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX
|
2013-09-04 09:55:17 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_HAS_TICK_BROADCAST if GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST
|
2017-09-27 15:51:30 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG
|
2017-10-12 12:20:50 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_INLINE_READ_LOCK if !PREEMPT
|
|
|
|
select ARCH_INLINE_READ_LOCK_BH if !PREEMPT
|
|
|
|
select ARCH_INLINE_READ_LOCK_IRQ if !PREEMPT
|
|
|
|
select ARCH_INLINE_READ_LOCK_IRQSAVE if !PREEMPT
|
|
|
|
select ARCH_INLINE_READ_UNLOCK if !PREEMPT
|
|
|
|
select ARCH_INLINE_READ_UNLOCK_BH if !PREEMPT
|
|
|
|
select ARCH_INLINE_READ_UNLOCK_IRQ if !PREEMPT
|
|
|
|
select ARCH_INLINE_READ_UNLOCK_IRQRESTORE if !PREEMPT
|
|
|
|
select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_LOCK if !PREEMPT
|
|
|
|
select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_LOCK_BH if !PREEMPT
|
|
|
|
select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_LOCK_IRQ if !PREEMPT
|
|
|
|
select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_LOCK_IRQSAVE if !PREEMPT
|
|
|
|
select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK if !PREEMPT
|
|
|
|
select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_BH if !PREEMPT
|
|
|
|
select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_IRQ if !PREEMPT
|
|
|
|
select ARCH_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_IRQRESTORE if !PREEMPT
|
2018-03-13 21:17:01 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_INLINE_SPIN_TRYLOCK if !PREEMPT
|
|
|
|
select ARCH_INLINE_SPIN_TRYLOCK_BH if !PREEMPT
|
|
|
|
select ARCH_INLINE_SPIN_LOCK if !PREEMPT
|
|
|
|
select ARCH_INLINE_SPIN_LOCK_BH if !PREEMPT
|
|
|
|
select ARCH_INLINE_SPIN_LOCK_IRQ if !PREEMPT
|
|
|
|
select ARCH_INLINE_SPIN_LOCK_IRQSAVE if !PREEMPT
|
|
|
|
select ARCH_INLINE_SPIN_UNLOCK if !PREEMPT
|
|
|
|
select ARCH_INLINE_SPIN_UNLOCK_BH if !PREEMPT
|
|
|
|
select ARCH_INLINE_SPIN_UNLOCK_IRQ if !PREEMPT
|
|
|
|
select ARCH_INLINE_SPIN_UNLOCK_IRQRESTORE if !PREEMPT
|
2014-05-09 09:33:01 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF
|
2017-10-12 12:20:50 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_USE_QUEUED_RWLOCKS
|
2018-03-13 20:45:45 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_USE_QUEUED_SPINLOCKS
|
2017-06-08 17:25:29 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_SUPPORTS_MEMORY_FAILURE
|
2014-06-06 17:53:16 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW
|
2018-05-17 06:17:10 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_SUPPORTS_INT128 if GCC_VERSION >= 50000 || CC_IS_CLANG
|
2016-04-08 22:50:28 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_SUPPORTS_NUMA_BALANCING
|
2012-11-07 14:16:28 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
|
2013-01-29 18:25:41 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_WANT_FRAME_POINTERS
|
2016-02-05 23:50:18 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_HAS_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL
|
2012-12-18 15:26:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARM_AMBA
|
2012-11-20 10:06:00 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARM_ARCH_TIMER
|
2013-01-14 12:39:31 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARM_GIC
|
2014-07-04 07:28:30 +00:00
|
|
|
select AUDIT_ARCH_COMPAT_GENERIC
|
2016-06-15 20:47:33 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARM_GIC_V2M if PCI
|
2014-06-30 15:01:31 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARM_GIC_V3
|
2016-06-15 20:47:33 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARM_GIC_V3_ITS if PCI
|
2015-07-31 14:46:16 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARM_PSCI_FW
|
2013-05-08 16:29:24 +00:00
|
|
|
select BUILDTIME_EXTABLE_SORT
|
2012-12-18 15:27:25 +00:00
|
|
|
select CLONE_BACKWARDS
|
2012-09-22 17:33:36 +00:00
|
|
|
select COMMON_CLK
|
2013-11-07 18:37:14 +00:00
|
|
|
select CPU_PM if (SUSPEND || CPU_IDLE)
|
2013-11-06 19:32:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select DCACHE_WORD_ACCESS
|
2017-12-24 12:53:50 +00:00
|
|
|
select DMA_DIRECT_OPS
|
2015-07-07 16:15:39 +00:00
|
|
|
select EDAC_SUPPORT
|
2015-11-09 18:09:55 +00:00
|
|
|
select FRAME_POINTER
|
2014-10-09 22:26:44 +00:00
|
|
|
select GENERIC_ALLOCATOR
|
2017-05-31 16:59:28 +00:00
|
|
|
select GENERIC_ARCH_TOPOLOGY
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS
|
2015-05-29 17:28:44 +00:00
|
|
|
select GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST
|
2014-03-04 01:10:04 +00:00
|
|
|
select GENERIC_CPU_AUTOPROBE
|
2014-04-07 22:39:52 +00:00
|
|
|
select GENERIC_EARLY_IOREMAP
|
2015-08-21 03:40:22 +00:00
|
|
|
select GENERIC_IDLE_POLL_SETUP
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
select GENERIC_IRQ_PROBE
|
|
|
|
select GENERIC_IRQ_SHOW
|
2015-04-22 17:16:33 +00:00
|
|
|
select GENERIC_IRQ_SHOW_LEVEL
|
2014-11-19 13:09:07 +00:00
|
|
|
select GENERIC_PCI_IOMAP
|
2013-07-18 23:21:18 +00:00
|
|
|
select GENERIC_SCHED_CLOCK
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
select GENERIC_SMP_IDLE_THREAD
|
2013-11-06 17:20:22 +00:00
|
|
|
select GENERIC_STRNCPY_FROM_USER
|
|
|
|
select GENERIC_STRNLEN_USER
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
select GENERIC_TIME_VSYSCALL
|
2014-08-26 10:03:17 +00:00
|
|
|
select HANDLE_DOMAIN_IRQ
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
select HARDIRQS_SW_RESEND
|
2016-12-01 13:51:12 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_ACPI_APEI if (ACPI && EFI)
|
2014-10-24 12:22:20 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_ALIGNED_STRUCT_PAGE if SLUB
|
2014-07-04 07:28:30 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
|
2014-11-03 02:02:23 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE
|
2016-02-16 12:52:35 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP
|
2014-01-07 14:17:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL
|
2017-11-16 01:36:40 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_ARCH_KASAN if !(ARM64_16K_PAGES && ARM64_VA_BITS_48)
|
2014-01-28 11:20:22 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB
|
2016-01-14 23:20:01 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
|
|
|
|
select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT
|
2014-11-28 05:26:39 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
|
2017-08-16 21:05:09 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
|
2016-04-18 18:16:14 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
|
2017-07-21 13:25:33 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK
|
2016-04-18 18:16:14 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_ARM_SMCCC
|
2016-05-13 17:08:28 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_EBPF_JIT
|
2014-04-30 09:54:32 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_C_RECORDMCOUNT
|
2014-10-24 12:22:20 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_CMPXCHG_DOUBLE
|
2015-05-29 13:57:47 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_CMPXCHG_LOCAL
|
2016-04-18 18:16:14 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING
|
2012-10-08 23:28:13 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE
|
2012-10-08 23:28:11 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK
|
2013-12-12 19:28:33 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_DMA_CONTIGUOUS
|
2014-04-30 09:54:34 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_DYNAMIC_FTRACE
|
2013-12-16 17:50:08 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
|
2014-04-30 09:54:32 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_FTRACE_MCOUNT_RECORD
|
2014-04-30 09:54:33 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_FUNCTION_TRACER
|
|
|
|
select HAVE_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
|
2016-05-23 22:09:38 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_GCC_PLUGINS
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_GENERIC_DMA_COHERENT
|
|
|
|
select HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT if PERF_EVENTS
|
2015-11-23 15:12:59 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_IRQ_TIME_ACCOUNTING
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_MEMBLOCK
|
2016-04-08 22:50:27 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_MEMBLOCK_NODE_MAP if NUMA
|
2017-09-27 15:51:30 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_NMI
|
2014-02-07 17:12:45 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_PATA_PLATFORM
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_PERF_EVENTS
|
2014-02-03 18:18:27 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_PERF_REGS
|
|
|
|
select HAVE_PERF_USER_STACK_DUMP
|
2016-07-08 16:35:45 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API
|
2014-10-09 22:29:23 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_RCU_TABLE_FREE
|
2018-06-14 10:36:45 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_STACKPROTECTOR
|
2014-04-30 09:54:36 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS
|
arm64: Kprobes with single stepping support
Add support for basic kernel probes(kprobes) and jump probes
(jprobes) for ARM64.
Kprobes utilizes software breakpoint and single step debug
exceptions supported on ARM v8.
A software breakpoint is placed at the probe address to trap the
kernel execution into the kprobe handler.
ARM v8 supports enabling single stepping before the break exception
return (ERET), with next PC in exception return address (ELR_EL1). The
kprobe handler prepares an executable memory slot for out-of-line
execution with a copy of the original instruction being probed, and
enables single stepping. The PC is set to the out-of-line slot address
before the ERET. With this scheme, the instruction is executed with the
exact same register context except for the PC (and DAIF) registers.
Debug mask (PSTATE.D) is enabled only when single stepping a recursive
kprobe, e.g.: during kprobes reenter so that probed instruction can be
single stepped within the kprobe handler -exception- context.
The recursion depth of kprobe is always 2, i.e. upon probe re-entry,
any further re-entry is prevented by not calling handlers and the case
counted as a missed kprobe).
Single stepping from the x-o-l slot has a drawback for PC-relative accesses
like branching and symbolic literals access as the offset from the new PC
(slot address) may not be ensured to fit in the immediate value of
the opcode. Such instructions need simulation, so reject
probing them.
Instructions generating exceptions or cpu mode change are rejected
for probing.
Exclusive load/store instructions are rejected too. Additionally, the
code is checked to see if it is inside an exclusive load/store sequence
(code from Pratyush).
System instructions are mostly enabled for stepping, except MSR/MRS
accesses to "DAIF" flags in PSTATE, which are not safe for
probing.
This also changes arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h to use
include/asm-generic/ptrace.h.
Thanks to Steve Capper and Pratyush Anand for several suggested
Changes.
Signed-off-by: Sandeepa Prabhu <sandeepa.s.prabhu@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-07-08 16:35:48 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_KPROBES
|
2017-02-06 09:54:33 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_KRETPROBES
|
2015-10-01 19:14:00 +00:00
|
|
|
select IOMMU_DMA if IOMMU_SUPPORT
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
select IRQ_DOMAIN
|
2015-04-27 20:53:09 +00:00
|
|
|
select IRQ_FORCED_THREADING
|
2012-10-16 10:26:57 +00:00
|
|
|
select MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA
|
2018-04-04 04:31:28 +00:00
|
|
|
select MULTI_IRQ_HANDLER
|
2018-05-09 04:53:49 +00:00
|
|
|
select NEED_DMA_MAP_STATE
|
2018-04-05 07:44:52 +00:00
|
|
|
select NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
select NO_BOOTMEM
|
|
|
|
select OF
|
|
|
|
select OF_EARLY_FLATTREE
|
2014-02-28 13:42:55 +00:00
|
|
|
select OF_RESERVED_MEM
|
2016-06-10 19:55:19 +00:00
|
|
|
select PCI_ECAM if ACPI
|
2013-02-28 18:14:37 +00:00
|
|
|
select POWER_RESET
|
|
|
|
select POWER_SUPPLY
|
2017-09-20 20:49:59 +00:00
|
|
|
select REFCOUNT_FULL
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
select SPARSE_IRQ
|
2018-04-24 07:00:54 +00:00
|
|
|
select SWIOTLB
|
2012-10-08 23:28:16 +00:00
|
|
|
select SYSCTL_EXCEPTION_TRACE
|
arm64: split thread_info from task stack
This patch moves arm64's struct thread_info from the task stack into
task_struct. This protects thread_info from corruption in the case of
stack overflows, and makes its address harder to determine if stack
addresses are leaked, making a number of attacks more difficult. Precise
detection and handling of overflow is left for subsequent patches.
Largely, this involves changing code to store the task_struct in sp_el0,
and acquire the thread_info from the task struct. Core code now
implements current_thread_info(), and as noted in <linux/sched.h> this
relies on offsetof(task_struct, thread_info) == 0, enforced by core
code.
This change means that the 'tsk' register used in entry.S now points to
a task_struct, rather than a thread_info as it used to. To make this
clear, the TI_* field offsets are renamed to TSK_TI_*, with asm-offsets
appropriately updated to account for the structural change.
Userspace clobbers sp_el0, and we can no longer restore this from the
stack. Instead, the current task is cached in a per-cpu variable that we
can safely access from early assembly as interrupts are disabled (and we
are thus not preemptible).
Both secondary entry and idle are updated to stash the sp and task
pointer separately.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Tested-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-11-03 20:23:13 +00:00
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select THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK
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2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
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help
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ARM 64-bit (AArch64) Linux support.
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config 64BIT
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def_bool y
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config MMU
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def_bool y
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2016-05-31 14:57:59 +00:00
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config ARM64_PAGE_SHIFT
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int
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default 16 if ARM64_64K_PAGES
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default 14 if ARM64_16K_PAGES
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default 12
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config ARM64_CONT_SHIFT
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int
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default 5 if ARM64_64K_PAGES
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default 7 if ARM64_16K_PAGES
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default 4
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2016-01-14 23:20:01 +00:00
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config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN
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default 14 if ARM64_64K_PAGES
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default 16 if ARM64_16K_PAGES
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default 18
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# max bits determined by the following formula:
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# VA_BITS - PAGE_SHIFT - 3
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config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
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default 19 if ARM64_VA_BITS=36
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default 24 if ARM64_VA_BITS=39
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default 27 if ARM64_VA_BITS=42
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default 30 if ARM64_VA_BITS=47
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default 29 if ARM64_VA_BITS=48 && ARM64_64K_PAGES
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default 31 if ARM64_VA_BITS=48 && ARM64_16K_PAGES
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default 33 if ARM64_VA_BITS=48
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default 14 if ARM64_64K_PAGES
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default 16 if ARM64_16K_PAGES
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default 18
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config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN
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default 7 if ARM64_64K_PAGES
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default 9 if ARM64_16K_PAGES
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default 11
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config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX
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default 16
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2014-04-07 22:39:19 +00:00
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config NO_IOPORT_MAP
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2014-09-29 14:29:31 +00:00
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def_bool y if !PCI
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2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
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config STACKTRACE_SUPPORT
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def_bool y
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2015-08-18 19:50:10 +00:00
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config ILLEGAL_POINTER_VALUE
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hex
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default 0xdead000000000000
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2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
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config LOCKDEP_SUPPORT
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def_bool y
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config TRACE_IRQFLAGS_SUPPORT
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def_bool y
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2014-03-14 17:47:05 +00:00
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config RWSEM_XCHGADD_ALGORITHM
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2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
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def_bool y
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2015-07-24 15:37:48 +00:00
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config GENERIC_BUG
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def_bool y
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depends on BUG
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config GENERIC_BUG_RELATIVE_POINTERS
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def_bool y
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depends on GENERIC_BUG
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2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
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config GENERIC_HWEIGHT
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def_bool y
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config GENERIC_CSUM
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def_bool y
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config GENERIC_CALIBRATE_DELAY
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def_bool y
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2017-12-24 12:52:03 +00:00
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config ZONE_DMA32
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2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
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def_bool y
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2017-06-06 11:31:20 +00:00
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config HAVE_GENERIC_GUP
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2014-10-09 22:29:25 +00:00
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def_bool y
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2015-05-29 17:28:44 +00:00
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config SMP
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def_bool y
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2013-07-09 13:18:12 +00:00
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config KERNEL_MODE_NEON
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def_bool y
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2014-04-18 22:19:59 +00:00
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config FIX_EARLYCON_MEM
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def_bool y
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2015-04-14 22:45:39 +00:00
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config PGTABLE_LEVELS
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int
|
2015-10-19 13:19:38 +00:00
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default 2 if ARM64_16K_PAGES && ARM64_VA_BITS_36
|
2015-04-14 22:45:39 +00:00
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default 2 if ARM64_64K_PAGES && ARM64_VA_BITS_42
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default 3 if ARM64_64K_PAGES && ARM64_VA_BITS_48
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default 3 if ARM64_4K_PAGES && ARM64_VA_BITS_39
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2015-10-19 13:19:37 +00:00
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default 3 if ARM64_16K_PAGES && ARM64_VA_BITS_47
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default 4 if !ARM64_64K_PAGES && ARM64_VA_BITS_48
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2015-04-14 22:45:39 +00:00
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|
2016-11-02 09:10:46 +00:00
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config ARCH_SUPPORTS_UPROBES
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def_bool y
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2017-06-14 10:43:55 +00:00
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config ARCH_PROC_KCORE_TEXT
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def_bool y
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|
2018-04-04 04:31:28 +00:00
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config MULTI_IRQ_HANDLER
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def_bool y
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|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
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source "init/Kconfig"
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source "kernel/Kconfig.freezer"
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|
2015-07-20 19:09:16 +00:00
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source "arch/arm64/Kconfig.platforms"
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
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menu "Bus support"
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|
2014-09-29 14:29:31 +00:00
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config PCI
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bool "PCI support"
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help
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This feature enables support for PCI bus system. If you say Y
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here, the kernel will include drivers and infrastructure code
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to support PCI bus devices.
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config PCI_DOMAINS
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def_bool PCI
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config PCI_DOMAINS_GENERIC
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def_bool PCI
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config PCI_SYSCALL
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def_bool PCI
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|
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source "drivers/pci/Kconfig"
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|
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
endmenu
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|
|
menu "Kernel Features"
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|
|
|
2014-11-14 15:54:12 +00:00
|
|
|
menu "ARM errata workarounds via the alternatives framework"
|
|
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config ARM64_ERRATUM_826319
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|
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bool "Cortex-A53: 826319: System might deadlock if a write cannot complete until read data is accepted"
|
|
|
|
default y
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|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
This option adds an alternative code sequence to work around ARM
|
|
|
|
erratum 826319 on Cortex-A53 parts up to r0p2 with an AMBA 4 ACE or
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AXI master interface and an L2 cache.
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If a Cortex-A53 uses an AMBA AXI4 ACE interface to other processors
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and is unable to accept a certain write via this interface, it will
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not progress on read data presented on the read data channel and the
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system can deadlock.
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The workaround promotes data cache clean instructions to
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data cache clean-and-invalidate.
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Please note that this does not necessarily enable the workaround,
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as it depends on the alternative framework, which will only patch
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the kernel if an affected CPU is detected.
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If unsure, say Y.
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config ARM64_ERRATUM_827319
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bool "Cortex-A53: 827319: Data cache clean instructions might cause overlapping transactions to the interconnect"
|
|
|
|
default y
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|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
This option adds an alternative code sequence to work around ARM
|
|
|
|
erratum 827319 on Cortex-A53 parts up to r0p2 with an AMBA 5 CHI
|
|
|
|
master interface and an L2 cache.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Under certain conditions this erratum can cause a clean line eviction
|
|
|
|
to occur at the same time as another transaction to the same address
|
|
|
|
on the AMBA 5 CHI interface, which can cause data corruption if the
|
|
|
|
interconnect reorders the two transactions.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The workaround promotes data cache clean instructions to
|
|
|
|
data cache clean-and-invalidate.
|
|
|
|
Please note that this does not necessarily enable the workaround,
|
|
|
|
as it depends on the alternative framework, which will only patch
|
|
|
|
the kernel if an affected CPU is detected.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If unsure, say Y.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config ARM64_ERRATUM_824069
|
|
|
|
bool "Cortex-A53: 824069: Cache line might not be marked as clean after a CleanShared snoop"
|
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
This option adds an alternative code sequence to work around ARM
|
|
|
|
erratum 824069 on Cortex-A53 parts up to r0p2 when it is connected
|
|
|
|
to a coherent interconnect.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If a Cortex-A53 processor is executing a store or prefetch for
|
|
|
|
write instruction at the same time as a processor in another
|
|
|
|
cluster is executing a cache maintenance operation to the same
|
|
|
|
address, then this erratum might cause a clean cache line to be
|
|
|
|
incorrectly marked as dirty.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The workaround promotes data cache clean instructions to
|
|
|
|
data cache clean-and-invalidate.
|
|
|
|
Please note that this option does not necessarily enable the
|
|
|
|
workaround, as it depends on the alternative framework, which will
|
|
|
|
only patch the kernel if an affected CPU is detected.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If unsure, say Y.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config ARM64_ERRATUM_819472
|
|
|
|
bool "Cortex-A53: 819472: Store exclusive instructions might cause data corruption"
|
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
This option adds an alternative code sequence to work around ARM
|
|
|
|
erratum 819472 on Cortex-A53 parts up to r0p1 with an L2 cache
|
|
|
|
present when it is connected to a coherent interconnect.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If the processor is executing a load and store exclusive sequence at
|
|
|
|
the same time as a processor in another cluster is executing a cache
|
|
|
|
maintenance operation to the same address, then this erratum might
|
|
|
|
cause data corruption.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The workaround promotes data cache clean instructions to
|
|
|
|
data cache clean-and-invalidate.
|
|
|
|
Please note that this does not necessarily enable the workaround,
|
|
|
|
as it depends on the alternative framework, which will only patch
|
|
|
|
the kernel if an affected CPU is detected.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If unsure, say Y.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config ARM64_ERRATUM_832075
|
|
|
|
bool "Cortex-A57: 832075: possible deadlock on mixing exclusive memory accesses with device loads"
|
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
This option adds an alternative code sequence to work around ARM
|
|
|
|
erratum 832075 on Cortex-A57 parts up to r1p2.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Affected Cortex-A57 parts might deadlock when exclusive load/store
|
|
|
|
instructions to Write-Back memory are mixed with Device loads.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The workaround is to promote device loads to use Load-Acquire
|
|
|
|
semantics.
|
|
|
|
Please note that this does not necessarily enable the workaround,
|
2015-11-16 10:28:18 +00:00
|
|
|
as it depends on the alternative framework, which will only patch
|
|
|
|
the kernel if an affected CPU is detected.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If unsure, say Y.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config ARM64_ERRATUM_834220
|
|
|
|
bool "Cortex-A57: 834220: Stage 2 translation fault might be incorrectly reported in presence of a Stage 1 fault"
|
|
|
|
depends on KVM
|
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
This option adds an alternative code sequence to work around ARM
|
|
|
|
erratum 834220 on Cortex-A57 parts up to r1p2.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Affected Cortex-A57 parts might report a Stage 2 translation
|
|
|
|
fault as the result of a Stage 1 fault for load crossing a
|
|
|
|
page boundary when there is a permission or device memory
|
|
|
|
alignment fault at Stage 1 and a translation fault at Stage 2.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The workaround is to verify that the Stage 1 translation
|
|
|
|
doesn't generate a fault before handling the Stage 2 fault.
|
|
|
|
Please note that this does not necessarily enable the workaround,
|
2014-11-14 15:54:12 +00:00
|
|
|
as it depends on the alternative framework, which will only patch
|
|
|
|
the kernel if an affected CPU is detected.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If unsure, say Y.
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-23 19:07:02 +00:00
|
|
|
config ARM64_ERRATUM_845719
|
|
|
|
bool "Cortex-A53: 845719: a load might read incorrect data"
|
|
|
|
depends on COMPAT
|
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
This option adds an alternative code sequence to work around ARM
|
|
|
|
erratum 845719 on Cortex-A53 parts up to r0p4.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
When running a compat (AArch32) userspace on an affected Cortex-A53
|
|
|
|
part, a load at EL0 from a virtual address that matches the bottom 32
|
|
|
|
bits of the virtual address used by a recent load at (AArch64) EL1
|
|
|
|
might return incorrect data.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The workaround is to write the contextidr_el1 register on exception
|
|
|
|
return to a 32-bit task.
|
|
|
|
Please note that this does not necessarily enable the workaround,
|
|
|
|
as it depends on the alternative framework, which will only patch
|
|
|
|
the kernel if an affected CPU is detected.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If unsure, say Y.
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-17 12:15:02 +00:00
|
|
|
config ARM64_ERRATUM_843419
|
|
|
|
bool "Cortex-A53: 843419: A load or store might access an incorrect address"
|
|
|
|
default y
|
arm64/kernel: don't ban ADRP to work around Cortex-A53 erratum #843419
Working around Cortex-A53 erratum #843419 involves special handling of
ADRP instructions that end up in the last two instruction slots of a
4k page, or whose output register gets overwritten without having been
read. (Note that the latter instruction sequence is never emitted by
a properly functioning compiler, which is why it is disregarded by the
handling of the same erratum in the bfd.ld linker which we rely on for
the core kernel)
Normally, this gets taken care of by the linker, which can spot such
sequences at final link time, and insert a veneer if the ADRP ends up
at a vulnerable offset. However, linux kernel modules are partially
linked ELF objects, and so there is no 'final link time' other than the
runtime loading of the module, at which time all the static relocations
are resolved.
For this reason, we have implemented the #843419 workaround for modules
by avoiding ADRP instructions altogether, by using the large C model,
and by passing -mpc-relative-literal-loads to recent versions of GCC
that may emit adrp/ldr pairs to perform literal loads. However, this
workaround forces us to keep literal data mixed with the instructions
in the executable .text segment, and literal data may inadvertently
turn into an exploitable speculative gadget depending on the relative
offsets of arbitrary symbols.
So let's reimplement this workaround in a way that allows us to switch
back to the small C model, and to drop the -mpc-relative-literal-loads
GCC switch, by patching affected ADRP instructions at runtime:
- ADRP instructions that do not appear at 4k relative offset 0xff8 or
0xffc are ignored
- ADRP instructions that are within 1 MB of their target symbol are
converted into ADR instructions
- remaining ADRP instructions are redirected via a veneer that performs
the load using an unaffected movn/movk sequence.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
[will: tidied up ADRP -> ADR instruction patching.]
[will: use ULL suffix for 64-bit immediate]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-03-06 17:15:33 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARM64_MODULE_PLTS if MODULES
|
2015-03-17 12:15:02 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
2016-08-22 10:58:36 +00:00
|
|
|
This option links the kernel with '--fix-cortex-a53-843419' and
|
arm64/kernel: don't ban ADRP to work around Cortex-A53 erratum #843419
Working around Cortex-A53 erratum #843419 involves special handling of
ADRP instructions that end up in the last two instruction slots of a
4k page, or whose output register gets overwritten without having been
read. (Note that the latter instruction sequence is never emitted by
a properly functioning compiler, which is why it is disregarded by the
handling of the same erratum in the bfd.ld linker which we rely on for
the core kernel)
Normally, this gets taken care of by the linker, which can spot such
sequences at final link time, and insert a veneer if the ADRP ends up
at a vulnerable offset. However, linux kernel modules are partially
linked ELF objects, and so there is no 'final link time' other than the
runtime loading of the module, at which time all the static relocations
are resolved.
For this reason, we have implemented the #843419 workaround for modules
by avoiding ADRP instructions altogether, by using the large C model,
and by passing -mpc-relative-literal-loads to recent versions of GCC
that may emit adrp/ldr pairs to perform literal loads. However, this
workaround forces us to keep literal data mixed with the instructions
in the executable .text segment, and literal data may inadvertently
turn into an exploitable speculative gadget depending on the relative
offsets of arbitrary symbols.
So let's reimplement this workaround in a way that allows us to switch
back to the small C model, and to drop the -mpc-relative-literal-loads
GCC switch, by patching affected ADRP instructions at runtime:
- ADRP instructions that do not appear at 4k relative offset 0xff8 or
0xffc are ignored
- ADRP instructions that are within 1 MB of their target symbol are
converted into ADR instructions
- remaining ADRP instructions are redirected via a veneer that performs
the load using an unaffected movn/movk sequence.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
[will: tidied up ADRP -> ADR instruction patching.]
[will: use ULL suffix for 64-bit immediate]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-03-06 17:15:33 +00:00
|
|
|
enables PLT support to replace certain ADRP instructions, which can
|
|
|
|
cause subsequent memory accesses to use an incorrect address on
|
|
|
|
Cortex-A53 parts up to r0p4.
|
2015-03-17 12:15:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If unsure, say Y.
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-26 14:12:49 +00:00
|
|
|
config ARM64_ERRATUM_1024718
|
|
|
|
bool "Cortex-A55: 1024718: Update of DBM/AP bits without break before make might result in incorrect update"
|
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
This option adds work around for Arm Cortex-A55 Erratum 1024718.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Affected Cortex-A55 cores (r0p0, r0p1, r1p0) could cause incorrect
|
|
|
|
update of the hardware dirty bit when the DBM/AP bits are updated
|
|
|
|
without a break-before-make. The work around is to disable the usage
|
|
|
|
of hardware DBM locally on the affected cores. CPUs not affected by
|
|
|
|
erratum will continue to use the feature.
|
2015-03-17 12:15:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If unsure, say Y.
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-21 20:58:38 +00:00
|
|
|
config CAVIUM_ERRATUM_22375
|
|
|
|
bool "Cavium erratum 22375, 24313"
|
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Enable workaround for erratum 22375, 24313.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This implements two gicv3-its errata workarounds for ThunderX. Both
|
|
|
|
with small impact affecting only ITS table allocation.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
erratum 22375: only alloc 8MB table size
|
|
|
|
erratum 24313: ignore memory access type
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The fixes are in ITS initialization and basically ignore memory access
|
|
|
|
type and table size provided by the TYPER and BASER registers.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If unsure, say Y.
|
|
|
|
|
2016-05-25 13:29:20 +00:00
|
|
|
config CAVIUM_ERRATUM_23144
|
|
|
|
bool "Cavium erratum 23144: ITS SYNC hang on dual socket system"
|
|
|
|
depends on NUMA
|
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
ITS SYNC command hang for cross node io and collections/cpu mapping.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If unsure, say Y.
|
|
|
|
|
2015-09-21 20:58:35 +00:00
|
|
|
config CAVIUM_ERRATUM_23154
|
|
|
|
bool "Cavium erratum 23154: Access to ICC_IAR1_EL1 is not sync'ed"
|
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
The gicv3 of ThunderX requires a modified version for
|
|
|
|
reading the IAR status to ensure data synchronization
|
|
|
|
(access to icc_iar1_el1 is not sync'ed before and after).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If unsure, say Y.
|
|
|
|
|
2016-02-25 01:44:57 +00:00
|
|
|
config CAVIUM_ERRATUM_27456
|
|
|
|
bool "Cavium erratum 27456: Broadcast TLBI instructions may cause icache corruption"
|
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
On ThunderX T88 pass 1.x through 2.1 parts, broadcast TLBI
|
|
|
|
instructions may cause the icache to become corrupted if it
|
|
|
|
contains data for a non-current ASID. The fix is to
|
|
|
|
invalidate the icache when changing the mm context.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If unsure, say Y.
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-09 11:49:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config CAVIUM_ERRATUM_30115
|
|
|
|
bool "Cavium erratum 30115: Guest may disable interrupts in host"
|
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
On ThunderX T88 pass 1.x through 2.2, T81 pass 1.0 through
|
|
|
|
1.2, and T83 Pass 1.0, KVM guest execution may disable
|
|
|
|
interrupts in host. Trapping both GICv3 group-0 and group-1
|
|
|
|
accesses sidesteps the issue.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If unsure, say Y.
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-08 20:08:37 +00:00
|
|
|
config QCOM_FALKOR_ERRATUM_1003
|
|
|
|
bool "Falkor E1003: Incorrect translation due to ASID change"
|
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
On Falkor v1, an incorrect ASID may be cached in the TLB when ASID
|
2017-11-14 14:29:19 +00:00
|
|
|
and BADDR are changed together in TTBRx_EL1. Since we keep the ASID
|
|
|
|
in TTBR1_EL1, this situation only occurs in the entry trampoline and
|
|
|
|
then only for entries in the walk cache, since the leaf translation
|
|
|
|
is unchanged. Work around the erratum by invalidating the walk cache
|
|
|
|
entries for the trampoline before entering the kernel proper.
|
2017-02-08 20:08:37 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-01-31 17:50:19 +00:00
|
|
|
config QCOM_FALKOR_ERRATUM_1009
|
|
|
|
bool "Falkor E1009: Prematurely complete a DSB after a TLBI"
|
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
On Falkor v1, the CPU may prematurely complete a DSB following a
|
|
|
|
TLBI xxIS invalidate maintenance operation. Repeat the TLBI operation
|
|
|
|
one more time to fix the issue.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If unsure, say Y.
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-07 14:20:38 +00:00
|
|
|
config QCOM_QDF2400_ERRATUM_0065
|
|
|
|
bool "QDF2400 E0065: Incorrect GITS_TYPER.ITT_Entry_size"
|
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
On Qualcomm Datacenter Technologies QDF2400 SoC, ITS hardware reports
|
|
|
|
ITE size incorrectly. The GITS_TYPER.ITT_Entry_size field should have
|
|
|
|
been indicated as 16Bytes (0xf), not 8Bytes (0x7).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If unsure, say Y.
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-17 16:55:56 +00:00
|
|
|
config SOCIONEXT_SYNQUACER_PREITS
|
|
|
|
bool "Socionext Synquacer: Workaround for GICv3 pre-ITS"
|
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Socionext Synquacer SoCs implement a separate h/w block to generate
|
|
|
|
MSI doorbell writes with non-zero values for the device ID.
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-28 20:20:37 +00:00
|
|
|
If unsure, say Y.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config HISILICON_ERRATUM_161600802
|
|
|
|
bool "Hip07 161600802: Erroneous redistributor VLPI base"
|
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
The HiSilicon Hip07 SoC usees the wrong redistributor base
|
|
|
|
when issued ITS commands such as VMOVP and VMAPP, and requires
|
|
|
|
a 128kB offset to be applied to the target address in this commands.
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-17 16:55:56 +00:00
|
|
|
If unsure, say Y.
|
2017-12-11 22:42:32 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config QCOM_FALKOR_ERRATUM_E1041
|
|
|
|
bool "Falkor E1041: Speculative instruction fetches might cause errant memory access"
|
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Falkor CPU may speculatively fetch instructions from an improper
|
|
|
|
memory location when MMU translation is changed from SCTLR_ELn[M]=1
|
|
|
|
to SCTLR_ELn[M]=0. Prefix an ISB instruction to fix the problem.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If unsure, say Y.
|
|
|
|
|
2014-11-14 15:54:12 +00:00
|
|
|
endmenu
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-12 09:40:38 +00:00
|
|
|
choice
|
|
|
|
prompt "Page size"
|
|
|
|
default ARM64_4K_PAGES
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Page size (translation granule) configuration.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config ARM64_4K_PAGES
|
|
|
|
bool "4KB"
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
This feature enables 4KB pages support.
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-19 13:19:37 +00:00
|
|
|
config ARM64_16K_PAGES
|
|
|
|
bool "16KB"
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
The system will use 16KB pages support. AArch32 emulation
|
|
|
|
requires applications compiled with 16K (or a multiple of 16K)
|
|
|
|
aligned segments.
|
|
|
|
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
config ARM64_64K_PAGES
|
2014-05-12 09:40:38 +00:00
|
|
|
bool "64KB"
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
This feature enables 64KB pages support (4KB by default)
|
|
|
|
allowing only two levels of page tables and faster TLB
|
2015-10-19 13:19:34 +00:00
|
|
|
look-up. AArch32 emulation requires applications compiled
|
|
|
|
with 64K aligned segments.
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-05-12 09:40:38 +00:00
|
|
|
endchoice
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
choice
|
|
|
|
prompt "Virtual address space size"
|
|
|
|
default ARM64_VA_BITS_39 if ARM64_4K_PAGES
|
2015-10-19 13:19:37 +00:00
|
|
|
default ARM64_VA_BITS_47 if ARM64_16K_PAGES
|
2014-05-12 09:40:38 +00:00
|
|
|
default ARM64_VA_BITS_42 if ARM64_64K_PAGES
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Allows choosing one of multiple possible virtual address
|
|
|
|
space sizes. The level of translation table is determined by
|
|
|
|
a combination of page size and virtual address space size.
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-19 13:19:38 +00:00
|
|
|
config ARM64_VA_BITS_36
|
2015-10-20 13:59:20 +00:00
|
|
|
bool "36-bit" if EXPERT
|
2015-10-19 13:19:38 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on ARM64_16K_PAGES
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-12 09:40:38 +00:00
|
|
|
config ARM64_VA_BITS_39
|
|
|
|
bool "39-bit"
|
|
|
|
depends on ARM64_4K_PAGES
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config ARM64_VA_BITS_42
|
|
|
|
bool "42-bit"
|
|
|
|
depends on ARM64_64K_PAGES
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-19 13:19:37 +00:00
|
|
|
config ARM64_VA_BITS_47
|
|
|
|
bool "47-bit"
|
|
|
|
depends on ARM64_16K_PAGES
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-12 09:40:51 +00:00
|
|
|
config ARM64_VA_BITS_48
|
|
|
|
bool "48-bit"
|
|
|
|
|
2014-05-12 09:40:38 +00:00
|
|
|
endchoice
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config ARM64_VA_BITS
|
|
|
|
int
|
2015-10-19 13:19:38 +00:00
|
|
|
default 36 if ARM64_VA_BITS_36
|
2014-05-12 09:40:38 +00:00
|
|
|
default 39 if ARM64_VA_BITS_39
|
|
|
|
default 42 if ARM64_VA_BITS_42
|
2015-10-19 13:19:37 +00:00
|
|
|
default 47 if ARM64_VA_BITS_47
|
2014-05-12 09:40:51 +00:00
|
|
|
default 48 if ARM64_VA_BITS_48
|
2014-05-12 09:40:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-12-13 17:07:16 +00:00
|
|
|
choice
|
|
|
|
prompt "Physical address space size"
|
|
|
|
default ARM64_PA_BITS_48
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Choose the maximum physical address range that the kernel will
|
|
|
|
support.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config ARM64_PA_BITS_48
|
|
|
|
bool "48-bit"
|
|
|
|
|
2017-12-13 17:07:25 +00:00
|
|
|
config ARM64_PA_BITS_52
|
|
|
|
bool "52-bit (ARMv8.2)"
|
|
|
|
depends on ARM64_64K_PAGES
|
|
|
|
depends on ARM64_PAN || !ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Enable support for a 52-bit physical address space, introduced as
|
|
|
|
part of the ARMv8.2-LPA extension.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
With this enabled, the kernel will also continue to work on CPUs that
|
|
|
|
do not support ARMv8.2-LPA, but with some added memory overhead (and
|
|
|
|
minor performance overhead).
|
|
|
|
|
2017-12-13 17:07:16 +00:00
|
|
|
endchoice
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config ARM64_PA_BITS
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
default 48 if ARM64_PA_BITS_48
|
2017-12-13 17:07:25 +00:00
|
|
|
default 52 if ARM64_PA_BITS_52
|
2017-12-13 17:07:16 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-10-11 13:52:19 +00:00
|
|
|
config CPU_BIG_ENDIAN
|
|
|
|
bool "Build big-endian kernel"
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Say Y if you plan on running a kernel in big-endian mode.
|
|
|
|
|
2014-03-04 07:51:17 +00:00
|
|
|
config SCHED_MC
|
|
|
|
bool "Multi-core scheduler support"
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Multi-core scheduler support improves the CPU scheduler's decision
|
|
|
|
making when dealing with multi-core CPU chips at a cost of slightly
|
|
|
|
increased overhead in some places. If unsure say N here.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config SCHED_SMT
|
|
|
|
bool "SMT scheduler support"
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Improves the CPU scheduler's decision making when dealing with
|
|
|
|
MultiThreading at a cost of slightly increased overhead in some
|
|
|
|
places. If unsure say N here.
|
|
|
|
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
config NR_CPUS
|
2015-03-18 11:01:18 +00:00
|
|
|
int "Maximum number of CPUs (2-4096)"
|
|
|
|
range 2 4096
|
2013-04-24 09:06:57 +00:00
|
|
|
# These have to remain sorted largest to smallest
|
2014-09-08 11:44:48 +00:00
|
|
|
default "64"
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-10-24 19:30:18 +00:00
|
|
|
config HOTPLUG_CPU
|
|
|
|
bool "Support for hot-pluggable CPUs"
|
2015-09-24 09:32:14 +00:00
|
|
|
select GENERIC_IRQ_MIGRATION
|
2013-10-24 19:30:18 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Say Y here to experiment with turning CPUs off and on. CPUs
|
|
|
|
can be controlled through /sys/devices/system/cpu.
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-08 22:50:27 +00:00
|
|
|
# Common NUMA Features
|
|
|
|
config NUMA
|
|
|
|
bool "Numa Memory Allocation and Scheduler Support"
|
2016-09-26 07:36:50 +00:00
|
|
|
select ACPI_NUMA if ACPI
|
|
|
|
select OF_NUMA
|
2016-04-08 22:50:27 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Enable NUMA (Non Uniform Memory Access) support.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The kernel will try to allocate memory used by a CPU on the
|
|
|
|
local memory of the CPU and add some more
|
|
|
|
NUMA awareness to the kernel.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config NODES_SHIFT
|
|
|
|
int "Maximum NUMA Nodes (as a power of 2)"
|
|
|
|
range 1 10
|
|
|
|
default "2"
|
|
|
|
depends on NEED_MULTIPLE_NODES
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Specify the maximum number of NUMA Nodes available on the target
|
|
|
|
system. Increases memory reserved to accommodate various tables.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config USE_PERCPU_NUMA_NODE_ID
|
|
|
|
def_bool y
|
|
|
|
depends on NUMA
|
|
|
|
|
2016-09-01 06:55:00 +00:00
|
|
|
config HAVE_SETUP_PER_CPU_AREA
|
|
|
|
def_bool y
|
|
|
|
depends on NUMA
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config NEED_PER_CPU_EMBED_FIRST_CHUNK
|
|
|
|
def_bool y
|
|
|
|
depends on NUMA
|
|
|
|
|
2016-12-14 09:11:47 +00:00
|
|
|
config HOLES_IN_ZONE
|
|
|
|
def_bool y
|
|
|
|
depends on NUMA
|
|
|
|
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
source kernel/Kconfig.preempt
|
2015-10-26 03:48:16 +00:00
|
|
|
source kernel/Kconfig.hz
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2016-02-06 00:24:47 +00:00
|
|
|
config ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
|
|
|
|
def_bool y
|
|
|
|
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
config ARCH_HAS_HOLES_MEMORYMODEL
|
|
|
|
def_bool y if SPARSEMEM
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config ARCH_SPARSEMEM_ENABLE
|
|
|
|
def_bool y
|
|
|
|
select SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP_ENABLE
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config ARCH_SPARSEMEM_DEFAULT
|
|
|
|
def_bool ARCH_SPARSEMEM_ENABLE
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config ARCH_SELECT_MEMORY_MODEL
|
|
|
|
def_bool ARCH_SPARSEMEM_ENABLE
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config HAVE_ARCH_PFN_VALID
|
|
|
|
def_bool ARCH_HAS_HOLES_MEMORYMODEL || !SPARSEMEM
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config HW_PERF_EVENTS
|
2015-10-02 09:55:03 +00:00
|
|
|
def_bool y
|
|
|
|
depends on ARM_PMU
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2013-04-10 12:48:00 +00:00
|
|
|
config SYS_SUPPORTS_HUGETLBFS
|
|
|
|
def_bool y
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config ARCH_WANT_HUGE_PMD_SHARE
|
2015-10-19 13:19:38 +00:00
|
|
|
def_bool y if ARM64_4K_PAGES || (ARM64_16K_PAGES && !ARM64_VA_BITS_36)
|
2013-04-10 12:48:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-04-03 16:48:54 +00:00
|
|
|
config ARCH_HAS_CACHE_LINE_SIZE
|
|
|
|
def_bool y
|
|
|
|
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
source "mm/Kconfig"
|
|
|
|
|
2014-11-28 05:26:39 +00:00
|
|
|
config SECCOMP
|
|
|
|
bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
|
|
|
|
---help---
|
|
|
|
This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications
|
|
|
|
that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their
|
|
|
|
execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to
|
|
|
|
the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write
|
|
|
|
syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in
|
|
|
|
their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is
|
|
|
|
enabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabled
|
|
|
|
and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls
|
|
|
|
defined by each seccomp mode.
|
|
|
|
|
2015-11-23 10:33:49 +00:00
|
|
|
config PARAVIRT
|
|
|
|
bool "Enable paravirtualization code"
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
This changes the kernel so it can modify itself when it is run
|
|
|
|
under a hypervisor, potentially improving performance significantly
|
|
|
|
over full virtualization.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config PARAVIRT_TIME_ACCOUNTING
|
|
|
|
bool "Paravirtual steal time accounting"
|
|
|
|
select PARAVIRT
|
|
|
|
default n
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Select this option to enable fine granularity task steal time
|
|
|
|
accounting. Time spent executing other tasks in parallel with
|
|
|
|
the current vCPU is discounted from the vCPU power. To account for
|
|
|
|
that, there can be a small performance impact.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If in doubt, say N here.
|
|
|
|
|
2016-06-23 17:54:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config KEXEC
|
|
|
|
depends on PM_SLEEP_SMP
|
|
|
|
select KEXEC_CORE
|
|
|
|
bool "kexec system call"
|
|
|
|
---help---
|
|
|
|
kexec is a system call that implements the ability to shutdown your
|
|
|
|
current kernel, and to start another kernel. It is like a reboot
|
|
|
|
but it is independent of the system firmware. And like a reboot
|
|
|
|
you can start any kernel with it, not just Linux.
|
|
|
|
|
arm64: kdump: provide /proc/vmcore file
Arch-specific functions are added to allow for implementing a crash dump
file interface, /proc/vmcore, which can be viewed as a ELF file.
A user space tool, like kexec-tools, is responsible for allocating
a separate region for the core's ELF header within crash kdump kernel
memory and filling it in when executing kexec_load().
Then, its location will be advertised to crash dump kernel via a new
device-tree property, "linux,elfcorehdr", and crash dump kernel preserves
the region for later use with reserve_elfcorehdr() at boot time.
On crash dump kernel, /proc/vmcore will access the primary kernel's memory
with copy_oldmem_page(), which feeds the data page-by-page by ioremap'ing
it since it does not reside in linear mapping on crash dump kernel.
Meanwhile, elfcorehdr_read() is simple as the region is always mapped.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2017-04-03 02:24:38 +00:00
|
|
|
config CRASH_DUMP
|
|
|
|
bool "Build kdump crash kernel"
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Generate crash dump after being started by kexec. This should
|
|
|
|
be normally only set in special crash dump kernels which are
|
|
|
|
loaded in the main kernel with kexec-tools into a specially
|
|
|
|
reserved region and then later executed after a crash by
|
|
|
|
kdump/kexec.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
For more details see Documentation/kdump/kdump.txt
|
|
|
|
|
2013-06-03 17:05:43 +00:00
|
|
|
config XEN_DOM0
|
|
|
|
def_bool y
|
|
|
|
depends on XEN
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config XEN
|
2014-09-17 21:07:06 +00:00
|
|
|
bool "Xen guest support on ARM64"
|
2013-06-03 17:05:43 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on ARM64 && OF
|
2013-10-10 13:40:44 +00:00
|
|
|
select SWIOTLB_XEN
|
2015-11-23 10:33:49 +00:00
|
|
|
select PARAVIRT
|
2013-06-03 17:05:43 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Say Y if you want to run Linux in a Virtual Machine on Xen on ARM64.
|
|
|
|
|
2013-04-25 14:19:21 +00:00
|
|
|
config FORCE_MAX_ZONEORDER
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
default "14" if (ARM64_64K_PAGES && TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE)
|
2015-10-19 13:19:37 +00:00
|
|
|
default "12" if (ARM64_16K_PAGES && TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE)
|
2013-04-25 14:19:21 +00:00
|
|
|
default "11"
|
2015-10-19 13:19:37 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
The kernel memory allocator divides physically contiguous memory
|
|
|
|
blocks into "zones", where each zone is a power of two number of
|
|
|
|
pages. This option selects the largest power of two that the kernel
|
|
|
|
keeps in the memory allocator. If you need to allocate very large
|
|
|
|
blocks of physically contiguous memory, then you may need to
|
|
|
|
increase this value.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This config option is actually maximum order plus one. For example,
|
|
|
|
a value of 11 means that the largest free memory block is 2^10 pages.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
We make sure that we can allocate upto a HugePage size for each configuration.
|
|
|
|
Hence we have :
|
|
|
|
MAX_ORDER = (PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT) + 1 => PAGE_SHIFT - 2
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
However for 4K, we choose a higher default value, 11 as opposed to 10, giving us
|
|
|
|
4M allocations matching the default size used by generic code.
|
2013-04-25 14:19:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-11-14 14:41:01 +00:00
|
|
|
config UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
|
2017-11-14 16:19:39 +00:00
|
|
|
bool "Unmap kernel when running in userspace (aka \"KAISER\")" if EXPERT
|
2017-11-14 14:41:01 +00:00
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
help
|
2017-11-14 16:19:39 +00:00
|
|
|
Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can
|
|
|
|
be used to bypass MMU permission checks and leak kernel data to
|
|
|
|
userspace. This can be defended against by unmapping the kernel
|
|
|
|
when running in userspace, mapping it back in on exception entry
|
|
|
|
via a trampoline page in the vector table.
|
2017-11-14 14:41:01 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If unsure, say Y.
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-03 11:17:58 +00:00
|
|
|
config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
|
|
|
|
bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT
|
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors rely on
|
|
|
|
being able to manipulate the branch predictor for a victim context by
|
|
|
|
executing aliasing branches in the attacker context. Such attacks
|
|
|
|
can be partially mitigated against by clearing internal branch
|
|
|
|
predictor state and limiting the prediction logic in some situations.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This config option will take CPU-specific actions to harden the
|
|
|
|
branch predictor against aliasing attacks and may rely on specific
|
|
|
|
instruction sequences or control bits being set by the system
|
|
|
|
firmware.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If unsure, say Y.
|
|
|
|
|
2018-02-15 11:47:14 +00:00
|
|
|
config HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS
|
|
|
|
bool "Harden EL2 vector mapping against system register leak" if EXPERT
|
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can
|
|
|
|
be used to leak privileged information such as the vector base
|
|
|
|
register, resulting in a potential defeat of the EL2 layout
|
|
|
|
randomization.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This config option will map the vectors to a fixed location,
|
|
|
|
independent of the EL2 code mapping, so that revealing VBAR_EL2
|
|
|
|
to an attacker does not give away any extra information. This
|
|
|
|
only gets enabled on affected CPUs.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If unsure, say Y.
|
|
|
|
|
2018-05-29 12:11:08 +00:00
|
|
|
config ARM64_SSBD
|
|
|
|
bool "Speculative Store Bypass Disable" if EXPERT
|
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
This enables mitigation of the bypassing of previous stores
|
|
|
|
by speculative loads.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If unsure, say Y.
|
|
|
|
|
2014-11-20 16:51:10 +00:00
|
|
|
menuconfig ARMV8_DEPRECATED
|
|
|
|
bool "Emulate deprecated/obsolete ARMv8 instructions"
|
|
|
|
depends on COMPAT
|
2017-11-06 18:07:11 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on SYSCTL
|
2014-11-20 16:51:10 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Legacy software support may require certain instructions
|
|
|
|
that have been deprecated or obsoleted in the architecture.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Enable this config to enable selective emulation of these
|
|
|
|
features.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If unsure, say Y
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ARMV8_DEPRECATED
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config SWP_EMULATION
|
|
|
|
bool "Emulate SWP/SWPB instructions"
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
ARMv8 obsoletes the use of A32 SWP/SWPB instructions such that
|
|
|
|
they are always undefined. Say Y here to enable software
|
|
|
|
emulation of these instructions for userspace using LDXR/STXR.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In some older versions of glibc [<=2.8] SWP is used during futex
|
|
|
|
trylock() operations with the assumption that the code will not
|
|
|
|
be preempted. This invalid assumption may be more likely to fail
|
|
|
|
with SWP emulation enabled, leading to deadlock of the user
|
|
|
|
application.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
NOTE: when accessing uncached shared regions, LDXR/STXR rely
|
|
|
|
on an external transaction monitoring block called a global
|
|
|
|
monitor to maintain update atomicity. If your system does not
|
|
|
|
implement a global monitor, this option can cause programs that
|
|
|
|
perform SWP operations to uncached memory to deadlock.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If unsure, say Y
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CP15_BARRIER_EMULATION
|
|
|
|
bool "Emulate CP15 Barrier instructions"
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
The CP15 barrier instructions - CP15ISB, CP15DSB, and
|
|
|
|
CP15DMB - are deprecated in ARMv8 (and ARMv7). It is
|
|
|
|
strongly recommended to use the ISB, DSB, and DMB
|
|
|
|
instructions instead.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Say Y here to enable software emulation of these
|
|
|
|
instructions for AArch32 userspace code. When this option is
|
|
|
|
enabled, CP15 barrier usage is traced which can help
|
|
|
|
identify software that needs updating.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If unsure, say Y
|
|
|
|
|
2015-01-21 12:43:11 +00:00
|
|
|
config SETEND_EMULATION
|
|
|
|
bool "Emulate SETEND instruction"
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
The SETEND instruction alters the data-endianness of the
|
|
|
|
AArch32 EL0, and is deprecated in ARMv8.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Say Y here to enable software emulation of the instruction
|
|
|
|
for AArch32 userspace code.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Note: All the cpus on the system must have mixed endian support at EL0
|
|
|
|
for this feature to be enabled. If a new CPU - which doesn't support mixed
|
|
|
|
endian - is hotplugged in after this feature has been enabled, there could
|
|
|
|
be unexpected results in the applications.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If unsure, say Y
|
2014-11-20 16:51:10 +00:00
|
|
|
endif
|
|
|
|
|
2016-07-01 17:25:31 +00:00
|
|
|
config ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN
|
|
|
|
bool "Emulate Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching"
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Enabling this option prevents the kernel from accessing
|
|
|
|
user-space memory directly by pointing TTBR0_EL1 to a reserved
|
|
|
|
zeroed area and reserved ASID. The user access routines
|
|
|
|
restore the valid TTBR0_EL1 temporarily.
|
|
|
|
|
2015-07-27 14:54:13 +00:00
|
|
|
menu "ARMv8.1 architectural features"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config ARM64_HW_AFDBM
|
|
|
|
bool "Support for hardware updates of the Access and Dirty page flags"
|
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
The ARMv8.1 architecture extensions introduce support for
|
|
|
|
hardware updates of the access and dirty information in page
|
|
|
|
table entries. When enabled in TCR_EL1 (HA and HD bits) on
|
|
|
|
capable processors, accesses to pages with PTE_AF cleared will
|
|
|
|
set this bit instead of raising an access flag fault.
|
|
|
|
Similarly, writes to read-only pages with the DBM bit set will
|
|
|
|
clear the read-only bit (AP[2]) instead of raising a
|
|
|
|
permission fault.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Kernels built with this configuration option enabled continue
|
|
|
|
to work on pre-ARMv8.1 hardware and the performance impact is
|
|
|
|
minimal. If unsure, say Y.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config ARM64_PAN
|
|
|
|
bool "Enable support for Privileged Access Never (PAN)"
|
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Privileged Access Never (PAN; part of the ARMv8.1 Extensions)
|
|
|
|
prevents the kernel or hypervisor from accessing user-space (EL0)
|
|
|
|
memory directly.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Choosing this option will cause any unprotected (not using
|
|
|
|
copy_to_user et al) memory access to fail with a permission fault.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The feature is detected at runtime, and will remain as a 'nop'
|
|
|
|
instruction if the cpu does not implement the feature.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config ARM64_LSE_ATOMICS
|
|
|
|
bool "Atomic instructions"
|
2018-05-21 18:14:22 +00:00
|
|
|
default y
|
2015-07-27 14:54:13 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
As part of the Large System Extensions, ARMv8.1 introduces new
|
|
|
|
atomic instructions that are designed specifically to scale in
|
|
|
|
very large systems.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Say Y here to make use of these instructions for the in-kernel
|
|
|
|
atomic routines. This incurs a small overhead on CPUs that do
|
|
|
|
not support these instructions and requires the kernel to be
|
2018-05-21 18:14:22 +00:00
|
|
|
built with binutils >= 2.25 in order for the new instructions
|
|
|
|
to be used.
|
2015-07-27 14:54:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-02-19 09:33:14 +00:00
|
|
|
config ARM64_VHE
|
|
|
|
bool "Enable support for Virtualization Host Extensions (VHE)"
|
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Virtualization Host Extensions (VHE) allow the kernel to run
|
|
|
|
directly at EL2 (instead of EL1) on processors that support
|
|
|
|
it. This leads to better performance for KVM, as they reduce
|
|
|
|
the cost of the world switch.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Selecting this option allows the VHE feature to be detected
|
|
|
|
at runtime, and does not affect processors that do not
|
|
|
|
implement this feature.
|
|
|
|
|
2015-07-27 14:54:13 +00:00
|
|
|
endmenu
|
|
|
|
|
2016-02-26 16:30:14 +00:00
|
|
|
menu "ARMv8.2 architectural features"
|
|
|
|
|
2016-02-05 14:58:48 +00:00
|
|
|
config ARM64_UAO
|
|
|
|
bool "Enable support for User Access Override (UAO)"
|
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
User Access Override (UAO; part of the ARMv8.2 Extensions)
|
|
|
|
causes the 'unprivileged' variant of the load/store instructions to
|
2017-09-26 03:47:59 +00:00
|
|
|
be overridden to be privileged.
|
2016-02-05 14:58:48 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This option changes get_user() and friends to use the 'unprivileged'
|
|
|
|
variant of the load/store instructions. This ensures that user-space
|
|
|
|
really did have access to the supplied memory. When addr_limit is
|
|
|
|
set to kernel memory the UAO bit will be set, allowing privileged
|
|
|
|
access to kernel memory.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Choosing this option will cause copy_to_user() et al to use user-space
|
|
|
|
memory permissions.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The feature is detected at runtime, the kernel will use the
|
|
|
|
regular load/store instructions if the cpu does not implement the
|
|
|
|
feature.
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-25 10:55:42 +00:00
|
|
|
config ARM64_PMEM
|
|
|
|
bool "Enable support for persistent memory"
|
|
|
|
select ARCH_HAS_PMEM_API
|
2017-07-25 10:55:43 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARCH_HAS_UACCESS_FLUSHCACHE
|
2017-07-25 10:55:42 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Say Y to enable support for the persistent memory API based on the
|
|
|
|
ARMv8.2 DCPoP feature.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The feature is detected at runtime, and the kernel will use DC CVAC
|
|
|
|
operations if DC CVAP is not supported (following the behaviour of
|
|
|
|
DC CVAP itself if the system does not define a point of persistence).
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-15 19:38:56 +00:00
|
|
|
config ARM64_RAS_EXTN
|
|
|
|
bool "Enable support for RAS CPU Extensions"
|
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
CPUs that support the Reliability, Availability and Serviceability
|
|
|
|
(RAS) Extensions, part of ARMv8.2 are able to track faults and
|
|
|
|
errors, classify them and report them to software.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
On CPUs with these extensions system software can use additional
|
|
|
|
barriers to determine if faults are pending and read the
|
|
|
|
classification from a new set of registers.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Selecting this feature will allow the kernel to use these barriers
|
|
|
|
and access the new registers if the system supports the extension.
|
|
|
|
Platform RAS features may additionally depend on firmware support.
|
|
|
|
|
2016-02-26 16:30:14 +00:00
|
|
|
endmenu
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-31 15:51:02 +00:00
|
|
|
config ARM64_SVE
|
|
|
|
bool "ARM Scalable Vector Extension support"
|
|
|
|
default y
|
2018-04-20 15:20:43 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on !KVM || ARM64_VHE
|
2017-10-31 15:51:02 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
The Scalable Vector Extension (SVE) is an extension to the AArch64
|
|
|
|
execution state which complements and extends the SIMD functionality
|
|
|
|
of the base architecture to support much larger vectors and to enable
|
|
|
|
additional vectorisation opportunities.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
To enable use of this extension on CPUs that implement it, say Y.
|
|
|
|
|
2018-03-23 18:08:31 +00:00
|
|
|
Note that for architectural reasons, firmware _must_ implement SVE
|
|
|
|
support when running on SVE capable hardware. The required support
|
|
|
|
is present in:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
* version 1.5 and later of the ARM Trusted Firmware
|
|
|
|
* the AArch64 boot wrapper since commit 5e1261e08abf
|
|
|
|
("bootwrapper: SVE: Enable SVE for EL2 and below").
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
For other firmware implementations, consult the firmware documentation
|
|
|
|
or vendor.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If you need the kernel to boot on SVE-capable hardware with broken
|
|
|
|
firmware, you may need to say N here until you get your firmware
|
|
|
|
fixed. Otherwise, you may experience firmware panics or lockups when
|
|
|
|
booting the kernel. If unsure and you are not observing these
|
|
|
|
symptoms, you should assume that it is safe to say Y.
|
2015-11-24 11:37:35 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-04-20 15:20:43 +00:00
|
|
|
CPUs that support SVE are architecturally required to support the
|
|
|
|
Virtualization Host Extensions (VHE), so the kernel makes no
|
|
|
|
provision for supporting SVE alongside KVM without VHE enabled.
|
|
|
|
Thus, you will need to enable CONFIG_ARM64_VHE if you want to support
|
|
|
|
KVM in the same kernel image.
|
|
|
|
|
2015-11-24 11:37:35 +00:00
|
|
|
config ARM64_MODULE_PLTS
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
|
|
select HAVE_MOD_ARCH_SPECIFIC
|
|
|
|
|
2016-01-26 08:13:44 +00:00
|
|
|
config RELOCATABLE
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
This builds the kernel as a Position Independent Executable (PIE),
|
|
|
|
which retains all relocation metadata required to relocate the
|
|
|
|
kernel binary at runtime to a different virtual address than the
|
|
|
|
address it was linked at.
|
|
|
|
Since AArch64 uses the RELA relocation format, this requires a
|
|
|
|
relocation pass at runtime even if the kernel is loaded at the
|
|
|
|
same address it was linked at.
|
|
|
|
|
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR
This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by
the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size
of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the
virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all
4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel
image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB
granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to
an acceptable value.
If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is
randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely
that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an
adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel
to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs.
If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is
randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval
[_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of
entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization,
but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch
and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is
shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded
further away if the module region is exhausted)
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 13:12:01 +00:00
|
|
|
config RANDOMIZE_BASE
|
|
|
|
bool "Randomize the address of the kernel image"
|
2016-07-26 17:16:55 +00:00
|
|
|
select ARM64_MODULE_PLTS if MODULES
|
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR
This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by
the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size
of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the
virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all
4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel
image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB
granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to
an acceptable value.
If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is
randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely
that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an
adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel
to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs.
If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is
randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval
[_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of
entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization,
but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch
and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is
shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded
further away if the module region is exhausted)
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 13:12:01 +00:00
|
|
|
select RELOCATABLE
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Randomizes the virtual address at which the kernel image is
|
|
|
|
loaded, as a security feature that deters exploit attempts
|
|
|
|
relying on knowledge of the location of kernel internals.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
It is the bootloader's job to provide entropy, by passing a
|
|
|
|
random u64 value in /chosen/kaslr-seed at kernel entry.
|
|
|
|
|
2016-01-26 13:48:29 +00:00
|
|
|
When booting via the UEFI stub, it will invoke the firmware's
|
|
|
|
EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL implementation (if available) to supply entropy
|
|
|
|
to the kernel proper. In addition, it will randomise the physical
|
|
|
|
location of the kernel Image as well.
|
|
|
|
|
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR
This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by
the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size
of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the
virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all
4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel
image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB
granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to
an acceptable value.
If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is
randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely
that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an
adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel
to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs.
If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is
randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval
[_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of
entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization,
but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch
and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is
shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded
further away if the module region is exhausted)
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 13:12:01 +00:00
|
|
|
If unsure, say N.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL
|
arm64/kernel: kaslr: reduce module randomization range to 4 GB
We currently have to rely on the GCC large code model for KASLR for
two distinct but related reasons:
- if we enable full randomization, modules will be loaded very far away
from the core kernel, where they are out of range for ADRP instructions,
- even without full randomization, the fact that the 128 MB module region
is now no longer fully reserved for kernel modules means that there is
a very low likelihood that the normal bottom-up allocation of other
vmalloc regions may collide, and use up the range for other things.
Large model code is suboptimal, given that each symbol reference involves
a literal load that goes through the D-cache, reducing cache utilization.
But more importantly, literals are not instructions but part of .text
nonetheless, and hence mapped with executable permissions.
So let's get rid of our dependency on the large model for KASLR, by:
- reducing the full randomization range to 4 GB, thereby ensuring that
ADRP references between modules and the kernel are always in range,
- reduce the spillover range to 4 GB as well, so that we fallback to a
region that is still guaranteed to be in range
- move the randomization window of the core kernel to the middle of the
VMALLOC space
Note that KASAN always uses the module region outside of the vmalloc space,
so keep the kernel close to that if KASAN is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-03-06 17:15:32 +00:00
|
|
|
bool "Randomize the module region over a 4 GB range"
|
2017-06-06 17:00:22 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on RANDOMIZE_BASE
|
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR
This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by
the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size
of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the
virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all
4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel
image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB
granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to
an acceptable value.
If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is
randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely
that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an
adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel
to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs.
If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is
randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval
[_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of
entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization,
but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch
and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is
shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded
further away if the module region is exhausted)
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 13:12:01 +00:00
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
help
|
arm64/kernel: kaslr: reduce module randomization range to 4 GB
We currently have to rely on the GCC large code model for KASLR for
two distinct but related reasons:
- if we enable full randomization, modules will be loaded very far away
from the core kernel, where they are out of range for ADRP instructions,
- even without full randomization, the fact that the 128 MB module region
is now no longer fully reserved for kernel modules means that there is
a very low likelihood that the normal bottom-up allocation of other
vmalloc regions may collide, and use up the range for other things.
Large model code is suboptimal, given that each symbol reference involves
a literal load that goes through the D-cache, reducing cache utilization.
But more importantly, literals are not instructions but part of .text
nonetheless, and hence mapped with executable permissions.
So let's get rid of our dependency on the large model for KASLR, by:
- reducing the full randomization range to 4 GB, thereby ensuring that
ADRP references between modules and the kernel are always in range,
- reduce the spillover range to 4 GB as well, so that we fallback to a
region that is still guaranteed to be in range
- move the randomization window of the core kernel to the middle of the
VMALLOC space
Note that KASAN always uses the module region outside of the vmalloc space,
so keep the kernel close to that if KASAN is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
2018-03-06 17:15:32 +00:00
|
|
|
Randomizes the location of the module region inside a 4 GB window
|
|
|
|
covering the core kernel. This way, it is less likely for modules
|
arm64: add support for kernel ASLR
This adds support for KASLR is implemented, based on entropy provided by
the bootloader in the /chosen/kaslr-seed DT property. Depending on the size
of the address space (VA_BITS) and the page size, the entropy in the
virtual displacement is up to 13 bits (16k/2 levels) and up to 25 bits (all
4 levels), with the sidenote that displacements that result in the kernel
image straddling a 1GB/32MB/512MB alignment boundary (for 4KB/16KB/64KB
granule kernels, respectively) are not allowed, and will be rounded up to
an acceptable value.
If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is enabled, the module region is
randomized independently from the core kernel. This makes it less likely
that the location of core kernel data structures can be determined by an
adversary, but causes all function calls from modules into the core kernel
to be resolved via entries in the module PLTs.
If CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL is not enabled, the module region is
randomized by choosing a page aligned 128 MB region inside the interval
[_etext - 128 MB, _stext + 128 MB). This gives between 10 and 14 bits of
entropy (depending on page size), independently of the kernel randomization,
but still guarantees that modules are within the range of relative branch
and jump instructions (with the caveat that, since the module region is
shared with other uses of the vmalloc area, modules may need to be loaded
further away if the module region is exhausted)
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
2016-01-26 13:12:01 +00:00
|
|
|
to leak information about the location of core kernel data structures
|
|
|
|
but it does imply that function calls between modules and the core
|
|
|
|
kernel will need to be resolved via veneers in the module PLT.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
When this option is not set, the module region will be randomized over
|
|
|
|
a limited range that contains the [_stext, _etext] interval of the
|
|
|
|
core kernel, so branch relocations are always in range.
|
|
|
|
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
endmenu
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
menu "Boot options"
|
|
|
|
|
2016-01-26 11:10:38 +00:00
|
|
|
config ARM64_ACPI_PARKING_PROTOCOL
|
|
|
|
bool "Enable support for the ARM64 ACPI parking protocol"
|
|
|
|
depends on ACPI
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Enable support for the ARM64 ACPI parking protocol. If disabled
|
|
|
|
the kernel will not allow booting through the ARM64 ACPI parking
|
|
|
|
protocol even if the corresponding data is present in the ACPI
|
|
|
|
MADT table.
|
|
|
|
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
config CMDLINE
|
|
|
|
string "Default kernel command string"
|
|
|
|
default ""
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Provide a set of default command-line options at build time by
|
|
|
|
entering them here. As a minimum, you should specify the the
|
|
|
|
root device (e.g. root=/dev/nfs).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config CMDLINE_FORCE
|
|
|
|
bool "Always use the default kernel command string"
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
Always use the default kernel command string, even if the boot
|
|
|
|
loader passes other arguments to the kernel.
|
|
|
|
This is useful if you cannot or don't want to change the
|
|
|
|
command-line options your boot loader passes to the kernel.
|
|
|
|
|
2014-07-02 12:54:43 +00:00
|
|
|
config EFI_STUB
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
|
|
|
2014-04-16 01:59:30 +00:00
|
|
|
config EFI
|
|
|
|
bool "UEFI runtime support"
|
|
|
|
depends on OF && !CPU_BIG_ENDIAN
|
2017-10-31 15:50:57 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON
|
2014-04-16 01:59:30 +00:00
|
|
|
select LIBFDT
|
|
|
|
select UCS2_STRING
|
|
|
|
select EFI_PARAMS_FROM_FDT
|
2014-07-04 17:41:53 +00:00
|
|
|
select EFI_RUNTIME_WRAPPERS
|
2014-07-02 12:54:43 +00:00
|
|
|
select EFI_STUB
|
|
|
|
select EFI_ARMSTUB
|
2014-04-16 01:59:30 +00:00
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
This option provides support for runtime services provided
|
|
|
|
by UEFI firmware (such as non-volatile variables, realtime
|
2014-04-16 02:47:52 +00:00
|
|
|
clock, and platform reset). A UEFI stub is also provided to
|
|
|
|
allow the kernel to be booted as an EFI application. This
|
|
|
|
is only useful on systems that have UEFI firmware.
|
2014-04-16 01:59:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2014-10-04 15:46:43 +00:00
|
|
|
config DMI
|
|
|
|
bool "Enable support for SMBIOS (DMI) tables"
|
|
|
|
depends on EFI
|
|
|
|
default y
|
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
This enables SMBIOS/DMI feature for systems.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This option is only useful on systems that have UEFI firmware.
|
|
|
|
However, even with this option, the resultant kernel should
|
|
|
|
continue to boot on existing non-UEFI platforms.
|
|
|
|
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
endmenu
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
menu "Userspace binary formats"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source "fs/Kconfig.binfmt"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config COMPAT
|
|
|
|
bool "Kernel support for 32-bit EL0"
|
2015-10-19 13:19:32 +00:00
|
|
|
depends on ARM64_4K_PAGES || EXPERT
|
2017-01-26 03:19:55 +00:00
|
|
|
select COMPAT_BINFMT_ELF if BINFMT_ELF
|
2012-10-08 23:28:08 +00:00
|
|
|
select HAVE_UID16
|
2012-12-25 21:29:11 +00:00
|
|
|
select OLD_SIGSUSPEND3
|
2012-12-26 00:31:29 +00:00
|
|
|
select COMPAT_OLD_SIGACTION
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
help
|
|
|
|
This option enables support for a 32-bit EL0 running under a 64-bit
|
|
|
|
kernel at EL1. AArch32-specific components such as system calls,
|
|
|
|
the user helper functions, VFP support and the ptrace interface are
|
|
|
|
handled appropriately by the kernel.
|
|
|
|
|
2015-10-19 13:19:37 +00:00
|
|
|
If you use a page size other than 4KB (i.e, 16KB or 64KB), please be aware
|
|
|
|
that you will only be able to execute AArch32 binaries that were compiled
|
|
|
|
with page size aligned segments.
|
2015-03-16 16:32:23 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
If you want to execute 32-bit userspace applications, say Y.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config SYSVIPC_COMPAT
|
|
|
|
def_bool y
|
|
|
|
depends on COMPAT && SYSVIPC
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
endmenu
|
|
|
|
|
2013-11-07 18:37:14 +00:00
|
|
|
menu "Power management options"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source "kernel/power/Kconfig"
|
|
|
|
|
2016-04-27 16:47:12 +00:00
|
|
|
config ARCH_HIBERNATION_POSSIBLE
|
|
|
|
def_bool y
|
|
|
|
depends on CPU_PM
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config ARCH_HIBERNATION_HEADER
|
|
|
|
def_bool y
|
|
|
|
depends on HIBERNATION
|
|
|
|
|
2013-11-07 18:37:14 +00:00
|
|
|
config ARCH_SUSPEND_POSSIBLE
|
|
|
|
def_bool y
|
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|
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|
|
endmenu
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|
|
|
2013-07-17 13:54:21 +00:00
|
|
|
menu "CPU Power Management"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source "drivers/cpuidle/Kconfig"
|
|
|
|
|
2014-02-24 02:27:57 +00:00
|
|
|
source "drivers/cpufreq/Kconfig"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
endmenu
|
|
|
|
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
source "net/Kconfig"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source "drivers/Kconfig"
|
|
|
|
|
2014-04-16 01:59:30 +00:00
|
|
|
source "drivers/firmware/Kconfig"
|
|
|
|
|
2015-03-24 14:02:53 +00:00
|
|
|
source "drivers/acpi/Kconfig"
|
|
|
|
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
source "fs/Kconfig"
|
|
|
|
|
2013-07-04 12:34:32 +00:00
|
|
|
source "arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig"
|
|
|
|
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
source "arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source "security/Kconfig"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source "crypto/Kconfig"
|
2014-03-06 08:23:33 +00:00
|
|
|
if CRYPTO
|
|
|
|
source "arch/arm64/crypto/Kconfig"
|
|
|
|
endif
|
2012-04-20 13:45:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
source "lib/Kconfig"
|