License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 14:07:57 +00:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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2011-02-09 08:24:34 +00:00
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/*
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* Generate definitions needed by assembly language modules.
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* This code generates raw asm output which is post-processed to extract
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* and format the required data.
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*/
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#define COMPILE_OFFSETS
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#include <linux/crypto.h>
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2023-01-01 09:12:50 +00:00
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#include <crypto/aria.h>
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2011-02-09 08:24:34 +00:00
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/stddef.h>
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#include <linux/hardirq.h>
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#include <linux/suspend.h>
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#include <linux/kbuild.h>
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#include <asm/processor.h>
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#include <asm/thread_info.h>
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#include <asm/sigframe.h>
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#include <asm/bootparam.h>
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#include <asm/suspend.h>
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2017-12-04 14:07:59 +00:00
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#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
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2022-04-05 23:29:11 +00:00
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#include <asm/tdx.h>
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2011-02-09 08:24:34 +00:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_XEN
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#include <xen/interface/xen.h>
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#endif
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2007-10-11 09:12:08 +00:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
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# include "asm-offsets_32.c"
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#else
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# include "asm-offsets_64.c"
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2007-07-19 08:49:26 +00:00
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#endif
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2011-02-09 08:24:34 +00:00
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2018-12-04 23:34:56 +00:00
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static void __used common(void)
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{
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2016-08-13 16:38:19 +00:00
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BLANK();
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OFFSET(TASK_threadsp, task_struct, thread.sp);
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Kbuild: rename CC_STACKPROTECTOR[_STRONG] config variables
The changes to automatically test for working stack protector compiler
support in the Kconfig files removed the special STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO
option that picked the strongest stack protector that the compiler
supported.
That was all a nice cleanup - it makes no sense to have the AUTO case
now that the Kconfig phase can just determine the compiler support
directly.
HOWEVER.
It also meant that doing "make oldconfig" would now _disable_ the strong
stackprotector if you had AUTO enabled, because in a legacy config file,
the sane stack protector configuration would look like
CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE is not set
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR is not set
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO=y
and when you ran this through "make oldconfig" with the Kbuild changes,
it would ask you about the regular CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR (that had
been renamed from CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR to just
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR), but it would think that the STRONG version
used to be disabled (because it was really enabled by AUTO), and would
disable it in the new config, resulting in:
CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set
CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y
That's dangerously subtle - people could suddenly find themselves with
the weaker stack protector setup without even realizing.
The solution here is to just rename not just the old RECULAR stack
protector option, but also the strong one. This does that by just
removing the CC_ prefix entirely for the user choices, because it really
is not about the compiler support (the compiler support now instead
automatially impacts _visibility_ of the options to users).
This results in "make oldconfig" actually asking the user for their
choice, so that we don't have any silent subtle security model changes.
The end result would generally look like this:
CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y
CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR=y
CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y
CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y
where the "CC_" versions really are about internal compiler
infrastructure, not the user selections.
Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2018-06-14 03:21:18 +00:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR
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2016-08-13 16:38:19 +00:00
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OFFSET(TASK_stack_canary, task_struct, stack_canary);
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#endif
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2011-02-09 08:24:34 +00:00
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BLANK();
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OFFSET(pbe_address, pbe, address);
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OFFSET(pbe_orig_address, pbe, orig_address);
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OFFSET(pbe_next, pbe, next);
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2015-04-12 13:14:45 +00:00
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#if defined(CONFIG_X86_32) || defined(CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION)
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BLANK();
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2015-09-05 07:32:41 +00:00
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OFFSET(IA32_SIGCONTEXT_ax, sigcontext_32, ax);
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OFFSET(IA32_SIGCONTEXT_bx, sigcontext_32, bx);
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OFFSET(IA32_SIGCONTEXT_cx, sigcontext_32, cx);
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OFFSET(IA32_SIGCONTEXT_dx, sigcontext_32, dx);
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OFFSET(IA32_SIGCONTEXT_si, sigcontext_32, si);
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OFFSET(IA32_SIGCONTEXT_di, sigcontext_32, di);
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OFFSET(IA32_SIGCONTEXT_bp, sigcontext_32, bp);
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OFFSET(IA32_SIGCONTEXT_sp, sigcontext_32, sp);
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OFFSET(IA32_SIGCONTEXT_ip, sigcontext_32, ip);
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2015-04-12 13:14:45 +00:00
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BLANK();
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OFFSET(IA32_RT_SIGFRAME_sigcontext, rt_sigframe_ia32, uc.uc_mcontext);
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#endif
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2011-02-09 08:24:34 +00:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_XEN
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BLANK();
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OFFSET(XEN_vcpu_info_mask, vcpu_info, evtchn_upcall_mask);
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OFFSET(XEN_vcpu_info_pending, vcpu_info, evtchn_upcall_pending);
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2019-07-11 11:40:55 +00:00
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OFFSET(XEN_vcpu_info_arch_cr2, vcpu_info, arch.cr2);
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2011-02-09 08:24:34 +00:00
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#endif
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2022-04-05 23:29:11 +00:00
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BLANK();
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OFFSET(TDX_MODULE_rcx, tdx_module_output, rcx);
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OFFSET(TDX_MODULE_rdx, tdx_module_output, rdx);
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OFFSET(TDX_MODULE_r8, tdx_module_output, r8);
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OFFSET(TDX_MODULE_r9, tdx_module_output, r9);
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OFFSET(TDX_MODULE_r10, tdx_module_output, r10);
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OFFSET(TDX_MODULE_r11, tdx_module_output, r11);
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x86/tdx: Add __tdx_module_call() and __tdx_hypercall() helper functions
Guests communicate with VMMs with hypercalls. Historically, these
are implemented using instructions that are known to cause VMEXITs
like VMCALL, VMLAUNCH, etc. However, with TDX, VMEXITs no longer
expose the guest state to the host. This prevents the old hypercall
mechanisms from working. So, to communicate with VMM, TDX
specification defines a new instruction called TDCALL.
In a TDX based VM, since the VMM is an untrusted entity, an intermediary
layer -- TDX module -- facilitates secure communication between the host
and the guest. TDX module is loaded like a firmware into a special CPU
mode called SEAM. TDX guests communicate with the TDX module using the
TDCALL instruction.
A guest uses TDCALL to communicate with both the TDX module and VMM.
The value of the RAX register when executing the TDCALL instruction is
used to determine the TDCALL type. A leaf of TDCALL used to communicate
with the VMM is called TDVMCALL.
Add generic interfaces to communicate with the TDX module and VMM
(using the TDCALL instruction).
__tdx_module_call() - Used to communicate with the TDX module (via
TDCALL instruction).
__tdx_hypercall() - Used by the guest to request services from
the VMM (via TDVMCALL leaf of TDCALL).
Also define an additional wrapper _tdx_hypercall(), which adds error
handling support for the TDCALL failure.
The __tdx_module_call() and __tdx_hypercall() helper functions are
implemented in assembly in a .S file. The TDCALL ABI requires
shuffling arguments in and out of registers, which proved to be
awkward with inline assembly.
Just like syscalls, not all TDVMCALL use cases need to use the same
number of argument registers. The implementation here picks the current
worst-case scenario for TDCALL (4 registers). For TDCALLs with fewer
than 4 arguments, there will end up being a few superfluous (cheap)
instructions. But, this approach maximizes code reuse.
For registers used by the TDCALL instruction, please check TDX GHCI
specification, the section titled "TDCALL instruction" and "TDG.VP.VMCALL
Interface".
Based on previous patch by Sean Christopherson.
Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220405232939.73860-4-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
2022-04-05 23:29:12 +00:00
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BLANK();
|
2023-01-26 22:11:54 +00:00
|
|
|
OFFSET(TDX_HYPERCALL_r8, tdx_hypercall_args, r8);
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OFFSET(TDX_HYPERCALL_r9, tdx_hypercall_args, r9);
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x86/tdx: Add __tdx_module_call() and __tdx_hypercall() helper functions
Guests communicate with VMMs with hypercalls. Historically, these
are implemented using instructions that are known to cause VMEXITs
like VMCALL, VMLAUNCH, etc. However, with TDX, VMEXITs no longer
expose the guest state to the host. This prevents the old hypercall
mechanisms from working. So, to communicate with VMM, TDX
specification defines a new instruction called TDCALL.
In a TDX based VM, since the VMM is an untrusted entity, an intermediary
layer -- TDX module -- facilitates secure communication between the host
and the guest. TDX module is loaded like a firmware into a special CPU
mode called SEAM. TDX guests communicate with the TDX module using the
TDCALL instruction.
A guest uses TDCALL to communicate with both the TDX module and VMM.
The value of the RAX register when executing the TDCALL instruction is
used to determine the TDCALL type. A leaf of TDCALL used to communicate
with the VMM is called TDVMCALL.
Add generic interfaces to communicate with the TDX module and VMM
(using the TDCALL instruction).
__tdx_module_call() - Used to communicate with the TDX module (via
TDCALL instruction).
__tdx_hypercall() - Used by the guest to request services from
the VMM (via TDVMCALL leaf of TDCALL).
Also define an additional wrapper _tdx_hypercall(), which adds error
handling support for the TDCALL failure.
The __tdx_module_call() and __tdx_hypercall() helper functions are
implemented in assembly in a .S file. The TDCALL ABI requires
shuffling arguments in and out of registers, which proved to be
awkward with inline assembly.
Just like syscalls, not all TDVMCALL use cases need to use the same
number of argument registers. The implementation here picks the current
worst-case scenario for TDCALL (4 registers). For TDCALLs with fewer
than 4 arguments, there will end up being a few superfluous (cheap)
instructions. But, this approach maximizes code reuse.
For registers used by the TDCALL instruction, please check TDX GHCI
specification, the section titled "TDCALL instruction" and "TDG.VP.VMCALL
Interface".
Based on previous patch by Sean Christopherson.
Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220405232939.73860-4-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
2022-04-05 23:29:12 +00:00
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OFFSET(TDX_HYPERCALL_r10, tdx_hypercall_args, r10);
|
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OFFSET(TDX_HYPERCALL_r11, tdx_hypercall_args, r11);
|
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OFFSET(TDX_HYPERCALL_r12, tdx_hypercall_args, r12);
|
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OFFSET(TDX_HYPERCALL_r13, tdx_hypercall_args, r13);
|
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OFFSET(TDX_HYPERCALL_r14, tdx_hypercall_args, r14);
|
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OFFSET(TDX_HYPERCALL_r15, tdx_hypercall_args, r15);
|
2023-01-26 22:11:54 +00:00
|
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OFFSET(TDX_HYPERCALL_rdi, tdx_hypercall_args, rdi);
|
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OFFSET(TDX_HYPERCALL_rsi, tdx_hypercall_args, rsi);
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OFFSET(TDX_HYPERCALL_rbx, tdx_hypercall_args, rbx);
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OFFSET(TDX_HYPERCALL_rdx, tdx_hypercall_args, rdx);
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x86/tdx: Add __tdx_module_call() and __tdx_hypercall() helper functions
Guests communicate with VMMs with hypercalls. Historically, these
are implemented using instructions that are known to cause VMEXITs
like VMCALL, VMLAUNCH, etc. However, with TDX, VMEXITs no longer
expose the guest state to the host. This prevents the old hypercall
mechanisms from working. So, to communicate with VMM, TDX
specification defines a new instruction called TDCALL.
In a TDX based VM, since the VMM is an untrusted entity, an intermediary
layer -- TDX module -- facilitates secure communication between the host
and the guest. TDX module is loaded like a firmware into a special CPU
mode called SEAM. TDX guests communicate with the TDX module using the
TDCALL instruction.
A guest uses TDCALL to communicate with both the TDX module and VMM.
The value of the RAX register when executing the TDCALL instruction is
used to determine the TDCALL type. A leaf of TDCALL used to communicate
with the VMM is called TDVMCALL.
Add generic interfaces to communicate with the TDX module and VMM
(using the TDCALL instruction).
__tdx_module_call() - Used to communicate with the TDX module (via
TDCALL instruction).
__tdx_hypercall() - Used by the guest to request services from
the VMM (via TDVMCALL leaf of TDCALL).
Also define an additional wrapper _tdx_hypercall(), which adds error
handling support for the TDCALL failure.
The __tdx_module_call() and __tdx_hypercall() helper functions are
implemented in assembly in a .S file. The TDCALL ABI requires
shuffling arguments in and out of registers, which proved to be
awkward with inline assembly.
Just like syscalls, not all TDVMCALL use cases need to use the same
number of argument registers. The implementation here picks the current
worst-case scenario for TDCALL (4 registers). For TDCALLs with fewer
than 4 arguments, there will end up being a few superfluous (cheap)
instructions. But, this approach maximizes code reuse.
For registers used by the TDCALL instruction, please check TDX GHCI
specification, the section titled "TDCALL instruction" and "TDG.VP.VMCALL
Interface".
Based on previous patch by Sean Christopherson.
Signed-off-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220405232939.73860-4-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
2022-04-05 23:29:12 +00:00
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2011-02-09 08:24:34 +00:00
|
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BLANK();
|
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OFFSET(BP_scratch, boot_params, scratch);
|
2017-02-06 11:22:43 +00:00
|
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OFFSET(BP_secure_boot, boot_params, secure_boot);
|
2011-02-09 08:24:34 +00:00
|
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OFFSET(BP_loadflags, boot_params, hdr.loadflags);
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OFFSET(BP_hardware_subarch, boot_params, hdr.hardware_subarch);
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OFFSET(BP_version, boot_params, hdr.version);
|
|
|
|
|
OFFSET(BP_kernel_alignment, boot_params, hdr.kernel_alignment);
|
x86/boot: Move compressed kernel to the end of the decompression buffer
This change makes later calculations about where the kernel is located
easier to reason about. To better understand this change, we must first
clarify what 'VO' and 'ZO' are. These values were introduced in commits
by hpa:
77d1a4999502 ("x86, boot: make symbols from the main vmlinux available")
37ba7ab5e33c ("x86, boot: make kernel_alignment adjustable; new bzImage fields")
Specifically:
All names prefixed with 'VO_':
- relate to the uncompressed kernel image
- the size of the VO image is: VO__end-VO__text ("VO_INIT_SIZE" define)
All names prefixed with 'ZO_':
- relate to the bootable compressed kernel image (boot/compressed/vmlinux),
which is composed of the following memory areas:
- head text
- compressed kernel (VO image and relocs table)
- decompressor code
- the size of the ZO image is: ZO__end - ZO_startup_32 ("ZO_INIT_SIZE" define, though see below)
The 'INIT_SIZE' value is used to find the larger of the two image sizes:
#define ZO_INIT_SIZE (ZO__end - ZO_startup_32 + ZO_z_extract_offset)
#define VO_INIT_SIZE (VO__end - VO__text)
#if ZO_INIT_SIZE > VO_INIT_SIZE
# define INIT_SIZE ZO_INIT_SIZE
#else
# define INIT_SIZE VO_INIT_SIZE
#endif
The current code uses extract_offset to decide where to position the
copied ZO (i.e. ZO starts at extract_offset). (This is why ZO_INIT_SIZE
currently includes the extract_offset.)
Why does z_extract_offset exist? It's needed because we are trying to minimize
the amount of RAM used for the whole act of creating an uncompressed, executable,
properly relocation-linked kernel image in system memory. We do this so that
kernels can be booted on even very small systems.
To achieve the goal of minimal memory consumption we have implemented an in-place
decompression strategy: instead of cleanly separating the VO and ZO images and
also allocating some memory for the decompression code's runtime needs, we instead
create this elaborate layout of memory buffers where the output (decompressed)
stream, as it progresses, overlaps with and destroys the input (compressed)
stream. This can only be done safely if the ZO image is placed to the end of the
VO range, plus a certain amount of safety distance to make sure that when the last
bytes of the VO range are decompressed, the compressed stream pointer is safely
beyond the end of the VO range.
z_extract_offset is calculated in arch/x86/boot/compressed/mkpiggy.c during
the build process, at a point when we know the exact compressed and
uncompressed size of the kernel images and can calculate this safe minimum
offset value. (Note that the mkpiggy.c calculation is not perfect, because
we don't know the decompressor used at that stage, so the z_extract_offset
calculation is necessarily imprecise and is mostly based on gzip internals -
we'll improve that in the next patch.)
When INIT_SIZE is bigger than VO_INIT_SIZE (uncommon but possible),
the copied ZO occupies the memory from extract_offset to the end of
decompression buffer. It overlaps with the soon-to-be-uncompressed kernel
like this:
|-----compressed kernel image------|
V V
0 extract_offset +INIT_SIZE
|-----------|---------------|-------------------------|--------|
| | | |
VO__text startup_32 of ZO VO__end ZO__end
^ ^
|-------uncompressed kernel image---------|
When INIT_SIZE is equal to VO_INIT_SIZE (likely) there's still space
left from end of ZO to the end of decompressing buffer, like below.
|-compressed kernel image-|
V V
0 extract_offset +INIT_SIZE
|-----------|---------------|-------------------------|--------|
| | | |
VO__text startup_32 of ZO ZO__end VO__end
^ ^
|------------uncompressed kernel image-------------|
To simplify calculations and avoid special cases, it is cleaner to
always place the compressed kernel image in memory so that ZO__end
is at the end of the decompression buffer, instead of placing t at
the start of extract_offset as is currently done.
This patch adds BP_init_size (which is the INIT_SIZE as passed in from
the boot_params) into asm-offsets.c to make it visible to the assembly
code.
Then when moving the ZO, it calculates the starting position of
the copied ZO (via BP_init_size and the ZO run size) so that the VO__end
will be at the end of the decompression buffer. To make the position
calculation safe, the end of ZO is page aligned (and a comment is added
to the existing VO alignment for good measure).
Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
[ Rewrote changelog and comments. ]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: lasse.collin@tukaani.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1461888548-32439-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
[ Rewrote the changelog some more. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-04-29 00:09:04 +00:00
|
|
|
OFFSET(BP_init_size, boot_params, hdr.init_size);
|
x86, efi: EFI boot stub support
There is currently a large divide between kernel development and the
development of EFI boot loaders. The idea behind this patch is to give
the kernel developers full control over the EFI boot process. As
H. Peter Anvin put it,
"The 'kernel carries its own stub' approach been very successful in
dealing with BIOS, and would make a lot of sense to me for EFI as
well."
This patch introduces an EFI boot stub that allows an x86 bzImage to
be loaded and executed by EFI firmware. The bzImage appears to the
firmware as an EFI application. Luckily there are enough free bits
within the bzImage header so that it can masquerade as an EFI
application, thereby coercing the EFI firmware into loading it and
jumping to its entry point. The beauty of this masquerading approach
is that both BIOS and EFI boot loaders can still load and run the same
bzImage, thereby allowing a single kernel image to work in any boot
environment.
The EFI boot stub supports multiple initrds, but they must exist on
the same partition as the bzImage. Command-line arguments for the
kernel can be appended after the bzImage name when run from the EFI
shell, e.g.
Shell> bzImage console=ttyS0 root=/dev/sdb initrd=initrd.img
v7:
- Fix checkpatch warnings.
v6:
- Try to allocate initrd memory just below hdr->inird_addr_max.
v5:
- load_options_size is UTF-16, which needs dividing by 2 to convert
to the corresponding ASCII size.
v4:
- Don't read more than image->load_options_size
v3:
- Fix following warnings when compiling CONFIG_EFI_STUB=n
arch/x86/boot/tools/build.c: In function ‘main’:
arch/x86/boot/tools/build.c:138:24: warning: unused variable ‘pe_header’
arch/x86/boot/tools/build.c:138:15: warning: unused variable ‘file_sz’
- As reported by Matthew Garrett, some Apple machines have GOPs that
don't have hardware attached. We need to weed these out by
searching for ones that handle the PCIIO protocol.
- Don't allocate memory if no initrds are on cmdline
- Don't trust image->load_options_size
Maarten Lankhorst noted:
- Don't strip first argument when booted from efibootmgr
- Don't allocate too much memory for cmdline
- Don't update cmdline_size, the kernel considers it read-only
- Don't accept '\n' for initrd names
v2:
- File alignment was too large, was 8192 should be 512. Reported by
Maarten Lankhorst on LKML.
- Added UGA support for graphics
- Use VIDEO_TYPE_EFI instead of hard-coded number.
- Move linelength assignment until after we've assigned depth
- Dynamically fill out AddressOfEntryPoint in tools/build.c
- Don't use magic number for GDT/TSS stuff. Requested by Andi Kleen
- The bzImage may need to be relocated as it may have been loaded at
a high address address by the firmware. This was required to get my
macbook booting because the firmware loaded it at 0x7cxxxxxx, which
triggers this error in decompress_kernel(),
if (heap > ((-__PAGE_OFFSET-(128<<20)-1) & 0x7fffffff))
error("Destination address too large");
Cc: Mike Waychison <mikew@google.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Henrik Rydberg <rydberg@euromail.se>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1321383097.2657.9.camel@mfleming-mobl1.ger.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
2011-12-12 21:27:52 +00:00
|
|
|
OFFSET(BP_pref_address, boot_params, hdr.pref_address);
|
2012-08-02 19:05:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BLANK();
|
|
|
|
|
DEFINE(PTREGS_SIZE, sizeof(struct pt_regs));
|
2017-12-04 14:07:12 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2017-12-04 14:07:59 +00:00
|
|
|
/* TLB state for the entry code */
|
|
|
|
|
OFFSET(TLB_STATE_user_pcid_flush_mask, tlb_state, user_pcid_flush_mask);
|
|
|
|
|
|
2017-12-04 14:07:20 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Layout info for cpu_entry_area */
|
2017-12-05 01:25:07 +00:00
|
|
|
OFFSET(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_entry_stack, cpu_entry_area, entry_stack_page);
|
|
|
|
|
DEFINE(SIZEOF_entry_stack, sizeof(struct entry_stack));
|
2018-07-18 09:40:44 +00:00
|
|
|
DEFINE(MASK_entry_stack, (~(sizeof(struct entry_stack) - 1)));
|
2018-07-18 09:40:38 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-09-03 22:59:43 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Offset for fields in tss_struct */
|
2018-07-18 09:40:38 +00:00
|
|
|
OFFSET(TSS_sp0, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp0);
|
|
|
|
|
OFFSET(TSS_sp1, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp1);
|
2018-09-03 22:59:43 +00:00
|
|
|
OFFSET(TSS_sp2, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp2);
|
2022-09-15 11:11:04 +00:00
|
|
|
OFFSET(X86_top_of_stack, pcpu_hot, top_of_stack);
|
2023-03-16 22:21:03 +00:00
|
|
|
OFFSET(X86_current_task, pcpu_hot, current_task);
|
2022-09-15 11:11:27 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
|
|
|
|
|
OFFSET(X86_call_depth, pcpu_hot, call_depth);
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2023-01-01 09:12:50 +00:00
|
|
|
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARIA_AESNI_AVX_X86_64)
|
|
|
|
|
/* Offset for fields in aria_ctx */
|
|
|
|
|
BLANK();
|
|
|
|
|
OFFSET(ARIA_CTX_enc_key, aria_ctx, enc_key);
|
|
|
|
|
OFFSET(ARIA_CTX_dec_key, aria_ctx, dec_key);
|
|
|
|
|
OFFSET(ARIA_CTX_rounds, aria_ctx, rounds);
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2022-09-15 11:11:04 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-02-09 08:24:34 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
