linux/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c

1564 lines
40 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 14:07:57 +00:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* sysctl_net_ipv4.c: sysctl interface to net IPV4 subsystem.
*
* Begun April 1, 1996, Mike Shaver.
* Added /proc/sys/net/ipv4 directory entry (empty =) ). [MS]
*/
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#include <linux/seqlock.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 08:04:11 +00:00
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <net/icmp.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
#include <net/ip_fib.h>
#include <net/tcp.h>
#include <net/udp.h>
#include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 10:01:00 +00:00
#include <net/ping.h>
#include <net/protocol.h>
#include <net/netevent.h>
static int tcp_retr1_max = 255;
static int ip_local_port_range_min[] = { 1, 1 };
static int ip_local_port_range_max[] = { 65535, 65535 };
static int tcp_adv_win_scale_min = -31;
static int tcp_adv_win_scale_max = 31;
static int tcp_app_win_max = 31;
static int tcp_min_snd_mss_min = TCP_MIN_SND_MSS;
static int tcp_min_snd_mss_max = 65535;
static int ip_privileged_port_min;
static int ip_privileged_port_max = 65535;
static int ip_ttl_min = 1;
static int ip_ttl_max = 255;
static int tcp_syn_retries_min = 1;
static int tcp_syn_retries_max = MAX_TCP_SYNCNT;
static int tcp_syn_linear_timeouts_max = MAX_TCP_SYNCNT;
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 10:01:00 +00:00
static int ip_ping_group_range_min[] = { 0, 0 };
static int ip_ping_group_range_max[] = { GID_T_MAX, GID_T_MAX };
static u32 u32_max_div_HZ = UINT_MAX / HZ;
static int one_day_secs = 24 * 3600;
static u32 fib_multipath_hash_fields_all_mask __maybe_unused =
FIB_MULTIPATH_HASH_FIELD_ALL_MASK;
tcp: Introduce optional per-netns ehash. The more sockets we have in the hash table, the longer we spend looking up the socket. While running a number of small workloads on the same host, they penalise each other and cause performance degradation. The root cause might be a single workload that consumes much more resources than the others. It often happens on a cloud service where different workloads share the same computing resource. On EC2 c5.24xlarge instance (196 GiB memory and 524288 (1Mi / 2) ehash entries), after running iperf3 in different netns, creating 24Mi sockets without data transfer in the root netns causes about 10% performance regression for the iperf3's connection. thash_entries sockets length Gbps 524288 1 1 50.7 24Mi 48 45.1 It is basically related to the length of the list of each hash bucket. For testing purposes to see how performance drops along the length, I set 131072 (1Mi / 8) to thash_entries, and here's the result. thash_entries sockets length Gbps 131072 1 1 50.7 1Mi 8 49.9 2Mi 16 48.9 4Mi 32 47.3 8Mi 64 44.6 16Mi 128 40.6 24Mi 192 36.3 32Mi 256 32.5 40Mi 320 27.0 48Mi 384 25.0 To resolve the socket lookup degradation, we introduce an optional per-netns hash table for TCP, but it's just ehash, and we still share the global bhash, bhash2 and lhash2. With a smaller ehash, we can look up non-listener sockets faster and isolate such noisy neighbours. In addition, we can reduce lock contention. We can control the ehash size by a new sysctl knob. However, depending on workloads, it will require very sensitive tuning, so we disable the feature by default (net.ipv4.tcp_child_ehash_entries == 0). Moreover, we can fall back to using the global ehash in case we fail to allocate enough memory for a new ehash. The maximum size is 16Mi, which is large enough that even if we have 48Mi sockets, the average list length is 3, and regression would be less than 1%. We can check the current ehash size by another read-only sysctl knob, net.ipv4.tcp_ehash_entries. A negative value means the netns shares the global ehash (per-netns ehash is disabled or failed to allocate memory). # dmesg | cut -d ' ' -f 5- | grep "established hash" TCP established hash table entries: 524288 (order: 10, 4194304 bytes, vmalloc hugepage) # sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_ehash_entries net.ipv4.tcp_ehash_entries = 524288 # can be changed by thash_entries # sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_child_ehash_entries net.ipv4.tcp_child_ehash_entries = 0 # disabled by default # ip netns add test1 # ip netns exec test1 sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_ehash_entries net.ipv4.tcp_ehash_entries = -524288 # share the global ehash # sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_child_ehash_entries=100 net.ipv4.tcp_child_ehash_entries = 100 # ip netns add test2 # ip netns exec test2 sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_ehash_entries net.ipv4.tcp_ehash_entries = 128 # own a per-netns ehash with 2^n buckets When more than two processes in the same netns create per-netns ehash concurrently with different sizes, we need to guarantee the size in one of the following ways: 1) Share the global ehash and create per-netns ehash First, unshare() with tcp_child_ehash_entries==0. It creates dedicated netns sysctl knobs where we can safely change tcp_child_ehash_entries and clone()/unshare() to create a per-netns ehash. 2) Control write on sysctl by BPF We can use BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL to allow/deny read/write on sysctl knobs. Note that the global ehash allocated at the boot time is spread over available NUMA nodes, but inet_pernet_hashinfo_alloc() will allocate pages for each per-netns ehash depending on the current process's NUMA policy. By default, the allocation is done in the local node only, so the per-netns hash table could fully reside on a random node. Thus, depending on the NUMA policy the netns is created with and the CPU the current thread is running on, we could see some performance differences for highly optimised networking applications. Note also that the default values of two sysctl knobs depend on the ehash size and should be tuned carefully: tcp_max_tw_buckets : tcp_child_ehash_entries / 2 tcp_max_syn_backlog : max(128, tcp_child_ehash_entries / 128) As a bonus, we can dismantle netns faster. Currently, while destroying netns, we call inet_twsk_purge(), which walks through the global ehash. It can be potentially big because it can have many sockets other than TIME_WAIT in all netns. Splitting ehash changes that situation, where it's only necessary for inet_twsk_purge() to clean up TIME_WAIT sockets in each netns. With regard to this, we do not free the per-netns ehash in inet_twsk_kill() to avoid UAF while iterating the per-netns ehash in inet_twsk_purge(). Instead, we do it in tcp_sk_exit_batch() after calling tcp_twsk_purge() to keep it protocol-family-independent. In the future, we could optimise ehash lookup/iteration further by removing netns comparison for the per-netns ehash. Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2022-09-08 01:10:22 +00:00
static unsigned int tcp_child_ehash_entries_max = 16 * 1024 * 1024;
udp: Introduce optional per-netns hash table. The maximum hash table size is 64K due to the nature of the protocol. [0] It's smaller than TCP, and fewer sockets can cause a performance drop. On an EC2 c5.24xlarge instance (192 GiB memory), after running iperf3 in different netns, creating 32Mi sockets without data transfer in the root netns causes regression for the iperf3's connection. uhash_entries sockets length Gbps 64K 1 1 5.69 1Mi 16 5.27 2Mi 32 4.90 4Mi 64 4.09 8Mi 128 2.96 16Mi 256 2.06 32Mi 512 1.12 The per-netns hash table breaks the lengthy lists into shorter ones. It is useful on a multi-tenant system with thousands of netns. With smaller hash tables, we can look up sockets faster, isolate noisy neighbours, and reduce lock contention. The max size of the per-netns table is 64K as well. This is because the possible hash range by udp_hashfn() always fits in 64K within the same netns and we cannot make full use of the whole buckets larger than 64K. /* 0 < num < 64K -> X < hash < X + 64K */ (num + net_hash_mix(net)) & mask; Also, the min size is 128. We use a bitmap to search for an available port in udp_lib_get_port(). To keep the bitmap on the stack and not fire the CONFIG_FRAME_WARN error at build time, we round up the table size to 128. The sysctl usage is the same with TCP: $ dmesg | cut -d ' ' -f 6- | grep "UDP hash" UDP hash table entries: 65536 (order: 9, 2097152 bytes, vmalloc) # sysctl net.ipv4.udp_hash_entries net.ipv4.udp_hash_entries = 65536 # can be changed by uhash_entries # sysctl net.ipv4.udp_child_hash_entries net.ipv4.udp_child_hash_entries = 0 # disabled by default # ip netns add test1 # ip netns exec test1 sysctl net.ipv4.udp_hash_entries net.ipv4.udp_hash_entries = -65536 # share the global table # sysctl -w net.ipv4.udp_child_hash_entries=100 net.ipv4.udp_child_hash_entries = 100 # ip netns add test2 # ip netns exec test2 sysctl net.ipv4.udp_hash_entries net.ipv4.udp_hash_entries = 128 # own a per-netns table with 2^n buckets We could optimise the hash table lookup/iteration further by removing the netns comparison for the per-netns one in the future. Also, we could optimise the sparse udp_hslot layout by putting it in udp_table. [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/4ACC2815.7010101@gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-11-14 21:57:57 +00:00
static unsigned int udp_child_hash_entries_max = UDP_HTABLE_SIZE_MAX;
static int tcp_plb_max_rounds = 31;
static int tcp_plb_max_cong_thresh = 256;
/* obsolete */
static int sysctl_tcp_low_latency __read_mostly;
/* Update system visible IP port range */
static void set_local_port_range(struct net *net, int range[2])
{
bool same_parity = !((range[0] ^ range[1]) & 1);
ipv4: disable BH when changing ip local port range This fixes the following lockdep warning: [ INFO: inconsistent lock state ] 4.3.0-rc7+ #1197 Not tainted --------------------------------- inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-R} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. sysctl/1019 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: (&(&net->ipv4.ip_local_ports.lock)->seqcount){+.+-..}, at: [<ffffffff81921de7>] ipv4_local_port_range+0xb4/0x12a {IN-SOFTIRQ-R} state was registered at: [<ffffffff810bd682>] __lock_acquire+0x2f6/0xdf0 [<ffffffff810be6d5>] lock_acquire+0x11c/0x1a4 [<ffffffff818e599c>] inet_get_local_port_range+0x4e/0xae [<ffffffff8166e8e3>] udp_flow_src_port.constprop.40+0x23/0x116 [<ffffffff81671cb9>] vxlan_xmit_one+0x219/0xa6a [<ffffffff81672f75>] vxlan_xmit+0xa6b/0xaa5 [<ffffffff817f2deb>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x2ae/0x465 [<ffffffff817f35ed>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x531/0x633 [<ffffffff817f3702>] dev_queue_xmit_sk+0x13/0x15 [<ffffffff818004a5>] neigh_resolve_output+0x12f/0x14d [<ffffffff81959cfa>] ip6_finish_output2+0x344/0x39f [<ffffffff8195bf58>] ip6_finish_output+0x88/0x8e [<ffffffff8195bfef>] ip6_output+0x91/0xe5 [<ffffffff819792ae>] dst_output_sk+0x47/0x4c [<ffffffff81979392>] NF_HOOK_THRESH.constprop.30+0x38/0x82 [<ffffffff8197981e>] mld_sendpack+0x189/0x266 [<ffffffff8197b28b>] mld_ifc_timer_expire+0x1ef/0x223 [<ffffffff810de581>] call_timer_fn+0xfb/0x28c [<ffffffff810ded1e>] run_timer_softirq+0x1c7/0x1f1 Fixes: b8f1a55639e6 ("udp: Add function to make source port for UDP tunnels") Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-11-03 22:32:57 +00:00
write_seqlock_bh(&net->ipv4.ip_local_ports.lock);
if (same_parity && !net->ipv4.ip_local_ports.warned) {
net->ipv4.ip_local_ports.warned = true;
pr_err_ratelimited("ip_local_port_range: prefer different parity for start/end values.\n");
}
net->ipv4.ip_local_ports.range[0] = range[0];
net->ipv4.ip_local_ports.range[1] = range[1];
ipv4: disable BH when changing ip local port range This fixes the following lockdep warning: [ INFO: inconsistent lock state ] 4.3.0-rc7+ #1197 Not tainted --------------------------------- inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-R} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. sysctl/1019 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE1:SE1] takes: (&(&net->ipv4.ip_local_ports.lock)->seqcount){+.+-..}, at: [<ffffffff81921de7>] ipv4_local_port_range+0xb4/0x12a {IN-SOFTIRQ-R} state was registered at: [<ffffffff810bd682>] __lock_acquire+0x2f6/0xdf0 [<ffffffff810be6d5>] lock_acquire+0x11c/0x1a4 [<ffffffff818e599c>] inet_get_local_port_range+0x4e/0xae [<ffffffff8166e8e3>] udp_flow_src_port.constprop.40+0x23/0x116 [<ffffffff81671cb9>] vxlan_xmit_one+0x219/0xa6a [<ffffffff81672f75>] vxlan_xmit+0xa6b/0xaa5 [<ffffffff817f2deb>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x2ae/0x465 [<ffffffff817f35ed>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x531/0x633 [<ffffffff817f3702>] dev_queue_xmit_sk+0x13/0x15 [<ffffffff818004a5>] neigh_resolve_output+0x12f/0x14d [<ffffffff81959cfa>] ip6_finish_output2+0x344/0x39f [<ffffffff8195bf58>] ip6_finish_output+0x88/0x8e [<ffffffff8195bfef>] ip6_output+0x91/0xe5 [<ffffffff819792ae>] dst_output_sk+0x47/0x4c [<ffffffff81979392>] NF_HOOK_THRESH.constprop.30+0x38/0x82 [<ffffffff8197981e>] mld_sendpack+0x189/0x266 [<ffffffff8197b28b>] mld_ifc_timer_expire+0x1ef/0x223 [<ffffffff810de581>] call_timer_fn+0xfb/0x28c [<ffffffff810ded1e>] run_timer_softirq+0x1c7/0x1f1 Fixes: b8f1a55639e6 ("udp: Add function to make source port for UDP tunnels") Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-11-03 22:32:57 +00:00
write_sequnlock_bh(&net->ipv4.ip_local_ports.lock);
}
/* Validate changes from /proc interface. */
static int ipv4_local_port_range(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct net *net =
container_of(table->data, struct net, ipv4.ip_local_ports.range);
int ret;
int range[2];
struct ctl_table tmp = {
.data = &range,
.maxlen = sizeof(range),
.mode = table->mode,
.extra1 = &ip_local_port_range_min,
.extra2 = &ip_local_port_range_max,
};
inet_get_local_port_range(net, &range[0], &range[1]);
ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (write && ret == 0) {
/* Ensure that the upper limit is not smaller than the lower,
* and that the lower does not encroach upon the privileged
* port limit.
*/
if ((range[1] < range[0]) ||
(range[0] < READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock)))
ret = -EINVAL;
else
set_local_port_range(net, range);
}
return ret;
}
/* Validate changes from /proc interface. */
static int ipv4_privileged_ports(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct net *net = container_of(table->data, struct net,
ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock);
int ret;
int pports;
int range[2];
struct ctl_table tmp = {
.data = &pports,
.maxlen = sizeof(pports),
.mode = table->mode,
.extra1 = &ip_privileged_port_min,
.extra2 = &ip_privileged_port_max,
};
pports = READ_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock);
ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (write && ret == 0) {
inet_get_local_port_range(net, &range[0], &range[1]);
/* Ensure that the local port range doesn't overlap with the
* privileged port range.
*/
if (range[0] < pports)
ret = -EINVAL;
else
WRITE_ONCE(net->ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock, pports);
}
return ret;
}
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 10:01:00 +00:00
static void inet_get_ping_group_range_table(struct ctl_table *table, kgid_t *low, kgid_t *high)
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 10:01:00 +00:00
{
kgid_t *data = table->data;
struct net *net =
container_of(table->data, struct net, ipv4.ping_group_range.range);
unsigned int seq;
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 10:01:00 +00:00
do {
seq = read_seqbegin(&net->ipv4.ping_group_range.lock);
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 10:01:00 +00:00
*low = data[0];
*high = data[1];
} while (read_seqretry(&net->ipv4.ping_group_range.lock, seq));
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 10:01:00 +00:00
}
/* Update system visible IP port range */
static void set_ping_group_range(struct ctl_table *table, kgid_t low, kgid_t high)
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 10:01:00 +00:00
{
kgid_t *data = table->data;
struct net *net =
container_of(table->data, struct net, ipv4.ping_group_range.range);
write_seqlock(&net->ipv4.ping_group_range.lock);
data[0] = low;
data[1] = high;
write_sequnlock(&net->ipv4.ping_group_range.lock);
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 10:01:00 +00:00
}
/* Validate changes from /proc interface. */
static int ipv4_ping_group_range(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 10:01:00 +00:00
{
struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 10:01:00 +00:00
int ret;
gid_t urange[2];
kgid_t low, high;
struct ctl_table tmp = {
.data = &urange,
.maxlen = sizeof(urange),
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 10:01:00 +00:00
.mode = table->mode,
.extra1 = &ip_ping_group_range_min,
.extra2 = &ip_ping_group_range_max,
};
inet_get_ping_group_range_table(table, &low, &high);
urange[0] = from_kgid_munged(user_ns, low);
urange[1] = from_kgid_munged(user_ns, high);
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 10:01:00 +00:00
ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (write && ret == 0) {
low = make_kgid(user_ns, urange[0]);
high = make_kgid(user_ns, urange[1]);
if (!gid_valid(low) || !gid_valid(high))
return -EINVAL;
if (urange[1] < urange[0] || gid_lt(high, low)) {
low = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, 1);
high = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, 0);
}
set_ping_group_range(table, low, high);
}
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 10:01:00 +00:00
return ret;
}
static int ipv4_fwd_update_priority(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct net *net;
int ret;
net = container_of(table->data, struct net,
ipv4.sysctl_ip_fwd_update_priority);
ret = proc_dou8vec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (write && ret == 0)
call_netevent_notifiers(NETEVENT_IPV4_FWD_UPDATE_PRIORITY_UPDATE,
net);
return ret;
}
static int proc_tcp_congestion_control(struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct net *net = container_of(ctl->data, struct net,
ipv4.tcp_congestion_control);
char val[TCP_CA_NAME_MAX];
struct ctl_table tbl = {
.data = val,
.maxlen = TCP_CA_NAME_MAX,
};
int ret;
tcp_get_default_congestion_control(net, val);
ret = proc_dostring(&tbl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (write && ret == 0)
ret = tcp_set_default_congestion_control(net, val);
return ret;
}
static int proc_tcp_available_congestion_control(struct ctl_table *ctl,
int write, void *buffer,
size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct ctl_table tbl = { .maxlen = TCP_CA_BUF_MAX, };
int ret;
tbl.data = kmalloc(tbl.maxlen, GFP_USER);
if (!tbl.data)
return -ENOMEM;
tcp_get_available_congestion_control(tbl.data, TCP_CA_BUF_MAX);
ret = proc_dostring(&tbl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
kfree(tbl.data);
return ret;
}
static int proc_allowed_congestion_control(struct ctl_table *ctl,
int write, void *buffer,
size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct ctl_table tbl = { .maxlen = TCP_CA_BUF_MAX };
int ret;
tbl.data = kmalloc(tbl.maxlen, GFP_USER);
if (!tbl.data)
return -ENOMEM;
tcp_get_allowed_congestion_control(tbl.data, tbl.maxlen);
ret = proc_dostring(&tbl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (write && ret == 0)
ret = tcp_set_allowed_congestion_control(tbl.data);
kfree(tbl.data);
return ret;
}
static int sscanf_key(char *buf, __le32 *key)
{
u32 user_key[4];
int i, ret = 0;
if (sscanf(buf, "%x-%x-%x-%x", user_key, user_key + 1,
user_key + 2, user_key + 3) != 4) {
ret = -EINVAL;
} else {
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(user_key); i++)
key[i] = cpu_to_le32(user_key[i]);
}
pr_debug("proc TFO key set 0x%x-%x-%x-%x <- 0x%s: %u\n",
user_key[0], user_key[1], user_key[2], user_key[3], buf, ret);
return ret;
}
static int proc_tcp_fastopen_key(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct net *net = container_of(table->data, struct net,
ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fastopen);
/* maxlen to print the list of keys in hex (*2), with dashes
* separating doublewords and a comma in between keys.
*/
struct ctl_table tbl = { .maxlen = ((TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH *
2 * TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_MAX) +
(TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_MAX * 5)) };
u32 user_key[TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_BUF_LENGTH / sizeof(u32)];
__le32 key[TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_BUF_LENGTH / sizeof(__le32)];
char *backup_data;
int ret, i = 0, off = 0, n_keys;
tbl.data = kmalloc(tbl.maxlen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tbl.data)
return -ENOMEM;
n_keys = tcp_fastopen_get_cipher(net, NULL, (u64 *)key);
if (!n_keys) {
memset(&key[0], 0, TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH);
n_keys = 1;
}
for (i = 0; i < n_keys * 4; i++)
user_key[i] = le32_to_cpu(key[i]);
for (i = 0; i < n_keys; i++) {
off += snprintf(tbl.data + off, tbl.maxlen - off,
"%08x-%08x-%08x-%08x",
user_key[i * 4],
user_key[i * 4 + 1],
user_key[i * 4 + 2],
user_key[i * 4 + 3]);
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(off >= tbl.maxlen - 1))
break;
if (i + 1 < n_keys)
off += snprintf(tbl.data + off, tbl.maxlen - off, ",");
}
ret = proc_dostring(&tbl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (write && ret == 0) {
backup_data = strchr(tbl.data, ',');
if (backup_data) {
*backup_data = '\0';
backup_data++;
}
if (sscanf_key(tbl.data, key)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto bad_key;
}
if (backup_data) {
if (sscanf_key(backup_data, key + 4)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto bad_key;
}
}
tcp_fastopen_reset_cipher(net, NULL, key,
backup_data ? key + 4 : NULL);
}
bad_key:
kfree(tbl.data);
return ret;
}
net/tcp_fastopen: Disable active side TFO in certain scenarios Middlebox firewall issues can potentially cause server's data being blackholed after a successful 3WHS using TFO. Following are the related reports from Apple: https://www.nanog.org/sites/default/files/Paasch_Network_Support.pdf Slide 31 identifies an issue where the client ACK to the server's data sent during a TFO'd handshake is dropped. C ---> syn-data ---> S C <--- syn/ack ----- S C (accept & write) C <---- data ------- S C ----- ACK -> X S [retry and timeout] https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/94/slides/slides-94-tcpm-13.pdf Slide 5 shows a similar situation that the server's data gets dropped after 3WHS. C ---- syn-data ---> S C <--- syn/ack ----- S C ---- ack --------> S S (accept & write) C? X <- data ------ S [retry and timeout] This is the worst failure b/c the client can not detect such behavior to mitigate the situation (such as disabling TFO). Failing to proceed, the application (e.g., SSL library) may simply timeout and retry with TFO again, and the process repeats indefinitely. The proposed solution is to disable active TFO globally under the following circumstances: 1. client side TFO socket detects out of order FIN 2. client side TFO socket receives out of order RST We disable active side TFO globally for 1hr at first. Then if it happens again, we disable it for 2h, then 4h, 8h, ... And we reset the timeout to 1hr if a client side TFO sockets not opened on loopback has successfully received data segs from server. And we examine this condition during close(). The rational behind it is that when such firewall issue happens, application running on the client should eventually close the socket as it is not able to get the data it is expecting. Or application running on the server should close the socket as it is not able to receive any response from client. In both cases, out of order FIN or RST will get received on the client given that the firewall will not block them as no data are in those frames. And we want to disable active TFO globally as it helps if the middle box is very close to the client and most of the connections are likely to fail. Also, add a debug sysctl: tcp_fastopen_blackhole_detect_timeout_sec: the initial timeout to use when firewall blackhole issue happens. This can be set and read. When setting it to 0, it means to disable the active disable logic. Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-20 21:45:46 +00:00
static int proc_tfo_blackhole_detect_timeout(struct ctl_table *table,
int write, void *buffer,
net/tcp_fastopen: Disable active side TFO in certain scenarios Middlebox firewall issues can potentially cause server's data being blackholed after a successful 3WHS using TFO. Following are the related reports from Apple: https://www.nanog.org/sites/default/files/Paasch_Network_Support.pdf Slide 31 identifies an issue where the client ACK to the server's data sent during a TFO'd handshake is dropped. C ---> syn-data ---> S C <--- syn/ack ----- S C (accept & write) C <---- data ------- S C ----- ACK -> X S [retry and timeout] https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/94/slides/slides-94-tcpm-13.pdf Slide 5 shows a similar situation that the server's data gets dropped after 3WHS. C ---- syn-data ---> S C <--- syn/ack ----- S C ---- ack --------> S S (accept & write) C? X <- data ------ S [retry and timeout] This is the worst failure b/c the client can not detect such behavior to mitigate the situation (such as disabling TFO). Failing to proceed, the application (e.g., SSL library) may simply timeout and retry with TFO again, and the process repeats indefinitely. The proposed solution is to disable active TFO globally under the following circumstances: 1. client side TFO socket detects out of order FIN 2. client side TFO socket receives out of order RST We disable active side TFO globally for 1hr at first. Then if it happens again, we disable it for 2h, then 4h, 8h, ... And we reset the timeout to 1hr if a client side TFO sockets not opened on loopback has successfully received data segs from server. And we examine this condition during close(). The rational behind it is that when such firewall issue happens, application running on the client should eventually close the socket as it is not able to get the data it is expecting. Or application running on the server should close the socket as it is not able to receive any response from client. In both cases, out of order FIN or RST will get received on the client given that the firewall will not block them as no data are in those frames. And we want to disable active TFO globally as it helps if the middle box is very close to the client and most of the connections are likely to fail. Also, add a debug sysctl: tcp_fastopen_blackhole_detect_timeout_sec: the initial timeout to use when firewall blackhole issue happens. This can be set and read. When setting it to 0, it means to disable the active disable logic. Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-20 21:45:46 +00:00
size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct net *net = container_of(table->data, struct net,
ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fastopen_blackhole_timeout);
net/tcp_fastopen: Disable active side TFO in certain scenarios Middlebox firewall issues can potentially cause server's data being blackholed after a successful 3WHS using TFO. Following are the related reports from Apple: https://www.nanog.org/sites/default/files/Paasch_Network_Support.pdf Slide 31 identifies an issue where the client ACK to the server's data sent during a TFO'd handshake is dropped. C ---> syn-data ---> S C <--- syn/ack ----- S C (accept & write) C <---- data ------- S C ----- ACK -> X S [retry and timeout] https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/94/slides/slides-94-tcpm-13.pdf Slide 5 shows a similar situation that the server's data gets dropped after 3WHS. C ---- syn-data ---> S C <--- syn/ack ----- S C ---- ack --------> S S (accept & write) C? X <- data ------ S [retry and timeout] This is the worst failure b/c the client can not detect such behavior to mitigate the situation (such as disabling TFO). Failing to proceed, the application (e.g., SSL library) may simply timeout and retry with TFO again, and the process repeats indefinitely. The proposed solution is to disable active TFO globally under the following circumstances: 1. client side TFO socket detects out of order FIN 2. client side TFO socket receives out of order RST We disable active side TFO globally for 1hr at first. Then if it happens again, we disable it for 2h, then 4h, 8h, ... And we reset the timeout to 1hr if a client side TFO sockets not opened on loopback has successfully received data segs from server. And we examine this condition during close(). The rational behind it is that when such firewall issue happens, application running on the client should eventually close the socket as it is not able to get the data it is expecting. Or application running on the server should close the socket as it is not able to receive any response from client. In both cases, out of order FIN or RST will get received on the client given that the firewall will not block them as no data are in those frames. And we want to disable active TFO globally as it helps if the middle box is very close to the client and most of the connections are likely to fail. Also, add a debug sysctl: tcp_fastopen_blackhole_detect_timeout_sec: the initial timeout to use when firewall blackhole issue happens. This can be set and read. When setting it to 0, it means to disable the active disable logic. Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-20 21:45:46 +00:00
int ret;
ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (write && ret == 0)
atomic_set(&net->ipv4.tfo_active_disable_times, 0);
return ret;
}
static int proc_tcp_available_ulp(struct ctl_table *ctl,
int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp,
loff_t *ppos)
{
struct ctl_table tbl = { .maxlen = TCP_ULP_BUF_MAX, };
int ret;
tbl.data = kmalloc(tbl.maxlen, GFP_USER);
if (!tbl.data)
return -ENOMEM;
tcp_get_available_ulp(tbl.data, TCP_ULP_BUF_MAX);
ret = proc_dostring(&tbl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
kfree(tbl.data);
net/tcp_fastopen: Disable active side TFO in certain scenarios Middlebox firewall issues can potentially cause server's data being blackholed after a successful 3WHS using TFO. Following are the related reports from Apple: https://www.nanog.org/sites/default/files/Paasch_Network_Support.pdf Slide 31 identifies an issue where the client ACK to the server's data sent during a TFO'd handshake is dropped. C ---> syn-data ---> S C <--- syn/ack ----- S C (accept & write) C <---- data ------- S C ----- ACK -> X S [retry and timeout] https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/94/slides/slides-94-tcpm-13.pdf Slide 5 shows a similar situation that the server's data gets dropped after 3WHS. C ---- syn-data ---> S C <--- syn/ack ----- S C ---- ack --------> S S (accept & write) C? X <- data ------ S [retry and timeout] This is the worst failure b/c the client can not detect such behavior to mitigate the situation (such as disabling TFO). Failing to proceed, the application (e.g., SSL library) may simply timeout and retry with TFO again, and the process repeats indefinitely. The proposed solution is to disable active TFO globally under the following circumstances: 1. client side TFO socket detects out of order FIN 2. client side TFO socket receives out of order RST We disable active side TFO globally for 1hr at first. Then if it happens again, we disable it for 2h, then 4h, 8h, ... And we reset the timeout to 1hr if a client side TFO sockets not opened on loopback has successfully received data segs from server. And we examine this condition during close(). The rational behind it is that when such firewall issue happens, application running on the client should eventually close the socket as it is not able to get the data it is expecting. Or application running on the server should close the socket as it is not able to receive any response from client. In both cases, out of order FIN or RST will get received on the client given that the firewall will not block them as no data are in those frames. And we want to disable active TFO globally as it helps if the middle box is very close to the client and most of the connections are likely to fail. Also, add a debug sysctl: tcp_fastopen_blackhole_detect_timeout_sec: the initial timeout to use when firewall blackhole issue happens. This can be set and read. When setting it to 0, it means to disable the active disable logic. Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-20 21:45:46 +00:00
return ret;
}
tcp: Introduce optional per-netns ehash. The more sockets we have in the hash table, the longer we spend looking up the socket. While running a number of small workloads on the same host, they penalise each other and cause performance degradation. The root cause might be a single workload that consumes much more resources than the others. It often happens on a cloud service where different workloads share the same computing resource. On EC2 c5.24xlarge instance (196 GiB memory and 524288 (1Mi / 2) ehash entries), after running iperf3 in different netns, creating 24Mi sockets without data transfer in the root netns causes about 10% performance regression for the iperf3's connection. thash_entries sockets length Gbps 524288 1 1 50.7 24Mi 48 45.1 It is basically related to the length of the list of each hash bucket. For testing purposes to see how performance drops along the length, I set 131072 (1Mi / 8) to thash_entries, and here's the result. thash_entries sockets length Gbps 131072 1 1 50.7 1Mi 8 49.9 2Mi 16 48.9 4Mi 32 47.3 8Mi 64 44.6 16Mi 128 40.6 24Mi 192 36.3 32Mi 256 32.5 40Mi 320 27.0 48Mi 384 25.0 To resolve the socket lookup degradation, we introduce an optional per-netns hash table for TCP, but it's just ehash, and we still share the global bhash, bhash2 and lhash2. With a smaller ehash, we can look up non-listener sockets faster and isolate such noisy neighbours. In addition, we can reduce lock contention. We can control the ehash size by a new sysctl knob. However, depending on workloads, it will require very sensitive tuning, so we disable the feature by default (net.ipv4.tcp_child_ehash_entries == 0). Moreover, we can fall back to using the global ehash in case we fail to allocate enough memory for a new ehash. The maximum size is 16Mi, which is large enough that even if we have 48Mi sockets, the average list length is 3, and regression would be less than 1%. We can check the current ehash size by another read-only sysctl knob, net.ipv4.tcp_ehash_entries. A negative value means the netns shares the global ehash (per-netns ehash is disabled or failed to allocate memory). # dmesg | cut -d ' ' -f 5- | grep "established hash" TCP established hash table entries: 524288 (order: 10, 4194304 bytes, vmalloc hugepage) # sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_ehash_entries net.ipv4.tcp_ehash_entries = 524288 # can be changed by thash_entries # sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_child_ehash_entries net.ipv4.tcp_child_ehash_entries = 0 # disabled by default # ip netns add test1 # ip netns exec test1 sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_ehash_entries net.ipv4.tcp_ehash_entries = -524288 # share the global ehash # sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_child_ehash_entries=100 net.ipv4.tcp_child_ehash_entries = 100 # ip netns add test2 # ip netns exec test2 sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_ehash_entries net.ipv4.tcp_ehash_entries = 128 # own a per-netns ehash with 2^n buckets When more than two processes in the same netns create per-netns ehash concurrently with different sizes, we need to guarantee the size in one of the following ways: 1) Share the global ehash and create per-netns ehash First, unshare() with tcp_child_ehash_entries==0. It creates dedicated netns sysctl knobs where we can safely change tcp_child_ehash_entries and clone()/unshare() to create a per-netns ehash. 2) Control write on sysctl by BPF We can use BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL to allow/deny read/write on sysctl knobs. Note that the global ehash allocated at the boot time is spread over available NUMA nodes, but inet_pernet_hashinfo_alloc() will allocate pages for each per-netns ehash depending on the current process's NUMA policy. By default, the allocation is done in the local node only, so the per-netns hash table could fully reside on a random node. Thus, depending on the NUMA policy the netns is created with and the CPU the current thread is running on, we could see some performance differences for highly optimised networking applications. Note also that the default values of two sysctl knobs depend on the ehash size and should be tuned carefully: tcp_max_tw_buckets : tcp_child_ehash_entries / 2 tcp_max_syn_backlog : max(128, tcp_child_ehash_entries / 128) As a bonus, we can dismantle netns faster. Currently, while destroying netns, we call inet_twsk_purge(), which walks through the global ehash. It can be potentially big because it can have many sockets other than TIME_WAIT in all netns. Splitting ehash changes that situation, where it's only necessary for inet_twsk_purge() to clean up TIME_WAIT sockets in each netns. With regard to this, we do not free the per-netns ehash in inet_twsk_kill() to avoid UAF while iterating the per-netns ehash in inet_twsk_purge(). Instead, we do it in tcp_sk_exit_batch() after calling tcp_twsk_purge() to keep it protocol-family-independent. In the future, we could optimise ehash lookup/iteration further by removing netns comparison for the per-netns ehash. Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2022-09-08 01:10:22 +00:00
static int proc_tcp_ehash_entries(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct net *net = container_of(table->data, struct net,
ipv4.sysctl_tcp_child_ehash_entries);
struct inet_hashinfo *hinfo = net->ipv4.tcp_death_row.hashinfo;
int tcp_ehash_entries;
struct ctl_table tbl;
tcp_ehash_entries = hinfo->ehash_mask + 1;
/* A negative number indicates that the child netns
* shares the global ehash.
*/
if (!net_eq(net, &init_net) && !hinfo->pernet)
tcp_ehash_entries *= -1;
udp: Introduce optional per-netns hash table. The maximum hash table size is 64K due to the nature of the protocol. [0] It's smaller than TCP, and fewer sockets can cause a performance drop. On an EC2 c5.24xlarge instance (192 GiB memory), after running iperf3 in different netns, creating 32Mi sockets without data transfer in the root netns causes regression for the iperf3's connection. uhash_entries sockets length Gbps 64K 1 1 5.69 1Mi 16 5.27 2Mi 32 4.90 4Mi 64 4.09 8Mi 128 2.96 16Mi 256 2.06 32Mi 512 1.12 The per-netns hash table breaks the lengthy lists into shorter ones. It is useful on a multi-tenant system with thousands of netns. With smaller hash tables, we can look up sockets faster, isolate noisy neighbours, and reduce lock contention. The max size of the per-netns table is 64K as well. This is because the possible hash range by udp_hashfn() always fits in 64K within the same netns and we cannot make full use of the whole buckets larger than 64K. /* 0 < num < 64K -> X < hash < X + 64K */ (num + net_hash_mix(net)) & mask; Also, the min size is 128. We use a bitmap to search for an available port in udp_lib_get_port(). To keep the bitmap on the stack and not fire the CONFIG_FRAME_WARN error at build time, we round up the table size to 128. The sysctl usage is the same with TCP: $ dmesg | cut -d ' ' -f 6- | grep "UDP hash" UDP hash table entries: 65536 (order: 9, 2097152 bytes, vmalloc) # sysctl net.ipv4.udp_hash_entries net.ipv4.udp_hash_entries = 65536 # can be changed by uhash_entries # sysctl net.ipv4.udp_child_hash_entries net.ipv4.udp_child_hash_entries = 0 # disabled by default # ip netns add test1 # ip netns exec test1 sysctl net.ipv4.udp_hash_entries net.ipv4.udp_hash_entries = -65536 # share the global table # sysctl -w net.ipv4.udp_child_hash_entries=100 net.ipv4.udp_child_hash_entries = 100 # ip netns add test2 # ip netns exec test2 sysctl net.ipv4.udp_hash_entries net.ipv4.udp_hash_entries = 128 # own a per-netns table with 2^n buckets We could optimise the hash table lookup/iteration further by removing the netns comparison for the per-netns one in the future. Also, we could optimise the sparse udp_hslot layout by putting it in udp_table. [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/4ACC2815.7010101@gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-11-14 21:57:57 +00:00
memset(&tbl, 0, sizeof(tbl));
tcp: Introduce optional per-netns ehash. The more sockets we have in the hash table, the longer we spend looking up the socket. While running a number of small workloads on the same host, they penalise each other and cause performance degradation. The root cause might be a single workload that consumes much more resources than the others. It often happens on a cloud service where different workloads share the same computing resource. On EC2 c5.24xlarge instance (196 GiB memory and 524288 (1Mi / 2) ehash entries), after running iperf3 in different netns, creating 24Mi sockets without data transfer in the root netns causes about 10% performance regression for the iperf3's connection. thash_entries sockets length Gbps 524288 1 1 50.7 24Mi 48 45.1 It is basically related to the length of the list of each hash bucket. For testing purposes to see how performance drops along the length, I set 131072 (1Mi / 8) to thash_entries, and here's the result. thash_entries sockets length Gbps 131072 1 1 50.7 1Mi 8 49.9 2Mi 16 48.9 4Mi 32 47.3 8Mi 64 44.6 16Mi 128 40.6 24Mi 192 36.3 32Mi 256 32.5 40Mi 320 27.0 48Mi 384 25.0 To resolve the socket lookup degradation, we introduce an optional per-netns hash table for TCP, but it's just ehash, and we still share the global bhash, bhash2 and lhash2. With a smaller ehash, we can look up non-listener sockets faster and isolate such noisy neighbours. In addition, we can reduce lock contention. We can control the ehash size by a new sysctl knob. However, depending on workloads, it will require very sensitive tuning, so we disable the feature by default (net.ipv4.tcp_child_ehash_entries == 0). Moreover, we can fall back to using the global ehash in case we fail to allocate enough memory for a new ehash. The maximum size is 16Mi, which is large enough that even if we have 48Mi sockets, the average list length is 3, and regression would be less than 1%. We can check the current ehash size by another read-only sysctl knob, net.ipv4.tcp_ehash_entries. A negative value means the netns shares the global ehash (per-netns ehash is disabled or failed to allocate memory). # dmesg | cut -d ' ' -f 5- | grep "established hash" TCP established hash table entries: 524288 (order: 10, 4194304 bytes, vmalloc hugepage) # sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_ehash_entries net.ipv4.tcp_ehash_entries = 524288 # can be changed by thash_entries # sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_child_ehash_entries net.ipv4.tcp_child_ehash_entries = 0 # disabled by default # ip netns add test1 # ip netns exec test1 sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_ehash_entries net.ipv4.tcp_ehash_entries = -524288 # share the global ehash # sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_child_ehash_entries=100 net.ipv4.tcp_child_ehash_entries = 100 # ip netns add test2 # ip netns exec test2 sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_ehash_entries net.ipv4.tcp_ehash_entries = 128 # own a per-netns ehash with 2^n buckets When more than two processes in the same netns create per-netns ehash concurrently with different sizes, we need to guarantee the size in one of the following ways: 1) Share the global ehash and create per-netns ehash First, unshare() with tcp_child_ehash_entries==0. It creates dedicated netns sysctl knobs where we can safely change tcp_child_ehash_entries and clone()/unshare() to create a per-netns ehash. 2) Control write on sysctl by BPF We can use BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL to allow/deny read/write on sysctl knobs. Note that the global ehash allocated at the boot time is spread over available NUMA nodes, but inet_pernet_hashinfo_alloc() will allocate pages for each per-netns ehash depending on the current process's NUMA policy. By default, the allocation is done in the local node only, so the per-netns hash table could fully reside on a random node. Thus, depending on the NUMA policy the netns is created with and the CPU the current thread is running on, we could see some performance differences for highly optimised networking applications. Note also that the default values of two sysctl knobs depend on the ehash size and should be tuned carefully: tcp_max_tw_buckets : tcp_child_ehash_entries / 2 tcp_max_syn_backlog : max(128, tcp_child_ehash_entries / 128) As a bonus, we can dismantle netns faster. Currently, while destroying netns, we call inet_twsk_purge(), which walks through the global ehash. It can be potentially big because it can have many sockets other than TIME_WAIT in all netns. Splitting ehash changes that situation, where it's only necessary for inet_twsk_purge() to clean up TIME_WAIT sockets in each netns. With regard to this, we do not free the per-netns ehash in inet_twsk_kill() to avoid UAF while iterating the per-netns ehash in inet_twsk_purge(). Instead, we do it in tcp_sk_exit_batch() after calling tcp_twsk_purge() to keep it protocol-family-independent. In the future, we could optimise ehash lookup/iteration further by removing netns comparison for the per-netns ehash. Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2022-09-08 01:10:22 +00:00
tbl.data = &tcp_ehash_entries;
tbl.maxlen = sizeof(int);
return proc_dointvec(&tbl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
}
udp: Introduce optional per-netns hash table. The maximum hash table size is 64K due to the nature of the protocol. [0] It's smaller than TCP, and fewer sockets can cause a performance drop. On an EC2 c5.24xlarge instance (192 GiB memory), after running iperf3 in different netns, creating 32Mi sockets without data transfer in the root netns causes regression for the iperf3's connection. uhash_entries sockets length Gbps 64K 1 1 5.69 1Mi 16 5.27 2Mi 32 4.90 4Mi 64 4.09 8Mi 128 2.96 16Mi 256 2.06 32Mi 512 1.12 The per-netns hash table breaks the lengthy lists into shorter ones. It is useful on a multi-tenant system with thousands of netns. With smaller hash tables, we can look up sockets faster, isolate noisy neighbours, and reduce lock contention. The max size of the per-netns table is 64K as well. This is because the possible hash range by udp_hashfn() always fits in 64K within the same netns and we cannot make full use of the whole buckets larger than 64K. /* 0 < num < 64K -> X < hash < X + 64K */ (num + net_hash_mix(net)) & mask; Also, the min size is 128. We use a bitmap to search for an available port in udp_lib_get_port(). To keep the bitmap on the stack and not fire the CONFIG_FRAME_WARN error at build time, we round up the table size to 128. The sysctl usage is the same with TCP: $ dmesg | cut -d ' ' -f 6- | grep "UDP hash" UDP hash table entries: 65536 (order: 9, 2097152 bytes, vmalloc) # sysctl net.ipv4.udp_hash_entries net.ipv4.udp_hash_entries = 65536 # can be changed by uhash_entries # sysctl net.ipv4.udp_child_hash_entries net.ipv4.udp_child_hash_entries = 0 # disabled by default # ip netns add test1 # ip netns exec test1 sysctl net.ipv4.udp_hash_entries net.ipv4.udp_hash_entries = -65536 # share the global table # sysctl -w net.ipv4.udp_child_hash_entries=100 net.ipv4.udp_child_hash_entries = 100 # ip netns add test2 # ip netns exec test2 sysctl net.ipv4.udp_hash_entries net.ipv4.udp_hash_entries = 128 # own a per-netns table with 2^n buckets We could optimise the hash table lookup/iteration further by removing the netns comparison for the per-netns one in the future. Also, we could optimise the sparse udp_hslot layout by putting it in udp_table. [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/4ACC2815.7010101@gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-11-14 21:57:57 +00:00
static int proc_udp_hash_entries(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct net *net = container_of(table->data, struct net,
ipv4.sysctl_udp_child_hash_entries);
int udp_hash_entries;
struct ctl_table tbl;
udp_hash_entries = net->ipv4.udp_table->mask + 1;
/* A negative number indicates that the child netns
* shares the global udp_table.
*/
if (!net_eq(net, &init_net) && net->ipv4.udp_table == &udp_table)
udp_hash_entries *= -1;
memset(&tbl, 0, sizeof(tbl));
tbl.data = &udp_hash_entries;
tbl.maxlen = sizeof(int);
return proc_dointvec(&tbl, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_MULTIPATH
static int proc_fib_multipath_hash_policy(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp,
loff_t *ppos)
{
struct net *net = container_of(table->data, struct net,
ipv4.sysctl_fib_multipath_hash_policy);
int ret;
ret = proc_dou8vec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (write && ret == 0)
call_netevent_notifiers(NETEVENT_IPV4_MPATH_HASH_UPDATE, net);
return ret;
}
static int proc_fib_multipath_hash_fields(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp,
loff_t *ppos)
{
struct net *net;
int ret;
net = container_of(table->data, struct net,
ipv4.sysctl_fib_multipath_hash_fields);
ret = proc_douintvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (write && ret == 0)
call_netevent_notifiers(NETEVENT_IPV4_MPATH_HASH_UPDATE, net);
return ret;
}
#endif
static struct ctl_table ipv4_table[] = {
{
.procname = "tcp_max_orphans",
.data = &sysctl_tcp_max_orphans,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "inet_peer_threshold",
.data = &inet_peer_threshold,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "inet_peer_minttl",
.data = &inet_peer_minttl,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_jiffies,
},
{
.procname = "inet_peer_maxttl",
.data = &inet_peer_maxttl,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_jiffies,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_mem",
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_tcp_mem),
.data = &sysctl_tcp_mem,
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_low_latency",
.data = &sysctl_tcp_low_latency,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
{
.procname = "cipso_cache_enable",
.data = &cipso_v4_cache_enabled,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "cipso_cache_bucket_size",
.data = &cipso_v4_cache_bucketsize,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "cipso_rbm_optfmt",
.data = &cipso_v4_rbm_optfmt,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "cipso_rbm_strictvalid",
.data = &cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
{
.procname = "tcp_available_ulp",
.maxlen = TCP_ULP_BUF_MAX,
.mode = 0444,
.proc_handler = proc_tcp_available_ulp,
},
{
.procname = "icmp_msgs_per_sec",
.data = &sysctl_icmp_msgs_per_sec,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-18 22:58:50 +00:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
},
{
.procname = "icmp_msgs_burst",
.data = &sysctl_icmp_msgs_burst,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-18 22:58:50 +00:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
},
{
.procname = "udp_mem",
.data = &sysctl_udp_mem,
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_udp_mem),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
},
ipv4: Allow amount of dirty memory from fib resizing to be controllable fib_trie implementation calls synchronize_rcu when a certain amount of pages are dirty from freed entries. The number of pages was determined experimentally in 2009 (commit c3059477fce2d). At the current setting, synchronize_rcu is called often -- 51 times in a second in one test with an average of an 8 msec delay adding a fib entry. The total impact is a lot of slow down modifying the fib. This is seen in the output of 'time' - the difference between real time and sys+user. For example, using 720,022 single path routes and 'ip -batch'[1]: $ time ./ip -batch ipv4/routes-1-hops real 0m14.214s user 0m2.513s sys 0m6.783s So roughly 35% of the actual time to install the routes is from the ip command getting scheduled out, most notably due to synchronize_rcu (this is observed using 'perf sched timehist'). This patch makes the amount of dirty memory configurable between 64k where the synchronize_rcu is called often (small, low end systems that are memory sensitive) to 64M where synchronize_rcu is called rarely during a large FIB change (for high end systems with lots of memory). The default is 512kB which corresponds to the current setting of 128 pages with a 4kB page size. As an example, at 16MB the worst interval shows 4 calls to synchronize_rcu in a second blocking for up to 30 msec in a single instance, and a total of almost 100 msec across the 4 calls in the second. The trade off is allowing FIB entries to consume more memory in a given time window but but with much better fib insertion rates (~30% increase in prefixes/sec). With this patch and net.ipv4.fib_sync_mem set to 16MB, the same batch file runs in: $ time ./ip -batch ipv4/routes-1-hops real 0m9.692s user 0m2.491s sys 0m6.769s So the dead time is reduced to about 1/2 second or <5% of the real time. [1] 'ip' modified to not request ACK messages which improves route insertion times by about 20% Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-03-20 16:18:59 +00:00
{
.procname = "fib_sync_mem",
.data = &sysctl_fib_sync_mem,
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_fib_sync_mem),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_douintvec_minmax,
.extra1 = &sysctl_fib_sync_mem_min,
.extra2 = &sysctl_fib_sync_mem_max,
},
{ }
};
static struct ctl_table ipv4_net_table[] = {
tcp: allocate tcp_death_row outside of struct netns_ipv4 I forgot tcp had per netns tracking of timewait sockets, and their sysctl to change the limit. After 0dad4087a86a ("tcp/dccp: get rid of inet_twsk_purge()"), whole struct net can be freed before last tw socket is freed. We need to allocate a separate struct inet_timewait_death_row object per netns. tw_count becomes a refcount and gains associated debugging infrastructure. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in inet_twsk_kill+0x358/0x3c0 net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c:46 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807d5f9f40 by task kworker/1:7/3690 CPU: 1 PID: 3690 Comm: kworker/1:7 Not tainted 5.16.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: events pwq_unbound_release_workfn Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x8d/0x336 mm/kasan/report.c:255 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:442 [inline] kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:459 inet_twsk_kill+0x358/0x3c0 net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c:46 call_timer_fn+0x1a5/0x6b0 kernel/time/timer.c:1421 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1466 [inline] __run_timers.part.0+0x67c/0xa30 kernel/time/timer.c:1734 __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1715 [inline] run_timer_softirq+0xb3/0x1d0 kernel/time/timer.c:1747 __do_softirq+0x29b/0x9c2 kernel/softirq.c:558 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:432 [inline] __irq_exit_rcu+0x123/0x180 kernel/softirq.c:637 irq_exit_rcu+0x5/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:649 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x93/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1097 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:638 RIP: 0010:lockdep_unregister_key+0x1c9/0x250 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6328 Code: 00 00 00 48 89 ee e8 46 fd ff ff 4c 89 f7 e8 5e c9 ff ff e8 09 cc ff ff 9c 58 f6 c4 02 75 26 41 f7 c4 00 02 00 00 74 01 fb 5b <5d> 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f e9 19 4a 08 00 0f 0b 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d RSP: 0018:ffffc90004077cb8 EFLAGS: 00000206 RAX: 0000000000000046 RBX: ffff88807b61b498 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff888077027128 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffffff8f1ea4fc R10: fffffbfff1ff93ee R11: 000000000000af1e R12: 0000000000000246 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffffff8ffc89b8 R15: ffffffff90157fb0 wq_unregister_lockdep kernel/workqueue.c:3508 [inline] pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x254/0x340 kernel/workqueue.c:3746 process_one_work+0x9ac/0x1650 kernel/workqueue.c:2307 worker_thread+0x657/0x1110 kernel/workqueue.c:2454 kthread+0x2e9/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:377 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295 </TASK> Allocated by task 3635: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:38 kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:46 [inline] set_alloc_info mm/kasan/common.c:437 [inline] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x90/0xc0 mm/kasan/common.c:470 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:732 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3230 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3238 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0x202/0x3a0 mm/slub.c:3243 kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:705 [inline] net_alloc net/core/net_namespace.c:407 [inline] copy_net_ns+0x125/0x760 net/core/net_namespace.c:462 create_new_namespaces+0x3f6/0xb20 kernel/nsproxy.c:110 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xc1/0x1f0 kernel/nsproxy.c:226 ksys_unshare+0x445/0x920 kernel/fork.c:3048 __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3119 [inline] __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3117 [inline] __x64_sys_unshare+0x2d/0x40 kernel/fork.c:3117 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88807d5f9a80 which belongs to the cache net_namespace of size 6528 The buggy address is located 1216 bytes inside of 6528-byte region [ffff88807d5f9a80, ffff88807d5fb400) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0001f57e00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88807d5f9a80 pfn:0x7d5f8 head:ffffea0001f57e00 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 memcg:ffff888070023001 flags: 0xfff00000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) raw: 00fff00000010200 ffff888010dd4f48 ffffea0001404e08 ffff8880118fd000 raw: ffff88807d5f9a80 0000000000040002 00000001ffffffff ffff888070023001 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd20c0(__GFP_IO|__GFP_FS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 3634, ts 119694798460, free_ts 119693556950 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:2434 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0xa72/0x2f50 mm/page_alloc.c:4165 __alloc_pages+0x1b2/0x500 mm/page_alloc.c:5389 alloc_pages+0x1aa/0x310 mm/mempolicy.c:2271 alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:1799 [inline] allocate_slab mm/slub.c:1944 [inline] new_slab+0x28a/0x3b0 mm/slub.c:2004 ___slab_alloc+0x87c/0xe90 mm/slub.c:3018 __slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x4d/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3105 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3196 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3238 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0x35c/0x3a0 mm/slub.c:3243 kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:705 [inline] net_alloc net/core/net_namespace.c:407 [inline] copy_net_ns+0x125/0x760 net/core/net_namespace.c:462 create_new_namespaces+0x3f6/0xb20 kernel/nsproxy.c:110 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xc1/0x1f0 kernel/nsproxy.c:226 ksys_unshare+0x445/0x920 kernel/fork.c:3048 __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3119 [inline] __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3117 [inline] __x64_sys_unshare+0x2d/0x40 kernel/fork.c:3117 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae page last free stack trace: reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline] free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1352 [inline] free_pcp_prepare+0x374/0x870 mm/page_alloc.c:1404 free_unref_page_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:3325 [inline] free_unref_page+0x19/0x690 mm/page_alloc.c:3404 skb_free_head net/core/skbuff.c:655 [inline] skb_release_data+0x65d/0x790 net/core/skbuff.c:677 skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:742 [inline] __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:756 [inline] consume_skb net/core/skbuff.c:914 [inline] consume_skb+0xc2/0x160 net/core/skbuff.c:908 skb_free_datagram+0x1b/0x1f0 net/core/datagram.c:325 netlink_recvmsg+0x636/0xea0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1998 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:948 [inline] sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:966 [inline] sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:962 [inline] ____sys_recvmsg+0x2c4/0x600 net/socket.c:2632 ___sys_recvmsg+0x127/0x200 net/socket.c:2674 __sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2704 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88807d5f9e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88807d5f9e80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff88807d5f9f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff88807d5f9f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88807d5fa000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb Fixes: 0dad4087a86a ("tcp/dccp: get rid of inet_twsk_purge()") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Reported-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Tested-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220126180714.845362-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2022-01-26 18:07:14 +00:00
{
.procname = "tcp_max_tw_buckets",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.tcp_death_row.sysctl_max_tw_buckets,
tcp: allocate tcp_death_row outside of struct netns_ipv4 I forgot tcp had per netns tracking of timewait sockets, and their sysctl to change the limit. After 0dad4087a86a ("tcp/dccp: get rid of inet_twsk_purge()"), whole struct net can be freed before last tw socket is freed. We need to allocate a separate struct inet_timewait_death_row object per netns. tw_count becomes a refcount and gains associated debugging infrastructure. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in inet_twsk_kill+0x358/0x3c0 net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c:46 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807d5f9f40 by task kworker/1:7/3690 CPU: 1 PID: 3690 Comm: kworker/1:7 Not tainted 5.16.0-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: events pwq_unbound_release_workfn Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x8d/0x336 mm/kasan/report.c:255 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:442 [inline] kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:459 inet_twsk_kill+0x358/0x3c0 net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c:46 call_timer_fn+0x1a5/0x6b0 kernel/time/timer.c:1421 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1466 [inline] __run_timers.part.0+0x67c/0xa30 kernel/time/timer.c:1734 __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1715 [inline] run_timer_softirq+0xb3/0x1d0 kernel/time/timer.c:1747 __do_softirq+0x29b/0x9c2 kernel/softirq.c:558 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:432 [inline] __irq_exit_rcu+0x123/0x180 kernel/softirq.c:637 irq_exit_rcu+0x5/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:649 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x93/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1097 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:638 RIP: 0010:lockdep_unregister_key+0x1c9/0x250 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6328 Code: 00 00 00 48 89 ee e8 46 fd ff ff 4c 89 f7 e8 5e c9 ff ff e8 09 cc ff ff 9c 58 f6 c4 02 75 26 41 f7 c4 00 02 00 00 74 01 fb 5b <5d> 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f e9 19 4a 08 00 0f 0b 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d RSP: 0018:ffffc90004077cb8 EFLAGS: 00000206 RAX: 0000000000000046 RBX: ffff88807b61b498 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff888077027128 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffffff8f1ea4fc R10: fffffbfff1ff93ee R11: 000000000000af1e R12: 0000000000000246 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffffff8ffc89b8 R15: ffffffff90157fb0 wq_unregister_lockdep kernel/workqueue.c:3508 [inline] pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x254/0x340 kernel/workqueue.c:3746 process_one_work+0x9ac/0x1650 kernel/workqueue.c:2307 worker_thread+0x657/0x1110 kernel/workqueue.c:2454 kthread+0x2e9/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:377 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295 </TASK> Allocated by task 3635: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:38 kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:46 [inline] set_alloc_info mm/kasan/common.c:437 [inline] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x90/0xc0 mm/kasan/common.c:470 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:732 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3230 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3238 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0x202/0x3a0 mm/slub.c:3243 kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:705 [inline] net_alloc net/core/net_namespace.c:407 [inline] copy_net_ns+0x125/0x760 net/core/net_namespace.c:462 create_new_namespaces+0x3f6/0xb20 kernel/nsproxy.c:110 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xc1/0x1f0 kernel/nsproxy.c:226 ksys_unshare+0x445/0x920 kernel/fork.c:3048 __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3119 [inline] __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3117 [inline] __x64_sys_unshare+0x2d/0x40 kernel/fork.c:3117 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88807d5f9a80 which belongs to the cache net_namespace of size 6528 The buggy address is located 1216 bytes inside of 6528-byte region [ffff88807d5f9a80, ffff88807d5fb400) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0001f57e00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88807d5f9a80 pfn:0x7d5f8 head:ffffea0001f57e00 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 memcg:ffff888070023001 flags: 0xfff00000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) raw: 00fff00000010200 ffff888010dd4f48 ffffea0001404e08 ffff8880118fd000 raw: ffff88807d5f9a80 0000000000040002 00000001ffffffff ffff888070023001 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd20c0(__GFP_IO|__GFP_FS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 3634, ts 119694798460, free_ts 119693556950 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:2434 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0xa72/0x2f50 mm/page_alloc.c:4165 __alloc_pages+0x1b2/0x500 mm/page_alloc.c:5389 alloc_pages+0x1aa/0x310 mm/mempolicy.c:2271 alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:1799 [inline] allocate_slab mm/slub.c:1944 [inline] new_slab+0x28a/0x3b0 mm/slub.c:2004 ___slab_alloc+0x87c/0xe90 mm/slub.c:3018 __slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x4d/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3105 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3196 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3238 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0x35c/0x3a0 mm/slub.c:3243 kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:705 [inline] net_alloc net/core/net_namespace.c:407 [inline] copy_net_ns+0x125/0x760 net/core/net_namespace.c:462 create_new_namespaces+0x3f6/0xb20 kernel/nsproxy.c:110 unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xc1/0x1f0 kernel/nsproxy.c:226 ksys_unshare+0x445/0x920 kernel/fork.c:3048 __do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3119 [inline] __se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:3117 [inline] __x64_sys_unshare+0x2d/0x40 kernel/fork.c:3117 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae page last free stack trace: reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline] free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1352 [inline] free_pcp_prepare+0x374/0x870 mm/page_alloc.c:1404 free_unref_page_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:3325 [inline] free_unref_page+0x19/0x690 mm/page_alloc.c:3404 skb_free_head net/core/skbuff.c:655 [inline] skb_release_data+0x65d/0x790 net/core/skbuff.c:677 skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:742 [inline] __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:756 [inline] consume_skb net/core/skbuff.c:914 [inline] consume_skb+0xc2/0x160 net/core/skbuff.c:908 skb_free_datagram+0x1b/0x1f0 net/core/datagram.c:325 netlink_recvmsg+0x636/0xea0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1998 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:948 [inline] sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:966 [inline] sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:962 [inline] ____sys_recvmsg+0x2c4/0x600 net/socket.c:2632 ___sys_recvmsg+0x127/0x200 net/socket.c:2674 __sys_recvmsg+0xe2/0x1a0 net/socket.c:2704 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88807d5f9e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88807d5f9e80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff88807d5f9f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff88807d5f9f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff88807d5fa000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb Fixes: 0dad4087a86a ("tcp/dccp: get rid of inet_twsk_purge()") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Reported-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Tested-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220126180714.845362-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2022-01-26 18:07:14 +00:00
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "icmp_echo_ignore_all",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_icmp_echo_ignore_all,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE
},
{
.procname = "icmp_echo_enable_probe",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_icmp_echo_enable_probe,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE
},
{
.procname = "icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE
},
{
.procname = "icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE
},
{
.procname = "icmp_errors_use_inbound_ifaddr",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_icmp_errors_use_inbound_ifaddr,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE
},
{
.procname = "icmp_ratelimit",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_icmp_ratelimit,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies,
},
{
.procname = "icmp_ratemask",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_icmp_ratemask,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 10:01:00 +00:00
{
.procname = "ping_group_range",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.ping_group_range.range,
.maxlen = sizeof(gid_t)*2,
net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind This patch adds IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind. It makes it possible to send ICMP_ECHO messages and receive the corresponding ICMP_ECHOREPLY messages without any special privileges. In other words, the patch makes it possible to implement setuid-less and CAP_NET_RAW-less /bin/ping. In order not to increase the kernel's attack surface, the new functionality is disabled by default, but is enabled at bootup by supporting Linux distributions, optionally with restriction to a group or a group range (see below). Similar functionality is implemented in Mac OS X: http://www.manpagez.com/man/4/icmp/ A new ping socket is created with socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, PROT_ICMP) Message identifiers (octets 4-5 of ICMP header) are interpreted as local ports. Addresses are stored in struct sockaddr_in. No port numbers are reserved for privileged processes, port 0 is reserved for API ("let the kernel pick a free number"). There is no notion of remote ports, remote port numbers provided by the user (e.g. in connect()) are ignored. Data sent and received include ICMP headers. This is deliberate to: 1) Avoid the need to transport headers values like sequence numbers by other means. 2) Make it easier to port existing programs using raw sockets. ICMP headers given to send() are checked and sanitized. The type must be ICMP_ECHO and the code must be zero (future extensions might relax this, see below). The id is set to the number (local port) of the socket, the checksum is always recomputed. ICMP reply packets received from the network are demultiplexed according to their id's, and are returned by recv() without any modifications. IP header information and ICMP errors of those packets may be obtained via ancillary data (IP_RECVTTL, IP_RETOPTS, and IP_RECVERR). ICMP source quenches and redirects are reported as fake errors via the error queue (IP_RECVERR); the next hop address for redirects is saved to ee_info (in network order). socket(2) is restricted to the group range specified in "/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ping_group_range". It is "1 0" by default, meaning that nobody (not even root) may create ping sockets. Setting it to "100 100" would grant permissions to the single group (to either make /sbin/ping g+s and owned by this group or to grant permissions to the "netadmins" group), "0 4294967295" would enable it for the world, "100 4294967295" would enable it for the users, but not daemons. The existing code might be (in the unlikely case anyone needs it) extended rather easily to handle other similar pairs of ICMP messages (Timestamp/Reply, Information Request/Reply, Address Mask Request/Reply etc.). Userspace ping util & patch for it: http://openwall.info/wiki/people/segoon/ping For Openwall GNU/*/Linux it was the last step on the road to the setuid-less distro. A revision of this patch (for RHEL5/OpenVZ kernels) is in use in Owl-current, such as in the 2011/03/12 LiveCD ISOs: http://mirrors.kernel.org/openwall/Owl/current/iso/ Initially this functionality was written by Pavel Kankovsky for Linux 2.4.32, but unfortunately it was never made public. All ping options (-b, -p, -Q, -R, -s, -t, -T, -M, -I), are tested with the patch. PATCH v3: - switched to flowi4. - minor changes to be consistent with raw sockets code. PATCH v2: - changed ping_debug() to pr_debug(). - removed CONFIG_IP_PING. - removed ping_seq_fops.owner field (unused for procfs). - switched to proc_net_fops_create(). - switched to %pK in seq_printf(). PATCH v1: - fixed checksumming bug. - CAP_NET_RAW may not create icmp sockets anymore. RFC v2: - minor cleanups. - introduced sysctl'able group range to restrict socket(2). Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2011-05-13 10:01:00 +00:00
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = ipv4_ping_group_range,
},
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_L3_MASTER_DEV
{
.procname = "raw_l3mdev_accept",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_raw_l3mdev_accept,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-18 22:58:50 +00:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
},
#endif
{
.procname = "tcp_ecn",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_ecn,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_TWO,
},
tcp: add rfc3168, section 6.1.1.1. fallback This work as a follow-up of commit f7b3bec6f516 ("net: allow setting ecn via routing table") and adds RFC3168 section 6.1.1.1. fallback for outgoing ECN connections. In other words, this work adds a retry with a non-ECN setup SYN packet, as suggested from the RFC on the first timeout: [...] A host that receives no reply to an ECN-setup SYN within the normal SYN retransmission timeout interval MAY resend the SYN and any subsequent SYN retransmissions with CWR and ECE cleared. [...] Schematic client-side view when assuming the server is in tcp_ecn=2 mode, that is, Linux default since 2009 via commit 255cac91c3c9 ("tcp: extend ECN sysctl to allow server-side only ECN"): 1) Normal ECN-capable path: SYN ECE CWR -----> <----- SYN ACK ECE ACK -----> 2) Path with broken middlebox, when client has fallback: SYN ECE CWR ----X crappy middlebox drops packet (timeout, rtx) SYN -----> <----- SYN ACK ACK -----> In case we would not have the fallback implemented, the middlebox drop point would basically end up as: SYN ECE CWR ----X crappy middlebox drops packet (timeout, rtx) SYN ECE CWR ----X crappy middlebox drops packet (timeout, rtx) SYN ECE CWR ----X crappy middlebox drops packet (timeout, rtx) In any case, it's rather a smaller percentage of sites where there would occur such additional setup latency: it was found in end of 2014 that ~56% of IPv4 and 65% of IPv6 servers of Alexa 1 million list would negotiate ECN (aka tcp_ecn=2 default), 0.42% of these webservers will fail to connect when trying to negotiate with ECN (tcp_ecn=1) due to timeouts, which the fallback would mitigate with a slight latency trade-off. Recent related paper on this topic: Brian Trammell, Mirja Kühlewind, Damiano Boppart, Iain Learmonth, Gorry Fairhurst, and Richard Scheffenegger: "Enabling Internet-Wide Deployment of Explicit Congestion Notification." Proc. PAM 2015, New York. http://ecn.ethz.ch/ecn-pam15.pdf Thus, when net.ipv4.tcp_ecn=1 is being set, the patch will perform RFC3168, section 6.1.1.1. fallback on timeout. For users explicitly not wanting this which can be in DC use case, we add a net.ipv4.tcp_ecn_fallback knob that allows for disabling the fallback. tp->ecn_flags are not being cleared in tcp_ecn_clear_syn() on output, but rather we let tcp_ecn_rcv_synack() take that over on input path in case a SYN ACK ECE was delayed. Thus a spurious SYN retransmission will not prevent ECN being negotiated eventually in that case. Reference: https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/92/slides/slides-92-iccrg-1.pdf Reference: https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/89/slides/slides-89-tsvarea-1.pdf Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Mirja Kühlewind <mirja.kuehlewind@tik.ee.ethz.ch> Signed-off-by: Brian Trammell <trammell@tik.ee.ethz.ch> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Dave That <dave.taht@gmail.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-19 19:04:22 +00:00
{
.procname = "tcp_ecn_fallback",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_ecn_fallback,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
tcp: add rfc3168, section 6.1.1.1. fallback This work as a follow-up of commit f7b3bec6f516 ("net: allow setting ecn via routing table") and adds RFC3168 section 6.1.1.1. fallback for outgoing ECN connections. In other words, this work adds a retry with a non-ECN setup SYN packet, as suggested from the RFC on the first timeout: [...] A host that receives no reply to an ECN-setup SYN within the normal SYN retransmission timeout interval MAY resend the SYN and any subsequent SYN retransmissions with CWR and ECE cleared. [...] Schematic client-side view when assuming the server is in tcp_ecn=2 mode, that is, Linux default since 2009 via commit 255cac91c3c9 ("tcp: extend ECN sysctl to allow server-side only ECN"): 1) Normal ECN-capable path: SYN ECE CWR -----> <----- SYN ACK ECE ACK -----> 2) Path with broken middlebox, when client has fallback: SYN ECE CWR ----X crappy middlebox drops packet (timeout, rtx) SYN -----> <----- SYN ACK ACK -----> In case we would not have the fallback implemented, the middlebox drop point would basically end up as: SYN ECE CWR ----X crappy middlebox drops packet (timeout, rtx) SYN ECE CWR ----X crappy middlebox drops packet (timeout, rtx) SYN ECE CWR ----X crappy middlebox drops packet (timeout, rtx) In any case, it's rather a smaller percentage of sites where there would occur such additional setup latency: it was found in end of 2014 that ~56% of IPv4 and 65% of IPv6 servers of Alexa 1 million list would negotiate ECN (aka tcp_ecn=2 default), 0.42% of these webservers will fail to connect when trying to negotiate with ECN (tcp_ecn=1) due to timeouts, which the fallback would mitigate with a slight latency trade-off. Recent related paper on this topic: Brian Trammell, Mirja Kühlewind, Damiano Boppart, Iain Learmonth, Gorry Fairhurst, and Richard Scheffenegger: "Enabling Internet-Wide Deployment of Explicit Congestion Notification." Proc. PAM 2015, New York. http://ecn.ethz.ch/ecn-pam15.pdf Thus, when net.ipv4.tcp_ecn=1 is being set, the patch will perform RFC3168, section 6.1.1.1. fallback on timeout. For users explicitly not wanting this which can be in DC use case, we add a net.ipv4.tcp_ecn_fallback knob that allows for disabling the fallback. tp->ecn_flags are not being cleared in tcp_ecn_clear_syn() on output, but rather we let tcp_ecn_rcv_synack() take that over on input path in case a SYN ACK ECE was delayed. Thus a spurious SYN retransmission will not prevent ECN being negotiated eventually in that case. Reference: https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/92/slides/slides-92-iccrg-1.pdf Reference: https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/89/slides/slides-89-tsvarea-1.pdf Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Mirja Kühlewind <mirja.kuehlewind@tik.ee.ethz.ch> Signed-off-by: Brian Trammell <trammell@tik.ee.ethz.ch> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Dave That <dave.taht@gmail.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-19 19:04:22 +00:00
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
tcp: add rfc3168, section 6.1.1.1. fallback This work as a follow-up of commit f7b3bec6f516 ("net: allow setting ecn via routing table") and adds RFC3168 section 6.1.1.1. fallback for outgoing ECN connections. In other words, this work adds a retry with a non-ECN setup SYN packet, as suggested from the RFC on the first timeout: [...] A host that receives no reply to an ECN-setup SYN within the normal SYN retransmission timeout interval MAY resend the SYN and any subsequent SYN retransmissions with CWR and ECE cleared. [...] Schematic client-side view when assuming the server is in tcp_ecn=2 mode, that is, Linux default since 2009 via commit 255cac91c3c9 ("tcp: extend ECN sysctl to allow server-side only ECN"): 1) Normal ECN-capable path: SYN ECE CWR -----> <----- SYN ACK ECE ACK -----> 2) Path with broken middlebox, when client has fallback: SYN ECE CWR ----X crappy middlebox drops packet (timeout, rtx) SYN -----> <----- SYN ACK ACK -----> In case we would not have the fallback implemented, the middlebox drop point would basically end up as: SYN ECE CWR ----X crappy middlebox drops packet (timeout, rtx) SYN ECE CWR ----X crappy middlebox drops packet (timeout, rtx) SYN ECE CWR ----X crappy middlebox drops packet (timeout, rtx) In any case, it's rather a smaller percentage of sites where there would occur such additional setup latency: it was found in end of 2014 that ~56% of IPv4 and 65% of IPv6 servers of Alexa 1 million list would negotiate ECN (aka tcp_ecn=2 default), 0.42% of these webservers will fail to connect when trying to negotiate with ECN (tcp_ecn=1) due to timeouts, which the fallback would mitigate with a slight latency trade-off. Recent related paper on this topic: Brian Trammell, Mirja Kühlewind, Damiano Boppart, Iain Learmonth, Gorry Fairhurst, and Richard Scheffenegger: "Enabling Internet-Wide Deployment of Explicit Congestion Notification." Proc. PAM 2015, New York. http://ecn.ethz.ch/ecn-pam15.pdf Thus, when net.ipv4.tcp_ecn=1 is being set, the patch will perform RFC3168, section 6.1.1.1. fallback on timeout. For users explicitly not wanting this which can be in DC use case, we add a net.ipv4.tcp_ecn_fallback knob that allows for disabling the fallback. tp->ecn_flags are not being cleared in tcp_ecn_clear_syn() on output, but rather we let tcp_ecn_rcv_synack() take that over on input path in case a SYN ACK ECE was delayed. Thus a spurious SYN retransmission will not prevent ECN being negotiated eventually in that case. Reference: https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/92/slides/slides-92-iccrg-1.pdf Reference: https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/89/slides/slides-89-tsvarea-1.pdf Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Mirja Kühlewind <mirja.kuehlewind@tik.ee.ethz.ch> Signed-off-by: Brian Trammell <trammell@tik.ee.ethz.ch> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Dave That <dave.taht@gmail.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-05-19 19:04:22 +00:00
},
{
.procname = "ip_dynaddr",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_ip_dynaddr,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "ip_early_demux",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_ip_early_demux,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "udp_early_demux",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_udp_early_demux,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
tcp/udp: Make early_demux back namespacified. Commit e21145a9871a ("ipv4: namespacify ip_early_demux sysctl knob") made it possible to enable/disable early_demux on a per-netns basis. Then, we introduced two knobs, tcp_early_demux and udp_early_demux, to switch it for TCP/UDP in commit dddb64bcb346 ("net: Add sysctl to toggle early demux for tcp and udp"). However, the .proc_handler() was wrong and actually disabled us from changing the behaviour in each netns. We can execute early_demux if net.ipv4.ip_early_demux is on and each proto .early_demux() handler is not NULL. When we toggle (tcp|udp)_early_demux, the change itself is saved in each netns variable, but the .early_demux() handler is a global variable, so the handler is switched based on the init_net's sysctl variable. Thus, netns (tcp|udp)_early_demux knobs have nothing to do with the logic. Whether we CAN execute proto .early_demux() is always decided by init_net's sysctl knob, and whether we DO it or not is by each netns ip_early_demux knob. This patch namespacifies (tcp|udp)_early_demux again. For now, the users of the .early_demux() handler are TCP and UDP only, and they are called directly to avoid retpoline. So, we can remove the .early_demux() handler from inet6?_protos and need not dereference them in ip6?_rcv_finish_core(). If another proto needs .early_demux(), we can restore it at that time. Fixes: dddb64bcb346 ("net: Add sysctl to toggle early demux for tcp and udp") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220713175207.7727-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2022-07-13 17:52:07 +00:00
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_early_demux",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_early_demux,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
tcp/udp: Make early_demux back namespacified. Commit e21145a9871a ("ipv4: namespacify ip_early_demux sysctl knob") made it possible to enable/disable early_demux on a per-netns basis. Then, we introduced two knobs, tcp_early_demux and udp_early_demux, to switch it for TCP/UDP in commit dddb64bcb346 ("net: Add sysctl to toggle early demux for tcp and udp"). However, the .proc_handler() was wrong and actually disabled us from changing the behaviour in each netns. We can execute early_demux if net.ipv4.ip_early_demux is on and each proto .early_demux() handler is not NULL. When we toggle (tcp|udp)_early_demux, the change itself is saved in each netns variable, but the .early_demux() handler is a global variable, so the handler is switched based on the init_net's sysctl variable. Thus, netns (tcp|udp)_early_demux knobs have nothing to do with the logic. Whether we CAN execute proto .early_demux() is always decided by init_net's sysctl knob, and whether we DO it or not is by each netns ip_early_demux knob. This patch namespacifies (tcp|udp)_early_demux again. For now, the users of the .early_demux() handler are TCP and UDP only, and they are called directly to avoid retpoline. So, we can remove the .early_demux() handler from inet6?_protos and need not dereference them in ip6?_rcv_finish_core(). If another proto needs .early_demux(), we can restore it at that time. Fixes: dddb64bcb346 ("net: Add sysctl to toggle early demux for tcp and udp") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220713175207.7727-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2022-07-13 17:52:07 +00:00
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "nexthop_compat_mode",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_nexthop_compat_mode,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
},
{
.procname = "ip_default_ttl",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_ip_default_ttl,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
.extra1 = &ip_ttl_min,
.extra2 = &ip_ttl_max,
},
{
.procname = "ip_local_port_range",
.maxlen = sizeof(init_net.ipv4.ip_local_ports.range),
.data = &init_net.ipv4.ip_local_ports.range,
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = ipv4_local_port_range,
},
{
.procname = "ip_local_reserved_ports",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports,
.maxlen = 65536,
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_do_large_bitmap,
},
{
.procname = "ip_no_pmtu_disc",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_ip_no_pmtu_disc,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
ipv4: introduce ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward and protect forwarding path against pmtu spoofing While forwarding we should not use the protocol path mtu to calculate the mtu for a forwarded packet but instead use the interface mtu. We mark forwarded skbs in ip_forward with IPSKB_FORWARDED, which was introduced for multicast forwarding. But as it does not conflict with our usage in unicast code path it is perfect for reuse. I moved the functions ip_sk_accept_pmtu, ip_sk_use_pmtu and ip_skb_dst_mtu along with the new ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward to net/ip.h to fix circular dependencies because of IPSKB_FORWARDED. Because someone might have written a software which does probe destinations manually and expects the kernel to honour those path mtus I introduced a new per-namespace "ip_forward_use_pmtu" knob so someone can disable this new behaviour. We also still use mtus which are locked on a route for forwarding. The reason for this change is, that path mtus information can be injected into the kernel via e.g. icmp_err protocol handler without verification of local sockets. As such, this could cause the IPv4 forwarding path to wrongfully emit fragmentation needed notifications or start to fragment packets along a path. Tunnel and ipsec output paths clear IPCB again, thus IPSKB_FORWARDED won't be set and further fragmentation logic will use the path mtu to determine the fragmentation size. They also recheck packet size with help of path mtu discovery and report appropriate errors. Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: John Heffner <johnwheffner@gmail.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-09 09:01:15 +00:00
{
.procname = "ip_forward_use_pmtu",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_ip_fwd_use_pmtu,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
ipv4: introduce ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward and protect forwarding path against pmtu spoofing While forwarding we should not use the protocol path mtu to calculate the mtu for a forwarded packet but instead use the interface mtu. We mark forwarded skbs in ip_forward with IPSKB_FORWARDED, which was introduced for multicast forwarding. But as it does not conflict with our usage in unicast code path it is perfect for reuse. I moved the functions ip_sk_accept_pmtu, ip_sk_use_pmtu and ip_skb_dst_mtu along with the new ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward to net/ip.h to fix circular dependencies because of IPSKB_FORWARDED. Because someone might have written a software which does probe destinations manually and expects the kernel to honour those path mtus I introduced a new per-namespace "ip_forward_use_pmtu" knob so someone can disable this new behaviour. We also still use mtus which are locked on a route for forwarding. The reason for this change is, that path mtus information can be injected into the kernel via e.g. icmp_err protocol handler without verification of local sockets. As such, this could cause the IPv4 forwarding path to wrongfully emit fragmentation needed notifications or start to fragment packets along a path. Tunnel and ipsec output paths clear IPCB again, thus IPSKB_FORWARDED won't be set and further fragmentation logic will use the path mtu to determine the fragmentation size. They also recheck packet size with help of path mtu discovery and report appropriate errors. Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: John Heffner <johnwheffner@gmail.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-09 09:01:15 +00:00
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
ipv4: introduce ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward and protect forwarding path against pmtu spoofing While forwarding we should not use the protocol path mtu to calculate the mtu for a forwarded packet but instead use the interface mtu. We mark forwarded skbs in ip_forward with IPSKB_FORWARDED, which was introduced for multicast forwarding. But as it does not conflict with our usage in unicast code path it is perfect for reuse. I moved the functions ip_sk_accept_pmtu, ip_sk_use_pmtu and ip_skb_dst_mtu along with the new ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward to net/ip.h to fix circular dependencies because of IPSKB_FORWARDED. Because someone might have written a software which does probe destinations manually and expects the kernel to honour those path mtus I introduced a new per-namespace "ip_forward_use_pmtu" knob so someone can disable this new behaviour. We also still use mtus which are locked on a route for forwarding. The reason for this change is, that path mtus information can be injected into the kernel via e.g. icmp_err protocol handler without verification of local sockets. As such, this could cause the IPv4 forwarding path to wrongfully emit fragmentation needed notifications or start to fragment packets along a path. Tunnel and ipsec output paths clear IPCB again, thus IPSKB_FORWARDED won't be set and further fragmentation logic will use the path mtu to determine the fragmentation size. They also recheck packet size with help of path mtu discovery and report appropriate errors. Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: John Heffner <johnwheffner@gmail.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-01-09 09:01:15 +00:00
},
{
.procname = "ip_forward_update_priority",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_ip_fwd_update_priority,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = ipv4_fwd_update_priority,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-18 22:58:50 +00:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
},
{
.procname = "ip_nonlocal_bind",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_ip_nonlocal_bind,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
tcp: bind(0) remove the SO_REUSEADDR restriction when ephemeral ports are exhausted. Commit aacd9289af8b82f5fb01bcdd53d0e3406d1333c7 ("tcp: bind() use stronger condition for bind_conflict") introduced a restriction to forbid to bind SO_REUSEADDR enabled sockets to the same (addr, port) tuple in order to assign ports dispersedly so that we can connect to the same remote host. The change results in accelerating port depletion so that we fail to bind sockets to the same local port even if we want to connect to the different remote hosts. You can reproduce this issue by following instructions below. 1. # sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range="32768 32768" 2. set SO_REUSEADDR to two sockets. 3. bind two sockets to (localhost, 0) and the latter fails. Therefore, when ephemeral ports are exhausted, bind(0) should fallback to the legacy behaviour to enable the SO_REUSEADDR option and make it possible to connect to different remote (addr, port) tuples. This patch allows us to bind SO_REUSEADDR enabled sockets to the same (addr, port) only when net.ipv4.ip_autobind_reuse is set 1 and all ephemeral ports are exhausted. This also allows connect() and listen() to share ports in the following way and may break some applications. So the ip_autobind_reuse is 0 by default and disables the feature. 1. setsockopt(sk1, SO_REUSEADDR) 2. setsockopt(sk2, SO_REUSEADDR) 3. bind(sk1, saddr, 0) 4. bind(sk2, saddr, 0) 5. connect(sk1, daddr) 6. listen(sk2) If it is set 1, we can fully utilize the 4-tuples, but we should use IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT for bind()+connect() as possible. The notable thing is that if all sockets bound to the same port have both SO_REUSEADDR and SO_REUSEPORT enabled, we can bind sockets to an ephemeral port and also do listen(). Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.co.jp> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-03-10 08:05:25 +00:00
{
.procname = "ip_autobind_reuse",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_ip_autobind_reuse,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
tcp: bind(0) remove the SO_REUSEADDR restriction when ephemeral ports are exhausted. Commit aacd9289af8b82f5fb01bcdd53d0e3406d1333c7 ("tcp: bind() use stronger condition for bind_conflict") introduced a restriction to forbid to bind SO_REUSEADDR enabled sockets to the same (addr, port) tuple in order to assign ports dispersedly so that we can connect to the same remote host. The change results in accelerating port depletion so that we fail to bind sockets to the same local port even if we want to connect to the different remote hosts. You can reproduce this issue by following instructions below. 1. # sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range="32768 32768" 2. set SO_REUSEADDR to two sockets. 3. bind two sockets to (localhost, 0) and the latter fails. Therefore, when ephemeral ports are exhausted, bind(0) should fallback to the legacy behaviour to enable the SO_REUSEADDR option and make it possible to connect to different remote (addr, port) tuples. This patch allows us to bind SO_REUSEADDR enabled sockets to the same (addr, port) only when net.ipv4.ip_autobind_reuse is set 1 and all ephemeral ports are exhausted. This also allows connect() and listen() to share ports in the following way and may break some applications. So the ip_autobind_reuse is 0 by default and disables the feature. 1. setsockopt(sk1, SO_REUSEADDR) 2. setsockopt(sk2, SO_REUSEADDR) 3. bind(sk1, saddr, 0) 4. bind(sk2, saddr, 0) 5. connect(sk1, daddr) 6. listen(sk2) If it is set 1, we can fully utilize the 4-tuples, but we should use IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT for bind()+connect() as possible. The notable thing is that if all sockets bound to the same port have both SO_REUSEADDR and SO_REUSEPORT enabled, we can bind sockets to an ephemeral port and also do listen(). Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.co.jp> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-03-10 08:05:25 +00:00
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
tcp: bind(0) remove the SO_REUSEADDR restriction when ephemeral ports are exhausted. Commit aacd9289af8b82f5fb01bcdd53d0e3406d1333c7 ("tcp: bind() use stronger condition for bind_conflict") introduced a restriction to forbid to bind SO_REUSEADDR enabled sockets to the same (addr, port) tuple in order to assign ports dispersedly so that we can connect to the same remote host. The change results in accelerating port depletion so that we fail to bind sockets to the same local port even if we want to connect to the different remote hosts. You can reproduce this issue by following instructions below. 1. # sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range="32768 32768" 2. set SO_REUSEADDR to two sockets. 3. bind two sockets to (localhost, 0) and the latter fails. Therefore, when ephemeral ports are exhausted, bind(0) should fallback to the legacy behaviour to enable the SO_REUSEADDR option and make it possible to connect to different remote (addr, port) tuples. This patch allows us to bind SO_REUSEADDR enabled sockets to the same (addr, port) only when net.ipv4.ip_autobind_reuse is set 1 and all ephemeral ports are exhausted. This also allows connect() and listen() to share ports in the following way and may break some applications. So the ip_autobind_reuse is 0 by default and disables the feature. 1. setsockopt(sk1, SO_REUSEADDR) 2. setsockopt(sk2, SO_REUSEADDR) 3. bind(sk1, saddr, 0) 4. bind(sk2, saddr, 0) 5. connect(sk1, daddr) 6. listen(sk2) If it is set 1, we can fully utilize the 4-tuples, but we should use IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT for bind()+connect() as possible. The notable thing is that if all sockets bound to the same port have both SO_REUSEADDR and SO_REUSEPORT enabled, we can bind sockets to an ephemeral port and also do listen(). Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.co.jp> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-03-10 08:05:25 +00:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
},
{
.procname = "fwmark_reflect",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_fwmark_reflect,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_fwmark_accept",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fwmark_accept,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_L3_MASTER_DEV
{
.procname = "tcp_l3mdev_accept",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_l3mdev_accept,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-18 22:58:50 +00:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
},
#endif
{
.procname = "tcp_mtu_probing",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_mtu_probing,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_base_mss",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_base_mss,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_min_snd_mss",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_min_snd_mss,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = &tcp_min_snd_mss_min,
.extra2 = &tcp_min_snd_mss_max,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_mtu_probe_floor",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_mtu_probe_floor,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = &tcp_min_snd_mss_min,
.extra2 = &tcp_min_snd_mss_max,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_probe_threshold",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_probe_threshold,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_probe_interval",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_probe_interval,
.maxlen = sizeof(u32),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_douintvec_minmax,
.extra2 = &u32_max_div_HZ,
},
IGMP: Inhibit reports for local multicast groups The range of addresses between 224.0.0.0 and 224.0.0.255 inclusive, is reserved for the use of routing protocols and other low-level topology discovery or maintenance protocols, such as gateway discovery and group membership reporting. Multicast routers should not forward any multicast datagram with destination addresses in this range, regardless of its TTL. Currently, IGMP reports are generated for this reserved range of addresses even though a router will ignore this information since it has no purpose. However, the presence of reserved group addresses in an IGMP membership report uses up network bandwidth and can also obscure addresses of interest when inspecting membership reports using packet inspection or debug messages. Although the RFCs for the various version of IGMP (e.g.RFC 3376 for v3) do not specify that the reserved addresses be excluded from membership reports, it should do no harm in doing so. In particular there should be no adverse effect in any IGMP snooping functionality since 224.0.0.x is specifically excluded as per RFC 4541 (IGMP and MLD Snooping Switches Considerations) section 2.1.2. Data Forwarding Rules: 2) Packets with a destination IP (DIP) address in the 224.0.0.X range which are not IGMP must be forwarded on all ports. IGMP reports for local multicast groups can now be optionally inhibited by means of a system control variable (by setting the value to zero) e.g.: echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/igmp_link_local_mcast_reports To retain backwards compatibility the previous behaviour is retained by default on system boot or reverted by setting the value back to non-zero e.g.: echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/igmp_link_local_mcast_reports Signed-off-by: Philip Downey <pdowney@brocade.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-08-27 15:46:26 +00:00
{
.procname = "igmp_link_local_mcast_reports",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_igmp_llm_reports,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
IGMP: Inhibit reports for local multicast groups The range of addresses between 224.0.0.0 and 224.0.0.255 inclusive, is reserved for the use of routing protocols and other low-level topology discovery or maintenance protocols, such as gateway discovery and group membership reporting. Multicast routers should not forward any multicast datagram with destination addresses in this range, regardless of its TTL. Currently, IGMP reports are generated for this reserved range of addresses even though a router will ignore this information since it has no purpose. However, the presence of reserved group addresses in an IGMP membership report uses up network bandwidth and can also obscure addresses of interest when inspecting membership reports using packet inspection or debug messages. Although the RFCs for the various version of IGMP (e.g.RFC 3376 for v3) do not specify that the reserved addresses be excluded from membership reports, it should do no harm in doing so. In particular there should be no adverse effect in any IGMP snooping functionality since 224.0.0.x is specifically excluded as per RFC 4541 (IGMP and MLD Snooping Switches Considerations) section 2.1.2. Data Forwarding Rules: 2) Packets with a destination IP (DIP) address in the 224.0.0.X range which are not IGMP must be forwarded on all ports. IGMP reports for local multicast groups can now be optionally inhibited by means of a system control variable (by setting the value to zero) e.g.: echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/igmp_link_local_mcast_reports To retain backwards compatibility the previous behaviour is retained by default on system boot or reverted by setting the value back to non-zero e.g.: echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/igmp_link_local_mcast_reports Signed-off-by: Philip Downey <pdowney@brocade.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-08-27 15:46:26 +00:00
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
IGMP: Inhibit reports for local multicast groups The range of addresses between 224.0.0.0 and 224.0.0.255 inclusive, is reserved for the use of routing protocols and other low-level topology discovery or maintenance protocols, such as gateway discovery and group membership reporting. Multicast routers should not forward any multicast datagram with destination addresses in this range, regardless of its TTL. Currently, IGMP reports are generated for this reserved range of addresses even though a router will ignore this information since it has no purpose. However, the presence of reserved group addresses in an IGMP membership report uses up network bandwidth and can also obscure addresses of interest when inspecting membership reports using packet inspection or debug messages. Although the RFCs for the various version of IGMP (e.g.RFC 3376 for v3) do not specify that the reserved addresses be excluded from membership reports, it should do no harm in doing so. In particular there should be no adverse effect in any IGMP snooping functionality since 224.0.0.x is specifically excluded as per RFC 4541 (IGMP and MLD Snooping Switches Considerations) section 2.1.2. Data Forwarding Rules: 2) Packets with a destination IP (DIP) address in the 224.0.0.X range which are not IGMP must be forwarded on all ports. IGMP reports for local multicast groups can now be optionally inhibited by means of a system control variable (by setting the value to zero) e.g.: echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/igmp_link_local_mcast_reports To retain backwards compatibility the previous behaviour is retained by default on system boot or reverted by setting the value back to non-zero e.g.: echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/igmp_link_local_mcast_reports Signed-off-by: Philip Downey <pdowney@brocade.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-08-27 15:46:26 +00:00
},
{
.procname = "igmp_max_memberships",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_igmp_max_memberships,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "igmp_max_msf",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_igmp_max_msf,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_MULTICAST
{
.procname = "igmp_qrv",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_igmp_qrv,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-18 22:58:50 +00:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE
},
#endif
{
.procname = "tcp_congestion_control",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control,
.mode = 0644,
.maxlen = TCP_CA_NAME_MAX,
.proc_handler = proc_tcp_congestion_control,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_available_congestion_control",
.maxlen = TCP_CA_BUF_MAX,
.mode = 0444,
.proc_handler = proc_tcp_available_congestion_control,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_allowed_congestion_control",
.maxlen = TCP_CA_BUF_MAX,
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_allowed_congestion_control,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_keepalive_time",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_keepalive_time,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_jiffies,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_keepalive_probes",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_keepalive_probes,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_keepalive_intvl",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_keepalive_intvl,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_jiffies,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_syn_retries",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syn_retries,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
.extra1 = &tcp_syn_retries_min,
.extra2 = &tcp_syn_retries_max
},
{
.procname = "tcp_synack_retries",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_synack_retries,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
{
.procname = "tcp_syncookies",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syncookies,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
#endif
{
.procname = "tcp_migrate_req",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_migrate_req,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE
},
{
.procname = "tcp_reordering",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_reordering,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tcp_retries1",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_retries1,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
.extra2 = &tcp_retr1_max
},
{
.procname = "tcp_retries2",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_retries2,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_orphan_retries",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_orphan_retries,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_fin_timeout",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fin_timeout,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_jiffies,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_notsent_lowat",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_notsent_lowat,
.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_douintvec,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_tw_reuse",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_tw_reuse,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-18 22:58:50 +00:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_TWO,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_max_syn_backlog",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_max_syn_backlog,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tcp_fastopen",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fastopen,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_fastopen_key",
.mode = 0600,
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fastopen,
/* maxlen to print the list of keys in hex (*2), with dashes
* separating doublewords and a comma in between keys.
*/
.maxlen = ((TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_LENGTH *
2 * TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_MAX) +
(TCP_FASTOPEN_KEY_MAX * 5)),
.proc_handler = proc_tcp_fastopen_key,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_fastopen_blackhole_timeout_sec",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fastopen_blackhole_timeout,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_tfo_blackhole_detect_timeout,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-18 22:58:50 +00:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
},
net: ipv4: Consider failed nexthops in multipath routes Multipath route lookups should consider knowledge about next hops and not select a hop that is known to be failed. Example: [h2] [h3] 15.0.0.5 | | 3| 3| [SP1] [SP2]--+ 1 2 1 2 | | /-------------+ | | \ / | | X | | / \ | | / \---------------\ | 1 2 1 2 12.0.0.2 [TOR1] 3-----------------3 [TOR2] 12.0.0.3 4 4 \ / \ / \ / -------| |-----/ 1 2 [TOR3] 3| | [h1] 12.0.0.1 host h1 with IP 12.0.0.1 has 2 paths to host h3 at 15.0.0.5: root@h1:~# ip ro ls ... 12.0.0.0/24 dev swp1 proto kernel scope link src 12.0.0.1 15.0.0.0/16 nexthop via 12.0.0.2 dev swp1 weight 1 nexthop via 12.0.0.3 dev swp1 weight 1 ... If the link between tor3 and tor1 is down and the link between tor1 and tor2 then tor1 is effectively cut-off from h1. Yet the route lookups in h1 are alternating between the 2 routes: ping 15.0.0.5 gets one and ssh 15.0.0.5 gets the other. Connections that attempt to use the 12.0.0.2 nexthop fail since that neighbor is not reachable: root@h1:~# ip neigh show ... 12.0.0.3 dev swp1 lladdr 00:02:00:00:00:1b REACHABLE 12.0.0.2 dev swp1 FAILED ... The failed path can be avoided by considering known neighbor information when selecting next hops. If the neighbor lookup fails we have no knowledge about the nexthop, so give it a shot. If there is an entry then only select the nexthop if the state is sane. This is similar to what fib_detect_death does. To maintain backward compatibility use of the neighbor information is based on a new sysctl, fib_multipath_use_neigh. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com> Reviewed-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-07 14:21:00 +00:00
#ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_MULTIPATH
{
.procname = "fib_multipath_use_neigh",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_fib_multipath_use_neigh,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
net: ipv4: Consider failed nexthops in multipath routes Multipath route lookups should consider knowledge about next hops and not select a hop that is known to be failed. Example: [h2] [h3] 15.0.0.5 | | 3| 3| [SP1] [SP2]--+ 1 2 1 2 | | /-------------+ | | \ / | | X | | / \ | | / \---------------\ | 1 2 1 2 12.0.0.2 [TOR1] 3-----------------3 [TOR2] 12.0.0.3 4 4 \ / \ / \ / -------| |-----/ 1 2 [TOR3] 3| | [h1] 12.0.0.1 host h1 with IP 12.0.0.1 has 2 paths to host h3 at 15.0.0.5: root@h1:~# ip ro ls ... 12.0.0.0/24 dev swp1 proto kernel scope link src 12.0.0.1 15.0.0.0/16 nexthop via 12.0.0.2 dev swp1 weight 1 nexthop via 12.0.0.3 dev swp1 weight 1 ... If the link between tor3 and tor1 is down and the link between tor1 and tor2 then tor1 is effectively cut-off from h1. Yet the route lookups in h1 are alternating between the 2 routes: ping 15.0.0.5 gets one and ssh 15.0.0.5 gets the other. Connections that attempt to use the 12.0.0.2 nexthop fail since that neighbor is not reachable: root@h1:~# ip neigh show ... 12.0.0.3 dev swp1 lladdr 00:02:00:00:00:1b REACHABLE 12.0.0.2 dev swp1 FAILED ... The failed path can be avoided by considering known neighbor information when selecting next hops. If the neighbor lookup fails we have no knowledge about the nexthop, so give it a shot. If there is an entry then only select the nexthop if the state is sane. This is similar to what fib_detect_death does. To maintain backward compatibility use of the neighbor information is based on a new sysctl, fib_multipath_use_neigh. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com> Reviewed-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-07 14:21:00 +00:00
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-18 22:58:50 +00:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
},
{
.procname = "fib_multipath_hash_policy",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_fib_multipath_hash_policy,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_fib_multipath_hash_policy,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-18 22:58:50 +00:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
net: sysctl: introduce sysctl SYSCTL_THREE This patch introdues the SYSCTL_THREE. KUnit: [00:10:14] ================ sysctl_test (10 subtests) ================= [00:10:14] [PASSED] sysctl_test_api_dointvec_null_tbl_data [00:10:14] [PASSED] sysctl_test_api_dointvec_table_maxlen_unset [00:10:14] [PASSED] sysctl_test_api_dointvec_table_len_is_zero [00:10:14] [PASSED] sysctl_test_api_dointvec_table_read_but_position_set [00:10:14] [PASSED] sysctl_test_dointvec_read_happy_single_positive [00:10:14] [PASSED] sysctl_test_dointvec_read_happy_single_negative [00:10:14] [PASSED] sysctl_test_dointvec_write_happy_single_positive [00:10:14] [PASSED] sysctl_test_dointvec_write_happy_single_negative [00:10:14] [PASSED] sysctl_test_api_dointvec_write_single_less_int_min [00:10:14] [PASSED] sysctl_test_api_dointvec_write_single_greater_int_max [00:10:14] =================== [PASSED] sysctl_test =================== ./run_kselftest.sh -c sysctl ... ok 1 selftests: sysctl: sysctl.sh Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Cc: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Cc: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@netfilter.org> Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com> Cc: Akhmat Karakotov <hmukos@yandex-team.ru> Signed-off-by: Tonghao Zhang <xiangxia.m.yue@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
2022-05-01 03:55:23 +00:00
.extra2 = SYSCTL_THREE,
net: ipv4: Consider failed nexthops in multipath routes Multipath route lookups should consider knowledge about next hops and not select a hop that is known to be failed. Example: [h2] [h3] 15.0.0.5 | | 3| 3| [SP1] [SP2]--+ 1 2 1 2 | | /-------------+ | | \ / | | X | | / \ | | / \---------------\ | 1 2 1 2 12.0.0.2 [TOR1] 3-----------------3 [TOR2] 12.0.0.3 4 4 \ / \ / \ / -------| |-----/ 1 2 [TOR3] 3| | [h1] 12.0.0.1 host h1 with IP 12.0.0.1 has 2 paths to host h3 at 15.0.0.5: root@h1:~# ip ro ls ... 12.0.0.0/24 dev swp1 proto kernel scope link src 12.0.0.1 15.0.0.0/16 nexthop via 12.0.0.2 dev swp1 weight 1 nexthop via 12.0.0.3 dev swp1 weight 1 ... If the link between tor3 and tor1 is down and the link between tor1 and tor2 then tor1 is effectively cut-off from h1. Yet the route lookups in h1 are alternating between the 2 routes: ping 15.0.0.5 gets one and ssh 15.0.0.5 gets the other. Connections that attempt to use the 12.0.0.2 nexthop fail since that neighbor is not reachable: root@h1:~# ip neigh show ... 12.0.0.3 dev swp1 lladdr 00:02:00:00:00:1b REACHABLE 12.0.0.2 dev swp1 FAILED ... The failed path can be avoided by considering known neighbor information when selecting next hops. If the neighbor lookup fails we have no knowledge about the nexthop, so give it a shot. If there is an entry then only select the nexthop if the state is sane. This is similar to what fib_detect_death does. To maintain backward compatibility use of the neighbor information is based on a new sysctl, fib_multipath_use_neigh. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com> Reviewed-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-07 14:21:00 +00:00
},
{
.procname = "fib_multipath_hash_fields",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_fib_multipath_hash_fields,
.maxlen = sizeof(u32),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_fib_multipath_hash_fields,
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE,
.extra2 = &fib_multipath_hash_fields_all_mask,
},
net: ipv4: Consider failed nexthops in multipath routes Multipath route lookups should consider knowledge about next hops and not select a hop that is known to be failed. Example: [h2] [h3] 15.0.0.5 | | 3| 3| [SP1] [SP2]--+ 1 2 1 2 | | /-------------+ | | \ / | | X | | / \ | | / \---------------\ | 1 2 1 2 12.0.0.2 [TOR1] 3-----------------3 [TOR2] 12.0.0.3 4 4 \ / \ / \ / -------| |-----/ 1 2 [TOR3] 3| | [h1] 12.0.0.1 host h1 with IP 12.0.0.1 has 2 paths to host h3 at 15.0.0.5: root@h1:~# ip ro ls ... 12.0.0.0/24 dev swp1 proto kernel scope link src 12.0.0.1 15.0.0.0/16 nexthop via 12.0.0.2 dev swp1 weight 1 nexthop via 12.0.0.3 dev swp1 weight 1 ... If the link between tor3 and tor1 is down and the link between tor1 and tor2 then tor1 is effectively cut-off from h1. Yet the route lookups in h1 are alternating between the 2 routes: ping 15.0.0.5 gets one and ssh 15.0.0.5 gets the other. Connections that attempt to use the 12.0.0.2 nexthop fail since that neighbor is not reachable: root@h1:~# ip neigh show ... 12.0.0.3 dev swp1 lladdr 00:02:00:00:00:1b REACHABLE 12.0.0.2 dev swp1 FAILED ... The failed path can be avoided by considering known neighbor information when selecting next hops. If the neighbor lookup fails we have no knowledge about the nexthop, so give it a shot. If there is an entry then only select the nexthop if the state is sane. This is similar to what fib_detect_death does. To maintain backward compatibility use of the neighbor information is based on a new sysctl, fib_multipath_use_neigh. Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com> Reviewed-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-04-07 14:21:00 +00:00
#endif
{
.procname = "ip_unprivileged_port_start",
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_ip_prot_sock,
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = ipv4_privileged_ports,
},
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_L3_MASTER_DEV
{
.procname = "udp_l3mdev_accept",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_udp_l3mdev_accept,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-18 22:58:50 +00:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
},
#endif
{
.procname = "tcp_sack",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_sack,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_window_scaling",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_window_scaling,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_timestamps",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_timestamps,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_early_retrans",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_early_retrans,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-18 22:58:50 +00:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_FOUR,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_recovery",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_recovery,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_thin_linear_timeouts",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_thin_linear_timeouts,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_slow_start_after_idle",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_slow_start_after_idle,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_retrans_collapse",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_retrans_collapse,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_stdurg",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_stdurg,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_rfc1337",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_rfc1337,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_abort_on_overflow",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_abort_on_overflow,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_fack",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_fack,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_max_reordering",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_max_reordering,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tcp_dsack",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_dsack,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_app_win",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_app_win,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = &tcp_app_win_max,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_adv_win_scale",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_adv_win_scale,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = &tcp_adv_win_scale_min,
.extra2 = &tcp_adv_win_scale_max,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_frto",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_frto,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_no_metrics_save",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_nometrics_save,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_no_ssthresh_metrics_save",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_no_ssthresh_metrics_save,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_moderate_rcvbuf",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_moderate_rcvbuf,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_tso_win_divisor",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_tso_win_divisor,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_workaround_signed_windows",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_workaround_signed_windows,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_limit_output_bytes",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_limit_output_bytes,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tcp_challenge_ack_limit",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_challenge_ack_limit,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec
},
{
.procname = "tcp_min_tso_segs",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_min_tso_segs,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-18 22:58:50 +00:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE,
},
tcp: adjust TSO packet sizes based on min_rtt Back when tcp_tso_autosize() and TCP pacing were introduced, our focus was really to reduce burst sizes for long distance flows. The simple heuristic of using sk_pacing_rate/1024 has worked well, but can lead to too small packets for hosts in the same rack/cluster, when thousands of flows compete for the bottleneck. Neal Cardwell had the idea of making the TSO burst size a function of both sk_pacing_rate and tcp_min_rtt() Indeed, for local flows, sending bigger bursts is better to reduce cpu costs, as occasional losses can be repaired quite fast. This patch is based on Neal Cardwell implementation done more than two years ago. bbr is adjusting max_pacing_rate based on measured bandwidth, while cubic would over estimate max_pacing_rate. /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_tso_rtt_log can be used to tune or disable this new feature, in logarithmic steps. Tested: 100Gbit NIC, two hosts in the same rack, 4K MTU. 600 flows rate-limited to 20000000 bytes per second. Before patch: (TSO sizes would be limited to 20000000/1024/4096 -> 4 segments per TSO) ~# echo 0 >/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_tso_rtt_log ~# nstat -n;perf stat ./super_netperf 600 -H otrv6 -l 20 -- -K dctcp -q 20000000;nstat|egrep "TcpInSegs|TcpOutSegs|TcpRetransSegs|Delivered" 96005 Performance counter stats for './super_netperf 600 -H otrv6 -l 20 -- -K dctcp -q 20000000': 65,945.29 msec task-clock # 2.845 CPUs utilized 1,314,632 context-switches # 19935.279 M/sec 5,292 cpu-migrations # 80.249 M/sec 940,641 page-faults # 14264.023 M/sec 201,117,030,926 cycles # 3049769.216 GHz (83.45%) 17,699,435,405 stalled-cycles-frontend # 8.80% frontend cycles idle (83.48%) 136,584,015,071 stalled-cycles-backend # 67.91% backend cycles idle (83.44%) 53,809,530,436 instructions # 0.27 insn per cycle # 2.54 stalled cycles per insn (83.36%) 9,062,315,523 branches # 137422329.563 M/sec (83.22%) 153,008,621 branch-misses # 1.69% of all branches (83.32%) 23.182970846 seconds time elapsed TcpInSegs 15648792 0.0 TcpOutSegs 58659110 0.0 # Average of 3.7 4K segments per TSO packet TcpExtTCPDelivered 58654791 0.0 TcpExtTCPDeliveredCE 19 0.0 After patch: ~# echo 9 >/proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_tso_rtt_log ~# nstat -n;perf stat ./super_netperf 600 -H otrv6 -l 20 -- -K dctcp -q 20000000;nstat|egrep "TcpInSegs|TcpOutSegs|TcpRetransSegs|Delivered" 96046 Performance counter stats for './super_netperf 600 -H otrv6 -l 20 -- -K dctcp -q 20000000': 48,982.58 msec task-clock # 2.104 CPUs utilized 186,014 context-switches # 3797.599 M/sec 3,109 cpu-migrations # 63.472 M/sec 941,180 page-faults # 19214.814 M/sec 153,459,763,868 cycles # 3132982.807 GHz (83.56%) 12,069,861,356 stalled-cycles-frontend # 7.87% frontend cycles idle (83.32%) 120,485,917,953 stalled-cycles-backend # 78.51% backend cycles idle (83.24%) 36,803,672,106 instructions # 0.24 insn per cycle # 3.27 stalled cycles per insn (83.18%) 5,947,266,275 branches # 121417383.427 M/sec (83.64%) 87,984,616 branch-misses # 1.48% of all branches (83.43%) 23.281200256 seconds time elapsed TcpInSegs 1434706 0.0 TcpOutSegs 58883378 0.0 # Average of 41 4K segments per TSO packet TcpExtTCPDelivered 58878971 0.0 TcpExtTCPDeliveredCE 9664 0.0 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reviewed-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220309015757.2532973-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2022-03-09 01:57:57 +00:00
{
.procname = "tcp_tso_rtt_log",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_tso_rtt_log,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_min_rtt_wlen",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_min_rtt_wlen,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-18 22:58:50 +00:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = &one_day_secs
},
{
.procname = "tcp_autocorking",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_autocorking,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-18 22:58:50 +00:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_invalid_ratelimit",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_invalid_ratelimit,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_pacing_ss_ratio",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_pacing_ss_ratio,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-18 22:58:50 +00:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE_THOUSAND,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_pacing_ca_ratio",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_pacing_ca_ratio,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-18 22:58:50 +00:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE_THOUSAND,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_wmem",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_wmem,
.maxlen = sizeof(init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_wmem),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-18 22:58:50 +00:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_rmem",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_rmem,
.maxlen = sizeof(init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_rmem),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-18 22:58:50 +00:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_comp_sack_delay_ns",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_delay_ns,
.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned long),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_comp_sack_slack_ns",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_slack_ns,
.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned long),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_comp_sack_nr",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_comp_sack_nr,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-18 22:58:50 +00:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_reflect_tos",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_reflect_tos,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
},
tcp: Introduce optional per-netns ehash. The more sockets we have in the hash table, the longer we spend looking up the socket. While running a number of small workloads on the same host, they penalise each other and cause performance degradation. The root cause might be a single workload that consumes much more resources than the others. It often happens on a cloud service where different workloads share the same computing resource. On EC2 c5.24xlarge instance (196 GiB memory and 524288 (1Mi / 2) ehash entries), after running iperf3 in different netns, creating 24Mi sockets without data transfer in the root netns causes about 10% performance regression for the iperf3's connection. thash_entries sockets length Gbps 524288 1 1 50.7 24Mi 48 45.1 It is basically related to the length of the list of each hash bucket. For testing purposes to see how performance drops along the length, I set 131072 (1Mi / 8) to thash_entries, and here's the result. thash_entries sockets length Gbps 131072 1 1 50.7 1Mi 8 49.9 2Mi 16 48.9 4Mi 32 47.3 8Mi 64 44.6 16Mi 128 40.6 24Mi 192 36.3 32Mi 256 32.5 40Mi 320 27.0 48Mi 384 25.0 To resolve the socket lookup degradation, we introduce an optional per-netns hash table for TCP, but it's just ehash, and we still share the global bhash, bhash2 and lhash2. With a smaller ehash, we can look up non-listener sockets faster and isolate such noisy neighbours. In addition, we can reduce lock contention. We can control the ehash size by a new sysctl knob. However, depending on workloads, it will require very sensitive tuning, so we disable the feature by default (net.ipv4.tcp_child_ehash_entries == 0). Moreover, we can fall back to using the global ehash in case we fail to allocate enough memory for a new ehash. The maximum size is 16Mi, which is large enough that even if we have 48Mi sockets, the average list length is 3, and regression would be less than 1%. We can check the current ehash size by another read-only sysctl knob, net.ipv4.tcp_ehash_entries. A negative value means the netns shares the global ehash (per-netns ehash is disabled or failed to allocate memory). # dmesg | cut -d ' ' -f 5- | grep "established hash" TCP established hash table entries: 524288 (order: 10, 4194304 bytes, vmalloc hugepage) # sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_ehash_entries net.ipv4.tcp_ehash_entries = 524288 # can be changed by thash_entries # sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_child_ehash_entries net.ipv4.tcp_child_ehash_entries = 0 # disabled by default # ip netns add test1 # ip netns exec test1 sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_ehash_entries net.ipv4.tcp_ehash_entries = -524288 # share the global ehash # sysctl -w net.ipv4.tcp_child_ehash_entries=100 net.ipv4.tcp_child_ehash_entries = 100 # ip netns add test2 # ip netns exec test2 sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_ehash_entries net.ipv4.tcp_ehash_entries = 128 # own a per-netns ehash with 2^n buckets When more than two processes in the same netns create per-netns ehash concurrently with different sizes, we need to guarantee the size in one of the following ways: 1) Share the global ehash and create per-netns ehash First, unshare() with tcp_child_ehash_entries==0. It creates dedicated netns sysctl knobs where we can safely change tcp_child_ehash_entries and clone()/unshare() to create a per-netns ehash. 2) Control write on sysctl by BPF We can use BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SYSCTL to allow/deny read/write on sysctl knobs. Note that the global ehash allocated at the boot time is spread over available NUMA nodes, but inet_pernet_hashinfo_alloc() will allocate pages for each per-netns ehash depending on the current process's NUMA policy. By default, the allocation is done in the local node only, so the per-netns hash table could fully reside on a random node. Thus, depending on the NUMA policy the netns is created with and the CPU the current thread is running on, we could see some performance differences for highly optimised networking applications. Note also that the default values of two sysctl knobs depend on the ehash size and should be tuned carefully: tcp_max_tw_buckets : tcp_child_ehash_entries / 2 tcp_max_syn_backlog : max(128, tcp_child_ehash_entries / 128) As a bonus, we can dismantle netns faster. Currently, while destroying netns, we call inet_twsk_purge(), which walks through the global ehash. It can be potentially big because it can have many sockets other than TIME_WAIT in all netns. Splitting ehash changes that situation, where it's only necessary for inet_twsk_purge() to clean up TIME_WAIT sockets in each netns. With regard to this, we do not free the per-netns ehash in inet_twsk_kill() to avoid UAF while iterating the per-netns ehash in inet_twsk_purge(). Instead, we do it in tcp_sk_exit_batch() after calling tcp_twsk_purge() to keep it protocol-family-independent. In the future, we could optimise ehash lookup/iteration further by removing netns comparison for the per-netns ehash. Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2022-09-08 01:10:22 +00:00
{
.procname = "tcp_ehash_entries",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_child_ehash_entries,
.mode = 0444,
.proc_handler = proc_tcp_ehash_entries,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_child_ehash_entries",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_child_ehash_entries,
.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_douintvec_minmax,
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = &tcp_child_ehash_entries_max,
},
udp: Introduce optional per-netns hash table. The maximum hash table size is 64K due to the nature of the protocol. [0] It's smaller than TCP, and fewer sockets can cause a performance drop. On an EC2 c5.24xlarge instance (192 GiB memory), after running iperf3 in different netns, creating 32Mi sockets without data transfer in the root netns causes regression for the iperf3's connection. uhash_entries sockets length Gbps 64K 1 1 5.69 1Mi 16 5.27 2Mi 32 4.90 4Mi 64 4.09 8Mi 128 2.96 16Mi 256 2.06 32Mi 512 1.12 The per-netns hash table breaks the lengthy lists into shorter ones. It is useful on a multi-tenant system with thousands of netns. With smaller hash tables, we can look up sockets faster, isolate noisy neighbours, and reduce lock contention. The max size of the per-netns table is 64K as well. This is because the possible hash range by udp_hashfn() always fits in 64K within the same netns and we cannot make full use of the whole buckets larger than 64K. /* 0 < num < 64K -> X < hash < X + 64K */ (num + net_hash_mix(net)) & mask; Also, the min size is 128. We use a bitmap to search for an available port in udp_lib_get_port(). To keep the bitmap on the stack and not fire the CONFIG_FRAME_WARN error at build time, we round up the table size to 128. The sysctl usage is the same with TCP: $ dmesg | cut -d ' ' -f 6- | grep "UDP hash" UDP hash table entries: 65536 (order: 9, 2097152 bytes, vmalloc) # sysctl net.ipv4.udp_hash_entries net.ipv4.udp_hash_entries = 65536 # can be changed by uhash_entries # sysctl net.ipv4.udp_child_hash_entries net.ipv4.udp_child_hash_entries = 0 # disabled by default # ip netns add test1 # ip netns exec test1 sysctl net.ipv4.udp_hash_entries net.ipv4.udp_hash_entries = -65536 # share the global table # sysctl -w net.ipv4.udp_child_hash_entries=100 net.ipv4.udp_child_hash_entries = 100 # ip netns add test2 # ip netns exec test2 sysctl net.ipv4.udp_hash_entries net.ipv4.udp_hash_entries = 128 # own a per-netns table with 2^n buckets We could optimise the hash table lookup/iteration further by removing the netns comparison for the per-netns one in the future. Also, we could optimise the sparse udp_hslot layout by putting it in udp_table. [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/4ACC2815.7010101@gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2022-11-14 21:57:57 +00:00
{
.procname = "udp_hash_entries",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_udp_child_hash_entries,
.mode = 0444,
.proc_handler = proc_udp_hash_entries,
},
{
.procname = "udp_child_hash_entries",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_udp_child_hash_entries,
.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_douintvec_minmax,
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = &udp_child_hash_entries_max,
},
{
.procname = "udp_rmem_min",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_udp_rmem_min,
.maxlen = sizeof(init_net.ipv4.sysctl_udp_rmem_min),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-18 22:58:50 +00:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE
},
{
.procname = "udp_wmem_min",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_udp_wmem_min,
.maxlen = sizeof(init_net.ipv4.sysctl_udp_wmem_min),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
proc/sysctl: add shared variables for range check In the sysctl code the proc_dointvec_minmax() function is often used to validate the user supplied value between an allowed range. This function uses the extra1 and extra2 members from struct ctl_table as minimum and maximum allowed value. On sysctl handler declaration, in every source file there are some readonly variables containing just an integer which address is assigned to the extra1 and extra2 members, so the sysctl range is enforced. The special values 0, 1 and INT_MAX are very often used as range boundary, leading duplication of variables like zero=0, one=1, int_max=INT_MAX in different source files: $ git grep -E '\.extra[12].*&(zero|one|int_max)' |wc -l 248 Add a const int array containing the most commonly used values, some macros to refer more easily to the correct array member, and use them instead of creating a local one for every object file. This is the bloat-o-meter output comparing the old and new binary compiled with the default Fedora config: # scripts/bloat-o-meter -d vmlinux.o.old vmlinux.o add/remove: 2/2 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 24/-188 (-164) Data old new delta sysctl_vals - 12 +12 __kstrtab_sysctl_vals - 12 +12 max 14 10 -4 int_max 16 - -16 one 68 - -68 zero 128 28 -100 Total: Before=20583249, After=20583085, chg -0.00% [mcroce@redhat.com: tipc: remove two unused variables] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190530091952.4108-1-mcroce@redhat.com [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c] [arnd@arndb.de: proc/sysctl: make firmware loader table conditional] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190617130014.1713870-1-arnd@arndb.de [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/eventpoll.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190430180111.10688-1-mcroce@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-18 22:58:50 +00:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE
},
net: ipv4: Emit notification when fib hardware flags are changed After installing a route to the kernel, user space receives an acknowledgment, which means the route was installed in the kernel, but not necessarily in hardware. The asynchronous nature of route installation in hardware can lead to a routing daemon advertising a route before it was actually installed in hardware. This can result in packet loss or mis-routed packets until the route is installed in hardware. It is also possible for a route already installed in hardware to change its action and therefore its flags. For example, a host route that is trapping packets can be "promoted" to perform decapsulation following the installation of an IPinIP/VXLAN tunnel. Emit RTM_NEWROUTE notifications whenever RTM_F_OFFLOAD/RTM_F_TRAP flags are changed. The aim is to provide an indication to user-space (e.g., routing daemons) about the state of the route in hardware. Introduce a sysctl that controls this behavior. Keep the default value at 0 (i.e., do not emit notifications) for several reasons: - Multiple RTM_NEWROUTE notification per-route might confuse existing routing daemons. - Convergence reasons in routing daemons. - The extra notifications will negatively impact the insertion rate. - Not all users are interested in these notifications. Signed-off-by: Amit Cohen <amcohen@nvidia.com> Acked-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2021-02-01 19:47:52 +00:00
{
.procname = "fib_notify_on_flag_change",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_fib_notify_on_flag_change,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
net: ipv4: Emit notification when fib hardware flags are changed After installing a route to the kernel, user space receives an acknowledgment, which means the route was installed in the kernel, but not necessarily in hardware. The asynchronous nature of route installation in hardware can lead to a routing daemon advertising a route before it was actually installed in hardware. This can result in packet loss or mis-routed packets until the route is installed in hardware. It is also possible for a route already installed in hardware to change its action and therefore its flags. For example, a host route that is trapping packets can be "promoted" to perform decapsulation following the installation of an IPinIP/VXLAN tunnel. Emit RTM_NEWROUTE notifications whenever RTM_F_OFFLOAD/RTM_F_TRAP flags are changed. The aim is to provide an indication to user-space (e.g., routing daemons) about the state of the route in hardware. Introduce a sysctl that controls this behavior. Keep the default value at 0 (i.e., do not emit notifications) for several reasons: - Multiple RTM_NEWROUTE notification per-route might confuse existing routing daemons. - Convergence reasons in routing daemons. - The extra notifications will negatively impact the insertion rate. - Not all users are interested in these notifications. Signed-off-by: Amit Cohen <amcohen@nvidia.com> Acked-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2021-02-01 19:47:52 +00:00
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
net: ipv4: Emit notification when fib hardware flags are changed After installing a route to the kernel, user space receives an acknowledgment, which means the route was installed in the kernel, but not necessarily in hardware. The asynchronous nature of route installation in hardware can lead to a routing daemon advertising a route before it was actually installed in hardware. This can result in packet loss or mis-routed packets until the route is installed in hardware. It is also possible for a route already installed in hardware to change its action and therefore its flags. For example, a host route that is trapping packets can be "promoted" to perform decapsulation following the installation of an IPinIP/VXLAN tunnel. Emit RTM_NEWROUTE notifications whenever RTM_F_OFFLOAD/RTM_F_TRAP flags are changed. The aim is to provide an indication to user-space (e.g., routing daemons) about the state of the route in hardware. Introduce a sysctl that controls this behavior. Keep the default value at 0 (i.e., do not emit notifications) for several reasons: - Multiple RTM_NEWROUTE notification per-route might confuse existing routing daemons. - Convergence reasons in routing daemons. - The extra notifications will negatively impact the insertion rate. - Not all users are interested in these notifications. Signed-off-by: Amit Cohen <amcohen@nvidia.com> Acked-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2021-02-01 19:47:52 +00:00
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_TWO,
net: ipv4: Emit notification when fib hardware flags are changed After installing a route to the kernel, user space receives an acknowledgment, which means the route was installed in the kernel, but not necessarily in hardware. The asynchronous nature of route installation in hardware can lead to a routing daemon advertising a route before it was actually installed in hardware. This can result in packet loss or mis-routed packets until the route is installed in hardware. It is also possible for a route already installed in hardware to change its action and therefore its flags. For example, a host route that is trapping packets can be "promoted" to perform decapsulation following the installation of an IPinIP/VXLAN tunnel. Emit RTM_NEWROUTE notifications whenever RTM_F_OFFLOAD/RTM_F_TRAP flags are changed. The aim is to provide an indication to user-space (e.g., routing daemons) about the state of the route in hardware. Introduce a sysctl that controls this behavior. Keep the default value at 0 (i.e., do not emit notifications) for several reasons: - Multiple RTM_NEWROUTE notification per-route might confuse existing routing daemons. - Convergence reasons in routing daemons. - The extra notifications will negatively impact the insertion rate. - Not all users are interested in these notifications. Signed-off-by: Amit Cohen <amcohen@nvidia.com> Acked-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2021-02-01 19:47:52 +00:00
},
{
.procname = "tcp_plb_enabled",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_plb_enabled,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_plb_idle_rehash_rounds",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_plb_idle_rehash_rounds,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
.extra2 = &tcp_plb_max_rounds,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_plb_rehash_rounds",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_plb_rehash_rounds,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
.extra2 = &tcp_plb_max_rounds,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_plb_suspend_rto_sec",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_plb_suspend_rto_sec,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_plb_cong_thresh",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_plb_cong_thresh,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = &tcp_plb_max_cong_thresh,
},
{
.procname = "tcp_syn_linear_timeouts",
.data = &init_net.ipv4.sysctl_tcp_syn_linear_timeouts,
.maxlen = sizeof(u8),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = &tcp_syn_linear_timeouts_max,
},
{ }
};
static __net_init int ipv4_sysctl_init_net(struct net *net)
{
struct ctl_table *table;
table = ipv4_net_table;
if (!net_eq(net, &init_net)) {
int i;
table = kmemdup(table, sizeof(ipv4_net_table), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!table)
goto err_alloc;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ipv4_net_table) - 1; i++) {
net: Make tcp_allowed_congestion_control readonly in non-init netns Currently, tcp_allowed_congestion_control is global and writable; writing to it in any net namespace will leak into all other net namespaces. tcp_available_congestion_control and tcp_allowed_congestion_control are the only sysctls in ipv4_net_table (the per-netns sysctl table) with a NULL data pointer; their handlers (proc_tcp_available_congestion_control and proc_allowed_congestion_control) have no other way of referencing a struct net. Thus, they operate globally. Because ipv4_net_table does not use designated initializers, there is no easy way to fix up this one "bad" table entry. However, the data pointer updating logic shouldn't be applied to NULL pointers anyway, so we instead force these entries to be read-only. These sysctls used to exist in ipv4_table (init-net only), but they were moved to the per-net ipv4_net_table, presumably without realizing that tcp_allowed_congestion_control was writable and thus introduced a leak. Because the intent of that commit was only to know (i.e. read) "which congestion algorithms are available or allowed", this read-only solution should be sufficient. The logic added in recent commit 31c4d2f160eb: ("net: Ensure net namespace isolation of sysctls") does not and cannot check for NULL data pointers, because other table entries (e.g. /proc/sys/net/netfilter/nf_log/) have .data=NULL but use other methods (.extra2) to access the struct net. Fixes: 9cb8e048e5d9 ("net/ipv4/sysctl: show tcp_{allowed, available}_congestion_control in non-initial netns") Signed-off-by: Jonathon Reinhart <jonathon.reinhart@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2021-04-13 07:08:48 +00:00
if (table[i].data) {
/* Update the variables to point into
* the current struct net
*/
table[i].data += (void *)net - (void *)&init_net;
} else {
/* Entries without data pointer are global;
* Make them read-only in non-init_net ns
*/
table[i].mode &= ~0222;
}
}
}
net->ipv4.ipv4_hdr = register_net_sysctl(net, "net/ipv4", table);
if (!net->ipv4.ipv4_hdr)
goto err_reg;
net->ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports = kzalloc(65536 / 8, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!net->ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports)
goto err_ports;
return 0;
err_ports:
unregister_net_sysctl_table(net->ipv4.ipv4_hdr);
err_reg:
if (!net_eq(net, &init_net))
kfree(table);
err_alloc:
return -ENOMEM;
}
static __net_exit void ipv4_sysctl_exit_net(struct net *net)
{
struct ctl_table *table;
kfree(net->ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports);
table = net->ipv4.ipv4_hdr->ctl_table_arg;
unregister_net_sysctl_table(net->ipv4.ipv4_hdr);
kfree(table);
}
static __net_initdata struct pernet_operations ipv4_sysctl_ops = {
.init = ipv4_sysctl_init_net,
.exit = ipv4_sysctl_exit_net,
};
static __init int sysctl_ipv4_init(void)
{
struct ctl_table_header *hdr;
hdr = register_net_sysctl(&init_net, "net/ipv4", ipv4_table);
if (!hdr)
return -ENOMEM;
if (register_pernet_subsys(&ipv4_sysctl_ops)) {
unregister_net_sysctl_table(hdr);
return -ENOMEM;
}
return 0;
}
__initcall(sysctl_ipv4_init);