linux/arch/x86/boot/compressed/kaslr.c

865 lines
23 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 14:07:57 +00:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* kaslr.c
*
* This contains the routines needed to generate a reasonable level of
* entropy to choose a randomized kernel base address offset in support
* of Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization (KASLR). Additionally
* handles walking the physical memory maps (and tracking memory regions
* to avoid) in order to select a physical memory location that can
* contain the entire properly aligned running kernel image.
*
*/
/*
* isspace() in linux/ctype.h is expected by next_args() to filter
* out "space/lf/tab". While boot/ctype.h conflicts with linux/ctype.h,
* since isdigit() is implemented in both of them. Hence disable it
* here.
*/
#define BOOT_CTYPE_H
#include "misc.h"
#include "error.h"
#include "../string.h"
#include "efi.h"
#include <generated/compile.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/uts.h>
#include <linux/utsname.h>
#include <linux/ctype.h>
kbuild: build init/built-in.a just once Kbuild builds init/built-in.a twice; first during the ordinary directory descending, second from scripts/link-vmlinux.sh. We do this because UTS_VERSION contains the build version and the timestamp. We cannot update it during the normal directory traversal since we do not yet know if we need to update vmlinux. UTS_VERSION is temporarily calculated, but omitted from the update check. Otherwise, vmlinux would be rebuilt every time. When Kbuild results in running link-vmlinux.sh, it increments the version number in the .version file and takes the timestamp at that time to really fix UTS_VERSION. However, updating the same file twice is a footgun. To avoid nasty timestamp issues, all build artifacts that depend on init/built-in.a are atomically generated in link-vmlinux.sh, where some of them do not need rebuilding. To fix this issue, this commit changes as follows: [1] Split UTS_VERSION out to include/generated/utsversion.h from include/generated/compile.h include/generated/utsversion.h is generated just before the vmlinux link. It is generated under include/generated/ because some decompressors (s390, x86) use UTS_VERSION. [2] Split init_uts_ns and linux_banner out to init/version-timestamp.c from init/version.c init_uts_ns and linux_banner contain UTS_VERSION. During the ordinary directory descending, they are compiled with __weak and used to determine if vmlinux needs relinking. Just before the vmlinux link, they are compiled without __weak to embed the real version and timestamp. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
2022-08-28 02:39:53 +00:00
#include <generated/utsversion.h>
#include <generated/utsrelease.h>
#define _SETUP
#include <asm/setup.h> /* For COMMAND_LINE_SIZE */
#undef _SETUP
extern unsigned long get_cmd_line_ptr(void);
/* Simplified build-specific string for starting entropy. */
static const char build_str[] = UTS_RELEASE " (" LINUX_COMPILE_BY "@"
LINUX_COMPILE_HOST ") (" LINUX_COMPILER ") " UTS_VERSION;
static unsigned long rotate_xor(unsigned long hash, const void *area,
size_t size)
{
size_t i;
unsigned long *ptr = (unsigned long *)area;
for (i = 0; i < size / sizeof(hash); i++) {
/* Rotate by odd number of bits and XOR. */
hash = (hash << ((sizeof(hash) * 8) - 7)) | (hash >> 7);
hash ^= ptr[i];
}
return hash;
}
/* Attempt to create a simple but unpredictable starting entropy. */
x86/mm: Refactor KASLR entropy functions Move the KASLR entropy functions into arch/x86/lib to be used in early kernel boot for KASLR memory randomization. Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Popov <alpopov@ptsecurity.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466556426-32664-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-22 00:46:58 +00:00
static unsigned long get_boot_seed(void)
{
unsigned long hash = 0;
hash = rotate_xor(hash, build_str, sizeof(build_str));
hash = rotate_xor(hash, boot_params_ptr, sizeof(*boot_params_ptr));
return hash;
}
x86/mm: Refactor KASLR entropy functions Move the KASLR entropy functions into arch/x86/lib to be used in early kernel boot for KASLR memory randomization. Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Popov <alpopov@ptsecurity.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466556426-32664-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-22 00:46:58 +00:00
#define KASLR_COMPRESSED_BOOT
#include "../../lib/kaslr.c"
/* Only supporting at most 4 unusable memmap regions with kaslr */
#define MAX_MEMMAP_REGIONS 4
static bool memmap_too_large;
/*
* Store memory limit: MAXMEM on 64-bit and KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE on 32-bit.
* It may be reduced by "mem=nn[KMG]" or "memmap=nn[KMG]" command line options.
*/
static u64 mem_limit;
/* Number of immovable memory regions */
static int num_immovable_mem;
enum mem_avoid_index {
MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE = 0,
MEM_AVOID_INITRD,
MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE,
MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS,
MEM_AVOID_MEMMAP_BEGIN,
MEM_AVOID_MEMMAP_END = MEM_AVOID_MEMMAP_BEGIN + MAX_MEMMAP_REGIONS - 1,
MEM_AVOID_MAX,
};
static struct mem_vector mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_MAX];
static bool mem_overlaps(struct mem_vector *one, struct mem_vector *two)
{
/* Item one is entirely before item two. */
if (one->start + one->size <= two->start)
return false;
/* Item one is entirely after item two. */
if (one->start >= two->start + two->size)
return false;
return true;
}
char *skip_spaces(const char *str)
{
while (isspace(*str))
++str;
return (char *)str;
}
#include "../../../../lib/ctype.c"
#include "../../../../lib/cmdline.c"
static int
parse_memmap(char *p, u64 *start, u64 *size)
{
char *oldp;
if (!p)
return -EINVAL;
/* We don't care about this option here */
if (!strncmp(p, "exactmap", 8))
return -EINVAL;
oldp = p;
*size = memparse(p, &p);
if (p == oldp)
return -EINVAL;
switch (*p) {
case '#':
case '$':
case '!':
*start = memparse(p + 1, &p);
return 0;
case '@':
/*
* memmap=nn@ss specifies usable region, should
* be skipped
*/
*size = 0;
fallthrough;
default:
/*
* If w/o offset, only size specified, memmap=nn[KMG] has the
* same behaviour as mem=nn[KMG]. It limits the max address
* system can use. Region above the limit should be avoided.
*/
*start = 0;
return 0;
}
return -EINVAL;
}
static void mem_avoid_memmap(char *str)
{
static int i;
if (i >= MAX_MEMMAP_REGIONS)
return;
while (str && (i < MAX_MEMMAP_REGIONS)) {
int rc;
u64 start, size;
char *k = strchr(str, ',');
if (k)
*k++ = 0;
rc = parse_memmap(str, &start, &size);
if (rc < 0)
break;
str = k;
if (start == 0) {
/* Store the specified memory limit if size > 0 */
if (size > 0 && size < mem_limit)
mem_limit = size;
continue;
}
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_MEMMAP_BEGIN + i].start = start;
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_MEMMAP_BEGIN + i].size = size;
i++;
}
/* More than 4 memmaps, fail kaslr */
if ((i >= MAX_MEMMAP_REGIONS) && str)
memmap_too_large = true;
}
/* Store the number of 1GB huge pages which users specified: */
static unsigned long max_gb_huge_pages;
static void parse_gb_huge_pages(char *param, char *val)
{
static bool gbpage_sz;
char *p;
if (!strcmp(param, "hugepagesz")) {
p = val;
if (memparse(p, &p) != PUD_SIZE) {
gbpage_sz = false;
return;
}
if (gbpage_sz)
warn("Repeatedly set hugeTLB page size of 1G!\n");
gbpage_sz = true;
return;
}
if (!strcmp(param, "hugepages") && gbpage_sz) {
p = val;
max_gb_huge_pages = simple_strtoull(p, &p, 0);
return;
}
}
static void handle_mem_options(void)
{
char *args = (char *)get_cmd_line_ptr();
size_t len;
char *tmp_cmdline;
char *param, *val;
u64 mem_size;
if (!args)
return;
len = strnlen(args, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE-1);
tmp_cmdline = malloc(len + 1);
if (!tmp_cmdline)
error("Failed to allocate space for tmp_cmdline");
memcpy(tmp_cmdline, args, len);
tmp_cmdline[len] = 0;
args = tmp_cmdline;
/* Chew leading spaces */
args = skip_spaces(args);
while (*args) {
args = next_arg(args, &param, &val);
/* Stop at -- */
if (!val && strcmp(param, "--") == 0)
break;
if (!strcmp(param, "memmap")) {
mem_avoid_memmap(val);
} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) && strstr(param, "hugepages")) {
x86/boot/KASLR: Skip specified number of 1GB huge pages when doing physical randomization (KASLR) When KASLR is enabled then 1GB huge pages allocations might regress sporadically. To reproduce on a KVM guest with 4GB RAM: - add the following options to the kernel command-line: 'default_hugepagesz=1G hugepagesz=1G hugepages=1' - boot the guest and check number of 1GB pages reserved: # grep HugePages_Total /proc/meminfo - sporadically, every couple of bootups the output of this command shows that when booting with "nokaslr" HugePages_Total is always 1, while booting without "nokaslr" sometimes HugePages_Total is set as 0 (that is, reserving the 1GB page failed). Note that you may need to boot a few times to trigger the issue, because it's somewhat non-deterministic. The root cause is that kernel may be put into the only good 1GB huge page in the [0x40000000, 0x7fffffff] physical range randomly. Below is the dmesg output snippet from the KVM guest. We can see that only [0x40000000, 0x7fffffff] region is good 1GB huge page, [0x100000000, 0x13fffffff] will be touched by the memblock top-down allocation: [...] e820: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: [...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x000000000009fbff] usable [...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000000009fc00-0x000000000009ffff] reserved [...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000000f0000-0x00000000000fffff] reserved [...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000100000-0x00000000bffdffff] usable [...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000bffe0000-0x00000000bfffffff] reserved [...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000feffc000-0x00000000feffffff] reserved [...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fffc0000-0x00000000ffffffff] reserved [...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000100000000-0x000000013fffffff] usable Besides, on bare-metal machines with larger memory, one less 1GB huge page might be available with KASLR enabled. That too is because the kernel image might be randomized into those "good" 1GB huge pages. To fix this, firstly parse the kernel command-line to get how many 1GB huge pages are specified. Then try to skip the specified number of 1GB huge pages when decide which memory region kernel can be randomized into. Also change the name of handle_mem_memmap() as handle_mem_options() since it handles not only 'mem=' and 'memmap=', but also 'hugepagesxxx' now. Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: indou.takao@jp.fujitsu.com Cc: keescook@chromium.org Cc: lcapitulino@redhat.com Cc: yasu.isimatu@gmail.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180625031656.12443-3-bhe@redhat.com [ Rewrote the changelog, fixed style problems in the code. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-06-25 03:16:56 +00:00
parse_gb_huge_pages(param, val);
} else if (!strcmp(param, "mem")) {
char *p = val;
if (!strcmp(p, "nopentium"))
continue;
mem_size = memparse(p, &p);
if (mem_size == 0)
break;
if (mem_size < mem_limit)
mem_limit = mem_size;
}
}
free(tmp_cmdline);
return;
}
/*
* In theory, KASLR can put the kernel anywhere in the range of [16M, MAXMEM)
* on 64-bit, and [16M, KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE) on 32-bit.
*
* The mem_avoid array is used to store the ranges that need to be avoided
* when KASLR searches for an appropriate random address. We must avoid any
* regions that are unsafe to overlap with during decompression, and other
* things like the initrd, cmdline and boot_params. This comment seeks to
* explain mem_avoid as clearly as possible since incorrect mem_avoid
* memory ranges lead to really hard to debug boot failures.
*
* The initrd, cmdline, and boot_params are trivial to identify for
* avoiding. They are MEM_AVOID_INITRD, MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE, and
* MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS respectively below.
*
* What is not obvious how to avoid is the range of memory that is used
* during decompression (MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE below). This range must cover
* the compressed kernel (ZO) and its run space, which is used to extract
* the uncompressed kernel (VO) and relocs.
*
* ZO's full run size sits against the end of the decompression buffer, so
* we can calculate where text, data, bss, etc of ZO are positioned more
* easily.
*
* For additional background, the decompression calculations can be found
* in header.S, and the memory diagram is based on the one found in misc.c.
*
* The following conditions are already enforced by the image layouts and
* associated code:
* - input + input_size >= output + output_size
* - kernel_total_size <= init_size
* - kernel_total_size <= output_size (see Note below)
* - output + init_size >= output + output_size
*
* (Note that kernel_total_size and output_size have no fundamental
* relationship, but output_size is passed to choose_random_location
* as a maximum of the two. The diagram is showing a case where
* kernel_total_size is larger than output_size, but this case is
* handled by bumping output_size.)
*
* The above conditions can be illustrated by a diagram:
*
* 0 output input input+input_size output+init_size
* | | | | |
* | | | | |
* |-----|--------|--------|--------------|-----------|--|-------------|
* | | |
* | | |
* output+init_size-ZO_INIT_SIZE output+output_size output+kernel_total_size
*
* [output, output+init_size) is the entire memory range used for
* extracting the compressed image.
*
* [output, output+kernel_total_size) is the range needed for the
* uncompressed kernel (VO) and its run size (bss, brk, etc).
*
* [output, output+output_size) is VO plus relocs (i.e. the entire
* uncompressed payload contained by ZO). This is the area of the buffer
* written to during decompression.
*
* [output+init_size-ZO_INIT_SIZE, output+init_size) is the worst-case
* range of the copied ZO and decompression code. (i.e. the range
* covered backwards of size ZO_INIT_SIZE, starting from output+init_size.)
*
* [input, input+input_size) is the original copied compressed image (ZO)
* (i.e. it does not include its run size). This range must be avoided
* because it contains the data used for decompression.
*
* [input+input_size, output+init_size) is [_text, _end) for ZO. This
* range includes ZO's heap and stack, and must be avoided since it
* performs the decompression.
*
* Since the above two ranges need to be avoided and they are adjacent,
* they can be merged, resulting in: [input, output+init_size) which
* becomes the MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE below.
*/
static void mem_avoid_init(unsigned long input, unsigned long input_size,
unsigned long output)
{
unsigned long init_size = boot_params_ptr->hdr.init_size;
u64 initrd_start, initrd_size;
unsigned long cmd_line, cmd_line_size;
/*
* Avoid the region that is unsafe to overlap during
* decompression.
*/
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE].start = input;
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_ZO_RANGE].size = (output + init_size) - input;
/* Avoid initrd. */
initrd_start = (u64)boot_params_ptr->ext_ramdisk_image << 32;
initrd_start |= boot_params_ptr->hdr.ramdisk_image;
initrd_size = (u64)boot_params_ptr->ext_ramdisk_size << 32;
initrd_size |= boot_params_ptr->hdr.ramdisk_size;
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_INITRD].start = initrd_start;
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_INITRD].size = initrd_size;
x86/KASLR: Build identity mappings on demand Currently KASLR only supports relocation in a small physical range (from 16M to 1G), due to using the initial kernel page table identity mapping. To support ranges above this, we need to have an identity mapping for the desired memory range before we can decompress (and later run) the kernel. 32-bit kernels already have the needed identity mapping. This patch adds identity mappings for the needed memory ranges on 64-bit kernels. This happens in two possible boot paths: If loaded via startup_32(), we need to set up the needed identity map. If loaded from a 64-bit bootloader, the bootloader will have already set up an identity mapping, and we'll start via the compressed kernel's startup_64(). In this case, the bootloader's page tables need to be avoided while selecting the new uncompressed kernel location. If not, the decompressor could overwrite them during decompression. To accomplish this, we could walk the pagetable and find every page that is used, and add them to mem_avoid, but this needs extra code and will require increasing the size of the mem_avoid array. Instead, we can create a new set of page tables for our own identity mapping instead. The pages for the new page table will come from the _pagetable section of the compressed kernel, which means they are already contained by in mem_avoid array. To do this, we reuse the code from the uncompressed kernel's identity mapping routines. The _pgtable will be shared by both the 32-bit and 64-bit paths to reduce init_size, as now the compressed kernel's _rodata to _end will contribute to init_size. To handle the possible mappings, we need to increase the existing page table buffer size: When booting via startup_64(), we need to cover the old VO, params, cmdline and uncompressed kernel. In an extreme case we could have them all beyond the 512G boundary, which needs (2+2)*4 pages with 2M mappings. And we'll need 2 for first 2M for VGA RAM. One more is needed for level4. This gets us to 19 pages total. When booting via startup_32(), KASLR could move the uncompressed kernel above 4G, so we need to create extra identity mappings, which should only need (2+2) pages at most when it is beyond the 512G boundary. So 19 pages is sufficient for this case as well. The resulting BOOT_*PGT_SIZE defines use the "_SIZE" suffix on their names to maintain logical consistency with the existing BOOT_HEAP_SIZE and BOOT_STACK_SIZE defines. This patch is based on earlier patches from Yinghai Lu and Baoquan He. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: lasse.collin@tukaani.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462572095-11754-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-06 22:01:35 +00:00
/* No need to set mapping for initrd, it will be handled in VO. */
/* Avoid kernel command line. */
cmd_line = get_cmd_line_ptr();
/* Calculate size of cmd_line. */
if (cmd_line) {
cmd_line_size = strnlen((char *)cmd_line, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE-1) + 1;
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE].start = cmd_line;
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_CMDLINE].size = cmd_line_size;
}
/* Avoid boot parameters. */
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS].start = (unsigned long)boot_params_ptr;
mem_avoid[MEM_AVOID_BOOTPARAMS].size = sizeof(*boot_params_ptr);
x86/KASLR: Build identity mappings on demand Currently KASLR only supports relocation in a small physical range (from 16M to 1G), due to using the initial kernel page table identity mapping. To support ranges above this, we need to have an identity mapping for the desired memory range before we can decompress (and later run) the kernel. 32-bit kernels already have the needed identity mapping. This patch adds identity mappings for the needed memory ranges on 64-bit kernels. This happens in two possible boot paths: If loaded via startup_32(), we need to set up the needed identity map. If loaded from a 64-bit bootloader, the bootloader will have already set up an identity mapping, and we'll start via the compressed kernel's startup_64(). In this case, the bootloader's page tables need to be avoided while selecting the new uncompressed kernel location. If not, the decompressor could overwrite them during decompression. To accomplish this, we could walk the pagetable and find every page that is used, and add them to mem_avoid, but this needs extra code and will require increasing the size of the mem_avoid array. Instead, we can create a new set of page tables for our own identity mapping instead. The pages for the new page table will come from the _pagetable section of the compressed kernel, which means they are already contained by in mem_avoid array. To do this, we reuse the code from the uncompressed kernel's identity mapping routines. The _pgtable will be shared by both the 32-bit and 64-bit paths to reduce init_size, as now the compressed kernel's _rodata to _end will contribute to init_size. To handle the possible mappings, we need to increase the existing page table buffer size: When booting via startup_64(), we need to cover the old VO, params, cmdline and uncompressed kernel. In an extreme case we could have them all beyond the 512G boundary, which needs (2+2)*4 pages with 2M mappings. And we'll need 2 for first 2M for VGA RAM. One more is needed for level4. This gets us to 19 pages total. When booting via startup_32(), KASLR could move the uncompressed kernel above 4G, so we need to create extra identity mappings, which should only need (2+2) pages at most when it is beyond the 512G boundary. So 19 pages is sufficient for this case as well. The resulting BOOT_*PGT_SIZE defines use the "_SIZE" suffix on their names to maintain logical consistency with the existing BOOT_HEAP_SIZE and BOOT_STACK_SIZE defines. This patch is based on earlier patches from Yinghai Lu and Baoquan He. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: lasse.collin@tukaani.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462572095-11754-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-06 22:01:35 +00:00
/* We don't need to set a mapping for setup_data. */
/* Mark the memmap regions we need to avoid */
x86/boot/KASLR: Skip specified number of 1GB huge pages when doing physical randomization (KASLR) When KASLR is enabled then 1GB huge pages allocations might regress sporadically. To reproduce on a KVM guest with 4GB RAM: - add the following options to the kernel command-line: 'default_hugepagesz=1G hugepagesz=1G hugepages=1' - boot the guest and check number of 1GB pages reserved: # grep HugePages_Total /proc/meminfo - sporadically, every couple of bootups the output of this command shows that when booting with "nokaslr" HugePages_Total is always 1, while booting without "nokaslr" sometimes HugePages_Total is set as 0 (that is, reserving the 1GB page failed). Note that you may need to boot a few times to trigger the issue, because it's somewhat non-deterministic. The root cause is that kernel may be put into the only good 1GB huge page in the [0x40000000, 0x7fffffff] physical range randomly. Below is the dmesg output snippet from the KVM guest. We can see that only [0x40000000, 0x7fffffff] region is good 1GB huge page, [0x100000000, 0x13fffffff] will be touched by the memblock top-down allocation: [...] e820: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: [...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x000000000009fbff] usable [...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000000009fc00-0x000000000009ffff] reserved [...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000000f0000-0x00000000000fffff] reserved [...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000100000-0x00000000bffdffff] usable [...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000bffe0000-0x00000000bfffffff] reserved [...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000feffc000-0x00000000feffffff] reserved [...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fffc0000-0x00000000ffffffff] reserved [...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000100000000-0x000000013fffffff] usable Besides, on bare-metal machines with larger memory, one less 1GB huge page might be available with KASLR enabled. That too is because the kernel image might be randomized into those "good" 1GB huge pages. To fix this, firstly parse the kernel command-line to get how many 1GB huge pages are specified. Then try to skip the specified number of 1GB huge pages when decide which memory region kernel can be randomized into. Also change the name of handle_mem_memmap() as handle_mem_options() since it handles not only 'mem=' and 'memmap=', but also 'hugepagesxxx' now. Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: indou.takao@jp.fujitsu.com Cc: keescook@chromium.org Cc: lcapitulino@redhat.com Cc: yasu.isimatu@gmail.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180625031656.12443-3-bhe@redhat.com [ Rewrote the changelog, fixed style problems in the code. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-06-25 03:16:56 +00:00
handle_mem_options();
/* Enumerate the immovable memory regions */
num_immovable_mem = count_immovable_mem_regions();
}
/*
* Does this memory vector overlap a known avoided area? If so, record the
* overlap region with the lowest address.
*/
static bool mem_avoid_overlap(struct mem_vector *img,
struct mem_vector *overlap)
{
int i;
struct setup_data *ptr;
u64 earliest = img->start + img->size;
bool is_overlapping = false;
for (i = 0; i < MEM_AVOID_MAX; i++) {
if (mem_overlaps(img, &mem_avoid[i]) &&
mem_avoid[i].start < earliest) {
*overlap = mem_avoid[i];
earliest = overlap->start;
is_overlapping = true;
}
}
/* Avoid all entries in the setup_data linked list. */
ptr = (struct setup_data *)(unsigned long)boot_params_ptr->hdr.setup_data;
while (ptr) {
struct mem_vector avoid;
avoid.start = (unsigned long)ptr;
avoid.size = sizeof(*ptr) + ptr->len;
if (mem_overlaps(img, &avoid) && (avoid.start < earliest)) {
*overlap = avoid;
earliest = overlap->start;
is_overlapping = true;
}
x86/boot: Introduce setup_indirect The setup_data is a bit awkward to use for extremely large data objects, both because the setup_data header has to be adjacent to the data object and because it has a 32-bit length field. However, it is important that intermediate stages of the boot process have a way to identify which chunks of memory are occupied by kernel data. Thus introduce an uniform way to specify such indirect data as setup_indirect struct and SETUP_INDIRECT type. And finally bump setup_header version in arch/x86/boot/header.S. Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com> Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com Cc: eric.snowberg@oracle.com Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: rdunlap@infradead.org Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org> Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191112134640.16035-4-daniel.kiper@oracle.com
2019-11-12 13:46:40 +00:00
if (ptr->type == SETUP_INDIRECT &&
((struct setup_indirect *)ptr->data)->type != SETUP_INDIRECT) {
avoid.start = ((struct setup_indirect *)ptr->data)->addr;
avoid.size = ((struct setup_indirect *)ptr->data)->len;
if (mem_overlaps(img, &avoid) && (avoid.start < earliest)) {
*overlap = avoid;
earliest = overlap->start;
is_overlapping = true;
}
}
ptr = (struct setup_data *)(unsigned long)ptr->next;
}
return is_overlapping;
}
x86/KASLR: Add 'struct slot_area' to manage random_addr slots In order to support KASLR moving the kernel anywhere in physical memory (which could be up to 64TB), we need to handle counting the potential randomization locations in a more efficient manner. In the worst case with 64TB, there could be roughly 32 * 1024 * 1024 randomization slots if CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN is 0x1000000. Currently the starting address of candidate positions is stored into the slots[] array, one at a time. This method would cost too much memory and it's also very inefficient to get and save the slot information into the slot array one by one. This patch introduces 'struct slot_area' to manage each contiguous region of randomization slots. Each slot_area will contain the starting address and how many available slots are in this area. As with the original code, the slot_areas[] will avoid the mem_avoid[] regions. Since setup_data is a linked list, it could contain an unknown number of memory regions to be avoided, which could cause us to fragment the contiguous memory that the slot_area array is tracking. In normal operation this level of fragmentation will be extremely rare, but we choose a suitably large value (100) for the array. If setup_data forces the slot_area array to become highly fragmented and there are more slots available beyond the first 100 found, the rest will be ignored for KASLR selection. The function store_slot_info() is used to calculate the number of slots available in the passed-in memory region and stores it into slot_areas[] after adjusting for alignment and size requirements. Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> [ Rewrote changelog, squashed with new functions. ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: lasse.collin@tukaani.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462825332-10505-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-09 20:22:06 +00:00
struct slot_area {
u64 addr;
unsigned long num;
x86/KASLR: Add 'struct slot_area' to manage random_addr slots In order to support KASLR moving the kernel anywhere in physical memory (which could be up to 64TB), we need to handle counting the potential randomization locations in a more efficient manner. In the worst case with 64TB, there could be roughly 32 * 1024 * 1024 randomization slots if CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN is 0x1000000. Currently the starting address of candidate positions is stored into the slots[] array, one at a time. This method would cost too much memory and it's also very inefficient to get and save the slot information into the slot array one by one. This patch introduces 'struct slot_area' to manage each contiguous region of randomization slots. Each slot_area will contain the starting address and how many available slots are in this area. As with the original code, the slot_areas[] will avoid the mem_avoid[] regions. Since setup_data is a linked list, it could contain an unknown number of memory regions to be avoided, which could cause us to fragment the contiguous memory that the slot_area array is tracking. In normal operation this level of fragmentation will be extremely rare, but we choose a suitably large value (100) for the array. If setup_data forces the slot_area array to become highly fragmented and there are more slots available beyond the first 100 found, the rest will be ignored for KASLR selection. The function store_slot_info() is used to calculate the number of slots available in the passed-in memory region and stores it into slot_areas[] after adjusting for alignment and size requirements. Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> [ Rewrote changelog, squashed with new functions. ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: lasse.collin@tukaani.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462825332-10505-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-09 20:22:06 +00:00
};
#define MAX_SLOT_AREA 100
static struct slot_area slot_areas[MAX_SLOT_AREA];
static unsigned int slot_area_index;
static unsigned long slot_max;
x86/KASLR: Add 'struct slot_area' to manage random_addr slots In order to support KASLR moving the kernel anywhere in physical memory (which could be up to 64TB), we need to handle counting the potential randomization locations in a more efficient manner. In the worst case with 64TB, there could be roughly 32 * 1024 * 1024 randomization slots if CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN is 0x1000000. Currently the starting address of candidate positions is stored into the slots[] array, one at a time. This method would cost too much memory and it's also very inefficient to get and save the slot information into the slot array one by one. This patch introduces 'struct slot_area' to manage each contiguous region of randomization slots. Each slot_area will contain the starting address and how many available slots are in this area. As with the original code, the slot_areas[] will avoid the mem_avoid[] regions. Since setup_data is a linked list, it could contain an unknown number of memory regions to be avoided, which could cause us to fragment the contiguous memory that the slot_area array is tracking. In normal operation this level of fragmentation will be extremely rare, but we choose a suitably large value (100) for the array. If setup_data forces the slot_area array to become highly fragmented and there are more slots available beyond the first 100 found, the rest will be ignored for KASLR selection. The function store_slot_info() is used to calculate the number of slots available in the passed-in memory region and stores it into slot_areas[] after adjusting for alignment and size requirements. Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> [ Rewrote changelog, squashed with new functions. ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: lasse.collin@tukaani.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462825332-10505-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-09 20:22:06 +00:00
static void store_slot_info(struct mem_vector *region, unsigned long image_size)
{
struct slot_area slot_area;
if (slot_area_index == MAX_SLOT_AREA)
return;
slot_area.addr = region->start;
slot_area.num = 1 + (region->size - image_size) / CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN;
x86/KASLR: Add 'struct slot_area' to manage random_addr slots In order to support KASLR moving the kernel anywhere in physical memory (which could be up to 64TB), we need to handle counting the potential randomization locations in a more efficient manner. In the worst case with 64TB, there could be roughly 32 * 1024 * 1024 randomization slots if CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN is 0x1000000. Currently the starting address of candidate positions is stored into the slots[] array, one at a time. This method would cost too much memory and it's also very inefficient to get and save the slot information into the slot array one by one. This patch introduces 'struct slot_area' to manage each contiguous region of randomization slots. Each slot_area will contain the starting address and how many available slots are in this area. As with the original code, the slot_areas[] will avoid the mem_avoid[] regions. Since setup_data is a linked list, it could contain an unknown number of memory regions to be avoided, which could cause us to fragment the contiguous memory that the slot_area array is tracking. In normal operation this level of fragmentation will be extremely rare, but we choose a suitably large value (100) for the array. If setup_data forces the slot_area array to become highly fragmented and there are more slots available beyond the first 100 found, the rest will be ignored for KASLR selection. The function store_slot_info() is used to calculate the number of slots available in the passed-in memory region and stores it into slot_areas[] after adjusting for alignment and size requirements. Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> [ Rewrote changelog, squashed with new functions. ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: lasse.collin@tukaani.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462825332-10505-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-09 20:22:06 +00:00
slot_areas[slot_area_index++] = slot_area;
slot_max += slot_area.num;
x86/KASLR: Add 'struct slot_area' to manage random_addr slots In order to support KASLR moving the kernel anywhere in physical memory (which could be up to 64TB), we need to handle counting the potential randomization locations in a more efficient manner. In the worst case with 64TB, there could be roughly 32 * 1024 * 1024 randomization slots if CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN is 0x1000000. Currently the starting address of candidate positions is stored into the slots[] array, one at a time. This method would cost too much memory and it's also very inefficient to get and save the slot information into the slot array one by one. This patch introduces 'struct slot_area' to manage each contiguous region of randomization slots. Each slot_area will contain the starting address and how many available slots are in this area. As with the original code, the slot_areas[] will avoid the mem_avoid[] regions. Since setup_data is a linked list, it could contain an unknown number of memory regions to be avoided, which could cause us to fragment the contiguous memory that the slot_area array is tracking. In normal operation this level of fragmentation will be extremely rare, but we choose a suitably large value (100) for the array. If setup_data forces the slot_area array to become highly fragmented and there are more slots available beyond the first 100 found, the rest will be ignored for KASLR selection. The function store_slot_info() is used to calculate the number of slots available in the passed-in memory region and stores it into slot_areas[] after adjusting for alignment and size requirements. Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> [ Rewrote changelog, squashed with new functions. ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: lasse.collin@tukaani.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462825332-10505-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-09 20:22:06 +00:00
}
/*
* Skip as many 1GB huge pages as possible in the passed region
* according to the number which users specified:
*/
static void
process_gb_huge_pages(struct mem_vector *region, unsigned long image_size)
{
u64 pud_start, pud_end;
unsigned long gb_huge_pages;
struct mem_vector tmp;
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) || !max_gb_huge_pages) {
store_slot_info(region, image_size);
return;
}
/* Are there any 1GB pages in the region? */
pud_start = ALIGN(region->start, PUD_SIZE);
pud_end = ALIGN_DOWN(region->start + region->size, PUD_SIZE);
/* No good 1GB huge pages found: */
if (pud_start >= pud_end) {
store_slot_info(region, image_size);
return;
}
/* Check if the head part of the region is usable. */
if (pud_start >= region->start + image_size) {
tmp.start = region->start;
tmp.size = pud_start - region->start;
store_slot_info(&tmp, image_size);
}
/* Skip the good 1GB pages. */
gb_huge_pages = (pud_end - pud_start) >> PUD_SHIFT;
if (gb_huge_pages > max_gb_huge_pages) {
pud_end = pud_start + (max_gb_huge_pages << PUD_SHIFT);
max_gb_huge_pages = 0;
} else {
max_gb_huge_pages -= gb_huge_pages;
}
/* Check if the tail part of the region is usable. */
if (region->start + region->size >= pud_end + image_size) {
tmp.start = pud_end;
tmp.size = region->start + region->size - pud_end;
store_slot_info(&tmp, image_size);
}
}
static u64 slots_fetch_random(void)
{
unsigned long slot;
unsigned int i;
/* Handle case of no slots stored. */
if (slot_max == 0)
return 0;
x86/mm: Refactor KASLR entropy functions Move the KASLR entropy functions into arch/x86/lib to be used in early kernel boot for KASLR memory randomization. Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Popov <alpopov@ptsecurity.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466556426-32664-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-22 00:46:58 +00:00
slot = kaslr_get_random_long("Physical") % slot_max;
for (i = 0; i < slot_area_index; i++) {
if (slot >= slot_areas[i].num) {
slot -= slot_areas[i].num;
continue;
}
return slot_areas[i].addr + ((u64)slot * CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN);
}
if (i == slot_area_index)
debug_putstr("slots_fetch_random() failed!?\n");
return 0;
}
static void __process_mem_region(struct mem_vector *entry,
unsigned long minimum,
unsigned long image_size)
{
struct mem_vector region, overlap;
u64 region_end;
/* Enforce minimum and memory limit. */
region.start = max_t(u64, entry->start, minimum);
region_end = min(entry->start + entry->size, mem_limit);
/* Give up if slot area array is full. */
while (slot_area_index < MAX_SLOT_AREA) {
/* Potentially raise address to meet alignment needs. */
region.start = ALIGN(region.start, CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN);
/* Did we raise the address above the passed in memory entry? */
if (region.start > region_end)
return;
/* Reduce size by any delta from the original address. */
region.size = region_end - region.start;
/* Return if region can't contain decompressed kernel */
if (region.size < image_size)
return;
/* If nothing overlaps, store the region and return. */
if (!mem_avoid_overlap(&region, &overlap)) {
x86/boot/KASLR: Skip specified number of 1GB huge pages when doing physical randomization (KASLR) When KASLR is enabled then 1GB huge pages allocations might regress sporadically. To reproduce on a KVM guest with 4GB RAM: - add the following options to the kernel command-line: 'default_hugepagesz=1G hugepagesz=1G hugepages=1' - boot the guest and check number of 1GB pages reserved: # grep HugePages_Total /proc/meminfo - sporadically, every couple of bootups the output of this command shows that when booting with "nokaslr" HugePages_Total is always 1, while booting without "nokaslr" sometimes HugePages_Total is set as 0 (that is, reserving the 1GB page failed). Note that you may need to boot a few times to trigger the issue, because it's somewhat non-deterministic. The root cause is that kernel may be put into the only good 1GB huge page in the [0x40000000, 0x7fffffff] physical range randomly. Below is the dmesg output snippet from the KVM guest. We can see that only [0x40000000, 0x7fffffff] region is good 1GB huge page, [0x100000000, 0x13fffffff] will be touched by the memblock top-down allocation: [...] e820: BIOS-provided physical RAM map: [...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x000000000009fbff] usable [...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x000000000009fc00-0x000000000009ffff] reserved [...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000000f0000-0x00000000000fffff] reserved [...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000000100000-0x00000000bffdffff] usable [...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000bffe0000-0x00000000bfffffff] reserved [...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000feffc000-0x00000000feffffff] reserved [...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000000fffc0000-0x00000000ffffffff] reserved [...] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000000100000000-0x000000013fffffff] usable Besides, on bare-metal machines with larger memory, one less 1GB huge page might be available with KASLR enabled. That too is because the kernel image might be randomized into those "good" 1GB huge pages. To fix this, firstly parse the kernel command-line to get how many 1GB huge pages are specified. Then try to skip the specified number of 1GB huge pages when decide which memory region kernel can be randomized into. Also change the name of handle_mem_memmap() as handle_mem_options() since it handles not only 'mem=' and 'memmap=', but also 'hugepagesxxx' now. Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: indou.takao@jp.fujitsu.com Cc: keescook@chromium.org Cc: lcapitulino@redhat.com Cc: yasu.isimatu@gmail.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180625031656.12443-3-bhe@redhat.com [ Rewrote the changelog, fixed style problems in the code. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-06-25 03:16:56 +00:00
process_gb_huge_pages(&region, image_size);
return;
}
/* Store beginning of region if holds at least image_size. */
if (overlap.start >= region.start + image_size) {
region.size = overlap.start - region.start;
process_gb_huge_pages(&region, image_size);
}
/* Clip off the overlapping region and start over. */
region.start = overlap.start + overlap.size;
}
}
static bool process_mem_region(struct mem_vector *region,
unsigned long minimum,
unsigned long image_size)
{
int i;
/*
* If no immovable memory found, or MEMORY_HOTREMOVE disabled,
* use @region directly.
*/
if (!num_immovable_mem) {
__process_mem_region(region, minimum, image_size);
if (slot_area_index == MAX_SLOT_AREA) {
debug_putstr("Aborted e820/efi memmap scan (slot_areas full)!\n");
return true;
}
return false;
}
#if defined(CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTREMOVE) && defined(CONFIG_ACPI)
/*
* If immovable memory found, filter the intersection between
* immovable memory and @region.
*/
for (i = 0; i < num_immovable_mem; i++) {
u64 start, end, entry_end, region_end;
struct mem_vector entry;
if (!mem_overlaps(region, &immovable_mem[i]))
continue;
start = immovable_mem[i].start;
end = start + immovable_mem[i].size;
region_end = region->start + region->size;
entry.start = clamp(region->start, start, end);
entry_end = clamp(region_end, start, end);
entry.size = entry_end - entry.start;
__process_mem_region(&entry, minimum, image_size);
if (slot_area_index == MAX_SLOT_AREA) {
debug_putstr("Aborted e820/efi memmap scan when walking immovable regions(slot_areas full)!\n");
return true;
}
}
#endif
return false;
}
x86/boot/KASLR: Prefer mirrored memory regions for the kernel physical address Currently KASLR will parse all e820 entries of RAM type and add all candidate positions into the slots array. After that we choose one slot randomly as the new position which the kernel will be decompressed into and run at. On systems with EFI enabled, e820 memory regions are coming from EFI memory regions by combining adjacent regions. These EFI memory regions have various attributes, and the "mirrored" attribute is one of them. The physical memory region whose descriptors in EFI memory map has EFI_MEMORY_MORE_RELIABLE attribute (bit: 16) are mirrored. The address range mirroring feature of the kernel arranges such mirrored regions into normal zones and other regions into movable zones. With the mirroring feature enabled, the code and data of the kernel can only be located in the more reliable mirrored regions. However, the current KASLR code doesn't check EFI memory entries, and could choose a new kernel position in non-mirrored regions. This will break the intended functionality of the address range mirroring feature. To fix this, if EFI is detected, iterate EFI memory map and pick the mirrored region to process for adding candidate of randomization slot. If EFI is disabled or no mirrored region found, still process the e820 memory map. Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com Cc: keescook@chromium.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Cc: n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com Cc: thgarnie@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1502722464-20614-3-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.com [ Rewrote most of the text. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-08-14 14:54:24 +00:00
#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
/*
* Only EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY and EFI_UNACCEPTED_MEMORY (if supported) are
* guaranteed to be free.
*
* Pick free memory more conservatively than the EFI spec allows: according to
* the spec, EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_{CODE|DATA} are also free memory and thus
* available to place the kernel image into, but in practice there's firmware
* where using that memory leads to crashes. Buggy vendor EFI code registers
* for an event that triggers on SetVirtualAddressMap(). The handler assumes
* that EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA memory has not been touched by loader yet, which
* is probably true for Windows.
*
* Preserve EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_* regions until after SetVirtualAddressMap().
*/
static inline bool memory_type_is_free(efi_memory_desc_t *md)
{
if (md->type == EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY)
return true;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNACCEPTED_MEMORY) &&
md->type == EFI_UNACCEPTED_MEMORY)
return true;
return false;
}
x86/boot/KASLR: Prefer mirrored memory regions for the kernel physical address Currently KASLR will parse all e820 entries of RAM type and add all candidate positions into the slots array. After that we choose one slot randomly as the new position which the kernel will be decompressed into and run at. On systems with EFI enabled, e820 memory regions are coming from EFI memory regions by combining adjacent regions. These EFI memory regions have various attributes, and the "mirrored" attribute is one of them. The physical memory region whose descriptors in EFI memory map has EFI_MEMORY_MORE_RELIABLE attribute (bit: 16) are mirrored. The address range mirroring feature of the kernel arranges such mirrored regions into normal zones and other regions into movable zones. With the mirroring feature enabled, the code and data of the kernel can only be located in the more reliable mirrored regions. However, the current KASLR code doesn't check EFI memory entries, and could choose a new kernel position in non-mirrored regions. This will break the intended functionality of the address range mirroring feature. To fix this, if EFI is detected, iterate EFI memory map and pick the mirrored region to process for adding candidate of randomization slot. If EFI is disabled or no mirrored region found, still process the e820 memory map. Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com Cc: keescook@chromium.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Cc: n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com Cc: thgarnie@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1502722464-20614-3-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.com [ Rewrote most of the text. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-08-14 14:54:24 +00:00
/*
* Returns true if we processed the EFI memmap, which we prefer over the E820
* table if it is available.
x86/boot/KASLR: Prefer mirrored memory regions for the kernel physical address Currently KASLR will parse all e820 entries of RAM type and add all candidate positions into the slots array. After that we choose one slot randomly as the new position which the kernel will be decompressed into and run at. On systems with EFI enabled, e820 memory regions are coming from EFI memory regions by combining adjacent regions. These EFI memory regions have various attributes, and the "mirrored" attribute is one of them. The physical memory region whose descriptors in EFI memory map has EFI_MEMORY_MORE_RELIABLE attribute (bit: 16) are mirrored. The address range mirroring feature of the kernel arranges such mirrored regions into normal zones and other regions into movable zones. With the mirroring feature enabled, the code and data of the kernel can only be located in the more reliable mirrored regions. However, the current KASLR code doesn't check EFI memory entries, and could choose a new kernel position in non-mirrored regions. This will break the intended functionality of the address range mirroring feature. To fix this, if EFI is detected, iterate EFI memory map and pick the mirrored region to process for adding candidate of randomization slot. If EFI is disabled or no mirrored region found, still process the e820 memory map. Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com Cc: keescook@chromium.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Cc: n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com Cc: thgarnie@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1502722464-20614-3-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.com [ Rewrote most of the text. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-08-14 14:54:24 +00:00
*/
static bool
process_efi_entries(unsigned long minimum, unsigned long image_size)
{
struct efi_info *e = &boot_params_ptr->efi_info;
x86/boot/KASLR: Prefer mirrored memory regions for the kernel physical address Currently KASLR will parse all e820 entries of RAM type and add all candidate positions into the slots array. After that we choose one slot randomly as the new position which the kernel will be decompressed into and run at. On systems with EFI enabled, e820 memory regions are coming from EFI memory regions by combining adjacent regions. These EFI memory regions have various attributes, and the "mirrored" attribute is one of them. The physical memory region whose descriptors in EFI memory map has EFI_MEMORY_MORE_RELIABLE attribute (bit: 16) are mirrored. The address range mirroring feature of the kernel arranges such mirrored regions into normal zones and other regions into movable zones. With the mirroring feature enabled, the code and data of the kernel can only be located in the more reliable mirrored regions. However, the current KASLR code doesn't check EFI memory entries, and could choose a new kernel position in non-mirrored regions. This will break the intended functionality of the address range mirroring feature. To fix this, if EFI is detected, iterate EFI memory map and pick the mirrored region to process for adding candidate of randomization slot. If EFI is disabled or no mirrored region found, still process the e820 memory map. Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com Cc: keescook@chromium.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Cc: n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com Cc: thgarnie@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1502722464-20614-3-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.com [ Rewrote most of the text. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-08-14 14:54:24 +00:00
bool efi_mirror_found = false;
struct mem_vector region;
efi_memory_desc_t *md;
unsigned long pmap;
char *signature;
u32 nr_desc;
int i;
signature = (char *)&e->efi_loader_signature;
if (strncmp(signature, EFI32_LOADER_SIGNATURE, 4) &&
strncmp(signature, EFI64_LOADER_SIGNATURE, 4))
return false;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
/* Can't handle data above 4GB at this time */
if (e->efi_memmap_hi) {
warn("EFI memmap is above 4GB, can't be handled now on x86_32. EFI should be disabled.\n");
return false;
}
pmap = e->efi_memmap;
#else
pmap = (e->efi_memmap | ((__u64)e->efi_memmap_hi << 32));
#endif
nr_desc = e->efi_memmap_size / e->efi_memdesc_size;
for (i = 0; i < nr_desc; i++) {
md = efi_early_memdesc_ptr(pmap, e->efi_memdesc_size, i);
if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_MORE_RELIABLE) {
efi_mirror_found = true;
x86/boot/KASLR: Work around firmware bugs by excluding EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_* and EFI_LOADER_* from KASLR's choice There's a potential bug in how we select the KASLR kernel address n the early boot code. The KASLR boot code currently chooses the kernel image's physical memory location from E820_TYPE_RAM regions by walking over all e820 entries. E820_TYPE_RAM includes EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE and EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA as well, so those regions can end up hosting the kernel image. According to the UEFI spec, all memory regions marked as EfiBootServicesCode and EfiBootServicesData are available as free memory after the first call to ExitBootServices(). I.e. so such regions should be usable for the kernel, per spec. In real life however, we have workarounds for broken x86 firmware, where we keep such regions reserved until SetVirtualAddressMap() is done. See the following code in should_map_region(): static bool should_map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md) { ... /* * Map boot services regions as a workaround for buggy * firmware that accesses them even when they shouldn't. * * See efi_{reserve,free}_boot_services(). */ if (md->type =3D=3D EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE || md->type =3D=3D EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA) return false; This workaround suppressed a boot crash, but potential issues still remain because no one prevents the regions from overlapping with kernel image by KASLR. So let's make sure that EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_{CODE|DATA} regions are never chosen as kernel memory for the workaround to work fine. Furthermore, EFI_LOADER_{CODE|DATA} regions are also excluded because they can be used after ExitBootServices() as defined in EFI spec. As a result, we choose kernel address only from EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY which is the only memory type we know to be safely free. Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Junichi Nomura <j-nomura@ce.jp.nec.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170828074444.GC23181@hori1.linux.bs1.fc.nec.co.jp [ Rewrote/fixed/clarified the changelog and the in code comments. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-08-28 07:30:59 +00:00
break;
x86/boot/KASLR: Prefer mirrored memory regions for the kernel physical address Currently KASLR will parse all e820 entries of RAM type and add all candidate positions into the slots array. After that we choose one slot randomly as the new position which the kernel will be decompressed into and run at. On systems with EFI enabled, e820 memory regions are coming from EFI memory regions by combining adjacent regions. These EFI memory regions have various attributes, and the "mirrored" attribute is one of them. The physical memory region whose descriptors in EFI memory map has EFI_MEMORY_MORE_RELIABLE attribute (bit: 16) are mirrored. The address range mirroring feature of the kernel arranges such mirrored regions into normal zones and other regions into movable zones. With the mirroring feature enabled, the code and data of the kernel can only be located in the more reliable mirrored regions. However, the current KASLR code doesn't check EFI memory entries, and could choose a new kernel position in non-mirrored regions. This will break the intended functionality of the address range mirroring feature. To fix this, if EFI is detected, iterate EFI memory map and pick the mirrored region to process for adding candidate of randomization slot. If EFI is disabled or no mirrored region found, still process the e820 memory map. Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com Cc: keescook@chromium.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Cc: n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com Cc: thgarnie@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1502722464-20614-3-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.com [ Rewrote most of the text. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-08-14 14:54:24 +00:00
}
}
x86/boot/KASLR: Work around firmware bugs by excluding EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_* and EFI_LOADER_* from KASLR's choice There's a potential bug in how we select the KASLR kernel address n the early boot code. The KASLR boot code currently chooses the kernel image's physical memory location from E820_TYPE_RAM regions by walking over all e820 entries. E820_TYPE_RAM includes EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE and EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA as well, so those regions can end up hosting the kernel image. According to the UEFI spec, all memory regions marked as EfiBootServicesCode and EfiBootServicesData are available as free memory after the first call to ExitBootServices(). I.e. so such regions should be usable for the kernel, per spec. In real life however, we have workarounds for broken x86 firmware, where we keep such regions reserved until SetVirtualAddressMap() is done. See the following code in should_map_region(): static bool should_map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md) { ... /* * Map boot services regions as a workaround for buggy * firmware that accesses them even when they shouldn't. * * See efi_{reserve,free}_boot_services(). */ if (md->type =3D=3D EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE || md->type =3D=3D EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA) return false; This workaround suppressed a boot crash, but potential issues still remain because no one prevents the regions from overlapping with kernel image by KASLR. So let's make sure that EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_{CODE|DATA} regions are never chosen as kernel memory for the workaround to work fine. Furthermore, EFI_LOADER_{CODE|DATA} regions are also excluded because they can be used after ExitBootServices() as defined in EFI spec. As a result, we choose kernel address only from EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY which is the only memory type we know to be safely free. Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Junichi Nomura <j-nomura@ce.jp.nec.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170828074444.GC23181@hori1.linux.bs1.fc.nec.co.jp [ Rewrote/fixed/clarified the changelog and the in code comments. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-08-28 07:30:59 +00:00
for (i = 0; i < nr_desc; i++) {
md = efi_early_memdesc_ptr(pmap, e->efi_memdesc_size, i);
if (!memory_type_is_free(md))
x86/boot/KASLR: Work around firmware bugs by excluding EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_* and EFI_LOADER_* from KASLR's choice There's a potential bug in how we select the KASLR kernel address n the early boot code. The KASLR boot code currently chooses the kernel image's physical memory location from E820_TYPE_RAM regions by walking over all e820 entries. E820_TYPE_RAM includes EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE and EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA as well, so those regions can end up hosting the kernel image. According to the UEFI spec, all memory regions marked as EfiBootServicesCode and EfiBootServicesData are available as free memory after the first call to ExitBootServices(). I.e. so such regions should be usable for the kernel, per spec. In real life however, we have workarounds for broken x86 firmware, where we keep such regions reserved until SetVirtualAddressMap() is done. See the following code in should_map_region(): static bool should_map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md) { ... /* * Map boot services regions as a workaround for buggy * firmware that accesses them even when they shouldn't. * * See efi_{reserve,free}_boot_services(). */ if (md->type =3D=3D EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE || md->type =3D=3D EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA) return false; This workaround suppressed a boot crash, but potential issues still remain because no one prevents the regions from overlapping with kernel image by KASLR. So let's make sure that EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_{CODE|DATA} regions are never chosen as kernel memory for the workaround to work fine. Furthermore, EFI_LOADER_{CODE|DATA} regions are also excluded because they can be used after ExitBootServices() as defined in EFI spec. As a result, we choose kernel address only from EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY which is the only memory type we know to be safely free. Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Junichi Nomura <j-nomura@ce.jp.nec.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170828074444.GC23181@hori1.linux.bs1.fc.nec.co.jp [ Rewrote/fixed/clarified the changelog and the in code comments. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-08-28 07:30:59 +00:00
continue;
x86/efi: EFI soft reservation to E820 enumeration UEFI 2.8 defines an EFI_MEMORY_SP attribute bit to augment the interpretation of the EFI Memory Types as "reserved for a specific purpose". The proposed Linux behavior for specific purpose memory is that it is reserved for direct-access (device-dax) by default and not available for any kernel usage, not even as an OOM fallback. Later, through udev scripts or another init mechanism, these device-dax claimed ranges can be reconfigured and hot-added to the available System-RAM with a unique node identifier. This device-dax management scheme implements "soft" in the "soft reserved" designation by allowing some or all of the reservation to be recovered as typical memory. This policy can be disabled at compile-time with CONFIG_EFI_SOFT_RESERVE=n, or runtime with efi=nosoftreserve. This patch introduces 2 new concepts at once given the entanglement between early boot enumeration relative to memory that can optionally be reserved from the kernel page allocator by default. The new concepts are: - E820_TYPE_SOFT_RESERVED: Upon detecting the EFI_MEMORY_SP attribute on EFI_CONVENTIONAL memory, update the E820 map with this new type. Only perform this classification if the CONFIG_EFI_SOFT_RESERVE=y policy is enabled, otherwise treat it as typical ram. - IORES_DESC_SOFT_RESERVED: Add a new I/O resource descriptor for a device driver to search iomem resources for application specific memory. Teach the iomem code to identify such ranges as "Soft Reserved". Note that the comment for do_add_efi_memmap() needed refreshing since it seemed to imply that the efi map might overflow the e820 table, but that is not an issue as of commit 7b6e4ba3cb1f "x86/boot/e820: Clean up the E820_X_MAX definition" that removed the 128 entry limit for e820__range_add(). A follow-on change integrates parsing of the ACPI HMAT to identify the node and sub-range boundaries of EFI_MEMORY_SP designated memory. For now, just identify and reserve memory of this type. Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
2019-11-07 01:43:16 +00:00
if (efi_soft_reserve_enabled() &&
(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_SP))
continue;
x86/boot/KASLR: Work around firmware bugs by excluding EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_* and EFI_LOADER_* from KASLR's choice There's a potential bug in how we select the KASLR kernel address n the early boot code. The KASLR boot code currently chooses the kernel image's physical memory location from E820_TYPE_RAM regions by walking over all e820 entries. E820_TYPE_RAM includes EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE and EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA as well, so those regions can end up hosting the kernel image. According to the UEFI spec, all memory regions marked as EfiBootServicesCode and EfiBootServicesData are available as free memory after the first call to ExitBootServices(). I.e. so such regions should be usable for the kernel, per spec. In real life however, we have workarounds for broken x86 firmware, where we keep such regions reserved until SetVirtualAddressMap() is done. See the following code in should_map_region(): static bool should_map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md) { ... /* * Map boot services regions as a workaround for buggy * firmware that accesses them even when they shouldn't. * * See efi_{reserve,free}_boot_services(). */ if (md->type =3D=3D EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE || md->type =3D=3D EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA) return false; This workaround suppressed a boot crash, but potential issues still remain because no one prevents the regions from overlapping with kernel image by KASLR. So let's make sure that EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_{CODE|DATA} regions are never chosen as kernel memory for the workaround to work fine. Furthermore, EFI_LOADER_{CODE|DATA} regions are also excluded because they can be used after ExitBootServices() as defined in EFI spec. As a result, we choose kernel address only from EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY which is the only memory type we know to be safely free. Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Junichi Nomura <j-nomura@ce.jp.nec.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170828074444.GC23181@hori1.linux.bs1.fc.nec.co.jp [ Rewrote/fixed/clarified the changelog and the in code comments. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-08-28 07:30:59 +00:00
if (efi_mirror_found &&
!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_MORE_RELIABLE))
continue;
region.start = md->phys_addr;
region.size = md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT;
if (process_mem_region(&region, minimum, image_size))
x86/boot/KASLR: Work around firmware bugs by excluding EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_* and EFI_LOADER_* from KASLR's choice There's a potential bug in how we select the KASLR kernel address n the early boot code. The KASLR boot code currently chooses the kernel image's physical memory location from E820_TYPE_RAM regions by walking over all e820 entries. E820_TYPE_RAM includes EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE and EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA as well, so those regions can end up hosting the kernel image. According to the UEFI spec, all memory regions marked as EfiBootServicesCode and EfiBootServicesData are available as free memory after the first call to ExitBootServices(). I.e. so such regions should be usable for the kernel, per spec. In real life however, we have workarounds for broken x86 firmware, where we keep such regions reserved until SetVirtualAddressMap() is done. See the following code in should_map_region(): static bool should_map_region(efi_memory_desc_t *md) { ... /* * Map boot services regions as a workaround for buggy * firmware that accesses them even when they shouldn't. * * See efi_{reserve,free}_boot_services(). */ if (md->type =3D=3D EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE || md->type =3D=3D EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA) return false; This workaround suppressed a boot crash, but potential issues still remain because no one prevents the regions from overlapping with kernel image by KASLR. So let's make sure that EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_{CODE|DATA} regions are never chosen as kernel memory for the workaround to work fine. Furthermore, EFI_LOADER_{CODE|DATA} regions are also excluded because they can be used after ExitBootServices() as defined in EFI spec. As a result, we choose kernel address only from EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY which is the only memory type we know to be safely free. Signed-off-by: Naoya Horiguchi <n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Junichi Nomura <j-nomura@ce.jp.nec.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170828074444.GC23181@hori1.linux.bs1.fc.nec.co.jp [ Rewrote/fixed/clarified the changelog and the in code comments. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-08-28 07:30:59 +00:00
break;
}
return true;
x86/boot/KASLR: Prefer mirrored memory regions for the kernel physical address Currently KASLR will parse all e820 entries of RAM type and add all candidate positions into the slots array. After that we choose one slot randomly as the new position which the kernel will be decompressed into and run at. On systems with EFI enabled, e820 memory regions are coming from EFI memory regions by combining adjacent regions. These EFI memory regions have various attributes, and the "mirrored" attribute is one of them. The physical memory region whose descriptors in EFI memory map has EFI_MEMORY_MORE_RELIABLE attribute (bit: 16) are mirrored. The address range mirroring feature of the kernel arranges such mirrored regions into normal zones and other regions into movable zones. With the mirroring feature enabled, the code and data of the kernel can only be located in the more reliable mirrored regions. However, the current KASLR code doesn't check EFI memory entries, and could choose a new kernel position in non-mirrored regions. This will break the intended functionality of the address range mirroring feature. To fix this, if EFI is detected, iterate EFI memory map and pick the mirrored region to process for adding candidate of randomization slot. If EFI is disabled or no mirrored region found, still process the e820 memory map. Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com Cc: keescook@chromium.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Cc: n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com Cc: thgarnie@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1502722464-20614-3-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.com [ Rewrote most of the text. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-08-14 14:54:24 +00:00
}
#else
static inline bool
process_efi_entries(unsigned long minimum, unsigned long image_size)
{
return false;
}
#endif
static void process_e820_entries(unsigned long minimum,
unsigned long image_size)
{
int i;
struct mem_vector region;
struct boot_e820_entry *entry;
/* Verify potential e820 positions, appending to slots list. */
for (i = 0; i < boot_params_ptr->e820_entries; i++) {
entry = &boot_params_ptr->e820_table[i];
/* Skip non-RAM entries. */
if (entry->type != E820_TYPE_RAM)
continue;
region.start = entry->addr;
region.size = entry->size;
if (process_mem_region(&region, minimum, image_size))
break;
}
}
static unsigned long find_random_phys_addr(unsigned long minimum,
unsigned long image_size)
{
u64 phys_addr;
/* Bail out early if it's impossible to succeed. */
if (minimum + image_size > mem_limit)
return 0;
/* Check if we had too many memmaps. */
if (memmap_too_large) {
x86/boot/KASLR: Prefer mirrored memory regions for the kernel physical address Currently KASLR will parse all e820 entries of RAM type and add all candidate positions into the slots array. After that we choose one slot randomly as the new position which the kernel will be decompressed into and run at. On systems with EFI enabled, e820 memory regions are coming from EFI memory regions by combining adjacent regions. These EFI memory regions have various attributes, and the "mirrored" attribute is one of them. The physical memory region whose descriptors in EFI memory map has EFI_MEMORY_MORE_RELIABLE attribute (bit: 16) are mirrored. The address range mirroring feature of the kernel arranges such mirrored regions into normal zones and other regions into movable zones. With the mirroring feature enabled, the code and data of the kernel can only be located in the more reliable mirrored regions. However, the current KASLR code doesn't check EFI memory entries, and could choose a new kernel position in non-mirrored regions. This will break the intended functionality of the address range mirroring feature. To fix this, if EFI is detected, iterate EFI memory map and pick the mirrored region to process for adding candidate of randomization slot. If EFI is disabled or no mirrored region found, still process the e820 memory map. Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com Cc: keescook@chromium.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Cc: n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com Cc: thgarnie@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1502722464-20614-3-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.com [ Rewrote most of the text. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-08-14 14:54:24 +00:00
debug_putstr("Aborted memory entries scan (more than 4 memmap= args)!\n");
return 0;
}
if (!process_efi_entries(minimum, image_size))
process_e820_entries(minimum, image_size);
phys_addr = slots_fetch_random();
x86/boot/KASLR: Prefer mirrored memory regions for the kernel physical address Currently KASLR will parse all e820 entries of RAM type and add all candidate positions into the slots array. After that we choose one slot randomly as the new position which the kernel will be decompressed into and run at. On systems with EFI enabled, e820 memory regions are coming from EFI memory regions by combining adjacent regions. These EFI memory regions have various attributes, and the "mirrored" attribute is one of them. The physical memory region whose descriptors in EFI memory map has EFI_MEMORY_MORE_RELIABLE attribute (bit: 16) are mirrored. The address range mirroring feature of the kernel arranges such mirrored regions into normal zones and other regions into movable zones. With the mirroring feature enabled, the code and data of the kernel can only be located in the more reliable mirrored regions. However, the current KASLR code doesn't check EFI memory entries, and could choose a new kernel position in non-mirrored regions. This will break the intended functionality of the address range mirroring feature. To fix this, if EFI is detected, iterate EFI memory map and pick the mirrored region to process for adding candidate of randomization slot. If EFI is disabled or no mirrored region found, still process the e820 memory map. Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com Cc: keescook@chromium.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Cc: n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com Cc: thgarnie@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1502722464-20614-3-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.com [ Rewrote most of the text. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-08-14 14:54:24 +00:00
/* Perform a final check to make sure the address is in range. */
if (phys_addr < minimum || phys_addr + image_size > mem_limit) {
warn("Invalid physical address chosen!\n");
return 0;
}
return (unsigned long)phys_addr;
}
x86/KASLR: Add virtual address choosing function To support randomizing the kernel virtual address separately from the physical address, this patch adds find_random_virt_addr() to choose a slot anywhere between LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR and KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE. Since this address is virtual, not physical, we can place the kernel anywhere in this region, as long as it is aligned and (in the case of kernel being larger than the slot size) placed with enough room to load the entire kernel image. For clarity and readability, find_random_addr() is renamed to find_random_phys_addr() and has "size" renamed to "image_size" to match find_random_virt_addr(). Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> [ Rewrote changelog, refactored slot calculation for readability. ] [ Renamed find_random_phys_addr() and size argument. ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: lasse.collin@tukaani.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462825332-10505-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-09 20:22:08 +00:00
static unsigned long find_random_virt_addr(unsigned long minimum,
unsigned long image_size)
{
unsigned long slots, random_addr;
/*
* There are how many CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN-sized slots
* that can hold image_size within the range of minimum to
* KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE?
*/
slots = 1 + (KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE - minimum - image_size) / CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN;
x86/KASLR: Add virtual address choosing function To support randomizing the kernel virtual address separately from the physical address, this patch adds find_random_virt_addr() to choose a slot anywhere between LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR and KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE. Since this address is virtual, not physical, we can place the kernel anywhere in this region, as long as it is aligned and (in the case of kernel being larger than the slot size) placed with enough room to load the entire kernel image. For clarity and readability, find_random_addr() is renamed to find_random_phys_addr() and has "size" renamed to "image_size" to match find_random_virt_addr(). Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> [ Rewrote changelog, refactored slot calculation for readability. ] [ Renamed find_random_phys_addr() and size argument. ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: lasse.collin@tukaani.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462825332-10505-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-09 20:22:08 +00:00
x86/mm: Refactor KASLR entropy functions Move the KASLR entropy functions into arch/x86/lib to be used in early kernel boot for KASLR memory randomization. Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Alexander Kuleshov <kuleshovmail@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Popov <alpopov@ptsecurity.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1466556426-32664-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-06-22 00:46:58 +00:00
random_addr = kaslr_get_random_long("Virtual") % slots;
x86/KASLR: Add virtual address choosing function To support randomizing the kernel virtual address separately from the physical address, this patch adds find_random_virt_addr() to choose a slot anywhere between LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR and KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE. Since this address is virtual, not physical, we can place the kernel anywhere in this region, as long as it is aligned and (in the case of kernel being larger than the slot size) placed with enough room to load the entire kernel image. For clarity and readability, find_random_addr() is renamed to find_random_phys_addr() and has "size" renamed to "image_size" to match find_random_virt_addr(). Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> [ Rewrote changelog, refactored slot calculation for readability. ] [ Renamed find_random_phys_addr() and size argument. ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: lasse.collin@tukaani.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1462825332-10505-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-09 20:22:08 +00:00
return random_addr * CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN + minimum;
}
/*
* Since this function examines addresses much more numerically,
* it takes the input and output pointers as 'unsigned long'.
*/
x86/KASLR: Randomize virtual address separately The current KASLR implementation randomizes the physical and virtual addresses of the kernel together (both are offset by the same amount). It calculates the delta of the physical address where vmlinux was linked to load and where it is finally loaded. If the delta is not equal to 0 (i.e. the kernel was relocated), relocation handling needs be done. On 64-bit, this patch randomizes both the physical address where kernel is decompressed and the virtual address where kernel text is mapped and will execute from. We now have two values being chosen, so the function arguments are reorganized to pass by pointer so they can be directly updated. Since relocation handling only depends on the virtual address, we must check the virtual delta, not the physical delta for processing kernel relocations. This also populates the page table for the new virtual address range. 32-bit does not support a separate virtual address, so it continues to use the physical offset for its virtual offset. Additionally updates the sanity checks done on the resulting kernel addresses since they are potentially separate now. [kees: rewrote changelog, limited virtual split to 64-bit only, update checks] [kees: fix CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=n boot failure] Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464216334-17200-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-25 22:45:32 +00:00
void choose_random_location(unsigned long input,
unsigned long input_size,
unsigned long *output,
unsigned long output_size,
unsigned long *virt_addr)
{
x86/KASLR: Allow randomization below the load address Currently the kernel image physical address randomization's lower boundary is the original kernel load address. For bootloaders that load kernels into very high memory (e.g. kexec), this means randomization takes place in a very small window at the top of memory, ignoring the large region of physical memory below the load address. Since mem_avoid[] is already correctly tracking the regions that must be avoided, this patch changes the minimum address to whatever is less: 512M (to conservatively avoid unknown things in lower memory) or the load address. Now, for example, if the kernel is loaded at 8G, [512M, 8G) will be added to the list of possible physical memory positions. Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> [ Rewrote the changelog, refactored the code to use min(). ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464216334-17200-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org [ Edited the changelog some more, plus the code comment as well. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-25 22:45:34 +00:00
unsigned long random_addr, min_addr;
if (cmdline_find_option_bool("nokaslr")) {
warn("KASLR disabled: 'nokaslr' on cmdline.");
x86/KASLR: Randomize virtual address separately The current KASLR implementation randomizes the physical and virtual addresses of the kernel together (both are offset by the same amount). It calculates the delta of the physical address where vmlinux was linked to load and where it is finally loaded. If the delta is not equal to 0 (i.e. the kernel was relocated), relocation handling needs be done. On 64-bit, this patch randomizes both the physical address where kernel is decompressed and the virtual address where kernel text is mapped and will execute from. We now have two values being chosen, so the function arguments are reorganized to pass by pointer so they can be directly updated. Since relocation handling only depends on the virtual address, we must check the virtual delta, not the physical delta for processing kernel relocations. This also populates the page table for the new virtual address range. 32-bit does not support a separate virtual address, so it continues to use the physical offset for its virtual offset. Additionally updates the sanity checks done on the resulting kernel addresses since they are potentially separate now. [kees: rewrote changelog, limited virtual split to 64-bit only, update checks] [kees: fix CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=n boot failure] Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464216334-17200-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-25 22:45:32 +00:00
return;
}
boot_params_ptr->hdr.loadflags |= KASLR_FLAG;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))
mem_limit = KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE;
else
mem_limit = MAXMEM;
/* Record the various known unsafe memory ranges. */
x86/KASLR: Randomize virtual address separately The current KASLR implementation randomizes the physical and virtual addresses of the kernel together (both are offset by the same amount). It calculates the delta of the physical address where vmlinux was linked to load and where it is finally loaded. If the delta is not equal to 0 (i.e. the kernel was relocated), relocation handling needs be done. On 64-bit, this patch randomizes both the physical address where kernel is decompressed and the virtual address where kernel text is mapped and will execute from. We now have two values being chosen, so the function arguments are reorganized to pass by pointer so they can be directly updated. Since relocation handling only depends on the virtual address, we must check the virtual delta, not the physical delta for processing kernel relocations. This also populates the page table for the new virtual address range. 32-bit does not support a separate virtual address, so it continues to use the physical offset for its virtual offset. Additionally updates the sanity checks done on the resulting kernel addresses since they are potentially separate now. [kees: rewrote changelog, limited virtual split to 64-bit only, update checks] [kees: fix CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=n boot failure] Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464216334-17200-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-25 22:45:32 +00:00
mem_avoid_init(input, input_size, *output);
x86/KASLR: Allow randomization below the load address Currently the kernel image physical address randomization's lower boundary is the original kernel load address. For bootloaders that load kernels into very high memory (e.g. kexec), this means randomization takes place in a very small window at the top of memory, ignoring the large region of physical memory below the load address. Since mem_avoid[] is already correctly tracking the regions that must be avoided, this patch changes the minimum address to whatever is less: 512M (to conservatively avoid unknown things in lower memory) or the load address. Now, for example, if the kernel is loaded at 8G, [512M, 8G) will be added to the list of possible physical memory positions. Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> [ Rewrote the changelog, refactored the code to use min(). ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464216334-17200-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org [ Edited the changelog some more, plus the code comment as well. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-25 22:45:34 +00:00
/*
* Low end of the randomization range should be the
* smaller of 512M or the initial kernel image
* location:
*/
min_addr = min(*output, 512UL << 20);
/* Make sure minimum is aligned. */
min_addr = ALIGN(min_addr, CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN);
x86/KASLR: Allow randomization below the load address Currently the kernel image physical address randomization's lower boundary is the original kernel load address. For bootloaders that load kernels into very high memory (e.g. kexec), this means randomization takes place in a very small window at the top of memory, ignoring the large region of physical memory below the load address. Since mem_avoid[] is already correctly tracking the regions that must be avoided, this patch changes the minimum address to whatever is less: 512M (to conservatively avoid unknown things in lower memory) or the load address. Now, for example, if the kernel is loaded at 8G, [512M, 8G) will be added to the list of possible physical memory positions. Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> [ Rewrote the changelog, refactored the code to use min(). ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464216334-17200-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org [ Edited the changelog some more, plus the code comment as well. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-25 22:45:34 +00:00
x86/boot/KASLR: Prefer mirrored memory regions for the kernel physical address Currently KASLR will parse all e820 entries of RAM type and add all candidate positions into the slots array. After that we choose one slot randomly as the new position which the kernel will be decompressed into and run at. On systems with EFI enabled, e820 memory regions are coming from EFI memory regions by combining adjacent regions. These EFI memory regions have various attributes, and the "mirrored" attribute is one of them. The physical memory region whose descriptors in EFI memory map has EFI_MEMORY_MORE_RELIABLE attribute (bit: 16) are mirrored. The address range mirroring feature of the kernel arranges such mirrored regions into normal zones and other regions into movable zones. With the mirroring feature enabled, the code and data of the kernel can only be located in the more reliable mirrored regions. However, the current KASLR code doesn't check EFI memory entries, and could choose a new kernel position in non-mirrored regions. This will break the intended functionality of the address range mirroring feature. To fix this, if EFI is detected, iterate EFI memory map and pick the mirrored region to process for adding candidate of randomization slot. If EFI is disabled or no mirrored region found, still process the e820 memory map. Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: izumi.taku@jp.fujitsu.com Cc: keescook@chromium.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk Cc: n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com Cc: thgarnie@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1502722464-20614-3-git-send-email-bhe@redhat.com [ Rewrote most of the text. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-08-14 14:54:24 +00:00
/* Walk available memory entries to find a random address. */
x86/KASLR: Allow randomization below the load address Currently the kernel image physical address randomization's lower boundary is the original kernel load address. For bootloaders that load kernels into very high memory (e.g. kexec), this means randomization takes place in a very small window at the top of memory, ignoring the large region of physical memory below the load address. Since mem_avoid[] is already correctly tracking the regions that must be avoided, this patch changes the minimum address to whatever is less: 512M (to conservatively avoid unknown things in lower memory) or the load address. Now, for example, if the kernel is loaded at 8G, [512M, 8G) will be added to the list of possible physical memory positions. Signed-off-by: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> [ Rewrote the changelog, refactored the code to use min(). ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464216334-17200-6-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org [ Edited the changelog some more, plus the code comment as well. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-25 22:45:34 +00:00
random_addr = find_random_phys_addr(min_addr, output_size);
if (!random_addr) {
warn("Physical KASLR disabled: no suitable memory region!");
x86/KASLR: Randomize virtual address separately The current KASLR implementation randomizes the physical and virtual addresses of the kernel together (both are offset by the same amount). It calculates the delta of the physical address where vmlinux was linked to load and where it is finally loaded. If the delta is not equal to 0 (i.e. the kernel was relocated), relocation handling needs be done. On 64-bit, this patch randomizes both the physical address where kernel is decompressed and the virtual address where kernel text is mapped and will execute from. We now have two values being chosen, so the function arguments are reorganized to pass by pointer so they can be directly updated. Since relocation handling only depends on the virtual address, we must check the virtual delta, not the physical delta for processing kernel relocations. This also populates the page table for the new virtual address range. 32-bit does not support a separate virtual address, so it continues to use the physical offset for its virtual offset. Additionally updates the sanity checks done on the resulting kernel addresses since they are potentially separate now. [kees: rewrote changelog, limited virtual split to 64-bit only, update checks] [kees: fix CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=n boot failure] Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464216334-17200-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-25 22:45:32 +00:00
} else {
/* Update the new physical address location. */
if (*output != random_addr)
x86/KASLR: Randomize virtual address separately The current KASLR implementation randomizes the physical and virtual addresses of the kernel together (both are offset by the same amount). It calculates the delta of the physical address where vmlinux was linked to load and where it is finally loaded. If the delta is not equal to 0 (i.e. the kernel was relocated), relocation handling needs be done. On 64-bit, this patch randomizes both the physical address where kernel is decompressed and the virtual address where kernel text is mapped and will execute from. We now have two values being chosen, so the function arguments are reorganized to pass by pointer so they can be directly updated. Since relocation handling only depends on the virtual address, we must check the virtual delta, not the physical delta for processing kernel relocations. This also populates the page table for the new virtual address range. 32-bit does not support a separate virtual address, so it continues to use the physical offset for its virtual offset. Additionally updates the sanity checks done on the resulting kernel addresses since they are potentially separate now. [kees: rewrote changelog, limited virtual split to 64-bit only, update checks] [kees: fix CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=n boot failure] Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464216334-17200-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-25 22:45:32 +00:00
*output = random_addr;
}
x86/KASLR: Randomize virtual address separately The current KASLR implementation randomizes the physical and virtual addresses of the kernel together (both are offset by the same amount). It calculates the delta of the physical address where vmlinux was linked to load and where it is finally loaded. If the delta is not equal to 0 (i.e. the kernel was relocated), relocation handling needs be done. On 64-bit, this patch randomizes both the physical address where kernel is decompressed and the virtual address where kernel text is mapped and will execute from. We now have two values being chosen, so the function arguments are reorganized to pass by pointer so they can be directly updated. Since relocation handling only depends on the virtual address, we must check the virtual delta, not the physical delta for processing kernel relocations. This also populates the page table for the new virtual address range. 32-bit does not support a separate virtual address, so it continues to use the physical offset for its virtual offset. Additionally updates the sanity checks done on the resulting kernel addresses since they are potentially separate now. [kees: rewrote changelog, limited virtual split to 64-bit only, update checks] [kees: fix CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE=n boot failure] Signed-off-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464216334-17200-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2016-05-25 22:45:32 +00:00
/* Pick random virtual address starting from LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR. */
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
random_addr = find_random_virt_addr(LOAD_PHYSICAL_ADDR, output_size);
*virt_addr = random_addr;
}