linux/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c

4250 lines
101 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

/*
* xfrm_policy.c
*
* Changes:
* Mitsuru KANDA @USAGI
* Kazunori MIYAZAWA @USAGI
* Kunihiro Ishiguro <kunihiro@ipinfusion.com>
* IPv6 support
* Kazunori MIYAZAWA @USAGI
* YOSHIFUJI Hideaki
* Split up af-specific portion
* Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com> Add the post_input processor
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
*
*/
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/kmod.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <linux/notifier.h>
#include <linux/netdevice.h>
#include <linux/netfilter.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/cache.h>
#include <linux/cpu.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/rhashtable.h>
#include <net/dst.h>
#include <net/flow.h>
#include <net/xfrm.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_STATISTICS
#include <net/snmp.h>
#endif
#include "xfrm_hash.h"
#define XFRM_QUEUE_TMO_MIN ((unsigned)(HZ/10))
#define XFRM_QUEUE_TMO_MAX ((unsigned)(60*HZ))
#define XFRM_MAX_QUEUE_LEN 100
struct xfrm_flo {
struct dst_entry *dst_orig;
u8 flags;
};
/* prefixes smaller than this are stored in lists, not trees. */
#define INEXACT_PREFIXLEN_IPV4 16
#define INEXACT_PREFIXLEN_IPV6 48
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_node {
struct rb_node node;
union {
xfrm_address_t addr;
struct rcu_head rcu;
};
u8 prefixlen;
xfrm: policy: add 2nd-level saddr trees for inexact policies This adds the fourth and final search class, containing policies where both saddr and daddr have prefix lengths (i.e., not wildcards). Inexact policies now end up in one of the following four search classes: 1. "Any:Any" list, containing policies where both saddr and daddr are wildcards or have very coarse prefixes, e.g. 10.0.0.0/8 and the like. 2. "saddr:any" list, containing policies with a fixed saddr/prefixlen, but without destination restrictions. These lists are stored in rbtree nodes; each node contains those policies matching saddr/prefixlen. 3. "Any:daddr" list. Similar to 2), except for policies where only the destinations are specified. 4. "saddr:daddr" lists, containing only those policies that match the given source/destination network. The root of the saddr/daddr nodes gets stored in the nodes of the 'daddr' tree. This diagram illustrates the list classes, and their placement in the lookup hierarchy: xfrm_pol_inexact_bin = hash(dir,type,family,if_id); | +---- root_d: sorted by daddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | +- root: sorted by saddr/prefix | | | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | | | + root: unused | | | | | + hhead: saddr:daddr policies | | | +- coarse policies and all any:daddr policies | +---- root_s: sorted by saddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | + root: unused | | | + hhead: saddr:any policies | +---- coarse policies and all any:any policies lookup for an inexact policy returns pointers to the four relevant list classes, after which each of the lists needs to be searched for the policy with the higher priority. This will only speed up lookups in case we have many policies and a sizeable portion of these have disjunct saddr/daddr addresses. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2018-11-07 22:00:41 +00:00
struct rb_root root;
/* the policies matching this node, can be empty list */
struct hlist_head hhead;
};
/* xfrm inexact policy search tree:
* xfrm_pol_inexact_bin = hash(dir,type,family,if_id);
* |
* +---- root_d: sorted by daddr:prefix
* | |
* | xfrm_pol_inexact_node
* | |
xfrm: policy: add 2nd-level saddr trees for inexact policies This adds the fourth and final search class, containing policies where both saddr and daddr have prefix lengths (i.e., not wildcards). Inexact policies now end up in one of the following four search classes: 1. "Any:Any" list, containing policies where both saddr and daddr are wildcards or have very coarse prefixes, e.g. 10.0.0.0/8 and the like. 2. "saddr:any" list, containing policies with a fixed saddr/prefixlen, but without destination restrictions. These lists are stored in rbtree nodes; each node contains those policies matching saddr/prefixlen. 3. "Any:daddr" list. Similar to 2), except for policies where only the destinations are specified. 4. "saddr:daddr" lists, containing only those policies that match the given source/destination network. The root of the saddr/daddr nodes gets stored in the nodes of the 'daddr' tree. This diagram illustrates the list classes, and their placement in the lookup hierarchy: xfrm_pol_inexact_bin = hash(dir,type,family,if_id); | +---- root_d: sorted by daddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | +- root: sorted by saddr/prefix | | | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | | | + root: unused | | | | | + hhead: saddr:daddr policies | | | +- coarse policies and all any:daddr policies | +---- root_s: sorted by saddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | + root: unused | | | + hhead: saddr:any policies | +---- coarse policies and all any:any policies lookup for an inexact policy returns pointers to the four relevant list classes, after which each of the lists needs to be searched for the policy with the higher priority. This will only speed up lookups in case we have many policies and a sizeable portion of these have disjunct saddr/daddr addresses. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2018-11-07 22:00:41 +00:00
* | +- root: sorted by saddr/prefix
* | | |
* | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node
* | | |
* | | + root: unused
* | | |
* | | + hhead: saddr:daddr policies
* | |
* | +- coarse policies and all any:daddr policies
* |
* +---- root_s: sorted by saddr:prefix
* | |
* | xfrm_pol_inexact_node
* | |
* | + root: unused
* | |
* | + hhead: saddr:any policies
* |
* +---- coarse policies and all any:any policies
*
xfrm: policy: add 2nd-level saddr trees for inexact policies This adds the fourth and final search class, containing policies where both saddr and daddr have prefix lengths (i.e., not wildcards). Inexact policies now end up in one of the following four search classes: 1. "Any:Any" list, containing policies where both saddr and daddr are wildcards or have very coarse prefixes, e.g. 10.0.0.0/8 and the like. 2. "saddr:any" list, containing policies with a fixed saddr/prefixlen, but without destination restrictions. These lists are stored in rbtree nodes; each node contains those policies matching saddr/prefixlen. 3. "Any:daddr" list. Similar to 2), except for policies where only the destinations are specified. 4. "saddr:daddr" lists, containing only those policies that match the given source/destination network. The root of the saddr/daddr nodes gets stored in the nodes of the 'daddr' tree. This diagram illustrates the list classes, and their placement in the lookup hierarchy: xfrm_pol_inexact_bin = hash(dir,type,family,if_id); | +---- root_d: sorted by daddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | +- root: sorted by saddr/prefix | | | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | | | + root: unused | | | | | + hhead: saddr:daddr policies | | | +- coarse policies and all any:daddr policies | +---- root_s: sorted by saddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | + root: unused | | | + hhead: saddr:any policies | +---- coarse policies and all any:any policies lookup for an inexact policy returns pointers to the four relevant list classes, after which each of the lists needs to be searched for the policy with the higher priority. This will only speed up lookups in case we have many policies and a sizeable portion of these have disjunct saddr/daddr addresses. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2018-11-07 22:00:41 +00:00
* Lookups return four candidate lists:
* 1. any:any list from top-level xfrm_pol_inexact_bin
* 2. any:daddr list from daddr tree
xfrm: policy: add 2nd-level saddr trees for inexact policies This adds the fourth and final search class, containing policies where both saddr and daddr have prefix lengths (i.e., not wildcards). Inexact policies now end up in one of the following four search classes: 1. "Any:Any" list, containing policies where both saddr and daddr are wildcards or have very coarse prefixes, e.g. 10.0.0.0/8 and the like. 2. "saddr:any" list, containing policies with a fixed saddr/prefixlen, but without destination restrictions. These lists are stored in rbtree nodes; each node contains those policies matching saddr/prefixlen. 3. "Any:daddr" list. Similar to 2), except for policies where only the destinations are specified. 4. "saddr:daddr" lists, containing only those policies that match the given source/destination network. The root of the saddr/daddr nodes gets stored in the nodes of the 'daddr' tree. This diagram illustrates the list classes, and their placement in the lookup hierarchy: xfrm_pol_inexact_bin = hash(dir,type,family,if_id); | +---- root_d: sorted by daddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | +- root: sorted by saddr/prefix | | | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | | | + root: unused | | | | | + hhead: saddr:daddr policies | | | +- coarse policies and all any:daddr policies | +---- root_s: sorted by saddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | + root: unused | | | + hhead: saddr:any policies | +---- coarse policies and all any:any policies lookup for an inexact policy returns pointers to the four relevant list classes, after which each of the lists needs to be searched for the policy with the higher priority. This will only speed up lookups in case we have many policies and a sizeable portion of these have disjunct saddr/daddr addresses. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2018-11-07 22:00:41 +00:00
* 3. saddr:daddr list from 2nd level daddr tree
* 4. saddr:any list from saddr tree
*
* This result set then needs to be searched for the policy with
* the lowest priority. If two results have same prio, youngest one wins.
*/
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_key {
possible_net_t net;
u32 if_id;
u16 family;
u8 dir, type;
};
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin {
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_key k;
struct rhash_head head;
/* list containing '*:*' policies */
struct hlist_head hhead;
seqcount_t count;
/* tree sorted by daddr/prefix */
struct rb_root root_d;
/* tree sorted by saddr/prefix */
struct rb_root root_s;
/* slow path below */
struct list_head inexact_bins;
struct rcu_head rcu;
};
enum xfrm_pol_inexact_candidate_type {
xfrm: policy: add 2nd-level saddr trees for inexact policies This adds the fourth and final search class, containing policies where both saddr and daddr have prefix lengths (i.e., not wildcards). Inexact policies now end up in one of the following four search classes: 1. "Any:Any" list, containing policies where both saddr and daddr are wildcards or have very coarse prefixes, e.g. 10.0.0.0/8 and the like. 2. "saddr:any" list, containing policies with a fixed saddr/prefixlen, but without destination restrictions. These lists are stored in rbtree nodes; each node contains those policies matching saddr/prefixlen. 3. "Any:daddr" list. Similar to 2), except for policies where only the destinations are specified. 4. "saddr:daddr" lists, containing only those policies that match the given source/destination network. The root of the saddr/daddr nodes gets stored in the nodes of the 'daddr' tree. This diagram illustrates the list classes, and their placement in the lookup hierarchy: xfrm_pol_inexact_bin = hash(dir,type,family,if_id); | +---- root_d: sorted by daddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | +- root: sorted by saddr/prefix | | | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | | | + root: unused | | | | | + hhead: saddr:daddr policies | | | +- coarse policies and all any:daddr policies | +---- root_s: sorted by saddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | + root: unused | | | + hhead: saddr:any policies | +---- coarse policies and all any:any policies lookup for an inexact policy returns pointers to the four relevant list classes, after which each of the lists needs to be searched for the policy with the higher priority. This will only speed up lookups in case we have many policies and a sizeable portion of these have disjunct saddr/daddr addresses. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2018-11-07 22:00:41 +00:00
XFRM_POL_CAND_BOTH,
XFRM_POL_CAND_SADDR,
XFRM_POL_CAND_DADDR,
XFRM_POL_CAND_ANY,
XFRM_POL_CAND_MAX,
};
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_candidates {
struct hlist_head *res[XFRM_POL_CAND_MAX];
};
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(xfrm_if_cb_lock);
static struct xfrm_if_cb const __rcu *xfrm_if_cb __read_mostly;
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(xfrm_policy_afinfo_lock);
static struct xfrm_policy_afinfo const __rcu *xfrm_policy_afinfo[AF_INET6 + 1]
__read_mostly;
static struct kmem_cache *xfrm_dst_cache __ro_after_init;
static __read_mostly seqcount_t xfrm_policy_hash_generation;
static struct rhashtable xfrm_policy_inexact_table;
static const struct rhashtable_params xfrm_pol_inexact_params;
static void xfrm_init_pmtu(struct xfrm_dst **bundle, int nr);
static int stale_bundle(struct dst_entry *dst);
static int xfrm_bundle_ok(struct xfrm_dst *xdst);
static void xfrm_policy_queue_process(struct timer_list *t);
static void __xfrm_policy_link(struct xfrm_policy *pol, int dir);
static struct xfrm_policy *__xfrm_policy_unlink(struct xfrm_policy *pol,
int dir);
static struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin *
xfrm_policy_inexact_lookup(struct net *net, u8 type, u16 family, u8 dir,
u32 if_id);
static struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin *
xfrm_policy_inexact_lookup_rcu(struct net *net,
u8 type, u16 family, u8 dir, u32 if_id);
static struct xfrm_policy *
xfrm_policy_insert_list(struct hlist_head *chain, struct xfrm_policy *policy,
bool excl);
static void xfrm_policy_insert_inexact_list(struct hlist_head *chain,
struct xfrm_policy *policy);
static bool
xfrm_policy_find_inexact_candidates(struct xfrm_pol_inexact_candidates *cand,
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin *b,
const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
const xfrm_address_t *daddr);
static inline bool xfrm_pol_hold_rcu(struct xfrm_policy *policy)
{
return refcount_inc_not_zero(&policy->refcnt);
}
static inline bool
__xfrm4_selector_match(const struct xfrm_selector *sel, const struct flowi *fl)
{
const struct flowi4 *fl4 = &fl->u.ip4;
return addr4_match(fl4->daddr, sel->daddr.a4, sel->prefixlen_d) &&
addr4_match(fl4->saddr, sel->saddr.a4, sel->prefixlen_s) &&
!((xfrm_flowi_dport(fl, &fl4->uli) ^ sel->dport) & sel->dport_mask) &&
!((xfrm_flowi_sport(fl, &fl4->uli) ^ sel->sport) & sel->sport_mask) &&
(fl4->flowi4_proto == sel->proto || !sel->proto) &&
(fl4->flowi4_oif == sel->ifindex || !sel->ifindex);
}
static inline bool
__xfrm6_selector_match(const struct xfrm_selector *sel, const struct flowi *fl)
{
const struct flowi6 *fl6 = &fl->u.ip6;
return addr_match(&fl6->daddr, &sel->daddr, sel->prefixlen_d) &&
addr_match(&fl6->saddr, &sel->saddr, sel->prefixlen_s) &&
!((xfrm_flowi_dport(fl, &fl6->uli) ^ sel->dport) & sel->dport_mask) &&
!((xfrm_flowi_sport(fl, &fl6->uli) ^ sel->sport) & sel->sport_mask) &&
(fl6->flowi6_proto == sel->proto || !sel->proto) &&
(fl6->flowi6_oif == sel->ifindex || !sel->ifindex);
}
bool xfrm_selector_match(const struct xfrm_selector *sel, const struct flowi *fl,
unsigned short family)
{
switch (family) {
case AF_INET:
return __xfrm4_selector_match(sel, fl);
case AF_INET6:
return __xfrm6_selector_match(sel, fl);
}
return false;
}
static const struct xfrm_policy_afinfo *xfrm_policy_get_afinfo(unsigned short family)
{
const struct xfrm_policy_afinfo *afinfo;
if (unlikely(family >= ARRAY_SIZE(xfrm_policy_afinfo)))
return NULL;
rcu_read_lock();
afinfo = rcu_dereference(xfrm_policy_afinfo[family]);
if (unlikely(!afinfo))
rcu_read_unlock();
return afinfo;
}
/* Called with rcu_read_lock(). */
static const struct xfrm_if_cb *xfrm_if_get_cb(void)
{
return rcu_dereference(xfrm_if_cb);
}
struct dst_entry *__xfrm_dst_lookup(struct net *net, int tos, int oif,
const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
const xfrm_address_t *daddr,
net: xfrm: support setting an output mark. On systems that use mark-based routing it may be necessary for routing lookups to use marks in order for packets to be routed correctly. An example of such a system is Android, which uses socket marks to route packets via different networks. Currently, routing lookups in tunnel mode always use a mark of zero, making routing incorrect on such systems. This patch adds a new output_mark element to the xfrm state and a corresponding XFRMA_OUTPUT_MARK netlink attribute. The output mark differs from the existing xfrm mark in two ways: 1. The xfrm mark is used to match xfrm policies and states, while the xfrm output mark is used to set the mark (and influence the routing) of the packets emitted by those states. 2. The existing mark is constrained to be a subset of the bits of the originating socket or transformed packet, but the output mark is arbitrary and depends only on the state. The use of a separate mark provides additional flexibility. For example: - A packet subject to two transforms (e.g., transport mode inside tunnel mode) can have two different output marks applied to it, one for the transport mode SA and one for the tunnel mode SA. - On a system where socket marks determine routing, the packets emitted by an IPsec tunnel can be routed based on a mark that is determined by the tunnel, not by the marks of the unencrypted packets. - Support for setting the output marks can be introduced without breaking any existing setups that employ both mark-based routing and xfrm tunnel mode. Simply changing the code to use the xfrm mark for routing output packets could xfrm mark could change behaviour in a way that breaks these setups. If the output mark is unspecified or set to zero, the mark is not set or changed. Tested: make allyesconfig; make -j64 Tested: https://android-review.googlesource.com/452776 Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2017-08-10 17:11:33 +00:00
int family, u32 mark)
{
const struct xfrm_policy_afinfo *afinfo;
struct dst_entry *dst;
afinfo = xfrm_policy_get_afinfo(family);
if (unlikely(afinfo == NULL))
return ERR_PTR(-EAFNOSUPPORT);
net: xfrm: support setting an output mark. On systems that use mark-based routing it may be necessary for routing lookups to use marks in order for packets to be routed correctly. An example of such a system is Android, which uses socket marks to route packets via different networks. Currently, routing lookups in tunnel mode always use a mark of zero, making routing incorrect on such systems. This patch adds a new output_mark element to the xfrm state and a corresponding XFRMA_OUTPUT_MARK netlink attribute. The output mark differs from the existing xfrm mark in two ways: 1. The xfrm mark is used to match xfrm policies and states, while the xfrm output mark is used to set the mark (and influence the routing) of the packets emitted by those states. 2. The existing mark is constrained to be a subset of the bits of the originating socket or transformed packet, but the output mark is arbitrary and depends only on the state. The use of a separate mark provides additional flexibility. For example: - A packet subject to two transforms (e.g., transport mode inside tunnel mode) can have two different output marks applied to it, one for the transport mode SA and one for the tunnel mode SA. - On a system where socket marks determine routing, the packets emitted by an IPsec tunnel can be routed based on a mark that is determined by the tunnel, not by the marks of the unencrypted packets. - Support for setting the output marks can be introduced without breaking any existing setups that employ both mark-based routing and xfrm tunnel mode. Simply changing the code to use the xfrm mark for routing output packets could xfrm mark could change behaviour in a way that breaks these setups. If the output mark is unspecified or set to zero, the mark is not set or changed. Tested: make allyesconfig; make -j64 Tested: https://android-review.googlesource.com/452776 Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2017-08-10 17:11:33 +00:00
dst = afinfo->dst_lookup(net, tos, oif, saddr, daddr, mark);
rcu_read_unlock();
return dst;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__xfrm_dst_lookup);
static inline struct dst_entry *xfrm_dst_lookup(struct xfrm_state *x,
int tos, int oif,
xfrm_address_t *prev_saddr,
xfrm_address_t *prev_daddr,
net: xfrm: support setting an output mark. On systems that use mark-based routing it may be necessary for routing lookups to use marks in order for packets to be routed correctly. An example of such a system is Android, which uses socket marks to route packets via different networks. Currently, routing lookups in tunnel mode always use a mark of zero, making routing incorrect on such systems. This patch adds a new output_mark element to the xfrm state and a corresponding XFRMA_OUTPUT_MARK netlink attribute. The output mark differs from the existing xfrm mark in two ways: 1. The xfrm mark is used to match xfrm policies and states, while the xfrm output mark is used to set the mark (and influence the routing) of the packets emitted by those states. 2. The existing mark is constrained to be a subset of the bits of the originating socket or transformed packet, but the output mark is arbitrary and depends only on the state. The use of a separate mark provides additional flexibility. For example: - A packet subject to two transforms (e.g., transport mode inside tunnel mode) can have two different output marks applied to it, one for the transport mode SA and one for the tunnel mode SA. - On a system where socket marks determine routing, the packets emitted by an IPsec tunnel can be routed based on a mark that is determined by the tunnel, not by the marks of the unencrypted packets. - Support for setting the output marks can be introduced without breaking any existing setups that employ both mark-based routing and xfrm tunnel mode. Simply changing the code to use the xfrm mark for routing output packets could xfrm mark could change behaviour in a way that breaks these setups. If the output mark is unspecified or set to zero, the mark is not set or changed. Tested: make allyesconfig; make -j64 Tested: https://android-review.googlesource.com/452776 Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2017-08-10 17:11:33 +00:00
int family, u32 mark)
{
struct net *net = xs_net(x);
xfrm_address_t *saddr = &x->props.saddr;
xfrm_address_t *daddr = &x->id.daddr;
struct dst_entry *dst;
if (x->type->flags & XFRM_TYPE_LOCAL_COADDR) {
saddr = x->coaddr;
daddr = prev_daddr;
}
if (x->type->flags & XFRM_TYPE_REMOTE_COADDR) {
saddr = prev_saddr;
daddr = x->coaddr;
}
net: xfrm: support setting an output mark. On systems that use mark-based routing it may be necessary for routing lookups to use marks in order for packets to be routed correctly. An example of such a system is Android, which uses socket marks to route packets via different networks. Currently, routing lookups in tunnel mode always use a mark of zero, making routing incorrect on such systems. This patch adds a new output_mark element to the xfrm state and a corresponding XFRMA_OUTPUT_MARK netlink attribute. The output mark differs from the existing xfrm mark in two ways: 1. The xfrm mark is used to match xfrm policies and states, while the xfrm output mark is used to set the mark (and influence the routing) of the packets emitted by those states. 2. The existing mark is constrained to be a subset of the bits of the originating socket or transformed packet, but the output mark is arbitrary and depends only on the state. The use of a separate mark provides additional flexibility. For example: - A packet subject to two transforms (e.g., transport mode inside tunnel mode) can have two different output marks applied to it, one for the transport mode SA and one for the tunnel mode SA. - On a system where socket marks determine routing, the packets emitted by an IPsec tunnel can be routed based on a mark that is determined by the tunnel, not by the marks of the unencrypted packets. - Support for setting the output marks can be introduced without breaking any existing setups that employ both mark-based routing and xfrm tunnel mode. Simply changing the code to use the xfrm mark for routing output packets could xfrm mark could change behaviour in a way that breaks these setups. If the output mark is unspecified or set to zero, the mark is not set or changed. Tested: make allyesconfig; make -j64 Tested: https://android-review.googlesource.com/452776 Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2017-08-10 17:11:33 +00:00
dst = __xfrm_dst_lookup(net, tos, oif, saddr, daddr, family, mark);
if (!IS_ERR(dst)) {
if (prev_saddr != saddr)
memcpy(prev_saddr, saddr, sizeof(*prev_saddr));
if (prev_daddr != daddr)
memcpy(prev_daddr, daddr, sizeof(*prev_daddr));
}
return dst;
}
static inline unsigned long make_jiffies(long secs)
{
if (secs >= (MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT-1)/HZ)
return MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT-1;
else
return secs*HZ;
}
static void xfrm_policy_timer(struct timer_list *t)
{
struct xfrm_policy *xp = from_timer(xp, t, timer);
time64_t now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
time64_t next = TIME64_MAX;
int warn = 0;
int dir;
read_lock(&xp->lock);
if (unlikely(xp->walk.dead))
goto out;
dir = xfrm_policy_id2dir(xp->index);
if (xp->lft.hard_add_expires_seconds) {
time64_t tmo = xp->lft.hard_add_expires_seconds +
xp->curlft.add_time - now;
if (tmo <= 0)
goto expired;
if (tmo < next)
next = tmo;
}
if (xp->lft.hard_use_expires_seconds) {
time64_t tmo = xp->lft.hard_use_expires_seconds +
(xp->curlft.use_time ? : xp->curlft.add_time) - now;
if (tmo <= 0)
goto expired;
if (tmo < next)
next = tmo;
}
if (xp->lft.soft_add_expires_seconds) {
time64_t tmo = xp->lft.soft_add_expires_seconds +
xp->curlft.add_time - now;
if (tmo <= 0) {
warn = 1;
tmo = XFRM_KM_TIMEOUT;
}
if (tmo < next)
next = tmo;
}
if (xp->lft.soft_use_expires_seconds) {
time64_t tmo = xp->lft.soft_use_expires_seconds +
(xp->curlft.use_time ? : xp->curlft.add_time) - now;
if (tmo <= 0) {
warn = 1;
tmo = XFRM_KM_TIMEOUT;
}
if (tmo < next)
next = tmo;
}
if (warn)
km_policy_expired(xp, dir, 0, 0);
if (next != TIME64_MAX &&
!mod_timer(&xp->timer, jiffies + make_jiffies(next)))
xfrm_pol_hold(xp);
out:
read_unlock(&xp->lock);
xfrm_pol_put(xp);
return;
expired:
read_unlock(&xp->lock);
if (!xfrm_policy_delete(xp, dir))
km_policy_expired(xp, dir, 1, 0);
xfrm_pol_put(xp);
}
/* Allocate xfrm_policy. Not used here, it is supposed to be used by pfkeyv2
* SPD calls.
*/
struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_alloc(struct net *net, gfp_t gfp)
{
struct xfrm_policy *policy;
policy = kzalloc(sizeof(struct xfrm_policy), gfp);
if (policy) {
write_pnet(&policy->xp_net, net);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&policy->walk.all);
INIT_HLIST_NODE(&policy->bydst_inexact_list);
INIT_HLIST_NODE(&policy->bydst);
INIT_HLIST_NODE(&policy->byidx);
rwlock_init(&policy->lock);
refcount_set(&policy->refcnt, 1);
skb_queue_head_init(&policy->polq.hold_queue);
timer_setup(&policy->timer, xfrm_policy_timer, 0);
timer_setup(&policy->polq.hold_timer,
xfrm_policy_queue_process, 0);
}
return policy;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_alloc);
static void xfrm_policy_destroy_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
{
struct xfrm_policy *policy = container_of(head, struct xfrm_policy, rcu);
security_xfrm_policy_free(policy->security);
kfree(policy);
}
/* Destroy xfrm_policy: descendant resources must be released to this moment. */
void xfrm_policy_destroy(struct xfrm_policy *policy)
{
BUG_ON(!policy->walk.dead);
if (del_timer(&policy->timer) || del_timer(&policy->polq.hold_timer))
BUG();
call_rcu(&policy->rcu, xfrm_policy_destroy_rcu);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_destroy);
/* Rule must be locked. Release descendant resources, announce
* entry dead. The rule must be unlinked from lists to the moment.
*/
static void xfrm_policy_kill(struct xfrm_policy *policy)
{
policy->walk.dead = 1;
atomic_inc(&policy->genid);
if (del_timer(&policy->polq.hold_timer))
xfrm_pol_put(policy);
skb_queue_purge(&policy->polq.hold_queue);
if (del_timer(&policy->timer))
xfrm_pol_put(policy);
xfrm_pol_put(policy);
}
static unsigned int xfrm_policy_hashmax __read_mostly = 1 * 1024 * 1024;
static inline unsigned int idx_hash(struct net *net, u32 index)
{
return __idx_hash(index, net->xfrm.policy_idx_hmask);
}
/* calculate policy hash thresholds */
static void __get_hash_thresh(struct net *net,
unsigned short family, int dir,
u8 *dbits, u8 *sbits)
{
switch (family) {
case AF_INET:
*dbits = net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir].dbits4;
*sbits = net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir].sbits4;
break;
case AF_INET6:
*dbits = net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir].dbits6;
*sbits = net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir].sbits6;
break;
default:
*dbits = 0;
*sbits = 0;
}
}
static struct hlist_head *policy_hash_bysel(struct net *net,
const struct xfrm_selector *sel,
unsigned short family, int dir)
{
unsigned int hmask = net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir].hmask;
unsigned int hash;
u8 dbits;
u8 sbits;
__get_hash_thresh(net, family, dir, &dbits, &sbits);
hash = __sel_hash(sel, family, hmask, dbits, sbits);
if (hash == hmask + 1)
return NULL;
return rcu_dereference_check(net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir].table,
lockdep_is_held(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock)) + hash;
}
static struct hlist_head *policy_hash_direct(struct net *net,
const xfrm_address_t *daddr,
const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
unsigned short family, int dir)
{
unsigned int hmask = net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir].hmask;
unsigned int hash;
u8 dbits;
u8 sbits;
__get_hash_thresh(net, family, dir, &dbits, &sbits);
hash = __addr_hash(daddr, saddr, family, hmask, dbits, sbits);
return rcu_dereference_check(net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir].table,
lockdep_is_held(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock)) + hash;
}
static void xfrm_dst_hash_transfer(struct net *net,
struct hlist_head *list,
struct hlist_head *ndsttable,
unsigned int nhashmask,
int dir)
{
hlist: drop the node parameter from iterators I'm not sure why, but the hlist for each entry iterators were conceived list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member) The hlist ones were greedy and wanted an extra parameter: hlist_for_each_entry(tpos, pos, head, member) Why did they need an extra pos parameter? I'm not quite sure. Not only they don't really need it, it also prevents the iterator from looking exactly like the list iterator, which is unfortunate. Besides the semantic patch, there was some manual work required: - Fix up the actual hlist iterators in linux/list.h - Fix up the declaration of other iterators based on the hlist ones. - A very small amount of places were using the 'node' parameter, this was modified to use 'obj->member' instead. - Coccinelle didn't handle the hlist_for_each_entry_safe iterator properly, so those had to be fixed up manually. The semantic patch which is mostly the work of Peter Senna Tschudin is here: @@ iterator name hlist_for_each_entry, hlist_for_each_entry_continue, hlist_for_each_entry_from, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh, for_each_busy_worker, ax25_uid_for_each, ax25_for_each, inet_bind_bucket_for_each, sctp_for_each_hentry, sk_for_each, sk_for_each_rcu, sk_for_each_from, sk_for_each_safe, sk_for_each_bound, hlist_for_each_entry_safe, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu, nr_neigh_for_each, nr_neigh_for_each_safe, nr_node_for_each, nr_node_for_each_safe, for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp, for_each_gfn_sp, for_each_host; type T; expression a,c,d,e; identifier b; statement S; @@ -T b; <+... when != b ( hlist_for_each_entry(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_from(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh(a, - b, c) S | for_each_busy_worker(a, c, - b, d) S | ax25_uid_for_each(a, - b, c) S | ax25_for_each(a, - b, c) S | inet_bind_bucket_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sctp_for_each_hentry(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_rcu(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_from -(a, b) +(a) S + sk_for_each_from(a) S | sk_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | sk_for_each_bound(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_safe(a, - b, c, d, e) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | nr_node_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_node_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d) S | for_each_host(a, - b, c) S | for_each_host_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | for_each_mesh_entry(a, - b, c, d) S ) ...+> [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus change from net/ipv4/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus hunk from net/ipv6/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings] [akpm@linux-foudnation.org: redo intrusive kvm changes] Tested-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-02-28 01:06:00 +00:00
struct hlist_node *tmp, *entry0 = NULL;
struct xfrm_policy *pol;
unsigned int h0 = 0;
u8 dbits;
u8 sbits;
redo:
hlist: drop the node parameter from iterators I'm not sure why, but the hlist for each entry iterators were conceived list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member) The hlist ones were greedy and wanted an extra parameter: hlist_for_each_entry(tpos, pos, head, member) Why did they need an extra pos parameter? I'm not quite sure. Not only they don't really need it, it also prevents the iterator from looking exactly like the list iterator, which is unfortunate. Besides the semantic patch, there was some manual work required: - Fix up the actual hlist iterators in linux/list.h - Fix up the declaration of other iterators based on the hlist ones. - A very small amount of places were using the 'node' parameter, this was modified to use 'obj->member' instead. - Coccinelle didn't handle the hlist_for_each_entry_safe iterator properly, so those had to be fixed up manually. The semantic patch which is mostly the work of Peter Senna Tschudin is here: @@ iterator name hlist_for_each_entry, hlist_for_each_entry_continue, hlist_for_each_entry_from, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh, for_each_busy_worker, ax25_uid_for_each, ax25_for_each, inet_bind_bucket_for_each, sctp_for_each_hentry, sk_for_each, sk_for_each_rcu, sk_for_each_from, sk_for_each_safe, sk_for_each_bound, hlist_for_each_entry_safe, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu, nr_neigh_for_each, nr_neigh_for_each_safe, nr_node_for_each, nr_node_for_each_safe, for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp, for_each_gfn_sp, for_each_host; type T; expression a,c,d,e; identifier b; statement S; @@ -T b; <+... when != b ( hlist_for_each_entry(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_from(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh(a, - b, c) S | for_each_busy_worker(a, c, - b, d) S | ax25_uid_for_each(a, - b, c) S | ax25_for_each(a, - b, c) S | inet_bind_bucket_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sctp_for_each_hentry(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_rcu(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_from -(a, b) +(a) S + sk_for_each_from(a) S | sk_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | sk_for_each_bound(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_safe(a, - b, c, d, e) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | nr_node_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_node_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d) S | for_each_host(a, - b, c) S | for_each_host_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | for_each_mesh_entry(a, - b, c, d) S ) ...+> [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus change from net/ipv4/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus hunk from net/ipv6/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings] [akpm@linux-foudnation.org: redo intrusive kvm changes] Tested-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-02-28 01:06:00 +00:00
hlist_for_each_entry_safe(pol, tmp, list, bydst) {
unsigned int h;
__get_hash_thresh(net, pol->family, dir, &dbits, &sbits);
h = __addr_hash(&pol->selector.daddr, &pol->selector.saddr,
pol->family, nhashmask, dbits, sbits);
if (!entry0) {
hlist_del_rcu(&pol->bydst);
hlist_add_head_rcu(&pol->bydst, ndsttable + h);
h0 = h;
} else {
if (h != h0)
continue;
hlist_del_rcu(&pol->bydst);
hlist_add_behind_rcu(&pol->bydst, entry0);
}
hlist: drop the node parameter from iterators I'm not sure why, but the hlist for each entry iterators were conceived list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member) The hlist ones were greedy and wanted an extra parameter: hlist_for_each_entry(tpos, pos, head, member) Why did they need an extra pos parameter? I'm not quite sure. Not only they don't really need it, it also prevents the iterator from looking exactly like the list iterator, which is unfortunate. Besides the semantic patch, there was some manual work required: - Fix up the actual hlist iterators in linux/list.h - Fix up the declaration of other iterators based on the hlist ones. - A very small amount of places were using the 'node' parameter, this was modified to use 'obj->member' instead. - Coccinelle didn't handle the hlist_for_each_entry_safe iterator properly, so those had to be fixed up manually. The semantic patch which is mostly the work of Peter Senna Tschudin is here: @@ iterator name hlist_for_each_entry, hlist_for_each_entry_continue, hlist_for_each_entry_from, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh, for_each_busy_worker, ax25_uid_for_each, ax25_for_each, inet_bind_bucket_for_each, sctp_for_each_hentry, sk_for_each, sk_for_each_rcu, sk_for_each_from, sk_for_each_safe, sk_for_each_bound, hlist_for_each_entry_safe, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu, nr_neigh_for_each, nr_neigh_for_each_safe, nr_node_for_each, nr_node_for_each_safe, for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp, for_each_gfn_sp, for_each_host; type T; expression a,c,d,e; identifier b; statement S; @@ -T b; <+... when != b ( hlist_for_each_entry(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_from(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh(a, - b, c) S | for_each_busy_worker(a, c, - b, d) S | ax25_uid_for_each(a, - b, c) S | ax25_for_each(a, - b, c) S | inet_bind_bucket_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sctp_for_each_hentry(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_rcu(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_from -(a, b) +(a) S + sk_for_each_from(a) S | sk_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | sk_for_each_bound(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_safe(a, - b, c, d, e) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | nr_node_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_node_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d) S | for_each_host(a, - b, c) S | for_each_host_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | for_each_mesh_entry(a, - b, c, d) S ) ...+> [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus change from net/ipv4/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus hunk from net/ipv6/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings] [akpm@linux-foudnation.org: redo intrusive kvm changes] Tested-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-02-28 01:06:00 +00:00
entry0 = &pol->bydst;
}
if (!hlist_empty(list)) {
entry0 = NULL;
goto redo;
}
}
static void xfrm_idx_hash_transfer(struct hlist_head *list,
struct hlist_head *nidxtable,
unsigned int nhashmask)
{
hlist: drop the node parameter from iterators I'm not sure why, but the hlist for each entry iterators were conceived list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member) The hlist ones were greedy and wanted an extra parameter: hlist_for_each_entry(tpos, pos, head, member) Why did they need an extra pos parameter? I'm not quite sure. Not only they don't really need it, it also prevents the iterator from looking exactly like the list iterator, which is unfortunate. Besides the semantic patch, there was some manual work required: - Fix up the actual hlist iterators in linux/list.h - Fix up the declaration of other iterators based on the hlist ones. - A very small amount of places were using the 'node' parameter, this was modified to use 'obj->member' instead. - Coccinelle didn't handle the hlist_for_each_entry_safe iterator properly, so those had to be fixed up manually. The semantic patch which is mostly the work of Peter Senna Tschudin is here: @@ iterator name hlist_for_each_entry, hlist_for_each_entry_continue, hlist_for_each_entry_from, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh, for_each_busy_worker, ax25_uid_for_each, ax25_for_each, inet_bind_bucket_for_each, sctp_for_each_hentry, sk_for_each, sk_for_each_rcu, sk_for_each_from, sk_for_each_safe, sk_for_each_bound, hlist_for_each_entry_safe, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu, nr_neigh_for_each, nr_neigh_for_each_safe, nr_node_for_each, nr_node_for_each_safe, for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp, for_each_gfn_sp, for_each_host; type T; expression a,c,d,e; identifier b; statement S; @@ -T b; <+... when != b ( hlist_for_each_entry(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_from(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh(a, - b, c) S | for_each_busy_worker(a, c, - b, d) S | ax25_uid_for_each(a, - b, c) S | ax25_for_each(a, - b, c) S | inet_bind_bucket_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sctp_for_each_hentry(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_rcu(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_from -(a, b) +(a) S + sk_for_each_from(a) S | sk_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | sk_for_each_bound(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_safe(a, - b, c, d, e) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | nr_node_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_node_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d) S | for_each_host(a, - b, c) S | for_each_host_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | for_each_mesh_entry(a, - b, c, d) S ) ...+> [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus change from net/ipv4/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus hunk from net/ipv6/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings] [akpm@linux-foudnation.org: redo intrusive kvm changes] Tested-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-02-28 01:06:00 +00:00
struct hlist_node *tmp;
struct xfrm_policy *pol;
hlist: drop the node parameter from iterators I'm not sure why, but the hlist for each entry iterators were conceived list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member) The hlist ones were greedy and wanted an extra parameter: hlist_for_each_entry(tpos, pos, head, member) Why did they need an extra pos parameter? I'm not quite sure. Not only they don't really need it, it also prevents the iterator from looking exactly like the list iterator, which is unfortunate. Besides the semantic patch, there was some manual work required: - Fix up the actual hlist iterators in linux/list.h - Fix up the declaration of other iterators based on the hlist ones. - A very small amount of places were using the 'node' parameter, this was modified to use 'obj->member' instead. - Coccinelle didn't handle the hlist_for_each_entry_safe iterator properly, so those had to be fixed up manually. The semantic patch which is mostly the work of Peter Senna Tschudin is here: @@ iterator name hlist_for_each_entry, hlist_for_each_entry_continue, hlist_for_each_entry_from, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh, for_each_busy_worker, ax25_uid_for_each, ax25_for_each, inet_bind_bucket_for_each, sctp_for_each_hentry, sk_for_each, sk_for_each_rcu, sk_for_each_from, sk_for_each_safe, sk_for_each_bound, hlist_for_each_entry_safe, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu, nr_neigh_for_each, nr_neigh_for_each_safe, nr_node_for_each, nr_node_for_each_safe, for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp, for_each_gfn_sp, for_each_host; type T; expression a,c,d,e; identifier b; statement S; @@ -T b; <+... when != b ( hlist_for_each_entry(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_from(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh(a, - b, c) S | for_each_busy_worker(a, c, - b, d) S | ax25_uid_for_each(a, - b, c) S | ax25_for_each(a, - b, c) S | inet_bind_bucket_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sctp_for_each_hentry(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_rcu(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_from -(a, b) +(a) S + sk_for_each_from(a) S | sk_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | sk_for_each_bound(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_safe(a, - b, c, d, e) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | nr_node_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_node_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d) S | for_each_host(a, - b, c) S | for_each_host_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | for_each_mesh_entry(a, - b, c, d) S ) ...+> [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus change from net/ipv4/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus hunk from net/ipv6/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings] [akpm@linux-foudnation.org: redo intrusive kvm changes] Tested-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-02-28 01:06:00 +00:00
hlist_for_each_entry_safe(pol, tmp, list, byidx) {
unsigned int h;
h = __idx_hash(pol->index, nhashmask);
hlist_add_head(&pol->byidx, nidxtable+h);
}
}
static unsigned long xfrm_new_hash_mask(unsigned int old_hmask)
{
return ((old_hmask + 1) << 1) - 1;
}
static void xfrm_bydst_resize(struct net *net, int dir)
{
unsigned int hmask = net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir].hmask;
unsigned int nhashmask = xfrm_new_hash_mask(hmask);
unsigned int nsize = (nhashmask + 1) * sizeof(struct hlist_head);
struct hlist_head *ndst = xfrm_hash_alloc(nsize);
struct hlist_head *odst;
int i;
if (!ndst)
return;
spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
write_seqcount_begin(&xfrm_policy_hash_generation);
odst = rcu_dereference_protected(net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir].table,
lockdep_is_held(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock));
odst = rcu_dereference_protected(net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir].table,
lockdep_is_held(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock));
for (i = hmask; i >= 0; i--)
xfrm_dst_hash_transfer(net, odst + i, ndst, nhashmask, dir);
rcu_assign_pointer(net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir].table, ndst);
net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir].hmask = nhashmask;
write_seqcount_end(&xfrm_policy_hash_generation);
spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
synchronize_rcu();
xfrm_hash_free(odst, (hmask + 1) * sizeof(struct hlist_head));
}
static void xfrm_byidx_resize(struct net *net, int total)
{
unsigned int hmask = net->xfrm.policy_idx_hmask;
unsigned int nhashmask = xfrm_new_hash_mask(hmask);
unsigned int nsize = (nhashmask + 1) * sizeof(struct hlist_head);
struct hlist_head *oidx = net->xfrm.policy_byidx;
struct hlist_head *nidx = xfrm_hash_alloc(nsize);
int i;
if (!nidx)
return;
spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
for (i = hmask; i >= 0; i--)
xfrm_idx_hash_transfer(oidx + i, nidx, nhashmask);
net->xfrm.policy_byidx = nidx;
net->xfrm.policy_idx_hmask = nhashmask;
spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
xfrm_hash_free(oidx, (hmask + 1) * sizeof(struct hlist_head));
}
static inline int xfrm_bydst_should_resize(struct net *net, int dir, int *total)
{
unsigned int cnt = net->xfrm.policy_count[dir];
unsigned int hmask = net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir].hmask;
if (total)
*total += cnt;
if ((hmask + 1) < xfrm_policy_hashmax &&
cnt > hmask)
return 1;
return 0;
}
static inline int xfrm_byidx_should_resize(struct net *net, int total)
{
unsigned int hmask = net->xfrm.policy_idx_hmask;
if ((hmask + 1) < xfrm_policy_hashmax &&
total > hmask)
return 1;
return 0;
}
void xfrm_spd_getinfo(struct net *net, struct xfrmk_spdinfo *si)
{
si->incnt = net->xfrm.policy_count[XFRM_POLICY_IN];
si->outcnt = net->xfrm.policy_count[XFRM_POLICY_OUT];
si->fwdcnt = net->xfrm.policy_count[XFRM_POLICY_FWD];
si->inscnt = net->xfrm.policy_count[XFRM_POLICY_IN+XFRM_POLICY_MAX];
si->outscnt = net->xfrm.policy_count[XFRM_POLICY_OUT+XFRM_POLICY_MAX];
si->fwdscnt = net->xfrm.policy_count[XFRM_POLICY_FWD+XFRM_POLICY_MAX];
si->spdhcnt = net->xfrm.policy_idx_hmask;
si->spdhmcnt = xfrm_policy_hashmax;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_spd_getinfo);
static DEFINE_MUTEX(hash_resize_mutex);
static void xfrm_hash_resize(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct net *net = container_of(work, struct net, xfrm.policy_hash_work);
int dir, total;
mutex_lock(&hash_resize_mutex);
total = 0;
for (dir = 0; dir < XFRM_POLICY_MAX; dir++) {
if (xfrm_bydst_should_resize(net, dir, &total))
xfrm_bydst_resize(net, dir);
}
if (xfrm_byidx_should_resize(net, total))
xfrm_byidx_resize(net, total);
mutex_unlock(&hash_resize_mutex);
}
/* Make sure *pol can be inserted into fastbin.
* Useful to check that later insert requests will be sucessful
* (provided xfrm_policy_lock is held throughout).
*/
static struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin *
xfrm_policy_inexact_alloc_bin(const struct xfrm_policy *pol, u8 dir)
{
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin *bin, *prev;
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_key k = {
.family = pol->family,
.type = pol->type,
.dir = dir,
.if_id = pol->if_id,
};
struct net *net = xp_net(pol);
lockdep_assert_held(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
write_pnet(&k.net, net);
bin = rhashtable_lookup_fast(&xfrm_policy_inexact_table, &k,
xfrm_pol_inexact_params);
if (bin)
return bin;
bin = kzalloc(sizeof(*bin), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!bin)
return NULL;
bin->k = k;
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&bin->hhead);
bin->root_d = RB_ROOT;
bin->root_s = RB_ROOT;
seqcount_init(&bin->count);
prev = rhashtable_lookup_get_insert_key(&xfrm_policy_inexact_table,
&bin->k, &bin->head,
xfrm_pol_inexact_params);
if (!prev) {
list_add(&bin->inexact_bins, &net->xfrm.inexact_bins);
return bin;
}
kfree(bin);
return IS_ERR(prev) ? NULL : prev;
}
static bool xfrm_pol_inexact_addr_use_any_list(const xfrm_address_t *addr,
int family, u8 prefixlen)
{
if (xfrm_addr_any(addr, family))
return true;
if (family == AF_INET6 && prefixlen < INEXACT_PREFIXLEN_IPV6)
return true;
if (family == AF_INET && prefixlen < INEXACT_PREFIXLEN_IPV4)
return true;
return false;
}
static bool
xfrm_policy_inexact_insert_use_any_list(const struct xfrm_policy *policy)
{
const xfrm_address_t *addr;
bool saddr_any, daddr_any;
u8 prefixlen;
addr = &policy->selector.saddr;
prefixlen = policy->selector.prefixlen_s;
saddr_any = xfrm_pol_inexact_addr_use_any_list(addr,
policy->family,
prefixlen);
addr = &policy->selector.daddr;
prefixlen = policy->selector.prefixlen_d;
daddr_any = xfrm_pol_inexact_addr_use_any_list(addr,
policy->family,
prefixlen);
return saddr_any && daddr_any;
}
static void xfrm_pol_inexact_node_init(struct xfrm_pol_inexact_node *node,
const xfrm_address_t *addr, u8 prefixlen)
{
node->addr = *addr;
node->prefixlen = prefixlen;
}
static struct xfrm_pol_inexact_node *
xfrm_pol_inexact_node_alloc(const xfrm_address_t *addr, u8 prefixlen)
{
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_node *node;
node = kzalloc(sizeof(*node), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (node)
xfrm_pol_inexact_node_init(node, addr, prefixlen);
return node;
}
static int xfrm_policy_addr_delta(const xfrm_address_t *a,
const xfrm_address_t *b,
u8 prefixlen, u16 family)
{
unsigned int pdw, pbi;
int delta = 0;
switch (family) {
case AF_INET:
if (sizeof(long) == 4 && prefixlen == 0)
return ntohl(a->a4) - ntohl(b->a4);
return (ntohl(a->a4) & ((~0UL << (32 - prefixlen)))) -
(ntohl(b->a4) & ((~0UL << (32 - prefixlen))));
case AF_INET6:
pdw = prefixlen >> 5;
pbi = prefixlen & 0x1f;
if (pdw) {
delta = memcmp(a->a6, b->a6, pdw << 2);
if (delta)
return delta;
}
if (pbi) {
u32 mask = ~0u << (32 - pbi);
delta = (ntohl(a->a6[pdw]) & mask) -
(ntohl(b->a6[pdw]) & mask);
}
break;
default:
break;
}
return delta;
}
static void xfrm_policy_inexact_list_reinsert(struct net *net,
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_node *n,
u16 family)
{
unsigned int matched_s, matched_d;
struct xfrm_policy *policy, *p;
matched_s = 0;
matched_d = 0;
list_for_each_entry_reverse(policy, &net->xfrm.policy_all, walk.all) {
struct hlist_node *newpos = NULL;
bool matches_s, matches_d;
if (!policy->bydst_reinsert)
continue;
WARN_ON_ONCE(policy->family != family);
policy->bydst_reinsert = false;
hlist_for_each_entry(p, &n->hhead, bydst) {
if (policy->priority > p->priority)
newpos = &p->bydst;
else if (policy->priority == p->priority &&
policy->pos > p->pos)
newpos = &p->bydst;
else
break;
}
if (newpos)
hlist_add_behind_rcu(&policy->bydst, newpos);
else
hlist_add_head_rcu(&policy->bydst, &n->hhead);
/* paranoia checks follow.
* Check that the reinserted policy matches at least
* saddr or daddr for current node prefix.
*
* Matching both is fine, matching saddr in one policy
* (but not daddr) and then matching only daddr in another
* is a bug.
*/
matches_s = xfrm_policy_addr_delta(&policy->selector.saddr,
&n->addr,
n->prefixlen,
family) == 0;
matches_d = xfrm_policy_addr_delta(&policy->selector.daddr,
&n->addr,
n->prefixlen,
family) == 0;
if (matches_s && matches_d)
continue;
WARN_ON_ONCE(!matches_s && !matches_d);
if (matches_s)
matched_s++;
if (matches_d)
matched_d++;
WARN_ON_ONCE(matched_s && matched_d);
}
}
xfrm: policy: add 2nd-level saddr trees for inexact policies This adds the fourth and final search class, containing policies where both saddr and daddr have prefix lengths (i.e., not wildcards). Inexact policies now end up in one of the following four search classes: 1. "Any:Any" list, containing policies where both saddr and daddr are wildcards or have very coarse prefixes, e.g. 10.0.0.0/8 and the like. 2. "saddr:any" list, containing policies with a fixed saddr/prefixlen, but without destination restrictions. These lists are stored in rbtree nodes; each node contains those policies matching saddr/prefixlen. 3. "Any:daddr" list. Similar to 2), except for policies where only the destinations are specified. 4. "saddr:daddr" lists, containing only those policies that match the given source/destination network. The root of the saddr/daddr nodes gets stored in the nodes of the 'daddr' tree. This diagram illustrates the list classes, and their placement in the lookup hierarchy: xfrm_pol_inexact_bin = hash(dir,type,family,if_id); | +---- root_d: sorted by daddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | +- root: sorted by saddr/prefix | | | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | | | + root: unused | | | | | + hhead: saddr:daddr policies | | | +- coarse policies and all any:daddr policies | +---- root_s: sorted by saddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | + root: unused | | | + hhead: saddr:any policies | +---- coarse policies and all any:any policies lookup for an inexact policy returns pointers to the four relevant list classes, after which each of the lists needs to be searched for the policy with the higher priority. This will only speed up lookups in case we have many policies and a sizeable portion of these have disjunct saddr/daddr addresses. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2018-11-07 22:00:41 +00:00
static void xfrm_policy_inexact_node_reinsert(struct net *net,
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_node *n,
struct rb_root *new,
u16 family)
{
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_node *node;
struct rb_node **p, *parent;
xfrm: policy: add 2nd-level saddr trees for inexact policies This adds the fourth and final search class, containing policies where both saddr and daddr have prefix lengths (i.e., not wildcards). Inexact policies now end up in one of the following four search classes: 1. "Any:Any" list, containing policies where both saddr and daddr are wildcards or have very coarse prefixes, e.g. 10.0.0.0/8 and the like. 2. "saddr:any" list, containing policies with a fixed saddr/prefixlen, but without destination restrictions. These lists are stored in rbtree nodes; each node contains those policies matching saddr/prefixlen. 3. "Any:daddr" list. Similar to 2), except for policies where only the destinations are specified. 4. "saddr:daddr" lists, containing only those policies that match the given source/destination network. The root of the saddr/daddr nodes gets stored in the nodes of the 'daddr' tree. This diagram illustrates the list classes, and their placement in the lookup hierarchy: xfrm_pol_inexact_bin = hash(dir,type,family,if_id); | +---- root_d: sorted by daddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | +- root: sorted by saddr/prefix | | | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | | | + root: unused | | | | | + hhead: saddr:daddr policies | | | +- coarse policies and all any:daddr policies | +---- root_s: sorted by saddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | + root: unused | | | + hhead: saddr:any policies | +---- coarse policies and all any:any policies lookup for an inexact policy returns pointers to the four relevant list classes, after which each of the lists needs to be searched for the policy with the higher priority. This will only speed up lookups in case we have many policies and a sizeable portion of these have disjunct saddr/daddr addresses. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2018-11-07 22:00:41 +00:00
/* we should not have another subtree here */
WARN_ON_ONCE(!RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&n->root));
restart:
parent = NULL;
xfrm: policy: add 2nd-level saddr trees for inexact policies This adds the fourth and final search class, containing policies where both saddr and daddr have prefix lengths (i.e., not wildcards). Inexact policies now end up in one of the following four search classes: 1. "Any:Any" list, containing policies where both saddr and daddr are wildcards or have very coarse prefixes, e.g. 10.0.0.0/8 and the like. 2. "saddr:any" list, containing policies with a fixed saddr/prefixlen, but without destination restrictions. These lists are stored in rbtree nodes; each node contains those policies matching saddr/prefixlen. 3. "Any:daddr" list. Similar to 2), except for policies where only the destinations are specified. 4. "saddr:daddr" lists, containing only those policies that match the given source/destination network. The root of the saddr/daddr nodes gets stored in the nodes of the 'daddr' tree. This diagram illustrates the list classes, and their placement in the lookup hierarchy: xfrm_pol_inexact_bin = hash(dir,type,family,if_id); | +---- root_d: sorted by daddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | +- root: sorted by saddr/prefix | | | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | | | + root: unused | | | | | + hhead: saddr:daddr policies | | | +- coarse policies and all any:daddr policies | +---- root_s: sorted by saddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | + root: unused | | | + hhead: saddr:any policies | +---- coarse policies and all any:any policies lookup for an inexact policy returns pointers to the four relevant list classes, after which each of the lists needs to be searched for the policy with the higher priority. This will only speed up lookups in case we have many policies and a sizeable portion of these have disjunct saddr/daddr addresses. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2018-11-07 22:00:41 +00:00
p = &new->rb_node;
while (*p) {
u8 prefixlen;
int delta;
parent = *p;
node = rb_entry(*p, struct xfrm_pol_inexact_node, node);
prefixlen = min(node->prefixlen, n->prefixlen);
delta = xfrm_policy_addr_delta(&n->addr, &node->addr,
prefixlen, family);
if (delta < 0) {
p = &parent->rb_left;
} else if (delta > 0) {
p = &parent->rb_right;
} else {
struct xfrm_policy *tmp;
hlist_for_each_entry(tmp, &n->hhead, bydst) {
xfrm: policy: add 2nd-level saddr trees for inexact policies This adds the fourth and final search class, containing policies where both saddr and daddr have prefix lengths (i.e., not wildcards). Inexact policies now end up in one of the following four search classes: 1. "Any:Any" list, containing policies where both saddr and daddr are wildcards or have very coarse prefixes, e.g. 10.0.0.0/8 and the like. 2. "saddr:any" list, containing policies with a fixed saddr/prefixlen, but without destination restrictions. These lists are stored in rbtree nodes; each node contains those policies matching saddr/prefixlen. 3. "Any:daddr" list. Similar to 2), except for policies where only the destinations are specified. 4. "saddr:daddr" lists, containing only those policies that match the given source/destination network. The root of the saddr/daddr nodes gets stored in the nodes of the 'daddr' tree. This diagram illustrates the list classes, and their placement in the lookup hierarchy: xfrm_pol_inexact_bin = hash(dir,type,family,if_id); | +---- root_d: sorted by daddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | +- root: sorted by saddr/prefix | | | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | | | + root: unused | | | | | + hhead: saddr:daddr policies | | | +- coarse policies and all any:daddr policies | +---- root_s: sorted by saddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | + root: unused | | | + hhead: saddr:any policies | +---- coarse policies and all any:any policies lookup for an inexact policy returns pointers to the four relevant list classes, after which each of the lists needs to be searched for the policy with the higher priority. This will only speed up lookups in case we have many policies and a sizeable portion of these have disjunct saddr/daddr addresses. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2018-11-07 22:00:41 +00:00
tmp->bydst_reinsert = true;
hlist_del_rcu(&tmp->bydst);
}
xfrm: policy: add 2nd-level saddr trees for inexact policies This adds the fourth and final search class, containing policies where both saddr and daddr have prefix lengths (i.e., not wildcards). Inexact policies now end up in one of the following four search classes: 1. "Any:Any" list, containing policies where both saddr and daddr are wildcards or have very coarse prefixes, e.g. 10.0.0.0/8 and the like. 2. "saddr:any" list, containing policies with a fixed saddr/prefixlen, but without destination restrictions. These lists are stored in rbtree nodes; each node contains those policies matching saddr/prefixlen. 3. "Any:daddr" list. Similar to 2), except for policies where only the destinations are specified. 4. "saddr:daddr" lists, containing only those policies that match the given source/destination network. The root of the saddr/daddr nodes gets stored in the nodes of the 'daddr' tree. This diagram illustrates the list classes, and their placement in the lookup hierarchy: xfrm_pol_inexact_bin = hash(dir,type,family,if_id); | +---- root_d: sorted by daddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | +- root: sorted by saddr/prefix | | | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | | | + root: unused | | | | | + hhead: saddr:daddr policies | | | +- coarse policies and all any:daddr policies | +---- root_s: sorted by saddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | + root: unused | | | + hhead: saddr:any policies | +---- coarse policies and all any:any policies lookup for an inexact policy returns pointers to the four relevant list classes, after which each of the lists needs to be searched for the policy with the higher priority. This will only speed up lookups in case we have many policies and a sizeable portion of these have disjunct saddr/daddr addresses. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2018-11-07 22:00:41 +00:00
xfrm_policy_inexact_list_reinsert(net, node, family);
if (node->prefixlen == n->prefixlen) {
kfree_rcu(n, rcu);
return;
}
rb_erase(*p, new);
kfree_rcu(n, rcu);
n = node;
n->prefixlen = prefixlen;
goto restart;
xfrm: policy: add 2nd-level saddr trees for inexact policies This adds the fourth and final search class, containing policies where both saddr and daddr have prefix lengths (i.e., not wildcards). Inexact policies now end up in one of the following four search classes: 1. "Any:Any" list, containing policies where both saddr and daddr are wildcards or have very coarse prefixes, e.g. 10.0.0.0/8 and the like. 2. "saddr:any" list, containing policies with a fixed saddr/prefixlen, but without destination restrictions. These lists are stored in rbtree nodes; each node contains those policies matching saddr/prefixlen. 3. "Any:daddr" list. Similar to 2), except for policies where only the destinations are specified. 4. "saddr:daddr" lists, containing only those policies that match the given source/destination network. The root of the saddr/daddr nodes gets stored in the nodes of the 'daddr' tree. This diagram illustrates the list classes, and their placement in the lookup hierarchy: xfrm_pol_inexact_bin = hash(dir,type,family,if_id); | +---- root_d: sorted by daddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | +- root: sorted by saddr/prefix | | | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | | | + root: unused | | | | | + hhead: saddr:daddr policies | | | +- coarse policies and all any:daddr policies | +---- root_s: sorted by saddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | + root: unused | | | + hhead: saddr:any policies | +---- coarse policies and all any:any policies lookup for an inexact policy returns pointers to the four relevant list classes, after which each of the lists needs to be searched for the policy with the higher priority. This will only speed up lookups in case we have many policies and a sizeable portion of these have disjunct saddr/daddr addresses. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2018-11-07 22:00:41 +00:00
}
}
rb_link_node_rcu(&n->node, parent, p);
rb_insert_color(&n->node, new);
}
/* merge nodes v and n */
static void xfrm_policy_inexact_node_merge(struct net *net,
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_node *v,
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_node *n,
u16 family)
{
xfrm: policy: add 2nd-level saddr trees for inexact policies This adds the fourth and final search class, containing policies where both saddr and daddr have prefix lengths (i.e., not wildcards). Inexact policies now end up in one of the following four search classes: 1. "Any:Any" list, containing policies where both saddr and daddr are wildcards or have very coarse prefixes, e.g. 10.0.0.0/8 and the like. 2. "saddr:any" list, containing policies with a fixed saddr/prefixlen, but without destination restrictions. These lists are stored in rbtree nodes; each node contains those policies matching saddr/prefixlen. 3. "Any:daddr" list. Similar to 2), except for policies where only the destinations are specified. 4. "saddr:daddr" lists, containing only those policies that match the given source/destination network. The root of the saddr/daddr nodes gets stored in the nodes of the 'daddr' tree. This diagram illustrates the list classes, and their placement in the lookup hierarchy: xfrm_pol_inexact_bin = hash(dir,type,family,if_id); | +---- root_d: sorted by daddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | +- root: sorted by saddr/prefix | | | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | | | + root: unused | | | | | + hhead: saddr:daddr policies | | | +- coarse policies and all any:daddr policies | +---- root_s: sorted by saddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | + root: unused | | | + hhead: saddr:any policies | +---- coarse policies and all any:any policies lookup for an inexact policy returns pointers to the four relevant list classes, after which each of the lists needs to be searched for the policy with the higher priority. This will only speed up lookups in case we have many policies and a sizeable portion of these have disjunct saddr/daddr addresses. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2018-11-07 22:00:41 +00:00
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_node *node;
struct xfrm_policy *tmp;
xfrm: policy: add 2nd-level saddr trees for inexact policies This adds the fourth and final search class, containing policies where both saddr and daddr have prefix lengths (i.e., not wildcards). Inexact policies now end up in one of the following four search classes: 1. "Any:Any" list, containing policies where both saddr and daddr are wildcards or have very coarse prefixes, e.g. 10.0.0.0/8 and the like. 2. "saddr:any" list, containing policies with a fixed saddr/prefixlen, but without destination restrictions. These lists are stored in rbtree nodes; each node contains those policies matching saddr/prefixlen. 3. "Any:daddr" list. Similar to 2), except for policies where only the destinations are specified. 4. "saddr:daddr" lists, containing only those policies that match the given source/destination network. The root of the saddr/daddr nodes gets stored in the nodes of the 'daddr' tree. This diagram illustrates the list classes, and their placement in the lookup hierarchy: xfrm_pol_inexact_bin = hash(dir,type,family,if_id); | +---- root_d: sorted by daddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | +- root: sorted by saddr/prefix | | | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | | | + root: unused | | | | | + hhead: saddr:daddr policies | | | +- coarse policies and all any:daddr policies | +---- root_s: sorted by saddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | + root: unused | | | + hhead: saddr:any policies | +---- coarse policies and all any:any policies lookup for an inexact policy returns pointers to the four relevant list classes, after which each of the lists needs to be searched for the policy with the higher priority. This will only speed up lookups in case we have many policies and a sizeable portion of these have disjunct saddr/daddr addresses. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2018-11-07 22:00:41 +00:00
struct rb_node *rnode;
/* To-be-merged node v has a subtree.
*
* Dismantle it and insert its nodes to n->root.
*/
while ((rnode = rb_first(&v->root)) != NULL) {
node = rb_entry(rnode, struct xfrm_pol_inexact_node, node);
rb_erase(&node->node, &v->root);
xfrm_policy_inexact_node_reinsert(net, node, &n->root,
family);
}
hlist_for_each_entry(tmp, &v->hhead, bydst) {
tmp->bydst_reinsert = true;
hlist_del_rcu(&tmp->bydst);
}
xfrm_policy_inexact_list_reinsert(net, n, family);
}
static struct xfrm_pol_inexact_node *
xfrm_policy_inexact_insert_node(struct net *net,
struct rb_root *root,
xfrm_address_t *addr,
u16 family, u8 prefixlen, u8 dir)
{
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_node *cached = NULL;
struct rb_node **p, *parent = NULL;
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_node *node;
p = &root->rb_node;
while (*p) {
int delta;
parent = *p;
node = rb_entry(*p, struct xfrm_pol_inexact_node, node);
delta = xfrm_policy_addr_delta(addr, &node->addr,
node->prefixlen,
family);
if (delta == 0 && prefixlen >= node->prefixlen) {
WARN_ON_ONCE(cached); /* ipsec policies got lost */
return node;
}
if (delta < 0)
p = &parent->rb_left;
else
p = &parent->rb_right;
if (prefixlen < node->prefixlen) {
delta = xfrm_policy_addr_delta(addr, &node->addr,
prefixlen,
family);
if (delta)
continue;
/* This node is a subnet of the new prefix. It needs
* to be removed and re-inserted with the smaller
* prefix and all nodes that are now also covered
* by the reduced prefixlen.
*/
rb_erase(&node->node, root);
if (!cached) {
xfrm_pol_inexact_node_init(node, addr,
prefixlen);
cached = node;
} else {
/* This node also falls within the new
* prefixlen. Merge the to-be-reinserted
* node and this one.
*/
xfrm_policy_inexact_node_merge(net, node,
cached, family);
kfree_rcu(node, rcu);
}
/* restart */
p = &root->rb_node;
parent = NULL;
}
}
node = cached;
if (!node) {
node = xfrm_pol_inexact_node_alloc(addr, prefixlen);
if (!node)
return NULL;
}
rb_link_node_rcu(&node->node, parent, p);
rb_insert_color(&node->node, root);
return node;
}
static void xfrm_policy_inexact_gc_tree(struct rb_root *r, bool rm)
{
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_node *node;
struct rb_node *rn = rb_first(r);
while (rn) {
node = rb_entry(rn, struct xfrm_pol_inexact_node, node);
xfrm: policy: add 2nd-level saddr trees for inexact policies This adds the fourth and final search class, containing policies where both saddr and daddr have prefix lengths (i.e., not wildcards). Inexact policies now end up in one of the following four search classes: 1. "Any:Any" list, containing policies where both saddr and daddr are wildcards or have very coarse prefixes, e.g. 10.0.0.0/8 and the like. 2. "saddr:any" list, containing policies with a fixed saddr/prefixlen, but without destination restrictions. These lists are stored in rbtree nodes; each node contains those policies matching saddr/prefixlen. 3. "Any:daddr" list. Similar to 2), except for policies where only the destinations are specified. 4. "saddr:daddr" lists, containing only those policies that match the given source/destination network. The root of the saddr/daddr nodes gets stored in the nodes of the 'daddr' tree. This diagram illustrates the list classes, and their placement in the lookup hierarchy: xfrm_pol_inexact_bin = hash(dir,type,family,if_id); | +---- root_d: sorted by daddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | +- root: sorted by saddr/prefix | | | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | | | + root: unused | | | | | + hhead: saddr:daddr policies | | | +- coarse policies and all any:daddr policies | +---- root_s: sorted by saddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | + root: unused | | | + hhead: saddr:any policies | +---- coarse policies and all any:any policies lookup for an inexact policy returns pointers to the four relevant list classes, after which each of the lists needs to be searched for the policy with the higher priority. This will only speed up lookups in case we have many policies and a sizeable portion of these have disjunct saddr/daddr addresses. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2018-11-07 22:00:41 +00:00
xfrm_policy_inexact_gc_tree(&node->root, rm);
rn = rb_next(rn);
xfrm: policy: add 2nd-level saddr trees for inexact policies This adds the fourth and final search class, containing policies where both saddr and daddr have prefix lengths (i.e., not wildcards). Inexact policies now end up in one of the following four search classes: 1. "Any:Any" list, containing policies where both saddr and daddr are wildcards or have very coarse prefixes, e.g. 10.0.0.0/8 and the like. 2. "saddr:any" list, containing policies with a fixed saddr/prefixlen, but without destination restrictions. These lists are stored in rbtree nodes; each node contains those policies matching saddr/prefixlen. 3. "Any:daddr" list. Similar to 2), except for policies where only the destinations are specified. 4. "saddr:daddr" lists, containing only those policies that match the given source/destination network. The root of the saddr/daddr nodes gets stored in the nodes of the 'daddr' tree. This diagram illustrates the list classes, and their placement in the lookup hierarchy: xfrm_pol_inexact_bin = hash(dir,type,family,if_id); | +---- root_d: sorted by daddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | +- root: sorted by saddr/prefix | | | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | | | + root: unused | | | | | + hhead: saddr:daddr policies | | | +- coarse policies and all any:daddr policies | +---- root_s: sorted by saddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | + root: unused | | | + hhead: saddr:any policies | +---- coarse policies and all any:any policies lookup for an inexact policy returns pointers to the four relevant list classes, after which each of the lists needs to be searched for the policy with the higher priority. This will only speed up lookups in case we have many policies and a sizeable portion of these have disjunct saddr/daddr addresses. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2018-11-07 22:00:41 +00:00
if (!hlist_empty(&node->hhead) || !RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&node->root)) {
WARN_ON_ONCE(rm);
continue;
}
rb_erase(&node->node, r);
kfree_rcu(node, rcu);
}
}
static void __xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin(struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin *b, bool net_exit)
{
write_seqcount_begin(&b->count);
xfrm_policy_inexact_gc_tree(&b->root_d, net_exit);
xfrm_policy_inexact_gc_tree(&b->root_s, net_exit);
write_seqcount_end(&b->count);
if (!RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&b->root_d) || !RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&b->root_s) ||
!hlist_empty(&b->hhead)) {
WARN_ON_ONCE(net_exit);
return;
}
if (rhashtable_remove_fast(&xfrm_policy_inexact_table, &b->head,
xfrm_pol_inexact_params) == 0) {
list_del(&b->inexact_bins);
kfree_rcu(b, rcu);
}
}
static void xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin(struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin *b)
{
struct net *net = read_pnet(&b->k.net);
spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
__xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin(b, false);
spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
}
static void __xfrm_policy_inexact_flush(struct net *net)
{
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin *bin, *t;
lockdep_assert_held(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(bin, t, &net->xfrm.inexact_bins, inexact_bins)
__xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin(bin, false);
}
static struct hlist_head *
xfrm_policy_inexact_alloc_chain(struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin *bin,
struct xfrm_policy *policy, u8 dir)
{
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_node *n;
struct net *net;
net = xp_net(policy);
lockdep_assert_held(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
if (xfrm_policy_inexact_insert_use_any_list(policy))
return &bin->hhead;
if (xfrm_pol_inexact_addr_use_any_list(&policy->selector.daddr,
policy->family,
policy->selector.prefixlen_d)) {
write_seqcount_begin(&bin->count);
n = xfrm_policy_inexact_insert_node(net,
&bin->root_s,
&policy->selector.saddr,
policy->family,
policy->selector.prefixlen_s,
dir);
write_seqcount_end(&bin->count);
if (!n)
return NULL;
return &n->hhead;
}
/* daddr is fixed */
write_seqcount_begin(&bin->count);
n = xfrm_policy_inexact_insert_node(net,
&bin->root_d,
&policy->selector.daddr,
policy->family,
policy->selector.prefixlen_d, dir);
write_seqcount_end(&bin->count);
if (!n)
return NULL;
xfrm: policy: add 2nd-level saddr trees for inexact policies This adds the fourth and final search class, containing policies where both saddr and daddr have prefix lengths (i.e., not wildcards). Inexact policies now end up in one of the following four search classes: 1. "Any:Any" list, containing policies where both saddr and daddr are wildcards or have very coarse prefixes, e.g. 10.0.0.0/8 and the like. 2. "saddr:any" list, containing policies with a fixed saddr/prefixlen, but without destination restrictions. These lists are stored in rbtree nodes; each node contains those policies matching saddr/prefixlen. 3. "Any:daddr" list. Similar to 2), except for policies where only the destinations are specified. 4. "saddr:daddr" lists, containing only those policies that match the given source/destination network. The root of the saddr/daddr nodes gets stored in the nodes of the 'daddr' tree. This diagram illustrates the list classes, and their placement in the lookup hierarchy: xfrm_pol_inexact_bin = hash(dir,type,family,if_id); | +---- root_d: sorted by daddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | +- root: sorted by saddr/prefix | | | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | | | + root: unused | | | | | + hhead: saddr:daddr policies | | | +- coarse policies and all any:daddr policies | +---- root_s: sorted by saddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | + root: unused | | | + hhead: saddr:any policies | +---- coarse policies and all any:any policies lookup for an inexact policy returns pointers to the four relevant list classes, after which each of the lists needs to be searched for the policy with the higher priority. This will only speed up lookups in case we have many policies and a sizeable portion of these have disjunct saddr/daddr addresses. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2018-11-07 22:00:41 +00:00
/* saddr is wildcard */
if (xfrm_pol_inexact_addr_use_any_list(&policy->selector.saddr,
policy->family,
policy->selector.prefixlen_s))
return &n->hhead;
write_seqcount_begin(&bin->count);
n = xfrm_policy_inexact_insert_node(net,
&n->root,
&policy->selector.saddr,
policy->family,
policy->selector.prefixlen_s, dir);
write_seqcount_end(&bin->count);
if (!n)
return NULL;
return &n->hhead;
}
static struct xfrm_policy *
xfrm_policy_inexact_insert(struct xfrm_policy *policy, u8 dir, int excl)
{
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin *bin;
struct xfrm_policy *delpol;
struct hlist_head *chain;
struct net *net;
bin = xfrm_policy_inexact_alloc_bin(policy, dir);
if (!bin)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
net = xp_net(policy);
lockdep_assert_held(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
chain = xfrm_policy_inexact_alloc_chain(bin, policy, dir);
if (!chain) {
__xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin(bin, false);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
delpol = xfrm_policy_insert_list(chain, policy, excl);
if (delpol && excl) {
__xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin(bin, false);
return ERR_PTR(-EEXIST);
}
chain = &net->xfrm.policy_inexact[dir];
xfrm_policy_insert_inexact_list(chain, policy);
if (delpol)
__xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin(bin, false);
return delpol;
}
xfrm: configure policy hash table thresholds by netlink Enable to specify local and remote prefix length thresholds for the policy hash table via a netlink XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO message. prefix length thresholds are specified by XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH and XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH optional attributes (struct xfrmu_spdhthresh). example: struct xfrmu_spdhthresh thresh4 = { .lbits = 0; .rbits = 24; }; struct xfrmu_spdhthresh thresh6 = { .lbits = 0; .rbits = 56; }; struct nlmsghdr *hdr; struct nl_msg *msg; msg = nlmsg_alloc(); hdr = nlmsg_put(msg, NL_AUTO_PORT, NL_AUTO_SEQ, XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH, sizeof(__u32), NLM_F_REQUEST); nla_put(msg, XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH, sizeof(thresh4), &thresh4); nla_put(msg, XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH, sizeof(thresh6), &thresh6); nla_send_auto(sk, msg); The numbers are the policy selector minimum prefix lengths to put a policy in the hash table. - lbits is the local threshold (source address for out policies, destination address for in and fwd policies). - rbits is the remote threshold (destination address for out policies, source address for in and fwd policies). The default values are: XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH: 32 32 XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH: 128 128 Dynamic re-building of the SPD is performed when the thresholds values are changed. The current thresholds can be read via a XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO request: the kernel replies to XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO requests by an XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO message, with both attributes XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH and XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH. Signed-off-by: Christophe Gouault <christophe.gouault@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2014-08-29 14:16:05 +00:00
static void xfrm_hash_rebuild(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct net *net = container_of(work, struct net,
xfrm.policy_hthresh.work);
unsigned int hmask;
struct xfrm_policy *pol;
struct xfrm_policy *policy;
struct hlist_head *chain;
struct hlist_head *odst;
struct hlist_node *newpos;
int i;
int dir;
unsigned seq;
u8 lbits4, rbits4, lbits6, rbits6;
mutex_lock(&hash_resize_mutex);
/* read selector prefixlen thresholds */
do {
seq = read_seqbegin(&net->xfrm.policy_hthresh.lock);
lbits4 = net->xfrm.policy_hthresh.lbits4;
rbits4 = net->xfrm.policy_hthresh.rbits4;
lbits6 = net->xfrm.policy_hthresh.lbits6;
rbits6 = net->xfrm.policy_hthresh.rbits6;
} while (read_seqretry(&net->xfrm.policy_hthresh.lock, seq));
spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
write_seqcount_begin(&xfrm_policy_hash_generation);
xfrm: configure policy hash table thresholds by netlink Enable to specify local and remote prefix length thresholds for the policy hash table via a netlink XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO message. prefix length thresholds are specified by XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH and XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH optional attributes (struct xfrmu_spdhthresh). example: struct xfrmu_spdhthresh thresh4 = { .lbits = 0; .rbits = 24; }; struct xfrmu_spdhthresh thresh6 = { .lbits = 0; .rbits = 56; }; struct nlmsghdr *hdr; struct nl_msg *msg; msg = nlmsg_alloc(); hdr = nlmsg_put(msg, NL_AUTO_PORT, NL_AUTO_SEQ, XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH, sizeof(__u32), NLM_F_REQUEST); nla_put(msg, XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH, sizeof(thresh4), &thresh4); nla_put(msg, XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH, sizeof(thresh6), &thresh6); nla_send_auto(sk, msg); The numbers are the policy selector minimum prefix lengths to put a policy in the hash table. - lbits is the local threshold (source address for out policies, destination address for in and fwd policies). - rbits is the remote threshold (destination address for out policies, source address for in and fwd policies). The default values are: XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH: 32 32 XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH: 128 128 Dynamic re-building of the SPD is performed when the thresholds values are changed. The current thresholds can be read via a XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO request: the kernel replies to XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO requests by an XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO message, with both attributes XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH and XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH. Signed-off-by: Christophe Gouault <christophe.gouault@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2014-08-29 14:16:05 +00:00
/* make sure that we can insert the indirect policies again before
* we start with destructive action.
*/
list_for_each_entry(policy, &net->xfrm.policy_all, walk.all) {
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin *bin;
u8 dbits, sbits;
dir = xfrm_policy_id2dir(policy->index);
if (policy->walk.dead || dir >= XFRM_POLICY_MAX)
continue;
if ((dir & XFRM_POLICY_MASK) == XFRM_POLICY_OUT) {
if (policy->family == AF_INET) {
dbits = rbits4;
sbits = lbits4;
} else {
dbits = rbits6;
sbits = lbits6;
}
} else {
if (policy->family == AF_INET) {
dbits = lbits4;
sbits = rbits4;
} else {
dbits = lbits6;
sbits = rbits6;
}
}
if (policy->selector.prefixlen_d < dbits ||
policy->selector.prefixlen_s < sbits)
continue;
bin = xfrm_policy_inexact_alloc_bin(policy, dir);
if (!bin)
goto out_unlock;
if (!xfrm_policy_inexact_alloc_chain(bin, policy, dir))
goto out_unlock;
}
xfrm: configure policy hash table thresholds by netlink Enable to specify local and remote prefix length thresholds for the policy hash table via a netlink XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO message. prefix length thresholds are specified by XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH and XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH optional attributes (struct xfrmu_spdhthresh). example: struct xfrmu_spdhthresh thresh4 = { .lbits = 0; .rbits = 24; }; struct xfrmu_spdhthresh thresh6 = { .lbits = 0; .rbits = 56; }; struct nlmsghdr *hdr; struct nl_msg *msg; msg = nlmsg_alloc(); hdr = nlmsg_put(msg, NL_AUTO_PORT, NL_AUTO_SEQ, XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH, sizeof(__u32), NLM_F_REQUEST); nla_put(msg, XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH, sizeof(thresh4), &thresh4); nla_put(msg, XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH, sizeof(thresh6), &thresh6); nla_send_auto(sk, msg); The numbers are the policy selector minimum prefix lengths to put a policy in the hash table. - lbits is the local threshold (source address for out policies, destination address for in and fwd policies). - rbits is the remote threshold (destination address for out policies, source address for in and fwd policies). The default values are: XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH: 32 32 XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH: 128 128 Dynamic re-building of the SPD is performed when the thresholds values are changed. The current thresholds can be read via a XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO request: the kernel replies to XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO requests by an XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO message, with both attributes XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH and XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH. Signed-off-by: Christophe Gouault <christophe.gouault@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2014-08-29 14:16:05 +00:00
/* reset the bydst and inexact table in all directions */
for (dir = 0; dir < XFRM_POLICY_MAX; dir++) {
struct hlist_node *n;
hlist_for_each_entry_safe(policy, n,
&net->xfrm.policy_inexact[dir],
bydst_inexact_list)
hlist_del_init(&policy->bydst_inexact_list);
xfrm: configure policy hash table thresholds by netlink Enable to specify local and remote prefix length thresholds for the policy hash table via a netlink XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO message. prefix length thresholds are specified by XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH and XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH optional attributes (struct xfrmu_spdhthresh). example: struct xfrmu_spdhthresh thresh4 = { .lbits = 0; .rbits = 24; }; struct xfrmu_spdhthresh thresh6 = { .lbits = 0; .rbits = 56; }; struct nlmsghdr *hdr; struct nl_msg *msg; msg = nlmsg_alloc(); hdr = nlmsg_put(msg, NL_AUTO_PORT, NL_AUTO_SEQ, XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH, sizeof(__u32), NLM_F_REQUEST); nla_put(msg, XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH, sizeof(thresh4), &thresh4); nla_put(msg, XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH, sizeof(thresh6), &thresh6); nla_send_auto(sk, msg); The numbers are the policy selector minimum prefix lengths to put a policy in the hash table. - lbits is the local threshold (source address for out policies, destination address for in and fwd policies). - rbits is the remote threshold (destination address for out policies, source address for in and fwd policies). The default values are: XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH: 32 32 XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH: 128 128 Dynamic re-building of the SPD is performed when the thresholds values are changed. The current thresholds can be read via a XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO request: the kernel replies to XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO requests by an XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO message, with both attributes XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH and XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH. Signed-off-by: Christophe Gouault <christophe.gouault@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2014-08-29 14:16:05 +00:00
hmask = net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir].hmask;
odst = net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir].table;
for (i = hmask; i >= 0; i--)
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(odst + i);
if ((dir & XFRM_POLICY_MASK) == XFRM_POLICY_OUT) {
/* dir out => dst = remote, src = local */
net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir].dbits4 = rbits4;
net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir].sbits4 = lbits4;
net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir].dbits6 = rbits6;
net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir].sbits6 = lbits6;
} else {
/* dir in/fwd => dst = local, src = remote */
net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir].dbits4 = lbits4;
net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir].sbits4 = rbits4;
net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir].dbits6 = lbits6;
net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir].sbits6 = rbits6;
}
}
/* re-insert all policies by order of creation */
list_for_each_entry_reverse(policy, &net->xfrm.policy_all, walk.all) {
if (policy->walk.dead)
continue;
dir = xfrm_policy_id2dir(policy->index);
if (dir >= XFRM_POLICY_MAX) {
/* skip socket policies */
continue;
}
xfrm: configure policy hash table thresholds by netlink Enable to specify local and remote prefix length thresholds for the policy hash table via a netlink XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO message. prefix length thresholds are specified by XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH and XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH optional attributes (struct xfrmu_spdhthresh). example: struct xfrmu_spdhthresh thresh4 = { .lbits = 0; .rbits = 24; }; struct xfrmu_spdhthresh thresh6 = { .lbits = 0; .rbits = 56; }; struct nlmsghdr *hdr; struct nl_msg *msg; msg = nlmsg_alloc(); hdr = nlmsg_put(msg, NL_AUTO_PORT, NL_AUTO_SEQ, XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH, sizeof(__u32), NLM_F_REQUEST); nla_put(msg, XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH, sizeof(thresh4), &thresh4); nla_put(msg, XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH, sizeof(thresh6), &thresh6); nla_send_auto(sk, msg); The numbers are the policy selector minimum prefix lengths to put a policy in the hash table. - lbits is the local threshold (source address for out policies, destination address for in and fwd policies). - rbits is the remote threshold (destination address for out policies, source address for in and fwd policies). The default values are: XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH: 32 32 XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH: 128 128 Dynamic re-building of the SPD is performed when the thresholds values are changed. The current thresholds can be read via a XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO request: the kernel replies to XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO requests by an XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO message, with both attributes XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH and XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH. Signed-off-by: Christophe Gouault <christophe.gouault@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2014-08-29 14:16:05 +00:00
newpos = NULL;
chain = policy_hash_bysel(net, &policy->selector,
policy->family, dir);
hlist_del_rcu(&policy->bydst);
if (!chain) {
void *p = xfrm_policy_inexact_insert(policy, dir, 0);
WARN_ONCE(IS_ERR(p), "reinsert: %ld\n", PTR_ERR(p));
continue;
}
xfrm: configure policy hash table thresholds by netlink Enable to specify local and remote prefix length thresholds for the policy hash table via a netlink XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO message. prefix length thresholds are specified by XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH and XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH optional attributes (struct xfrmu_spdhthresh). example: struct xfrmu_spdhthresh thresh4 = { .lbits = 0; .rbits = 24; }; struct xfrmu_spdhthresh thresh6 = { .lbits = 0; .rbits = 56; }; struct nlmsghdr *hdr; struct nl_msg *msg; msg = nlmsg_alloc(); hdr = nlmsg_put(msg, NL_AUTO_PORT, NL_AUTO_SEQ, XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH, sizeof(__u32), NLM_F_REQUEST); nla_put(msg, XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH, sizeof(thresh4), &thresh4); nla_put(msg, XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH, sizeof(thresh6), &thresh6); nla_send_auto(sk, msg); The numbers are the policy selector minimum prefix lengths to put a policy in the hash table. - lbits is the local threshold (source address for out policies, destination address for in and fwd policies). - rbits is the remote threshold (destination address for out policies, source address for in and fwd policies). The default values are: XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH: 32 32 XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH: 128 128 Dynamic re-building of the SPD is performed when the thresholds values are changed. The current thresholds can be read via a XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO request: the kernel replies to XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO requests by an XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO message, with both attributes XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH and XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH. Signed-off-by: Christophe Gouault <christophe.gouault@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2014-08-29 14:16:05 +00:00
hlist_for_each_entry(pol, chain, bydst) {
if (policy->priority >= pol->priority)
newpos = &pol->bydst;
else
break;
}
if (newpos)
hlist_add_behind_rcu(&policy->bydst, newpos);
xfrm: configure policy hash table thresholds by netlink Enable to specify local and remote prefix length thresholds for the policy hash table via a netlink XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO message. prefix length thresholds are specified by XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH and XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH optional attributes (struct xfrmu_spdhthresh). example: struct xfrmu_spdhthresh thresh4 = { .lbits = 0; .rbits = 24; }; struct xfrmu_spdhthresh thresh6 = { .lbits = 0; .rbits = 56; }; struct nlmsghdr *hdr; struct nl_msg *msg; msg = nlmsg_alloc(); hdr = nlmsg_put(msg, NL_AUTO_PORT, NL_AUTO_SEQ, XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH, sizeof(__u32), NLM_F_REQUEST); nla_put(msg, XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH, sizeof(thresh4), &thresh4); nla_put(msg, XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH, sizeof(thresh6), &thresh6); nla_send_auto(sk, msg); The numbers are the policy selector minimum prefix lengths to put a policy in the hash table. - lbits is the local threshold (source address for out policies, destination address for in and fwd policies). - rbits is the remote threshold (destination address for out policies, source address for in and fwd policies). The default values are: XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH: 32 32 XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH: 128 128 Dynamic re-building of the SPD is performed when the thresholds values are changed. The current thresholds can be read via a XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO request: the kernel replies to XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO requests by an XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO message, with both attributes XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH and XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH. Signed-off-by: Christophe Gouault <christophe.gouault@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2014-08-29 14:16:05 +00:00
else
hlist_add_head_rcu(&policy->bydst, chain);
xfrm: configure policy hash table thresholds by netlink Enable to specify local and remote prefix length thresholds for the policy hash table via a netlink XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO message. prefix length thresholds are specified by XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH and XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH optional attributes (struct xfrmu_spdhthresh). example: struct xfrmu_spdhthresh thresh4 = { .lbits = 0; .rbits = 24; }; struct xfrmu_spdhthresh thresh6 = { .lbits = 0; .rbits = 56; }; struct nlmsghdr *hdr; struct nl_msg *msg; msg = nlmsg_alloc(); hdr = nlmsg_put(msg, NL_AUTO_PORT, NL_AUTO_SEQ, XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH, sizeof(__u32), NLM_F_REQUEST); nla_put(msg, XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH, sizeof(thresh4), &thresh4); nla_put(msg, XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH, sizeof(thresh6), &thresh6); nla_send_auto(sk, msg); The numbers are the policy selector minimum prefix lengths to put a policy in the hash table. - lbits is the local threshold (source address for out policies, destination address for in and fwd policies). - rbits is the remote threshold (destination address for out policies, source address for in and fwd policies). The default values are: XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH: 32 32 XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH: 128 128 Dynamic re-building of the SPD is performed when the thresholds values are changed. The current thresholds can be read via a XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO request: the kernel replies to XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO requests by an XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO message, with both attributes XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH and XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH. Signed-off-by: Christophe Gouault <christophe.gouault@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2014-08-29 14:16:05 +00:00
}
out_unlock:
__xfrm_policy_inexact_flush(net);
write_seqcount_end(&xfrm_policy_hash_generation);
spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
xfrm: configure policy hash table thresholds by netlink Enable to specify local and remote prefix length thresholds for the policy hash table via a netlink XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO message. prefix length thresholds are specified by XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH and XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH optional attributes (struct xfrmu_spdhthresh). example: struct xfrmu_spdhthresh thresh4 = { .lbits = 0; .rbits = 24; }; struct xfrmu_spdhthresh thresh6 = { .lbits = 0; .rbits = 56; }; struct nlmsghdr *hdr; struct nl_msg *msg; msg = nlmsg_alloc(); hdr = nlmsg_put(msg, NL_AUTO_PORT, NL_AUTO_SEQ, XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH, sizeof(__u32), NLM_F_REQUEST); nla_put(msg, XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH, sizeof(thresh4), &thresh4); nla_put(msg, XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH, sizeof(thresh6), &thresh6); nla_send_auto(sk, msg); The numbers are the policy selector minimum prefix lengths to put a policy in the hash table. - lbits is the local threshold (source address for out policies, destination address for in and fwd policies). - rbits is the remote threshold (destination address for out policies, source address for in and fwd policies). The default values are: XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH: 32 32 XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH: 128 128 Dynamic re-building of the SPD is performed when the thresholds values are changed. The current thresholds can be read via a XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO request: the kernel replies to XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO requests by an XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO message, with both attributes XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH and XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH. Signed-off-by: Christophe Gouault <christophe.gouault@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2014-08-29 14:16:05 +00:00
mutex_unlock(&hash_resize_mutex);
}
void xfrm_policy_hash_rebuild(struct net *net)
{
schedule_work(&net->xfrm.policy_hthresh.work);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_hash_rebuild);
/* Generate new index... KAME seems to generate them ordered by cost
* of an absolute inpredictability of ordering of rules. This will not pass. */
static u32 xfrm_gen_index(struct net *net, int dir, u32 index)
{
static u32 idx_generator;
for (;;) {
struct hlist_head *list;
struct xfrm_policy *p;
u32 idx;
int found;
if (!index) {
idx = (idx_generator | dir);
idx_generator += 8;
} else {
idx = index;
index = 0;
}
if (idx == 0)
idx = 8;
list = net->xfrm.policy_byidx + idx_hash(net, idx);
found = 0;
hlist: drop the node parameter from iterators I'm not sure why, but the hlist for each entry iterators were conceived list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member) The hlist ones were greedy and wanted an extra parameter: hlist_for_each_entry(tpos, pos, head, member) Why did they need an extra pos parameter? I'm not quite sure. Not only they don't really need it, it also prevents the iterator from looking exactly like the list iterator, which is unfortunate. Besides the semantic patch, there was some manual work required: - Fix up the actual hlist iterators in linux/list.h - Fix up the declaration of other iterators based on the hlist ones. - A very small amount of places were using the 'node' parameter, this was modified to use 'obj->member' instead. - Coccinelle didn't handle the hlist_for_each_entry_safe iterator properly, so those had to be fixed up manually. The semantic patch which is mostly the work of Peter Senna Tschudin is here: @@ iterator name hlist_for_each_entry, hlist_for_each_entry_continue, hlist_for_each_entry_from, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh, for_each_busy_worker, ax25_uid_for_each, ax25_for_each, inet_bind_bucket_for_each, sctp_for_each_hentry, sk_for_each, sk_for_each_rcu, sk_for_each_from, sk_for_each_safe, sk_for_each_bound, hlist_for_each_entry_safe, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu, nr_neigh_for_each, nr_neigh_for_each_safe, nr_node_for_each, nr_node_for_each_safe, for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp, for_each_gfn_sp, for_each_host; type T; expression a,c,d,e; identifier b; statement S; @@ -T b; <+... when != b ( hlist_for_each_entry(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_from(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh(a, - b, c) S | for_each_busy_worker(a, c, - b, d) S | ax25_uid_for_each(a, - b, c) S | ax25_for_each(a, - b, c) S | inet_bind_bucket_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sctp_for_each_hentry(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_rcu(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_from -(a, b) +(a) S + sk_for_each_from(a) S | sk_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | sk_for_each_bound(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_safe(a, - b, c, d, e) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | nr_node_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_node_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d) S | for_each_host(a, - b, c) S | for_each_host_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | for_each_mesh_entry(a, - b, c, d) S ) ...+> [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus change from net/ipv4/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus hunk from net/ipv6/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings] [akpm@linux-foudnation.org: redo intrusive kvm changes] Tested-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-02-28 01:06:00 +00:00
hlist_for_each_entry(p, list, byidx) {
if (p->index == idx) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found)
return idx;
}
}
static inline int selector_cmp(struct xfrm_selector *s1, struct xfrm_selector *s2)
{
u32 *p1 = (u32 *) s1;
u32 *p2 = (u32 *) s2;
int len = sizeof(struct xfrm_selector) / sizeof(u32);
int i;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if (p1[i] != p2[i])
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static void xfrm_policy_requeue(struct xfrm_policy *old,
struct xfrm_policy *new)
{
struct xfrm_policy_queue *pq = &old->polq;
struct sk_buff_head list;
if (skb_queue_empty(&pq->hold_queue))
return;
__skb_queue_head_init(&list);
spin_lock_bh(&pq->hold_queue.lock);
skb_queue_splice_init(&pq->hold_queue, &list);
if (del_timer(&pq->hold_timer))
xfrm_pol_put(old);
spin_unlock_bh(&pq->hold_queue.lock);
pq = &new->polq;
spin_lock_bh(&pq->hold_queue.lock);
skb_queue_splice(&list, &pq->hold_queue);
pq->timeout = XFRM_QUEUE_TMO_MIN;
if (!mod_timer(&pq->hold_timer, jiffies))
xfrm_pol_hold(new);
spin_unlock_bh(&pq->hold_queue.lock);
}
static bool xfrm_policy_mark_match(struct xfrm_policy *policy,
struct xfrm_policy *pol)
{
u32 mark = policy->mark.v & policy->mark.m;
if (policy->mark.v == pol->mark.v && policy->mark.m == pol->mark.m)
return true;
if ((mark & pol->mark.m) == pol->mark.v &&
policy->priority == pol->priority)
return true;
return false;
}
static u32 xfrm_pol_bin_key(const void *data, u32 len, u32 seed)
{
const struct xfrm_pol_inexact_key *k = data;
u32 a = k->type << 24 | k->dir << 16 | k->family;
return jhash_3words(a, k->if_id, net_hash_mix(read_pnet(&k->net)),
seed);
}
static u32 xfrm_pol_bin_obj(const void *data, u32 len, u32 seed)
{
const struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin *b = data;
return xfrm_pol_bin_key(&b->k, 0, seed);
}
static int xfrm_pol_bin_cmp(struct rhashtable_compare_arg *arg,
const void *ptr)
{
const struct xfrm_pol_inexact_key *key = arg->key;
const struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin *b = ptr;
int ret;
if (!net_eq(read_pnet(&b->k.net), read_pnet(&key->net)))
return -1;
ret = b->k.dir ^ key->dir;
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = b->k.type ^ key->type;
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = b->k.family ^ key->family;
if (ret)
return ret;
return b->k.if_id ^ key->if_id;
}
static const struct rhashtable_params xfrm_pol_inexact_params = {
.head_offset = offsetof(struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin, head),
.hashfn = xfrm_pol_bin_key,
.obj_hashfn = xfrm_pol_bin_obj,
.obj_cmpfn = xfrm_pol_bin_cmp,
.automatic_shrinking = true,
};
static void xfrm_policy_insert_inexact_list(struct hlist_head *chain,
struct xfrm_policy *policy)
{
struct xfrm_policy *pol, *delpol = NULL;
struct hlist_node *newpos = NULL;
int i = 0;
hlist_for_each_entry(pol, chain, bydst_inexact_list) {
if (pol->type == policy->type &&
pol->if_id == policy->if_id &&
!selector_cmp(&pol->selector, &policy->selector) &&
xfrm_policy_mark_match(policy, pol) &&
xfrm_sec_ctx_match(pol->security, policy->security) &&
!WARN_ON(delpol)) {
delpol = pol;
if (policy->priority > pol->priority)
continue;
} else if (policy->priority >= pol->priority) {
newpos = &pol->bydst_inexact_list;
continue;
}
if (delpol)
break;
}
if (newpos)
hlist_add_behind_rcu(&policy->bydst_inexact_list, newpos);
else
hlist_add_head_rcu(&policy->bydst_inexact_list, chain);
hlist_for_each_entry(pol, chain, bydst_inexact_list) {
pol->pos = i;
i++;
}
}
static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_insert_list(struct hlist_head *chain,
struct xfrm_policy *policy,
bool excl)
{
struct xfrm_policy *pol, *newpos = NULL, *delpol = NULL;
hlist: drop the node parameter from iterators I'm not sure why, but the hlist for each entry iterators were conceived list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member) The hlist ones were greedy and wanted an extra parameter: hlist_for_each_entry(tpos, pos, head, member) Why did they need an extra pos parameter? I'm not quite sure. Not only they don't really need it, it also prevents the iterator from looking exactly like the list iterator, which is unfortunate. Besides the semantic patch, there was some manual work required: - Fix up the actual hlist iterators in linux/list.h - Fix up the declaration of other iterators based on the hlist ones. - A very small amount of places were using the 'node' parameter, this was modified to use 'obj->member' instead. - Coccinelle didn't handle the hlist_for_each_entry_safe iterator properly, so those had to be fixed up manually. The semantic patch which is mostly the work of Peter Senna Tschudin is here: @@ iterator name hlist_for_each_entry, hlist_for_each_entry_continue, hlist_for_each_entry_from, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh, for_each_busy_worker, ax25_uid_for_each, ax25_for_each, inet_bind_bucket_for_each, sctp_for_each_hentry, sk_for_each, sk_for_each_rcu, sk_for_each_from, sk_for_each_safe, sk_for_each_bound, hlist_for_each_entry_safe, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu, nr_neigh_for_each, nr_neigh_for_each_safe, nr_node_for_each, nr_node_for_each_safe, for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp, for_each_gfn_sp, for_each_host; type T; expression a,c,d,e; identifier b; statement S; @@ -T b; <+... when != b ( hlist_for_each_entry(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_from(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh(a, - b, c) S | for_each_busy_worker(a, c, - b, d) S | ax25_uid_for_each(a, - b, c) S | ax25_for_each(a, - b, c) S | inet_bind_bucket_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sctp_for_each_hentry(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_rcu(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_from -(a, b) +(a) S + sk_for_each_from(a) S | sk_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | sk_for_each_bound(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_safe(a, - b, c, d, e) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | nr_node_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_node_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d) S | for_each_host(a, - b, c) S | for_each_host_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | for_each_mesh_entry(a, - b, c, d) S ) ...+> [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus change from net/ipv4/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus hunk from net/ipv6/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings] [akpm@linux-foudnation.org: redo intrusive kvm changes] Tested-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-02-28 01:06:00 +00:00
hlist_for_each_entry(pol, chain, bydst) {
if (pol->type == policy->type &&
pol->if_id == policy->if_id &&
!selector_cmp(&pol->selector, &policy->selector) &&
xfrm_policy_mark_match(policy, pol) &&
xfrm_sec_ctx_match(pol->security, policy->security) &&
!WARN_ON(delpol)) {
if (excl)
return ERR_PTR(-EEXIST);
delpol = pol;
if (policy->priority > pol->priority)
continue;
} else if (policy->priority >= pol->priority) {
newpos = pol;
continue;
}
if (delpol)
break;
}
if (newpos)
hlist_add_behind_rcu(&policy->bydst, &newpos->bydst);
else
hlist_add_head_rcu(&policy->bydst, chain);
return delpol;
}
int xfrm_policy_insert(int dir, struct xfrm_policy *policy, int excl)
{
struct net *net = xp_net(policy);
struct xfrm_policy *delpol;
struct hlist_head *chain;
spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
chain = policy_hash_bysel(net, &policy->selector, policy->family, dir);
if (chain)
delpol = xfrm_policy_insert_list(chain, policy, excl);
else
delpol = xfrm_policy_inexact_insert(policy, dir, excl);
if (IS_ERR(delpol)) {
spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
return PTR_ERR(delpol);
}
__xfrm_policy_link(policy, dir);
/* After previous checking, family can either be AF_INET or AF_INET6 */
if (policy->family == AF_INET)
rt_genid_bump_ipv4(net);
else
rt_genid_bump_ipv6(net);
if (delpol) {
xfrm_policy_requeue(delpol, policy);
__xfrm_policy_unlink(delpol, dir);
}
policy->index = delpol ? delpol->index : xfrm_gen_index(net, dir, policy->index);
hlist_add_head(&policy->byidx, net->xfrm.policy_byidx+idx_hash(net, policy->index));
policy->curlft.add_time = ktime_get_real_seconds();
policy->curlft.use_time = 0;
if (!mod_timer(&policy->timer, jiffies + HZ))
xfrm_pol_hold(policy);
spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
if (delpol)
xfrm_policy_kill(delpol);
else if (xfrm_bydst_should_resize(net, dir, NULL))
schedule_work(&net->xfrm.policy_hash_work);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_insert);
static struct xfrm_policy *
__xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(struct hlist_head *chain, u32 mark, u32 if_id,
u8 type, int dir,
struct xfrm_selector *sel,
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
{
struct xfrm_policy *pol;
if (!chain)
return NULL;
hlist_for_each_entry(pol, chain, bydst) {
if (pol->type == type &&
pol->if_id == if_id &&
(mark & pol->mark.m) == pol->mark.v &&
!selector_cmp(sel, &pol->selector) &&
xfrm_sec_ctx_match(ctx, pol->security))
return pol;
}
return NULL;
}
struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(struct net *net, u32 mark, u32 if_id,
u8 type, int dir,
struct xfrm_selector *sel,
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, int delete,
int *err)
{
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin *bin = NULL;
struct xfrm_policy *pol, *ret = NULL;
struct hlist_head *chain;
*err = 0;
spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
chain = policy_hash_bysel(net, sel, sel->family, dir);
if (!chain) {
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_candidates cand;
int i;
bin = xfrm_policy_inexact_lookup(net, type,
sel->family, dir, if_id);
if (!bin) {
spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
return NULL;
}
if (!xfrm_policy_find_inexact_candidates(&cand, bin,
&sel->saddr,
&sel->daddr)) {
spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
return NULL;
}
pol = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cand.res); i++) {
struct xfrm_policy *tmp;
tmp = __xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(cand.res[i], mark,
if_id, type, dir,
sel, ctx);
if (!tmp)
continue;
if (!pol || tmp->pos < pol->pos)
pol = tmp;
}
} else {
pol = __xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx(chain, mark, if_id, type, dir,
sel, ctx);
}
if (pol) {
xfrm_pol_hold(pol);
if (delete) {
*err = security_xfrm_policy_delete(pol->security);
if (*err) {
spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
return pol;
}
__xfrm_policy_unlink(pol, dir);
}
ret = pol;
}
spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
if (ret && delete)
xfrm_policy_kill(ret);
if (bin && delete)
xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin(bin);
return ret;
}
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_bysel_ctx);
struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_byid(struct net *net, u32 mark, u32 if_id,
u8 type, int dir, u32 id, int delete,
int *err)
{
struct xfrm_policy *pol, *ret;
struct hlist_head *chain;
*err = -ENOENT;
if (xfrm_policy_id2dir(id) != dir)
return NULL;
*err = 0;
spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
chain = net->xfrm.policy_byidx + idx_hash(net, id);
ret = NULL;
hlist: drop the node parameter from iterators I'm not sure why, but the hlist for each entry iterators were conceived list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member) The hlist ones were greedy and wanted an extra parameter: hlist_for_each_entry(tpos, pos, head, member) Why did they need an extra pos parameter? I'm not quite sure. Not only they don't really need it, it also prevents the iterator from looking exactly like the list iterator, which is unfortunate. Besides the semantic patch, there was some manual work required: - Fix up the actual hlist iterators in linux/list.h - Fix up the declaration of other iterators based on the hlist ones. - A very small amount of places were using the 'node' parameter, this was modified to use 'obj->member' instead. - Coccinelle didn't handle the hlist_for_each_entry_safe iterator properly, so those had to be fixed up manually. The semantic patch which is mostly the work of Peter Senna Tschudin is here: @@ iterator name hlist_for_each_entry, hlist_for_each_entry_continue, hlist_for_each_entry_from, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh, for_each_busy_worker, ax25_uid_for_each, ax25_for_each, inet_bind_bucket_for_each, sctp_for_each_hentry, sk_for_each, sk_for_each_rcu, sk_for_each_from, sk_for_each_safe, sk_for_each_bound, hlist_for_each_entry_safe, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu, nr_neigh_for_each, nr_neigh_for_each_safe, nr_node_for_each, nr_node_for_each_safe, for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp, for_each_gfn_sp, for_each_host; type T; expression a,c,d,e; identifier b; statement S; @@ -T b; <+... when != b ( hlist_for_each_entry(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_from(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh(a, - b, c) S | for_each_busy_worker(a, c, - b, d) S | ax25_uid_for_each(a, - b, c) S | ax25_for_each(a, - b, c) S | inet_bind_bucket_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sctp_for_each_hentry(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_rcu(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_from -(a, b) +(a) S + sk_for_each_from(a) S | sk_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | sk_for_each_bound(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_safe(a, - b, c, d, e) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | nr_node_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_node_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d) S | for_each_host(a, - b, c) S | for_each_host_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | for_each_mesh_entry(a, - b, c, d) S ) ...+> [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus change from net/ipv4/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus hunk from net/ipv6/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings] [akpm@linux-foudnation.org: redo intrusive kvm changes] Tested-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-02-28 01:06:00 +00:00
hlist_for_each_entry(pol, chain, byidx) {
if (pol->type == type && pol->index == id &&
pol->if_id == if_id &&
(mark & pol->mark.m) == pol->mark.v) {
xfrm_pol_hold(pol);
if (delete) {
*err = security_xfrm_policy_delete(
pol->security);
if (*err) {
spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
return pol;
}
__xfrm_policy_unlink(pol, dir);
}
ret = pol;
break;
}
}
spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
if (ret && delete)
xfrm_policy_kill(ret);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_byid);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
static inline int
xfrm_policy_flush_secctx_check(struct net *net, u8 type, bool task_valid)
{
struct xfrm_policy *pol;
int err = 0;
list_for_each_entry(pol, &net->xfrm.policy_all, walk.all) {
if (pol->walk.dead ||
xfrm_policy_id2dir(pol->index) >= XFRM_POLICY_MAX ||
pol->type != type)
continue;
err = security_xfrm_policy_delete(pol->security);
if (err) {
xfrm_audit_policy_delete(pol, 0, task_valid);
return err;
}
}
return err;
}
#else
static inline int
xfrm_policy_flush_secctx_check(struct net *net, u8 type, bool task_valid)
{
return 0;
}
#endif
int xfrm_policy_flush(struct net *net, u8 type, bool task_valid)
{
int dir, err = 0, cnt = 0;
struct xfrm_policy *pol;
spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
err = xfrm_policy_flush_secctx_check(net, type, task_valid);
if (err)
goto out;
again:
list_for_each_entry(pol, &net->xfrm.policy_all, walk.all) {
dir = xfrm_policy_id2dir(pol->index);
if (pol->walk.dead ||
dir >= XFRM_POLICY_MAX ||
pol->type != type)
continue;
__xfrm_policy_unlink(pol, dir);
spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
cnt++;
xfrm_audit_policy_delete(pol, 1, task_valid);
xfrm_policy_kill(pol);
spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
goto again;
}
if (cnt)
__xfrm_policy_inexact_flush(net);
else
err = -ESRCH;
out:
spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_flush);
int xfrm_policy_walk(struct net *net, struct xfrm_policy_walk *walk,
int (*func)(struct xfrm_policy *, int, int, void*),
void *data)
{
struct xfrm_policy *pol;
struct xfrm_policy_walk_entry *x;
int error = 0;
if (walk->type >= XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAX &&
walk->type != XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_ANY)
return -EINVAL;
if (list_empty(&walk->walk.all) && walk->seq != 0)
return 0;
spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
if (list_empty(&walk->walk.all))
x = list_first_entry(&net->xfrm.policy_all, struct xfrm_policy_walk_entry, all);
else
x = list_first_entry(&walk->walk.all,
struct xfrm_policy_walk_entry, all);
list_for_each_entry_from(x, &net->xfrm.policy_all, all) {
if (x->dead)
continue;
pol = container_of(x, struct xfrm_policy, walk);
if (walk->type != XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_ANY &&
walk->type != pol->type)
continue;
error = func(pol, xfrm_policy_id2dir(pol->index),
walk->seq, data);
if (error) {
list_move_tail(&walk->walk.all, &x->all);
goto out;
}
walk->seq++;
}
if (walk->seq == 0) {
error = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
list_del_init(&walk->walk.all);
out:
spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
return error;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_walk);
void xfrm_policy_walk_init(struct xfrm_policy_walk *walk, u8 type)
{
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&walk->walk.all);
walk->walk.dead = 1;
walk->type = type;
walk->seq = 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_walk_init);
void xfrm_policy_walk_done(struct xfrm_policy_walk *walk, struct net *net)
{
if (list_empty(&walk->walk.all))
return;
spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock); /*FIXME where is net? */
list_del(&walk->walk.all);
spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_walk_done);
IPsec: propagate security module errors up from flow_cache_lookup When a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return an access denied permission (or other error). We were not handling that correctly, and in fact inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not associated with an xfrm policy. The way I was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec. The first SYNACK would be blocked, because of an uncached lookup via flow_cache_lookup(), which would fail to resolve an xfrm policy because the SELinux policy is checked at that point via the resolver. However, retransmitted SYNACKs would then find a cached flow entry when calling into flow_cache_lookup() with a null xfrm policy, which is interpreted by xfrm_lookup() as the packet not having any associated policy and similarly to the first case, allowing it to pass without transformation. The solution presented here is to first ensure that errno values are correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly. Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which indicates that the packet can pass freely). This also forces any future lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux) for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the flow cache entry). Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-10-05 20:42:27 +00:00
/*
* Find policy to apply to this flow.
*
* Returns 0 if policy found, else an -errno.
*/
static int xfrm_policy_match(const struct xfrm_policy *pol,
const struct flowi *fl,
u8 type, u16 family, int dir, u32 if_id)
{
const struct xfrm_selector *sel = &pol->selector;
int ret = -ESRCH;
bool match;
if (pol->family != family ||
pol->if_id != if_id ||
(fl->flowi_mark & pol->mark.m) != pol->mark.v ||
pol->type != type)
IPsec: propagate security module errors up from flow_cache_lookup When a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return an access denied permission (or other error). We were not handling that correctly, and in fact inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not associated with an xfrm policy. The way I was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec. The first SYNACK would be blocked, because of an uncached lookup via flow_cache_lookup(), which would fail to resolve an xfrm policy because the SELinux policy is checked at that point via the resolver. However, retransmitted SYNACKs would then find a cached flow entry when calling into flow_cache_lookup() with a null xfrm policy, which is interpreted by xfrm_lookup() as the packet not having any associated policy and similarly to the first case, allowing it to pass without transformation. The solution presented here is to first ensure that errno values are correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly. Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which indicates that the packet can pass freely). This also forces any future lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux) for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the flow cache entry). Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-10-05 20:42:27 +00:00
return ret;
match = xfrm_selector_match(sel, fl, family);
IPsec: propagate security module errors up from flow_cache_lookup When a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return an access denied permission (or other error). We were not handling that correctly, and in fact inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not associated with an xfrm policy. The way I was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec. The first SYNACK would be blocked, because of an uncached lookup via flow_cache_lookup(), which would fail to resolve an xfrm policy because the SELinux policy is checked at that point via the resolver. However, retransmitted SYNACKs would then find a cached flow entry when calling into flow_cache_lookup() with a null xfrm policy, which is interpreted by xfrm_lookup() as the packet not having any associated policy and similarly to the first case, allowing it to pass without transformation. The solution presented here is to first ensure that errno values are correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly. Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which indicates that the packet can pass freely). This also forces any future lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux) for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the flow cache entry). Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-10-05 20:42:27 +00:00
if (match)
ret = security_xfrm_policy_lookup(pol->security, fl->flowi_secid,
dir);
IPsec: propagate security module errors up from flow_cache_lookup When a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return an access denied permission (or other error). We were not handling that correctly, and in fact inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not associated with an xfrm policy. The way I was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec. The first SYNACK would be blocked, because of an uncached lookup via flow_cache_lookup(), which would fail to resolve an xfrm policy because the SELinux policy is checked at that point via the resolver. However, retransmitted SYNACKs would then find a cached flow entry when calling into flow_cache_lookup() with a null xfrm policy, which is interpreted by xfrm_lookup() as the packet not having any associated policy and similarly to the first case, allowing it to pass without transformation. The solution presented here is to first ensure that errno values are correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly. Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which indicates that the packet can pass freely). This also forces any future lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux) for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the flow cache entry). Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-10-05 20:42:27 +00:00
return ret;
}
static struct xfrm_pol_inexact_node *
xfrm_policy_lookup_inexact_addr(const struct rb_root *r,
seqcount_t *count,
const xfrm_address_t *addr, u16 family)
{
const struct rb_node *parent;
int seq;
again:
seq = read_seqcount_begin(count);
parent = rcu_dereference_raw(r->rb_node);
while (parent) {
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_node *node;
int delta;
node = rb_entry(parent, struct xfrm_pol_inexact_node, node);
delta = xfrm_policy_addr_delta(addr, &node->addr,
node->prefixlen, family);
if (delta < 0) {
parent = rcu_dereference_raw(parent->rb_left);
continue;
} else if (delta > 0) {
parent = rcu_dereference_raw(parent->rb_right);
continue;
}
return node;
}
if (read_seqcount_retry(count, seq))
goto again;
return NULL;
}
static bool
xfrm_policy_find_inexact_candidates(struct xfrm_pol_inexact_candidates *cand,
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin *b,
const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
const xfrm_address_t *daddr)
{
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_node *n;
u16 family;
if (!b)
return false;
family = b->k.family;
memset(cand, 0, sizeof(*cand));
cand->res[XFRM_POL_CAND_ANY] = &b->hhead;
n = xfrm_policy_lookup_inexact_addr(&b->root_d, &b->count, daddr,
family);
xfrm: policy: add 2nd-level saddr trees for inexact policies This adds the fourth and final search class, containing policies where both saddr and daddr have prefix lengths (i.e., not wildcards). Inexact policies now end up in one of the following four search classes: 1. "Any:Any" list, containing policies where both saddr and daddr are wildcards or have very coarse prefixes, e.g. 10.0.0.0/8 and the like. 2. "saddr:any" list, containing policies with a fixed saddr/prefixlen, but without destination restrictions. These lists are stored in rbtree nodes; each node contains those policies matching saddr/prefixlen. 3. "Any:daddr" list. Similar to 2), except for policies where only the destinations are specified. 4. "saddr:daddr" lists, containing only those policies that match the given source/destination network. The root of the saddr/daddr nodes gets stored in the nodes of the 'daddr' tree. This diagram illustrates the list classes, and their placement in the lookup hierarchy: xfrm_pol_inexact_bin = hash(dir,type,family,if_id); | +---- root_d: sorted by daddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | +- root: sorted by saddr/prefix | | | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | | | + root: unused | | | | | + hhead: saddr:daddr policies | | | +- coarse policies and all any:daddr policies | +---- root_s: sorted by saddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | + root: unused | | | + hhead: saddr:any policies | +---- coarse policies and all any:any policies lookup for an inexact policy returns pointers to the four relevant list classes, after which each of the lists needs to be searched for the policy with the higher priority. This will only speed up lookups in case we have many policies and a sizeable portion of these have disjunct saddr/daddr addresses. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2018-11-07 22:00:41 +00:00
if (n) {
cand->res[XFRM_POL_CAND_DADDR] = &n->hhead;
xfrm: policy: add 2nd-level saddr trees for inexact policies This adds the fourth and final search class, containing policies where both saddr and daddr have prefix lengths (i.e., not wildcards). Inexact policies now end up in one of the following four search classes: 1. "Any:Any" list, containing policies where both saddr and daddr are wildcards or have very coarse prefixes, e.g. 10.0.0.0/8 and the like. 2. "saddr:any" list, containing policies with a fixed saddr/prefixlen, but without destination restrictions. These lists are stored in rbtree nodes; each node contains those policies matching saddr/prefixlen. 3. "Any:daddr" list. Similar to 2), except for policies where only the destinations are specified. 4. "saddr:daddr" lists, containing only those policies that match the given source/destination network. The root of the saddr/daddr nodes gets stored in the nodes of the 'daddr' tree. This diagram illustrates the list classes, and their placement in the lookup hierarchy: xfrm_pol_inexact_bin = hash(dir,type,family,if_id); | +---- root_d: sorted by daddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | +- root: sorted by saddr/prefix | | | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | | | + root: unused | | | | | + hhead: saddr:daddr policies | | | +- coarse policies and all any:daddr policies | +---- root_s: sorted by saddr:prefix | | | xfrm_pol_inexact_node | | | + root: unused | | | + hhead: saddr:any policies | +---- coarse policies and all any:any policies lookup for an inexact policy returns pointers to the four relevant list classes, after which each of the lists needs to be searched for the policy with the higher priority. This will only speed up lookups in case we have many policies and a sizeable portion of these have disjunct saddr/daddr addresses. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2018-11-07 22:00:41 +00:00
n = xfrm_policy_lookup_inexact_addr(&n->root, &b->count, saddr,
family);
if (n)
cand->res[XFRM_POL_CAND_BOTH] = &n->hhead;
}
n = xfrm_policy_lookup_inexact_addr(&b->root_s, &b->count, saddr,
family);
if (n)
cand->res[XFRM_POL_CAND_SADDR] = &n->hhead;
return true;
}
static struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin *
xfrm_policy_inexact_lookup_rcu(struct net *net, u8 type, u16 family,
u8 dir, u32 if_id)
{
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_key k = {
.family = family,
.type = type,
.dir = dir,
.if_id = if_id,
};
write_pnet(&k.net, net);
return rhashtable_lookup(&xfrm_policy_inexact_table, &k,
xfrm_pol_inexact_params);
}
static struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin *
xfrm_policy_inexact_lookup(struct net *net, u8 type, u16 family,
u8 dir, u32 if_id)
{
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin *bin;
lockdep_assert_held(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
rcu_read_lock();
bin = xfrm_policy_inexact_lookup_rcu(net, type, family, dir, if_id);
rcu_read_unlock();
return bin;
}
static struct xfrm_policy *
__xfrm_policy_eval_candidates(struct hlist_head *chain,
struct xfrm_policy *prefer,
const struct flowi *fl,
u8 type, u16 family, int dir, u32 if_id)
{
u32 priority = prefer ? prefer->priority : ~0u;
struct xfrm_policy *pol;
if (!chain)
return NULL;
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(pol, chain, bydst) {
int err;
if (pol->priority > priority)
break;
err = xfrm_policy_match(pol, fl, type, family, dir, if_id);
if (err) {
if (err != -ESRCH)
return ERR_PTR(err);
continue;
}
if (prefer) {
/* matches. Is it older than *prefer? */
if (pol->priority == priority &&
prefer->pos < pol->pos)
return prefer;
}
return pol;
}
return NULL;
}
static struct xfrm_policy *
xfrm_policy_eval_candidates(struct xfrm_pol_inexact_candidates *cand,
struct xfrm_policy *prefer,
const struct flowi *fl,
u8 type, u16 family, int dir, u32 if_id)
{
struct xfrm_policy *tmp;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cand->res); i++) {
tmp = __xfrm_policy_eval_candidates(cand->res[i],
prefer,
fl, type, family, dir,
if_id);
if (!tmp)
continue;
if (IS_ERR(tmp))
return tmp;
prefer = tmp;
}
return prefer;
}
static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype(struct net *net, u8 type,
const struct flowi *fl,
u16 family, u8 dir,
u32 if_id)
{
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_candidates cand;
const xfrm_address_t *daddr, *saddr;
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin *bin;
struct xfrm_policy *pol, *ret;
struct hlist_head *chain;
unsigned int sequence;
int err;
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
daddr = xfrm_flowi_daddr(fl, family);
saddr = xfrm_flowi_saddr(fl, family);
if (unlikely(!daddr || !saddr))
return NULL;
rcu_read_lock();
retry:
do {
sequence = read_seqcount_begin(&xfrm_policy_hash_generation);
chain = policy_hash_direct(net, daddr, saddr, family, dir);
} while (read_seqcount_retry(&xfrm_policy_hash_generation, sequence));
ret = NULL;
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(pol, chain, bydst) {
err = xfrm_policy_match(pol, fl, type, family, dir, if_id);
IPsec: propagate security module errors up from flow_cache_lookup When a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return an access denied permission (or other error). We were not handling that correctly, and in fact inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not associated with an xfrm policy. The way I was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec. The first SYNACK would be blocked, because of an uncached lookup via flow_cache_lookup(), which would fail to resolve an xfrm policy because the SELinux policy is checked at that point via the resolver. However, retransmitted SYNACKs would then find a cached flow entry when calling into flow_cache_lookup() with a null xfrm policy, which is interpreted by xfrm_lookup() as the packet not having any associated policy and similarly to the first case, allowing it to pass without transformation. The solution presented here is to first ensure that errno values are correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly. Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which indicates that the packet can pass freely). This also forces any future lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux) for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the flow cache entry). Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-10-05 20:42:27 +00:00
if (err) {
if (err == -ESRCH)
continue;
else {
ret = ERR_PTR(err);
goto fail;
}
} else {
ret = pol;
break;
}
}
bin = xfrm_policy_inexact_lookup_rcu(net, type, family, dir, if_id);
if (!bin || !xfrm_policy_find_inexact_candidates(&cand, bin, saddr,
daddr))
goto skip_inexact;
pol = xfrm_policy_eval_candidates(&cand, ret, fl, type,
family, dir, if_id);
if (pol) {
ret = pol;
if (IS_ERR(pol))
goto fail;
}
skip_inexact:
if (read_seqcount_retry(&xfrm_policy_hash_generation, sequence))
goto retry;
if (ret && !xfrm_pol_hold_rcu(ret))
goto retry;
IPsec: propagate security module errors up from flow_cache_lookup When a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return an access denied permission (or other error). We were not handling that correctly, and in fact inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not associated with an xfrm policy. The way I was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec. The first SYNACK would be blocked, because of an uncached lookup via flow_cache_lookup(), which would fail to resolve an xfrm policy because the SELinux policy is checked at that point via the resolver. However, retransmitted SYNACKs would then find a cached flow entry when calling into flow_cache_lookup() with a null xfrm policy, which is interpreted by xfrm_lookup() as the packet not having any associated policy and similarly to the first case, allowing it to pass without transformation. The solution presented here is to first ensure that errno values are correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly. Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which indicates that the packet can pass freely). This also forces any future lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux) for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the flow cache entry). Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-10-05 20:42:27 +00:00
fail:
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_lookup(struct net *net,
const struct flowi *fl,
u16 family, u8 dir, u32 if_id)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_SUB_POLICY
struct xfrm_policy *pol;
pol = xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype(net, XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_SUB, fl, family,
dir, if_id);
if (pol != NULL)
return pol;
#endif
return xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype(net, XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN, fl, family,
dir, if_id);
}
static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(const struct sock *sk, int dir,
const struct flowi *fl,
u16 family, u32 if_id)
{
struct xfrm_policy *pol;
rcu_read_lock();
again:
pol = rcu_dereference(sk->sk_policy[dir]);
if (pol != NULL) {
bool match;
int err = 0;
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
if (pol->family != family) {
pol = NULL;
goto out;
}
match = xfrm_selector_match(&pol->selector, fl, family);
if (match) {
if ((sk->sk_mark & pol->mark.m) != pol->mark.v ||
pol->if_id != if_id) {
pol = NULL;
goto out;
}
err = security_xfrm_policy_lookup(pol->security,
fl->flowi_secid,
dir);
if (!err) {
if (!xfrm_pol_hold_rcu(pol))
goto again;
} else if (err == -ESRCH) {
pol = NULL;
} else {
pol = ERR_PTR(err);
}
} else
pol = NULL;
}
out:
rcu_read_unlock();
return pol;
}
static void __xfrm_policy_link(struct xfrm_policy *pol, int dir)
{
struct net *net = xp_net(pol);
list_add(&pol->walk.all, &net->xfrm.policy_all);
net->xfrm.policy_count[dir]++;
xfrm_pol_hold(pol);
}
static struct xfrm_policy *__xfrm_policy_unlink(struct xfrm_policy *pol,
int dir)
{
struct net *net = xp_net(pol);
if (list_empty(&pol->walk.all))
return NULL;
/* Socket policies are not hashed. */
if (!hlist_unhashed(&pol->bydst)) {
hlist_del_rcu(&pol->bydst);
hlist_del_init(&pol->bydst_inexact_list);
hlist_del(&pol->byidx);
}
list_del_init(&pol->walk.all);
net->xfrm.policy_count[dir]--;
return pol;
}
static void xfrm_sk_policy_link(struct xfrm_policy *pol, int dir)
{
__xfrm_policy_link(pol, XFRM_POLICY_MAX + dir);
}
static void xfrm_sk_policy_unlink(struct xfrm_policy *pol, int dir)
{
__xfrm_policy_unlink(pol, XFRM_POLICY_MAX + dir);
}
int xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *pol, int dir)
{
struct net *net = xp_net(pol);
spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
pol = __xfrm_policy_unlink(pol, dir);
spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
if (pol) {
xfrm_policy_kill(pol);
return 0;
}
return -ENOENT;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_delete);
int xfrm_sk_policy_insert(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct xfrm_policy *pol)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct xfrm_policy *old_pol;
#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_SUB_POLICY
if (pol && pol->type != XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN)
return -EINVAL;
#endif
spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
old_pol = rcu_dereference_protected(sk->sk_policy[dir],
lockdep_is_held(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock));
if (pol) {
pol->curlft.add_time = ktime_get_real_seconds();
pol->index = xfrm_gen_index(net, XFRM_POLICY_MAX+dir, 0);
xfrm_sk_policy_link(pol, dir);
}
rcu_assign_pointer(sk->sk_policy[dir], pol);
if (old_pol) {
if (pol)
xfrm_policy_requeue(old_pol, pol);
/* Unlinking succeeds always. This is the only function
* allowed to delete or replace socket policy.
*/
xfrm_sk_policy_unlink(old_pol, dir);
}
spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
if (old_pol) {
xfrm_policy_kill(old_pol);
}
return 0;
}
static struct xfrm_policy *clone_policy(const struct xfrm_policy *old, int dir)
{
struct xfrm_policy *newp = xfrm_policy_alloc(xp_net(old), GFP_ATOMIC);
struct net *net = xp_net(old);
if (newp) {
newp->selector = old->selector;
if (security_xfrm_policy_clone(old->security,
&newp->security)) {
[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction. This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2005-12-14 07:12:27 +00:00
kfree(newp);
return NULL; /* ENOMEM */
}
newp->lft = old->lft;
newp->curlft = old->curlft;
newp->mark = old->mark;
newp->if_id = old->if_id;
newp->action = old->action;
newp->flags = old->flags;
newp->xfrm_nr = old->xfrm_nr;
newp->index = old->index;
newp->type = old->type;
newp->family = old->family;
memcpy(newp->xfrm_vec, old->xfrm_vec,
newp->xfrm_nr*sizeof(struct xfrm_tmpl));
spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
xfrm_sk_policy_link(newp, dir);
spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
xfrm_pol_put(newp);
}
return newp;
}
int __xfrm_sk_clone_policy(struct sock *sk, const struct sock *osk)
{
const struct xfrm_policy *p;
struct xfrm_policy *np;
int i, ret = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
p = rcu_dereference(osk->sk_policy[i]);
if (p) {
np = clone_policy(p, i);
if (unlikely(!np)) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
break;
}
rcu_assign_pointer(sk->sk_policy[i], np);
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
static int
xfrm_get_saddr(struct net *net, int oif, xfrm_address_t *local,
net: xfrm: support setting an output mark. On systems that use mark-based routing it may be necessary for routing lookups to use marks in order for packets to be routed correctly. An example of such a system is Android, which uses socket marks to route packets via different networks. Currently, routing lookups in tunnel mode always use a mark of zero, making routing incorrect on such systems. This patch adds a new output_mark element to the xfrm state and a corresponding XFRMA_OUTPUT_MARK netlink attribute. The output mark differs from the existing xfrm mark in two ways: 1. The xfrm mark is used to match xfrm policies and states, while the xfrm output mark is used to set the mark (and influence the routing) of the packets emitted by those states. 2. The existing mark is constrained to be a subset of the bits of the originating socket or transformed packet, but the output mark is arbitrary and depends only on the state. The use of a separate mark provides additional flexibility. For example: - A packet subject to two transforms (e.g., transport mode inside tunnel mode) can have two different output marks applied to it, one for the transport mode SA and one for the tunnel mode SA. - On a system where socket marks determine routing, the packets emitted by an IPsec tunnel can be routed based on a mark that is determined by the tunnel, not by the marks of the unencrypted packets. - Support for setting the output marks can be introduced without breaking any existing setups that employ both mark-based routing and xfrm tunnel mode. Simply changing the code to use the xfrm mark for routing output packets could xfrm mark could change behaviour in a way that breaks these setups. If the output mark is unspecified or set to zero, the mark is not set or changed. Tested: make allyesconfig; make -j64 Tested: https://android-review.googlesource.com/452776 Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2017-08-10 17:11:33 +00:00
xfrm_address_t *remote, unsigned short family, u32 mark)
{
int err;
const struct xfrm_policy_afinfo *afinfo = xfrm_policy_get_afinfo(family);
if (unlikely(afinfo == NULL))
return -EINVAL;
net: xfrm: support setting an output mark. On systems that use mark-based routing it may be necessary for routing lookups to use marks in order for packets to be routed correctly. An example of such a system is Android, which uses socket marks to route packets via different networks. Currently, routing lookups in tunnel mode always use a mark of zero, making routing incorrect on such systems. This patch adds a new output_mark element to the xfrm state and a corresponding XFRMA_OUTPUT_MARK netlink attribute. The output mark differs from the existing xfrm mark in two ways: 1. The xfrm mark is used to match xfrm policies and states, while the xfrm output mark is used to set the mark (and influence the routing) of the packets emitted by those states. 2. The existing mark is constrained to be a subset of the bits of the originating socket or transformed packet, but the output mark is arbitrary and depends only on the state. The use of a separate mark provides additional flexibility. For example: - A packet subject to two transforms (e.g., transport mode inside tunnel mode) can have two different output marks applied to it, one for the transport mode SA and one for the tunnel mode SA. - On a system where socket marks determine routing, the packets emitted by an IPsec tunnel can be routed based on a mark that is determined by the tunnel, not by the marks of the unencrypted packets. - Support for setting the output marks can be introduced without breaking any existing setups that employ both mark-based routing and xfrm tunnel mode. Simply changing the code to use the xfrm mark for routing output packets could xfrm mark could change behaviour in a way that breaks these setups. If the output mark is unspecified or set to zero, the mark is not set or changed. Tested: make allyesconfig; make -j64 Tested: https://android-review.googlesource.com/452776 Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2017-08-10 17:11:33 +00:00
err = afinfo->get_saddr(net, oif, local, remote, mark);
rcu_read_unlock();
return err;
}
/* Resolve list of templates for the flow, given policy. */
static int
xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one(struct xfrm_policy *policy, const struct flowi *fl,
struct xfrm_state **xfrm, unsigned short family)
{
struct net *net = xp_net(policy);
int nx;
int i, error;
xfrm_address_t *daddr = xfrm_flowi_daddr(fl, family);
xfrm_address_t *saddr = xfrm_flowi_saddr(fl, family);
xfrm_address_t tmp;
for (nx = 0, i = 0; i < policy->xfrm_nr; i++) {
struct xfrm_state *x;
xfrm_address_t *remote = daddr;
xfrm_address_t *local = saddr;
struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl = &policy->xfrm_vec[i];
if (tmpl->mode == XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL ||
tmpl->mode == XFRM_MODE_BEET) {
remote = &tmpl->id.daddr;
local = &tmpl->saddr;
if (xfrm_addr_any(local, tmpl->encap_family)) {
error = xfrm_get_saddr(net, fl->flowi_oif,
&tmp, remote,
tmpl->encap_family, 0);
if (error)
goto fail;
local = &tmp;
}
}
x = xfrm_state_find(remote, local, fl, tmpl, policy, &error,
family, policy->if_id);
if (x && x->km.state == XFRM_STATE_VALID) {
xfrm[nx++] = x;
daddr = remote;
saddr = local;
continue;
}
if (x) {
error = (x->km.state == XFRM_STATE_ERROR ?
-EINVAL : -EAGAIN);
xfrm_state_put(x);
} else if (error == -ESRCH) {
error = -EAGAIN;
}
if (!tmpl->optional)
goto fail;
}
return nx;
fail:
for (nx--; nx >= 0; nx--)
xfrm_state_put(xfrm[nx]);
return error;
}
static int
xfrm_tmpl_resolve(struct xfrm_policy **pols, int npols, const struct flowi *fl,
struct xfrm_state **xfrm, unsigned short family)
{
struct xfrm_state *tp[XFRM_MAX_DEPTH];
struct xfrm_state **tpp = (npols > 1) ? tp : xfrm;
int cnx = 0;
int error;
int ret;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < npols; i++) {
if (cnx + pols[i]->xfrm_nr >= XFRM_MAX_DEPTH) {
error = -ENOBUFS;
goto fail;
}
ret = xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one(pols[i], fl, &tpp[cnx], family);
if (ret < 0) {
error = ret;
goto fail;
} else
cnx += ret;
}
/* found states are sorted for outbound processing */
if (npols > 1)
xfrm_state_sort(xfrm, tpp, cnx, family);
return cnx;
fail:
for (cnx--; cnx >= 0; cnx--)
xfrm_state_put(tpp[cnx]);
return error;
}
static int xfrm_get_tos(const struct flowi *fl, int family)
{
const struct xfrm_policy_afinfo *afinfo;
int tos;
afinfo = xfrm_policy_get_afinfo(family);
if (!afinfo)
return 0;
tos = afinfo->get_tos(fl);
rcu_read_unlock();
return tos;
}
static inline struct xfrm_dst *xfrm_alloc_dst(struct net *net, int family)
{
const struct xfrm_policy_afinfo *afinfo = xfrm_policy_get_afinfo(family);
struct dst_ops *dst_ops;
struct xfrm_dst *xdst;
if (!afinfo)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
switch (family) {
case AF_INET:
dst_ops = &net->xfrm.xfrm4_dst_ops;
break;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
case AF_INET6:
dst_ops = &net->xfrm.xfrm6_dst_ops;
break;
#endif
default:
BUG();
}
xdst = dst_alloc(dst_ops, NULL, 1, DST_OBSOLETE_NONE, 0);
if (likely(xdst)) {
struct dst_entry *dst = &xdst->u.dst;
memset(dst + 1, 0, sizeof(*xdst) - sizeof(*dst));
} else
xdst = ERR_PTR(-ENOBUFS);
rcu_read_unlock();
return xdst;
}
static inline int xfrm_init_path(struct xfrm_dst *path, struct dst_entry *dst,
int nfheader_len)
{
const struct xfrm_policy_afinfo *afinfo =
xfrm_policy_get_afinfo(dst->ops->family);
int err;
if (!afinfo)
return -EINVAL;
err = afinfo->init_path(path, dst, nfheader_len);
rcu_read_unlock();
return err;
}
static inline int xfrm_fill_dst(struct xfrm_dst *xdst, struct net_device *dev,
const struct flowi *fl)
{
const struct xfrm_policy_afinfo *afinfo =
xfrm_policy_get_afinfo(xdst->u.dst.ops->family);
int err;
if (!afinfo)
return -EINVAL;
err = afinfo->fill_dst(xdst, dev, fl);
rcu_read_unlock();
return err;
}
/* Allocate chain of dst_entry's, attach known xfrm's, calculate
* all the metrics... Shortly, bundle a bundle.
*/
static struct dst_entry *xfrm_bundle_create(struct xfrm_policy *policy,
struct xfrm_state **xfrm,
struct xfrm_dst **bundle,
int nx,
const struct flowi *fl,
struct dst_entry *dst)
{
struct net *net = xp_net(policy);
unsigned long now = jiffies;
struct net_device *dev;
struct xfrm_mode *inner_mode;
struct xfrm_dst *xdst_prev = NULL;
struct xfrm_dst *xdst0 = NULL;
int i = 0;
int err;
int header_len = 0;
int nfheader_len = 0;
int trailer_len = 0;
int tos;
int family = policy->selector.family;
xfrm_address_t saddr, daddr;
xfrm_flowi_addr_get(fl, &saddr, &daddr, family);
tos = xfrm_get_tos(fl, family);
dst_hold(dst);
for (; i < nx; i++) {
struct xfrm_dst *xdst = xfrm_alloc_dst(net, family);
struct dst_entry *dst1 = &xdst->u.dst;
err = PTR_ERR(xdst);
if (IS_ERR(xdst)) {
dst_release(dst);
goto put_states;
}
bundle[i] = xdst;
if (!xdst_prev)
xdst0 = xdst;
else
/* Ref count is taken during xfrm_alloc_dst()
* No need to do dst_clone() on dst1
*/
xfrm_dst_set_child(xdst_prev, &xdst->u.dst);
if (xfrm[i]->sel.family == AF_UNSPEC) {
inner_mode = xfrm_ip2inner_mode(xfrm[i],
xfrm_af2proto(family));
if (!inner_mode) {
err = -EAFNOSUPPORT;
dst_release(dst);
goto put_states;
}
} else
inner_mode = xfrm[i]->inner_mode;
xdst->route = dst;
dst_copy_metrics(dst1, dst);
if (xfrm[i]->props.mode != XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT) {
__u32 mark = 0;
if (xfrm[i]->props.smark.v || xfrm[i]->props.smark.m)
mark = xfrm_smark_get(fl->flowi_mark, xfrm[i]);
family = xfrm[i]->props.family;
dst = xfrm_dst_lookup(xfrm[i], tos, fl->flowi_oif,
&saddr, &daddr, family, mark);
err = PTR_ERR(dst);
if (IS_ERR(dst))
goto put_states;
} else
dst_hold(dst);
dst1->xfrm = xfrm[i];
xdst->xfrm_genid = xfrm[i]->genid;
dst1->obsolete = DST_OBSOLETE_FORCE_CHK;
dst1->flags |= DST_HOST;
dst1->lastuse = now;
dst1->input = dst_discard;
dst1->output = inner_mode->afinfo->output;
xdst_prev = xdst;
header_len += xfrm[i]->props.header_len;
if (xfrm[i]->type->flags & XFRM_TYPE_NON_FRAGMENT)
nfheader_len += xfrm[i]->props.header_len;
trailer_len += xfrm[i]->props.trailer_len;
}
xfrm_dst_set_child(xdst_prev, dst);
xdst0->path = dst;
err = -ENODEV;
dev = dst->dev;
if (!dev)
goto free_dst;
xfrm_init_path(xdst0, dst, nfheader_len);
xfrm_init_pmtu(bundle, nx);
for (xdst_prev = xdst0; xdst_prev != (struct xfrm_dst *)dst;
xdst_prev = (struct xfrm_dst *) xfrm_dst_child(&xdst_prev->u.dst)) {
err = xfrm_fill_dst(xdst_prev, dev, fl);
if (err)
goto free_dst;
xdst_prev->u.dst.header_len = header_len;
xdst_prev->u.dst.trailer_len = trailer_len;
header_len -= xdst_prev->u.dst.xfrm->props.header_len;
trailer_len -= xdst_prev->u.dst.xfrm->props.trailer_len;
}
return &xdst0->u.dst;
put_states:
for (; i < nx; i++)
xfrm_state_put(xfrm[i]);
free_dst:
if (xdst0)
dst_release_immediate(&xdst0->u.dst);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
static int xfrm_expand_policies(const struct flowi *fl, u16 family,
struct xfrm_policy **pols,
int *num_pols, int *num_xfrms)
{
int i;
if (*num_pols == 0 || !pols[0]) {
*num_pols = 0;
*num_xfrms = 0;
return 0;
}
if (IS_ERR(pols[0]))
return PTR_ERR(pols[0]);
*num_xfrms = pols[0]->xfrm_nr;
#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_SUB_POLICY
if (pols[0] && pols[0]->action == XFRM_POLICY_ALLOW &&
pols[0]->type != XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN) {
pols[1] = xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype(xp_net(pols[0]),
XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN,
fl, family,
XFRM_POLICY_OUT,
pols[0]->if_id);
if (pols[1]) {
if (IS_ERR(pols[1])) {
xfrm_pols_put(pols, *num_pols);
return PTR_ERR(pols[1]);
}
(*num_pols)++;
(*num_xfrms) += pols[1]->xfrm_nr;
}
}
#endif
for (i = 0; i < *num_pols; i++) {
if (pols[i]->action != XFRM_POLICY_ALLOW) {
*num_xfrms = -1;
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
static struct xfrm_dst *
xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle(struct xfrm_policy **pols, int num_pols,
const struct flowi *fl, u16 family,
struct dst_entry *dst_orig)
{
struct net *net = xp_net(pols[0]);
struct xfrm_state *xfrm[XFRM_MAX_DEPTH];
struct xfrm_dst *bundle[XFRM_MAX_DEPTH];
xfrm: policy: remove pcpu policy cache Kristian Evensen says: In a project I am involved in, we are running ipsec (Strongswan) on different mt7621-based routers. Each router is configured as an initiator and has around ~30 tunnels to different responders (running on misc. devices). Before the flow cache was removed (kernel 4.9), we got a combined throughput of around 70Mbit/s for all tunnels on one router. However, we recently switched to kernel 4.14 (4.14.48), and the total throughput is somewhere around 57Mbit/s (best-case). I.e., a drop of around 20%. Reverting the flow cache removal restores, as expected, performance levels to that of kernel 4.9. When pcpu xdst exists, it has to be validated first before it can be used. A negative hit thus increases cost vs. no-cache. As number of tunnels increases, hit rate decreases so this pcpu caching isn't a viable strategy. Furthermore, the xdst cache also needs to run with BH off, so when removing this the bh disable/enable pairs can be removed too. Kristian tested a 4.14.y backport of this change and reported increased performance: In our tests, the throughput reduction has been reduced from around -20% to -5%. We also see that the overall throughput is independent of the number of tunnels, while before the throughput was reduced as the number of tunnels increased. Reported-by: Kristian Evensen <kristian.evensen@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2018-06-25 15:26:02 +00:00
struct xfrm_dst *xdst;
struct dst_entry *dst;
int err;
/* Try to instantiate a bundle */
err = xfrm_tmpl_resolve(pols, num_pols, fl, xfrm, family);
if (err <= 0) {
if (err == 0)
return NULL;
if (err != -EAGAIN)
XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTPOLERROR);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
dst = xfrm_bundle_create(pols[0], xfrm, bundle, err, fl, dst_orig);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTBUNDLEGENERROR);
return ERR_CAST(dst);
}
xdst = (struct xfrm_dst *)dst;
xdst->num_xfrms = err;
xdst->num_pols = num_pols;
memcpy(xdst->pols, pols, sizeof(struct xfrm_policy *) * num_pols);
xdst->policy_genid = atomic_read(&pols[0]->genid);
return xdst;
}
static void xfrm_policy_queue_process(struct timer_list *t)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct sock *sk;
struct dst_entry *dst;
struct xfrm_policy *pol = from_timer(pol, t, polq.hold_timer);
struct net *net = xp_net(pol);
struct xfrm_policy_queue *pq = &pol->polq;
struct flowi fl;
struct sk_buff_head list;
spin_lock(&pq->hold_queue.lock);
skb = skb_peek(&pq->hold_queue);
if (!skb) {
spin_unlock(&pq->hold_queue.lock);
goto out;
}
dst = skb_dst(skb);
sk = skb->sk;
xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl, dst->ops->family);
spin_unlock(&pq->hold_queue.lock);
dst_hold(xfrm_dst_path(dst));
dst = xfrm_lookup(net, xfrm_dst_path(dst), &fl, sk, XFRM_LOOKUP_QUEUE);
if (IS_ERR(dst))
goto purge_queue;
if (dst->flags & DST_XFRM_QUEUE) {
dst_release(dst);
if (pq->timeout >= XFRM_QUEUE_TMO_MAX)
goto purge_queue;
pq->timeout = pq->timeout << 1;
if (!mod_timer(&pq->hold_timer, jiffies + pq->timeout))
xfrm_pol_hold(pol);
goto out;
}
dst_release(dst);
__skb_queue_head_init(&list);
spin_lock(&pq->hold_queue.lock);
pq->timeout = 0;
skb_queue_splice_init(&pq->hold_queue, &list);
spin_unlock(&pq->hold_queue.lock);
while (!skb_queue_empty(&list)) {
skb = __skb_dequeue(&list);
xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl, skb_dst(skb)->ops->family);
dst_hold(xfrm_dst_path(skb_dst(skb)));
dst = xfrm_lookup(net, xfrm_dst_path(skb_dst(skb)), &fl, skb->sk, 0);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
continue;
}
nf_reset(skb);
skb_dst_drop(skb);
skb_dst_set(skb, dst);
dst_output(net, skb->sk, skb);
}
out:
xfrm_pol_put(pol);
return;
purge_queue:
pq->timeout = 0;
skb_queue_purge(&pq->hold_queue);
xfrm_pol_put(pol);
}
static int xdst_queue_output(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
unsigned long sched_next;
struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);
struct xfrm_dst *xdst = (struct xfrm_dst *) dst;
struct xfrm_policy *pol = xdst->pols[0];
struct xfrm_policy_queue *pq = &pol->polq;
if (unlikely(skb_fclone_busy(sk, skb))) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
}
if (pq->hold_queue.qlen > XFRM_MAX_QUEUE_LEN) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EAGAIN;
}
skb_dst_force(skb);
spin_lock_bh(&pq->hold_queue.lock);
if (!pq->timeout)
pq->timeout = XFRM_QUEUE_TMO_MIN;
sched_next = jiffies + pq->timeout;
if (del_timer(&pq->hold_timer)) {
if (time_before(pq->hold_timer.expires, sched_next))
sched_next = pq->hold_timer.expires;
xfrm_pol_put(pol);
}
__skb_queue_tail(&pq->hold_queue, skb);
if (!mod_timer(&pq->hold_timer, sched_next))
xfrm_pol_hold(pol);
spin_unlock_bh(&pq->hold_queue.lock);
return 0;
}
static struct xfrm_dst *xfrm_create_dummy_bundle(struct net *net,
struct xfrm_flo *xflo,
const struct flowi *fl,
int num_xfrms,
u16 family)
{
int err;
struct net_device *dev;
struct dst_entry *dst;
struct dst_entry *dst1;
struct xfrm_dst *xdst;
xdst = xfrm_alloc_dst(net, family);
if (IS_ERR(xdst))
return xdst;
if (!(xflo->flags & XFRM_LOOKUP_QUEUE) ||
net->xfrm.sysctl_larval_drop ||
num_xfrms <= 0)
return xdst;
dst = xflo->dst_orig;
dst1 = &xdst->u.dst;
dst_hold(dst);
xdst->route = dst;
dst_copy_metrics(dst1, dst);
dst1->obsolete = DST_OBSOLETE_FORCE_CHK;
dst1->flags |= DST_HOST | DST_XFRM_QUEUE;
dst1->lastuse = jiffies;
dst1->input = dst_discard;
dst1->output = xdst_queue_output;
dst_hold(dst);
xfrm_dst_set_child(xdst, dst);
xdst->path = dst;
xfrm_init_path((struct xfrm_dst *)dst1, dst, 0);
err = -ENODEV;
dev = dst->dev;
if (!dev)
goto free_dst;
err = xfrm_fill_dst(xdst, dev, fl);
if (err)
goto free_dst;
out:
return xdst;
free_dst:
dst_release(dst1);
xdst = ERR_PTR(err);
goto out;
}
static struct xfrm_dst *xfrm_bundle_lookup(struct net *net,
const struct flowi *fl,
u16 family, u8 dir,
struct xfrm_flo *xflo, u32 if_id)
{
struct xfrm_policy *pols[XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAX];
int num_pols = 0, num_xfrms = 0, err;
struct xfrm_dst *xdst;
/* Resolve policies to use if we couldn't get them from
* previous cache entry */
num_pols = 1;
pols[0] = xfrm_policy_lookup(net, fl, family, dir, if_id);
err = xfrm_expand_policies(fl, family, pols,
&num_pols, &num_xfrms);
if (err < 0)
goto inc_error;
if (num_pols == 0)
return NULL;
if (num_xfrms <= 0)
goto make_dummy_bundle;
xdst = xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle(pols, num_pols, fl, family,
xflo->dst_orig);
if (IS_ERR(xdst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(xdst);
if (err == -EREMOTE) {
xfrm_pols_put(pols, num_pols);
return NULL;
}
if (err != -EAGAIN)
goto error;
goto make_dummy_bundle;
} else if (xdst == NULL) {
num_xfrms = 0;
goto make_dummy_bundle;
}
return xdst;
make_dummy_bundle:
/* We found policies, but there's no bundles to instantiate:
* either because the policy blocks, has no transformations or
* we could not build template (no xfrm_states).*/
xdst = xfrm_create_dummy_bundle(net, xflo, fl, num_xfrms, family);
if (IS_ERR(xdst)) {
xfrm_pols_put(pols, num_pols);
return ERR_CAST(xdst);
}
xdst->num_pols = num_pols;
xdst->num_xfrms = num_xfrms;
memcpy(xdst->pols, pols, sizeof(struct xfrm_policy *) * num_pols);
return xdst;
inc_error:
XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTPOLERROR);
error:
xfrm_pols_put(pols, num_pols);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
static struct dst_entry *make_blackhole(struct net *net, u16 family,
struct dst_entry *dst_orig)
{
const struct xfrm_policy_afinfo *afinfo = xfrm_policy_get_afinfo(family);
struct dst_entry *ret;
if (!afinfo) {
dst_release(dst_orig);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
} else {
ret = afinfo->blackhole_route(net, dst_orig);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
/* Finds/creates a bundle for given flow and if_id
*
* At the moment we eat a raw IP route. Mostly to speed up lookups
* on interfaces with disabled IPsec.
*
* xfrm_lookup uses an if_id of 0 by default, and is provided for
* compatibility
*/
struct dst_entry *xfrm_lookup_with_ifid(struct net *net,
struct dst_entry *dst_orig,
const struct flowi *fl,
const struct sock *sk,
int flags, u32 if_id)
{
struct xfrm_policy *pols[XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAX];
struct xfrm_dst *xdst;
struct dst_entry *dst, *route;
u16 family = dst_orig->ops->family;
u8 dir = XFRM_POLICY_OUT;
int i, err, num_pols, num_xfrms = 0, drop_pols = 0;
dst = NULL;
xdst = NULL;
route = NULL;
sk = sk_const_to_full_sk(sk);
if (sk && sk->sk_policy[XFRM_POLICY_OUT]) {
num_pols = 1;
pols[0] = xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(sk, XFRM_POLICY_OUT, fl, family,
if_id);
err = xfrm_expand_policies(fl, family, pols,
&num_pols, &num_xfrms);
if (err < 0)
goto dropdst;
if (num_pols) {
if (num_xfrms <= 0) {
drop_pols = num_pols;
goto no_transform;
}
xdst = xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle(
pols, num_pols, fl,
family, dst_orig);
if (IS_ERR(xdst)) {
xfrm_pols_put(pols, num_pols);
err = PTR_ERR(xdst);
if (err == -EREMOTE)
goto nopol;
goto dropdst;
} else if (xdst == NULL) {
num_xfrms = 0;
drop_pols = num_pols;
goto no_transform;
}
route = xdst->route;
}
}
if (xdst == NULL) {
struct xfrm_flo xflo;
xflo.dst_orig = dst_orig;
xflo.flags = flags;
/* To accelerate a bit... */
if ((dst_orig->flags & DST_NOXFRM) ||
!net->xfrm.policy_count[XFRM_POLICY_OUT])
goto nopol;
xdst = xfrm_bundle_lookup(net, fl, family, dir, &xflo, if_id);
if (xdst == NULL)
goto nopol;
if (IS_ERR(xdst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(xdst);
goto dropdst;
}
num_pols = xdst->num_pols;
num_xfrms = xdst->num_xfrms;
memcpy(pols, xdst->pols, sizeof(struct xfrm_policy *) * num_pols);
route = xdst->route;
}
dst = &xdst->u.dst;
if (route == NULL && num_xfrms > 0) {
/* The only case when xfrm_bundle_lookup() returns a
* bundle with null route, is when the template could
* not be resolved. It means policies are there, but
* bundle could not be created, since we don't yet
* have the xfrm_state's. We need to wait for KM to
* negotiate new SA's or bail out with error.*/
if (net->xfrm.sysctl_larval_drop) {
XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTNOSTATES);
err = -EREMOTE;
goto error;
}
err = -EAGAIN;
XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTNOSTATES);
goto error;
}
no_transform:
if (num_pols == 0)
goto nopol;
if ((flags & XFRM_LOOKUP_ICMP) &&
!(pols[0]->flags & XFRM_POLICY_ICMP)) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto error;
}
for (i = 0; i < num_pols; i++)
pols[i]->curlft.use_time = ktime_get_real_seconds();
if (num_xfrms < 0) {
/* Prohibit the flow */
XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTPOLBLOCK);
err = -EPERM;
goto error;
} else if (num_xfrms > 0) {
/* Flow transformed */
dst_release(dst_orig);
} else {
/* Flow passes untransformed */
dst_release(dst);
dst = dst_orig;
}
ok:
xfrm_pols_put(pols, drop_pols);
if (dst && dst->xfrm &&
dst->xfrm->props.mode == XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL)
dst->flags |= DST_XFRM_TUNNEL;
return dst;
nopol:
if (!(flags & XFRM_LOOKUP_ICMP)) {
dst = dst_orig;
goto ok;
}
err = -ENOENT;
error:
dst_release(dst);
dropdst:
if (!(flags & XFRM_LOOKUP_KEEP_DST_REF))
dst_release(dst_orig);
xfrm_pols_put(pols, drop_pols);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_lookup_with_ifid);
/* Main function: finds/creates a bundle for given flow.
*
* At the moment we eat a raw IP route. Mostly to speed up lookups
* on interfaces with disabled IPsec.
*/
struct dst_entry *xfrm_lookup(struct net *net, struct dst_entry *dst_orig,
const struct flowi *fl, const struct sock *sk,
int flags)
{
return xfrm_lookup_with_ifid(net, dst_orig, fl, sk, flags, 0);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_lookup);
/* Callers of xfrm_lookup_route() must ensure a call to dst_output().
* Otherwise we may send out blackholed packets.
*/
struct dst_entry *xfrm_lookup_route(struct net *net, struct dst_entry *dst_orig,
const struct flowi *fl,
const struct sock *sk, int flags)
{
struct dst_entry *dst = xfrm_lookup(net, dst_orig, fl, sk,
flags | XFRM_LOOKUP_QUEUE |
XFRM_LOOKUP_KEEP_DST_REF);
if (IS_ERR(dst) && PTR_ERR(dst) == -EREMOTE)
return make_blackhole(net, dst_orig->ops->family, dst_orig);
xfrm: fix missing dst_release() after policy blocking lbcast and multicast Fix missing dst_release() when local broadcast or multicast traffic is xfrm policy blocked. For IPv4 this results to dst leak: ip_route_output_flow() allocates dst_entry via __ip_route_output_key() and passes it to xfrm_lookup_route(). xfrm_lookup returns ERR_PTR(-EPERM) that is propagated. The dst that was allocated is never released. IPv4 local broadcast testcase: ping -b 192.168.1.255 & sleep 1 ip xfrm policy add src 0.0.0.0/0 dst 192.168.1.255/32 dir out action block IPv4 multicast testcase: ping 224.0.0.1 & sleep 1 ip xfrm policy add src 0.0.0.0/0 dst 224.0.0.1/32 dir out action block For IPv6 the missing dst_release() causes trouble e.g. when used in netns: ip netns add TEST ip netns exec TEST ip link set lo up ip link add dummy0 type dummy ip link set dev dummy0 netns TEST ip netns exec TEST ip addr add fd00::1111 dev dummy0 ip netns exec TEST ip link set dummy0 up ip netns exec TEST ping -6 -c 5 ff02::1%dummy0 & sleep 1 ip netns exec TEST ip xfrm policy add src ::/0 dst ff02::1 dir out action block wait ip netns del TEST After netns deletion we see: [ 258.239097] unregister_netdevice: waiting for lo to become free. Usage count = 2 [ 268.279061] unregister_netdevice: waiting for lo to become free. Usage count = 2 [ 278.367018] unregister_netdevice: waiting for lo to become free. Usage count = 2 [ 288.375259] unregister_netdevice: waiting for lo to become free. Usage count = 2 Fixes: ac37e2515c1a ("xfrm: release dst_orig in case of error in xfrm_lookup()") Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2018-06-21 06:30:47 +00:00
if (IS_ERR(dst))
dst_release(dst_orig);
return dst;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_lookup_route);
static inline int
xfrm_secpath_reject(int idx, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct flowi *fl)
{
struct sec_path *sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
struct xfrm_state *x;
if (!sp || idx < 0 || idx >= sp->len)
return 0;
x = sp->xvec[idx];
if (!x->type->reject)
return 0;
return x->type->reject(x, skb, fl);
}
/* When skb is transformed back to its "native" form, we have to
* check policy restrictions. At the moment we make this in maximally
* stupid way. Shame on me. :-) Of course, connected sockets must
* have policy cached at them.
*/
static inline int
xfrm_state_ok(const struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, const struct xfrm_state *x,
unsigned short family)
{
if (xfrm_state_kern(x))
return tmpl->optional && !xfrm_state_addr_cmp(tmpl, x, tmpl->encap_family);
return x->id.proto == tmpl->id.proto &&
(x->id.spi == tmpl->id.spi || !tmpl->id.spi) &&
(x->props.reqid == tmpl->reqid || !tmpl->reqid) &&
x->props.mode == tmpl->mode &&
(tmpl->allalgs || (tmpl->aalgos & (1<<x->props.aalgo)) ||
!(xfrm_id_proto_match(tmpl->id.proto, IPSEC_PROTO_ANY))) &&
!(x->props.mode != XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT &&
xfrm_state_addr_cmp(tmpl, x, family));
}
/*
* 0 or more than 0 is returned when validation is succeeded (either bypass
* because of optional transport mode, or next index of the mathced secpath
* state with the template.
* -1 is returned when no matching template is found.
* Otherwise "-2 - errored_index" is returned.
*/
static inline int
xfrm_policy_ok(const struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl, const struct sec_path *sp, int start,
unsigned short family)
{
int idx = start;
if (tmpl->optional) {
if (tmpl->mode == XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT)
return start;
} else
start = -1;
for (; idx < sp->len; idx++) {
if (xfrm_state_ok(tmpl, sp->xvec[idx], family))
return ++idx;
if (sp->xvec[idx]->props.mode != XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT) {
if (start == -1)
start = -2-idx;
break;
}
}
return start;
}
int __xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl,
unsigned int family, int reverse)
{
const struct xfrm_policy_afinfo *afinfo = xfrm_policy_get_afinfo(family);
int err;
if (unlikely(afinfo == NULL))
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
afinfo->decode_session(skb, fl, reverse);
err = security_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl->flowi_secid);
rcu_read_unlock();
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__xfrm_decode_session);
static inline int secpath_has_nontransport(const struct sec_path *sp, int k, int *idxp)
{
for (; k < sp->len; k++) {
if (sp->xvec[k]->props.mode != XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT) {
*idxp = k;
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned short family)
{
struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
struct xfrm_policy *pol;
struct xfrm_policy *pols[XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAX];
int npols = 0;
int xfrm_nr;
int pi;
int reverse;
struct flowi fl;
int xerr_idx = -1;
const struct xfrm_if_cb *ifcb;
struct sec_path *sp;
struct xfrm_if *xi;
u32 if_id = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
ifcb = xfrm_if_get_cb();
if (ifcb) {
xi = ifcb->decode_session(skb);
if (xi) {
if_id = xi->p.if_id;
net = xi->net;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
reverse = dir & ~XFRM_POLICY_MASK;
dir &= XFRM_POLICY_MASK;
if (__xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl, family, reverse) < 0) {
XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINHDRERROR);
return 0;
}
nf_nat_decode_session(skb, &fl, family);
/* First, check used SA against their selectors. */
sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
if (sp) {
int i;
for (i = sp->len - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
if (!xfrm_selector_match(&x->sel, &fl, family)) {
XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINSTATEMISMATCH);
return 0;
}
}
}
pol = NULL;
sk = sk_to_full_sk(sk);
if (sk && sk->sk_policy[dir]) {
pol = xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(sk, dir, &fl, family, if_id);
if (IS_ERR(pol)) {
XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINPOLERROR);
return 0;
}
}
if (!pol)
pol = xfrm_policy_lookup(net, &fl, family, dir, if_id);
if (IS_ERR(pol)) {
XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINPOLERROR);
IPsec: propagate security module errors up from flow_cache_lookup When a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return an access denied permission (or other error). We were not handling that correctly, and in fact inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not associated with an xfrm policy. The way I was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec. The first SYNACK would be blocked, because of an uncached lookup via flow_cache_lookup(), which would fail to resolve an xfrm policy because the SELinux policy is checked at that point via the resolver. However, retransmitted SYNACKs would then find a cached flow entry when calling into flow_cache_lookup() with a null xfrm policy, which is interpreted by xfrm_lookup() as the packet not having any associated policy and similarly to the first case, allowing it to pass without transformation. The solution presented here is to first ensure that errno values are correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly. Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which indicates that the packet can pass freely). This also forces any future lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux) for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the flow cache entry). Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-10-05 20:42:27 +00:00
return 0;
}
IPsec: propagate security module errors up from flow_cache_lookup When a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return an access denied permission (or other error). We were not handling that correctly, and in fact inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not associated with an xfrm policy. The way I was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec. The first SYNACK would be blocked, because of an uncached lookup via flow_cache_lookup(), which would fail to resolve an xfrm policy because the SELinux policy is checked at that point via the resolver. However, retransmitted SYNACKs would then find a cached flow entry when calling into flow_cache_lookup() with a null xfrm policy, which is interpreted by xfrm_lookup() as the packet not having any associated policy and similarly to the first case, allowing it to pass without transformation. The solution presented here is to first ensure that errno values are correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly. Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which indicates that the packet can pass freely). This also forces any future lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux) for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the flow cache entry). Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-10-05 20:42:27 +00:00
if (!pol) {
if (sp && secpath_has_nontransport(sp, 0, &xerr_idx)) {
xfrm_secpath_reject(xerr_idx, skb, &fl);
XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINNOPOLS);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
pol->curlft.use_time = ktime_get_real_seconds();
pols[0] = pol;
npols++;
#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_SUB_POLICY
if (pols[0]->type != XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN) {
pols[1] = xfrm_policy_lookup_bytype(net, XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN,
&fl, family,
XFRM_POLICY_IN, if_id);
if (pols[1]) {
if (IS_ERR(pols[1])) {
XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINPOLERROR);
IPsec: propagate security module errors up from flow_cache_lookup When a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return an access denied permission (or other error). We were not handling that correctly, and in fact inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not associated with an xfrm policy. The way I was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec. The first SYNACK would be blocked, because of an uncached lookup via flow_cache_lookup(), which would fail to resolve an xfrm policy because the SELinux policy is checked at that point via the resolver. However, retransmitted SYNACKs would then find a cached flow entry when calling into flow_cache_lookup() with a null xfrm policy, which is interpreted by xfrm_lookup() as the packet not having any associated policy and similarly to the first case, allowing it to pass without transformation. The solution presented here is to first ensure that errno values are correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly. Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which indicates that the packet can pass freely). This also forces any future lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux) for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the flow cache entry). Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2006-10-05 20:42:27 +00:00
return 0;
}
pols[1]->curlft.use_time = ktime_get_real_seconds();
npols++;
}
}
#endif
if (pol->action == XFRM_POLICY_ALLOW) {
static struct sec_path dummy;
struct xfrm_tmpl *tp[XFRM_MAX_DEPTH];
struct xfrm_tmpl *stp[XFRM_MAX_DEPTH];
struct xfrm_tmpl **tpp = tp;
int ti = 0;
int i, k;
sp = skb_sec_path(skb);
if (!sp)
sp = &dummy;
for (pi = 0; pi < npols; pi++) {
if (pols[pi] != pol &&
pols[pi]->action != XFRM_POLICY_ALLOW) {
XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINPOLBLOCK);
goto reject;
}
if (ti + pols[pi]->xfrm_nr >= XFRM_MAX_DEPTH) {
XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINBUFFERERROR);
goto reject_error;
}
for (i = 0; i < pols[pi]->xfrm_nr; i++)
tpp[ti++] = &pols[pi]->xfrm_vec[i];
}
xfrm_nr = ti;
if (npols > 1) {
xfrm_tmpl_sort(stp, tpp, xfrm_nr, family, net);
tpp = stp;
}
/* For each tunnel xfrm, find the first matching tmpl.
* For each tmpl before that, find corresponding xfrm.
* Order is _important_. Later we will implement
* some barriers, but at the moment barriers
* are implied between each two transformations.
*/
for (i = xfrm_nr-1, k = 0; i >= 0; i--) {
k = xfrm_policy_ok(tpp[i], sp, k, family);
if (k < 0) {
if (k < -1)
/* "-2 - errored_index" returned */
xerr_idx = -(2+k);
XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINTMPLMISMATCH);
goto reject;
}
}
if (secpath_has_nontransport(sp, k, &xerr_idx)) {
XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINTMPLMISMATCH);
goto reject;
}
xfrm_pols_put(pols, npols);
return 1;
}
XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINPOLBLOCK);
reject:
xfrm_secpath_reject(xerr_idx, skb, &fl);
reject_error:
xfrm_pols_put(pols, npols);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__xfrm_policy_check);
int __xfrm_route_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned short family)
{
struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
struct flowi fl;
struct dst_entry *dst;
int res = 1;
if (xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl, family) < 0) {
XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMFWDHDRERROR);
return 0;
}
skb_dst_force(skb);
if (!skb_dst(skb)) {
XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMFWDHDRERROR);
return 0;
}
dst = xfrm_lookup(net, skb_dst(skb), &fl, NULL, XFRM_LOOKUP_QUEUE);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
res = 0;
dst = NULL;
}
skb_dst_set(skb, dst);
return res;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__xfrm_route_forward);
/* Optimize later using cookies and generation ids. */
static struct dst_entry *xfrm_dst_check(struct dst_entry *dst, u32 cookie)
{
/* Code (such as __xfrm4_bundle_create()) sets dst->obsolete
* to DST_OBSOLETE_FORCE_CHK to force all XFRM destinations to
* get validated by dst_ops->check on every use. We do this
* because when a normal route referenced by an XFRM dst is
* obsoleted we do not go looking around for all parent
* referencing XFRM dsts so that we can invalidate them. It
* is just too much work. Instead we make the checks here on
* every use. For example:
*
* XFRM dst A --> IPv4 dst X
*
* X is the "xdst->route" of A (X is also the "dst->path" of A
* in this example). If X is marked obsolete, "A" will not
* notice. That's what we are validating here via the
* stale_bundle() check.
*
xfrm: take refcnt of dst when creating struct xfrm_dst bundle During the creation of xfrm_dst bundle, always take ref count when allocating the dst. This way, xfrm_bundle_create() will form a linked list of dst with dst->child pointing to a ref counted dst child. And the returned dst pointer is also ref counted. This makes the link from the flow cache to this dst now ref counted properly. As the dst is always ref counted properly, we can safely mark DST_NOGC flag so dst_release() will release dst based on refcnt only. And dst gc is no longer needed and all dst_free() and its related function calls should be replaced with dst_release() or dst_release_immediate(). The special handling logic for dst->child in dst_destroy() can be replaced with a simple dst_release_immediate() call on the child to release the whole list linked by dst->child pointer. Previously used DST_NOHASH flag is not needed anymore as well. The reason that DST_NOHASH is used in the existing code is mainly to prevent the dst inserted in the fib tree to be wrongly destroyed during the deletion of the xfrm_dst bundle. So in the existing code, DST_NOHASH flag is marked in all the dst children except the one which is in the fib tree. However, with this patch series to remove dst gc logic and release dst only based on ref count, it is safe to release all the children from a xfrm_dst bundle as long as the dst children are all ref counted properly which is already the case in the existing code. So, this patch removes the use of DST_NOHASH flag. Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-17 17:42:38 +00:00
* When a dst is removed from the fib tree, DST_OBSOLETE_DEAD will
* be marked on it.
* This will force stale_bundle() to fail on any xdst bundle with
xfrm: take refcnt of dst when creating struct xfrm_dst bundle During the creation of xfrm_dst bundle, always take ref count when allocating the dst. This way, xfrm_bundle_create() will form a linked list of dst with dst->child pointing to a ref counted dst child. And the returned dst pointer is also ref counted. This makes the link from the flow cache to this dst now ref counted properly. As the dst is always ref counted properly, we can safely mark DST_NOGC flag so dst_release() will release dst based on refcnt only. And dst gc is no longer needed and all dst_free() and its related function calls should be replaced with dst_release() or dst_release_immediate(). The special handling logic for dst->child in dst_destroy() can be replaced with a simple dst_release_immediate() call on the child to release the whole list linked by dst->child pointer. Previously used DST_NOHASH flag is not needed anymore as well. The reason that DST_NOHASH is used in the existing code is mainly to prevent the dst inserted in the fib tree to be wrongly destroyed during the deletion of the xfrm_dst bundle. So in the existing code, DST_NOHASH flag is marked in all the dst children except the one which is in the fib tree. However, with this patch series to remove dst gc logic and release dst only based on ref count, it is safe to release all the children from a xfrm_dst bundle as long as the dst children are all ref counted properly which is already the case in the existing code. So, this patch removes the use of DST_NOHASH flag. Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-17 17:42:38 +00:00
* this dst linked in it.
*/
if (dst->obsolete < 0 && !stale_bundle(dst))
return dst;
return NULL;
}
static int stale_bundle(struct dst_entry *dst)
{
return !xfrm_bundle_ok((struct xfrm_dst *)dst);
}
void xfrm_dst_ifdown(struct dst_entry *dst, struct net_device *dev)
{
while ((dst = xfrm_dst_child(dst)) && dst->xfrm && dst->dev == dev) {
dst->dev = dev_net(dev)->loopback_dev;
dev_hold(dst->dev);
dev_put(dev);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_dst_ifdown);
static void xfrm_link_failure(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
/* Impossible. Such dst must be popped before reaches point of failure. */
}
static struct dst_entry *xfrm_negative_advice(struct dst_entry *dst)
{
if (dst) {
if (dst->obsolete) {
dst_release(dst);
dst = NULL;
}
}
return dst;
}
static void xfrm_init_pmtu(struct xfrm_dst **bundle, int nr)
{
while (nr--) {
struct xfrm_dst *xdst = bundle[nr];
u32 pmtu, route_mtu_cached;
struct dst_entry *dst;
dst = &xdst->u.dst;
pmtu = dst_mtu(xfrm_dst_child(dst));
xdst->child_mtu_cached = pmtu;
pmtu = xfrm_state_mtu(dst->xfrm, pmtu);
route_mtu_cached = dst_mtu(xdst->route);
xdst->route_mtu_cached = route_mtu_cached;
if (pmtu > route_mtu_cached)
pmtu = route_mtu_cached;
dst_metric_set(dst, RTAX_MTU, pmtu);
}
}
/* Check that the bundle accepts the flow and its components are
* still valid.
*/
static int xfrm_bundle_ok(struct xfrm_dst *first)
{
struct xfrm_dst *bundle[XFRM_MAX_DEPTH];
struct dst_entry *dst = &first->u.dst;
struct xfrm_dst *xdst;
int start_from, nr;
u32 mtu;
if (!dst_check(xfrm_dst_path(dst), ((struct xfrm_dst *)dst)->path_cookie) ||
(dst->dev && !netif_running(dst->dev)))
return 0;
if (dst->flags & DST_XFRM_QUEUE)
return 1;
start_from = nr = 0;
do {
struct xfrm_dst *xdst = (struct xfrm_dst *)dst;
if (dst->xfrm->km.state != XFRM_STATE_VALID)
return 0;
if (xdst->xfrm_genid != dst->xfrm->genid)
return 0;
if (xdst->num_pols > 0 &&
xdst->policy_genid != atomic_read(&xdst->pols[0]->genid))
return 0;
bundle[nr++] = xdst;
mtu = dst_mtu(xfrm_dst_child(dst));
if (xdst->child_mtu_cached != mtu) {
start_from = nr;
xdst->child_mtu_cached = mtu;
}
if (!dst_check(xdst->route, xdst->route_cookie))
return 0;
mtu = dst_mtu(xdst->route);
if (xdst->route_mtu_cached != mtu) {
start_from = nr;
xdst->route_mtu_cached = mtu;
}
dst = xfrm_dst_child(dst);
} while (dst->xfrm);
if (likely(!start_from))
return 1;
xdst = bundle[start_from - 1];
mtu = xdst->child_mtu_cached;
while (start_from--) {
dst = &xdst->u.dst;
mtu = xfrm_state_mtu(dst->xfrm, mtu);
if (mtu > xdst->route_mtu_cached)
mtu = xdst->route_mtu_cached;
dst_metric_set(dst, RTAX_MTU, mtu);
if (!start_from)
break;
xdst = bundle[start_from - 1];
xdst->child_mtu_cached = mtu;
}
return 1;
}
static unsigned int xfrm_default_advmss(const struct dst_entry *dst)
{
return dst_metric_advmss(xfrm_dst_path(dst));
}
static unsigned int xfrm_mtu(const struct dst_entry *dst)
{
unsigned int mtu = dst_metric_raw(dst, RTAX_MTU);
return mtu ? : dst_mtu(xfrm_dst_path(dst));
}
static const void *xfrm_get_dst_nexthop(const struct dst_entry *dst,
const void *daddr)
{
while (dst->xfrm) {
const struct xfrm_state *xfrm = dst->xfrm;
dst = xfrm_dst_child(dst);
if (xfrm->props.mode == XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT)
continue;
if (xfrm->type->flags & XFRM_TYPE_REMOTE_COADDR)
daddr = xfrm->coaddr;
else if (!(xfrm->type->flags & XFRM_TYPE_LOCAL_COADDR))
daddr = &xfrm->id.daddr;
}
return daddr;
}
static struct neighbour *xfrm_neigh_lookup(const struct dst_entry *dst,
struct sk_buff *skb,
const void *daddr)
{
const struct dst_entry *path = xfrm_dst_path(dst);
if (!skb)
daddr = xfrm_get_dst_nexthop(dst, daddr);
return path->ops->neigh_lookup(path, skb, daddr);
}
static void xfrm_confirm_neigh(const struct dst_entry *dst, const void *daddr)
{
const struct dst_entry *path = xfrm_dst_path(dst);
daddr = xfrm_get_dst_nexthop(dst, daddr);
path->ops->confirm_neigh(path, daddr);
}
int xfrm_policy_register_afinfo(const struct xfrm_policy_afinfo *afinfo, int family)
{
int err = 0;
if (WARN_ON(family >= ARRAY_SIZE(xfrm_policy_afinfo)))
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
spin_lock(&xfrm_policy_afinfo_lock);
if (unlikely(xfrm_policy_afinfo[family] != NULL))
err = -EEXIST;
else {
struct dst_ops *dst_ops = afinfo->dst_ops;
if (likely(dst_ops->kmem_cachep == NULL))
dst_ops->kmem_cachep = xfrm_dst_cache;
if (likely(dst_ops->check == NULL))
dst_ops->check = xfrm_dst_check;
if (likely(dst_ops->default_advmss == NULL))
dst_ops->default_advmss = xfrm_default_advmss;
if (likely(dst_ops->mtu == NULL))
dst_ops->mtu = xfrm_mtu;
if (likely(dst_ops->negative_advice == NULL))
dst_ops->negative_advice = xfrm_negative_advice;
if (likely(dst_ops->link_failure == NULL))
dst_ops->link_failure = xfrm_link_failure;
if (likely(dst_ops->neigh_lookup == NULL))
dst_ops->neigh_lookup = xfrm_neigh_lookup;
if (likely(!dst_ops->confirm_neigh))
dst_ops->confirm_neigh = xfrm_confirm_neigh;
rcu_assign_pointer(xfrm_policy_afinfo[family], afinfo);
}
spin_unlock(&xfrm_policy_afinfo_lock);
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_register_afinfo);
void xfrm_policy_unregister_afinfo(const struct xfrm_policy_afinfo *afinfo)
{
struct dst_ops *dst_ops = afinfo->dst_ops;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xfrm_policy_afinfo); i++) {
if (xfrm_policy_afinfo[i] != afinfo)
continue;
RCU_INIT_POINTER(xfrm_policy_afinfo[i], NULL);
break;
}
synchronize_rcu();
dst_ops->kmem_cachep = NULL;
dst_ops->check = NULL;
dst_ops->negative_advice = NULL;
dst_ops->link_failure = NULL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_policy_unregister_afinfo);
void xfrm_if_register_cb(const struct xfrm_if_cb *ifcb)
{
spin_lock(&xfrm_if_cb_lock);
rcu_assign_pointer(xfrm_if_cb, ifcb);
spin_unlock(&xfrm_if_cb_lock);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_if_register_cb);
void xfrm_if_unregister_cb(void)
{
RCU_INIT_POINTER(xfrm_if_cb, NULL);
synchronize_rcu();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_if_unregister_cb);
#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_STATISTICS
static int __net_init xfrm_statistics_init(struct net *net)
{
int rv;
net->mib.xfrm_statistics = alloc_percpu(struct linux_xfrm_mib);
if (!net->mib.xfrm_statistics)
return -ENOMEM;
rv = xfrm_proc_init(net);
if (rv < 0)
free_percpu(net->mib.xfrm_statistics);
return rv;
}
static void xfrm_statistics_fini(struct net *net)
{
xfrm_proc_fini(net);
free_percpu(net->mib.xfrm_statistics);
}
#else
static int __net_init xfrm_statistics_init(struct net *net)
{
return 0;
}
static void xfrm_statistics_fini(struct net *net)
{
}
#endif
static int __net_init xfrm_policy_init(struct net *net)
{
unsigned int hmask, sz;
int dir, err;
if (net_eq(net, &init_net)) {
xfrm_dst_cache = kmem_cache_create("xfrm_dst_cache",
sizeof(struct xfrm_dst),
0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC,
NULL);
err = rhashtable_init(&xfrm_policy_inexact_table,
&xfrm_pol_inexact_params);
BUG_ON(err);
}
hmask = 8 - 1;
sz = (hmask+1) * sizeof(struct hlist_head);
net->xfrm.policy_byidx = xfrm_hash_alloc(sz);
if (!net->xfrm.policy_byidx)
goto out_byidx;
net->xfrm.policy_idx_hmask = hmask;
for (dir = 0; dir < XFRM_POLICY_MAX; dir++) {
struct xfrm_policy_hash *htab;
net->xfrm.policy_count[dir] = 0;
net->xfrm.policy_count[XFRM_POLICY_MAX + dir] = 0;
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&net->xfrm.policy_inexact[dir]);
htab = &net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir];
htab->table = xfrm_hash_alloc(sz);
if (!htab->table)
goto out_bydst;
htab->hmask = hmask;
htab->dbits4 = 32;
htab->sbits4 = 32;
htab->dbits6 = 128;
htab->sbits6 = 128;
}
xfrm: configure policy hash table thresholds by netlink Enable to specify local and remote prefix length thresholds for the policy hash table via a netlink XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO message. prefix length thresholds are specified by XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH and XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH optional attributes (struct xfrmu_spdhthresh). example: struct xfrmu_spdhthresh thresh4 = { .lbits = 0; .rbits = 24; }; struct xfrmu_spdhthresh thresh6 = { .lbits = 0; .rbits = 56; }; struct nlmsghdr *hdr; struct nl_msg *msg; msg = nlmsg_alloc(); hdr = nlmsg_put(msg, NL_AUTO_PORT, NL_AUTO_SEQ, XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH, sizeof(__u32), NLM_F_REQUEST); nla_put(msg, XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH, sizeof(thresh4), &thresh4); nla_put(msg, XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH, sizeof(thresh6), &thresh6); nla_send_auto(sk, msg); The numbers are the policy selector minimum prefix lengths to put a policy in the hash table. - lbits is the local threshold (source address for out policies, destination address for in and fwd policies). - rbits is the remote threshold (destination address for out policies, source address for in and fwd policies). The default values are: XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH: 32 32 XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH: 128 128 Dynamic re-building of the SPD is performed when the thresholds values are changed. The current thresholds can be read via a XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO request: the kernel replies to XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO requests by an XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO message, with both attributes XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH and XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH. Signed-off-by: Christophe Gouault <christophe.gouault@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2014-08-29 14:16:05 +00:00
net->xfrm.policy_hthresh.lbits4 = 32;
net->xfrm.policy_hthresh.rbits4 = 32;
net->xfrm.policy_hthresh.lbits6 = 128;
net->xfrm.policy_hthresh.rbits6 = 128;
seqlock_init(&net->xfrm.policy_hthresh.lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&net->xfrm.policy_all);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&net->xfrm.inexact_bins);
INIT_WORK(&net->xfrm.policy_hash_work, xfrm_hash_resize);
xfrm: configure policy hash table thresholds by netlink Enable to specify local and remote prefix length thresholds for the policy hash table via a netlink XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO message. prefix length thresholds are specified by XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH and XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH optional attributes (struct xfrmu_spdhthresh). example: struct xfrmu_spdhthresh thresh4 = { .lbits = 0; .rbits = 24; }; struct xfrmu_spdhthresh thresh6 = { .lbits = 0; .rbits = 56; }; struct nlmsghdr *hdr; struct nl_msg *msg; msg = nlmsg_alloc(); hdr = nlmsg_put(msg, NL_AUTO_PORT, NL_AUTO_SEQ, XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH, sizeof(__u32), NLM_F_REQUEST); nla_put(msg, XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH, sizeof(thresh4), &thresh4); nla_put(msg, XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH, sizeof(thresh6), &thresh6); nla_send_auto(sk, msg); The numbers are the policy selector minimum prefix lengths to put a policy in the hash table. - lbits is the local threshold (source address for out policies, destination address for in and fwd policies). - rbits is the remote threshold (destination address for out policies, source address for in and fwd policies). The default values are: XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH: 32 32 XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH: 128 128 Dynamic re-building of the SPD is performed when the thresholds values are changed. The current thresholds can be read via a XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO request: the kernel replies to XFRM_MSG_GETSPDINFO requests by an XFRM_MSG_NEWSPDINFO message, with both attributes XFRMA_SPD_IPV4_HTHRESH and XFRMA_SPD_IPV6_HTHRESH. Signed-off-by: Christophe Gouault <christophe.gouault@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
2014-08-29 14:16:05 +00:00
INIT_WORK(&net->xfrm.policy_hthresh.work, xfrm_hash_rebuild);
return 0;
out_bydst:
for (dir--; dir >= 0; dir--) {
struct xfrm_policy_hash *htab;
htab = &net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir];
xfrm_hash_free(htab->table, sz);
}
xfrm_hash_free(net->xfrm.policy_byidx, sz);
out_byidx:
return -ENOMEM;
}
static void xfrm_policy_fini(struct net *net)
{
struct xfrm_pol_inexact_bin *b, *t;
unsigned int sz;
int dir;
flush_work(&net->xfrm.policy_hash_work);
#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_SUB_POLICY
xfrm_policy_flush(net, XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_SUB, false);
#endif
xfrm_policy_flush(net, XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN, false);
WARN_ON(!list_empty(&net->xfrm.policy_all));
for (dir = 0; dir < XFRM_POLICY_MAX; dir++) {
struct xfrm_policy_hash *htab;
WARN_ON(!hlist_empty(&net->xfrm.policy_inexact[dir]));
htab = &net->xfrm.policy_bydst[dir];
sz = (htab->hmask + 1) * sizeof(struct hlist_head);
WARN_ON(!hlist_empty(htab->table));
xfrm_hash_free(htab->table, sz);
}
sz = (net->xfrm.policy_idx_hmask + 1) * sizeof(struct hlist_head);
WARN_ON(!hlist_empty(net->xfrm.policy_byidx));
xfrm_hash_free(net->xfrm.policy_byidx, sz);
spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(b, t, &net->xfrm.inexact_bins, inexact_bins)
__xfrm_policy_inexact_prune_bin(b, true);
spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
}
static int __net_init xfrm_net_init(struct net *net)
{
int rv;
/* Initialize the per-net locks here */
spin_lock_init(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock);
spin_lock_init(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
mutex_init(&net->xfrm.xfrm_cfg_mutex);
rv = xfrm_statistics_init(net);
if (rv < 0)
goto out_statistics;
rv = xfrm_state_init(net);
if (rv < 0)
goto out_state;
rv = xfrm_policy_init(net);
if (rv < 0)
goto out_policy;
rv = xfrm_sysctl_init(net);
if (rv < 0)
goto out_sysctl;
return 0;
out_sysctl:
xfrm_policy_fini(net);
out_policy:
xfrm_state_fini(net);
out_state:
xfrm_statistics_fini(net);
out_statistics:
return rv;
}
static void __net_exit xfrm_net_exit(struct net *net)
{
xfrm_sysctl_fini(net);
xfrm_policy_fini(net);
xfrm_state_fini(net);
xfrm_statistics_fini(net);
}
static struct pernet_operations __net_initdata xfrm_net_ops = {
.init = xfrm_net_init,
.exit = xfrm_net_exit,
};
void __init xfrm_init(void)
{
register_pernet_subsys(&xfrm_net_ops);
xfrm_dev_init();
seqcount_init(&xfrm_policy_hash_generation);
xfrm_input_init();
RCU_INIT_POINTER(xfrm_if_cb, NULL);
synchronize_rcu();
}
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
static void xfrm_audit_common_policyinfo(struct xfrm_policy *xp,
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf)
{
[IPSEC]: SPD auditing fix to include the netmask/prefix-length Currently the netmask/prefix-length of an IPsec SPD entry is not included in any of the SPD related audit messages. This can cause a problem when the audit log is examined as the netmask/prefix-length is vital in determining what network traffic is affected by a particular SPD entry. This patch fixes this problem by adding two additional fields, "src_prefixlen" and "dst_prefixlen", to the SPD audit messages to indicate the source and destination netmasks. These new fields are only included in the audit message when the netmask/prefix-length is less than the address length, i.e. the SPD entry applies to a network address and not a host address. Example audit message: type=UNKNOWN[1415] msg=audit(1196105849.752:25): auid=0 \ subj=root:system_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=SPD-add res=1 \ src=192.168.0.0 src_prefixlen=24 dst=192.168.1.0 dst_prefixlen=24 In addition, this patch also fixes a few other things in the xfrm_audit_common_policyinfo() function. The IPv4 string formatting was converted to use the standard NIPQUAD_FMT constant, the memcpy() was removed from the IPv6 code path and replaced with a typecast (the memcpy() was acting as a slow, implicit typecast anyway), and two local variables were created to make referencing the XFRM security context and selector information cleaner. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-12-01 12:27:18 +00:00
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = xp->security;
struct xfrm_selector *sel = &xp->selector;
if (ctx)
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_alg=%u sec_doi=%u sec_obj=%s",
[IPSEC]: SPD auditing fix to include the netmask/prefix-length Currently the netmask/prefix-length of an IPsec SPD entry is not included in any of the SPD related audit messages. This can cause a problem when the audit log is examined as the netmask/prefix-length is vital in determining what network traffic is affected by a particular SPD entry. This patch fixes this problem by adding two additional fields, "src_prefixlen" and "dst_prefixlen", to the SPD audit messages to indicate the source and destination netmasks. These new fields are only included in the audit message when the netmask/prefix-length is less than the address length, i.e. the SPD entry applies to a network address and not a host address. Example audit message: type=UNKNOWN[1415] msg=audit(1196105849.752:25): auid=0 \ subj=root:system_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=SPD-add res=1 \ src=192.168.0.0 src_prefixlen=24 dst=192.168.1.0 dst_prefixlen=24 In addition, this patch also fixes a few other things in the xfrm_audit_common_policyinfo() function. The IPv4 string formatting was converted to use the standard NIPQUAD_FMT constant, the memcpy() was removed from the IPv6 code path and replaced with a typecast (the memcpy() was acting as a slow, implicit typecast anyway), and two local variables were created to make referencing the XFRM security context and selector information cleaner. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-12-01 12:27:18 +00:00
ctx->ctx_alg, ctx->ctx_doi, ctx->ctx_str);
switch (sel->family) {
case AF_INET:
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " src=%pI4", &sel->saddr.a4);
[IPSEC]: SPD auditing fix to include the netmask/prefix-length Currently the netmask/prefix-length of an IPsec SPD entry is not included in any of the SPD related audit messages. This can cause a problem when the audit log is examined as the netmask/prefix-length is vital in determining what network traffic is affected by a particular SPD entry. This patch fixes this problem by adding two additional fields, "src_prefixlen" and "dst_prefixlen", to the SPD audit messages to indicate the source and destination netmasks. These new fields are only included in the audit message when the netmask/prefix-length is less than the address length, i.e. the SPD entry applies to a network address and not a host address. Example audit message: type=UNKNOWN[1415] msg=audit(1196105849.752:25): auid=0 \ subj=root:system_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=SPD-add res=1 \ src=192.168.0.0 src_prefixlen=24 dst=192.168.1.0 dst_prefixlen=24 In addition, this patch also fixes a few other things in the xfrm_audit_common_policyinfo() function. The IPv4 string formatting was converted to use the standard NIPQUAD_FMT constant, the memcpy() was removed from the IPv6 code path and replaced with a typecast (the memcpy() was acting as a slow, implicit typecast anyway), and two local variables were created to make referencing the XFRM security context and selector information cleaner. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-12-01 12:27:18 +00:00
if (sel->prefixlen_s != 32)
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " src_prefixlen=%d",
sel->prefixlen_s);
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " dst=%pI4", &sel->daddr.a4);
[IPSEC]: SPD auditing fix to include the netmask/prefix-length Currently the netmask/prefix-length of an IPsec SPD entry is not included in any of the SPD related audit messages. This can cause a problem when the audit log is examined as the netmask/prefix-length is vital in determining what network traffic is affected by a particular SPD entry. This patch fixes this problem by adding two additional fields, "src_prefixlen" and "dst_prefixlen", to the SPD audit messages to indicate the source and destination netmasks. These new fields are only included in the audit message when the netmask/prefix-length is less than the address length, i.e. the SPD entry applies to a network address and not a host address. Example audit message: type=UNKNOWN[1415] msg=audit(1196105849.752:25): auid=0 \ subj=root:system_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=SPD-add res=1 \ src=192.168.0.0 src_prefixlen=24 dst=192.168.1.0 dst_prefixlen=24 In addition, this patch also fixes a few other things in the xfrm_audit_common_policyinfo() function. The IPv4 string formatting was converted to use the standard NIPQUAD_FMT constant, the memcpy() was removed from the IPv6 code path and replaced with a typecast (the memcpy() was acting as a slow, implicit typecast anyway), and two local variables were created to make referencing the XFRM security context and selector information cleaner. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-12-01 12:27:18 +00:00
if (sel->prefixlen_d != 32)
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " dst_prefixlen=%d",
sel->prefixlen_d);
break;
case AF_INET6:
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " src=%pI6", sel->saddr.a6);
[IPSEC]: SPD auditing fix to include the netmask/prefix-length Currently the netmask/prefix-length of an IPsec SPD entry is not included in any of the SPD related audit messages. This can cause a problem when the audit log is examined as the netmask/prefix-length is vital in determining what network traffic is affected by a particular SPD entry. This patch fixes this problem by adding two additional fields, "src_prefixlen" and "dst_prefixlen", to the SPD audit messages to indicate the source and destination netmasks. These new fields are only included in the audit message when the netmask/prefix-length is less than the address length, i.e. the SPD entry applies to a network address and not a host address. Example audit message: type=UNKNOWN[1415] msg=audit(1196105849.752:25): auid=0 \ subj=root:system_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=SPD-add res=1 \ src=192.168.0.0 src_prefixlen=24 dst=192.168.1.0 dst_prefixlen=24 In addition, this patch also fixes a few other things in the xfrm_audit_common_policyinfo() function. The IPv4 string formatting was converted to use the standard NIPQUAD_FMT constant, the memcpy() was removed from the IPv6 code path and replaced with a typecast (the memcpy() was acting as a slow, implicit typecast anyway), and two local variables were created to make referencing the XFRM security context and selector information cleaner. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-12-01 12:27:18 +00:00
if (sel->prefixlen_s != 128)
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " src_prefixlen=%d",
sel->prefixlen_s);
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " dst=%pI6", sel->daddr.a6);
[IPSEC]: SPD auditing fix to include the netmask/prefix-length Currently the netmask/prefix-length of an IPsec SPD entry is not included in any of the SPD related audit messages. This can cause a problem when the audit log is examined as the netmask/prefix-length is vital in determining what network traffic is affected by a particular SPD entry. This patch fixes this problem by adding two additional fields, "src_prefixlen" and "dst_prefixlen", to the SPD audit messages to indicate the source and destination netmasks. These new fields are only included in the audit message when the netmask/prefix-length is less than the address length, i.e. the SPD entry applies to a network address and not a host address. Example audit message: type=UNKNOWN[1415] msg=audit(1196105849.752:25): auid=0 \ subj=root:system_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 op=SPD-add res=1 \ src=192.168.0.0 src_prefixlen=24 dst=192.168.1.0 dst_prefixlen=24 In addition, this patch also fixes a few other things in the xfrm_audit_common_policyinfo() function. The IPv4 string formatting was converted to use the standard NIPQUAD_FMT constant, the memcpy() was removed from the IPv6 code path and replaced with a typecast (the memcpy() was acting as a slow, implicit typecast anyway), and two local variables were created to make referencing the XFRM security context and selector information cleaner. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-12-01 12:27:18 +00:00
if (sel->prefixlen_d != 128)
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " dst_prefixlen=%d",
sel->prefixlen_d);
break;
}
}
void xfrm_audit_policy_add(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result, bool task_valid)
{
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SPD-add");
if (audit_buf == NULL)
return;
xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo(task_valid, audit_buf);
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", result);
xfrm_audit_common_policyinfo(xp, audit_buf);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xfrm_audit_policy_add);
void xfrm_audit_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result,
bool task_valid)
{
struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SPD-delete");
if (audit_buf == NULL)
return;
xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo(task_valid, audit_buf);
audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", result);
xfrm_audit_common_policyinfo(xp, audit_buf);
audit_log_end(audit_buf);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xfrm_audit_policy_delete);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_MIGRATE
static bool xfrm_migrate_selector_match(const struct xfrm_selector *sel_cmp,
const struct xfrm_selector *sel_tgt)
{
if (sel_cmp->proto == IPSEC_ULPROTO_ANY) {
if (sel_tgt->family == sel_cmp->family &&
xfrm_addr_equal(&sel_tgt->daddr, &sel_cmp->daddr,
sel_cmp->family) &&
xfrm_addr_equal(&sel_tgt->saddr, &sel_cmp->saddr,
sel_cmp->family) &&
sel_tgt->prefixlen_d == sel_cmp->prefixlen_d &&
sel_tgt->prefixlen_s == sel_cmp->prefixlen_s) {
return true;
}
} else {
if (memcmp(sel_tgt, sel_cmp, sizeof(*sel_tgt)) == 0) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_migrate_policy_find(const struct xfrm_selector *sel,
u8 dir, u8 type, struct net *net)
{
struct xfrm_policy *pol, *ret = NULL;
struct hlist_head *chain;
u32 priority = ~0U;
spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
chain = policy_hash_direct(net, &sel->daddr, &sel->saddr, sel->family, dir);
hlist: drop the node parameter from iterators I'm not sure why, but the hlist for each entry iterators were conceived list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member) The hlist ones were greedy and wanted an extra parameter: hlist_for_each_entry(tpos, pos, head, member) Why did they need an extra pos parameter? I'm not quite sure. Not only they don't really need it, it also prevents the iterator from looking exactly like the list iterator, which is unfortunate. Besides the semantic patch, there was some manual work required: - Fix up the actual hlist iterators in linux/list.h - Fix up the declaration of other iterators based on the hlist ones. - A very small amount of places were using the 'node' parameter, this was modified to use 'obj->member' instead. - Coccinelle didn't handle the hlist_for_each_entry_safe iterator properly, so those had to be fixed up manually. The semantic patch which is mostly the work of Peter Senna Tschudin is here: @@ iterator name hlist_for_each_entry, hlist_for_each_entry_continue, hlist_for_each_entry_from, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh, for_each_busy_worker, ax25_uid_for_each, ax25_for_each, inet_bind_bucket_for_each, sctp_for_each_hentry, sk_for_each, sk_for_each_rcu, sk_for_each_from, sk_for_each_safe, sk_for_each_bound, hlist_for_each_entry_safe, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu, nr_neigh_for_each, nr_neigh_for_each_safe, nr_node_for_each, nr_node_for_each_safe, for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp, for_each_gfn_sp, for_each_host; type T; expression a,c,d,e; identifier b; statement S; @@ -T b; <+... when != b ( hlist_for_each_entry(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_from(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh(a, - b, c) S | for_each_busy_worker(a, c, - b, d) S | ax25_uid_for_each(a, - b, c) S | ax25_for_each(a, - b, c) S | inet_bind_bucket_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sctp_for_each_hentry(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_rcu(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_from -(a, b) +(a) S + sk_for_each_from(a) S | sk_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | sk_for_each_bound(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_safe(a, - b, c, d, e) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | nr_node_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_node_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d) S | for_each_host(a, - b, c) S | for_each_host_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | for_each_mesh_entry(a, - b, c, d) S ) ...+> [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus change from net/ipv4/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus hunk from net/ipv6/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings] [akpm@linux-foudnation.org: redo intrusive kvm changes] Tested-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-02-28 01:06:00 +00:00
hlist_for_each_entry(pol, chain, bydst) {
if (xfrm_migrate_selector_match(sel, &pol->selector) &&
pol->type == type) {
ret = pol;
priority = ret->priority;
break;
}
}
chain = &net->xfrm.policy_inexact[dir];
hlist_for_each_entry(pol, chain, bydst_inexact_list) {
if ((pol->priority >= priority) && ret)
break;
if (xfrm_migrate_selector_match(sel, &pol->selector) &&
pol->type == type) {
ret = pol;
break;
}
}
xfrm_pol_hold(ret);
spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
return ret;
}
static int migrate_tmpl_match(const struct xfrm_migrate *m, const struct xfrm_tmpl *t)
{
int match = 0;
if (t->mode == m->mode && t->id.proto == m->proto &&
(m->reqid == 0 || t->reqid == m->reqid)) {
switch (t->mode) {
case XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL:
case XFRM_MODE_BEET:
if (xfrm_addr_equal(&t->id.daddr, &m->old_daddr,
m->old_family) &&
xfrm_addr_equal(&t->saddr, &m->old_saddr,
m->old_family)) {
match = 1;
}
break;
case XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT:
/* in case of transport mode, template does not store
any IP addresses, hence we just compare mode and
protocol */
match = 1;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
return match;
}
/* update endpoint address(es) of template(s) */
static int xfrm_policy_migrate(struct xfrm_policy *pol,
struct xfrm_migrate *m, int num_migrate)
{
struct xfrm_migrate *mp;
int i, j, n = 0;
write_lock_bh(&pol->lock);
if (unlikely(pol->walk.dead)) {
/* target policy has been deleted */
write_unlock_bh(&pol->lock);
return -ENOENT;
}
for (i = 0; i < pol->xfrm_nr; i++) {
for (j = 0, mp = m; j < num_migrate; j++, mp++) {
if (!migrate_tmpl_match(mp, &pol->xfrm_vec[i]))
continue;
n++;
if (pol->xfrm_vec[i].mode != XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL &&
pol->xfrm_vec[i].mode != XFRM_MODE_BEET)
continue;
/* update endpoints */
memcpy(&pol->xfrm_vec[i].id.daddr, &mp->new_daddr,
sizeof(pol->xfrm_vec[i].id.daddr));
memcpy(&pol->xfrm_vec[i].saddr, &mp->new_saddr,
sizeof(pol->xfrm_vec[i].saddr));
pol->xfrm_vec[i].encap_family = mp->new_family;
/* flush bundles */
atomic_inc(&pol->genid);
}
}
write_unlock_bh(&pol->lock);
if (!n)
return -ENODATA;
return 0;
}
static int xfrm_migrate_check(const struct xfrm_migrate *m, int num_migrate)
{
int i, j;
if (num_migrate < 1 || num_migrate > XFRM_MAX_DEPTH)
return -EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < num_migrate; i++) {
if (xfrm_addr_any(&m[i].new_daddr, m[i].new_family) ||
xfrm_addr_any(&m[i].new_saddr, m[i].new_family))
return -EINVAL;
/* check if there is any duplicated entry */
for (j = i + 1; j < num_migrate; j++) {
if (!memcmp(&m[i].old_daddr, &m[j].old_daddr,
sizeof(m[i].old_daddr)) &&
!memcmp(&m[i].old_saddr, &m[j].old_saddr,
sizeof(m[i].old_saddr)) &&
m[i].proto == m[j].proto &&
m[i].mode == m[j].mode &&
m[i].reqid == m[j].reqid &&
m[i].old_family == m[j].old_family)
return -EINVAL;
}
}
return 0;
}
int xfrm_migrate(const struct xfrm_selector *sel, u8 dir, u8 type,
struct xfrm_migrate *m, int num_migrate,
struct xfrm_kmaddress *k, struct net *net,
struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap)
{
int i, err, nx_cur = 0, nx_new = 0;
struct xfrm_policy *pol = NULL;
struct xfrm_state *x, *xc;
struct xfrm_state *x_cur[XFRM_MAX_DEPTH];
struct xfrm_state *x_new[XFRM_MAX_DEPTH];
struct xfrm_migrate *mp;
/* Stage 0 - sanity checks */
if ((err = xfrm_migrate_check(m, num_migrate)) < 0)
goto out;
if (dir >= XFRM_POLICY_MAX) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* Stage 1 - find policy */
if ((pol = xfrm_migrate_policy_find(sel, dir, type, net)) == NULL) {
err = -ENOENT;
goto out;
}
/* Stage 2 - find and update state(s) */
for (i = 0, mp = m; i < num_migrate; i++, mp++) {
if ((x = xfrm_migrate_state_find(mp, net))) {
x_cur[nx_cur] = x;
nx_cur++;
xc = xfrm_state_migrate(x, mp, encap);
if (xc) {
x_new[nx_new] = xc;
nx_new++;
} else {
err = -ENODATA;
goto restore_state;
}
}
}
/* Stage 3 - update policy */
if ((err = xfrm_policy_migrate(pol, m, num_migrate)) < 0)
goto restore_state;
/* Stage 4 - delete old state(s) */
if (nx_cur) {
xfrm_states_put(x_cur, nx_cur);
xfrm_states_delete(x_cur, nx_cur);
}
/* Stage 5 - announce */
km_migrate(sel, dir, type, m, num_migrate, k, encap);
xfrm_pol_put(pol);
return 0;
out:
return err;
restore_state:
if (pol)
xfrm_pol_put(pol);
if (nx_cur)
xfrm_states_put(x_cur, nx_cur);
if (nx_new)
xfrm_states_delete(x_new, nx_new);
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_migrate);
#endif