License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 14:07:57 +00:00
|
|
|
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
# Makefile for the linux kernel.
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
|
2013-07-31 20:53:42 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-y = fork.o exec_domain.o panic.o \
|
2014-06-22 10:06:40 +00:00
|
|
|
cpu.o exit.o softirq.o resource.o \
|
2020-08-15 00:31:07 +00:00
|
|
|
sysctl.o capability.o ptrace.o user.o \
|
2017-09-08 23:17:12 +00:00
|
|
|
signal.o sys.o umh.o workqueue.o pid.o task_work.o \
|
2022-06-22 06:38:37 +00:00
|
|
|
extable.o params.o \
|
2014-06-22 10:06:40 +00:00
|
|
|
kthread.o sys_ni.o nsproxy.o \
|
2013-07-08 23:01:32 +00:00
|
|
|
notifier.o ksysfs.o cred.o reboot.o \
|
2023-06-08 03:31:18 +00:00
|
|
|
async.o range.o smpboot.o ucount.o regset.o ksyms_common.o
|
kernel: conditionally support non-root users, groups and capabilities
There are a lot of embedded systems that run most or all of their
functionality in init, running as root:root. For these systems,
supporting multiple users is not necessary.
This patch adds a new symbol, CONFIG_MULTIUSER, that makes support for
non-root users, non-root groups, and capabilities optional. It is enabled
under CONFIG_EXPERT menu.
When this symbol is not defined, UID and GID are zero in any possible case
and processes always have all capabilities.
The following syscalls are compiled out: setuid, setregid, setgid,
setreuid, setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setgroups,
getgroups, setfsuid, setfsgid, capget, capset.
Also, groups.c is compiled out completely.
In kernel/capability.c, capable function was moved in order to avoid
adding two ifdef blocks.
This change saves about 25 KB on a defconfig build. The most minimal
kernels have total text sizes in the high hundreds of kB rather than
low MB. (The 25k goes down a bit with allnoconfig, but not that much.
The kernel was booted in Qemu. All the common functionalities work.
Adding users/groups is not possible, failing with -ENOSYS.
Bloat-o-meter output:
add/remove: 7/87 grow/shrink: 19/397 up/down: 1675/-26325 (-24650)
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Iulia Manda <iulia.manda21@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 23:16:41 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-08-19 04:27:58 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_USERMODE_DRIVER) += usermode_driver.o
|
kernel: conditionally support non-root users, groups and capabilities
There are a lot of embedded systems that run most or all of their
functionality in init, running as root:root. For these systems,
supporting multiple users is not necessary.
This patch adds a new symbol, CONFIG_MULTIUSER, that makes support for
non-root users, non-root groups, and capabilities optional. It is enabled
under CONFIG_EXPERT menu.
When this symbol is not defined, UID and GID are zero in any possible case
and processes always have all capabilities.
The following syscalls are compiled out: setuid, setregid, setgid,
setreuid, setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setgroups,
getgroups, setfsuid, setfsgid, capget, capset.
Also, groups.c is compiled out completely.
In kernel/capability.c, capable function was moved in order to avoid
adding two ifdef blocks.
This change saves about 25 KB on a defconfig build. The most minimal
kernels have total text sizes in the high hundreds of kB rather than
low MB. (The 25k goes down a bit with allnoconfig, but not that much.
The kernel was booted in Qemu. All the common functionalities work.
Adding users/groups is not possible, failing with -ENOSYS.
Bloat-o-meter output:
add/remove: 7/87 grow/shrink: 19/397 up/down: 1675/-26325 (-24650)
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Iulia Manda <iulia.manda21@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-15 23:16:41 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_MULTIUSER) += groups.o
|
2023-03-10 22:03:30 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_VHOST_TASK) += vhost_task.o
|
2011-10-25 08:00:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-10-06 23:06:12 +00:00
|
|
|
ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
|
2016-01-30 03:54:03 +00:00
|
|
|
# Do not trace internal ftrace files
|
2015-01-09 12:06:33 +00:00
|
|
|
CFLAGS_REMOVE_irq_work.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
|
2008-05-12 19:20:55 +00:00
|
|
|
endif
|
|
|
|
|
kernel: add kcov code coverage
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system. A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.
kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking).
Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.
This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.
We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs
We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.
Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid
input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.
kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.
Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-22 21:27:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# Prevents flicker of uninteresting __do_softirq()/__local_bh_disable_ip()
|
|
|
|
# in coverage traces.
|
|
|
|
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_softirq.o := n
|
2019-11-14 18:02:58 +00:00
|
|
|
# Avoid KCSAN instrumentation in softirq ("No shared variables, all the data
|
|
|
|
# are CPU local" => assume no data races), to reduce overhead in interrupts.
|
|
|
|
KCSAN_SANITIZE_softirq.o = n
|
kernel: add kcov code coverage
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system. A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.
kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking).
Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.
This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.
We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs
We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.
Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid
input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.
kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.
Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-22 21:27:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# These are called from save_stack_trace() on slub debug path,
|
|
|
|
# and produce insane amounts of uninteresting coverage.
|
|
|
|
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_extable.o := n
|
2020-01-31 06:17:35 +00:00
|
|
|
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_stacktrace.o := n
|
kernel: add kcov code coverage
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system. A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.
kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking).
Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.
This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.
We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs
We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.
Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid
input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.
kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.
Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-22 21:27:30 +00:00
|
|
|
# Don't self-instrument.
|
|
|
|
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_kcov.o := n
|
2020-12-16 04:46:46 +00:00
|
|
|
# If sanitizers detect any issues in kcov, it may lead to recursion
|
|
|
|
# via printk, etc.
|
kernel: add kcov code coverage
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system. A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.
kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking).
Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.
This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.
We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs
We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.
Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid
input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.
kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.
Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-22 21:27:30 +00:00
|
|
|
KASAN_SANITIZE_kcov.o := n
|
2019-11-14 18:02:58 +00:00
|
|
|
KCSAN_SANITIZE_kcov.o := n
|
2020-12-16 04:46:46 +00:00
|
|
|
UBSAN_SANITIZE_kcov.o := n
|
2022-09-15 15:03:46 +00:00
|
|
|
KMSAN_SANITIZE_kcov.o := n
|
2020-08-12 01:36:56 +00:00
|
|
|
CFLAGS_kcov.o := $(call cc-option, -fno-conserve-stack) -fno-stack-protector
|
kernel: add kcov code coverage
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system. A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.
kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking).
Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.
This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.
We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs
We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.
Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid
input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.
kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.
Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-22 21:27:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2011-11-15 16:14:39 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-y += sched/
|
2013-10-31 17:11:53 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-y += locking/
|
2012-01-13 23:33:03 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-y += power/
|
2013-07-31 20:53:42 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-y += printk/
|
2013-08-30 07:39:53 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-y += irq/
|
2013-10-09 03:23:47 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-y += rcu/
|
2014-12-16 17:58:19 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-y += livepatch/
|
2018-06-12 17:01:45 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-y += dma/
|
2020-07-22 21:59:56 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-y += entry/
|
2022-03-22 14:03:31 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_MODULES) += module/
|
2011-11-15 16:14:39 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-02-05 22:00:12 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_KCMP) += kcmp.o
|
2008-10-19 03:27:19 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_FREEZER) += freezer.o
|
2008-07-25 08:45:35 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_PROFILING) += profile.o
|
2006-07-03 07:24:38 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_STACKTRACE) += stacktrace.o
|
2006-06-26 07:25:06 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-y += time/
|
2021-09-23 17:10:50 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_FUTEX) += futex/
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_ISA_DMA) += dma.o
|
2011-01-13 00:59:39 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_SMP) += smp.o
|
2009-01-14 17:35:44 +00:00
|
|
|
ifneq ($(CONFIG_SMP),y)
|
2009-01-09 20:27:08 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-y += up.o
|
|
|
|
endif
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_UID16) += uid16.o
|
2019-07-04 18:57:34 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORMAT) += module_signature.o
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS) += kallsyms.o
|
kallsyms: Add self-test facility
Added test cases for basic functions and performance of functions
kallsyms_lookup_name(), kallsyms_on_each_symbol() and
kallsyms_on_each_match_symbol(). It also calculates the compression rate
of the kallsyms compression algorithm for the current symbol set.
The basic functions test begins by testing a set of symbols whose address
values are known. Then, traverse all symbol addresses and find the
corresponding symbol name based on the address. It's impossible to
determine whether these addresses are correct, but we can use the above
three functions along with the addresses to test each other. Due to the
traversal operation of kallsyms_on_each_symbol() is too slow, only 60
symbols can be tested in one second, so let it test on average once
every 128 symbols. The other two functions validate all symbols.
If the basic functions test is passed, print only performance test
results. If the test fails, print error information, but do not perform
subsequent performance tests.
Start self-test automatically after system startup if
CONFIG_KALLSYMS_SELFTEST=y.
Example of output content: (prefix 'kallsyms_selftest:' is omitted
start
---------------------------------------------------------
| nr_symbols | compressed size | original size | ratio(%) |
|---------------------------------------------------------|
| 107543 | 1357912 | 2407433 | 56.40 |
---------------------------------------------------------
kallsyms_lookup_name() looked up 107543 symbols
The time spent on each symbol is (ns): min=630, max=35295, avg=7353
kallsyms_on_each_symbol() traverse all: 11782628 ns
kallsyms_on_each_match_symbol() traverse all: 9261 ns
finish
Signed-off-by: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
2022-11-15 08:33:48 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_KALLSYMS_SELFTEST) += kallsyms_selftest.o
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT) += acct.o
|
crash: move crashkernel parsing and vmcore related code under CONFIG_CRASH_CORE
Patch series "kexec/fadump: remove dependency with CONFIG_KEXEC and
reuse crashkernel parameter for fadump", v4.
Traditionally, kdump is used to save vmcore in case of a crash. Some
architectures like powerpc can save vmcore using architecture specific
support instead of kexec/kdump mechanism. Such architecture specific
support also needs to reserve memory, to be used by dump capture kernel.
crashkernel parameter can be a reused, for memory reservation, by such
architecture specific infrastructure.
This patchset removes dependency with CONFIG_KEXEC for crashkernel
parameter and vmcoreinfo related code as it can be reused without kexec
support. Also, crashkernel parameter is reused instead of
fadump_reserve_mem to reserve memory for fadump.
The first patch moves crashkernel parameter parsing and vmcoreinfo
related code under CONFIG_CRASH_CORE instead of CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE. The
second patch reuses the definitions of append_elf_note() & final_note()
functions under CONFIG_CRASH_CORE in IA64 arch code. The third patch
removes dependency on CONFIG_KEXEC for firmware-assisted dump (fadump)
in powerpc. The next patch reuses crashkernel parameter for reserving
memory for fadump, instead of the fadump_reserve_mem parameter. This
has the advantage of using all syntaxes crashkernel parameter supports,
for fadump as well. The last patch updates fadump kernel documentation
about use of crashkernel parameter.
This patch (of 5):
Traditionally, kdump is used to save vmcore in case of a crash. Some
architectures like powerpc can save vmcore using architecture specific
support instead of kexec/kdump mechanism. Such architecture specific
support also needs to reserve memory, to be used by dump capture kernel.
crashkernel parameter can be a reused, for memory reservation, by such
architecture specific infrastructure.
But currently, code related to vmcoreinfo and parsing of crashkernel
parameter is built under CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE. This patch introduces
CONFIG_CRASH_CORE and moves the above mentioned code under this config,
allowing code reuse without dependency on CONFIG_KEXEC. There is no
functional change with this patch.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/149035338104.6881.4550894432615189948.stgit@hbathini.in.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Hari Bathini <hbathini@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Mahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-05-08 22:56:18 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_CORE) += crash_core.o
|
2015-09-09 22:38:55 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE) += kexec_core.o
|
2005-06-25 21:57:52 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC) += kexec.o
|
2015-09-09 22:38:51 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE) += kexec_file.o
|
2019-08-23 19:49:13 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_ELF) += kexec_elf.o
|
2008-01-30 12:33:08 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_BACKTRACE_SELF_TEST) += backtracetest.o
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_COMPAT) += compat.o
|
2016-12-27 19:49:05 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUPS) += cgroup/
|
2008-02-08 12:18:23 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_UTS_NS) += utsname.o
|
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_USER_NS) += user_namespace.o
|
2008-02-08 12:18:24 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_PID_NS) += pid_namespace.o
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_IKCONFIG) += configs.o
|
2019-05-15 21:35:51 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_IKHEADERS) += kheaders.o
|
2010-05-08 14:20:53 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_SMP) += stop_machine.o
|
2009-12-18 01:12:06 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += audit.o auditfilter.o
|
2018-11-16 17:17:35 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL) += auditsc.o audit_watch.o audit_fsnotify.o audit_tree.o
|
2009-12-18 01:12:06 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL) += gcov/
|
kernel: add kcov code coverage
kcov provides code coverage collection for coverage-guided fuzzing
(randomized testing). Coverage-guided fuzzing is a testing technique
that uses coverage feedback to determine new interesting inputs to a
system. A notable user-space example is AFL
(http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/). However, this technique is not
widely used for kernel testing due to missing compiler and kernel
support.
kcov does not aim to collect as much coverage as possible. It aims to
collect more or less stable coverage that is function of syscall inputs.
To achieve this goal it does not collect coverage in soft/hard
interrupts and instrumentation of some inherently non-deterministic or
non-interesting parts of kernel is disbled (e.g. scheduler, locking).
Currently there is a single coverage collection mode (tracing), but the
API anticipates additional collection modes. Initially I also
implemented a second mode which exposes coverage in a fixed-size hash
table of counters (what Quentin used in his original patch). I've
dropped the second mode for simplicity.
This patch adds the necessary support on kernel side. The complimentary
compiler support was added in gcc revision 231296.
We've used this support to build syzkaller system call fuzzer, which has
found 90 kernel bugs in just 2 months:
https://github.com/google/syzkaller/wiki/Found-Bugs
We've also found 30+ bugs in our internal systems with syzkaller.
Another (yet unexplored) direction where kcov coverage would greatly
help is more traditional "blob mutation". For example, mounting a
random blob as a filesystem, or receiving a random blob over wire.
Why not gcov. Typical fuzzing loop looks as follows: (1) reset
coverage, (2) execute a bit of code, (3) collect coverage, repeat. A
typical coverage can be just a dozen of basic blocks (e.g. an invalid
input). In such context gcov becomes prohibitively expensive as
reset/collect coverage steps depend on total number of basic
blocks/edges in program (in case of kernel it is about 2M). Cost of
kcov depends only on number of executed basic blocks/edges. On top of
that, kernel requires per-thread coverage because there are always
background threads and unrelated processes that also produce coverage.
With inlined gcov instrumentation per-thread coverage is not possible.
kcov exposes kernel PCs and control flow to user-space which is
insecure. But debugfs should not be mapped as user accessible.
Based on a patch by Quentin Casasnovas.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make task_struct.kcov_mode have type `enum kcov_mode']
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak allmodconfig]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: follow x86 Makefile layout standards]
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Tavis Ormandy <taviso@google.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com>
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-03-22 21:27:30 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_KCOV) += kcov.o
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_KPROBES) += kprobes.o
|
2018-01-12 17:56:03 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_FAIL_FUNCTION) += fail_function.o
|
2009-05-19 12:49:32 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_KGDB) += debug/
|
2009-01-15 19:08:40 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK) += hung_task.o
|
2010-05-07 21:11:44 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR) += watchdog.o
|
watchdog/hardlockup: detect hard lockups using secondary (buddy) CPUs
Implement a hardlockup detector that doesn't doesn't need any extra
arch-specific support code to detect lockups. Instead of using something
arch-specific we will use the buddy system, where each CPU watches out for
another one. Specifically, each CPU will use its softlockup hrtimer to
check that the next CPU is processing hrtimer interrupts by verifying that
a counter is increasing.
NOTE: unlike the other hard lockup detectors, the buddy one can't easily
show what's happening on the CPU that locked up just by doing a simple
backtrace. It relies on some other mechanism in the system to get
information about the locked up CPUs. This could be support for NMI
backtraces like [1], it could be a mechanism for printing the PC of locked
CPUs at panic time like [2] / [3], or it could be something else. Even
though that means we still rely on arch-specific code, this arch-specific
code seems to often be implemented even on architectures that don't have a
hardlockup detector.
This style of hardlockup detector originated in some downstream Android
trees and has been rebased on / carried in ChromeOS trees for quite a long
time for use on arm and arm64 boards. Historically on these boards we've
leveraged mechanism [2] / [3] to get information about hung CPUs, but we
could move to [1].
Although the original motivation for the buddy system was for use on
systems without an arch-specific hardlockup detector, it can still be
useful to use even on systems that _do_ have an arch-specific hardlockup
detector. On x86, for instance, there is a 24-part patch series [4] in
progress switching the arch-specific hard lockup detector from a scarce
perf counter to a less-scarce hardware resource. Potentially the buddy
system could be a simpler alternative to free up the perf counter but
still get hard lockup detection.
Overall, pros (+) and cons (-) of the buddy system compared to an
arch-specific hardlockup detector (which might be implemented using
perf):
+ The buddy system is usable on systems that don't have an
arch-specific hardlockup detector, like arm32 and arm64 (though it's
being worked on for arm64 [5]).
+ The buddy system may free up scarce hardware resources.
+ If a CPU totally goes out to lunch (can't process NMIs) the buddy
system could still detect the problem (though it would be unlikely
to be able to get a stack trace).
+ The buddy system uses the same timer function to pet the hardlockup
detector on the running CPU as it uses to detect hardlockups on
other CPUs. Compared to other hardlockup detectors, this means it
generates fewer interrupts and thus is likely better able to let
CPUs stay idle longer.
- If all CPUs are hard locked up at the same time the buddy system
can't detect it.
- If we don't have SMP we can't use the buddy system.
- The buddy system needs an arch-specific mechanism (possibly NMI
backtrace) to get info about the locked up CPU.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230419225604.21204-1-dianders@chromium.org
[2] https://issuetracker.google.com/172213129
[3] https://docs.kernel.org/trace/coresight/coresight-cpu-debug.html
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230301234753.28582-1-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com/
[5] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20220903093415.15850-1-lecopzer.chen@mediatek.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230519101840.v5.14.I6bf789d21d0c3d75d382e7e51a804a7a51315f2c@changeid
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <groeck@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Tzung-Bi Shih <tzungbi@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@csie.org>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Masayoshi Mizuma <msys.mizuma@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Pingfan Liu <kernelfans@gmail.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org>
Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
2023-05-19 17:18:38 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_BUDDY) += watchdog_buddy.o
|
2023-05-19 17:18:31 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF) += watchdog_perf.o
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_SECCOMP) += seccomp.o
|
2006-03-23 18:56:55 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_RELAY) += relay.o
|
2007-02-14 08:33:58 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += utsname_sysctl.o
|
2006-07-14 07:24:36 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_TASK_DELAY_ACCT) += delayacct.o
|
2006-10-01 06:28:55 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_TASKSTATS) += taskstats.o tsacct.o
|
tracing: Kernel Tracepoints
Implementation of kernel tracepoints. Inspired from the Linux Kernel
Markers. Allows complete typing verification by declaring both tracing
statement inline functions and probe registration/unregistration static
inline functions within the same macro "DEFINE_TRACE". No format string
is required. See the tracepoint Documentation and Samples patches for
usage examples.
Taken from the documentation patch :
"A tracepoint placed in code provides a hook to call a function (probe)
that you can provide at runtime. A tracepoint can be "on" (a probe is
connected to it) or "off" (no probe is attached). When a tracepoint is
"off" it has no effect, except for adding a tiny time penalty (checking
a condition for a branch) and space penalty (adding a few bytes for the
function call at the end of the instrumented function and adds a data
structure in a separate section). When a tracepoint is "on", the
function you provide is called each time the tracepoint is executed, in
the execution context of the caller. When the function provided ends its
execution, it returns to the caller (continuing from the tracepoint
site).
You can put tracepoints at important locations in the code. They are
lightweight hooks that can pass an arbitrary number of parameters, which
prototypes are described in a tracepoint declaration placed in a header
file."
Addition and removal of tracepoints is synchronized by RCU using the
scheduler (and preempt_disable) as guarantees to find a quiescent state
(this is really RCU "classic"). The update side uses rcu_barrier_sched()
with call_rcu_sched() and the read/execute side uses
"preempt_disable()/preempt_enable()".
We make sure the previous array containing probes, which has been
scheduled for deletion by the rcu callback, is indeed freed before we
proceed to the next update. It therefore limits the rate of modification
of a single tracepoint to one update per RCU period. The objective here
is to permit fast batch add/removal of probes on _different_
tracepoints.
Changelog :
- Use #name ":" #proto as string to identify the tracepoint in the
tracepoint table. This will make sure not type mismatch happens due to
connexion of a probe with the wrong type to a tracepoint declared with
the same name in a different header.
- Add tracepoint_entry_free_old.
- Change __TO_TRACE to get rid of the 'i' iterator.
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com> :
Tested on x86-64.
Performance impact of a tracepoint : same as markers, except that it
adds about 70 bytes of instructions in an unlikely branch of each
instrumented function (the for loop, the stack setup and the function
call). It currently adds a memory read, a test and a conditional branch
at the instrumentation site (in the hot path). Immediate values will
eventually change this into a load immediate, test and branch, which
removes the memory read which will make the i-cache impact smaller
(changing the memory read for a load immediate removes 3-4 bytes per
site on x86_32 (depending on mov prefixes), or 7-8 bytes on x86_64, it
also saves the d-cache hit).
About the performance impact of tracepoints (which is comparable to
markers), even without immediate values optimizations, tests done by
Hideo Aoki on ia64 show no regression. His test case was using hackbench
on a kernel where scheduler instrumentation (about 5 events in code
scheduler code) was added.
Quoting Hideo Aoki about Markers :
I evaluated overhead of kernel marker using linux-2.6-sched-fixes git
tree, which includes several markers for LTTng, using an ia64 server.
While the immediate trace mark feature isn't implemented on ia64, there
is no major performance regression. So, I think that we don't have any
issues to propose merging marker point patches into Linus's tree from
the viewpoint of performance impact.
I prepared two kernels to evaluate. The first one was compiled without
CONFIG_MARKERS. The second one was enabled CONFIG_MARKERS.
I downloaded the original hackbench from the following URL:
http://devresources.linux-foundation.org/craiger/hackbench/src/hackbench.c
I ran hackbench 5 times in each condition and calculated the average and
difference between the kernels.
The parameter of hackbench: every 50 from 50 to 800
The number of CPUs of the server: 2, 4, and 8
Below is the results. As you can see, major performance regression
wasn't found in any case. Even if number of processes increases,
differences between marker-enabled kernel and marker- disabled kernel
doesn't increase. Moreover, if number of CPUs increases, the differences
doesn't increase either.
Curiously, marker-enabled kernel is better than marker-disabled kernel
in more than half cases, although I guess it comes from the difference
of memory access pattern.
* 2 CPUs
Number of | without | with | diff | diff |
processes | Marker [Sec] | Marker [Sec] | [Sec] | [%] |
--------------------------------------------------------------
50 | 4.811 | 4.872 | +0.061 | +1.27 |
100 | 9.854 | 10.309 | +0.454 | +4.61 |
150 | 15.602 | 15.040 | -0.562 | -3.6 |
200 | 20.489 | 20.380 | -0.109 | -0.53 |
250 | 25.798 | 25.652 | -0.146 | -0.56 |
300 | 31.260 | 30.797 | -0.463 | -1.48 |
350 | 36.121 | 35.770 | -0.351 | -0.97 |
400 | 42.288 | 42.102 | -0.186 | -0.44 |
450 | 47.778 | 47.253 | -0.526 | -1.1 |
500 | 51.953 | 52.278 | +0.325 | +0.63 |
550 | 58.401 | 57.700 | -0.701 | -1.2 |
600 | 63.334 | 63.222 | -0.112 | -0.18 |
650 | 68.816 | 68.511 | -0.306 | -0.44 |
700 | 74.667 | 74.088 | -0.579 | -0.78 |
750 | 78.612 | 79.582 | +0.970 | +1.23 |
800 | 85.431 | 85.263 | -0.168 | -0.2 |
--------------------------------------------------------------
* 4 CPUs
Number of | without | with | diff | diff |
processes | Marker [Sec] | Marker [Sec] | [Sec] | [%] |
--------------------------------------------------------------
50 | 2.586 | 2.584 | -0.003 | -0.1 |
100 | 5.254 | 5.283 | +0.030 | +0.56 |
150 | 8.012 | 8.074 | +0.061 | +0.76 |
200 | 11.172 | 11.000 | -0.172 | -1.54 |
250 | 13.917 | 14.036 | +0.119 | +0.86 |
300 | 16.905 | 16.543 | -0.362 | -2.14 |
350 | 19.901 | 20.036 | +0.135 | +0.68 |
400 | 22.908 | 23.094 | +0.186 | +0.81 |
450 | 26.273 | 26.101 | -0.172 | -0.66 |
500 | 29.554 | 29.092 | -0.461 | -1.56 |
550 | 32.377 | 32.274 | -0.103 | -0.32 |
600 | 35.855 | 35.322 | -0.533 | -1.49 |
650 | 39.192 | 38.388 | -0.804 | -2.05 |
700 | 41.744 | 41.719 | -0.025 | -0.06 |
750 | 45.016 | 44.496 | -0.520 | -1.16 |
800 | 48.212 | 47.603 | -0.609 | -1.26 |
--------------------------------------------------------------
* 8 CPUs
Number of | without | with | diff | diff |
processes | Marker [Sec] | Marker [Sec] | [Sec] | [%] |
--------------------------------------------------------------
50 | 2.094 | 2.072 | -0.022 | -1.07 |
100 | 4.162 | 4.273 | +0.111 | +2.66 |
150 | 6.485 | 6.540 | +0.055 | +0.84 |
200 | 8.556 | 8.478 | -0.078 | -0.91 |
250 | 10.458 | 10.258 | -0.200 | -1.91 |
300 | 12.425 | 12.750 | +0.325 | +2.62 |
350 | 14.807 | 14.839 | +0.032 | +0.22 |
400 | 16.801 | 16.959 | +0.158 | +0.94 |
450 | 19.478 | 19.009 | -0.470 | -2.41 |
500 | 21.296 | 21.504 | +0.208 | +0.98 |
550 | 23.842 | 23.979 | +0.137 | +0.57 |
600 | 26.309 | 26.111 | -0.198 | -0.75 |
650 | 28.705 | 28.446 | -0.259 | -0.9 |
700 | 31.233 | 31.394 | +0.161 | +0.52 |
750 | 34.064 | 33.720 | -0.344 | -1.01 |
800 | 36.320 | 36.114 | -0.206 | -0.57 |
--------------------------------------------------------------
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@polymtl.ca>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@redhat.com>
Acked-by: 'Peter Zijlstra' <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-07-18 16:16:16 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS) += tracepoint.o
|
2008-01-25 20:08:34 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_LATENCYTOP) += latencytop.o
|
2008-10-06 23:06:12 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER) += trace/
|
2008-05-12 19:20:42 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_TRACING) += trace/
|
trace: Stop compiling in trace_clock unconditionally
Commit 56449f437 "tracing: make the trace clocks available generally",
in April 2009, made trace_clock available unconditionally, since
CONFIG_X86_DS used it too.
Commit faa4602e47 "x86, perf, bts, mm: Delete the never used BTS-ptrace code",
in March 2010, removed CONFIG_X86_DS, and now only CONFIG_RING_BUFFER (split
out from CONFIG_TRACING for general use) has a dependency on trace_clock. So,
only compile in trace_clock with CONFIG_RING_BUFFER or CONFIG_TRACING
enabled.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20120903024513.GA19583@leaf
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2012-09-03 02:45:14 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_TRACE_CLOCK) += trace/
|
2009-06-25 05:30:12 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_RING_BUFFER) += trace/
|
2010-10-28 15:31:17 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS) += trace/
|
2022-03-26 02:27:05 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_RETHOOK) += trace/
|
2010-10-14 06:01:34 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_IRQ_WORK) += irq_work.o
|
2011-02-10 10:04:45 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_PM) += cpu_pm.o
|
2014-10-24 01:41:08 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_BPF) += bpf/
|
2019-11-14 18:02:54 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_KCSAN) += kcsan/
|
2020-04-27 16:00:07 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK) += scs.o
|
2022-03-14 11:49:36 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_HAVE_STATIC_CALL) += static_call.o
|
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE) += static_call_inline.o
|
add support for Clang CFI
This change adds support for Clang’s forward-edge Control Flow
Integrity (CFI) checking. With CONFIG_CFI_CLANG, the compiler
injects a runtime check before each indirect function call to ensure
the target is a valid function with the correct static type. This
restricts possible call targets and makes it more difficult for
an attacker to exploit bugs that allow the modification of stored
function pointers. For more details, see:
https://clang.llvm.org/docs/ControlFlowIntegrity.html
Clang requires CONFIG_LTO_CLANG to be enabled with CFI to gain
visibility to possible call targets. Kernel modules are supported
with Clang’s cross-DSO CFI mode, which allows checking between
independently compiled components.
With CFI enabled, the compiler injects a __cfi_check() function into
the kernel and each module for validating local call targets. For
cross-module calls that cannot be validated locally, the compiler
calls the global __cfi_slowpath_diag() function, which determines
the target module and calls the correct __cfi_check() function. This
patch includes a slowpath implementation that uses __module_address()
to resolve call targets, and with CONFIG_CFI_CLANG_SHADOW enabled, a
shadow map that speeds up module look-ups by ~3x.
Clang implements indirect call checking using jump tables and
offers two methods of generating them. With canonical jump tables,
the compiler renames each address-taken function to <function>.cfi
and points the original symbol to a jump table entry, which passes
__cfi_check() validation. This isn’t compatible with stand-alone
assembly code, which the compiler doesn’t instrument, and would
result in indirect calls to assembly code to fail. Therefore, we
default to using non-canonical jump tables instead, where the compiler
generates a local jump table entry <function>.cfi_jt for each
address-taken function, and replaces all references to the function
with the address of the jump table entry.
Note that because non-canonical jump table addresses are local
to each component, they break cross-module function address
equality. Specifically, the address of a global function will be
different in each module, as it's replaced with the address of a local
jump table entry. If this address is passed to a different module,
it won’t match the address of the same function taken there. This
may break code that relies on comparing addresses passed from other
components.
CFI checking can be disabled in a function with the __nocfi attribute.
Additionally, CFI can be disabled for an entire compilation unit by
filtering out CC_FLAGS_CFI.
By default, CFI failures result in a kernel panic to stop a potential
exploit. CONFIG_CFI_PERMISSIVE enables a permissive mode, where the
kernel prints out a rate-limited warning instead, and allows execution
to continue. This option is helpful for locating type mismatches, but
should only be enabled during development.
Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408182843.1754385-2-samitolvanen@google.com
2021-04-08 18:28:26 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CFI_CLANG) += cfi.o
|
2023-12-11 18:27:00 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_NUMA) += numa.o
|
2010-10-26 18:24:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) += events/
|
|
|
|
|
2009-10-25 12:24:45 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER) += user-return-notifier.o
|
2010-01-06 08:47:10 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_PADATA) += padata.o
|
2011-03-23 23:43:29 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP) += crash_dump.o
|
jump label: Reduce the cycle count by changing the link order
In the course of testing jump labels for use with the CFS
bandwidth controller, Paul Turner, discovered that using jump
labels reduced the branch count and the instruction count, but
did not reduce the cycle count or wall time.
I noticed that having the jump_label.o included in the kernel
but not used in any way still caused this increase in cycle
count and wall time. Thus, I moved jump_label.o in the
kernel/Makefile, thus changing the link order, and presumably
moving it out of hot icache areas. This brought down the cycle
count/time as expected.
In addition to Paul's testing, I've tested the patch using a
single 'static_branch()' in the getppid() path, and basically
running tight loops of calls to getppid(). Here are my results
for the branch disabled case:
With jump labels turned on (CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL), branch disabled:
Performance counter stats for 'bash -c /tmp/getppid;true' (50 runs):
3,969,510,217 instructions # 0.864 IPC ( +-0.000% )
4,592,334,954 cycles ( +- 0.046% )
751,634,470 branches ( +- 0.000% )
1.722635797 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.046% )
Jump labels turned off (CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL not set), branch
disabled:
Performance counter stats for 'bash -c /tmp/getppid;true' (50 runs):
4,009,611,846 instructions # 0.867 IPC ( +-0.000% )
4,622,210,580 cycles ( +- 0.012% )
771,662,904 branches ( +- 0.000% )
1.734341454 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.022% )
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com>
Cc: rth@redhat.com
Cc: a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20110805204040.GG2522@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Tested-by: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
2011-08-05 20:40:40 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL) += jump_label.o
|
2012-11-27 18:33:25 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING) += context_tracking.o
|
2014-01-27 19:49:39 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_TORTURE_TEST) += torture.o
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2018-03-30 02:07:13 +00:00
|
|
|
obj-$(CONFIG_HAS_IOMEM) += iomem.o
|
rseq: Introduce restartable sequences system call
Expose a new system call allowing each thread to register one userspace
memory area to be used as an ABI between kernel and user-space for two
purposes: user-space restartable sequences and quick access to read the
current CPU number value from user-space.
* Restartable sequences (per-cpu atomics)
Restartables sequences allow user-space to perform update operations on
per-cpu data without requiring heavy-weight atomic operations.
The restartable critical sections (percpu atomics) work has been started
by Paul Turner and Andrew Hunter. It lets the kernel handle restart of
critical sections. [1] [2] The re-implementation proposed here brings a
few simplifications to the ABI which facilitates porting to other
architectures and speeds up the user-space fast path.
Here are benchmarks of various rseq use-cases.
Test hardware:
arm32: ARMv7 Processor rev 4 (v7l) "Cubietruck", 2-core
x86-64: Intel E5-2630 v3@2.40GHz, 16-core, hyperthreading
The following benchmarks were all performed on a single thread.
* Per-CPU statistic counter increment
getcpu+atomic (ns/op) rseq (ns/op) speedup
arm32: 344.0 31.4 11.0
x86-64: 15.3 2.0 7.7
* LTTng-UST: write event 32-bit header, 32-bit payload into tracer
per-cpu buffer
getcpu+atomic (ns/op) rseq (ns/op) speedup
arm32: 2502.0 2250.0 1.1
x86-64: 117.4 98.0 1.2
* liburcu percpu: lock-unlock pair, dereference, read/compare word
getcpu+atomic (ns/op) rseq (ns/op) speedup
arm32: 751.0 128.5 5.8
x86-64: 53.4 28.6 1.9
* jemalloc memory allocator adapted to use rseq
Using rseq with per-cpu memory pools in jemalloc at Facebook (based on
rseq 2016 implementation):
The production workload response-time has 1-2% gain avg. latency, and
the P99 overall latency drops by 2-3%.
* Reading the current CPU number
Speeding up reading the current CPU number on which the caller thread is
running is done by keeping the current CPU number up do date within the
cpu_id field of the memory area registered by the thread. This is done
by making scheduler preemption set the TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME flag on the
current thread. Upon return to user-space, a notify-resume handler
updates the current CPU value within the registered user-space memory
area. User-space can then read the current CPU number directly from
memory.
Keeping the current cpu id in a memory area shared between kernel and
user-space is an improvement over current mechanisms available to read
the current CPU number, which has the following benefits over
alternative approaches:
- 35x speedup on ARM vs system call through glibc
- 20x speedup on x86 compared to calling glibc, which calls vdso
executing a "lsl" instruction,
- 14x speedup on x86 compared to inlined "lsl" instruction,
- Unlike vdso approaches, this cpu_id value can be read from an inline
assembly, which makes it a useful building block for restartable
sequences.
- The approach of reading the cpu id through memory mapping shared
between kernel and user-space is portable (e.g. ARM), which is not the
case for the lsl-based x86 vdso.
On x86, yet another possible approach would be to use the gs segment
selector to point to user-space per-cpu data. This approach performs
similarly to the cpu id cache, but it has two disadvantages: it is
not portable, and it is incompatible with existing applications already
using the gs segment selector for other purposes.
Benchmarking various approaches for reading the current CPU number:
ARMv7 Processor rev 4 (v7l)
Machine model: Cubietruck
- Baseline (empty loop): 8.4 ns
- Read CPU from rseq cpu_id: 16.7 ns
- Read CPU from rseq cpu_id (lazy register): 19.8 ns
- glibc 2.19-0ubuntu6.6 getcpu: 301.8 ns
- getcpu system call: 234.9 ns
x86-64 Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 v3 @ 2.40GHz:
- Baseline (empty loop): 0.8 ns
- Read CPU from rseq cpu_id: 0.8 ns
- Read CPU from rseq cpu_id (lazy register): 0.8 ns
- Read using gs segment selector: 0.8 ns
- "lsl" inline assembly: 13.0 ns
- glibc 2.19-0ubuntu6 getcpu: 16.6 ns
- getcpu system call: 53.9 ns
- Speed (benchmark taken on v8 of patchset)
Running 10 runs of hackbench -l 100000 seems to indicate, contrary to
expectations, that enabling CONFIG_RSEQ slightly accelerates the
scheduler:
Configuration: 2 sockets * 8-core Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 v3 @
2.40GHz (directly on hardware, hyperthreading disabled in BIOS, energy
saving disabled in BIOS, turboboost disabled in BIOS, cpuidle.off=1
kernel parameter), with a Linux v4.6 defconfig+localyesconfig,
restartable sequences series applied.
* CONFIG_RSEQ=n
avg.: 41.37 s
std.dev.: 0.36 s
* CONFIG_RSEQ=y
avg.: 40.46 s
std.dev.: 0.33 s
- Size
On x86-64, between CONFIG_RSEQ=n/y, the text size increase of vmlinux is
567 bytes, and the data size increase of vmlinux is 5696 bytes.
[1] https://lwn.net/Articles/650333/
[2] http://www.linuxplumbersconf.org/2013/ocw/system/presentations/1695/original/LPC%20-%20PerCpu%20Atomics.pdf
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joelaf@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Chris Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrew Hunter <ahh@google.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: "Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Cc: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Ben Maurer <bmaurer@fb.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20151027235635.16059.11630.stgit@pjt-glaptop.roam.corp.google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150624222609.6116.86035.stgit@kitami.mtv.corp.google.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180602124408.8430-3-mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
2018-06-02 12:43:54 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_RSEQ) += rseq.o
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pipe: Add general notification queue support
Make it possible to have a general notification queue built on top of a
standard pipe. Notifications are 'spliced' into the pipe and then read
out. splice(), vmsplice() and sendfile() are forbidden on pipes used for
notifications as post_one_notification() cannot take pipe->mutex. This
means that notifications could be posted in between individual pipe
buffers, making iov_iter_revert() difficult to effect.
The way the notification queue is used is:
(1) An application opens a pipe with a special flag and indicates the
number of messages it wishes to be able to queue at once (this can
only be set once):
pipe2(fds, O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE);
ioctl(fds[0], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE, queue_depth);
(2) The application then uses poll() and read() as normal to extract data
from the pipe. read() will return multiple notifications if the
buffer is big enough, but it will not split a notification across
buffers - rather it will return a short read or EMSGSIZE.
Notification messages include a length in the header so that the
caller can split them up.
Each message has a header that describes it:
struct watch_notification {
__u32 type:24;
__u32 subtype:8;
__u32 info;
};
The type indicates the source (eg. mount tree changes, superblock events,
keyring changes, block layer events) and the subtype indicates the event
type (eg. mount, unmount; EIO, EDQUOT; link, unlink). The info field
indicates a number of things, including the entry length, an ID assigned to
a watchpoint contributing to this buffer and type-specific flags.
Supplementary data, such as the key ID that generated an event, can be
attached in additional slots. The maximum message size is 127 bytes.
Messages may not be padded or aligned, so there is no guarantee, for
example, that the notification type will be on a 4-byte bounary.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2020-01-14 17:07:11 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE) += watch_queue.o
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2015-08-11 03:07:06 +00:00
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2020-11-03 20:45:08 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_RESOURCE_KUNIT_TEST) += resource_kunit.o
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2019-09-23 09:02:47 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL_KUNIT_TEST) += sysctl-test.o
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2020-06-24 12:33:26 +00:00
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CFLAGS_stackleak.o += $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN)
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2018-08-16 22:16:58 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) += stackleak.o
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KASAN_SANITIZE_stackleak.o := n
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2019-11-14 18:02:58 +00:00
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KCSAN_SANITIZE_stackleak.o := n
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2018-08-16 22:16:58 +00:00
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KCOV_INSTRUMENT_stackleak.o := n
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2020-06-24 22:59:59 +00:00
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obj-$(CONFIG_SCF_TORTURE_TEST) += scftorture.o
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2019-03-08 00:29:53 +00:00
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$(obj)/configs.o: $(obj)/config_data.gz
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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2021-04-25 06:24:07 +00:00
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targets += config_data config_data.gz
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$(obj)/config_data.gz: $(obj)/config_data FORCE
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2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
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$(call if_changed,gzip)
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Provide in-kernel headers to make extending kernel easier
Introduce in-kernel headers which are made available as an archive
through proc (/proc/kheaders.tar.xz file). This archive makes it
possible to run eBPF and other tracing programs that need to extend the
kernel for tracing purposes without any dependency on the file system
having headers.
A github PR is sent for the corresponding BCC patch at:
https://github.com/iovisor/bcc/pull/2312
On Android and embedded systems, it is common to switch kernels but not
have kernel headers available on the file system. Further once a
different kernel is booted, any headers stored on the file system will
no longer be useful. This is an issue even well known to distros.
By storing the headers as a compressed archive within the kernel, we can
avoid these issues that have been a hindrance for a long time.
The best way to use this feature is by building it in. Several users
have a need for this, when they switch debug kernels, they do not want to
update the filesystem or worry about it where to store the headers on
it. However, the feature is also buildable as a module in case the user
desires it not being part of the kernel image. This makes it possible to
load and unload the headers from memory on demand. A tracing program can
load the module, do its operations, and then unload the module to save
kernel memory. The total memory needed is 3.3MB.
By having the archive available at a fixed location independent of
filesystem dependencies and conventions, all debugging tools can
directly refer to the fixed location for the archive, without concerning
with where the headers on a typical filesystem which significantly
simplifies tooling that needs kernel headers.
The code to read the headers is based on /proc/config.gz code and uses
the same technique to embed the headers.
Other approaches were discussed such as having an in-memory mountable
filesystem, but that has drawbacks such as requiring an in-kernel xz
decompressor which we don't have today, and requiring usage of 42 MB of
kernel memory to host the decompressed headers at anytime. Also this
approach is simpler than such approaches.
Reviewed-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-04-26 19:04:29 +00:00
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|
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|
2021-04-25 06:24:07 +00:00
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|
|
filechk_cat = cat $<
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|
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$(obj)/config_data: $(KCONFIG_CONFIG) FORCE
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$(call filechk,cat)
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|
|
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|
Provide in-kernel headers to make extending kernel easier
Introduce in-kernel headers which are made available as an archive
through proc (/proc/kheaders.tar.xz file). This archive makes it
possible to run eBPF and other tracing programs that need to extend the
kernel for tracing purposes without any dependency on the file system
having headers.
A github PR is sent for the corresponding BCC patch at:
https://github.com/iovisor/bcc/pull/2312
On Android and embedded systems, it is common to switch kernels but not
have kernel headers available on the file system. Further once a
different kernel is booted, any headers stored on the file system will
no longer be useful. This is an issue even well known to distros.
By storing the headers as a compressed archive within the kernel, we can
avoid these issues that have been a hindrance for a long time.
The best way to use this feature is by building it in. Several users
have a need for this, when they switch debug kernels, they do not want to
update the filesystem or worry about it where to store the headers on
it. However, the feature is also buildable as a module in case the user
desires it not being part of the kernel image. This makes it possible to
load and unload the headers from memory on demand. A tracing program can
load the module, do its operations, and then unload the module to save
kernel memory. The total memory needed is 3.3MB.
By having the archive available at a fixed location independent of
filesystem dependencies and conventions, all debugging tools can
directly refer to the fixed location for the archive, without concerning
with where the headers on a typical filesystem which significantly
simplifies tooling that needs kernel headers.
The code to read the headers is based on /proc/config.gz code and uses
the same technique to embed the headers.
Other approaches were discussed such as having an in-memory mountable
filesystem, but that has drawbacks such as requiring an in-kernel xz
decompressor which we don't have today, and requiring usage of 42 MB of
kernel memory to host the decompressed headers at anytime. Also this
approach is simpler than such approaches.
Reviewed-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-04-26 19:04:29 +00:00
|
|
|
$(obj)/kheaders.o: $(obj)/kheaders_data.tar.xz
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
quiet_cmd_genikh = CHK $(obj)/kheaders_data.tar.xz
|
2019-10-08 12:05:55 +00:00
|
|
|
cmd_genikh = $(CONFIG_SHELL) $(srctree)/kernel/gen_kheaders.sh $@
|
Provide in-kernel headers to make extending kernel easier
Introduce in-kernel headers which are made available as an archive
through proc (/proc/kheaders.tar.xz file). This archive makes it
possible to run eBPF and other tracing programs that need to extend the
kernel for tracing purposes without any dependency on the file system
having headers.
A github PR is sent for the corresponding BCC patch at:
https://github.com/iovisor/bcc/pull/2312
On Android and embedded systems, it is common to switch kernels but not
have kernel headers available on the file system. Further once a
different kernel is booted, any headers stored on the file system will
no longer be useful. This is an issue even well known to distros.
By storing the headers as a compressed archive within the kernel, we can
avoid these issues that have been a hindrance for a long time.
The best way to use this feature is by building it in. Several users
have a need for this, when they switch debug kernels, they do not want to
update the filesystem or worry about it where to store the headers on
it. However, the feature is also buildable as a module in case the user
desires it not being part of the kernel image. This makes it possible to
load and unload the headers from memory on demand. A tracing program can
load the module, do its operations, and then unload the module to save
kernel memory. The total memory needed is 3.3MB.
By having the archive available at a fixed location independent of
filesystem dependencies and conventions, all debugging tools can
directly refer to the fixed location for the archive, without concerning
with where the headers on a typical filesystem which significantly
simplifies tooling that needs kernel headers.
The code to read the headers is based on /proc/config.gz code and uses
the same technique to embed the headers.
Other approaches were discussed such as having an in-memory mountable
filesystem, but that has drawbacks such as requiring an in-kernel xz
decompressor which we don't have today, and requiring usage of 42 MB of
kernel memory to host the decompressed headers at anytime. Also this
approach is simpler than such approaches.
Reviewed-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-04-26 19:04:29 +00:00
|
|
|
$(obj)/kheaders_data.tar.xz: FORCE
|
|
|
|
$(call cmd,genikh)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
clean-files := kheaders_data.tar.xz kheaders.md5
|