linux/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c

1718 lines
45 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/* L2TP core.
*
* Copyright (c) 2008,2009,2010 Katalix Systems Ltd
*
* This file contains some code of the original L2TPv2 pppol2tp
* driver, which has the following copyright:
*
* Authors: Martijn van Oosterhout <kleptog@svana.org>
* James Chapman (jchapman@katalix.com)
* Contributors:
* Michal Ostrowski <mostrows@speakeasy.net>
* Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@xconectiva.com.br>
* David S. Miller (davem@redhat.com)
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/rculist.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/kthread.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/jiffies.h>
#include <linux/netdevice.h>
#include <linux/net.h>
#include <linux/inetdevice.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/in.h>
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/udp.h>
#include <linux/l2tp.h>
#include <linux/hash.h>
#include <linux/sort.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
#include <net/netns/generic.h>
#include <net/dst.h>
#include <net/ip.h>
#include <net/udp.h>
#include <net/udp_tunnel.h>
#include <net/inet_common.h>
#include <net/xfrm.h>
#include <net/protocol.h>
#include <net/inet6_connection_sock.h>
#include <net/inet_ecn.h>
#include <net/ip6_route.h>
#include <net/ip6_checksum.h>
#include <asm/byteorder.h>
#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include "l2tp_core.h"
#include "trace.h"
#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
#include "trace.h"
#define L2TP_DRV_VERSION "V2.0"
/* L2TP header constants */
#define L2TP_HDRFLAG_T 0x8000
#define L2TP_HDRFLAG_L 0x4000
#define L2TP_HDRFLAG_S 0x0800
#define L2TP_HDRFLAG_O 0x0200
#define L2TP_HDRFLAG_P 0x0100
#define L2TP_HDR_VER_MASK 0x000F
#define L2TP_HDR_VER_2 0x0002
#define L2TP_HDR_VER_3 0x0003
/* L2TPv3 default L2-specific sublayer */
#define L2TP_SLFLAG_S 0x40000000
#define L2TP_SL_SEQ_MASK 0x00ffffff
#define L2TP_HDR_SIZE_MAX 14
/* Default trace flags */
#define L2TP_DEFAULT_DEBUG_FLAGS 0
/* Private data stored for received packets in the skb.
*/
struct l2tp_skb_cb {
u32 ns;
u16 has_seq;
u16 length;
unsigned long expires;
};
#define L2TP_SKB_CB(skb) ((struct l2tp_skb_cb *)&(skb)->cb[sizeof(struct inet_skb_parm)])
static struct workqueue_struct *l2tp_wq;
/* per-net private data for this module */
static unsigned int l2tp_net_id;
struct l2tp_net {
struct list_head l2tp_tunnel_list;
/* Lock for write access to l2tp_tunnel_list */
spinlock_t l2tp_tunnel_list_lock;
struct hlist_head l2tp_session_hlist[L2TP_HASH_SIZE_2];
/* Lock for write access to l2tp_session_hlist */
spinlock_t l2tp_session_hlist_lock;
};
l2tp: fix races with ipv4-mapped ipv6 addresses The l2tp_tunnel_create() function checks for v4mapped ipv6 sockets and cache that flag, so that l2tp core code can reusing it at xmit time. If the socket is provided by the userspace, the connection status of the tunnel sockets can change between the tunnel creation and the xmit call, so that syzbot is able to trigger the following splat: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ip6_dst_idev include/net/ip6_fib.h:192 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ip6_xmit+0x1f76/0x2260 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:264 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801bd949318 by task syz-executor4/23448 CPU: 0 PID: 23448 Comm: syz-executor4 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc4+ #65 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x24d lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:256 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline] kasan_report+0x23c/0x360 mm/kasan/report.c:412 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:433 ip6_dst_idev include/net/ip6_fib.h:192 [inline] ip6_xmit+0x1f76/0x2260 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:264 inet6_csk_xmit+0x2fc/0x580 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:139 l2tp_xmit_core net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:1053 [inline] l2tp_xmit_skb+0x105f/0x1410 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:1148 pppol2tp_sendmsg+0x470/0x670 net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c:341 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:640 ___sys_sendmsg+0x767/0x8b0 net/socket.c:2046 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x210 net/socket.c:2080 SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2091 [inline] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 net/socket.c:2087 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x453e69 RSP: 002b:00007f819593cc68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f819593d6d4 RCX: 0000000000453e69 RDX: 0000000000000081 RSI: 000000002037ffc8 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 000000000072bea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 00000000000004c3 R14: 00000000006f72e8 R15: 0000000000000000 This change addresses the issues: * explicitly checking for TCP_ESTABLISHED for user space provided sockets * dropping the v4mapped flag usage - it can become outdated - and explicitly invoking ipv6_addr_v4mapped() instead The issue is apparently there since ancient times. v1 -> v2: (many thanks to Guillaume) - with csum issue introduced in v1 - replace pr_err with pr_debug - fix build issue with IPV6 disabled - move l2tp_sk_is_v4mapped in l2tp_core.c v2 -> v3: - don't update inet_daddr for v4mapped address, unneeded - drop rendundant check at creation time Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+92fa328176eb07e4ac1a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 3557baabf280 ("[L2TP]: PPP over L2TP driver core") Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-03-12 13:54:24 +00:00
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
static bool l2tp_sk_is_v6(struct sock *sk)
{
return sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 &&
!ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&sk->sk_v6_daddr);
}
#endif
static inline struct l2tp_net *l2tp_pernet(const struct net *net)
{
return net_generic(net, l2tp_net_id);
}
/* Session hash global list for L2TPv3.
* The session_id SHOULD be random according to RFC3931, but several
* L2TP implementations use incrementing session_ids. So we do a real
* hash on the session_id, rather than a simple bitmask.
*/
static inline struct hlist_head *
l2tp_session_id_hash_2(struct l2tp_net *pn, u32 session_id)
{
return &pn->l2tp_session_hlist[hash_32(session_id, L2TP_HASH_BITS_2)];
}
/* Session hash list.
* The session_id SHOULD be random according to RFC2661, but several
* L2TP implementations (Cisco and Microsoft) use incrementing
* session_ids. So we do a real hash on the session_id, rather than a
* simple bitmask.
*/
static inline struct hlist_head *
l2tp_session_id_hash(struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel, u32 session_id)
{
return &tunnel->session_hlist[hash_32(session_id, L2TP_HASH_BITS)];
}
static void l2tp_tunnel_free(struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel)
l2tp: fix races with tunnel socket close The tunnel socket tunnel->sock (struct sock) is accessed when preparing a new ppp session on a tunnel at pppol2tp_session_init. If the socket is closed by a thread while another is creating a new session, the threads race. In pppol2tp_connect, the tunnel object may be created if the pppol2tp socket is associated with the special session_id 0 and the tunnel socket is looked up using the provided fd. When handling this, pppol2tp_connect cannot sock_hold the tunnel socket to prevent it being destroyed during pppol2tp_connect since this may itself may race with the socket being destroyed. Doing sockfd_lookup in pppol2tp_connect isn't sufficient to prevent tunnel->sock going away either because a given tunnel socket fd may be reused between calls to pppol2tp_connect. Instead, have l2tp_tunnel_create sock_hold the tunnel socket before it does sockfd_put. This ensures that the tunnel's socket is always extant while the tunnel object exists. Hold a ref on the socket until the tunnel is destroyed and ensure that all tunnel destroy paths go through a common function (l2tp_tunnel_delete) since this will do the final sock_put to release the tunnel socket. Since the tunnel's socket is now guaranteed to exist if the tunnel exists, we no longer need to use sockfd_lookup via l2tp_sock_to_tunnel to derive the tunnel from the socket since this is always sk_user_data. Also, sessions no longer sock_hold the tunnel socket since sessions already hold a tunnel ref and the tunnel sock will not be freed until the tunnel is freed. Removing these sock_holds in l2tp_session_register avoids a possible sock leak in the pppol2tp_connect error path if l2tp_session_register succeeds but attaching a ppp channel fails. The pppol2tp_connect error path could have been fixed instead and have the sock ref dropped when the session is freed, but doing a sock_put of the tunnel socket when the session is freed would require a new session_free callback. It is simpler to just remove the sock_hold of the tunnel socket in l2tp_session_register, now that the tunnel socket lifetime is guaranteed. Finally, some init code in l2tp_tunnel_create is reordered to ensure that the new tunnel object's refcount is set and the tunnel socket ref is taken before the tunnel socket destructor callbacks are set. kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 4360 Comm: syzbot_19c09769 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc2+ #34 Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 RIP: 0010:pppol2tp_session_init+0x1d6/0x500 RSP: 0018:ffff88001377fb40 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88001636a940 RCX: ffffffff84836c1d RDX: 0000000000000045 RSI: 0000000055976744 RDI: 0000000000000228 RBP: ffff88001377fb60 R08: ffffffff84836bc8 R09: 0000000000000002 R10: ffff88001377fab8 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff88001636aac8 R14: ffff8800160f81c0 R15: 1ffff100026eff76 FS: 00007ffb3ea66700(0000) GS:ffff88001a400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020e77000 CR3: 0000000016261000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: pppol2tp_connect+0xd18/0x13c0 ? pppol2tp_session_create+0x170/0x170 ? __might_fault+0x115/0x1d0 ? lock_downgrade+0x860/0x860 ? __might_fault+0xe5/0x1d0 ? security_socket_connect+0x8e/0xc0 SYSC_connect+0x1b6/0x310 ? SYSC_bind+0x280/0x280 ? __do_page_fault+0x5d1/0xca0 ? up_read+0x1f/0x40 ? __do_page_fault+0x3c8/0xca0 SyS_connect+0x29/0x30 ? SyS_accept+0x40/0x40 do_syscall_64+0x1e0/0x730 ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x7ffb3e376259 RSP: 002b:00007ffeda4f6508 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020e77012 RCX: 00007ffb3e376259 RDX: 000000000000002e RSI: 0000000020e77000 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007ffeda4f6540 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000400b60 R13: 00007ffeda4f6660 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Code: 80 3d b0 ff 06 02 00 0f 84 07 02 00 00 e8 13 d6 db fc 49 8d bc 24 28 02 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 f a 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 ed 02 00 00 4d 8b a4 24 28 02 00 00 e8 13 16 Fixes: 80d84ef3ff1dd ("l2tp: prevent l2tp_tunnel_delete racing with userspace close") Signed-off-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-23 17:45:45 +00:00
{
trace_free_tunnel(tunnel);
l2tp: fix races with tunnel socket close The tunnel socket tunnel->sock (struct sock) is accessed when preparing a new ppp session on a tunnel at pppol2tp_session_init. If the socket is closed by a thread while another is creating a new session, the threads race. In pppol2tp_connect, the tunnel object may be created if the pppol2tp socket is associated with the special session_id 0 and the tunnel socket is looked up using the provided fd. When handling this, pppol2tp_connect cannot sock_hold the tunnel socket to prevent it being destroyed during pppol2tp_connect since this may itself may race with the socket being destroyed. Doing sockfd_lookup in pppol2tp_connect isn't sufficient to prevent tunnel->sock going away either because a given tunnel socket fd may be reused between calls to pppol2tp_connect. Instead, have l2tp_tunnel_create sock_hold the tunnel socket before it does sockfd_put. This ensures that the tunnel's socket is always extant while the tunnel object exists. Hold a ref on the socket until the tunnel is destroyed and ensure that all tunnel destroy paths go through a common function (l2tp_tunnel_delete) since this will do the final sock_put to release the tunnel socket. Since the tunnel's socket is now guaranteed to exist if the tunnel exists, we no longer need to use sockfd_lookup via l2tp_sock_to_tunnel to derive the tunnel from the socket since this is always sk_user_data. Also, sessions no longer sock_hold the tunnel socket since sessions already hold a tunnel ref and the tunnel sock will not be freed until the tunnel is freed. Removing these sock_holds in l2tp_session_register avoids a possible sock leak in the pppol2tp_connect error path if l2tp_session_register succeeds but attaching a ppp channel fails. The pppol2tp_connect error path could have been fixed instead and have the sock ref dropped when the session is freed, but doing a sock_put of the tunnel socket when the session is freed would require a new session_free callback. It is simpler to just remove the sock_hold of the tunnel socket in l2tp_session_register, now that the tunnel socket lifetime is guaranteed. Finally, some init code in l2tp_tunnel_create is reordered to ensure that the new tunnel object's refcount is set and the tunnel socket ref is taken before the tunnel socket destructor callbacks are set. kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 4360 Comm: syzbot_19c09769 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc2+ #34 Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 RIP: 0010:pppol2tp_session_init+0x1d6/0x500 RSP: 0018:ffff88001377fb40 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88001636a940 RCX: ffffffff84836c1d RDX: 0000000000000045 RSI: 0000000055976744 RDI: 0000000000000228 RBP: ffff88001377fb60 R08: ffffffff84836bc8 R09: 0000000000000002 R10: ffff88001377fab8 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff88001636aac8 R14: ffff8800160f81c0 R15: 1ffff100026eff76 FS: 00007ffb3ea66700(0000) GS:ffff88001a400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020e77000 CR3: 0000000016261000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: pppol2tp_connect+0xd18/0x13c0 ? pppol2tp_session_create+0x170/0x170 ? __might_fault+0x115/0x1d0 ? lock_downgrade+0x860/0x860 ? __might_fault+0xe5/0x1d0 ? security_socket_connect+0x8e/0xc0 SYSC_connect+0x1b6/0x310 ? SYSC_bind+0x280/0x280 ? __do_page_fault+0x5d1/0xca0 ? up_read+0x1f/0x40 ? __do_page_fault+0x3c8/0xca0 SyS_connect+0x29/0x30 ? SyS_accept+0x40/0x40 do_syscall_64+0x1e0/0x730 ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x7ffb3e376259 RSP: 002b:00007ffeda4f6508 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020e77012 RCX: 00007ffb3e376259 RDX: 000000000000002e RSI: 0000000020e77000 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007ffeda4f6540 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000400b60 R13: 00007ffeda4f6660 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Code: 80 3d b0 ff 06 02 00 0f 84 07 02 00 00 e8 13 d6 db fc 49 8d bc 24 28 02 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 f a 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 ed 02 00 00 4d 8b a4 24 28 02 00 00 e8 13 16 Fixes: 80d84ef3ff1dd ("l2tp: prevent l2tp_tunnel_delete racing with userspace close") Signed-off-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-23 17:45:45 +00:00
sock_put(tunnel->sock);
/* the tunnel is freed in the socket destructor */
}
static void l2tp_session_free(struct l2tp_session *session)
{
trace_free_session(session);
l2tp: make magic feather checks more useful The l2tp tunnel and session structures contain a "magic feather" field which was originally intended to help trace lifetime bugs in the code. Since the introduction of the shared kernel refcount code in refcount.h, and l2tp's porting to those APIs, we are covered by the refcount code's checks and warnings. Duplicating those checks in the l2tp code isn't useful. However, magic feather checks are still useful to help to detect bugs stemming from misuse/trampling of the sk_user_data pointer in struct sock. The l2tp code makes extensive use of sk_user_data to stash pointers to the tunnel and session structures, and if another subsystem overwrites sk_user_data it's important to detect this. As such, rework l2tp's magic feather checks to focus on validating the tunnel and session data structures when they're extracted from sk_user_data. * Add a new accessor function l2tp_sk_to_tunnel which contains a magic feather check, and is used by l2tp_core and l2tp_ip[6] * Comment l2tp_udp_encap_recv which doesn't use this new accessor function because of the specific nature of the codepath it is called in * Drop l2tp_session_queue_purge's check on the session magic feather: it is called from code which is walking the tunnel session list, and hence doesn't need validation * Drop l2tp_session_free's check on the tunnel magic feather: the intention of this check is covered by refcount.h's reference count sanity checking * Add session magic validation in pppol2tp_ioctl. On failure return -EBADF, which mirrors the approach in pppol2tp_[sg]etsockopt. Signed-off-by: Tom Parkin <tparkin@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-09-03 08:54:51 +00:00
if (session->tunnel)
l2tp_tunnel_dec_refcount(session->tunnel);
kfree(session);
}
l2tp: make magic feather checks more useful The l2tp tunnel and session structures contain a "magic feather" field which was originally intended to help trace lifetime bugs in the code. Since the introduction of the shared kernel refcount code in refcount.h, and l2tp's porting to those APIs, we are covered by the refcount code's checks and warnings. Duplicating those checks in the l2tp code isn't useful. However, magic feather checks are still useful to help to detect bugs stemming from misuse/trampling of the sk_user_data pointer in struct sock. The l2tp code makes extensive use of sk_user_data to stash pointers to the tunnel and session structures, and if another subsystem overwrites sk_user_data it's important to detect this. As such, rework l2tp's magic feather checks to focus on validating the tunnel and session data structures when they're extracted from sk_user_data. * Add a new accessor function l2tp_sk_to_tunnel which contains a magic feather check, and is used by l2tp_core and l2tp_ip[6] * Comment l2tp_udp_encap_recv which doesn't use this new accessor function because of the specific nature of the codepath it is called in * Drop l2tp_session_queue_purge's check on the session magic feather: it is called from code which is walking the tunnel session list, and hence doesn't need validation * Drop l2tp_session_free's check on the tunnel magic feather: the intention of this check is covered by refcount.h's reference count sanity checking * Add session magic validation in pppol2tp_ioctl. On failure return -EBADF, which mirrors the approach in pppol2tp_[sg]etsockopt. Signed-off-by: Tom Parkin <tparkin@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-09-03 08:54:51 +00:00
struct l2tp_tunnel *l2tp_sk_to_tunnel(struct sock *sk)
{
struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel = sk->sk_user_data;
if (tunnel)
if (WARN_ON(tunnel->magic != L2TP_TUNNEL_MAGIC))
l2tp: make magic feather checks more useful The l2tp tunnel and session structures contain a "magic feather" field which was originally intended to help trace lifetime bugs in the code. Since the introduction of the shared kernel refcount code in refcount.h, and l2tp's porting to those APIs, we are covered by the refcount code's checks and warnings. Duplicating those checks in the l2tp code isn't useful. However, magic feather checks are still useful to help to detect bugs stemming from misuse/trampling of the sk_user_data pointer in struct sock. The l2tp code makes extensive use of sk_user_data to stash pointers to the tunnel and session structures, and if another subsystem overwrites sk_user_data it's important to detect this. As such, rework l2tp's magic feather checks to focus on validating the tunnel and session data structures when they're extracted from sk_user_data. * Add a new accessor function l2tp_sk_to_tunnel which contains a magic feather check, and is used by l2tp_core and l2tp_ip[6] * Comment l2tp_udp_encap_recv which doesn't use this new accessor function because of the specific nature of the codepath it is called in * Drop l2tp_session_queue_purge's check on the session magic feather: it is called from code which is walking the tunnel session list, and hence doesn't need validation * Drop l2tp_session_free's check on the tunnel magic feather: the intention of this check is covered by refcount.h's reference count sanity checking * Add session magic validation in pppol2tp_ioctl. On failure return -EBADF, which mirrors the approach in pppol2tp_[sg]etsockopt. Signed-off-by: Tom Parkin <tparkin@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-09-03 08:54:51 +00:00
return NULL;
l2tp: make magic feather checks more useful The l2tp tunnel and session structures contain a "magic feather" field which was originally intended to help trace lifetime bugs in the code. Since the introduction of the shared kernel refcount code in refcount.h, and l2tp's porting to those APIs, we are covered by the refcount code's checks and warnings. Duplicating those checks in the l2tp code isn't useful. However, magic feather checks are still useful to help to detect bugs stemming from misuse/trampling of the sk_user_data pointer in struct sock. The l2tp code makes extensive use of sk_user_data to stash pointers to the tunnel and session structures, and if another subsystem overwrites sk_user_data it's important to detect this. As such, rework l2tp's magic feather checks to focus on validating the tunnel and session data structures when they're extracted from sk_user_data. * Add a new accessor function l2tp_sk_to_tunnel which contains a magic feather check, and is used by l2tp_core and l2tp_ip[6] * Comment l2tp_udp_encap_recv which doesn't use this new accessor function because of the specific nature of the codepath it is called in * Drop l2tp_session_queue_purge's check on the session magic feather: it is called from code which is walking the tunnel session list, and hence doesn't need validation * Drop l2tp_session_free's check on the tunnel magic feather: the intention of this check is covered by refcount.h's reference count sanity checking * Add session magic validation in pppol2tp_ioctl. On failure return -EBADF, which mirrors the approach in pppol2tp_[sg]etsockopt. Signed-off-by: Tom Parkin <tparkin@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-09-03 08:54:51 +00:00
return tunnel;
}
l2tp: make magic feather checks more useful The l2tp tunnel and session structures contain a "magic feather" field which was originally intended to help trace lifetime bugs in the code. Since the introduction of the shared kernel refcount code in refcount.h, and l2tp's porting to those APIs, we are covered by the refcount code's checks and warnings. Duplicating those checks in the l2tp code isn't useful. However, magic feather checks are still useful to help to detect bugs stemming from misuse/trampling of the sk_user_data pointer in struct sock. The l2tp code makes extensive use of sk_user_data to stash pointers to the tunnel and session structures, and if another subsystem overwrites sk_user_data it's important to detect this. As such, rework l2tp's magic feather checks to focus on validating the tunnel and session data structures when they're extracted from sk_user_data. * Add a new accessor function l2tp_sk_to_tunnel which contains a magic feather check, and is used by l2tp_core and l2tp_ip[6] * Comment l2tp_udp_encap_recv which doesn't use this new accessor function because of the specific nature of the codepath it is called in * Drop l2tp_session_queue_purge's check on the session magic feather: it is called from code which is walking the tunnel session list, and hence doesn't need validation * Drop l2tp_session_free's check on the tunnel magic feather: the intention of this check is covered by refcount.h's reference count sanity checking * Add session magic validation in pppol2tp_ioctl. On failure return -EBADF, which mirrors the approach in pppol2tp_[sg]etsockopt. Signed-off-by: Tom Parkin <tparkin@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-09-03 08:54:51 +00:00
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_sk_to_tunnel);
void l2tp_tunnel_inc_refcount(struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel)
{
refcount_inc(&tunnel->ref_count);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_tunnel_inc_refcount);
void l2tp_tunnel_dec_refcount(struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel)
{
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&tunnel->ref_count))
l2tp_tunnel_free(tunnel);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_tunnel_dec_refcount);
void l2tp_session_inc_refcount(struct l2tp_session *session)
{
refcount_inc(&session->ref_count);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_session_inc_refcount);
void l2tp_session_dec_refcount(struct l2tp_session *session)
{
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&session->ref_count))
l2tp_session_free(session);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_session_dec_refcount);
l2tp: fix races with tunnel socket close The tunnel socket tunnel->sock (struct sock) is accessed when preparing a new ppp session on a tunnel at pppol2tp_session_init. If the socket is closed by a thread while another is creating a new session, the threads race. In pppol2tp_connect, the tunnel object may be created if the pppol2tp socket is associated with the special session_id 0 and the tunnel socket is looked up using the provided fd. When handling this, pppol2tp_connect cannot sock_hold the tunnel socket to prevent it being destroyed during pppol2tp_connect since this may itself may race with the socket being destroyed. Doing sockfd_lookup in pppol2tp_connect isn't sufficient to prevent tunnel->sock going away either because a given tunnel socket fd may be reused between calls to pppol2tp_connect. Instead, have l2tp_tunnel_create sock_hold the tunnel socket before it does sockfd_put. This ensures that the tunnel's socket is always extant while the tunnel object exists. Hold a ref on the socket until the tunnel is destroyed and ensure that all tunnel destroy paths go through a common function (l2tp_tunnel_delete) since this will do the final sock_put to release the tunnel socket. Since the tunnel's socket is now guaranteed to exist if the tunnel exists, we no longer need to use sockfd_lookup via l2tp_sock_to_tunnel to derive the tunnel from the socket since this is always sk_user_data. Also, sessions no longer sock_hold the tunnel socket since sessions already hold a tunnel ref and the tunnel sock will not be freed until the tunnel is freed. Removing these sock_holds in l2tp_session_register avoids a possible sock leak in the pppol2tp_connect error path if l2tp_session_register succeeds but attaching a ppp channel fails. The pppol2tp_connect error path could have been fixed instead and have the sock ref dropped when the session is freed, but doing a sock_put of the tunnel socket when the session is freed would require a new session_free callback. It is simpler to just remove the sock_hold of the tunnel socket in l2tp_session_register, now that the tunnel socket lifetime is guaranteed. Finally, some init code in l2tp_tunnel_create is reordered to ensure that the new tunnel object's refcount is set and the tunnel socket ref is taken before the tunnel socket destructor callbacks are set. kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 4360 Comm: syzbot_19c09769 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc2+ #34 Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 RIP: 0010:pppol2tp_session_init+0x1d6/0x500 RSP: 0018:ffff88001377fb40 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88001636a940 RCX: ffffffff84836c1d RDX: 0000000000000045 RSI: 0000000055976744 RDI: 0000000000000228 RBP: ffff88001377fb60 R08: ffffffff84836bc8 R09: 0000000000000002 R10: ffff88001377fab8 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff88001636aac8 R14: ffff8800160f81c0 R15: 1ffff100026eff76 FS: 00007ffb3ea66700(0000) GS:ffff88001a400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020e77000 CR3: 0000000016261000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: pppol2tp_connect+0xd18/0x13c0 ? pppol2tp_session_create+0x170/0x170 ? __might_fault+0x115/0x1d0 ? lock_downgrade+0x860/0x860 ? __might_fault+0xe5/0x1d0 ? security_socket_connect+0x8e/0xc0 SYSC_connect+0x1b6/0x310 ? SYSC_bind+0x280/0x280 ? __do_page_fault+0x5d1/0xca0 ? up_read+0x1f/0x40 ? __do_page_fault+0x3c8/0xca0 SyS_connect+0x29/0x30 ? SyS_accept+0x40/0x40 do_syscall_64+0x1e0/0x730 ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x7ffb3e376259 RSP: 002b:00007ffeda4f6508 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020e77012 RCX: 00007ffb3e376259 RDX: 000000000000002e RSI: 0000000020e77000 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007ffeda4f6540 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000400b60 R13: 00007ffeda4f6660 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Code: 80 3d b0 ff 06 02 00 0f 84 07 02 00 00 e8 13 d6 db fc 49 8d bc 24 28 02 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 f a 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 ed 02 00 00 4d 8b a4 24 28 02 00 00 e8 13 16 Fixes: 80d84ef3ff1dd ("l2tp: prevent l2tp_tunnel_delete racing with userspace close") Signed-off-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-23 17:45:45 +00:00
/* Lookup a tunnel. A new reference is held on the returned tunnel. */
struct l2tp_tunnel *l2tp_tunnel_get(const struct net *net, u32 tunnel_id)
{
const struct l2tp_net *pn = l2tp_pernet(net);
struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel;
rcu_read_lock_bh();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(tunnel, &pn->l2tp_tunnel_list, list) {
l2ip: fix possible use-after-free Before taking a refcount on a rcu protected structure, we need to make sure the refcount is not zero. syzbot reported : refcount_t: increment on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 23533 at lib/refcount.c:156 refcount_inc_checked lib/refcount.c:156 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 23533 at lib/refcount.c:156 refcount_inc_checked+0x61/0x70 lib/refcount.c:154 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 1 PID: 23533 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc7+ #93 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 panic+0x2cb/0x65c kernel/panic.c:214 __warn.cold+0x20/0x45 kernel/panic.c:571 report_bug+0x263/0x2b0 lib/bug.c:186 fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:179 [inline] fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:174 [inline] do_error_trap+0x11b/0x200 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:272 do_invalid_op+0x37/0x50 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:291 invalid_op+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:973 RIP: 0010:refcount_inc_checked lib/refcount.c:156 [inline] RIP: 0010:refcount_inc_checked+0x61/0x70 lib/refcount.c:154 Code: 1d 98 2b 2a 06 31 ff 89 de e8 db 2c 40 fe 84 db 75 dd e8 92 2b 40 fe 48 c7 c7 20 7a a1 87 c6 05 78 2b 2a 06 01 e8 7d d9 12 fe <0f> 0b eb c1 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 RSP: 0018:ffff888069f0fba8 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000f353 RSI: ffffffff815afcb6 RDI: ffffed100d3e1f67 RBP: ffff888069f0fbb8 R08: ffff88809b1845c0 R09: ffffed1015d23ef1 R10: ffffed1015d23ef0 R11: ffff8880ae91f787 R12: ffff8880a8f26968 R13: 0000000000000004 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff8880a49a6440 l2tp_tunnel_inc_refcount net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h:240 [inline] l2tp_tunnel_get+0x250/0x580 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:173 pppol2tp_connect+0xc00/0x1c70 net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c:702 __sys_connect+0x266/0x330 net/socket.c:1808 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1819 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1816 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1816 Fixes: 54652eb12c1b ("l2tp: hold tunnel while looking up sessions in l2tp_netlink") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-30 13:27:58 +00:00
if (tunnel->tunnel_id == tunnel_id &&
refcount_inc_not_zero(&tunnel->ref_count)) {
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
return tunnel;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
return NULL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_tunnel_get);
struct l2tp_tunnel *l2tp_tunnel_get_nth(const struct net *net, int nth)
{
const struct l2tp_net *pn = l2tp_pernet(net);
struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel;
int count = 0;
rcu_read_lock_bh();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(tunnel, &pn->l2tp_tunnel_list, list) {
l2ip: fix possible use-after-free Before taking a refcount on a rcu protected structure, we need to make sure the refcount is not zero. syzbot reported : refcount_t: increment on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 23533 at lib/refcount.c:156 refcount_inc_checked lib/refcount.c:156 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 23533 at lib/refcount.c:156 refcount_inc_checked+0x61/0x70 lib/refcount.c:154 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 1 PID: 23533 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc7+ #93 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 panic+0x2cb/0x65c kernel/panic.c:214 __warn.cold+0x20/0x45 kernel/panic.c:571 report_bug+0x263/0x2b0 lib/bug.c:186 fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:179 [inline] fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:174 [inline] do_error_trap+0x11b/0x200 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:272 do_invalid_op+0x37/0x50 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:291 invalid_op+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:973 RIP: 0010:refcount_inc_checked lib/refcount.c:156 [inline] RIP: 0010:refcount_inc_checked+0x61/0x70 lib/refcount.c:154 Code: 1d 98 2b 2a 06 31 ff 89 de e8 db 2c 40 fe 84 db 75 dd e8 92 2b 40 fe 48 c7 c7 20 7a a1 87 c6 05 78 2b 2a 06 01 e8 7d d9 12 fe <0f> 0b eb c1 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 RSP: 0018:ffff888069f0fba8 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000f353 RSI: ffffffff815afcb6 RDI: ffffed100d3e1f67 RBP: ffff888069f0fbb8 R08: ffff88809b1845c0 R09: ffffed1015d23ef1 R10: ffffed1015d23ef0 R11: ffff8880ae91f787 R12: ffff8880a8f26968 R13: 0000000000000004 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff8880a49a6440 l2tp_tunnel_inc_refcount net/l2tp/l2tp_core.h:240 [inline] l2tp_tunnel_get+0x250/0x580 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:173 pppol2tp_connect+0xc00/0x1c70 net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c:702 __sys_connect+0x266/0x330 net/socket.c:1808 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1819 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1816 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1816 Fixes: 54652eb12c1b ("l2tp: hold tunnel while looking up sessions in l2tp_netlink") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-30 13:27:58 +00:00
if (++count > nth &&
refcount_inc_not_zero(&tunnel->ref_count)) {
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
return tunnel;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
return NULL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_tunnel_get_nth);
struct l2tp_session *l2tp_tunnel_get_session(struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel,
u32 session_id)
{
struct hlist_head *session_list;
struct l2tp_session *session;
session_list = l2tp_session_id_hash(tunnel, session_id);
read_lock_bh(&tunnel->hlist_lock);
hlist_for_each_entry(session, session_list, hlist)
if (session->session_id == session_id) {
l2tp_session_inc_refcount(session);
read_unlock_bh(&tunnel->hlist_lock);
return session;
}
read_unlock_bh(&tunnel->hlist_lock);
return NULL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_tunnel_get_session);
struct l2tp_session *l2tp_session_get(const struct net *net, u32 session_id)
{
struct hlist_head *session_list;
struct l2tp_session *session;
session_list = l2tp_session_id_hash_2(l2tp_pernet(net), session_id);
rcu_read_lock_bh();
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(session, session_list, global_hlist)
if (session->session_id == session_id) {
l2tp_session_inc_refcount(session);
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
return session;
}
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
return NULL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_session_get);
struct l2tp_session *l2tp_session_get_nth(struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel, int nth)
{
int hash;
struct l2tp_session *session;
int count = 0;
read_lock_bh(&tunnel->hlist_lock);
for (hash = 0; hash < L2TP_HASH_SIZE; hash++) {
hlist: drop the node parameter from iterators I'm not sure why, but the hlist for each entry iterators were conceived list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member) The hlist ones were greedy and wanted an extra parameter: hlist_for_each_entry(tpos, pos, head, member) Why did they need an extra pos parameter? I'm not quite sure. Not only they don't really need it, it also prevents the iterator from looking exactly like the list iterator, which is unfortunate. Besides the semantic patch, there was some manual work required: - Fix up the actual hlist iterators in linux/list.h - Fix up the declaration of other iterators based on the hlist ones. - A very small amount of places were using the 'node' parameter, this was modified to use 'obj->member' instead. - Coccinelle didn't handle the hlist_for_each_entry_safe iterator properly, so those had to be fixed up manually. The semantic patch which is mostly the work of Peter Senna Tschudin is here: @@ iterator name hlist_for_each_entry, hlist_for_each_entry_continue, hlist_for_each_entry_from, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh, for_each_busy_worker, ax25_uid_for_each, ax25_for_each, inet_bind_bucket_for_each, sctp_for_each_hentry, sk_for_each, sk_for_each_rcu, sk_for_each_from, sk_for_each_safe, sk_for_each_bound, hlist_for_each_entry_safe, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu, nr_neigh_for_each, nr_neigh_for_each_safe, nr_node_for_each, nr_node_for_each_safe, for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp, for_each_gfn_sp, for_each_host; type T; expression a,c,d,e; identifier b; statement S; @@ -T b; <+... when != b ( hlist_for_each_entry(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_from(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh(a, - b, c) S | for_each_busy_worker(a, c, - b, d) S | ax25_uid_for_each(a, - b, c) S | ax25_for_each(a, - b, c) S | inet_bind_bucket_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sctp_for_each_hentry(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_rcu(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_from -(a, b) +(a) S + sk_for_each_from(a) S | sk_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | sk_for_each_bound(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_safe(a, - b, c, d, e) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | nr_node_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_node_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d) S | for_each_host(a, - b, c) S | for_each_host_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | for_each_mesh_entry(a, - b, c, d) S ) ...+> [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus change from net/ipv4/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus hunk from net/ipv6/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings] [akpm@linux-foudnation.org: redo intrusive kvm changes] Tested-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-02-28 01:06:00 +00:00
hlist_for_each_entry(session, &tunnel->session_hlist[hash], hlist) {
if (++count > nth) {
l2tp_session_inc_refcount(session);
read_unlock_bh(&tunnel->hlist_lock);
return session;
}
}
}
read_unlock_bh(&tunnel->hlist_lock);
return NULL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_session_get_nth);
/* Lookup a session by interface name.
* This is very inefficient but is only used by management interfaces.
*/
struct l2tp_session *l2tp_session_get_by_ifname(const struct net *net,
const char *ifname)
{
struct l2tp_net *pn = l2tp_pernet(net);
int hash;
struct l2tp_session *session;
rcu_read_lock_bh();
for (hash = 0; hash < L2TP_HASH_SIZE_2; hash++) {
hlist: drop the node parameter from iterators I'm not sure why, but the hlist for each entry iterators were conceived list_for_each_entry(pos, head, member) The hlist ones were greedy and wanted an extra parameter: hlist_for_each_entry(tpos, pos, head, member) Why did they need an extra pos parameter? I'm not quite sure. Not only they don't really need it, it also prevents the iterator from looking exactly like the list iterator, which is unfortunate. Besides the semantic patch, there was some manual work required: - Fix up the actual hlist iterators in linux/list.h - Fix up the declaration of other iterators based on the hlist ones. - A very small amount of places were using the 'node' parameter, this was modified to use 'obj->member' instead. - Coccinelle didn't handle the hlist_for_each_entry_safe iterator properly, so those had to be fixed up manually. The semantic patch which is mostly the work of Peter Senna Tschudin is here: @@ iterator name hlist_for_each_entry, hlist_for_each_entry_continue, hlist_for_each_entry_from, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh, for_each_busy_worker, ax25_uid_for_each, ax25_for_each, inet_bind_bucket_for_each, sctp_for_each_hentry, sk_for_each, sk_for_each_rcu, sk_for_each_from, sk_for_each_safe, sk_for_each_bound, hlist_for_each_entry_safe, hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu, nr_neigh_for_each, nr_neigh_for_each_safe, nr_node_for_each, nr_node_for_each_safe, for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp, for_each_gfn_sp, for_each_host; type T; expression a,c,d,e; identifier b; statement S; @@ -T b; <+... when != b ( hlist_for_each_entry(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_from(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_rcu_bh(a, - b, c, d) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu_bh(a, - b, c) S | for_each_busy_worker(a, c, - b, d) S | ax25_uid_for_each(a, - b, c) S | ax25_for_each(a, - b, c) S | inet_bind_bucket_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sctp_for_each_hentry(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_rcu(a, - b, c) S | sk_for_each_from -(a, b) +(a) S + sk_for_each_from(a) S | sk_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | sk_for_each_bound(a, - b, c) S | hlist_for_each_entry_safe(a, - b, c, d, e) S | hlist_for_each_entry_continue_rcu(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_neigh_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | nr_node_for_each(a, - b, c) S | nr_node_for_each_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_sp(a, c, d) S | - for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d, b) S + for_each_gfn_indirect_valid_sp(a, c, d) S | for_each_host(a, - b, c) S | for_each_host_safe(a, - b, c, d) S | for_each_mesh_entry(a, - b, c, d) S ) ...+> [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus change from net/ipv4/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: drop bogus hunk from net/ipv6/raw.c] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix warnings] [akpm@linux-foudnation.org: redo intrusive kvm changes] Tested-by: Peter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@gmail.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com> Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2013-02-28 01:06:00 +00:00
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(session, &pn->l2tp_session_hlist[hash], global_hlist) {
if (!strcmp(session->ifname, ifname)) {
l2tp_session_inc_refcount(session);
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
return session;
}
}
}
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
return NULL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_session_get_by_ifname);
int l2tp_session_register(struct l2tp_session *session,
struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel)
{
struct l2tp_session *session_walk;
struct hlist_head *g_head;
struct hlist_head *head;
struct l2tp_net *pn;
int err;
head = l2tp_session_id_hash(tunnel, session->session_id);
write_lock_bh(&tunnel->hlist_lock);
if (!tunnel->acpt_newsess) {
err = -ENODEV;
goto err_tlock;
}
hlist_for_each_entry(session_walk, head, hlist)
if (session_walk->session_id == session->session_id) {
err = -EEXIST;
goto err_tlock;
}
if (tunnel->version == L2TP_HDR_VER_3) {
pn = l2tp_pernet(tunnel->l2tp_net);
g_head = l2tp_session_id_hash_2(pn, session->session_id);
spin_lock_bh(&pn->l2tp_session_hlist_lock);
/* IP encap expects session IDs to be globally unique, while
* UDP encap doesn't.
*/
hlist_for_each_entry(session_walk, g_head, global_hlist)
if (session_walk->session_id == session->session_id &&
(session_walk->tunnel->encap == L2TP_ENCAPTYPE_IP ||
tunnel->encap == L2TP_ENCAPTYPE_IP)) {
err = -EEXIST;
goto err_tlock_pnlock;
}
l2tp_tunnel_inc_refcount(tunnel);
hlist_add_head_rcu(&session->global_hlist, g_head);
spin_unlock_bh(&pn->l2tp_session_hlist_lock);
} else {
l2tp_tunnel_inc_refcount(tunnel);
}
hlist_add_head(&session->hlist, head);
write_unlock_bh(&tunnel->hlist_lock);
trace_register_session(session);
return 0;
err_tlock_pnlock:
spin_unlock_bh(&pn->l2tp_session_hlist_lock);
err_tlock:
write_unlock_bh(&tunnel->hlist_lock);
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_session_register);
/*****************************************************************************
* Receive data handling
*****************************************************************************/
/* Queue a skb in order. We come here only if the skb has an L2TP sequence
* number.
*/
static void l2tp_recv_queue_skb(struct l2tp_session *session, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sk_buff *skbp;
struct sk_buff *tmp;
u32 ns = L2TP_SKB_CB(skb)->ns;
spin_lock_bh(&session->reorder_q.lock);
skb_queue_walk_safe(&session->reorder_q, skbp, tmp) {
if (L2TP_SKB_CB(skbp)->ns > ns) {
__skb_queue_before(&session->reorder_q, skbp, skb);
atomic_long_inc(&session->stats.rx_oos_packets);
goto out;
}
}
__skb_queue_tail(&session->reorder_q, skb);
out:
spin_unlock_bh(&session->reorder_q.lock);
}
/* Dequeue a single skb.
*/
static void l2tp_recv_dequeue_skb(struct l2tp_session *session, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel = session->tunnel;
int length = L2TP_SKB_CB(skb)->length;
/* We're about to requeue the skb, so return resources
* to its current owner (a socket receive buffer).
*/
skb_orphan(skb);
atomic_long_inc(&tunnel->stats.rx_packets);
atomic_long_add(length, &tunnel->stats.rx_bytes);
atomic_long_inc(&session->stats.rx_packets);
atomic_long_add(length, &session->stats.rx_bytes);
if (L2TP_SKB_CB(skb)->has_seq) {
/* Bump our Nr */
session->nr++;
session->nr &= session->nr_max;
trace_session_seqnum_update(session);
}
/* call private receive handler */
if (session->recv_skb)
(*session->recv_skb)(session, skb, L2TP_SKB_CB(skb)->length);
else
kfree_skb(skb);
}
/* Dequeue skbs from the session's reorder_q, subject to packet order.
* Skbs that have been in the queue for too long are simply discarded.
*/
static void l2tp_recv_dequeue(struct l2tp_session *session)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct sk_buff *tmp;
/* If the pkt at the head of the queue has the nr that we
* expect to send up next, dequeue it and any other
* in-sequence packets behind it.
*/
start:
spin_lock_bh(&session->reorder_q.lock);
skb_queue_walk_safe(&session->reorder_q, skb, tmp) {
struct l2tp_skb_cb *cb = L2TP_SKB_CB(skb);
/* If the packet has been pending on the queue for too long, discard it */
if (time_after(jiffies, cb->expires)) {
atomic_long_inc(&session->stats.rx_seq_discards);
atomic_long_inc(&session->stats.rx_errors);
trace_session_pkt_expired(session, cb->ns);
session->reorder_skip = 1;
__skb_unlink(skb, &session->reorder_q);
kfree_skb(skb);
continue;
}
if (cb->has_seq) {
if (session->reorder_skip) {
session->reorder_skip = 0;
session->nr = cb->ns;
trace_session_seqnum_reset(session);
}
if (cb->ns != session->nr)
goto out;
}
__skb_unlink(skb, &session->reorder_q);
/* Process the skb. We release the queue lock while we
* do so to let other contexts process the queue.
*/
spin_unlock_bh(&session->reorder_q.lock);
l2tp_recv_dequeue_skb(session, skb);
goto start;
}
out:
spin_unlock_bh(&session->reorder_q.lock);
}
static int l2tp_seq_check_rx_window(struct l2tp_session *session, u32 nr)
{
u32 nws;
if (nr >= session->nr)
nws = nr - session->nr;
else
nws = (session->nr_max + 1) - (session->nr - nr);
return nws < session->nr_window_size;
}
/* If packet has sequence numbers, queue it if acceptable. Returns 0 if
* acceptable, else non-zero.
*/
static int l2tp_recv_data_seq(struct l2tp_session *session, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct l2tp_skb_cb *cb = L2TP_SKB_CB(skb);
if (!l2tp_seq_check_rx_window(session, cb->ns)) {
/* Packet sequence number is outside allowed window.
* Discard it.
*/
trace_session_pkt_outside_rx_window(session, cb->ns);
goto discard;
}
if (session->reorder_timeout != 0) {
/* Packet reordering enabled. Add skb to session's
* reorder queue, in order of ns.
*/
l2tp_recv_queue_skb(session, skb);
goto out;
}
/* Packet reordering disabled. Discard out-of-sequence packets, while
* tracking the number if in-sequence packets after the first OOS packet
* is seen. After nr_oos_count_max in-sequence packets, reset the
* sequence number to re-enable packet reception.
*/
if (cb->ns == session->nr) {
skb_queue_tail(&session->reorder_q, skb);
} else {
u32 nr_oos = cb->ns;
u32 nr_next = (session->nr_oos + 1) & session->nr_max;
if (nr_oos == nr_next)
session->nr_oos_count++;
else
session->nr_oos_count = 0;
session->nr_oos = nr_oos;
if (session->nr_oos_count > session->nr_oos_count_max) {
session->reorder_skip = 1;
}
if (!session->reorder_skip) {
atomic_long_inc(&session->stats.rx_seq_discards);
trace_session_pkt_oos(session, cb->ns);
goto discard;
}
skb_queue_tail(&session->reorder_q, skb);
}
out:
return 0;
discard:
return 1;
}
/* Do receive processing of L2TP data frames. We handle both L2TPv2
* and L2TPv3 data frames here.
*
* L2TPv2 Data Message Header
*
* 0 1 2 3
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* |T|L|x|x|S|x|O|P|x|x|x|x| Ver | Length (opt) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Tunnel ID | Session ID |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Ns (opt) | Nr (opt) |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Offset Size (opt) | Offset pad... (opt)
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
* Data frames are marked by T=0. All other fields are the same as
* those in L2TP control frames.
*
* L2TPv3 Data Message Header
*
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | L2TP Session Header |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | L2-Specific Sublayer |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Tunnel Payload ...
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
* L2TPv3 Session Header Over IP
*
* 0 1 2 3
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Session ID |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Cookie (optional, maximum 64 bits)...
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
* L2TPv3 L2-Specific Sublayer Format
*
* 0 1 2 3
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* |x|S|x|x|x|x|x|x| Sequence Number |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*
* Cookie value and sublayer format are negotiated with the peer when
* the session is set up. Unlike L2TPv2, we do not need to parse the
* packet header to determine if optional fields are present.
*
* Caller must already have parsed the frame and determined that it is
* a data (not control) frame before coming here. Fields up to the
* session-id have already been parsed and ptr points to the data
* after the session-id.
*/
void l2tp_recv_common(struct l2tp_session *session, struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned char *ptr, unsigned char *optr, u16 hdrflags,
int length)
{
struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel = session->tunnel;
int offset;
/* Parse and check optional cookie */
if (session->peer_cookie_len > 0) {
if (memcmp(ptr, &session->peer_cookie[0], session->peer_cookie_len)) {
pr_debug_ratelimited("%s: cookie mismatch (%u/%u). Discarding.\n",
tunnel->name, tunnel->tunnel_id,
session->session_id);
atomic_long_inc(&session->stats.rx_cookie_discards);
goto discard;
}
ptr += session->peer_cookie_len;
}
/* Handle the optional sequence numbers. Sequence numbers are
* in different places for L2TPv2 and L2TPv3.
*
* If we are the LAC, enable/disable sequence numbers under
* the control of the LNS. If no sequence numbers present but
* we were expecting them, discard frame.
*/
L2TP_SKB_CB(skb)->has_seq = 0;
if (tunnel->version == L2TP_HDR_VER_2) {
if (hdrflags & L2TP_HDRFLAG_S) {
/* Store L2TP info in the skb */
L2TP_SKB_CB(skb)->ns = ntohs(*(__be16 *)ptr);
L2TP_SKB_CB(skb)->has_seq = 1;
ptr += 2;
/* Skip past nr in the header */
ptr += 2;
}
} else if (session->l2specific_type == L2TP_L2SPECTYPE_DEFAULT) {
u32 l2h = ntohl(*(__be32 *)ptr);
if (l2h & 0x40000000) {
/* Store L2TP info in the skb */
L2TP_SKB_CB(skb)->ns = l2h & 0x00ffffff;
L2TP_SKB_CB(skb)->has_seq = 1;
}
ptr += 4;
}
if (L2TP_SKB_CB(skb)->has_seq) {
/* Received a packet with sequence numbers. If we're the LAC,
* check if we sre sending sequence numbers and if not,
* configure it so.
*/
if (!session->lns_mode && !session->send_seq) {
trace_session_seqnum_lns_enable(session);
session->send_seq = 1;
l2tp_session_set_header_len(session, tunnel->version);
}
} else {
/* No sequence numbers.
* If user has configured mandatory sequence numbers, discard.
*/
if (session->recv_seq) {
pr_debug_ratelimited("%s: recv data has no seq numbers when required. Discarding.\n",
session->name);
atomic_long_inc(&session->stats.rx_seq_discards);
goto discard;
}
/* If we're the LAC and we're sending sequence numbers, the
* LNS has requested that we no longer send sequence numbers.
* If we're the LNS and we're sending sequence numbers, the
* LAC is broken. Discard the frame.
*/
if (!session->lns_mode && session->send_seq) {
trace_session_seqnum_lns_disable(session);
session->send_seq = 0;
l2tp_session_set_header_len(session, tunnel->version);
} else if (session->send_seq) {
pr_debug_ratelimited("%s: recv data has no seq numbers when required. Discarding.\n",
session->name);
atomic_long_inc(&session->stats.rx_seq_discards);
goto discard;
}
}
l2tp: remove configurable payload offset If L2TP_ATTR_OFFSET is set to a non-zero value in L2TPv3 tunnels, it results in L2TPv3 packets being transmitted which might not be compliant with the L2TPv3 RFC. This patch has l2tp ignore the offset setting and send all packets with no offset. In more detail: L2TPv2 supports a variable offset from the L2TPv2 header to the payload. The offset value is indicated by an optional field in the L2TP header. Our L2TP implementation already detects the presence of the optional offset and skips that many bytes when handling data received packets. All transmitted packets are always transmitted with no offset. L2TPv3 has no optional offset field in the L2TPv3 packet header. Instead, L2TPv3 defines optional fields in a "Layer-2 Specific Sublayer". At the time when the original L2TP code was written, there was talk at IETF of offset being implemented in a new Layer-2 Specific Sublayer. A L2TP_ATTR_OFFSET netlink attribute was added so that this offset could be configured and the intention was to allow it to be also used to set the tx offset for L2TPv2. However, no L2TPv3 offset was ever specified and the L2TP_ATTR_OFFSET parameter was forgotten about. Setting L2TP_ATTR_OFFSET results in L2TPv3 packets being transmitted with the specified number of bytes padding between L2TPv3 header and payload. This is not compliant with L2TPv3 RFC3931. This change removes the configurable offset altogether while retaining L2TP_ATTR_OFFSET for backwards compatibility. Any L2TP_ATTR_OFFSET value is ignored. Signed-off-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-01-03 22:48:06 +00:00
/* Session data offset is defined only for L2TPv2 and is
* indicated by an optional 16-bit value in the header.
*/
if (tunnel->version == L2TP_HDR_VER_2) {
/* If offset bit set, skip it. */
if (hdrflags & L2TP_HDRFLAG_O) {
offset = ntohs(*(__be16 *)ptr);
ptr += 2 + offset;
}
l2tp: remove configurable payload offset If L2TP_ATTR_OFFSET is set to a non-zero value in L2TPv3 tunnels, it results in L2TPv3 packets being transmitted which might not be compliant with the L2TPv3 RFC. This patch has l2tp ignore the offset setting and send all packets with no offset. In more detail: L2TPv2 supports a variable offset from the L2TPv2 header to the payload. The offset value is indicated by an optional field in the L2TP header. Our L2TP implementation already detects the presence of the optional offset and skips that many bytes when handling data received packets. All transmitted packets are always transmitted with no offset. L2TPv3 has no optional offset field in the L2TPv3 packet header. Instead, L2TPv3 defines optional fields in a "Layer-2 Specific Sublayer". At the time when the original L2TP code was written, there was talk at IETF of offset being implemented in a new Layer-2 Specific Sublayer. A L2TP_ATTR_OFFSET netlink attribute was added so that this offset could be configured and the intention was to allow it to be also used to set the tx offset for L2TPv2. However, no L2TPv3 offset was ever specified and the L2TP_ATTR_OFFSET parameter was forgotten about. Setting L2TP_ATTR_OFFSET results in L2TPv3 packets being transmitted with the specified number of bytes padding between L2TPv3 header and payload. This is not compliant with L2TPv3 RFC3931. This change removes the configurable offset altogether while retaining L2TP_ATTR_OFFSET for backwards compatibility. Any L2TP_ATTR_OFFSET value is ignored. Signed-off-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-01-03 22:48:06 +00:00
}
offset = ptr - optr;
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, offset))
goto discard;
__skb_pull(skb, offset);
/* Prepare skb for adding to the session's reorder_q. Hold
* packets for max reorder_timeout or 1 second if not
* reordering.
*/
L2TP_SKB_CB(skb)->length = length;
L2TP_SKB_CB(skb)->expires = jiffies +
(session->reorder_timeout ? session->reorder_timeout : HZ);
/* Add packet to the session's receive queue. Reordering is done here, if
* enabled. Saved L2TP protocol info is stored in skb->sb[].
*/
if (L2TP_SKB_CB(skb)->has_seq) {
if (l2tp_recv_data_seq(session, skb))
goto discard;
} else {
/* No sequence numbers. Add the skb to the tail of the
* reorder queue. This ensures that it will be
* delivered after all previous sequenced skbs.
*/
skb_queue_tail(&session->reorder_q, skb);
}
/* Try to dequeue as many skbs from reorder_q as we can. */
l2tp_recv_dequeue(session);
return;
discard:
atomic_long_inc(&session->stats.rx_errors);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_recv_common);
/* Drop skbs from the session's reorder_q
*/
static void l2tp_session_queue_purge(struct l2tp_session *session)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
while ((skb = skb_dequeue(&session->reorder_q))) {
atomic_long_inc(&session->stats.rx_errors);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
}
/* Internal UDP receive frame. Do the real work of receiving an L2TP data frame
* here. The skb is not on a list when we get here.
* Returns 0 if the packet was a data packet and was successfully passed on.
* Returns 1 if the packet was not a good data packet and could not be
* forwarded. All such packets are passed up to userspace to deal with.
*/
static int l2tp_udp_recv_core(struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct l2tp_session *session = NULL;
unsigned char *ptr, *optr;
u16 hdrflags;
u32 tunnel_id, session_id;
u16 version;
int length;
/* UDP has verified checksum */
/* UDP always verifies the packet length. */
__skb_pull(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr));
/* Short packet? */
if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, L2TP_HDR_SIZE_MAX)) {
pr_debug_ratelimited("%s: recv short packet (len=%d)\n",
tunnel->name, skb->len);
goto invalid;
}
/* Point to L2TP header */
optr = skb->data;
ptr = skb->data;
/* Get L2TP header flags */
hdrflags = ntohs(*(__be16 *)ptr);
/* Check protocol version */
version = hdrflags & L2TP_HDR_VER_MASK;
if (version != tunnel->version) {
pr_debug_ratelimited("%s: recv protocol version mismatch: got %d expected %d\n",
tunnel->name, version, tunnel->version);
goto invalid;
}
/* Get length of L2TP packet */
length = skb->len;
/* If type is control packet, it is handled by userspace. */
if (hdrflags & L2TP_HDRFLAG_T)
goto pass;
/* Skip flags */
ptr += 2;
if (tunnel->version == L2TP_HDR_VER_2) {
/* If length is present, skip it */
if (hdrflags & L2TP_HDRFLAG_L)
ptr += 2;
/* Extract tunnel and session ID */
tunnel_id = ntohs(*(__be16 *)ptr);
ptr += 2;
session_id = ntohs(*(__be16 *)ptr);
ptr += 2;
} else {
ptr += 2; /* skip reserved bits */
tunnel_id = tunnel->tunnel_id;
session_id = ntohl(*(__be32 *)ptr);
ptr += 4;
}
/* Find the session context */
session = l2tp_tunnel_get_session(tunnel, session_id);
if (!session || !session->recv_skb) {
if (session)
l2tp_session_dec_refcount(session);
/* Not found? Pass to userspace to deal with */
pr_debug_ratelimited("%s: no session found (%u/%u). Passing up.\n",
tunnel->name, tunnel_id, session_id);
goto pass;
}
if (tunnel->version == L2TP_HDR_VER_3 &&
l2tp_v3_ensure_opt_in_linear(session, skb, &ptr, &optr))
goto invalid;
l2tp_recv_common(session, skb, ptr, optr, hdrflags, length);
l2tp_session_dec_refcount(session);
return 0;
invalid:
atomic_long_inc(&tunnel->stats.rx_invalid);
pass:
/* Put UDP header back */
__skb_push(skb, sizeof(struct udphdr));
return 1;
}
/* UDP encapsulation receive handler. See net/ipv4/udp.c.
* Return codes:
* 0 : success.
* <0: error
* >0: skb should be passed up to userspace as UDP.
*/
int l2tp_udp_encap_recv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel;
l2tp: make magic feather checks more useful The l2tp tunnel and session structures contain a "magic feather" field which was originally intended to help trace lifetime bugs in the code. Since the introduction of the shared kernel refcount code in refcount.h, and l2tp's porting to those APIs, we are covered by the refcount code's checks and warnings. Duplicating those checks in the l2tp code isn't useful. However, magic feather checks are still useful to help to detect bugs stemming from misuse/trampling of the sk_user_data pointer in struct sock. The l2tp code makes extensive use of sk_user_data to stash pointers to the tunnel and session structures, and if another subsystem overwrites sk_user_data it's important to detect this. As such, rework l2tp's magic feather checks to focus on validating the tunnel and session data structures when they're extracted from sk_user_data. * Add a new accessor function l2tp_sk_to_tunnel which contains a magic feather check, and is used by l2tp_core and l2tp_ip[6] * Comment l2tp_udp_encap_recv which doesn't use this new accessor function because of the specific nature of the codepath it is called in * Drop l2tp_session_queue_purge's check on the session magic feather: it is called from code which is walking the tunnel session list, and hence doesn't need validation * Drop l2tp_session_free's check on the tunnel magic feather: the intention of this check is covered by refcount.h's reference count sanity checking * Add session magic validation in pppol2tp_ioctl. On failure return -EBADF, which mirrors the approach in pppol2tp_[sg]etsockopt. Signed-off-by: Tom Parkin <tparkin@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-09-03 08:54:51 +00:00
/* Note that this is called from the encap_rcv hook inside an
* RCU-protected region, but without the socket being locked.
* Hence we use rcu_dereference_sk_user_data to access the
* tunnel data structure rather the usual l2tp_sk_to_tunnel
* accessor function.
*/
tunnel = rcu_dereference_sk_user_data(sk);
if (!tunnel)
goto pass_up;
l2tp: make magic feather checks more useful The l2tp tunnel and session structures contain a "magic feather" field which was originally intended to help trace lifetime bugs in the code. Since the introduction of the shared kernel refcount code in refcount.h, and l2tp's porting to those APIs, we are covered by the refcount code's checks and warnings. Duplicating those checks in the l2tp code isn't useful. However, magic feather checks are still useful to help to detect bugs stemming from misuse/trampling of the sk_user_data pointer in struct sock. The l2tp code makes extensive use of sk_user_data to stash pointers to the tunnel and session structures, and if another subsystem overwrites sk_user_data it's important to detect this. As such, rework l2tp's magic feather checks to focus on validating the tunnel and session data structures when they're extracted from sk_user_data. * Add a new accessor function l2tp_sk_to_tunnel which contains a magic feather check, and is used by l2tp_core and l2tp_ip[6] * Comment l2tp_udp_encap_recv which doesn't use this new accessor function because of the specific nature of the codepath it is called in * Drop l2tp_session_queue_purge's check on the session magic feather: it is called from code which is walking the tunnel session list, and hence doesn't need validation * Drop l2tp_session_free's check on the tunnel magic feather: the intention of this check is covered by refcount.h's reference count sanity checking * Add session magic validation in pppol2tp_ioctl. On failure return -EBADF, which mirrors the approach in pppol2tp_[sg]etsockopt. Signed-off-by: Tom Parkin <tparkin@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-09-03 08:54:51 +00:00
if (WARN_ON(tunnel->magic != L2TP_TUNNEL_MAGIC))
goto pass_up;
if (l2tp_udp_recv_core(tunnel, skb))
l2tp: fix races with tunnel socket close The tunnel socket tunnel->sock (struct sock) is accessed when preparing a new ppp session on a tunnel at pppol2tp_session_init. If the socket is closed by a thread while another is creating a new session, the threads race. In pppol2tp_connect, the tunnel object may be created if the pppol2tp socket is associated with the special session_id 0 and the tunnel socket is looked up using the provided fd. When handling this, pppol2tp_connect cannot sock_hold the tunnel socket to prevent it being destroyed during pppol2tp_connect since this may itself may race with the socket being destroyed. Doing sockfd_lookup in pppol2tp_connect isn't sufficient to prevent tunnel->sock going away either because a given tunnel socket fd may be reused between calls to pppol2tp_connect. Instead, have l2tp_tunnel_create sock_hold the tunnel socket before it does sockfd_put. This ensures that the tunnel's socket is always extant while the tunnel object exists. Hold a ref on the socket until the tunnel is destroyed and ensure that all tunnel destroy paths go through a common function (l2tp_tunnel_delete) since this will do the final sock_put to release the tunnel socket. Since the tunnel's socket is now guaranteed to exist if the tunnel exists, we no longer need to use sockfd_lookup via l2tp_sock_to_tunnel to derive the tunnel from the socket since this is always sk_user_data. Also, sessions no longer sock_hold the tunnel socket since sessions already hold a tunnel ref and the tunnel sock will not be freed until the tunnel is freed. Removing these sock_holds in l2tp_session_register avoids a possible sock leak in the pppol2tp_connect error path if l2tp_session_register succeeds but attaching a ppp channel fails. The pppol2tp_connect error path could have been fixed instead and have the sock ref dropped when the session is freed, but doing a sock_put of the tunnel socket when the session is freed would require a new session_free callback. It is simpler to just remove the sock_hold of the tunnel socket in l2tp_session_register, now that the tunnel socket lifetime is guaranteed. Finally, some init code in l2tp_tunnel_create is reordered to ensure that the new tunnel object's refcount is set and the tunnel socket ref is taken before the tunnel socket destructor callbacks are set. kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 4360 Comm: syzbot_19c09769 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc2+ #34 Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 RIP: 0010:pppol2tp_session_init+0x1d6/0x500 RSP: 0018:ffff88001377fb40 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88001636a940 RCX: ffffffff84836c1d RDX: 0000000000000045 RSI: 0000000055976744 RDI: 0000000000000228 RBP: ffff88001377fb60 R08: ffffffff84836bc8 R09: 0000000000000002 R10: ffff88001377fab8 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff88001636aac8 R14: ffff8800160f81c0 R15: 1ffff100026eff76 FS: 00007ffb3ea66700(0000) GS:ffff88001a400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020e77000 CR3: 0000000016261000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: pppol2tp_connect+0xd18/0x13c0 ? pppol2tp_session_create+0x170/0x170 ? __might_fault+0x115/0x1d0 ? lock_downgrade+0x860/0x860 ? __might_fault+0xe5/0x1d0 ? security_socket_connect+0x8e/0xc0 SYSC_connect+0x1b6/0x310 ? SYSC_bind+0x280/0x280 ? __do_page_fault+0x5d1/0xca0 ? up_read+0x1f/0x40 ? __do_page_fault+0x3c8/0xca0 SyS_connect+0x29/0x30 ? SyS_accept+0x40/0x40 do_syscall_64+0x1e0/0x730 ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x7ffb3e376259 RSP: 002b:00007ffeda4f6508 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020e77012 RCX: 00007ffb3e376259 RDX: 000000000000002e RSI: 0000000020e77000 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007ffeda4f6540 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000400b60 R13: 00007ffeda4f6660 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Code: 80 3d b0 ff 06 02 00 0f 84 07 02 00 00 e8 13 d6 db fc 49 8d bc 24 28 02 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 f a 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 ed 02 00 00 4d 8b a4 24 28 02 00 00 e8 13 16 Fixes: 80d84ef3ff1dd ("l2tp: prevent l2tp_tunnel_delete racing with userspace close") Signed-off-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-23 17:45:45 +00:00
goto pass_up;
return 0;
pass_up:
return 1;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_udp_encap_recv);
/************************************************************************
* Transmit handling
***********************************************************************/
/* Build an L2TP header for the session into the buffer provided.
*/
static int l2tp_build_l2tpv2_header(struct l2tp_session *session, void *buf)
{
struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel = session->tunnel;
__be16 *bufp = buf;
__be16 *optr = buf;
u16 flags = L2TP_HDR_VER_2;
u32 tunnel_id = tunnel->peer_tunnel_id;
u32 session_id = session->peer_session_id;
if (session->send_seq)
flags |= L2TP_HDRFLAG_S;
/* Setup L2TP header. */
*bufp++ = htons(flags);
*bufp++ = htons(tunnel_id);
*bufp++ = htons(session_id);
if (session->send_seq) {
*bufp++ = htons(session->ns);
*bufp++ = 0;
session->ns++;
session->ns &= 0xffff;
trace_session_seqnum_update(session);
}
return bufp - optr;
}
static int l2tp_build_l2tpv3_header(struct l2tp_session *session, void *buf)
{
struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel = session->tunnel;
char *bufp = buf;
char *optr = bufp;
/* Setup L2TP header. The header differs slightly for UDP and
* IP encapsulations. For UDP, there is 4 bytes of flags.
*/
if (tunnel->encap == L2TP_ENCAPTYPE_UDP) {
u16 flags = L2TP_HDR_VER_3;
*((__be16 *)bufp) = htons(flags);
bufp += 2;
*((__be16 *)bufp) = 0;
bufp += 2;
}
*((__be32 *)bufp) = htonl(session->peer_session_id);
bufp += 4;
if (session->cookie_len) {
memcpy(bufp, &session->cookie[0], session->cookie_len);
bufp += session->cookie_len;
}
if (session->l2specific_type == L2TP_L2SPECTYPE_DEFAULT) {
u32 l2h = 0;
if (session->send_seq) {
l2h = 0x40000000 | session->ns;
session->ns++;
session->ns &= 0xffffff;
trace_session_seqnum_update(session);
}
*((__be32 *)bufp) = htonl(l2h);
bufp += 4;
}
return bufp - optr;
}
/* Queue the packet to IP for output: tunnel socket lock must be held */
static int l2tp_xmit_queue(struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel, struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl)
{
int err;
skb->ignore_df = 1;
skb_dst_drop(skb);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
l2tp: fix races with ipv4-mapped ipv6 addresses The l2tp_tunnel_create() function checks for v4mapped ipv6 sockets and cache that flag, so that l2tp core code can reusing it at xmit time. If the socket is provided by the userspace, the connection status of the tunnel sockets can change between the tunnel creation and the xmit call, so that syzbot is able to trigger the following splat: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ip6_dst_idev include/net/ip6_fib.h:192 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ip6_xmit+0x1f76/0x2260 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:264 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801bd949318 by task syz-executor4/23448 CPU: 0 PID: 23448 Comm: syz-executor4 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc4+ #65 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x24d lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:256 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline] kasan_report+0x23c/0x360 mm/kasan/report.c:412 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:433 ip6_dst_idev include/net/ip6_fib.h:192 [inline] ip6_xmit+0x1f76/0x2260 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:264 inet6_csk_xmit+0x2fc/0x580 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:139 l2tp_xmit_core net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:1053 [inline] l2tp_xmit_skb+0x105f/0x1410 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:1148 pppol2tp_sendmsg+0x470/0x670 net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c:341 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:640 ___sys_sendmsg+0x767/0x8b0 net/socket.c:2046 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x210 net/socket.c:2080 SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2091 [inline] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 net/socket.c:2087 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x453e69 RSP: 002b:00007f819593cc68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f819593d6d4 RCX: 0000000000453e69 RDX: 0000000000000081 RSI: 000000002037ffc8 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 000000000072bea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 00000000000004c3 R14: 00000000006f72e8 R15: 0000000000000000 This change addresses the issues: * explicitly checking for TCP_ESTABLISHED for user space provided sockets * dropping the v4mapped flag usage - it can become outdated - and explicitly invoking ipv6_addr_v4mapped() instead The issue is apparently there since ancient times. v1 -> v2: (many thanks to Guillaume) - with csum issue introduced in v1 - replace pr_err with pr_debug - fix build issue with IPV6 disabled - move l2tp_sk_is_v4mapped in l2tp_core.c v2 -> v3: - don't update inet_daddr for v4mapped address, unneeded - drop rendundant check at creation time Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+92fa328176eb07e4ac1a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 3557baabf280 ("[L2TP]: PPP over L2TP driver core") Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-03-12 13:54:24 +00:00
if (l2tp_sk_is_v6(tunnel->sock))
err = inet6_csk_xmit(tunnel->sock, skb, NULL);
else
#endif
err = ip_queue_xmit(tunnel->sock, skb, fl);
return err >= 0 ? NET_XMIT_SUCCESS : NET_XMIT_DROP;
}
static int l2tp_xmit_core(struct l2tp_session *session, struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int *len)
{
struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel = session->tunnel;
unsigned int data_len = skb->len;
struct sock *sk = tunnel->sock;
int headroom, uhlen, udp_len;
int ret = NET_XMIT_SUCCESS;
struct inet_sock *inet;
struct udphdr *uh;
/* Check that there's enough headroom in the skb to insert IP,
* UDP and L2TP headers. If not enough, expand it to
* make room. Adjust truesize.
*/
uhlen = (tunnel->encap == L2TP_ENCAPTYPE_UDP) ? sizeof(*uh) : 0;
headroom = NET_SKB_PAD + sizeof(struct iphdr) + uhlen + session->hdr_len;
if (skb_cow_head(skb, headroom)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return NET_XMIT_DROP;
}
/* Setup L2TP header */
if (tunnel->version == L2TP_HDR_VER_2)
l2tp_build_l2tpv2_header(session, __skb_push(skb, session->hdr_len));
else
l2tp_build_l2tpv3_header(session, __skb_push(skb, session->hdr_len));
/* Reset skb netfilter state */
memset(&(IPCB(skb)->opt), 0, sizeof(IPCB(skb)->opt));
IPCB(skb)->flags &= ~(IPSKB_XFRM_TUNNEL_SIZE | IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED | IPSKB_REROUTED);
nf_reset_ct(skb);
bh_lock_sock(sk);
if (sock_owned_by_user(sk)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
ret = NET_XMIT_DROP;
goto out_unlock;
}
l2tp: fix races with ipv4-mapped ipv6 addresses The l2tp_tunnel_create() function checks for v4mapped ipv6 sockets and cache that flag, so that l2tp core code can reusing it at xmit time. If the socket is provided by the userspace, the connection status of the tunnel sockets can change between the tunnel creation and the xmit call, so that syzbot is able to trigger the following splat: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ip6_dst_idev include/net/ip6_fib.h:192 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ip6_xmit+0x1f76/0x2260 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:264 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801bd949318 by task syz-executor4/23448 CPU: 0 PID: 23448 Comm: syz-executor4 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc4+ #65 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x24d lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:256 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline] kasan_report+0x23c/0x360 mm/kasan/report.c:412 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:433 ip6_dst_idev include/net/ip6_fib.h:192 [inline] ip6_xmit+0x1f76/0x2260 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:264 inet6_csk_xmit+0x2fc/0x580 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:139 l2tp_xmit_core net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:1053 [inline] l2tp_xmit_skb+0x105f/0x1410 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:1148 pppol2tp_sendmsg+0x470/0x670 net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c:341 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:640 ___sys_sendmsg+0x767/0x8b0 net/socket.c:2046 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x210 net/socket.c:2080 SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2091 [inline] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 net/socket.c:2087 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x453e69 RSP: 002b:00007f819593cc68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f819593d6d4 RCX: 0000000000453e69 RDX: 0000000000000081 RSI: 000000002037ffc8 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 000000000072bea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 00000000000004c3 R14: 00000000006f72e8 R15: 0000000000000000 This change addresses the issues: * explicitly checking for TCP_ESTABLISHED for user space provided sockets * dropping the v4mapped flag usage - it can become outdated - and explicitly invoking ipv6_addr_v4mapped() instead The issue is apparently there since ancient times. v1 -> v2: (many thanks to Guillaume) - with csum issue introduced in v1 - replace pr_err with pr_debug - fix build issue with IPV6 disabled - move l2tp_sk_is_v4mapped in l2tp_core.c v2 -> v3: - don't update inet_daddr for v4mapped address, unneeded - drop rendundant check at creation time Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+92fa328176eb07e4ac1a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 3557baabf280 ("[L2TP]: PPP over L2TP driver core") Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-03-12 13:54:24 +00:00
/* The user-space may change the connection status for the user-space
* provided socket at run time: we must check it under the socket lock
*/
if (tunnel->fd >= 0 && sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
kfree_skb(skb);
ret = NET_XMIT_DROP;
goto out_unlock;
}
/* Report transmitted length before we add encap header, which keeps
* statistics consistent for both UDP and IP encap tx/rx paths.
*/
*len = skb->len;
inet = inet_sk(sk);
switch (tunnel->encap) {
case L2TP_ENCAPTYPE_UDP:
/* Setup UDP header */
__skb_push(skb, sizeof(*uh));
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
uh = udp_hdr(skb);
uh->source = inet->inet_sport;
uh->dest = inet->inet_dport;
udp_len = uhlen + session->hdr_len + data_len;
uh->len = htons(udp_len);
/* Calculate UDP checksum if configured to do so */
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
l2tp: fix races with ipv4-mapped ipv6 addresses The l2tp_tunnel_create() function checks for v4mapped ipv6 sockets and cache that flag, so that l2tp core code can reusing it at xmit time. If the socket is provided by the userspace, the connection status of the tunnel sockets can change between the tunnel creation and the xmit call, so that syzbot is able to trigger the following splat: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ip6_dst_idev include/net/ip6_fib.h:192 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ip6_xmit+0x1f76/0x2260 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:264 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801bd949318 by task syz-executor4/23448 CPU: 0 PID: 23448 Comm: syz-executor4 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc4+ #65 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x24d lib/dump_stack.c:53 print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:256 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline] kasan_report+0x23c/0x360 mm/kasan/report.c:412 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:433 ip6_dst_idev include/net/ip6_fib.h:192 [inline] ip6_xmit+0x1f76/0x2260 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:264 inet6_csk_xmit+0x2fc/0x580 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:139 l2tp_xmit_core net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:1053 [inline] l2tp_xmit_skb+0x105f/0x1410 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:1148 pppol2tp_sendmsg+0x470/0x670 net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c:341 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:630 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:640 ___sys_sendmsg+0x767/0x8b0 net/socket.c:2046 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x210 net/socket.c:2080 SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2091 [inline] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 net/socket.c:2087 do_syscall_64+0x281/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x453e69 RSP: 002b:00007f819593cc68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f819593d6d4 RCX: 0000000000453e69 RDX: 0000000000000081 RSI: 000000002037ffc8 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 000000000072bea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 00000000000004c3 R14: 00000000006f72e8 R15: 0000000000000000 This change addresses the issues: * explicitly checking for TCP_ESTABLISHED for user space provided sockets * dropping the v4mapped flag usage - it can become outdated - and explicitly invoking ipv6_addr_v4mapped() instead The issue is apparently there since ancient times. v1 -> v2: (many thanks to Guillaume) - with csum issue introduced in v1 - replace pr_err with pr_debug - fix build issue with IPV6 disabled - move l2tp_sk_is_v4mapped in l2tp_core.c v2 -> v3: - don't update inet_daddr for v4mapped address, unneeded - drop rendundant check at creation time Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+92fa328176eb07e4ac1a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 3557baabf280 ("[L2TP]: PPP over L2TP driver core") Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-03-12 13:54:24 +00:00
if (l2tp_sk_is_v6(sk))
udp6_set_csum(udp_get_no_check6_tx(sk),
skb, &inet6_sk(sk)->saddr,
&sk->sk_v6_daddr, udp_len);
else
#endif
udp_set_csum(sk->sk_no_check_tx, skb, inet->inet_saddr,
inet->inet_daddr, udp_len);
break;
case L2TP_ENCAPTYPE_IP:
break;
}
ret = l2tp_xmit_queue(tunnel, skb, &inet->cork.fl);
out_unlock:
bh_unlock_sock(sk);
return ret;
}
/* If caller requires the skb to have a ppp header, the header must be
* inserted in the skb data before calling this function.
*/
int l2tp_xmit_skb(struct l2tp_session *session, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
unsigned int len = 0;
int ret;
ret = l2tp_xmit_core(session, skb, &len);
if (ret == NET_XMIT_SUCCESS) {
atomic_long_inc(&session->tunnel->stats.tx_packets);
atomic_long_add(len, &session->tunnel->stats.tx_bytes);
atomic_long_inc(&session->stats.tx_packets);
atomic_long_add(len, &session->stats.tx_bytes);
} else {
atomic_long_inc(&session->tunnel->stats.tx_errors);
atomic_long_inc(&session->stats.tx_errors);
}
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_xmit_skb);
/*****************************************************************************
* Tinnel and session create/destroy.
*****************************************************************************/
/* Tunnel socket destruct hook.
* The tunnel context is deleted only when all session sockets have been
* closed.
*/
static void l2tp_tunnel_destruct(struct sock *sk)
{
l2tp: make magic feather checks more useful The l2tp tunnel and session structures contain a "magic feather" field which was originally intended to help trace lifetime bugs in the code. Since the introduction of the shared kernel refcount code in refcount.h, and l2tp's porting to those APIs, we are covered by the refcount code's checks and warnings. Duplicating those checks in the l2tp code isn't useful. However, magic feather checks are still useful to help to detect bugs stemming from misuse/trampling of the sk_user_data pointer in struct sock. The l2tp code makes extensive use of sk_user_data to stash pointers to the tunnel and session structures, and if another subsystem overwrites sk_user_data it's important to detect this. As such, rework l2tp's magic feather checks to focus on validating the tunnel and session data structures when they're extracted from sk_user_data. * Add a new accessor function l2tp_sk_to_tunnel which contains a magic feather check, and is used by l2tp_core and l2tp_ip[6] * Comment l2tp_udp_encap_recv which doesn't use this new accessor function because of the specific nature of the codepath it is called in * Drop l2tp_session_queue_purge's check on the session magic feather: it is called from code which is walking the tunnel session list, and hence doesn't need validation * Drop l2tp_session_free's check on the tunnel magic feather: the intention of this check is covered by refcount.h's reference count sanity checking * Add session magic validation in pppol2tp_ioctl. On failure return -EBADF, which mirrors the approach in pppol2tp_[sg]etsockopt. Signed-off-by: Tom Parkin <tparkin@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-09-03 08:54:51 +00:00
struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel = l2tp_sk_to_tunnel(sk);
if (!tunnel)
goto end;
/* Disable udp encapsulation */
switch (tunnel->encap) {
case L2TP_ENCAPTYPE_UDP:
/* No longer an encapsulation socket. See net/ipv4/udp.c */
(udp_sk(sk))->encap_type = 0;
(udp_sk(sk))->encap_rcv = NULL;
(udp_sk(sk))->encap_destroy = NULL;
break;
case L2TP_ENCAPTYPE_IP:
break;
}
/* Remove hooks into tunnel socket */
sk->sk_destruct = tunnel->old_sk_destruct;
sk->sk_user_data = NULL;
/* Call the original destructor */
if (sk->sk_destruct)
(*sk->sk_destruct)(sk);
l2tp: fix races with tunnel socket close The tunnel socket tunnel->sock (struct sock) is accessed when preparing a new ppp session on a tunnel at pppol2tp_session_init. If the socket is closed by a thread while another is creating a new session, the threads race. In pppol2tp_connect, the tunnel object may be created if the pppol2tp socket is associated with the special session_id 0 and the tunnel socket is looked up using the provided fd. When handling this, pppol2tp_connect cannot sock_hold the tunnel socket to prevent it being destroyed during pppol2tp_connect since this may itself may race with the socket being destroyed. Doing sockfd_lookup in pppol2tp_connect isn't sufficient to prevent tunnel->sock going away either because a given tunnel socket fd may be reused between calls to pppol2tp_connect. Instead, have l2tp_tunnel_create sock_hold the tunnel socket before it does sockfd_put. This ensures that the tunnel's socket is always extant while the tunnel object exists. Hold a ref on the socket until the tunnel is destroyed and ensure that all tunnel destroy paths go through a common function (l2tp_tunnel_delete) since this will do the final sock_put to release the tunnel socket. Since the tunnel's socket is now guaranteed to exist if the tunnel exists, we no longer need to use sockfd_lookup via l2tp_sock_to_tunnel to derive the tunnel from the socket since this is always sk_user_data. Also, sessions no longer sock_hold the tunnel socket since sessions already hold a tunnel ref and the tunnel sock will not be freed until the tunnel is freed. Removing these sock_holds in l2tp_session_register avoids a possible sock leak in the pppol2tp_connect error path if l2tp_session_register succeeds but attaching a ppp channel fails. The pppol2tp_connect error path could have been fixed instead and have the sock ref dropped when the session is freed, but doing a sock_put of the tunnel socket when the session is freed would require a new session_free callback. It is simpler to just remove the sock_hold of the tunnel socket in l2tp_session_register, now that the tunnel socket lifetime is guaranteed. Finally, some init code in l2tp_tunnel_create is reordered to ensure that the new tunnel object's refcount is set and the tunnel socket ref is taken before the tunnel socket destructor callbacks are set. kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 4360 Comm: syzbot_19c09769 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc2+ #34 Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 RIP: 0010:pppol2tp_session_init+0x1d6/0x500 RSP: 0018:ffff88001377fb40 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88001636a940 RCX: ffffffff84836c1d RDX: 0000000000000045 RSI: 0000000055976744 RDI: 0000000000000228 RBP: ffff88001377fb60 R08: ffffffff84836bc8 R09: 0000000000000002 R10: ffff88001377fab8 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff88001636aac8 R14: ffff8800160f81c0 R15: 1ffff100026eff76 FS: 00007ffb3ea66700(0000) GS:ffff88001a400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020e77000 CR3: 0000000016261000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: pppol2tp_connect+0xd18/0x13c0 ? pppol2tp_session_create+0x170/0x170 ? __might_fault+0x115/0x1d0 ? lock_downgrade+0x860/0x860 ? __might_fault+0xe5/0x1d0 ? security_socket_connect+0x8e/0xc0 SYSC_connect+0x1b6/0x310 ? SYSC_bind+0x280/0x280 ? __do_page_fault+0x5d1/0xca0 ? up_read+0x1f/0x40 ? __do_page_fault+0x3c8/0xca0 SyS_connect+0x29/0x30 ? SyS_accept+0x40/0x40 do_syscall_64+0x1e0/0x730 ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x7ffb3e376259 RSP: 002b:00007ffeda4f6508 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020e77012 RCX: 00007ffb3e376259 RDX: 000000000000002e RSI: 0000000020e77000 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007ffeda4f6540 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000400b60 R13: 00007ffeda4f6660 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Code: 80 3d b0 ff 06 02 00 0f 84 07 02 00 00 e8 13 d6 db fc 49 8d bc 24 28 02 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 f a 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 ed 02 00 00 4d 8b a4 24 28 02 00 00 e8 13 16 Fixes: 80d84ef3ff1dd ("l2tp: prevent l2tp_tunnel_delete racing with userspace close") Signed-off-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-23 17:45:45 +00:00
kfree_rcu(tunnel, rcu);
end:
return;
}
/* Remove an l2tp session from l2tp_core's hash lists. */
static void l2tp_session_unhash(struct l2tp_session *session)
{
struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel = session->tunnel;
/* Remove the session from core hashes */
if (tunnel) {
/* Remove from the per-tunnel hash */
write_lock_bh(&tunnel->hlist_lock);
hlist_del_init(&session->hlist);
write_unlock_bh(&tunnel->hlist_lock);
/* For L2TPv3 we have a per-net hash: remove from there, too */
if (tunnel->version != L2TP_HDR_VER_2) {
struct l2tp_net *pn = l2tp_pernet(tunnel->l2tp_net);
spin_lock_bh(&pn->l2tp_session_hlist_lock);
hlist_del_init_rcu(&session->global_hlist);
spin_unlock_bh(&pn->l2tp_session_hlist_lock);
synchronize_rcu();
}
}
}
/* When the tunnel is closed, all the attached sessions need to go too.
*/
static void l2tp_tunnel_closeall(struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel)
{
int hash;
struct hlist_node *walk;
struct hlist_node *tmp;
struct l2tp_session *session;
write_lock_bh(&tunnel->hlist_lock);
tunnel->acpt_newsess = false;
for (hash = 0; hash < L2TP_HASH_SIZE; hash++) {
again:
hlist_for_each_safe(walk, tmp, &tunnel->session_hlist[hash]) {
session = hlist_entry(walk, struct l2tp_session, hlist);
hlist_del_init(&session->hlist);
write_unlock_bh(&tunnel->hlist_lock);
l2tp_session_delete(session);
write_lock_bh(&tunnel->hlist_lock);
/* Now restart from the beginning of this hash
* chain. We always remove a session from the
* list so we are guaranteed to make forward
* progress.
*/
goto again;
}
}
write_unlock_bh(&tunnel->hlist_lock);
}
/* Tunnel socket destroy hook for UDP encapsulation */
static void l2tp_udp_encap_destroy(struct sock *sk)
{
l2tp: make magic feather checks more useful The l2tp tunnel and session structures contain a "magic feather" field which was originally intended to help trace lifetime bugs in the code. Since the introduction of the shared kernel refcount code in refcount.h, and l2tp's porting to those APIs, we are covered by the refcount code's checks and warnings. Duplicating those checks in the l2tp code isn't useful. However, magic feather checks are still useful to help to detect bugs stemming from misuse/trampling of the sk_user_data pointer in struct sock. The l2tp code makes extensive use of sk_user_data to stash pointers to the tunnel and session structures, and if another subsystem overwrites sk_user_data it's important to detect this. As such, rework l2tp's magic feather checks to focus on validating the tunnel and session data structures when they're extracted from sk_user_data. * Add a new accessor function l2tp_sk_to_tunnel which contains a magic feather check, and is used by l2tp_core and l2tp_ip[6] * Comment l2tp_udp_encap_recv which doesn't use this new accessor function because of the specific nature of the codepath it is called in * Drop l2tp_session_queue_purge's check on the session magic feather: it is called from code which is walking the tunnel session list, and hence doesn't need validation * Drop l2tp_session_free's check on the tunnel magic feather: the intention of this check is covered by refcount.h's reference count sanity checking * Add session magic validation in pppol2tp_ioctl. On failure return -EBADF, which mirrors the approach in pppol2tp_[sg]etsockopt. Signed-off-by: Tom Parkin <tparkin@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-09-03 08:54:51 +00:00
struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel = l2tp_sk_to_tunnel(sk);
l2tp: fix races with tunnel socket close The tunnel socket tunnel->sock (struct sock) is accessed when preparing a new ppp session on a tunnel at pppol2tp_session_init. If the socket is closed by a thread while another is creating a new session, the threads race. In pppol2tp_connect, the tunnel object may be created if the pppol2tp socket is associated with the special session_id 0 and the tunnel socket is looked up using the provided fd. When handling this, pppol2tp_connect cannot sock_hold the tunnel socket to prevent it being destroyed during pppol2tp_connect since this may itself may race with the socket being destroyed. Doing sockfd_lookup in pppol2tp_connect isn't sufficient to prevent tunnel->sock going away either because a given tunnel socket fd may be reused between calls to pppol2tp_connect. Instead, have l2tp_tunnel_create sock_hold the tunnel socket before it does sockfd_put. This ensures that the tunnel's socket is always extant while the tunnel object exists. Hold a ref on the socket until the tunnel is destroyed and ensure that all tunnel destroy paths go through a common function (l2tp_tunnel_delete) since this will do the final sock_put to release the tunnel socket. Since the tunnel's socket is now guaranteed to exist if the tunnel exists, we no longer need to use sockfd_lookup via l2tp_sock_to_tunnel to derive the tunnel from the socket since this is always sk_user_data. Also, sessions no longer sock_hold the tunnel socket since sessions already hold a tunnel ref and the tunnel sock will not be freed until the tunnel is freed. Removing these sock_holds in l2tp_session_register avoids a possible sock leak in the pppol2tp_connect error path if l2tp_session_register succeeds but attaching a ppp channel fails. The pppol2tp_connect error path could have been fixed instead and have the sock ref dropped when the session is freed, but doing a sock_put of the tunnel socket when the session is freed would require a new session_free callback. It is simpler to just remove the sock_hold of the tunnel socket in l2tp_session_register, now that the tunnel socket lifetime is guaranteed. Finally, some init code in l2tp_tunnel_create is reordered to ensure that the new tunnel object's refcount is set and the tunnel socket ref is taken before the tunnel socket destructor callbacks are set. kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 4360 Comm: syzbot_19c09769 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc2+ #34 Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 RIP: 0010:pppol2tp_session_init+0x1d6/0x500 RSP: 0018:ffff88001377fb40 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88001636a940 RCX: ffffffff84836c1d RDX: 0000000000000045 RSI: 0000000055976744 RDI: 0000000000000228 RBP: ffff88001377fb60 R08: ffffffff84836bc8 R09: 0000000000000002 R10: ffff88001377fab8 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff88001636aac8 R14: ffff8800160f81c0 R15: 1ffff100026eff76 FS: 00007ffb3ea66700(0000) GS:ffff88001a400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020e77000 CR3: 0000000016261000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: pppol2tp_connect+0xd18/0x13c0 ? pppol2tp_session_create+0x170/0x170 ? __might_fault+0x115/0x1d0 ? lock_downgrade+0x860/0x860 ? __might_fault+0xe5/0x1d0 ? security_socket_connect+0x8e/0xc0 SYSC_connect+0x1b6/0x310 ? SYSC_bind+0x280/0x280 ? __do_page_fault+0x5d1/0xca0 ? up_read+0x1f/0x40 ? __do_page_fault+0x3c8/0xca0 SyS_connect+0x29/0x30 ? SyS_accept+0x40/0x40 do_syscall_64+0x1e0/0x730 ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x7ffb3e376259 RSP: 002b:00007ffeda4f6508 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020e77012 RCX: 00007ffb3e376259 RDX: 000000000000002e RSI: 0000000020e77000 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007ffeda4f6540 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000400b60 R13: 00007ffeda4f6660 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Code: 80 3d b0 ff 06 02 00 0f 84 07 02 00 00 e8 13 d6 db fc 49 8d bc 24 28 02 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 f a 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 ed 02 00 00 4d 8b a4 24 28 02 00 00 e8 13 16 Fixes: 80d84ef3ff1dd ("l2tp: prevent l2tp_tunnel_delete racing with userspace close") Signed-off-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-23 17:45:45 +00:00
if (tunnel)
l2tp_tunnel_delete(tunnel);
}
/* Workqueue tunnel deletion function */
static void l2tp_tunnel_del_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
l2tp: fix races with tunnel socket close The tunnel socket tunnel->sock (struct sock) is accessed when preparing a new ppp session on a tunnel at pppol2tp_session_init. If the socket is closed by a thread while another is creating a new session, the threads race. In pppol2tp_connect, the tunnel object may be created if the pppol2tp socket is associated with the special session_id 0 and the tunnel socket is looked up using the provided fd. When handling this, pppol2tp_connect cannot sock_hold the tunnel socket to prevent it being destroyed during pppol2tp_connect since this may itself may race with the socket being destroyed. Doing sockfd_lookup in pppol2tp_connect isn't sufficient to prevent tunnel->sock going away either because a given tunnel socket fd may be reused between calls to pppol2tp_connect. Instead, have l2tp_tunnel_create sock_hold the tunnel socket before it does sockfd_put. This ensures that the tunnel's socket is always extant while the tunnel object exists. Hold a ref on the socket until the tunnel is destroyed and ensure that all tunnel destroy paths go through a common function (l2tp_tunnel_delete) since this will do the final sock_put to release the tunnel socket. Since the tunnel's socket is now guaranteed to exist if the tunnel exists, we no longer need to use sockfd_lookup via l2tp_sock_to_tunnel to derive the tunnel from the socket since this is always sk_user_data. Also, sessions no longer sock_hold the tunnel socket since sessions already hold a tunnel ref and the tunnel sock will not be freed until the tunnel is freed. Removing these sock_holds in l2tp_session_register avoids a possible sock leak in the pppol2tp_connect error path if l2tp_session_register succeeds but attaching a ppp channel fails. The pppol2tp_connect error path could have been fixed instead and have the sock ref dropped when the session is freed, but doing a sock_put of the tunnel socket when the session is freed would require a new session_free callback. It is simpler to just remove the sock_hold of the tunnel socket in l2tp_session_register, now that the tunnel socket lifetime is guaranteed. Finally, some init code in l2tp_tunnel_create is reordered to ensure that the new tunnel object's refcount is set and the tunnel socket ref is taken before the tunnel socket destructor callbacks are set. kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 4360 Comm: syzbot_19c09769 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc2+ #34 Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 RIP: 0010:pppol2tp_session_init+0x1d6/0x500 RSP: 0018:ffff88001377fb40 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88001636a940 RCX: ffffffff84836c1d RDX: 0000000000000045 RSI: 0000000055976744 RDI: 0000000000000228 RBP: ffff88001377fb60 R08: ffffffff84836bc8 R09: 0000000000000002 R10: ffff88001377fab8 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff88001636aac8 R14: ffff8800160f81c0 R15: 1ffff100026eff76 FS: 00007ffb3ea66700(0000) GS:ffff88001a400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020e77000 CR3: 0000000016261000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: pppol2tp_connect+0xd18/0x13c0 ? pppol2tp_session_create+0x170/0x170 ? __might_fault+0x115/0x1d0 ? lock_downgrade+0x860/0x860 ? __might_fault+0xe5/0x1d0 ? security_socket_connect+0x8e/0xc0 SYSC_connect+0x1b6/0x310 ? SYSC_bind+0x280/0x280 ? __do_page_fault+0x5d1/0xca0 ? up_read+0x1f/0x40 ? __do_page_fault+0x3c8/0xca0 SyS_connect+0x29/0x30 ? SyS_accept+0x40/0x40 do_syscall_64+0x1e0/0x730 ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x7ffb3e376259 RSP: 002b:00007ffeda4f6508 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020e77012 RCX: 00007ffb3e376259 RDX: 000000000000002e RSI: 0000000020e77000 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007ffeda4f6540 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000400b60 R13: 00007ffeda4f6660 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Code: 80 3d b0 ff 06 02 00 0f 84 07 02 00 00 e8 13 d6 db fc 49 8d bc 24 28 02 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 f a 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 ed 02 00 00 4d 8b a4 24 28 02 00 00 e8 13 16 Fixes: 80d84ef3ff1dd ("l2tp: prevent l2tp_tunnel_delete racing with userspace close") Signed-off-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-23 17:45:45 +00:00
struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel = container_of(work, struct l2tp_tunnel,
del_work);
struct sock *sk = tunnel->sock;
struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
l2tp: fix tunnel lookup use-after-free race l2tp_tunnel_get walks the tunnel list to find a matching tunnel instance and if a match is found, its refcount is increased before returning the tunnel pointer. But when tunnel objects are destroyed, they are on the tunnel list after their refcount hits zero. Fix this by moving the code that removes the tunnel from the tunnel list from the tunnel socket destructor into in the l2tp_tunnel_delete path, before the tunnel refcount is decremented. refcount_t: increment on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 13507 at lib/refcount.c:153 refcount_inc+0x47/0x50 Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 13507 Comm: syzbot_6e6a5ec8 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc2+ #36 Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 RIP: 0010:refcount_inc+0x47/0x50 RSP: 0018:ffff8800136ffb20 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: dffffc0000000008 RBX: ffff880017068e68 RCX: ffffffff814d3333 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88001a59f6d8 RDI: ffff88001a59f6d8 RBP: ffff8800136ffb28 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff8800136ffab0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880017068e50 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8800174da800 R15: 0000000000000004 FS: 00007f403ab1e700(0000) GS:ffff88001a580000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000205fafd2 CR3: 0000000016770000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Call Trace: l2tp_tunnel_get+0x2dd/0x4e0 pppol2tp_connect+0x428/0x13c0 ? pppol2tp_session_create+0x170/0x170 ? __might_fault+0x115/0x1d0 ? lock_downgrade+0x860/0x860 ? __might_fault+0xe5/0x1d0 ? security_socket_connect+0x8e/0xc0 SYSC_connect+0x1b6/0x310 ? SYSC_bind+0x280/0x280 ? __do_page_fault+0x5d1/0xca0 ? up_read+0x1f/0x40 ? __do_page_fault+0x3c8/0xca0 SyS_connect+0x29/0x30 ? SyS_accept+0x40/0x40 do_syscall_64+0x1e0/0x730 ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x7f403a42f259 RSP: 002b:00007f403ab1dee8 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000205fafe4 RCX: 00007f403a42f259 RDX: 000000000000002e RSI: 00000000205fafd2 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f403ab1df20 R08: 00007f403ab1e700 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f403ab1e700 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffc81906cbf R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007f403ab2b040 Code: 3b ff 5b 5d c3 e8 ca 5f 3b ff 80 3d 49 8e 66 04 00 75 ea e8 bc 5f 3b ff 48 c7 c7 60 69 64 85 c6 05 34 8e 66 04 01 e8 59 49 15 ff <0f> 0b eb ce 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 49 Fixes: f8ccac0e44934 ("l2tp: put tunnel socket release on a workqueue") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+19c09769f14b48810113@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+347bd5acde002e353a36@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+6e6a5ec8de31a94cd015@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+9df43faf09bd400f2993@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-23 17:45:47 +00:00
struct l2tp_net *pn;
l2tp: Avoid schedule while atomic in exit_net While destroying a network namespace that contains a L2TP tunnel a "BUG: scheduling while atomic" can be observed. Enabling lockdep shows that this is happening because l2tp_exit_net() is calling l2tp_tunnel_closeall() (via l2tp_tunnel_delete()) from within an RCU critical section. l2tp_exit_net() takes rcu_read_lock_bh() << list_for_each_entry_rcu() >> l2tp_tunnel_delete() l2tp_tunnel_closeall() __l2tp_session_unhash() synchronize_rcu() << Illegal inside RCU critical section >> BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 86, name: kworker/u16:2 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 2 PID: 86 Comm: kworker/u16:2 Tainted: G W O 4.4.6-at1 #2 Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.6.1-xs125300 05/09/2016 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net 0000000000000000 ffff880202417b90 ffffffff812b0013 ffff880202410ac0 ffffffff81870de8 ffff880202417bb8 ffffffff8107aee8 ffffffff81870de8 0000000000000c51 0000000000000000 ffff880202417be0 ffffffff8107b024 Call Trace: [<ffffffff812b0013>] dump_stack+0x85/0xc2 [<ffffffff8107aee8>] ___might_sleep+0x148/0x240 [<ffffffff8107b024>] __might_sleep+0x44/0x80 [<ffffffff810b21bd>] synchronize_sched+0x2d/0xe0 [<ffffffff8109be6d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [<ffffffff8105c7bb>] ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0x6b/0xc0 [<ffffffff816a1b00>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x30/0x40 [<ffffffff81667482>] __l2tp_session_unhash+0x172/0x220 [<ffffffff81667397>] ? __l2tp_session_unhash+0x87/0x220 [<ffffffff8166888b>] l2tp_tunnel_closeall+0x9b/0x140 [<ffffffff81668c74>] l2tp_tunnel_delete+0x14/0x60 [<ffffffff81668dd0>] l2tp_exit_net+0x110/0x270 [<ffffffff81668d5c>] ? l2tp_exit_net+0x9c/0x270 [<ffffffff815001c3>] ops_exit_list.isra.6+0x33/0x60 [<ffffffff81501166>] cleanup_net+0x1b6/0x280 ... This bug can easily be reproduced with a few steps: $ sudo unshare -n bash # Create a shell in a new namespace # ip link set lo up # ip addr add 127.0.0.1 dev lo # ip l2tp add tunnel remote 127.0.0.1 local 127.0.0.1 tunnel_id 1 \ peer_tunnel_id 1 udp_sport 50000 udp_dport 50000 # ip l2tp add session name foo tunnel_id 1 session_id 1 \ peer_session_id 1 # ip link set foo up # exit # Exit the shell, in turn exiting the namespace $ dmesg ... [942121.089216] BUG: scheduling while atomic: kworker/u16:3/13872/0x00000200 ... To fix this, move the call to l2tp_tunnel_closeall() out of the RCU critical section, and instead call it from l2tp_tunnel_del_work(), which is running from the l2tp_wq workqueue. Fixes: 2b551c6e7d5b ("l2tp: close sessions before initiating tunnel delete") Signed-off-by: Ridge Kennedy <ridge.kennedy@alliedtelesis.co.nz> Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-02-22 01:59:49 +00:00
l2tp_tunnel_closeall(tunnel);
l2tp: don't use inet_shutdown on tunnel destroy Previously, if a tunnel was closed, we called inet_shutdown to mark the socket as unconnected such that userspace would get errors and then close the socket. This could race with userspace closing the socket. Instead, leave userspace to close the socket in its own time (our tunnel will be detached anyway). BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000a0 IP: __lock_acquire+0x263/0x1630 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Modules linked in: CPU: 2 PID: 42 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc7+ #129 Workqueue: l2tp l2tp_tunnel_del_work RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x263/0x1630 RSP: 0018:ffff88001a37fc70 EFLAGS: 00010002 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000088 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff88001a37fd18 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000000076fd R12: 00000000000000a0 R13: ffff88001a3722c0 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88001ad00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000000a0 CR3: 000000001730b000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Call Trace: ? __lock_acquire+0xc77/0x1630 ? console_trylock+0x11/0xa0 lock_acquire+0x117/0x230 ? lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xa0 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x3a/0x50 ? lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xa0 lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xa0 inet_shutdown+0x33/0xf0 l2tp_tunnel_del_work+0x60/0xef process_one_work+0x1ea/0x5f0 ? process_one_work+0x162/0x5f0 worker_thread+0x48/0x3e0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 kthread+0x108/0x140 ? process_one_work+0x5f0/0x5f0 ? kthread_stop+0x2a0/0x2a0 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 Code: 00 41 81 ff ff 1f 00 00 0f 87 7a 13 00 00 45 85 f6 49 8b 85 68 08 00 00 0f 84 ae 03 00 00 c7 44 24 18 00 00 00 00 e9 f0 00 00 00 <49> 81 3c 24 80 93 3f 83 b8 00 00 00 00 44 0f 44 c0 83 fe 01 0f RIP: __lock_acquire+0x263/0x1630 RSP: ffff88001a37fc70 CR2: 00000000000000a0 Fixes: 309795f4bec2d ("l2tp: Add netlink control API for L2TP") Signed-off-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-23 17:45:43 +00:00
/* If the tunnel socket was created within the kernel, use
* the sk API to release it here.
*/
l2tp: don't use inet_shutdown on tunnel destroy Previously, if a tunnel was closed, we called inet_shutdown to mark the socket as unconnected such that userspace would get errors and then close the socket. This could race with userspace closing the socket. Instead, leave userspace to close the socket in its own time (our tunnel will be detached anyway). BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000a0 IP: __lock_acquire+0x263/0x1630 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Modules linked in: CPU: 2 PID: 42 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc7+ #129 Workqueue: l2tp l2tp_tunnel_del_work RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x263/0x1630 RSP: 0018:ffff88001a37fc70 EFLAGS: 00010002 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000088 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff88001a37fd18 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 00000000000076fd R12: 00000000000000a0 R13: ffff88001a3722c0 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88001ad00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000000a0 CR3: 000000001730b000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Call Trace: ? __lock_acquire+0xc77/0x1630 ? console_trylock+0x11/0xa0 lock_acquire+0x117/0x230 ? lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xa0 _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x3a/0x50 ? lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xa0 lock_sock_nested+0x3a/0xa0 inet_shutdown+0x33/0xf0 l2tp_tunnel_del_work+0x60/0xef process_one_work+0x1ea/0x5f0 ? process_one_work+0x162/0x5f0 worker_thread+0x48/0x3e0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 kthread+0x108/0x140 ? process_one_work+0x5f0/0x5f0 ? kthread_stop+0x2a0/0x2a0 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 Code: 00 41 81 ff ff 1f 00 00 0f 87 7a 13 00 00 45 85 f6 49 8b 85 68 08 00 00 0f 84 ae 03 00 00 c7 44 24 18 00 00 00 00 e9 f0 00 00 00 <49> 81 3c 24 80 93 3f 83 b8 00 00 00 00 44 0f 44 c0 83 fe 01 0f RIP: __lock_acquire+0x263/0x1630 RSP: ffff88001a37fc70 CR2: 00000000000000a0 Fixes: 309795f4bec2d ("l2tp: Add netlink control API for L2TP") Signed-off-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-23 17:45:43 +00:00
if (tunnel->fd < 0) {
if (sock) {
kernel_sock_shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR);
sock_release(sock);
}
}
l2tp: fix tunnel lookup use-after-free race l2tp_tunnel_get walks the tunnel list to find a matching tunnel instance and if a match is found, its refcount is increased before returning the tunnel pointer. But when tunnel objects are destroyed, they are on the tunnel list after their refcount hits zero. Fix this by moving the code that removes the tunnel from the tunnel list from the tunnel socket destructor into in the l2tp_tunnel_delete path, before the tunnel refcount is decremented. refcount_t: increment on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 13507 at lib/refcount.c:153 refcount_inc+0x47/0x50 Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 13507 Comm: syzbot_6e6a5ec8 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc2+ #36 Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 RIP: 0010:refcount_inc+0x47/0x50 RSP: 0018:ffff8800136ffb20 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: dffffc0000000008 RBX: ffff880017068e68 RCX: ffffffff814d3333 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88001a59f6d8 RDI: ffff88001a59f6d8 RBP: ffff8800136ffb28 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff8800136ffab0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff880017068e50 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8800174da800 R15: 0000000000000004 FS: 00007f403ab1e700(0000) GS:ffff88001a580000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000205fafd2 CR3: 0000000016770000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Call Trace: l2tp_tunnel_get+0x2dd/0x4e0 pppol2tp_connect+0x428/0x13c0 ? pppol2tp_session_create+0x170/0x170 ? __might_fault+0x115/0x1d0 ? lock_downgrade+0x860/0x860 ? __might_fault+0xe5/0x1d0 ? security_socket_connect+0x8e/0xc0 SYSC_connect+0x1b6/0x310 ? SYSC_bind+0x280/0x280 ? __do_page_fault+0x5d1/0xca0 ? up_read+0x1f/0x40 ? __do_page_fault+0x3c8/0xca0 SyS_connect+0x29/0x30 ? SyS_accept+0x40/0x40 do_syscall_64+0x1e0/0x730 ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x7f403a42f259 RSP: 002b:00007f403ab1dee8 EFLAGS: 00000296 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000205fafe4 RCX: 00007f403a42f259 RDX: 000000000000002e RSI: 00000000205fafd2 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f403ab1df20 R08: 00007f403ab1e700 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f403ab1e700 R11: 0000000000000296 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffc81906cbf R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007f403ab2b040 Code: 3b ff 5b 5d c3 e8 ca 5f 3b ff 80 3d 49 8e 66 04 00 75 ea e8 bc 5f 3b ff 48 c7 c7 60 69 64 85 c6 05 34 8e 66 04 01 e8 59 49 15 ff <0f> 0b eb ce 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 49 Fixes: f8ccac0e44934 ("l2tp: put tunnel socket release on a workqueue") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+19c09769f14b48810113@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+347bd5acde002e353a36@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+6e6a5ec8de31a94cd015@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+9df43faf09bd400f2993@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-23 17:45:47 +00:00
/* Remove the tunnel struct from the tunnel list */
pn = l2tp_pernet(tunnel->l2tp_net);
spin_lock_bh(&pn->l2tp_tunnel_list_lock);
list_del_rcu(&tunnel->list);
spin_unlock_bh(&pn->l2tp_tunnel_list_lock);
l2tp: fix races with tunnel socket close The tunnel socket tunnel->sock (struct sock) is accessed when preparing a new ppp session on a tunnel at pppol2tp_session_init. If the socket is closed by a thread while another is creating a new session, the threads race. In pppol2tp_connect, the tunnel object may be created if the pppol2tp socket is associated with the special session_id 0 and the tunnel socket is looked up using the provided fd. When handling this, pppol2tp_connect cannot sock_hold the tunnel socket to prevent it being destroyed during pppol2tp_connect since this may itself may race with the socket being destroyed. Doing sockfd_lookup in pppol2tp_connect isn't sufficient to prevent tunnel->sock going away either because a given tunnel socket fd may be reused between calls to pppol2tp_connect. Instead, have l2tp_tunnel_create sock_hold the tunnel socket before it does sockfd_put. This ensures that the tunnel's socket is always extant while the tunnel object exists. Hold a ref on the socket until the tunnel is destroyed and ensure that all tunnel destroy paths go through a common function (l2tp_tunnel_delete) since this will do the final sock_put to release the tunnel socket. Since the tunnel's socket is now guaranteed to exist if the tunnel exists, we no longer need to use sockfd_lookup via l2tp_sock_to_tunnel to derive the tunnel from the socket since this is always sk_user_data. Also, sessions no longer sock_hold the tunnel socket since sessions already hold a tunnel ref and the tunnel sock will not be freed until the tunnel is freed. Removing these sock_holds in l2tp_session_register avoids a possible sock leak in the pppol2tp_connect error path if l2tp_session_register succeeds but attaching a ppp channel fails. The pppol2tp_connect error path could have been fixed instead and have the sock ref dropped when the session is freed, but doing a sock_put of the tunnel socket when the session is freed would require a new session_free callback. It is simpler to just remove the sock_hold of the tunnel socket in l2tp_session_register, now that the tunnel socket lifetime is guaranteed. Finally, some init code in l2tp_tunnel_create is reordered to ensure that the new tunnel object's refcount is set and the tunnel socket ref is taken before the tunnel socket destructor callbacks are set. kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 4360 Comm: syzbot_19c09769 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc2+ #34 Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 RIP: 0010:pppol2tp_session_init+0x1d6/0x500 RSP: 0018:ffff88001377fb40 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88001636a940 RCX: ffffffff84836c1d RDX: 0000000000000045 RSI: 0000000055976744 RDI: 0000000000000228 RBP: ffff88001377fb60 R08: ffffffff84836bc8 R09: 0000000000000002 R10: ffff88001377fab8 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff88001636aac8 R14: ffff8800160f81c0 R15: 1ffff100026eff76 FS: 00007ffb3ea66700(0000) GS:ffff88001a400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020e77000 CR3: 0000000016261000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: pppol2tp_connect+0xd18/0x13c0 ? pppol2tp_session_create+0x170/0x170 ? __might_fault+0x115/0x1d0 ? lock_downgrade+0x860/0x860 ? __might_fault+0xe5/0x1d0 ? security_socket_connect+0x8e/0xc0 SYSC_connect+0x1b6/0x310 ? SYSC_bind+0x280/0x280 ? __do_page_fault+0x5d1/0xca0 ? up_read+0x1f/0x40 ? __do_page_fault+0x3c8/0xca0 SyS_connect+0x29/0x30 ? SyS_accept+0x40/0x40 do_syscall_64+0x1e0/0x730 ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x7ffb3e376259 RSP: 002b:00007ffeda4f6508 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020e77012 RCX: 00007ffb3e376259 RDX: 000000000000002e RSI: 0000000020e77000 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007ffeda4f6540 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000400b60 R13: 00007ffeda4f6660 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Code: 80 3d b0 ff 06 02 00 0f 84 07 02 00 00 e8 13 d6 db fc 49 8d bc 24 28 02 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 f a 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 ed 02 00 00 4d 8b a4 24 28 02 00 00 e8 13 16 Fixes: 80d84ef3ff1dd ("l2tp: prevent l2tp_tunnel_delete racing with userspace close") Signed-off-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-23 17:45:45 +00:00
/* drop initial ref */
l2tp_tunnel_dec_refcount(tunnel);
/* drop workqueue ref */
l2tp_tunnel_dec_refcount(tunnel);
}
/* Create a socket for the tunnel, if one isn't set up by
* userspace. This is used for static tunnels where there is no
* managing L2TP daemon.
*
* Since we don't want these sockets to keep a namespace alive by
* themselves, we drop the socket's namespace refcount after creation.
* These sockets are freed when the namespace exits using the pernet
* exit hook.
*/
static int l2tp_tunnel_sock_create(struct net *net,
u32 tunnel_id,
u32 peer_tunnel_id,
struct l2tp_tunnel_cfg *cfg,
struct socket **sockp)
{
int err = -EINVAL;
struct socket *sock = NULL;
struct udp_port_cfg udp_conf;
switch (cfg->encap) {
case L2TP_ENCAPTYPE_UDP:
memset(&udp_conf, 0, sizeof(udp_conf));
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
if (cfg->local_ip6 && cfg->peer_ip6) {
udp_conf.family = AF_INET6;
memcpy(&udp_conf.local_ip6, cfg->local_ip6,
sizeof(udp_conf.local_ip6));
memcpy(&udp_conf.peer_ip6, cfg->peer_ip6,
sizeof(udp_conf.peer_ip6));
udp_conf.use_udp6_tx_checksums =
!cfg->udp6_zero_tx_checksums;
udp_conf.use_udp6_rx_checksums =
!cfg->udp6_zero_rx_checksums;
} else
#endif
{
udp_conf.family = AF_INET;
udp_conf.local_ip = cfg->local_ip;
udp_conf.peer_ip = cfg->peer_ip;
udp_conf.use_udp_checksums = cfg->use_udp_checksums;
}
udp_conf.local_udp_port = htons(cfg->local_udp_port);
udp_conf.peer_udp_port = htons(cfg->peer_udp_port);
err = udp_sock_create(net, &udp_conf, &sock);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
break;
case L2TP_ENCAPTYPE_IP:
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
if (cfg->local_ip6 && cfg->peer_ip6) {
struct sockaddr_l2tpip6 ip6_addr = {0};
err = sock_create_kern(net, AF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM,
IPPROTO_L2TP, &sock);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
ip6_addr.l2tp_family = AF_INET6;
memcpy(&ip6_addr.l2tp_addr, cfg->local_ip6,
sizeof(ip6_addr.l2tp_addr));
ip6_addr.l2tp_conn_id = tunnel_id;
err = kernel_bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&ip6_addr,
sizeof(ip6_addr));
if (err < 0)
goto out;
ip6_addr.l2tp_family = AF_INET6;
memcpy(&ip6_addr.l2tp_addr, cfg->peer_ip6,
sizeof(ip6_addr.l2tp_addr));
ip6_addr.l2tp_conn_id = peer_tunnel_id;
err = kernel_connect(sock,
(struct sockaddr *)&ip6_addr,
sizeof(ip6_addr), 0);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
} else
#endif
{
struct sockaddr_l2tpip ip_addr = {0};
err = sock_create_kern(net, AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM,
IPPROTO_L2TP, &sock);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
ip_addr.l2tp_family = AF_INET;
ip_addr.l2tp_addr = cfg->local_ip;
ip_addr.l2tp_conn_id = tunnel_id;
err = kernel_bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&ip_addr,
sizeof(ip_addr));
if (err < 0)
goto out;
ip_addr.l2tp_family = AF_INET;
ip_addr.l2tp_addr = cfg->peer_ip;
ip_addr.l2tp_conn_id = peer_tunnel_id;
err = kernel_connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&ip_addr,
sizeof(ip_addr), 0);
if (err < 0)
goto out;
}
break;
default:
goto out;
}
out:
*sockp = sock;
if (err < 0 && sock) {
kernel_sock_shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR);
sock_release(sock);
*sockp = NULL;
}
return err;
}
l2tp: fix a lockdep splat Fixes following lockdep splat : [ 1614.734896] ============================================= [ 1614.734898] [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ] [ 1614.734901] 3.6.0-rc3+ #782 Not tainted [ 1614.734903] --------------------------------------------- [ 1614.734905] swapper/11/0 is trying to acquire lock: [ 1614.734907] (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa0209d72>] l2tp_xmit_skb+0x172/0xa50 [l2tp_core] [ 1614.734920] [ 1614.734920] but task is already holding lock: [ 1614.734922] (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff815fce23>] tcp_v4_err+0x163/0x6b0 [ 1614.734932] [ 1614.734932] other info that might help us debug this: [ 1614.734935] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 1614.734935] [ 1614.734937] CPU0 [ 1614.734938] ---- [ 1614.734940] lock(slock-AF_INET); [ 1614.734943] lock(slock-AF_INET); [ 1614.734946] [ 1614.734946] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 1614.734946] [ 1614.734949] May be due to missing lock nesting notation [ 1614.734949] [ 1614.734952] 7 locks held by swapper/11/0: [ 1614.734954] #0: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff81592801>] __netif_receive_skb+0x251/0xd00 [ 1614.734964] #1: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff815d319c>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x4c/0x4e0 [ 1614.734972] #2: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8160d116>] icmp_socket_deliver+0x46/0x230 [ 1614.734982] #3: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff815fce23>] tcp_v4_err+0x163/0x6b0 [ 1614.734989] #4: (rcu_read_lock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff815da240>] ip_queue_xmit+0x0/0x680 [ 1614.734997] #5: (rcu_read_lock_bh){.+....}, at: [<ffffffff815d9925>] ip_finish_output+0x135/0x890 [ 1614.735004] #6: (rcu_read_lock_bh){.+....}, at: [<ffffffff81595680>] dev_queue_xmit+0x0/0xe00 [ 1614.735012] [ 1614.735012] stack backtrace: [ 1614.735016] Pid: 0, comm: swapper/11 Not tainted 3.6.0-rc3+ #782 [ 1614.735018] Call Trace: [ 1614.735020] <IRQ> [<ffffffff810a50ac>] __lock_acquire+0x144c/0x1b10 [ 1614.735033] [<ffffffff810a334b>] ? check_usage+0x9b/0x4d0 [ 1614.735037] [<ffffffff810a6762>] ? mark_held_locks+0x82/0x130 [ 1614.735042] [<ffffffff810a5df0>] lock_acquire+0x90/0x200 [ 1614.735047] [<ffffffffa0209d72>] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x172/0xa50 [l2tp_core] [ 1614.735051] [<ffffffff810a69ad>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [ 1614.735060] [<ffffffff81749b31>] _raw_spin_lock+0x41/0x50 [ 1614.735065] [<ffffffffa0209d72>] ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x172/0xa50 [l2tp_core] [ 1614.735069] [<ffffffffa0209d72>] l2tp_xmit_skb+0x172/0xa50 [l2tp_core] [ 1614.735075] [<ffffffffa014f7f2>] l2tp_eth_dev_xmit+0x32/0x60 [l2tp_eth] [ 1614.735079] [<ffffffff81595112>] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x502/0xa70 [ 1614.735083] [<ffffffff81594c6e>] ? dev_hard_start_xmit+0x5e/0xa70 [ 1614.735087] [<ffffffff815957c1>] ? dev_queue_xmit+0x141/0xe00 [ 1614.735093] [<ffffffff815b622e>] sch_direct_xmit+0xfe/0x290 [ 1614.735098] [<ffffffff81595865>] dev_queue_xmit+0x1e5/0xe00 [ 1614.735102] [<ffffffff81595680>] ? dev_hard_start_xmit+0xa70/0xa70 [ 1614.735106] [<ffffffff815b4daa>] ? eth_header+0x3a/0xf0 [ 1614.735111] [<ffffffff8161d33e>] ? fib_get_table+0x2e/0x280 [ 1614.735117] [<ffffffff8160a7e2>] arp_xmit+0x22/0x60 [ 1614.735121] [<ffffffff8160a863>] arp_send+0x43/0x50 [ 1614.735125] [<ffffffff8160b82f>] arp_solicit+0x18f/0x450 [ 1614.735132] [<ffffffff8159d9da>] neigh_probe+0x4a/0x70 [ 1614.735137] [<ffffffff815a191a>] __neigh_event_send+0xea/0x300 [ 1614.735141] [<ffffffff815a1c93>] neigh_resolve_output+0x163/0x260 [ 1614.735146] [<ffffffff815d9cf5>] ip_finish_output+0x505/0x890 [ 1614.735150] [<ffffffff815d9925>] ? ip_finish_output+0x135/0x890 [ 1614.735154] [<ffffffff815dae79>] ip_output+0x59/0xf0 [ 1614.735158] [<ffffffff815da1cd>] ip_local_out+0x2d/0xa0 [ 1614.735162] [<ffffffff815da403>] ip_queue_xmit+0x1c3/0x680 [ 1614.735165] [<ffffffff815da240>] ? ip_local_out+0xa0/0xa0 [ 1614.735172] [<ffffffff815f4402>] tcp_transmit_skb+0x402/0xa60 [ 1614.735177] [<ffffffff815f5a11>] tcp_retransmit_skb+0x1a1/0x620 [ 1614.735181] [<ffffffff815f7e93>] tcp_retransmit_timer+0x393/0x960 [ 1614.735185] [<ffffffff815fce23>] ? tcp_v4_err+0x163/0x6b0 [ 1614.735189] [<ffffffff815fd317>] tcp_v4_err+0x657/0x6b0 [ 1614.735194] [<ffffffff8160d116>] ? icmp_socket_deliver+0x46/0x230 [ 1614.735199] [<ffffffff8160d19e>] icmp_socket_deliver+0xce/0x230 [ 1614.735203] [<ffffffff8160d116>] ? icmp_socket_deliver+0x46/0x230 [ 1614.735208] [<ffffffff8160d464>] icmp_unreach+0xe4/0x2c0 [ 1614.735213] [<ffffffff8160e520>] icmp_rcv+0x350/0x4a0 [ 1614.735217] [<ffffffff815d3285>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x135/0x4e0 [ 1614.735221] [<ffffffff815d319c>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x4c/0x4e0 [ 1614.735225] [<ffffffff815d3ffa>] ip_local_deliver+0x4a/0x90 [ 1614.735229] [<ffffffff815d37b7>] ip_rcv_finish+0x187/0x730 [ 1614.735233] [<ffffffff815d425d>] ip_rcv+0x21d/0x300 [ 1614.735237] [<ffffffff81592a1b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x46b/0xd00 [ 1614.735241] [<ffffffff81592801>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x251/0xd00 [ 1614.735245] [<ffffffff81593368>] process_backlog+0xb8/0x180 [ 1614.735249] [<ffffffff81593cf9>] net_rx_action+0x159/0x330 [ 1614.735257] [<ffffffff810491f0>] __do_softirq+0xd0/0x3e0 [ 1614.735264] [<ffffffff8109ed24>] ? tick_program_event+0x24/0x30 [ 1614.735270] [<ffffffff8175419c>] call_softirq+0x1c/0x30 [ 1614.735278] [<ffffffff8100425d>] do_softirq+0x8d/0xc0 [ 1614.735282] [<ffffffff8104983e>] irq_exit+0xae/0xe0 [ 1614.735287] [<ffffffff8175494e>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6e/0x99 [ 1614.735291] [<ffffffff81753a1c>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x6c/0x80 [ 1614.735293] <EOI> [<ffffffff810a14ad>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xd/0x10 [ 1614.735306] [<ffffffff81336f85>] ? intel_idle+0xf5/0x150 [ 1614.735310] [<ffffffff81336f7e>] ? intel_idle+0xee/0x150 [ 1614.735317] [<ffffffff814e6ea9>] cpuidle_enter+0x19/0x20 [ 1614.735321] [<ffffffff814e7538>] cpuidle_idle_call+0xa8/0x630 [ 1614.735327] [<ffffffff8100c1ba>] cpu_idle+0x8a/0xe0 [ 1614.735333] [<ffffffff8173762e>] start_secondary+0x220/0x222 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2012-09-04 07:18:57 +00:00
static struct lock_class_key l2tp_socket_class;
int l2tp_tunnel_create(int fd, int version, u32 tunnel_id, u32 peer_tunnel_id,
struct l2tp_tunnel_cfg *cfg, struct l2tp_tunnel **tunnelp)
{
struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel = NULL;
int err;
enum l2tp_encap_type encap = L2TP_ENCAPTYPE_UDP;
if (cfg)
encap = cfg->encap;
tunnel = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunnel), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tunnel) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto err;
}
tunnel->version = version;
tunnel->tunnel_id = tunnel_id;
tunnel->peer_tunnel_id = peer_tunnel_id;
tunnel->magic = L2TP_TUNNEL_MAGIC;
sprintf(&tunnel->name[0], "tunl %u", tunnel_id);
rwlock_init(&tunnel->hlist_lock);
tunnel->acpt_newsess = true;
tunnel->encap = encap;
l2tp: fix races with tunnel socket close The tunnel socket tunnel->sock (struct sock) is accessed when preparing a new ppp session on a tunnel at pppol2tp_session_init. If the socket is closed by a thread while another is creating a new session, the threads race. In pppol2tp_connect, the tunnel object may be created if the pppol2tp socket is associated with the special session_id 0 and the tunnel socket is looked up using the provided fd. When handling this, pppol2tp_connect cannot sock_hold the tunnel socket to prevent it being destroyed during pppol2tp_connect since this may itself may race with the socket being destroyed. Doing sockfd_lookup in pppol2tp_connect isn't sufficient to prevent tunnel->sock going away either because a given tunnel socket fd may be reused between calls to pppol2tp_connect. Instead, have l2tp_tunnel_create sock_hold the tunnel socket before it does sockfd_put. This ensures that the tunnel's socket is always extant while the tunnel object exists. Hold a ref on the socket until the tunnel is destroyed and ensure that all tunnel destroy paths go through a common function (l2tp_tunnel_delete) since this will do the final sock_put to release the tunnel socket. Since the tunnel's socket is now guaranteed to exist if the tunnel exists, we no longer need to use sockfd_lookup via l2tp_sock_to_tunnel to derive the tunnel from the socket since this is always sk_user_data. Also, sessions no longer sock_hold the tunnel socket since sessions already hold a tunnel ref and the tunnel sock will not be freed until the tunnel is freed. Removing these sock_holds in l2tp_session_register avoids a possible sock leak in the pppol2tp_connect error path if l2tp_session_register succeeds but attaching a ppp channel fails. The pppol2tp_connect error path could have been fixed instead and have the sock ref dropped when the session is freed, but doing a sock_put of the tunnel socket when the session is freed would require a new session_free callback. It is simpler to just remove the sock_hold of the tunnel socket in l2tp_session_register, now that the tunnel socket lifetime is guaranteed. Finally, some init code in l2tp_tunnel_create is reordered to ensure that the new tunnel object's refcount is set and the tunnel socket ref is taken before the tunnel socket destructor callbacks are set. kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 4360 Comm: syzbot_19c09769 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc2+ #34 Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006 RIP: 0010:pppol2tp_session_init+0x1d6/0x500 RSP: 0018:ffff88001377fb40 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88001636a940 RCX: ffffffff84836c1d RDX: 0000000000000045 RSI: 0000000055976744 RDI: 0000000000000228 RBP: ffff88001377fb60 R08: ffffffff84836bc8 R09: 0000000000000002 R10: ffff88001377fab8 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff88001636aac8 R14: ffff8800160f81c0 R15: 1ffff100026eff76 FS: 00007ffb3ea66700(0000) GS:ffff88001a400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020e77000 CR3: 0000000016261000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: pppol2tp_connect+0xd18/0x13c0 ? pppol2tp_session_create+0x170/0x170 ? __might_fault+0x115/0x1d0 ? lock_downgrade+0x860/0x860 ? __might_fault+0xe5/0x1d0 ? security_socket_connect+0x8e/0xc0 SYSC_connect+0x1b6/0x310 ? SYSC_bind+0x280/0x280 ? __do_page_fault+0x5d1/0xca0 ? up_read+0x1f/0x40 ? __do_page_fault+0x3c8/0xca0 SyS_connect+0x29/0x30 ? SyS_accept+0x40/0x40 do_syscall_64+0x1e0/0x730 ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x7ffb3e376259 RSP: 002b:00007ffeda4f6508 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020e77012 RCX: 00007ffb3e376259 RDX: 000000000000002e RSI: 0000000020e77000 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007ffeda4f6540 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000400b60 R13: 00007ffeda4f6660 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Code: 80 3d b0 ff 06 02 00 0f 84 07 02 00 00 e8 13 d6 db fc 49 8d bc 24 28 02 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 f a 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 ed 02 00 00 4d 8b a4 24 28 02 00 00 e8 13 16 Fixes: 80d84ef3ff1dd ("l2tp: prevent l2tp_tunnel_delete racing with userspace close") Signed-off-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-23 17:45:45 +00:00
refcount_set(&tunnel->ref_count, 1);
tunnel->fd = fd;
/* Init delete workqueue struct */
INIT_WORK(&tunnel->del_work, l2tp_tunnel_del_work);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tunnel->list);
err = 0;
err:
if (tunnelp)
*tunnelp = tunnel;
return err;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_tunnel_create);
l2tp: fix races in tunnel creation l2tp_tunnel_create() inserts the new tunnel into the namespace's tunnel list and sets the socket's ->sk_user_data field, before returning it to the caller. Therefore, there are two ways the tunnel can be accessed and freed, before the caller even had the opportunity to take a reference. In practice, syzbot could crash the module by closing the socket right after a new tunnel was returned to pppol2tp_create(). This patch moves tunnel registration out of l2tp_tunnel_create(), so that the caller can safely hold a reference before publishing the tunnel. This second step is done with the new l2tp_tunnel_register() function, which is now responsible for associating the tunnel to its socket and for inserting it into the namespace's list. While moving the code to l2tp_tunnel_register(), a few modifications have been done. First, the socket validation tests are done in a helper function, for clarity. Also, modifying the socket is now done after having inserted the tunnel to the namespace's tunnels list. This will allow insertion to fail, without having to revert theses modifications in the error path (a followup patch will check for duplicate tunnels before insertion). Either the socket is a kernel socket which we control, or it is a user-space socket for which we have a reference on the file descriptor. In any case, the socket isn't going to be closed from under us. Reported-by: syzbot+fbeeb5c3b538e8545644@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: fd558d186df2 ("l2tp: Split pppol2tp patch into separate l2tp and ppp parts") Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-04-10 19:01:12 +00:00
static int l2tp_validate_socket(const struct sock *sk, const struct net *net,
enum l2tp_encap_type encap)
{
if (!net_eq(sock_net(sk), net))
return -EINVAL;
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_DGRAM)
return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
l2tp: add sk_family checks to l2tp_validate_socket syzbot was able to trigger a crash after using an ISDN socket and fool l2tp. Fix this by making sure the UDP socket is of the proper family. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in setup_udp_tunnel_sock+0x465/0x540 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel.c:78 Write of size 1 at addr ffff88808ed0c590 by task syz-executor.5/3018 CPU: 0 PID: 3018 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc6-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x188/0x20d lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd3/0x413 mm/kasan/report.c:382 __kasan_report.cold+0x20/0x38 mm/kasan/report.c:511 kasan_report+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:625 setup_udp_tunnel_sock+0x465/0x540 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel.c:78 l2tp_tunnel_register+0xb15/0xdd0 net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c:1523 l2tp_nl_cmd_tunnel_create+0x4b2/0xa60 net/l2tp/l2tp_netlink.c:249 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:673 [inline] genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:718 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x627/0xdf0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:735 netlink_rcv_skb+0x15a/0x410 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2469 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:746 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1303 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x537/0x740 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1329 netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xe10 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1918 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:672 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e6/0x810 net/socket.c:2352 ___sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x170 net/socket.c:2406 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2439 do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3 RIP: 0033:0x45ca29 Code: 0d b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 db b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007effe76edc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004fe1c0 RCX: 000000000045ca29 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 000000000078bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 000000000000094e R14: 00000000004d5d00 R15: 00007effe76ee6d4 Allocated by task 3018: save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:49 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:495 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xbf/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:468 __do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3656 [inline] __kmalloc+0x161/0x7a0 mm/slab.c:3665 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:560 [inline] sk_prot_alloc+0x223/0x2f0 net/core/sock.c:1612 sk_alloc+0x36/0x1100 net/core/sock.c:1666 data_sock_create drivers/isdn/mISDN/socket.c:600 [inline] mISDN_sock_create+0x272/0x400 drivers/isdn/mISDN/socket.c:796 __sock_create+0x3cb/0x730 net/socket.c:1428 sock_create net/socket.c:1479 [inline] __sys_socket+0xef/0x200 net/socket.c:1521 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1530 [inline] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1528 [inline] __x64_sys_socket+0x6f/0xb0 net/socket.c:1528 do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3 Freed by task 2484: save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:49 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline] kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:317 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0xf7/0x140 mm/kasan/common.c:456 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3426 [inline] kfree+0x109/0x2b0 mm/slab.c:3757 kvfree+0x42/0x50 mm/util.c:603 __free_fdtable+0x2d/0x70 fs/file.c:31 put_files_struct fs/file.c:420 [inline] put_files_struct+0x248/0x2e0 fs/file.c:413 exit_files+0x7e/0xa0 fs/file.c:445 do_exit+0xb04/0x2dd0 kernel/exit.c:791 do_group_exit+0x125/0x340 kernel/exit.c:894 get_signal+0x47b/0x24e0 kernel/signal.c:2739 do_signal+0x81/0x2240 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:784 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x26c/0x360 arch/x86/entry/common.c:161 prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:196 [inline] syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:279 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x6b1/0x7d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:305 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88808ed0c000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048 The buggy address is located 1424 bytes inside of 2048-byte region [ffff88808ed0c000, ffff88808ed0c800) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00023b4300 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 flags: 0xfffe0000000200(slab) raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea0002838208 ffffea00015ba288 ffff8880aa000e00 raw: 0000000000000000 ffff88808ed0c000 0000000100000001 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88808ed0c480: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff88808ed0c500: 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffff88808ed0c580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff88808ed0c600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88808ed0c680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc Fixes: 6b9f34239b00 ("l2tp: fix races in tunnel creation") Fixes: fd558d186df2 ("l2tp: Split pppol2tp patch into separate l2tp and ppp parts") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com> Cc: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-05-29 18:32:25 +00:00
if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
l2tp: fix races in tunnel creation l2tp_tunnel_create() inserts the new tunnel into the namespace's tunnel list and sets the socket's ->sk_user_data field, before returning it to the caller. Therefore, there are two ways the tunnel can be accessed and freed, before the caller even had the opportunity to take a reference. In practice, syzbot could crash the module by closing the socket right after a new tunnel was returned to pppol2tp_create(). This patch moves tunnel registration out of l2tp_tunnel_create(), so that the caller can safely hold a reference before publishing the tunnel. This second step is done with the new l2tp_tunnel_register() function, which is now responsible for associating the tunnel to its socket and for inserting it into the namespace's list. While moving the code to l2tp_tunnel_register(), a few modifications have been done. First, the socket validation tests are done in a helper function, for clarity. Also, modifying the socket is now done after having inserted the tunnel to the namespace's tunnels list. This will allow insertion to fail, without having to revert theses modifications in the error path (a followup patch will check for duplicate tunnels before insertion). Either the socket is a kernel socket which we control, or it is a user-space socket for which we have a reference on the file descriptor. In any case, the socket isn't going to be closed from under us. Reported-by: syzbot+fbeeb5c3b538e8545644@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: fd558d186df2 ("l2tp: Split pppol2tp patch into separate l2tp and ppp parts") Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-04-10 19:01:12 +00:00
if ((encap == L2TP_ENCAPTYPE_UDP && sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_UDP) ||
(encap == L2TP_ENCAPTYPE_IP && sk->sk_protocol != IPPROTO_L2TP))
return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
if (sk->sk_user_data)
return -EBUSY;
return 0;
}
int l2tp_tunnel_register(struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel, struct net *net,
struct l2tp_tunnel_cfg *cfg)
{
struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel_walk;
l2tp: fix races in tunnel creation l2tp_tunnel_create() inserts the new tunnel into the namespace's tunnel list and sets the socket's ->sk_user_data field, before returning it to the caller. Therefore, there are two ways the tunnel can be accessed and freed, before the caller even had the opportunity to take a reference. In practice, syzbot could crash the module by closing the socket right after a new tunnel was returned to pppol2tp_create(). This patch moves tunnel registration out of l2tp_tunnel_create(), so that the caller can safely hold a reference before publishing the tunnel. This second step is done with the new l2tp_tunnel_register() function, which is now responsible for associating the tunnel to its socket and for inserting it into the namespace's list. While moving the code to l2tp_tunnel_register(), a few modifications have been done. First, the socket validation tests are done in a helper function, for clarity. Also, modifying the socket is now done after having inserted the tunnel to the namespace's tunnels list. This will allow insertion to fail, without having to revert theses modifications in the error path (a followup patch will check for duplicate tunnels before insertion). Either the socket is a kernel socket which we control, or it is a user-space socket for which we have a reference on the file descriptor. In any case, the socket isn't going to be closed from under us. Reported-by: syzbot+fbeeb5c3b538e8545644@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: fd558d186df2 ("l2tp: Split pppol2tp patch into separate l2tp and ppp parts") Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-04-10 19:01:12 +00:00
struct l2tp_net *pn;
struct socket *sock;
struct sock *sk;
int ret;
if (tunnel->fd < 0) {
ret = l2tp_tunnel_sock_create(net, tunnel->tunnel_id,
tunnel->peer_tunnel_id, cfg,
&sock);
if (ret < 0)
goto err;
} else {
sock = sockfd_lookup(tunnel->fd, &ret);
if (!sock)
goto err;
ret = l2tp_validate_socket(sock->sk, net, tunnel->encap);
if (ret < 0)
goto err_sock;
}
tunnel->l2tp_net = net;
pn = l2tp_pernet(net);
sk = sock->sk;
sock_hold(sk);
tunnel->sock = sk;
l2tp: fix races in tunnel creation l2tp_tunnel_create() inserts the new tunnel into the namespace's tunnel list and sets the socket's ->sk_user_data field, before returning it to the caller. Therefore, there are two ways the tunnel can be accessed and freed, before the caller even had the opportunity to take a reference. In practice, syzbot could crash the module by closing the socket right after a new tunnel was returned to pppol2tp_create(). This patch moves tunnel registration out of l2tp_tunnel_create(), so that the caller can safely hold a reference before publishing the tunnel. This second step is done with the new l2tp_tunnel_register() function, which is now responsible for associating the tunnel to its socket and for inserting it into the namespace's list. While moving the code to l2tp_tunnel_register(), a few modifications have been done. First, the socket validation tests are done in a helper function, for clarity. Also, modifying the socket is now done after having inserted the tunnel to the namespace's tunnels list. This will allow insertion to fail, without having to revert theses modifications in the error path (a followup patch will check for duplicate tunnels before insertion). Either the socket is a kernel socket which we control, or it is a user-space socket for which we have a reference on the file descriptor. In any case, the socket isn't going to be closed from under us. Reported-by: syzbot+fbeeb5c3b538e8545644@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: fd558d186df2 ("l2tp: Split pppol2tp patch into separate l2tp and ppp parts") Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-04-10 19:01:12 +00:00
spin_lock_bh(&pn->l2tp_tunnel_list_lock);
list_for_each_entry(tunnel_walk, &pn->l2tp_tunnel_list, list) {
if (tunnel_walk->tunnel_id == tunnel->tunnel_id) {
spin_unlock_bh(&pn->l2tp_tunnel_list_lock);
sock_put(sk);
ret = -EEXIST;
goto err_sock;
}
}
l2tp: fix races in tunnel creation l2tp_tunnel_create() inserts the new tunnel into the namespace's tunnel list and sets the socket's ->sk_user_data field, before returning it to the caller. Therefore, there are two ways the tunnel can be accessed and freed, before the caller even had the opportunity to take a reference. In practice, syzbot could crash the module by closing the socket right after a new tunnel was returned to pppol2tp_create(). This patch moves tunnel registration out of l2tp_tunnel_create(), so that the caller can safely hold a reference before publishing the tunnel. This second step is done with the new l2tp_tunnel_register() function, which is now responsible for associating the tunnel to its socket and for inserting it into the namespace's list. While moving the code to l2tp_tunnel_register(), a few modifications have been done. First, the socket validation tests are done in a helper function, for clarity. Also, modifying the socket is now done after having inserted the tunnel to the namespace's tunnels list. This will allow insertion to fail, without having to revert theses modifications in the error path (a followup patch will check for duplicate tunnels before insertion). Either the socket is a kernel socket which we control, or it is a user-space socket for which we have a reference on the file descriptor. In any case, the socket isn't going to be closed from under us. Reported-by: syzbot+fbeeb5c3b538e8545644@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: fd558d186df2 ("l2tp: Split pppol2tp patch into separate l2tp and ppp parts") Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-04-10 19:01:12 +00:00
list_add_rcu(&tunnel->list, &pn->l2tp_tunnel_list);
spin_unlock_bh(&pn->l2tp_tunnel_list_lock);
if (tunnel->encap == L2TP_ENCAPTYPE_UDP) {
struct udp_tunnel_sock_cfg udp_cfg = {
.sk_user_data = tunnel,
.encap_type = UDP_ENCAP_L2TPINUDP,
.encap_rcv = l2tp_udp_encap_recv,
.encap_destroy = l2tp_udp_encap_destroy,
};
setup_udp_tunnel_sock(net, sock, &udp_cfg);
} else {
sk->sk_user_data = tunnel;
}
tunnel->old_sk_destruct = sk->sk_destruct;
sk->sk_destruct = &l2tp_tunnel_destruct;
lockdep_set_class_and_name(&sk->sk_lock.slock, &l2tp_socket_class,
"l2tp_sock");
sk->sk_allocation = GFP_ATOMIC;
trace_register_tunnel(tunnel);
l2tp: fix races in tunnel creation l2tp_tunnel_create() inserts the new tunnel into the namespace's tunnel list and sets the socket's ->sk_user_data field, before returning it to the caller. Therefore, there are two ways the tunnel can be accessed and freed, before the caller even had the opportunity to take a reference. In practice, syzbot could crash the module by closing the socket right after a new tunnel was returned to pppol2tp_create(). This patch moves tunnel registration out of l2tp_tunnel_create(), so that the caller can safely hold a reference before publishing the tunnel. This second step is done with the new l2tp_tunnel_register() function, which is now responsible for associating the tunnel to its socket and for inserting it into the namespace's list. While moving the code to l2tp_tunnel_register(), a few modifications have been done. First, the socket validation tests are done in a helper function, for clarity. Also, modifying the socket is now done after having inserted the tunnel to the namespace's tunnels list. This will allow insertion to fail, without having to revert theses modifications in the error path (a followup patch will check for duplicate tunnels before insertion). Either the socket is a kernel socket which we control, or it is a user-space socket for which we have a reference on the file descriptor. In any case, the socket isn't going to be closed from under us. Reported-by: syzbot+fbeeb5c3b538e8545644@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: fd558d186df2 ("l2tp: Split pppol2tp patch into separate l2tp and ppp parts") Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-04-10 19:01:12 +00:00
if (tunnel->fd >= 0)
sockfd_put(sock);
return 0;
err_sock:
if (tunnel->fd < 0)
sock_release(sock);
else
sockfd_put(sock);
l2tp: fix races in tunnel creation l2tp_tunnel_create() inserts the new tunnel into the namespace's tunnel list and sets the socket's ->sk_user_data field, before returning it to the caller. Therefore, there are two ways the tunnel can be accessed and freed, before the caller even had the opportunity to take a reference. In practice, syzbot could crash the module by closing the socket right after a new tunnel was returned to pppol2tp_create(). This patch moves tunnel registration out of l2tp_tunnel_create(), so that the caller can safely hold a reference before publishing the tunnel. This second step is done with the new l2tp_tunnel_register() function, which is now responsible for associating the tunnel to its socket and for inserting it into the namespace's list. While moving the code to l2tp_tunnel_register(), a few modifications have been done. First, the socket validation tests are done in a helper function, for clarity. Also, modifying the socket is now done after having inserted the tunnel to the namespace's tunnels list. This will allow insertion to fail, without having to revert theses modifications in the error path (a followup patch will check for duplicate tunnels before insertion). Either the socket is a kernel socket which we control, or it is a user-space socket for which we have a reference on the file descriptor. In any case, the socket isn't going to be closed from under us. Reported-by: syzbot+fbeeb5c3b538e8545644@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: fd558d186df2 ("l2tp: Split pppol2tp patch into separate l2tp and ppp parts") Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-04-10 19:01:12 +00:00
err:
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_tunnel_register);
/* This function is used by the netlink TUNNEL_DELETE command.
*/
void l2tp_tunnel_delete(struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel)
{
if (!test_and_set_bit(0, &tunnel->dead)) {
trace_delete_tunnel(tunnel);
l2tp_tunnel_inc_refcount(tunnel);
queue_work(l2tp_wq, &tunnel->del_work);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_tunnel_delete);
void l2tp_session_delete(struct l2tp_session *session)
{
if (test_and_set_bit(0, &session->dead))
return;
trace_delete_session(session);
l2tp_session_unhash(session);
l2tp_session_queue_purge(session);
if (session->session_close)
(*session->session_close)(session);
l2tp_session_dec_refcount(session);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_session_delete);
/* We come here whenever a session's send_seq, cookie_len or
* l2specific_type parameters are set.
*/
void l2tp_session_set_header_len(struct l2tp_session *session, int version)
{
if (version == L2TP_HDR_VER_2) {
session->hdr_len = 6;
if (session->send_seq)
session->hdr_len += 4;
} else {
session->hdr_len = 4 + session->cookie_len;
session->hdr_len += l2tp_get_l2specific_len(session);
if (session->tunnel->encap == L2TP_ENCAPTYPE_UDP)
session->hdr_len += 4;
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_session_set_header_len);
struct l2tp_session *l2tp_session_create(int priv_size, struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel, u32 session_id,
u32 peer_session_id, struct l2tp_session_cfg *cfg)
{
struct l2tp_session *session;
session = kzalloc(sizeof(*session) + priv_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (session) {
session->magic = L2TP_SESSION_MAGIC;
session->tunnel = tunnel;
session->session_id = session_id;
session->peer_session_id = peer_session_id;
session->nr = 0;
if (tunnel->version == L2TP_HDR_VER_2)
session->nr_max = 0xffff;
else
session->nr_max = 0xffffff;
session->nr_window_size = session->nr_max / 2;
session->nr_oos_count_max = 4;
/* Use NR of first received packet */
session->reorder_skip = 1;
sprintf(&session->name[0], "sess %u/%u",
tunnel->tunnel_id, session->session_id);
skb_queue_head_init(&session->reorder_q);
INIT_HLIST_NODE(&session->hlist);
INIT_HLIST_NODE(&session->global_hlist);
if (cfg) {
session->pwtype = cfg->pw_type;
session->send_seq = cfg->send_seq;
session->recv_seq = cfg->recv_seq;
session->lns_mode = cfg->lns_mode;
session->reorder_timeout = cfg->reorder_timeout;
session->l2specific_type = cfg->l2specific_type;
session->cookie_len = cfg->cookie_len;
memcpy(&session->cookie[0], &cfg->cookie[0], cfg->cookie_len);
session->peer_cookie_len = cfg->peer_cookie_len;
memcpy(&session->peer_cookie[0], &cfg->peer_cookie[0], cfg->peer_cookie_len);
}
l2tp_session_set_header_len(session, tunnel->version);
refcount_set(&session->ref_count, 1);
return session;
}
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2tp_session_create);
/*****************************************************************************
* Init and cleanup
*****************************************************************************/
static __net_init int l2tp_init_net(struct net *net)
{
struct l2tp_net *pn = net_generic(net, l2tp_net_id);
int hash;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pn->l2tp_tunnel_list);
spin_lock_init(&pn->l2tp_tunnel_list_lock);
for (hash = 0; hash < L2TP_HASH_SIZE_2; hash++)
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&pn->l2tp_session_hlist[hash]);
spin_lock_init(&pn->l2tp_session_hlist_lock);
return 0;
}
static __net_exit void l2tp_exit_net(struct net *net)
{
struct l2tp_net *pn = l2tp_pernet(net);
struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel = NULL;
int hash;
rcu_read_lock_bh();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(tunnel, &pn->l2tp_tunnel_list, list) {
l2tp_tunnel_delete(tunnel);
}
rcu_read_unlock_bh();
l2tp: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000128 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1 CPU: 0 PID: 5697 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G W 5.1.0-rc7+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.9.3-0-ge2fc41e-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x53/0x10b0 Code: 8b 1c 25 40 5e 01 00 4c 8b 6d 10 45 85 e4 0f 84 bd 06 00 00 44 8b 1d 7c d2 09 02 49 89 fe 41 89 d2 45 85 db 0f 84 47 02 00 00 <48> 81 3f a0 05 70 83 b8 00 00 00 00 44 0f 44 c0 83 fe 01 0f 86 3a RSP: 0018:ffffc90001c07a28 EFLAGS: 00010002 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88822f038440 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000128 RBP: ffffc90001c07a88 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000128 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fead0811540(0000) GS:ffff888237a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000128 CR3: 00000002310da000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: ? __lock_acquire+0x24e/0x10b0 lock_acquire+0xdf/0x230 ? flush_workqueue+0x71/0x530 flush_workqueue+0x97/0x530 ? flush_workqueue+0x71/0x530 l2tp_exit_net+0x170/0x2b0 [l2tp_core ? l2tp_exit_net+0x93/0x2b0 [l2tp_core ops_exit_list.isra.6+0x36/0x60 unregister_pernet_operations+0xb8/0x110 unregister_pernet_device+0x25/0x40 l2tp_init+0x55/0x1000 [l2tp_core ? 0xffffffffa018d000 do_one_initcall+0x6c/0x3cc ? do_init_module+0x22/0x1f1 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x97/0xb0 ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x325/0x3b0 do_init_module+0x5b/0x1f1 load_module+0x1db1/0x2690 ? m_show+0x1d0/0x1d0 __do_sys_finit_module+0xc5/0xd0 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x15/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x6b/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x7fead031a839 Code: 00 f3 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 1f f6 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffe8d9acca8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000560078398b80 RCX: 00007fead031a839 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000056007659dc2e RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000056007659dc2e R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000560078398b80 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00005600783a04a0 R14: 0000000000040000 R15: 0000560078398b80 Modules linked in: l2tp_core(+) e1000 ip_tables ipv6 [last unloaded: l2tp_core CR2: 0000000000000128 ---[ end trace 8322b2b8bf83f8e1 If alloc_workqueue fails in l2tp_init, l2tp_net_ops is unregistered on failure path. Then l2tp_exit_net is called which will flush NULL workqueue, this patch add a NULL check to fix it. Fixes: 67e04c29ec0d ("l2tp: unregister l2tp_net_ops on failure path") Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-05-06 14:44:04 +00:00
if (l2tp_wq)
flush_workqueue(l2tp_wq);
rcu_barrier();
for (hash = 0; hash < L2TP_HASH_SIZE_2; hash++)
WARN_ON_ONCE(!hlist_empty(&pn->l2tp_session_hlist[hash]));
}
static struct pernet_operations l2tp_net_ops = {
.init = l2tp_init_net,
.exit = l2tp_exit_net,
.id = &l2tp_net_id,
.size = sizeof(struct l2tp_net),
};
static int __init l2tp_init(void)
{
int rc = 0;
rc = register_pernet_device(&l2tp_net_ops);
if (rc)
goto out;
l2tp_wq = alloc_workqueue("l2tp", WQ_UNBOUND, 0);
if (!l2tp_wq) {
pr_err("alloc_workqueue failed\n");
unregister_pernet_device(&l2tp_net_ops);
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
pr_info("L2TP core driver, %s\n", L2TP_DRV_VERSION);
out:
return rc;
}
static void __exit l2tp_exit(void)
{
unregister_pernet_device(&l2tp_net_ops);
if (l2tp_wq) {
destroy_workqueue(l2tp_wq);
l2tp_wq = NULL;
}
}
module_init(l2tp_init);
module_exit(l2tp_exit);
MODULE_AUTHOR("James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("L2TP core");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_VERSION(L2TP_DRV_VERSION);