2019-05-19 12:08:55 +00:00
|
|
|
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/types.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/sched.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/module.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/sunrpc/types.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/sunrpc/xdr.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/sunrpc/svcsock.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/sunrpc/svcauth.h>
|
2007-07-17 11:04:42 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_api.h>
|
2013-02-04 17:50:00 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/sunrpc/addr.h>
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/err.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/hash.h>
|
2005-06-23 07:09:02 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/string.h>
|
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h
percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being
included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which
in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files
universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies.
percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for
this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those
headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion
needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is
used as the basis of conversion.
http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py
The script does the followings.
* Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that
only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used,
gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h.
* When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include
blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms
to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains
core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered -
alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there
doesn't seem to be any matching order.
* If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly
because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out
an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the
file.
The conversion was done in the following steps.
1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly
over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h
and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400
files.
2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion,
some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or
embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added
inclusions to around 150 files.
3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits
from #2 to make sure no file was left behind.
4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed.
e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab
APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually.
5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically
editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h
files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h
inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually
wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each
slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as
necessary.
6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h.
7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures
were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my
distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few
more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things
build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq).
* x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config.
* powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig
* sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig
* ia64 SMP allmodconfig
* s390 SMP allmodconfig
* alpha SMP allmodconfig
* um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig
8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as
a separate patch and serve as bisection point.
Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step
6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch.
If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch
headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of
the specific arch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 08:04:11 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/slab.h>
|
2006-10-04 09:15:50 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <net/sock.h>
|
2008-01-18 14:50:56 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <net/ipv6.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <linux/kernel.h>
|
2011-11-14 23:56:38 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
#define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2010-09-27 10:02:29 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "netns.h"
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* AUTHUNIX and AUTHNULL credentials are both handled here.
|
|
|
|
* AUTHNULL is treated just like AUTHUNIX except that the uid/gid
|
|
|
|
* are always nobody (-2). i.e. we do the same IP address checks for
|
|
|
|
* AUTHNULL as for AUTHUNIX, and that is done here.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct unix_domain {
|
|
|
|
struct auth_domain h;
|
|
|
|
/* other stuff later */
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2011-06-21 01:19:12 +00:00
|
|
|
extern struct auth_ops svcauth_null;
|
2006-03-27 09:14:59 +00:00
|
|
|
extern struct auth_ops svcauth_unix;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-01 14:41:44 +00:00
|
|
|
static void svcauth_unix_domain_release_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
|
2011-03-08 03:50:47 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-10-01 14:41:44 +00:00
|
|
|
struct auth_domain *dom = container_of(head, struct auth_domain, rcu_head);
|
2011-03-08 03:50:47 +00:00
|
|
|
struct unix_domain *ud = container_of(dom, struct unix_domain, h);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
kfree(dom->name);
|
|
|
|
kfree(ud);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-01 14:41:44 +00:00
|
|
|
static void svcauth_unix_domain_release(struct auth_domain *dom)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
call_rcu(&dom->rcu_head, svcauth_unix_domain_release_rcu);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
struct auth_domain *unix_domain_find(char *name)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2006-03-27 09:14:59 +00:00
|
|
|
struct auth_domain *rv;
|
|
|
|
struct unix_domain *new = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-01 14:41:44 +00:00
|
|
|
rv = auth_domain_find(name);
|
2006-03-27 09:14:59 +00:00
|
|
|
while(1) {
|
2006-03-27 09:15:11 +00:00
|
|
|
if (rv) {
|
|
|
|
if (new && rv != &new->h)
|
2011-03-10 03:40:30 +00:00
|
|
|
svcauth_unix_domain_release(&new->h);
|
2006-03-27 09:15:11 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (rv->flavour != &svcauth_unix) {
|
|
|
|
auth_domain_put(rv);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-03-27 09:14:59 +00:00
|
|
|
return rv;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
new = kmalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (new == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
kref_init(&new->h.ref);
|
|
|
|
new->h.name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL);
|
2006-12-13 08:35:44 +00:00
|
|
|
if (new->h.name == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
kfree(new);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-03-27 09:14:59 +00:00
|
|
|
new->h.flavour = &svcauth_unix;
|
|
|
|
rv = auth_domain_lookup(name, &new->h);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-12-23 21:30:12 +00:00
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unix_domain_find);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**************************************************
|
|
|
|
* cache for IP address to unix_domain
|
|
|
|
* as needed by AUTH_UNIX
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define IP_HASHBITS 8
|
|
|
|
#define IP_HASHMAX (1<<IP_HASHBITS)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct ip_map {
|
|
|
|
struct cache_head h;
|
|
|
|
char m_class[8]; /* e.g. "nfsd" */
|
2008-01-18 14:50:56 +00:00
|
|
|
struct in6_addr m_addr;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
struct unix_domain *m_client;
|
2018-10-01 14:41:46 +00:00
|
|
|
struct rcu_head m_rcu;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2006-03-27 09:15:09 +00:00
|
|
|
static void ip_map_put(struct kref *kref)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2006-03-27 09:15:09 +00:00
|
|
|
struct cache_head *item = container_of(kref, struct cache_head, ref);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ip_map *im = container_of(item, struct ip_map,h);
|
2006-03-27 09:15:09 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (test_bit(CACHE_VALID, &item->flags) &&
|
|
|
|
!test_bit(CACHE_NEGATIVE, &item->flags))
|
|
|
|
auth_domain_put(&im->m_client->h);
|
2018-10-01 14:41:46 +00:00
|
|
|
kfree_rcu(im, m_rcu);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-07-18 08:11:12 +00:00
|
|
|
static inline int hash_ip6(const struct in6_addr *ip)
|
2008-01-18 14:50:56 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2012-07-18 08:11:12 +00:00
|
|
|
return hash_32(ipv6_addr_hash(ip), IP_HASHBITS);
|
2008-01-18 14:50:56 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-03-27 09:15:02 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ip_map_match(struct cache_head *corig, struct cache_head *cnew)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2006-03-27 09:15:02 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ip_map *orig = container_of(corig, struct ip_map, h);
|
|
|
|
struct ip_map *new = container_of(cnew, struct ip_map, h);
|
2009-11-30 00:55:45 +00:00
|
|
|
return strcmp(orig->m_class, new->m_class) == 0 &&
|
|
|
|
ipv6_addr_equal(&orig->m_addr, &new->m_addr);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-03-27 09:15:02 +00:00
|
|
|
static void ip_map_init(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *citem)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2006-03-27 09:15:02 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ip_map *new = container_of(cnew, struct ip_map, h);
|
|
|
|
struct ip_map *item = container_of(citem, struct ip_map, h);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
strcpy(new->m_class, item->m_class);
|
2011-11-21 03:39:03 +00:00
|
|
|
new->m_addr = item->m_addr;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-03-27 09:15:02 +00:00
|
|
|
static void update(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *citem)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2006-03-27 09:15:02 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ip_map *new = container_of(cnew, struct ip_map, h);
|
|
|
|
struct ip_map *item = container_of(citem, struct ip_map, h);
|
|
|
|
|
2006-03-27 09:14:59 +00:00
|
|
|
kref_get(&item->m_client->h.ref);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
new->m_client = item->m_client;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-03-27 09:15:02 +00:00
|
|
|
static struct cache_head *ip_map_alloc(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ip_map *i = kmalloc(sizeof(*i), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (i)
|
|
|
|
return &i->h;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-03-01 23:21:42 +00:00
|
|
|
static int ip_map_upcall(struct cache_detail *cd, struct cache_head *h)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return sunrpc_cache_pipe_upcall(cd, h);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
static void ip_map_request(struct cache_detail *cd,
|
|
|
|
struct cache_head *h,
|
|
|
|
char **bpp, int *blen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2008-01-18 14:50:56 +00:00
|
|
|
char text_addr[40];
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ip_map *im = container_of(h, struct ip_map, h);
|
|
|
|
|
2008-01-18 14:50:56 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&(im->m_addr))) {
|
2008-10-31 07:54:56 +00:00
|
|
|
snprintf(text_addr, 20, "%pI4", &im->m_addr.s6_addr32[3]);
|
2008-01-18 14:50:56 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2008-10-29 19:52:50 +00:00
|
|
|
snprintf(text_addr, 40, "%pI6", &im->m_addr);
|
2008-01-18 14:50:56 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
qword_add(bpp, blen, im->m_class);
|
|
|
|
qword_add(bpp, blen, text_addr);
|
|
|
|
(*bpp)[-1] = '\n';
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-09-27 09:57:36 +00:00
|
|
|
static struct ip_map *__ip_map_lookup(struct cache_detail *cd, char *class, struct in6_addr *addr);
|
nfs: use time64_t internally
The timestamps for the cache are all in boottime seconds, so they
don't overflow 32-bit values, but the use of time_t is deprecated
because it generally does overflow when used with wall-clock time.
There are multiple possible ways of avoiding it:
- leave time_t, which is safe here, but forces others to
look into this code to determine that it is over and over.
- use a more generic type, like 'int' or 'long', which is known
to be sufficient here but loses the documentation of referring
to timestamps
- use ktime_t everywhere, and convert into seconds in the few
places where we want realtime-seconds. The conversion is
sometimes expensive, but not more so than the conversion we
do today.
- use time64_t to clarify that this code is safe. Nothing would
change for 64-bit architectures, but it is slightly less
efficient on 32-bit architectures.
Without a clear winner of the three approaches above, this picks
the last one, favouring readability over a small performance
loss on 32-bit architectures.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2017-10-20 14:34:42 +00:00
|
|
|
static int __ip_map_update(struct cache_detail *cd, struct ip_map *ipm, struct unix_domain *udom, time64_t expiry);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int ip_map_parse(struct cache_detail *cd,
|
|
|
|
char *mesg, int mlen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* class ipaddress [domainname] */
|
|
|
|
/* should be safe just to use the start of the input buffer
|
|
|
|
* for scratch: */
|
|
|
|
char *buf = mesg;
|
|
|
|
int len;
|
2006-03-27 09:15:02 +00:00
|
|
|
char class[8];
|
2010-01-26 19:03:47 +00:00
|
|
|
union {
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr sa;
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in s4;
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in6 s6;
|
|
|
|
} address;
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in6 sin6;
|
2006-03-27 09:15:02 +00:00
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct ip_map *ipmp;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
struct auth_domain *dom;
|
nfs: use time64_t internally
The timestamps for the cache are all in boottime seconds, so they
don't overflow 32-bit values, but the use of time_t is deprecated
because it generally does overflow when used with wall-clock time.
There are multiple possible ways of avoiding it:
- leave time_t, which is safe here, but forces others to
look into this code to determine that it is over and over.
- use a more generic type, like 'int' or 'long', which is known
to be sufficient here but loses the documentation of referring
to timestamps
- use ktime_t everywhere, and convert into seconds in the few
places where we want realtime-seconds. The conversion is
sometimes expensive, but not more so than the conversion we
do today.
- use time64_t to clarify that this code is safe. Nothing would
change for 64-bit architectures, but it is slightly less
efficient on 32-bit architectures.
Without a clear winner of the three approaches above, this picks
the last one, favouring readability over a small performance
loss on 32-bit architectures.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2017-10-20 14:34:42 +00:00
|
|
|
time64_t expiry;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (mesg[mlen-1] != '\n')
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
mesg[mlen-1] = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* class */
|
2006-03-27 09:15:02 +00:00
|
|
|
len = qword_get(&mesg, class, sizeof(class));
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (len <= 0) return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* ip address */
|
|
|
|
len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
|
|
|
|
if (len <= 0) return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
2012-01-19 17:42:45 +00:00
|
|
|
if (rpc_pton(cd->net, buf, len, &address.sa, sizeof(address)) == 0)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2010-01-26 19:03:47 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (address.sa.sa_family) {
|
|
|
|
case AF_INET:
|
|
|
|
/* Form a mapped IPv4 address in sin6 */
|
|
|
|
sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
|
2010-10-05 16:48:02 +00:00
|
|
|
ipv6_addr_set_v4mapped(address.s4.sin_addr.s_addr,
|
|
|
|
&sin6.sin6_addr);
|
2010-01-26 19:03:47 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2011-12-10 09:48:31 +00:00
|
|
|
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
|
2010-01-26 19:03:47 +00:00
|
|
|
case AF_INET6:
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&sin6, &address.s6, sizeof(sin6));
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-02-09 23:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
expiry = get_expiry(&mesg);
|
|
|
|
if (expiry ==0)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* domainname, or empty for NEGATIVE */
|
|
|
|
len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
|
|
|
|
if (len < 0) return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (len) {
|
|
|
|
dom = unix_domain_find(buf);
|
|
|
|
if (dom == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOENT;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
dom = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2010-01-26 19:03:47 +00:00
|
|
|
/* IPv6 scope IDs are ignored for now */
|
2010-09-27 09:57:36 +00:00
|
|
|
ipmp = __ip_map_lookup(cd, class, &sin6.sin6_addr);
|
2006-03-27 09:15:02 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ipmp) {
|
2010-09-27 09:57:36 +00:00
|
|
|
err = __ip_map_update(cd, ipmp,
|
2006-03-27 09:15:02 +00:00
|
|
|
container_of(dom, struct unix_domain, h),
|
|
|
|
expiry);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
} else
|
2006-03-27 09:15:02 +00:00
|
|
|
err = -ENOMEM;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (dom)
|
|
|
|
auth_domain_put(dom);
|
2006-03-27 09:15:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
cache_flush();
|
2006-03-27 09:15:02 +00:00
|
|
|
return err;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int ip_map_show(struct seq_file *m,
|
|
|
|
struct cache_detail *cd,
|
|
|
|
struct cache_head *h)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ip_map *im;
|
2008-01-18 14:50:56 +00:00
|
|
|
struct in6_addr addr;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
char *dom = "-no-domain-";
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (h == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
seq_puts(m, "#class IP domain\n");
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
im = container_of(h, struct ip_map, h);
|
|
|
|
/* class addr domain */
|
2011-11-21 03:39:03 +00:00
|
|
|
addr = im->m_addr;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2007-02-09 23:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
if (test_bit(CACHE_VALID, &h->flags) &&
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
!test_bit(CACHE_NEGATIVE, &h->flags))
|
|
|
|
dom = im->m_client->h.name;
|
|
|
|
|
2008-01-18 14:50:56 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&addr)) {
|
2008-10-31 07:54:56 +00:00
|
|
|
seq_printf(m, "%s %pI4 %s\n",
|
|
|
|
im->m_class, &addr.s6_addr32[3], dom);
|
2008-01-18 14:50:56 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2008-10-29 19:52:50 +00:00
|
|
|
seq_printf(m, "%s %pI6 %s\n", im->m_class, &addr, dom);
|
2008-01-18 14:50:56 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-02-09 23:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2010-09-27 09:57:36 +00:00
|
|
|
static struct ip_map *__ip_map_lookup(struct cache_detail *cd, char *class,
|
|
|
|
struct in6_addr *addr)
|
2006-03-27 09:15:02 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ip_map ip;
|
|
|
|
struct cache_head *ch;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
strcpy(ip.m_class, class);
|
2011-11-21 03:39:03 +00:00
|
|
|
ip.m_addr = *addr;
|
2018-10-01 14:41:46 +00:00
|
|
|
ch = sunrpc_cache_lookup_rcu(cd, &ip.h,
|
|
|
|
hash_str(class, IP_HASHBITS) ^
|
|
|
|
hash_ip6(addr));
|
2006-03-27 09:15:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ch)
|
|
|
|
return container_of(ch, struct ip_map, h);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2010-09-27 09:59:48 +00:00
|
|
|
static inline struct ip_map *ip_map_lookup(struct net *net, char *class,
|
|
|
|
struct in6_addr *addr)
|
2010-09-27 09:57:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2010-09-27 10:02:29 +00:00
|
|
|
struct sunrpc_net *sn;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
|
|
|
|
return __ip_map_lookup(sn->ip_map_cache, class, addr);
|
2010-09-27 09:57:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int __ip_map_update(struct cache_detail *cd, struct ip_map *ipm,
|
nfs: use time64_t internally
The timestamps for the cache are all in boottime seconds, so they
don't overflow 32-bit values, but the use of time_t is deprecated
because it generally does overflow when used with wall-clock time.
There are multiple possible ways of avoiding it:
- leave time_t, which is safe here, but forces others to
look into this code to determine that it is over and over.
- use a more generic type, like 'int' or 'long', which is known
to be sufficient here but loses the documentation of referring
to timestamps
- use ktime_t everywhere, and convert into seconds in the few
places where we want realtime-seconds. The conversion is
sometimes expensive, but not more so than the conversion we
do today.
- use time64_t to clarify that this code is safe. Nothing would
change for 64-bit architectures, but it is slightly less
efficient on 32-bit architectures.
Without a clear winner of the three approaches above, this picks
the last one, favouring readability over a small performance
loss on 32-bit architectures.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2017-10-20 14:34:42 +00:00
|
|
|
struct unix_domain *udom, time64_t expiry)
|
2006-03-27 09:15:02 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ip_map ip;
|
|
|
|
struct cache_head *ch;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ip.m_client = udom;
|
|
|
|
ip.h.flags = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!udom)
|
|
|
|
set_bit(CACHE_NEGATIVE, &ip.h.flags);
|
|
|
|
ip.h.expiry_time = expiry;
|
2010-09-27 09:57:36 +00:00
|
|
|
ch = sunrpc_cache_update(cd, &ip.h, &ipm->h,
|
2006-03-27 09:15:02 +00:00
|
|
|
hash_str(ipm->m_class, IP_HASHBITS) ^
|
2012-07-18 08:11:12 +00:00
|
|
|
hash_ip6(&ipm->m_addr));
|
2006-03-27 09:15:02 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!ch)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
2010-09-27 09:57:36 +00:00
|
|
|
cache_put(ch, cd);
|
2006-03-27 09:15:02 +00:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2010-09-27 09:59:48 +00:00
|
|
|
static inline int ip_map_update(struct net *net, struct ip_map *ipm,
|
nfs: use time64_t internally
The timestamps for the cache are all in boottime seconds, so they
don't overflow 32-bit values, but the use of time_t is deprecated
because it generally does overflow when used with wall-clock time.
There are multiple possible ways of avoiding it:
- leave time_t, which is safe here, but forces others to
look into this code to determine that it is over and over.
- use a more generic type, like 'int' or 'long', which is known
to be sufficient here but loses the documentation of referring
to timestamps
- use ktime_t everywhere, and convert into seconds in the few
places where we want realtime-seconds. The conversion is
sometimes expensive, but not more so than the conversion we
do today.
- use time64_t to clarify that this code is safe. Nothing would
change for 64-bit architectures, but it is slightly less
efficient on 32-bit architectures.
Without a clear winner of the three approaches above, this picks
the last one, favouring readability over a small performance
loss on 32-bit architectures.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2017-10-20 14:34:42 +00:00
|
|
|
struct unix_domain *udom, time64_t expiry)
|
2010-09-27 09:57:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2010-09-27 10:02:29 +00:00
|
|
|
struct sunrpc_net *sn;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
|
|
|
|
return __ip_map_update(sn->ip_map_cache, ipm, udom, expiry);
|
2010-09-27 09:57:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-04-11 11:13:28 +00:00
|
|
|
void svcauth_unix_purge(struct net *net)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2012-04-11 11:13:28 +00:00
|
|
|
struct sunrpc_net *sn;
|
2010-09-27 10:02:29 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-04-11 11:13:28 +00:00
|
|
|
sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
|
|
|
|
cache_purge(sn->ip_map_cache);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2008-12-23 21:30:12 +00:00
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(svcauth_unix_purge);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2006-10-04 09:15:50 +00:00
|
|
|
static inline struct ip_map *
|
2010-09-27 09:59:13 +00:00
|
|
|
ip_map_cached_get(struct svc_xprt *xprt)
|
2006-10-04 09:15:50 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2007-12-31 03:08:08 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ip_map *ipm = NULL;
|
2010-09-27 10:02:29 +00:00
|
|
|
struct sunrpc_net *sn;
|
2007-12-31 03:08:08 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (test_bit(XPT_CACHE_AUTH, &xprt->xpt_flags)) {
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&xprt->xpt_lock);
|
|
|
|
ipm = xprt->xpt_auth_cache;
|
|
|
|
if (ipm != NULL) {
|
2013-06-13 02:53:42 +00:00
|
|
|
sn = net_generic(xprt->xpt_net, sunrpc_net_id);
|
|
|
|
if (cache_is_expired(sn->ip_map_cache, &ipm->h)) {
|
2007-12-31 03:08:08 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The entry has been invalidated since it was
|
|
|
|
* remembered, e.g. by a second mount from the
|
|
|
|
* same IP address.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
xprt->xpt_auth_cache = NULL;
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&xprt->xpt_lock);
|
2010-09-27 10:02:29 +00:00
|
|
|
cache_put(&ipm->h, sn->ip_map_cache);
|
2007-12-31 03:08:08 +00:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cache_get(&ipm->h);
|
2006-10-04 09:15:50 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-31 03:08:08 +00:00
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&xprt->xpt_lock);
|
2006-10-04 09:15:50 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ipm;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static inline void
|
2010-09-27 09:59:13 +00:00
|
|
|
ip_map_cached_put(struct svc_xprt *xprt, struct ip_map *ipm)
|
2006-10-04 09:15:50 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2007-12-31 03:08:08 +00:00
|
|
|
if (test_bit(XPT_CACHE_AUTH, &xprt->xpt_flags)) {
|
|
|
|
spin_lock(&xprt->xpt_lock);
|
|
|
|
if (xprt->xpt_auth_cache == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
/* newly cached, keep the reference */
|
|
|
|
xprt->xpt_auth_cache = ipm;
|
|
|
|
ipm = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
spin_unlock(&xprt->xpt_lock);
|
2007-04-17 05:53:25 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2010-09-27 10:02:29 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ipm) {
|
|
|
|
struct sunrpc_net *sn;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sn = net_generic(xprt->xpt_net, sunrpc_net_id);
|
|
|
|
cache_put(&ipm->h, sn->ip_map_cache);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-10-04 09:15:50 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void
|
2010-09-27 09:58:42 +00:00
|
|
|
svcauth_unix_info_release(struct svc_xprt *xpt)
|
2006-10-04 09:15:50 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2010-09-27 09:58:42 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ip_map *ipm;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ipm = xpt->xpt_auth_cache;
|
2010-09-27 10:02:29 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ipm != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
struct sunrpc_net *sn;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sn = net_generic(xpt->xpt_net, sunrpc_net_id);
|
|
|
|
cache_put(&ipm->h, sn->ip_map_cache);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-10-04 09:15:50 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
/****************************************************************************
|
|
|
|
* auth.unix.gid cache
|
|
|
|
* simple cache to map a UID to a list of GIDs
|
2017-02-07 13:48:11 +00:00
|
|
|
* because AUTH_UNIX aka AUTH_SYS has a max of UNX_NGROUPS
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define GID_HASHBITS 8
|
|
|
|
#define GID_HASHMAX (1<<GID_HASHBITS)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct unix_gid {
|
|
|
|
struct cache_head h;
|
2013-02-02 00:31:17 +00:00
|
|
|
kuid_t uid;
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct group_info *gi;
|
2018-10-01 14:41:46 +00:00
|
|
|
struct rcu_head rcu;
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2013-02-02 09:57:30 +00:00
|
|
|
static int unix_gid_hash(kuid_t uid)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return hash_long(from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), GID_HASHBITS);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
static void unix_gid_put(struct kref *kref)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct cache_head *item = container_of(kref, struct cache_head, ref);
|
|
|
|
struct unix_gid *ug = container_of(item, struct unix_gid, h);
|
|
|
|
if (test_bit(CACHE_VALID, &item->flags) &&
|
|
|
|
!test_bit(CACHE_NEGATIVE, &item->flags))
|
|
|
|
put_group_info(ug->gi);
|
2018-10-01 14:41:46 +00:00
|
|
|
kfree_rcu(ug, rcu);
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int unix_gid_match(struct cache_head *corig, struct cache_head *cnew)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct unix_gid *orig = container_of(corig, struct unix_gid, h);
|
|
|
|
struct unix_gid *new = container_of(cnew, struct unix_gid, h);
|
2013-02-02 00:39:32 +00:00
|
|
|
return uid_eq(orig->uid, new->uid);
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void unix_gid_init(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *citem)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct unix_gid *new = container_of(cnew, struct unix_gid, h);
|
|
|
|
struct unix_gid *item = container_of(citem, struct unix_gid, h);
|
|
|
|
new->uid = item->uid;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void unix_gid_update(struct cache_head *cnew, struct cache_head *citem)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct unix_gid *new = container_of(cnew, struct unix_gid, h);
|
|
|
|
struct unix_gid *item = container_of(citem, struct unix_gid, h);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
get_group_info(item->gi);
|
|
|
|
new->gi = item->gi;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct cache_head *unix_gid_alloc(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct unix_gid *g = kmalloc(sizeof(*g), GFP_KERNEL);
|
|
|
|
if (g)
|
|
|
|
return &g->h;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-03-01 23:21:42 +00:00
|
|
|
static int unix_gid_upcall(struct cache_detail *cd, struct cache_head *h)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return sunrpc_cache_pipe_upcall_timeout(cd, h);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
static void unix_gid_request(struct cache_detail *cd,
|
|
|
|
struct cache_head *h,
|
|
|
|
char **bpp, int *blen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char tuid[20];
|
|
|
|
struct unix_gid *ug = container_of(h, struct unix_gid, h);
|
|
|
|
|
2013-02-02 10:49:44 +00:00
|
|
|
snprintf(tuid, 20, "%u", from_kuid(&init_user_ns, ug->uid));
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
qword_add(bpp, blen, tuid);
|
|
|
|
(*bpp)[-1] = '\n';
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-02-02 00:31:17 +00:00
|
|
|
static struct unix_gid *unix_gid_lookup(struct cache_detail *cd, kuid_t uid);
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int unix_gid_parse(struct cache_detail *cd,
|
|
|
|
char *mesg, int mlen)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* uid expiry Ngid gid0 gid1 ... gidN-1 */
|
2013-02-02 10:49:44 +00:00
|
|
|
int id;
|
|
|
|
kuid_t uid;
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
int gids;
|
|
|
|
int rv;
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
nfs: use time64_t internally
The timestamps for the cache are all in boottime seconds, so they
don't overflow 32-bit values, but the use of time_t is deprecated
because it generally does overflow when used with wall-clock time.
There are multiple possible ways of avoiding it:
- leave time_t, which is safe here, but forces others to
look into this code to determine that it is over and over.
- use a more generic type, like 'int' or 'long', which is known
to be sufficient here but loses the documentation of referring
to timestamps
- use ktime_t everywhere, and convert into seconds in the few
places where we want realtime-seconds. The conversion is
sometimes expensive, but not more so than the conversion we
do today.
- use time64_t to clarify that this code is safe. Nothing would
change for 64-bit architectures, but it is slightly less
efficient on 32-bit architectures.
Without a clear winner of the three approaches above, this picks
the last one, favouring readability over a small performance
loss on 32-bit architectures.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
2017-10-20 14:34:42 +00:00
|
|
|
time64_t expiry;
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct unix_gid ug, *ugp;
|
|
|
|
|
2012-01-20 07:48:18 +00:00
|
|
|
if (mesg[mlen - 1] != '\n')
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
mesg[mlen-1] = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-02-02 10:49:44 +00:00
|
|
|
rv = get_int(&mesg, &id);
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
if (rv)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2019-04-09 16:13:40 +00:00
|
|
|
uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), id);
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
ug.uid = uid;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
expiry = get_expiry(&mesg);
|
|
|
|
if (expiry == 0)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rv = get_int(&mesg, &gids);
|
|
|
|
if (rv || gids < 0 || gids > 8192)
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ug.gi = groups_alloc(gids);
|
|
|
|
if (!ug.gi)
|
|
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0 ; i < gids ; i++) {
|
|
|
|
int gid;
|
2011-11-14 23:56:38 +00:00
|
|
|
kgid_t kgid;
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
rv = get_int(&mesg, &gid);
|
|
|
|
err = -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
if (rv)
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
2019-04-09 16:13:40 +00:00
|
|
|
kgid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), gid);
|
2011-11-14 23:56:38 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!gid_valid(kgid))
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
cred: simpler, 1D supplementary groups
Current supplementary groups code can massively overallocate memory and
is implemented in a way so that access to individual gid is done via 2D
array.
If number of gids is <= 32, memory allocation is more or less tolerable
(140/148 bytes). But if it is not, code allocates full page (!)
regardless and, what's even more fun, doesn't reuse small 32-entry
array.
2D array means dependent shifts, loads and LEAs without possibility to
optimize them (gid is never known at compile time).
All of the above is unnecessary. Switch to the usual
trailing-zero-len-array scheme. Memory is allocated with
kmalloc/vmalloc() and only as much as needed. Accesses become simpler
(LEA 8(gi,idx,4) or even without displacement).
Maximum number of gids is 65536 which translates to 256KB+8 bytes. I
think kernel can handle such allocation.
On my usual desktop system with whole 9 (nine) aux groups, struct
group_info shrinks from 148 bytes to 44 bytes, yay!
Nice side effects:
- "gi->gid[i]" is shorter than "GROUP_AT(gi, i)", less typing,
- fix little mess in net/ipv4/ping.c
should have been using GROUP_AT macro but this point becomes moot,
- aux group allocation is persistent and should be accounted as such.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160817201927.GA2096@p183.telecom.by
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-10-08 00:03:12 +00:00
|
|
|
ug.gi->gid[i] = kgid;
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-12-14 23:33:12 +00:00
|
|
|
groups_sort(ug.gi);
|
2012-01-19 17:42:29 +00:00
|
|
|
ugp = unix_gid_lookup(cd, uid);
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ugp) {
|
|
|
|
struct cache_head *ch;
|
|
|
|
ug.h.flags = 0;
|
|
|
|
ug.h.expiry_time = expiry;
|
2012-01-19 17:42:29 +00:00
|
|
|
ch = sunrpc_cache_update(cd,
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
&ug.h, &ugp->h,
|
2013-02-02 09:57:30 +00:00
|
|
|
unix_gid_hash(uid));
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!ch)
|
|
|
|
err = -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
err = 0;
|
2012-01-19 17:42:29 +00:00
|
|
|
cache_put(ch, cd);
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
err = -ENOMEM;
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
|
|
if (ug.gi)
|
|
|
|
put_group_info(ug.gi);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int unix_gid_show(struct seq_file *m,
|
|
|
|
struct cache_detail *cd,
|
|
|
|
struct cache_head *h)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2019-04-09 16:13:40 +00:00
|
|
|
struct user_namespace *user_ns = m->file->f_cred->user_ns;
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct unix_gid *ug;
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
int glen;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (h == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
seq_puts(m, "#uid cnt: gids...\n");
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ug = container_of(h, struct unix_gid, h);
|
|
|
|
if (test_bit(CACHE_VALID, &h->flags) &&
|
|
|
|
!test_bit(CACHE_NEGATIVE, &h->flags))
|
|
|
|
glen = ug->gi->ngroups;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
glen = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2013-02-02 10:49:44 +00:00
|
|
|
seq_printf(m, "%u %d:", from_kuid_munged(user_ns, ug->uid), glen);
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < glen; i++)
|
cred: simpler, 1D supplementary groups
Current supplementary groups code can massively overallocate memory and
is implemented in a way so that access to individual gid is done via 2D
array.
If number of gids is <= 32, memory allocation is more or less tolerable
(140/148 bytes). But if it is not, code allocates full page (!)
regardless and, what's even more fun, doesn't reuse small 32-entry
array.
2D array means dependent shifts, loads and LEAs without possibility to
optimize them (gid is never known at compile time).
All of the above is unnecessary. Switch to the usual
trailing-zero-len-array scheme. Memory is allocated with
kmalloc/vmalloc() and only as much as needed. Accesses become simpler
(LEA 8(gi,idx,4) or even without displacement).
Maximum number of gids is 65536 which translates to 256KB+8 bytes. I
think kernel can handle such allocation.
On my usual desktop system with whole 9 (nine) aux groups, struct
group_info shrinks from 148 bytes to 44 bytes, yay!
Nice side effects:
- "gi->gid[i]" is shorter than "GROUP_AT(gi, i)", less typing,
- fix little mess in net/ipv4/ping.c
should have been using GROUP_AT macro but this point becomes moot,
- aux group allocation is persistent and should be accounted as such.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160817201927.GA2096@p183.telecom.by
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-10-08 00:03:12 +00:00
|
|
|
seq_printf(m, " %d", from_kgid_munged(user_ns, ug->gi->gid[i]));
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
seq_printf(m, "\n");
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-17 16:14:26 +00:00
|
|
|
static const struct cache_detail unix_gid_cache_template = {
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
|
|
.hash_size = GID_HASHMAX,
|
|
|
|
.name = "auth.unix.gid",
|
|
|
|
.cache_put = unix_gid_put,
|
2020-03-01 23:21:42 +00:00
|
|
|
.cache_upcall = unix_gid_upcall,
|
2013-02-04 11:02:45 +00:00
|
|
|
.cache_request = unix_gid_request,
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
.cache_parse = unix_gid_parse,
|
|
|
|
.cache_show = unix_gid_show,
|
|
|
|
.match = unix_gid_match,
|
|
|
|
.init = unix_gid_init,
|
|
|
|
.update = unix_gid_update,
|
|
|
|
.alloc = unix_gid_alloc,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2012-01-19 17:42:29 +00:00
|
|
|
int unix_gid_cache_create(struct net *net)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
|
|
|
|
struct cache_detail *cd;
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cd = cache_create_net(&unix_gid_cache_template, net);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(cd))
|
|
|
|
return PTR_ERR(cd);
|
|
|
|
err = cache_register_net(cd, net);
|
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
|
|
cache_destroy_net(cd, net);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sn->unix_gid_cache = cd;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void unix_gid_cache_destroy(struct net *net)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
|
|
|
|
struct cache_detail *cd = sn->unix_gid_cache;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sn->unix_gid_cache = NULL;
|
|
|
|
cache_purge(cd);
|
|
|
|
cache_unregister_net(cd, net);
|
|
|
|
cache_destroy_net(cd, net);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-02-02 00:31:17 +00:00
|
|
|
static struct unix_gid *unix_gid_lookup(struct cache_detail *cd, kuid_t uid)
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct unix_gid ug;
|
|
|
|
struct cache_head *ch;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ug.uid = uid;
|
2018-10-01 14:41:46 +00:00
|
|
|
ch = sunrpc_cache_lookup_rcu(cd, &ug.h, unix_gid_hash(uid));
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ch)
|
|
|
|
return container_of(ch, struct unix_gid, h);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-02-02 00:31:17 +00:00
|
|
|
static struct group_info *unix_gid_find(kuid_t uid, struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2009-10-20 22:51:34 +00:00
|
|
|
struct unix_gid *ug;
|
|
|
|
struct group_info *gi;
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
2012-01-19 17:42:29 +00:00
|
|
|
struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_net,
|
|
|
|
sunrpc_net_id);
|
2009-10-20 22:51:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-01-19 17:42:29 +00:00
|
|
|
ug = unix_gid_lookup(sn->unix_gid_cache, uid);
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!ug)
|
2009-10-20 22:51:34 +00:00
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
|
2012-01-19 17:42:29 +00:00
|
|
|
ret = cache_check(sn->unix_gid_cache, &ug->h, &rqstp->rq_chandle);
|
2009-10-20 22:51:34 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (ret) {
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
case -ENOENT:
|
2009-10-20 22:51:34 +00:00
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
|
2010-08-12 07:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
case -ETIMEDOUT:
|
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-ESHUTDOWN);
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
case 0:
|
2009-10-20 22:51:34 +00:00
|
|
|
gi = get_group_info(ug->gi);
|
2012-01-19 17:42:29 +00:00
|
|
|
cache_put(&ug->h, sn->unix_gid_cache);
|
2009-10-20 22:51:34 +00:00
|
|
|
return gi;
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
default:
|
2009-10-20 22:51:34 +00:00
|
|
|
return ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
|
2007-02-14 08:33:13 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
knfsd: nfsd: set rq_client to ip-address-determined-domain
We want it to be possible for users to restrict exports both by IP address and
by pseudoflavor. The pseudoflavor information has previously been passed
using special auth_domains stored in the rq_client field. After the preceding
patch that stored the pseudoflavor in rq_pflavor, that's now superfluous; so
now we use rq_client for the ip information, as auth_null and auth_unix do.
However, we keep around the special auth_domain in the rq_gssclient field for
backwards compatibility purposes, so we can still do upcalls using the old
"gss/pseudoflavor" auth_domain if upcalls using the unix domain to give us an
appropriate export. This allows us to continue supporting old mountd.
In fact, for this first patch, we always use the "gss/pseudoflavor"
auth_domain (and only it) if it is available; thus rq_client is ignored in the
auth_gss case, and this patch on its own makes no change in behavior; that
will be left to later patches.
Note on idmap: I'm almost tempted to just replace the auth_domain in the idmap
upcall by a dummy value--no version of idmapd has ever used it, and it's
unlikely anyone really wants to perform idmapping differently depending on the
where the client is (they may want to perform *credential* mapping
differently, but that's a different matter--the idmapper just handles id's
used in getattr and setattr). But I'm updating the idmapd code anyway, just
out of general backwards-compatibility paranoia.
Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-17 11:04:46 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
svcauth_unix_set_client(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2008-01-18 14:50:56 +00:00
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in *sin;
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6, sin6_storage;
|
2006-03-27 09:15:02 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ip_map *ipm;
|
2009-10-20 22:51:34 +00:00
|
|
|
struct group_info *gi;
|
|
|
|
struct svc_cred *cred = &rqstp->rq_cred;
|
2010-09-27 09:59:13 +00:00
|
|
|
struct svc_xprt *xprt = rqstp->rq_xprt;
|
2010-09-27 10:02:29 +00:00
|
|
|
struct net *net = xprt->xpt_net;
|
|
|
|
struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-18 14:50:56 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (rqstp->rq_addr.ss_family) {
|
|
|
|
case AF_INET:
|
|
|
|
sin = svc_addr_in(rqstp);
|
|
|
|
sin6 = &sin6_storage;
|
2009-10-07 20:58:25 +00:00
|
|
|
ipv6_addr_set_v4mapped(sin->sin_addr.s_addr, &sin6->sin6_addr);
|
2008-01-18 14:50:56 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case AF_INET6:
|
|
|
|
sin6 = svc_addr_in6(rqstp);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
BUG();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
rqstp->rq_client = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (rqstp->rq_proc == 0)
|
|
|
|
return SVC_OK;
|
|
|
|
|
2010-09-27 09:59:13 +00:00
|
|
|
ipm = ip_map_cached_get(xprt);
|
2006-10-04 09:15:50 +00:00
|
|
|
if (ipm == NULL)
|
2010-09-27 10:02:29 +00:00
|
|
|
ipm = __ip_map_lookup(sn->ip_map_cache, rqstp->rq_server->sv_program->pg_class,
|
2008-01-18 14:50:56 +00:00
|
|
|
&sin6->sin6_addr);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ipm == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return SVC_DENIED;
|
|
|
|
|
2010-09-27 10:02:29 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (cache_check(sn->ip_map_cache, &ipm->h, &rqstp->rq_chandle)) {
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
BUG();
|
2006-12-13 08:35:25 +00:00
|
|
|
case -ETIMEDOUT:
|
2010-08-12 07:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
return SVC_CLOSE;
|
|
|
|
case -EAGAIN:
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return SVC_DROP;
|
|
|
|
case -ENOENT:
|
|
|
|
return SVC_DENIED;
|
|
|
|
case 0:
|
|
|
|
rqstp->rq_client = &ipm->m_client->h;
|
2006-03-27 09:14:59 +00:00
|
|
|
kref_get(&rqstp->rq_client->ref);
|
2010-09-27 09:59:13 +00:00
|
|
|
ip_map_cached_put(xprt, ipm);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-10-20 22:51:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
gi = unix_gid_find(cred->cr_uid, rqstp);
|
|
|
|
switch (PTR_ERR(gi)) {
|
|
|
|
case -EAGAIN:
|
|
|
|
return SVC_DROP;
|
2010-08-12 07:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
case -ESHUTDOWN:
|
|
|
|
return SVC_CLOSE;
|
2009-10-20 22:51:34 +00:00
|
|
|
case -ENOENT:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
put_group_info(cred->cr_group_info);
|
|
|
|
cred->cr_group_info = gi;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return SVC_OK;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-12-23 21:30:12 +00:00
|
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(svcauth_unix_set_client);
|
knfsd: nfsd: set rq_client to ip-address-determined-domain
We want it to be possible for users to restrict exports both by IP address and
by pseudoflavor. The pseudoflavor information has previously been passed
using special auth_domains stored in the rq_client field. After the preceding
patch that stored the pseudoflavor in rq_pflavor, that's now superfluous; so
now we use rq_client for the ip information, as auth_null and auth_unix do.
However, we keep around the special auth_domain in the rq_gssclient field for
backwards compatibility purposes, so we can still do upcalls using the old
"gss/pseudoflavor" auth_domain if upcalls using the unix domain to give us an
appropriate export. This allows us to continue supporting old mountd.
In fact, for this first patch, we always use the "gss/pseudoflavor"
auth_domain (and only it) if it is available; thus rq_client is ignored in the
auth_gss case, and this patch on its own makes no change in behavior; that
will be left to later patches.
Note on idmap: I'm almost tempted to just replace the auth_domain in the idmap
upcall by a dummy value--no version of idmapd has ever used it, and it's
unlikely anyone really wants to perform idmapping differently depending on the
where the client is (they may want to perform *credential* mapping
differently, but that's a different matter--the idmapper just handles id's
used in getattr and setattr). But I'm updating the idmapd code anyway, just
out of general backwards-compatibility paranoia.
Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-17 11:04:46 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2006-09-27 05:29:38 +00:00
|
|
|
svcauth_null_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *authp)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct kvec *argv = &rqstp->rq_arg.head[0];
|
|
|
|
struct kvec *resv = &rqstp->rq_res.head[0];
|
|
|
|
struct svc_cred *cred = &rqstp->rq_cred;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (argv->iov_len < 3*4)
|
|
|
|
return SVC_GARBAGE;
|
|
|
|
|
2007-02-09 23:38:13 +00:00
|
|
|
if (svc_getu32(argv) != 0) {
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
dprintk("svc: bad null cred\n");
|
|
|
|
*authp = rpc_autherr_badcred;
|
|
|
|
return SVC_DENIED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-09-27 05:28:46 +00:00
|
|
|
if (svc_getu32(argv) != htonl(RPC_AUTH_NULL) || svc_getu32(argv) != 0) {
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
dprintk("svc: bad null verf\n");
|
|
|
|
*authp = rpc_autherr_badverf;
|
|
|
|
return SVC_DENIED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Signal that mapping to nobody uid/gid is required */
|
2013-02-01 23:55:38 +00:00
|
|
|
cred->cr_uid = INVALID_UID;
|
|
|
|
cred->cr_gid = INVALID_GID;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
cred->cr_group_info = groups_alloc(0);
|
|
|
|
if (cred->cr_group_info == NULL)
|
2010-08-12 07:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
return SVC_CLOSE; /* kmalloc failure - client must retry */
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Put NULL verifier */
|
2006-09-27 05:28:46 +00:00
|
|
|
svc_putnl(resv, RPC_AUTH_NULL);
|
|
|
|
svc_putnl(resv, 0);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-05-15 02:06:49 +00:00
|
|
|
rqstp->rq_cred.cr_flavor = RPC_AUTH_NULL;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return SVC_OK;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
svcauth_null_release(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (rqstp->rq_client)
|
|
|
|
auth_domain_put(rqstp->rq_client);
|
|
|
|
rqstp->rq_client = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info)
|
|
|
|
put_group_info(rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info);
|
|
|
|
rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0; /* don't drop */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct auth_ops svcauth_null = {
|
|
|
|
.name = "null",
|
|
|
|
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
|
|
.flavour = RPC_AUTH_NULL,
|
|
|
|
.accept = svcauth_null_accept,
|
|
|
|
.release = svcauth_null_release,
|
|
|
|
.set_client = svcauth_unix_set_client,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
2006-09-27 05:29:38 +00:00
|
|
|
svcauth_unix_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *authp)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct kvec *argv = &rqstp->rq_arg.head[0];
|
|
|
|
struct kvec *resv = &rqstp->rq_res.head[0];
|
|
|
|
struct svc_cred *cred = &rqstp->rq_cred;
|
2019-04-09 16:13:40 +00:00
|
|
|
struct user_namespace *userns;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
u32 slen, i;
|
|
|
|
int len = argv->iov_len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((len -= 3*4) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return SVC_GARBAGE;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
svc_getu32(argv); /* length */
|
|
|
|
svc_getu32(argv); /* time stamp */
|
2006-09-27 05:28:46 +00:00
|
|
|
slen = XDR_QUADLEN(svc_getnl(argv)); /* machname length */
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
if (slen > 64 || (len -= (slen + 3)*4) < 0)
|
|
|
|
goto badcred;
|
2006-09-27 05:29:38 +00:00
|
|
|
argv->iov_base = (void*)((__be32*)argv->iov_base + slen); /* skip machname */
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
argv->iov_len -= slen*4;
|
2013-05-24 21:24:34 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Note: we skip uid_valid()/gid_valid() checks here for
|
|
|
|
* backwards compatibility with clients that use -1 id's.
|
|
|
|
* Instead, -1 uid or gid is later mapped to the
|
|
|
|
* (export-specific) anonymous id by nfsd_setuser.
|
|
|
|
* Supplementary gid's will be left alone.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2019-04-09 16:13:40 +00:00
|
|
|
userns = (rqstp->rq_xprt && rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_cred) ?
|
|
|
|
rqstp->rq_xprt->xpt_cred->user_ns : &init_user_ns;
|
|
|
|
cred->cr_uid = make_kuid(userns, svc_getnl(argv)); /* uid */
|
|
|
|
cred->cr_gid = make_kgid(userns, svc_getnl(argv)); /* gid */
|
2006-09-27 05:28:46 +00:00
|
|
|
slen = svc_getnl(argv); /* gids length */
|
2017-02-07 13:48:11 +00:00
|
|
|
if (slen > UNX_NGROUPS || (len -= (slen + 2)*4) < 0)
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
goto badcred;
|
2009-10-20 22:51:34 +00:00
|
|
|
cred->cr_group_info = groups_alloc(slen);
|
|
|
|
if (cred->cr_group_info == NULL)
|
2010-08-12 07:04:07 +00:00
|
|
|
return SVC_CLOSE;
|
2011-11-14 23:56:38 +00:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < slen; i++) {
|
2019-04-09 16:13:40 +00:00
|
|
|
kgid_t kgid = make_kgid(userns, svc_getnl(argv));
|
cred: simpler, 1D supplementary groups
Current supplementary groups code can massively overallocate memory and
is implemented in a way so that access to individual gid is done via 2D
array.
If number of gids is <= 32, memory allocation is more or less tolerable
(140/148 bytes). But if it is not, code allocates full page (!)
regardless and, what's even more fun, doesn't reuse small 32-entry
array.
2D array means dependent shifts, loads and LEAs without possibility to
optimize them (gid is never known at compile time).
All of the above is unnecessary. Switch to the usual
trailing-zero-len-array scheme. Memory is allocated with
kmalloc/vmalloc() and only as much as needed. Accesses become simpler
(LEA 8(gi,idx,4) or even without displacement).
Maximum number of gids is 65536 which translates to 256KB+8 bytes. I
think kernel can handle such allocation.
On my usual desktop system with whole 9 (nine) aux groups, struct
group_info shrinks from 148 bytes to 44 bytes, yay!
Nice side effects:
- "gi->gid[i]" is shorter than "GROUP_AT(gi, i)", less typing,
- fix little mess in net/ipv4/ping.c
should have been using GROUP_AT macro but this point becomes moot,
- aux group allocation is persistent and should be accounted as such.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160817201927.GA2096@p183.telecom.by
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2016-10-08 00:03:12 +00:00
|
|
|
cred->cr_group_info->gid[i] = kgid;
|
2011-11-14 23:56:38 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-12-14 23:33:12 +00:00
|
|
|
groups_sort(cred->cr_group_info);
|
2006-09-27 05:28:46 +00:00
|
|
|
if (svc_getu32(argv) != htonl(RPC_AUTH_NULL) || svc_getu32(argv) != 0) {
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
*authp = rpc_autherr_badverf;
|
|
|
|
return SVC_DENIED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Put NULL verifier */
|
2006-09-27 05:28:46 +00:00
|
|
|
svc_putnl(resv, RPC_AUTH_NULL);
|
|
|
|
svc_putnl(resv, 0);
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-05-15 02:06:49 +00:00
|
|
|
rqstp->rq_cred.cr_flavor = RPC_AUTH_UNIX;
|
2005-04-16 22:20:36 +00:00
|
|
|
return SVC_OK;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
badcred:
|
|
|
|
*authp = rpc_autherr_badcred;
|
|
|
|
return SVC_DENIED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
svcauth_unix_release(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Verifier (such as it is) is already in place.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (rqstp->rq_client)
|
|
|
|
auth_domain_put(rqstp->rq_client);
|
|
|
|
rqstp->rq_client = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info)
|
|
|
|
put_group_info(rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info);
|
|
|
|
rqstp->rq_cred.cr_group_info = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct auth_ops svcauth_unix = {
|
|
|
|
.name = "unix",
|
|
|
|
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
|
|
.flavour = RPC_AUTH_UNIX,
|
|
|
|
.accept = svcauth_unix_accept,
|
|
|
|
.release = svcauth_unix_release,
|
|
|
|
.domain_release = svcauth_unix_domain_release,
|
|
|
|
.set_client = svcauth_unix_set_client,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-17 16:14:26 +00:00
|
|
|
static const struct cache_detail ip_map_cache_template = {
|
2012-01-19 17:42:45 +00:00
|
|
|
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
|
|
|
|
.hash_size = IP_HASHMAX,
|
|
|
|
.name = "auth.unix.ip",
|
|
|
|
.cache_put = ip_map_put,
|
2020-03-01 23:21:42 +00:00
|
|
|
.cache_upcall = ip_map_upcall,
|
2013-02-04 11:02:45 +00:00
|
|
|
.cache_request = ip_map_request,
|
2012-01-19 17:42:45 +00:00
|
|
|
.cache_parse = ip_map_parse,
|
|
|
|
.cache_show = ip_map_show,
|
|
|
|
.match = ip_map_match,
|
|
|
|
.init = ip_map_init,
|
|
|
|
.update = update,
|
|
|
|
.alloc = ip_map_alloc,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2010-09-27 10:02:29 +00:00
|
|
|
int ip_map_cache_create(struct net *net)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
|
2012-01-19 17:42:45 +00:00
|
|
|
struct cache_detail *cd;
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
2010-09-27 10:02:29 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-01-19 17:42:45 +00:00
|
|
|
cd = cache_create_net(&ip_map_cache_template, net);
|
|
|
|
if (IS_ERR(cd))
|
|
|
|
return PTR_ERR(cd);
|
2010-09-27 10:02:29 +00:00
|
|
|
err = cache_register_net(cd, net);
|
2012-01-19 17:42:45 +00:00
|
|
|
if (err) {
|
|
|
|
cache_destroy_net(cd, net);
|
|
|
|
return err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2010-09-27 10:02:29 +00:00
|
|
|
sn->ip_map_cache = cd;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void ip_map_cache_destroy(struct net *net)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2012-01-19 17:42:45 +00:00
|
|
|
struct sunrpc_net *sn = net_generic(net, sunrpc_net_id);
|
|
|
|
struct cache_detail *cd = sn->ip_map_cache;
|
2010-09-27 10:02:29 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2012-01-19 17:42:45 +00:00
|
|
|
sn->ip_map_cache = NULL;
|
|
|
|
cache_purge(cd);
|
|
|
|
cache_unregister_net(cd, net);
|
|
|
|
cache_destroy_net(cd, net);
|
2010-09-27 10:02:29 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|